(i) |
‘The follow up of the infantry must be immediate and aggressive,
employing the maximum of infantry strength available. The maximum
amount of infantry was not employed in this attack, nor was the attack
aggressively pushed. Too great reliance was placed on the ability of the
bombing to do the task alone’. (From report of Ground Commander.) The
first waves must follow close on the artillery barrage, leaving isolated
strongpoints and centres of resistance to mopping-up parties.
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(ii) |
Air bombardment alone cannot be expected to destroy strong defences
or determined resistance by infantry well dug in, especially in a fortified
town like
Cassino.
|
(iii) |
Debris and cratering hinder the use of tanks and generally delay the
attacker. Hence the tonnage of bombs to be dropped must be carefully
considered. The report of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force suggested
that such heavy attacks on fortified towns were better suited to defensive
operations as at Battipaglia in the
Salerno battle, than to the opening
blow of an offensive, as at
Cassino.
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(iv) |
The technique of street fighting needs continued emphasis in
infantry training.
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(v) |
Since close artillery support is not possible in attacking a heavily
defended town, mortar crews and tank-destroyer crews must follow the
assault closely.
|
(vi) |
In general, the delay in launching the operation clearly illustrated
the disadvantages of relying on air force action as an essential part of
an army plan in times of the year when the weather is unfavourable.
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(vii) |
The smooth co-ordination of air and artillery effort showed that
when the air force is placed in close support it should be regarded as part
of the fire-power available to the army commander.
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