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Royal Colonial Institute British Citizenship an Inquiry as to its Meaning
By E. B. Sargent
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Editor's Note.

EVERY schoolboy might be expected to know what is meant by British Citizenship. But the fact is that the answer to this seemingly elementary question is far from easy. In an interesting article which we publish this month Mr. E. B. Sargent points out how loosely the terms "British citizen" and "British subject" are used and interchanged even by the Empire's leading statesmen, and how unsatisfactory is the guidance of learned authorities in the matter. It would be easy to extend his selection of illustrations, and also to emphasise the practical importance of the question, by dipping into the mass of documents in which, for instance, the grievances of British Indians in South Africa or British Columbia have, from time to time, been set forth. Such phrases as the "rights of British citizenship," or the "rights of British subjects," or the "liberties" of one or other, are frequently used in protest against legislative or administrative action which the responsible parties uphold as perfectly legitimate. Those who argue, not without reason, that the first essential of Imperial thinking is to define the meanings of conventional terms, and to call things by their right names, might more usefully occupy themselves in elucidating the significance of "British citizen" and "British subject," than in seeking a substitute for "British Empire." What *are* the rights, privileges, liberties, or responsibilities of a British subject? Is a citizen the same as a subject? If not, what is the difference? And does "British" applied to citizen mean the same as "British" applied to subject? As Mr. Sargent reminds us, subject and citizen are terms inherited from ancient conditions of society widely dissimilar to those of to-day. Conventionally speaking, the instinct of democracy associates "citizen" with a right of voting, in regard to which there is little prospect of uniformity within the Empire; while the idea of Imperial unity postulates a certain status held in common by all "subjects" who are born or naturalised under the British flag. On that view, all citizens would be British subjects, but all subjects would not be citizens; and British citizens would mean citizens of Britain only, which seems unsatisfactory. In point of fact, a common status of British subject has not yet been established, though lately a strenuous effort has been made, by the machinery of the Imperial Conference, to rectify the anomalies whereby a British subject in one part of the Empire may be a foreigner in another. Simple as the problem seems at first sight, it is vastly complicated when statesmen come to deal with it, largely owing to differences of opinion in various parts of the Empire about the colour question, and the specification of undesirable immigrants. The records of the Imperial Conference, especially those of the last two sessions, certainly seem to show that the effort at improvement has been embarrassed by the absence of any definite understanding as to what constitutes the rights of a British subject within the Empire. In foreign countries a British subject, when he finds himself in danger or trouble, may realise with precision both the privileges and the limitations of his status; but not as a migrant within the Empire. It is to be hoped that some of those who have studied this most important question will follow up Mr. Sargent's observations.

British Citizenship.

WHAT do we mean by British Citizenship? My own observation leads me to believe that even the most practised speakers and writers use these words with quite different connotations.

I might not have been spurred to write upon this theme, had not the proceedings of the recent Imperial Conference shown that its members were no more in agreement than the rest of us as to what makes a British citizen. Anyone who takes up the Blue Book, and reads the report of the discussion on Naturalisation, will be convinced that some of His Majesty's Ministers ignored altogether any difference between a British subject and a British citizen, while others felt that the confusion of these terms would make it impossible to bring the discussion to a successful issue. The Minister who drew the most careful distinction between the subject and the citizen came from South Africa.

In explaining to the Conference the difficulties experienced by Canada as regards the present laws of naturalisation within the Empire, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said:

In Canada, where we receive annually at the present time some 100,000 American citizens, who generally take out letters of naturalisation as soon as it is possible for them to do so, we are in this condition: those

100,000 American citizens are British subjects in Canada, but if they come to Great Britain they are still American citizens. . . . I think this principle may be laid down as an object to be ultimately reached—a British subject anywhere, a British subject every where, . . . A measure ought to be adopted whereby it should be universal that if a man is made a British subject somewhere in the British Empire under authority delegated by this Parliament of Great Britain, then legislation to that effect should carry the power of naturalisation not only in the country in which naturalisation has been granted, but all over the British Empire, or, indeed, all over the world. In other words, *civis Britannicus* is *civis Britannicus* not only in the country of naturalisation, but everywhere.

P. 252, Cd. 5745.

All the difficulty lies in the last sentence. It might be understood to include the proposition that adult British subjects, women no less than men, coming to Canada from Australia, should have as full political rights in the former Dominion as in the latter. Moreover, the use of the Latin words suggests, though it does not affirm, the right of all British subjects as citizens, whether inhabitants of a self-governing Dominion or not, to move freely within the Empire. We cannot suppose that the then Canadian Prime Minister intended to convey these ideas to his colleagues, but that his words were open to a number of such constructions is clear from the statement of the South African point of view by Mr. Malan, in which he tries to guard against any possible confusion between the status of subject and the status of citizen.

Provided that it is clearly understood, and clearly expressed, that "British subject anywhere, British subject everywhere," means subject to the local laws which obtain as regards the right of British subjects, whether of citizenship or of admittance into a country we think that the principles as laid down by Sir Wilfrid Laurier are correct and sound ones.

P. 256, Cd. 5745.

Sir Joseph Ward's remark "that no reasonable objection could be offered so far as New Zealand is concerned, to the exercise of power by the Imperial Legislature in defining for the whole Empire the conditions of British citizenship"

P. 254, Cd. 5745.

was made before this speech of the South African Minister. On the contrary, Mr. Churchill was in possession of the views of all present when he used the same phrase in connection with the proposed general certificates of naturalisation:

Therefore I welcome with the greatest satisfaction the strong statements made by every one of the representatives of the Dominions present here today in favour of the desirability of securing a uniform and worldwide status of British citizenship which shall protect the holder of that certificate wherever he may be, whether he be within the British Empire or in foreign countries.

P. 256, Cd. 5745.

These are clearly no loose or hasty utterances. They show that in the highest conclave of our Empire, British citizenship had an essentially different meaning in the mouths of different speakers. My first suggestion, then, is that the Editor of *United Empire* should invite both past and present Ministers of the Crown, not only in the United Kingdom but also in the Dominions overseas (including the Crown Colonies and India), to define the term as carefully as may be, especially in connection with the relation between a British subject and a British citizen. The replies to this question might throw an unexpected light upon modern thought in regard to the political development of the Empire.

But uncertainty as to the use of the term does not end with statesmen. Writers upon political institutions are in no closer agreement than they as to the difference between a subject and a citizen. Let me first take two statements valuable for the comparison made between British citizenship and the citizenship of the Greek States and of Rome. Freeman, in his "Greater Greece and Greater Britain," says:

The Greek would have deemed himself degraded by the name of *subject*. To him the word that best translates it expressed the position of men who, either in their own persons or in the persons of the cities to which they belonged, were shorn of the common rights of every city, of every citizen. We use the word "subject" daily without any feeling of being lowered by it.

P. 23, edn, 1886.

Gibbon, in "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," commenting on the laws which were finally superseded in the reign of Justinian, remarks:

But in the eye of the law, all Roman citizens were equal, and all subjects of the Empire were citizens of Rome. That inestimable character was degraded to an obsolete and empty name. The voice of a Roman could no longer enact his laws, or create the annual ministers of his power.

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In connection with both these quotations, it should be observed that we have to take account of an element in the population lower than the subject, namely, the slave. With the abolition of slavery, the relations of the

citizen to the subject could not but acquire new values, though I do not here propose to say anything about this side of the question, But now let me refer to a work dealing with more modern aspects of political government, namely, Bluntschli's "Theory of the State."

Full citizenship (*Vollbereditsung*) implies membership in the nation, but more than that, it implies complete political rights; it is thus the fullest expression of the relation of the individual to the State. . . . Women and minors are excluded.

P. 217, 3rd edn. (English Translation.)

If by British citizenship we mean this full citizenship, ignoring such compound terms as citizen-elect and citizen-subject, then not only would women and minors be excluded, but also every British subject with electoral rights in the oversea Dominions, since as a colonial citizen he may not join in the making of laws inconsistent with any Act of the British Parliament,

P. 191, *Hogan's Government of the United Kingdom*. 1910.

We should thus have to speak in a descending scale, first of parliamentary electors within the United Kingdom as alone possessed of British citizenship, then of those in the self-governing Dominions overseas as Canadian citizens, Australian citizens, etc. Next would follow various classes of Crown colonists, distinguished as citizens of Jamaica, etc., then a group of British Indian citizens (since the word "citizenship" is used in the Indian Proclamation of the late King-Emperor), and, lastly, women electors, who would be merely citizens of London, Montreal, etc., unless they were domiciled in Australia or New Zealand, when they would rise in the foregoing scale. Finally would come the class of unenfranchised (and disfranchised) persons and minors, who, if not aliens, would, like all the classes already mentioned, be British subjects. Such would be the result of not recognising that British citizenship is multiform in character. On the other hand, if we agree to include more than one status of citizen in our definition of the term, at what point are we to stop?

I should like to be able to quote from Thorold Rogers' "British Citizen." But while with admirable skill he traces the citizen historically, he avoids any definition of the term at any period in the development of our institutions. He does, however, say that although there is no date assignable to the liberties and self-government of London, it was probably a municipality from Roman days, and that it had never lost the form which it then had.

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If this be true, one element in British citizenship is directly connected with the political institutions of the greatest Empire which preceded our own. Upon the whole, it would, I think, be fair to quote Rogers as associating citizenship with electoral rights, though not to the exclusion of other privileges and duties.

Dicey, in his "Laws of the Constitution," lay a especial stress upon those other attributes of citizenship, when he speaks of personal freedom and of freedom of discussion and public meeting as "in fact the chief advantages which citizens hope to gain by the change from a despotic to a constitutional form of government."

P. 280, edn. 1908.

If it were necessary at this stage to range the author upon one side or the other, I should enter him as opposed to any distinction, between the citizen and the subject, But he is able to speak for himself, and I trust that he may be induced to state his own views on the subject.

It would be possible to give extracts from several minor works upon citizenship, written in the last few years, which do not hesitate to define the citizen, either simply as a member or subject of a State or more precisely as a subject of a State as distinguished from a resident who is an alien. I might also give quotations (many of them conflicting) from various encyclopædias and dictionaries, but these, or some of them, are doubtless ready to the hand of most of your readers. The new edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," however, directs the inquirer to two articles by Salmond on "Citizenship and Allegiance" in the [*unclear*: Law] *Quarterly Review*.

July 1901 and January 1902.

These cannot lightly be dismissed. The author finds the origins of citizenship and of subjectship or subjecthood—whichever term we prefer to employ to mark the status of a subject—the one in Roman, the other in [*unclear*: feudal] conceptions. He points out that under feudalism place of birth was substituted for descent as the chief title of state-membership. But it is clear that, in his view, "subject" and "citizen" are now used in current speech as interchangeable words:

This use of "subject," as the modern equivalent of "citizen," is awkward because in a wider, earlier, and still permissible sense, "subject" includes any person *subject* to the power and jurisdiction of the State, and therefore a resident alien no less than a subject in the narrower sense. A subject who is a citizen may be distinguished when distinction is necessary as a *natural subject*. One who is not a citizen may be termed an *alien subject*,

One of the chief obstacles to ascertaining the views of writers from their works is that many of them deal with forms of government rather than with citizenship itself. They are experts in political institutions, but they do not give the same-careful consideration to the individual subject and the realities of citizenship The

framework is all. In a mere account of institutions, how much there is to admire in the arrangement for a double citizenship, Roman and provincial, which in the later Empire was designed to embrace the free population of the civilised world within a corporate whole. Yet Dill, in his "Roman Society in the [unclear: Las] Century of the Western Empire," shows, with a few quiet touches, how the unhappy citizens of provincial towns sought escape from their onerous burdens and unreal privileges by taking refuge in the hermitage or hiding themselves among charcoal-burners and serfs.

Book III., chap. ii.

In the same way, the problems of our own Empire, looked at from the [unclear: point] of view of the individual citizen, acquire fresh significance. Numbers, as [unclear: well] as political power begin to tell. We are reminded that our Indian fellow subjects, with their exiguous citizenship, form a large majority of all British subjects, and that in South Africa it is the exception for a British subject to be so descended as to be able to claim electoral privileges. We note the different status of women subjects as they pass from one part of the self-governing Dominions to another. We realise that the same man is an elector in various capacities in the same territory, and that his citizenship is a complex whole subject to internal strains.

I shall fail in my object if this inquiry be treated as a plea for one among the various meanings which have been attached to British citizenship. It is a many sided discussion of the question that is my desire. Is British citizenship to be regarded as progressive in character and multiform, or is only the full political status in the British Isles intended thereby? If progressive, can we extend the term to adult males among the Basutos, for example, whose political institutions are quite rudimentary, but who are all equally citizens or no citizens? Are the Maoris with an inferior political status to British subjects of an European descent within the the same Dominion, or women in England with the municipal franchise only, properly within the pale of British citizenship? Upon the special problems 'which arise within the Union of South Africa I will not enlarge, lest it should be thought that my intention is to compile a formidable examination paper. On the contrary, I hope to elicit the broad views of those who have already been led to think and speak upon matters of citizenship, and not to narrow the discussion to any special issues.

E. B. SARGANT.

Local Bodies' Statutory Liabilities

Reprinted from the "Commonwealth Law Review."

By Sir Robert Stout, K.C.M.G.,

Chief Justice of New Zealand.

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Local Bodies' Statutory Liabilities.

BY SIR ROBERT STOUT, K.C.M.G.

(From The Commonwealth Law Review.)

WHAT the liability of local bodies in charge of roads for non-repair of such roads may be has led to much diverse judicial opinion. The question now is whether the many recent decisions have finally determined what the law is.

The first case always cited is *Russell v. The Men of Devon* (2 T.R. 667) decided in 1788. That was an action on the case. The plaintiff sued "the men dwelling in the county of Devon" to recover satisfaction for an injury done to the waggon of the plaintiffs in consequence of a bridge being out of repair which ought to have been repaired by the countv. The matter came before the Court on a demurrer to the declaration. There were two main grounds of objection to the relevancy of the action (1) that the defendants were not a corporation and that the defendants varied from day to day and a suit against them was therefore impossible, and (2) on the wider ground "that no individual could maintain an action against the defendants for any neglect to repair a road that ought to be repaired by the public." In the judgment the main reliance for allowing the demurrer was on the first ground. Lord Kenyon said, "Many of the principles laid down by the plaintiff's counsel cannot be controverted; as that an action would lie by an individual for an injury which he has sustained against any other individual who is bound to repair. But the question here is, whether this body of men who are sued in the present action are a corporation, or qua a corporation against whom such an action can be maintained. If it be reasonable that they should be by law liable to such an action, recourse must be had to the Legislature for that purpose."

It is true Lord Kenyon refers to the passage quoted by defendants' counsel from Brookes' Abridgement, namely, "Accion sur le case," s. 93: "Coen chemin est irrepayer issint q ieo mire mon cheval ieo naûa ace vs cesty q doit reparer ceo car est popul et serra reforme p præstmt qd nota p. Heydone et 6," saying: "Therefore I think that this experiment ought not to be encouraged; there is no law or reason for supporting the action; and there is a precedent against in Brooke; though even without that authority I should be of opinion that this action

cannot be maintained." Mr. Justice Ashurst also referred to Brookes, saying, "This case stands in principle; but I think the case cited from Brookes' Abridgement is a direct authority to show that no such action could be maintained; and the reason of that case is a good one, namely, because the action must be brought against the public."

The law rested here so far as suing the inhabitants as a whole is concerned. The creation of corporations and of companies, rare before the nineteenth century, increased in that century by leaps and bounds. Local authorities were created. At first the incorporation was not complete. Surveyors of highways who could be sued were appointed, and they stood in relation to the public as quasi-corporations, just as at first public companies and banks had their "public officers," who could sue or be sued on behalf of the bank or company; and the question then arose, seeing that the difficulty of suing an ever-changing body like "the inhabitants" of a county had been got rid of, had a person injured a right of action against the surveyor.

In asking the Courts to so rule there was a principle of law involved which was affirmed in the *Mayor, etc., of Lyme Regis v. Henley* ([1834] 2 C1. and Fin. 331). In that case the Mayor and Burgesses of Lyme Regis had been granted by letters patent from the King a remission of ancient rent payable to the King, and he willed that the Mayor and Burgesses and their successors should at their own cost thenceforth for ever repair, maintain, and support all and singular the buildings, banks, sea-shores, etc., and the pier, etc., at their own costs and charges. The sea-walls were allowed to fall into disrepair, the plaintiff (Henley's) messuages were injured by the invasion of the sea, and the question was, "Were the Mayor and Burgesses liable in damages to the plaintiff?" The case was referred by the House of Lords to the Judges, and Mr. Justice Park delivered the unanimous opinion of the Judges that the defendants were liable, and the House of Lords concurred. The grounds of the decision were (1) that the Charter did cast on the defendants the burden of repairing the sea-walls, etc., and the corporation having accepted the benefits conferred by the Charter must bear the burden conferred by the Charter; (2) that the duty was a public duty for which an indictment would lie; (3) that an action would lie. The ground for thus holding was that if the liability arose by prescription both an indictment and an action would lie, citing *The Mayor, etc., of Lynn v. Turner* (Cowp. 86); *Churchman v. Pienstal Show* (225 Corth. 199); *Paine v. Partridge* (Narda. 162). 'The opinion says that' it is clear and undoubted law that wherever an indictment lies for non-repair, an action on the case will lie at the suit of a party sustaining any peculiar damage. Now we are unable to see any sound distinction between a liability by prescription [*unclear*: but locally]

One case cited in cases on the liability of corporations to repair is *Couch v. Steel* ([1854] 2 Ell. and Bl. 402), though the decision has been questioned in *Atkinson v. The Newcastle Waterworks Co.* (L.R. 2 Ex. 441) and doubted in *Cowley v. New Market Local Board* ([1892] A.C. 345), and cannot now, therefore, be considered as a proper declaration of the law. In that case, as the Shipping Act (7 and 8 Vict. c. 112, s. 18) provided that a ship-owner must have proper medicine on board, a sailor who suffered injury through the non-supply of medicine was held entitled to recover damages. There was another principle involved, namely, the statute provided a penalty if the ship-owner committed a breach of the statute, but it was held that that did not prevent an action for the peculiar damage sustained. The principle of the common law relied on was said to be stated in Comyn's Digest and Coke's Institutes. It is laid down in the Digest as follows (see "Action upon Statute F.")—"If a statute provide a remedy for the party grieved, though it did not give any express penalty or forfeiture, he may have an action upon the statute." It is also stated in the Digest—"So in every case where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to law." The Digest quotes Cap. L Statute Westminster the Second "Super vero statutis in defectum legis et ad remedia editis, ne dimittus querentes cum ad curiam regis venerint recedant de remedio desperati, habeant brevia in suo casu provisiva," etc.

"Moreover concerning the statutes where the law faileth, and for remedies, lest suitors coming to the King's Court should depart from thence without remedy, they shall have writs provided in their cases," etc.

Another case relied on to show that a liability rests on the local body charged with repair of a public work to compensate one who sustains particular damage through a breach of the statutory duty is *Hartnell v. The Ryde Commissioners* ([1863] 4 B. and S. 361).

The validity of this decision has, however, been questioned by Lords Halsbury and Herschell in *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board*. In that case by the Ryde Improvement Act which incorporated the Towns Improvement Act 1847, the Ryde Commissioners were empowered to levy rates and to repair the highways of which the management was vested in them. They were liable to indictment if they neglected to repair, in the same manner as the inhabitants of a parish were liable. It was held by Crompton and Blackburn JJ., that they were liable for damages sustained by a person through the non-repair of a street. It was said by Lords Halsbury and Herschell that the Judges relied upon a particular statute. This is true, but if the statutory references are considered it will be seen that there is no hint in the statute that the Commissioners were to be liable to actions.

All that was said was that they were liable to repair and to be indicted for non-repair, and it was on this account that they were held liable. Mr. Justice Crompton said, "Under the Towns Improvement Act 1847, s. 49, the Commissioners were guilty of a misdemeanor in refusing or neglecting to repair; *and being so*, if a private person suffers special damage from the repairs not having been done, they are within the general rule of law, and unless they can discharge themselves they are liable to an action." Blackburn, J., was of the same opinion.

It will be necessary now to consider the two classes of cases in which the local body or local authorities have not been held liable. The first class to which reference may be made is where the statute imposes a liability and also a penalty for the breach. In such a case it has been held that the statute by providing for a penalty has (contrary to the decision in *Couch v. Steel*) inferentially deprived a person of damages for an injury he has personally sustained.

One leading case is *Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Company* ([1877] L.R. 2 Ex. 441). The defendant company as an undertaker of waterworks under The Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 was bound by statute (1) to fix and maintain fire-plugs (2) to keep their pipes to which fire-plugs were fixed at all times charged with water at a certain pressure, and to allow all persons at all times to use the same for extinguishing fires without compensation. A penalty of £10 was recoverable summarily (half the penalty to go to the informer) for neglect of either of these duties. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover, though he averred in his declaration the fire-plugs were not charged with water, and that in consequence thereof he could not obtain a proper supply of water to extinguish the fire on his premises, and his timber-yard and sawmills were in consequence burned down. The judgment was that of Lord Cairns, Chief Justice Cockburn, and Lord Justice Brett. Lord Cairns stated that the Act created a statutory duty, but it did not follow that the breach implied an unknown liability as to damages. He said, "In the one case the undertakers would know beforehand what they had to meet as the consequence of their neglect. They would come under definite penalties. In the other they would virtually become gratuitous insurers of safety from fire so far as water is capable of producing that safety, of all the houses in the district, over which their powers were to extend." He also pointed out that in certain cases the penalty was to go to those injured, for example, if there is no supply for domestic purposes, the penalty was 40s. a day, to go to the householder deprived of his supply, and he asked, "Why is it that in some cases there is a penalty which is to go into the pocket of the person injured, and not in the case of neglecting to keep the pipes fixed to the fireplugs charged under the proper pressure?" The other Judges adopted this reasoning. It will be noticed, therefore, that this case does not necessarily conflict with *Couch v. Steel*, for in the statute construed there were provisions which might well be held to negative the implication that a private remedy was left open to the person injured. Chief Justice Cockburn put it the other way, saying, "that the particular Act does not by implication give a person who may be injured by the breach of the duties thereby imposed, any remedy over and above those which it gives in express terms."

As to the liability of surveyors the case of *McKinnon v. Penson* ([1853] 8 Ex. 319; [1854] 9 Ex. 609) decided that a surveyor was not liable to an action for damages by a person who has been injured by the non-repair of a bridge on a highway. The bridge became ruinous, and the plaintiff's servant, driving across the bridge was precipitated with his carriage into the water. It was held in the Court of Exchequer and afterwards in the Exchequer Chamber that no action lay. Chief Baron Pollock said, in delivering the judgment of the Court, "We think it clear on the full consideration of that case (*Russell v. The Men of Devon*) that the only reason why the action would not lie was because the inhabitants of the county were not a corporation and could not be sued." It will be observed that he does not ground the decision on the passage from Brookes' Abridgement. The Exchequer does not refer to Brookes in its judgment, and practically bases its judgment on the principle that the statute did not expressly give a remedy, and one could not be inferred, though Baron Alderson during the argument quoted the passage from Brooke applicable to the case. In *Young v. Davis* (2 H. & C. 197) the same question was raised, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber held without calling on the defendants to argue that the plaintiff was without a remedy, and said, *inter alia*, "To read the Act as creating a duty on the surveyor to a class more extensive than the parish which employs him, would introduce an anomaly not at all within the general scope of the Act, namely a new liability to action imposed on a servant for a mere neglect of his employer's duty, in respect of which, moreover, such employer in this particular mode of proceeding, is irresponsible."

The Court of Queen's Bench in *Gibson v. The Mayor of Preston* ([1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 218) had to consider whether under *The Public Health Act* 1848 [11 and 12 Victoria cap. 63] there was not a right of action given to a person injured through the neglect of the local body charged with the repair of the highways. A similar question had been raised as to the liability of the vestry under the *Metropolis Local Act*, 18 and 19 Victoria cap. 120. In *Parsons v. St. Matthews Bethnal Green* (L.R. 3 Common Pleas 56) the Court of Common Pleas held that though the duties and liabilities of surveyors of highways had been transferred to the Vestry, it did not appear from the statute—there was no mention of it—that the duties and liabilities of the parish had been transferred, and consequently the Vestry could not be sued for non-feasance. The Court of Queen's Bench

followed the Court of Common Pleas and decided against the plaintiff and said, "It is incumbent on a plaintiff who seeks to establish that such a right is exceptionally given, to persons sustaining an injury in a particular district, to show distinctly that the Legislature had such an intention in passing the enactment to which such an effect is attributed."

White v. The Hindley Local Board ([1875] L.R. 10 Q.B. 219) did not invade the principle of the cases just cited. The plaintiff was injured by a grid or grating in a sewer being in a defective state, and it was held that the local board as the corporation in which the sewers were vested was liable. Mr. Justice Blackburn said, "Mr. Baylis is justified I think in saying that the local board so far as they are surveyors of the highway are not liable for the non-repair of the grid, because the inhabitants are the persons liable for the non-repair of the highway, *and the local board are not substituted for the inhabitants, but are only made surveyors of highways.*" The part I italicise is worthy of notice. It shows the ground on which Mr. Justice Blackburn conceived that the cases of *Gibson v. The Mayor of Preston* and *Parsons v. St. Matthews Bethnal Green* were based. The fact the local body was proprietor of the sewer made them liable. Suppose they had been as they are in New Zealand municipalities proprietors of the streets, would they be liable? Baron Martin said in *Young v. Davis* ([1862] 312 J. Ex. 250 at 254), "No case has been brought before us where an action has been held to be maintainable against a person bound to repair a road *ratione tenurce*" Very different language is used by the Privy Council in the case I shall next refer to. One case that has given rise to much controversy and seemed to lay down a new rule was the case of the *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson* ([1879] 4 App. Cas. 256). The Municipality of Bathurst had in accordance with s. 117 of The Municipalities Act of New South Wales, "the care, construction and management of public roads." There was no direct statutory provision declaring that the municipality must repair the roads. There was, however, a power to repair, and for the municipality to enter upon private lands and take material for repair. Their Lordships of the Privy Council decided that a person injured through a barrel drain in a public road having fallen into disrepair was entitled to sue the municipality for damages. The grounds of the decision were (1) That the municipality had the care, construction and management of the roads and streets, the construction of the barrel drain was within the powers of the municipality and that they had power to repair it. "Their lordships are of opinion that under these circumstances a duty was cast upon them to keep the artificial work which they had created in such a state as to prevent its causing danger to passengers on the highway, which but for such artificial construction would not have existed, or at least to protect the public when it arose by filling up the hole or fencing it." (2) After quoting *White v. Hindley Local Board* their lordships said, "In this case the barrel drain, even if the property of it did not belong to the appellants, was not only made by the appellants, but the sole control and management of it, were by statute vested in them, and in their lordships' view these circumstances threw upon them a duty of a similar kind to that which was held to exist in the case just cited." They held that a person being injured an action lay, quoting *Henley v. The Mayor and Burgesses of Lyme Regis*. They quoted Lord Tenterden's decision in the Court of Queen's Bench in error (3 Barn, and Ad., pp. 77, 92 and 23) as follows:—

"We think the obligation to repair banks and sea-shores is one which concerns the public in consequence of which an indictment might have been obtained against the plaintiff in error [that is the corporation defendants] for their general default *from whence it follows that an action on the case will lie against them either for a direct and particular damage sustained by an individual as in the ordinary case of a nuisance in a highway by a stranger digging a trench, etc., or by the act or default of a person bound to repair ratione tenures.* An indictment may be sustained for a general injury to the public, and an action on the case for a special and particular injury to an individual." By adopting the language of this judgment as opposite to the non-repair of a drain in a road there is no doubt that their lordships placed the responsibility of a local body in charge of the roads higher than it had hitherto been placed, and since that decision there have been many decisions that require consideration. They are—*Blackmore v. Vestry of Mile End Old Town* ([1882] 9 Q.B.D. 451); *Kent v. Worthing Local Board* ([1883] 10 Q.B.D. 118); commented on in *Moore v. Lambeth Waterworks Company* ([1886] Q.B.D. 162); *Cowley v. Newmarket Local Board* ([1892] App. Cas. 345); *Municipality of Picton v. Geldert* ([1893] App. Cas. 524); *Thompson v. Mayor of Brighton* and *Oliver v. Horsham Local Board* ([1894] 1 Q.B. 332); *Municipality of Sydney v. Bourke* ([1895] App. Cas. 433); *Maguire v. Corporation of Liverpool* ([1905] 1 King's Bench 767).

Kent v. Worthing Local Board practically followed the *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*. The local authority had the waterworks and highways under their control. Through the wearing away of a highway the cover of a valve projected above the highway and caused an accident. It was held that the local authority was liable as the local authority had charge of both the highways and the waterworks. In the case of *Moore v. Lambeth Waterworks Company* the company had not the charge of the highway, and it was the non-repair of the highway that made the top of the company's fire-plug dangerous, and that led to the accident. It was held that the company was not liable. *Kent v. Worthing Local Board* might, it was said, be upheld, because it was a double authority. In *Blackmore v. Vestry of Mile End. Old Town* the Vestry was held liable for an injury

resulting from the cover of a water-meter having been worn smooth, the Vestry being in charge of both the waterworks and the road. The House of Lords in *Cowley v. Newmarket Local Board* had brought before it the Privy Council's decision in *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*, though it is not referred to in the judgment. The facts of the case were that a highway was vested in the local board by virtue of The Public Health Act of 1875. The Act provides that a local authority shall have and be subject to all the powers, duties and liabilities of surveyors of highways, and shall from time to time level, alter and repair the highways vested in them. An owner of land adjoining the highway making an approach to his land without the sanction or authority of the local board, made a drop in the level of the highway, and left it in a dangerous condition. The appellant walking along the highway fell down the drop and was injured. It was held that the board was not liable. Lord Halsbury held that if there were no defect in the construction the defendant board was not liable for non-feasance. He relied on the passage already quoted from Brooke's Abridgement, citing *Russell v. The Men of Devon*. He quoted *McKinnon v. Penson* with approval, and questioned *Hartnell v. The Ryde Commissioners*. He said that the non-liability of local bodies for non-feasance in managing roads had been maintained for certainly more than a century. Lord Herschell and Lord Hannen agreed that there was no liability. Lord Herschell stated that the purview of the statute must be looked at before the Court could assume that a breach of the statute causing damage to a particular person would give a right of action. This case did not necessarily conflict with the *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*. There were two important points of difference—first, that the local body had only the liability of surveyors of highways, and the Courts had decided before The Public Health Act of 1875 was passed that such a liability did not include a liability for non-feasance; and second, the injury done to the highway had been done by a stranger, and the only charge that could therefore be made against the local body was the non-repair of the highway, not a defect in an original work of the local body. In 1893 the question again came before the Privy Council in the *Municipality of Picton v. Geldert*.

In this case a bridge had been erected over a county road. The approach to the bridge had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The result was that the plaintiff was injured. The question was whether the statute by which the powers and duties of the defendants were regulated imposed upon them a liability to repair and made them liable in damages for mere non-feasance at the suit of a private person. The Common Law of England was in force in Nova Scotia before any statute was passed in reference to roads. The Privy Council said that after *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board* "it must now be taken as settled law that a transfer to a public corporation of the obligation to repair does not of itself render such corporation liable to an action in respect of mere nonfeasance. In order to establish such liability it must be shown that the Legislature has used language indicating an intention that this liability should be imposed. Their Lordships quoted their own decision in the case of *The Sanitary Commissioners of Gibraltar v. Orfila* (15 App. Cas. 411), where it was said in the case of mere nonfeasance no claim for reparation will lie except at the instance of a person who can show that the statute or ordinance under which they acted imposed on the Commissioners a duty which they neglected or failed to perform. It will be noticed from reading the judgment in this case that the law of Nova Scotia was similar to the law of England. The Act in force, passed in 1761 in Nova Scotia, provided that two surveyors of highways were to be elected for each town in the county, and the duties of the surveyors were to enforce and regulate the labour which the inhabitants were bound to supply for the maintainance and repair of highways and bridges. The Council then considered the Act of 1897, under which the action was brought. It is called "The County Incorporation Act," and their Lordships pointed out that the liability to maintain roads and bridges lay upon the inhabitants, and this liability was preserved by The County Incorporations Act. As to the Bathurst case, their Lordships said that the governing fact in that case is that the conduct complained of was not in the view of the Committee non-feasance, but mis-feasance, and they put the ground of the decision thus:—"The ground of the decision was that the municipality having under the powers conferred upon them, constructed a drain, which unless kept in proper condition would cause a nuisance to the highway, were bound to keep this artificial work in such a condition that no nuisance would be caused, and that if owing to their failure to do this the highway subsided and the nuisance was created, they were as much liable for mis-feasance as if they had by their direct act made the hole in the road which constituted the nuisance to the highway. "The case, therefore," they continued, "differs from that before their Lordships where the only charge that could be made against the defendants was that they failed to repair the approach to the bridge."

This same question came before the Court of Appeal in England in *Thompson v. The Mayor of Brighton*, and *Oliver v. The Horsham Local Board* ([1894] 1 Q.B. 332). In both these cases the charge was against urban authorities under the Public Health Act. They had placed a man-hole in one of the sewers. The cover of the manhole was in the highway. It had been properly made, and was in good repair, but the road had been allowed to wear away, so that the cover projected over the surface of the road. It was held that the only breach of duty was the omission to repair the highway, and that no action would lie, and *Kent v. The Worthington Local Board* was overruled. Lord Lindley said: The House of Lords in *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board* affirmed *Gibson v. The Mayor of Preston*, and declined to apply the principles laid down in *Couch v. Steel* and acted

upon in *Hartnell v. The Ryde Commissioners* to local authorities governed by The Health Act, 1875. He also said, "The law on this subject is in my opinion very unsatisfactory, but I cannot on that account declare it to be different from what it is." The question was again before the Privy Council in 1895, in *The Municipal Council of Sydnj v. Bourke*, on appeal. The allegation was that the municipal council had allowed Kent Street to fall into disrepair, whereby the plaintiff's husband was thrown from a van whilst driving, and died from the injuries received. Their Lordships considered the case first apart from the authority of the *Bathurst Case*. The Privy Council held that the statute relating to the maintenance of highways was empowering only, and did not create a duty. In this case the highways were vested in the council and that argument as to that liability was met in this way. The judgment said, "It is asserted that because all public ways are vested in the council, it is bound to keep them in good repair, and is liable to anyone injured by their non-repair. That is said to be established by the case of *The Borough of Bathurst v. McPherson*. Considered apart from authority it is difficult to see on what this contention rests. Before the '43 Act was passed the existing ways were vested in someone whether it were the owner of the soil over which they had been made or some other body or person. It seems clear that such persons were not merely on that account bound to keep them in repair. How then can the transfer of these ways to the council or the vesting of them in it create such an obligation?"

They dealt with the *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*, and they said the *ratio decidendi* was that the defendants had caused a nuisance in the highway. It was entirely open to question whether there was an obligation to keep the highway in repair or whether any person injured by the breach of such a duty could maintain an action. The case was treated as one of mere non-feasance and indeed it was not so. The defendants had created a nuisance, having made a drain, and failed to keep it in such a condition that the road would not fall into it, they were just as much liable as if they made an excavation without constructing the drain, and the road had consequently subsided and become foundrous. They also said "that the decision did not in any way depend on the question whether the defendants were liable to an action in respect of non-repair of the highway which is the only question in the present case." They also said, "that there was no doubt that certain *dicta* to be found in the course of the judgment in the case under discussion were somewhat broader than was necessary for its decision," and referring to the decisions of the series of cases ending with *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board*, in which it has been held that an action would not lie for non-repair of a highway, the judgment proceeded, "the ground upon which it was held that it would not, even where the duty of keeping the roads in repair had been in express terms imposed by statute on a corporate body—was that it had long been settled that though the duty to repair rested on the inhabitants, subjecting them to indictment in case of its breach, they could not be sued, and there was nothing to show that the Legislature in transferring the duty to a corporate body had intended to change the nature or extent of their liability."

The only other case which it is necessary to refer to is the late case of *Maguire v. The Corporation of Liverpool* ([1905] 1 King's Bench 767). That case, however, is not different from other cases which had been decided prior to *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board*. The defendant corporation were declared to be surveyors of highways for the Borough of Liverpool. The control of the streets was vested in them and they were empowered to form or pave the streets with such materials as they should think fit. They were also liable to be indicted for want of repair. They allowed one of their streets to fall into disrepair. There was no evidence of mis-feasance and it was held that there was no liability for non-feasance, and if *Hartnell v. The Ryde Commissioners* decided to the contrary it must be deemed to be over-ruled. The Lord Justices stated that the Court must start in construing the statute with the *prima facie* presumption that it was not intended to cast on the new body a larger liability than was cast over the inhabitants, and L. J. Vaughan-Williams said, "We have to find in the Act something which shows a distinct intention on the part of the Legislature" to create a larger liability than existed prior to the transferring of the streets to the corporation, and there is nothing showing that in the statute. Considering all the authorities which have been cited, the law in England seems to be plain that local bodies are not liable in an action for non-feasance in the carrying out of their duties, such as looking after streets, etc., vested in them, though they may be liable to indictment. The reason for the law is that at common law the inhabitants were not so liable, as decided in *Russell v. The Men of Devon*, and laid down in the cases referred to in Brooke's Abridgement. The judgment in *Russell v. The Men of Devon* decided the matter not merely on the ground of a want of incorporation of the defendants, but also on the general ground laid down in Brooke's Abridgement. There must, therefore, be something in the statute showing that a private person has a remedy for non-feasance before he can succeed in England or in the colonies, where there are similar statutes to those in England, against a local body for injury sustained through the nonrepair of streets or roads.

It appears to me that the *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson* cannot really be differentiated from the other cases. In this case there seems to have been an open drain or stream running through the street, and all the corporation did was to put a bridge of brick across this open drain or stream. This was not creating a nuisance in the highway. It was doing no more than bridging the stream by an ordinary bridge. If instead of putting in a barrel drain of brick they had raised a wooden or stone bridge across the stream the cases show that they would

not have been liable. It was a case of approaches to a bridge in the *Municipal Council of Picton v. Geldert*. It was also a case of a bridge in *McKinnon v. Penson*. The barrel drain, as it is termed in the Borough of Bathurst case, was not part of a sewerage scheme, it was part of a road formation. To say that that was creating a nuisance in the highway is really a misuse of language, or a misapprehension [*unclear*: of]

The New Zealand Courts have followed *Cowley v. The Newmarket Local Board*. The most important case was *Tarry v. The Taranaki County Council* (12 N.Z.L.R. 467), and it was held that the county council was not liable for non-feasance, on the ground that the common law of England was in force in New Zealand prior to the passing of the Counties Act, and that the Counties Act did not in express terms give a right of action for neglect to repair roads.

In America the case of *Henley v. The Mayor of Lyme Regis* is followed, and the principle stated by Mr. Justice Park in delivering the opinion of the Judges is approved of. I notice, however, that Mr. Justice Park is spoken of as Baron Parke in the American report. The most important case is *Weightman v. The City of Washington* (1 Black. U.S. Rep. 4 Miller 349), being a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1861,

Other cases which have followed it are the cases of *Barnes v. The District of Columbia* ([1875] 91 U.S. Reports 540; *Cleveland v. King* ([1889] 132 U.S. Rep. 295); *District of Columbia v. Woodbury* ([1889] 136 U.S. Rep. 450). The rule laid down by the U.S. Court is first, that a distinction is made between municipal corporations proper, such as cities and incorporated villages, and what are called *quasi* municipalities, such as counties and townships; second—municipal corporations proper are without any express statutory provision to that effect held liable for all injuries caused by defective highways, on the theory that being invested with the exclusive control over the highways within their limits, and having implied power to raise money for their construction and repair, it is their duty to keep the highways in a reasonably safe condition, for failure to perform which they are subject to a corresponding liability (see *American and English Encyclopædia of Law*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 15, p. 420). The Supreme Court of the United States makes no distinction between a municipal corporation and a corporation organised for private gain. However, as I have said, it makes a distinction between a corporation proper, and what is termed an involuntary quasi-corporation, such as a county, town, school district, or township. (See *Barnes v. District of Columbia*, p. 552.) The rule that is thus laid down by the Supreme Court is followed by a large number of States, namely by thirty-one. However, in the New England states proper, and in Arkansas, California, Michigan, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, the contrary is held and the English rule is followed—that is, a corporation is not liable unless the statute expressly recognises such liability. In many of the States there are such statutory liabilities.

It may therefore be said that so far as the rule in England and the colonies is concerned, the local body is not liable for non-feasance relating to the maintainance of a road, unless there is something express in the statute under which it acts creating the liability. This may well be termed an exception to the rule that the breach of a statutory duty followed by an injury to an individual gives a right of action to the person injured.

There are many cases in which this rule has been laid down. See for example *Oliver v. N. E. Railway Company* (L.R. 9 Q.B. 409); *Hawkins v. The King* (25 N.Z.L.R. 287), in addition to the cases already referred to.

How this exception came to be law may easily be gathered from the cases which have been previously referred to. It began, no doubt, because of the difficulty of making the inhabitants liable in a civil action. There were few corporations in the eighteenth century. Local bodies as such did not exist, and when there came to be local control that local control was given to surveyors of highways, agents or employees of the inhabitants. The common law not having recognised the liability of the inhabitants, the Court held that these agents of the inhabitants could not be made liable for damages which were irrecoverable against the inhabitants. The law is now too firmly fixed to be altered, and the inconvenience that might arise from an alteration of the law has been well pointed out in many of the judgments. Lawyers, however, have not so much to consider the question of convenience or inconvenience as what the law is, Whether it would be wise to introduce into the colonies the rule as laid down in America is a question for the consideration of the lawgivers. The law as it now stands is clear and decided, notwithstanding the decision in *The Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*. There is much to be said in favour of a modification of the law. It might be wise to continue the non-liability of local bodies, so far as unformed roads or streets are concerned, but if a local body had formed and made streets or roads, and they allowed them to fall into disrepair, and knowingly allowed them to remain in a dangerous condition, surely they ought to be liable for a neglect of their statutory duty to any one who suffers through that neglect. If this principle of law were laid down, then the decision of the Privy Council in the Bathurst case would become the rule, and, considering the advance we have made in local government, it would only be in accordance with right and reason that such a liability should be cast on local bodies.

Wellington, N.Z.

ROBERT STOUT.

A Council of State for the Empire.

By J.H. Shaw, M.A., LL.M.

(Six years Examiner in Constitutional Law and History, University of Melbourne.)

Price: Threepence.

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Note.

A short explanation is needed as to how the following article came to appear in its present form of a pamphlet. It was originally written as a special article and posted from Nelson to a newspaper in N.Z. on the 21st of February last. It lay quiescent in the office of that paper for no less than seven weeks, after which time I wrote enquiring and got a reply which did not seem satisfactory. In the meantime the world was moving and I felt that I was getting into a very false and unjust position. Among other things the Premier on the 10th of April at a banquet in Wellington, for the first time, so far as I know, propounded the idea of an Imperial Council. This it will be seen is just the leading idea of my article lying bewitched in the newspaper office. Mr. Seddon's first idea among his suggestions for the Conference in London was a periodical Conference of Colonial Premiers. Of course this suggestion at the banquet was a mere coincidence. But I became more dissatisfied about my enchanted article and in two telegrams claimed its return. This, after some delay was done, after eight weeks to a day, on 18th April, the editor saying that he only wanted to keep it "a few weeks" more, which I thought was very curious. But I offered to return it if he would publish it without further delay, which he declined to do.

I then offered it after full explanation to another editor in another town, who undertook to deal with it at once. It was posted accordingly from Nelson on 24th April, and lo! the moment it entered the second office it was again bewitched. I could on writing get no account of it, and after some three weeks of further enchantment I finally got it back after two demands on the 19th of May.

Truly I am puzzled and enchanted, not knowing what to think. Let me hope that the article will now do some of the good it aimed at, and that when the Premier of N.Z. comes to deliver his views at the great Conference in London there will be a still more exact coincidence of these views with the ideas of this pamphlet. I shall then be still more enchanted.

Be it noted that neither of these editors rejected the article as a contribution, they only kept it safe bewitched as mentioned.

J. H. S. Nelson,

New Zealand.

A Council of State for the Empire

By J. H. Shaw, M.A., LL.M.

(Six years Examiner in Constitutional Law and History, University of Melbourne.)

"The Roman Senate was the noblest organ of the nation, and in consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and patriotism, in grasp of power and unwavering courage, the foremost political corporation of all times."—(Mommson.)

An article published by me some months ago in N.Z. on "Parliamentary Government and the Empire" was destructive and negative in tendency and method, that is, it attacked existing institutions. And as there is always a fair presumption against political change as such, those who attack ought not only to accept the burden of proof of the need of change, but also be prepared to suggest something else in the room of what they propose to remove.

The following propositions, I think, strike the key note of all that is needful to say, at least from the colonial standpoint, on this important subject.

- A great modification in the system of government of the Empire must come and come quickly.
- I think this great change will take the form of some radical modification of the ancient and legal organ of our Government, the Privy Council.

- This must be accompanied by some fundamental modification of the power of the House of Commons in Imperial concerns.

And truly since I first wrote a change has come quickly so far at least as the stage of discussion is concerned. It has come with a rush; in the magazines currently arriving many articles deal more or less directly with the subject. These of course are in their proposals as various as the minds of writers of them. But, however, else they may differ they seem to agree pretty generally in two points, first that the existing system has broken down, that in fact it is doomed, and secondly that the Empire is endangered. It is clear that in whatever change may be made or whatever new organ of State may be created the Colonies must be represented. It therefore behoves us to be moving betimes, and to put our ideas in some sort of form in order that we may know our minds, and see clearly what we want, so as to join effectively and fruitfully in the coming discussion. To this purpose I propose to devote a few reflections which I may say are not the ephemeral growth of yesterday or the day before or entertained in the spirit of a political poseur. After a residence of some 45 years in this and another colony, and as it is a matter to which I have devoted special attention I think I may venture to do this much without presumption. To me then it seems clear that the existing Privy Council might without any violent legal or political wrench, be re-constituted so as to make it into a Great Imperial Council of State which must contain representatives from all the constituent parts of the Empire, whatever may be the particular forms of their local institutions, self-governing or not. I use the term "representative" in a general sense and I wish carefully to guard myself against suggesting anything like popular election in such a serious matter as this is. To allow the "*arbitrium popularis auræ*," the fickle reek of popular breath, to intrude into such an arena would be in my view nothing short of fatal. By whatever means or whatever channel or on whatever principle these representatives came to this great Council this mode of entry ought to be from the first and resolutely precluded.

On what principle then ought this great State Council to be constituted? To this question history has I think, furnished to us an answer at once clear, fruitful and light-bringing. Of all the Councils of State, advisory or executive or both, which ever existed in the course of political history I believe that the greatest, the wisest and the most generally successful was the Senate of ancient Rome. In the constitution of that great State Council we will in my opinion find the best and surest pattern of our new state organ for the government of the Empire. On what principal and by what mode of appointment was this illustrious council constituted? First then, it was not in any right sense elected at all, perhaps we may say it was appointed. It was permanent, subject to the revision every five years by the Censors. It was primarily and in theory advisory to the Curule Magistrates of the State, Consuls, Praetors, &c., but it became in course of time and in practice the most powerful deliberative and administrative body in the Roman state. It was a chamber of statesmen consisting of all those who had filled high offices, who had negotiated treaties, commanded armies or fleets; of all living public men who had passed through any important political office or employment. Here in my opinion we have the finest model for that Imperial Council which I firmly believe will before the lapse of much time, be entrusted with the government of this great empire. Without going into details of its procedure I may here note that there was no such thing in the Roman Senate as what we now mean by "debate," there was therefore no room for artful dodging and to the everlasting honour, safety and glory of the Roman State, there were no able Parliamentarians. Each Senator on being called upon, in accordance with fixed rules of procedure, by the Presiding Magistrate, for his opinion delivered it accordingly. But if there was no able Parliamentarian, there was something far grander. Imagine the "assembly of Kings." What dignity! What Majesty! A Cato a Scipio, a Fabius, a Julius, called on for his opinion, and as the weighty words calmly fall from his lips carrying the prestige of a great life of public service, what an impression! What "*auctoritas*"! He knows well and all know the words are not idle terms of debate, but are to issue in serious action, to make their mark perhaps in history and on men's minds and lives through the ages. Is there any grander scene in the records of man? No wonder that Rome was great! No wonder that her thoughts and deeds and works made deep and abiding mark on this round globe, still visible, yea, living to this our day.

Following the pattern of the Roman Senate we can not have much difficulty in looking for the materials—the men who ought to compose the Council. These ought to be all who are or have been Chief Justices, or heads of any of the superior courts of law either in the United Kingdom or in any colony. All who have for a specified term of years filled the office of puisne judge. All who have held any Cabinet office for a specified term of years, including those who have been for said term, Premiers of self-governing colonies. All who have filled the office of Commander-in-Chief. All Governor's General of India or of British America, or of the Australian Commonwealth. All who have been Governors of Colonies for, say, five years. All who had been for a term of years permanent Under-Secretaries of State and so on. The Premiers of self-governing colonies ought in my opinion to be clearly disqualified for the Imperial Council while they continue in office as such. But I think that all existing Agents General and all who have been such ought certainly to be "*ex officio*" members of the Council. It will be seen that this enumeration is merely tentative and suggestive of the mode of

application of the principle above stated. This may be varied, expanded or restricted as may appear expedient. But on one point I am clear and decided; that is, that from this Council every breath of popular suffrage, of applause or dispraise ought to be rigidly excluded. The Statesmen of the Council ought, like Zeus of old "in purest air abiding" to whom King Agamemnon prayed before Troy to live in a region far above the clouds and heats of party passions, and prejudices. Proceeding on this principle and inspired, and elevated by this spirit we may hope to have and I strongly believe we can have an Imperial Council of men in spirit, aims and capacities worthy to tread in the steps of the Roman Senate, and equal to the administration of our world wide empire. The main lines of this enumeration I may here note have been taken from a proposal made many years ago by Mr. J. S. Mill for a reconstitution of the House of Lords.

I come now to the third point above noted at the head of this paper which is, without doubt the one which will present real difficulty, great and possibly fierce divergence of view and opinion; I mean how as a part, an essential, nay an absolutely indispensable part of an Imperial scheme are you to modify the power of the House of Commons in Imperial concerns? This is the true crux and hinge of the whole business, and any one proposing any plan of Imperial reform must be prepared to meet the difficulty with some definite measure.

I think, however, that even this difficulty, when courageously faced is not quite so insurmountable as at first sight it seems. There is, in my opinion only one way of overcoming the difficulty and that is by simply going back to legal first principles of the Constitution and removing the King's Ministers, or at least those of them who deal with Imperial interests, from the House of Commons and confining them to the Privy or Imperial Council where originally they belonged, nay where necessarily and by law they belong now. Both in Britain and in self-governing Colonies, Cabinet Ministers holding legal offices are members in the one case of the Privy Council and in the other of the Executive Council. This course, with more or less completeness, must be taken; but so long as you leave the King's Ministers in the Commons House, and expose them to the wild and capricious gales of its party disputes you never will escape from the curse of party government. If an Imperial organ of government is to be constructed in the mode and on the principles here advocated this course must be taken. But this once accomplished I would then leave the Parliament to its proper function of legislation and criticism, and generally to the local business of the Kingdom. It is hardly necessary to refer to the fact that Ministers are by the American Constitution excluded from sitting in Congress. But this policy is by no means a novelty in British legislation. In 1693-4 a Bill was passed to the effect that no member subsequently elected should accept any office under the Crown; but King William refused his royal assent. Again the Act of Settlement by clause 6 enacted that "no person who has an office or place of profit, under the King or receives a pension from the Crown shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons," This not suiting the purposes of certain politicians was repealed in 1705, and in 1707 was passed the absurd law (still I believe in force) making distinction as to disability between offices created before or after October 25th, 1705.

Again in reigns of Geo. II. and Geo. III. various acts were passed with the same object of excluding office holders from the House.

My plan therefore is not at all or in any sense legal or political, an innovation.

A proposal substantially the same was some forty years ago criticised unfavourably by an eminent thinker, Mr. J. S. Mill. And assuredly in my mind this criticism furnishes one of the most glaring instances showing how valueless, fallacious, and misleading are arguments "a priori" when applied even by intellects of the highest order and power to cases liable to be corrected by "a posteriori" considerations arising from the general progress of the world and the march of history.

Truly man's power of forecasting the changes wrought by only some forty years is very small and very feeble indeed! To make this very curious and important case clear I will quote even at expense of some space Mr. Mills language. "It has been proposed that the powers of our own as well as of Colonial Parliaments should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and Imperial concerns in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as Great Britain itself. On this system there would then be a perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer dependencies."

He then proceeds to criticise this proposal declaring the suggestions to be "so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker."

Let me classify the grounds on which he founds this conclusion which bulks in our eyes, with our wider experience and the progress of only 40 years, as so extraordinary and even childish.

- Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government, or even members of one federation.
- They have not the same interests; they have not and never can have a sufficient habit of taking council together; they are not part of the same public.
- They do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena but apart.

- They have an imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another, and neither know each other's objects nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct.
- England is sufficient for her own protection without the colonies and would be in a stronger and more dignified position separated from them than when reduced to be a single member of an American, African and Australian Federation.
- Over and above questions of commerce England derives little advantage, except in *prestige* from her dependencies and that little is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her.

It may be said generally of these arguments that they smack strongly of the Manchester school, and that they only need be clearly stated to be scouted in the clearer light and the changed conditions of our time. The improved steam navigation and the ocean cables have deprived head No. 1 of any force whatever.

Heads Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are curious indeed coming from the great author of Mill's Logic, for without doubt they plainly beg the whole question; how are they to take council together, discuss and deliberate in the same arena without an organic institution wherein to do so? This would be the function of the Imperial Council. The statement is even now not quite true thanks to the press and the quick transit and the ocean cables. Heads 5 and 6 have been triumphantly answered by the Boer war, and what is going on before our own eyes in the colonies sending off their young manhood to protect the Empire. And these are the criticisms of a man who only some 30 years ago was in the world of economic and political discussion little short of a recognised despot! It must be here noted that in the passage quoted above the words "representative" and "represented" must, I take it, have been used by Mill in the same general sense in which I have above employed the same term and not as embodying any form of popular suffrage which as I said before is foreign and repugnant to the entire substance of my pattern of an Imperial Council. Of course all that class of so-called Imperial Legislation would have to go with the foreign and Imperial business proposed to be withdrawn from the existing Parliament, and dealt with exclusively by the Imperial Council; that is part of the plan. The House of Commons and the Lords would be left to deal as they liked and on any plan they pleased with the internal concerns of the United Kingdom. "But," says some one, "you would reduce the Houses to be a mere sort of local bodies or parish councils without dignity or any fit arena for large talents and capacities; you would leave no statesmen of high and commanding ability!" I answer, not so; I would leave the talking, perorating gentlemen, to orate and perorate to their hearts content, but I would deprive them of the power of doing mischief; and I would at the same time provide a wider, higher sphere for the statesmen of higher order who, as things are now ordered, are, as I said, in the paper first mentioned, lost to the nation and the Empire.

It will be seen that on this plan and on these principles, very little change is proposed in the legal constitution of the Kingdom. An ancient but still surviving and vital and virile organ of that constitution is seized upon and it is proposed not to revolutionise any principle at all, but to modify, reconstitute, and enlarge its sphere of usefulness and as it were, still further to vitalise its vitality. This is not in any proper sense revolution; it is the highest and wisest order of conservative statesmanship. And here I may fittingly bring in the majestic language of the greatest of all philosophic statesmen to throw its golden weight and splendour on the theme.

"Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts, wherein by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of the human race, the whole at one time is never old, or middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression. Thus, by perserving the method of nature in the conduct of the State, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete."

Thus wrote, more than one hundred years ago, the imperial genius of Edmund Burke, and so in treating the State as a living organism I have tried in this paper, to follow with steps unequal "a constitutional policy working after the pattern of nature." Let me hope that this attempt may not be without some little usefulness in preparing our minds for the great change which must, I repeat, come before a long interval in the government of this Empire.

I am convinced that, whatever may be the immediate results of the great Conference on the Political relation of the Colonies to the Empire, the path here opened up is the path which will in the long run lead to a permanent and satisfactory settlement of a difficult and dangerous condition of things.

vignette

Imperial Preferential Trade

From A Canadian Point of View

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Imperial Preferential Trade

From a Canadian Point of View

In introducing a discussion on the subject of preferential

Introductory

trade within the Empire, so far as it affects Canada, it is fortunate that, on the surface at least, one does not require to emphasize the necessity for a good understanding between Britain and her colonies. The differences which arise, and which, it must be confessed, are sometimes rather radical, are due to different conceptions of the best methods and means for promoting the closest and most permanent ties between the different parts of the Empire. At an earlier day the term Imperialism might perhaps have been accepted by all, as expressive of a generous policy of mutual sympathy and co-operation in the promotion of noble ideals of civilization throughout the Empire. But, unfortunately, this term has been more and more monopolized by special organizations which have identified it with such a narrow, mercenary, and unspiritual conception of imperial destiny, that those who aspire to a wider and more generous outlook for the individual, and a more cosmopolitan ideal of civilization for the Empire, cannot possibly accept it as representing their aims. Those whose spirits have once glowed in response to the lofty and enlightened conceptions of the place of the British race in the world's progress, as set forth by the great minds of the past and the present, can hardly be expected to enlist under the banner of the New Imperialism.

We may, and we do, introduce the bucksterning spirit of sectional interests into national politics, and in the crudest manner pervert patriotism to the service of private interests and corporate schemes. But, though this inevitably results in the degradation of politics, yet the evils chiefly work themselves out in party strife and party corruption, while the structural national unity is preserved. But the introduction of this spirit into imperial relations must prove absolutely fatal, for no corrosion of the ties of Empire is so vitriolic as the suspicion that the material interests of one part are being sacrificed to those of another. Sectionalism, not partyism, is the receptacle of all bitterness in imperial relations. As I shall attempt to show, very briefly, it was the removal, first of despotic, then of mercenary interests from the imperial relationship, and the transfer of the latter to private enterprise, that at once saved the Empire from dissolution and improved its economic condition. The imperial interest was turned into new and loftier channels where it has peacefully and beneficently flowed till quite recently. How fatal may be the attempt to exploit the imperial ties once more, in the interest of material gains of wholly speculative promise, those who have followed the history of colonial relations can best appreciate.

One of the most interesting phenomena of the present day is the remarkable wave of declining self-reliance, amounting in some cases almost to despair, which, without any reasonable outward cause, is at present sweeping over the Mother Country, and even spreading to the other parts of the Empire. But, whatever be the ultimate explanation of this popular panic, it is at least highly necessary that we should seek to guard ourselves, in advance, against any possible follies which we may be tempted to commit; for nothing is so contagious as blind fear, or so uncontrollable when thoroughly roused.

Mr. Chamberlain, with his unique capacity for burying himself in one idea at a time, has been chiefly instrumental in preaching the decline of British power and capacity. Nothing more strikingly demonstrates his well-known demagogic influence than his remarkable feat in bringing so many British people from a condition of prosperous contentment to the very brink of ruin, within a twelvemonth. The very Empire itself is for him but as clay in the hands of the potter; for has he not assured us time and again, that by means of the Boer War he brought it to a condition of unparalleled unity and solidarity; and has he not, within a very short period, reduced it to such a parlous condition that nothing can save us from destruction but committing our destinies to his charge, by giving him a blank mandate to work out our salvation? Now we in Canada cannot dictate to the British people what commercial policy they must adopt, for we in the past chose for ourselves, and insisted upon following the example of the United States, not that of Britain. We can have nothing to say, therefore, even should the British people under the influence of Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, and their assistants, become convinced that their day of greatness and independence has suddenly passed, and that henceforth instead of following a policy of their own and leading the commercial world, as they have done so long, they must go back several centuries and learn once more to imitate the example and copy the policy of other European nations. But, in the face of such possible changes, it behooves us in Canada to know where we stand, so that we shall not be blindly committed to a line of policy which may be inconsistent with our national interests and dignity, or threaten the maintenance of those higher relationships within the Empire, which must

be independent of fiscal changes in any part of it.

It is my chief purpose, in the following pages, to throw some light on the central issues which must come to the front in any endeavour to make the colonies and the Mother Country mutually dependent upon each other, and thus to approximate to a self-dependent Empire. It is necessary, therefore, first, to indicate broadly the nature of the problems with which we are confronted; secondly, to trace briefly the historic development of the colonial relationship, with special reference to the rise and fall of the preferential system; thirdly, in the light of past facts and present conditions, to consider what is likely to be the significance for Canada of any preference on grain or other food products, which is likely to be offered, and also of the special sacrifices, or other return, which she is expected to make for the preferences promised; and lastly, to give expression to a few general principles which seem to be involved in our present condition, and the development of which must determine the trend of our immediate future.

The Problem

First, then, as to the nature of the problem which at present confronts Canada. This is connected with the imperial aspect of the fiscal proposals at present before the British people, and must be carefully distinguished from the purely British problem as to whether that country is or is not to change its fiscal system, and adopt a protectionist policy in place of a free trade one. But, even in the stating of the problem, we are met with a difficulty, for the supporters of Mr. Chamberlain in Canada, and Mr. Chamberlain and his followers in Britain, so far as they take the world into their confidence, present the proposed preferential relations and their consequences in widely different forms. A highly coloured prospectus is issued, in the usual sonorous and swelling terms, for the establishment of a limited partnership, through the medium of which the partners shall exploit one another's property, and it is made plain to each in turn that he will undoubtedly receive the lion's share. In other words, in the presentation of the preferential scheme, we have a striking example of what is, unfortunately, already too familiar to Canadians under the designation of the two-faced campaign, the same party preaching one policy in one province and a very different one in another. Yet the evil of these unscrupulous and disintegrating tactics in Canada is offset, to a certain extent, by the existence of two parties which manage, in a measure, to expose each other's misrepresentations. Between the different parts of the Empire there are as yet no such checks, hence it is possible for the double-faced campaign to enjoy an unusually free course, leaving it to the hard, practical consequences to reveal the deception which has been practised. How the subsequent gnashing of teeth must affect the imperial relations, is a matter upon which one does not care to dwell.

Is it not, then, a matter of the utmost importance, at once for the honour of our own country and as affecting the integrity of our relations to the Empire, that we should be perfectly honest, both with ourselves and with the people of Britain, alike as to what is offered to us, what is expected from us in return, and what we are prepared to grant? But, when proposals of preferential trade are held out to us, whether in broad outline, or in detail, it will not do for those who aspire to inform and lead Canadian opinion to present in an exaggerated form the advantages which are to come to us, and to greatly minimize or ignore what the people of Britain are being led to expect from us in return. Nor should we attempt to give the people of Britain the impression, that we are heartily in sympathy with the promises which are being made to them on our behalf, when we know, or ought to know, that we have no intention of conceding so much. Yet that this process of mutual deception is being regularly practised, any one who is at all familiar with what is being promised in Canada, on the one hand, and in Britain, on the other, cannot but recognize.

By the studied vagueness of his utterances, Mr. Chamberlain, consciously or unconsciously, facilitates this mutual deception. Though professing to base the whole of his preferential scheme upon the immense advantages to be derived by the Mother Country and the colonies from their mutual concessions to each other, he gives us a very unsatisfactory account of how that system is expected to be worked out. Those in Britain who are anxious to give his proposals a fair and full consideration, have found it impossible to get him to commit himself on the most necessary details. Such details as he does permit to escape him, from time to time, are apt to be shortly repudiated, when he discovers the consequences to which they inevitably lead.

Mr. Chamberlain talks vaguely about the stagnation or decay of British trade, of how Britain is being crowded out of the markets of the world, and how she must, consequently, seek safe and permanent outlets for the products of her future industry, in a very greatly expanded trade with the colonies. In good round terms the people of Britain are constantly being promised that the colonies are to provide them, almost immediately, with a very greatly expanded trade, and thus to become the chief hope for the future of their industries. When asked for some definite plan as to how this salvation of British industry is to be insured, and how he expects the colonies to adjust themselves to these new conditions, he still finds refuge in vague statements. From these, however, we may gather at least the general trend of his views.

In common with Mr. Balfour he deplors the mistaken colonial policy, or want of policy, of the free trade era, which permitted the colonies, and particularly Canada, to enter upon a manufacturing future. As he has

pointed out, Canada, having made most progress in the line of developing industries for herself, now takes from Britain a much smaller amount of manufactures per head of the population, than any of the other self-governing colonies. Had a wise policy been followed at the time of the introduction of free trade in Britain, the colonies might, with much advantage to themselves and more profit to Britain, have been retained in a commercial union with the Mother Country, of such a nature that Britain would have continued to supply the colonies with increasing quantities of manufactured goods, and have received from them greater quantities of food and raw materials. However, when cornered on this point, Mr. Chamberlain hastens to assure the colonies that they are not to be deprived of their existing industries, at least so far as they prove their capacity to survive. Much, therefore, of what has been lost, through the establishment of colonial industries, must be accepted as lost. But it is still not too late to arrest the further development of this process, and by timely bargaining with the colonies, and by a wisely directed lateral pressure, in the shape of a preferential tariff¹ on food supplies, to divert the attention of the colonies, and especially of Canada, from the expansion of manufacturing to the expansion of agriculture. This would secure for Britain the manufacturing industry of the Empire, and a greatly enlarged field for her goods among the expanding agricultural population and the increasing number of those engaged in the processes of exchange and transportation. Connected with this is the further ideal of securing the British food supply, and the supply of many other raw materials, entirely within the Empire. Instead, however, of explaining how this ideal of a self-contained Empire is to be worked out, he leaves that to the guess-work of his followers. His own speeches are occupied, for the most part, with what the majority of his audiences evidently regard as much more interesting and satisfactory, namely, re-iterated assurances that the Empire at large is ripe for his scheme, that it is the only possible one which will prevent it from breaking into fragments, and that his opponents have no alternative scheme for averting this catastrophe. This is a very safe boast and defiance, as aimed at those who do not recognize the impending calamity.

The fact is that Mr. Chamberlain treats the whole subject, not as an honest and straightforward statesman, but merely as a skilful politician, who is bent on allowing to his critics as little foothold as possible, while, by adroitly playing on the susceptibilities of the masses with vague alarms and reassuring promises, he hopes to be returned to power with a popular mandate on imperial preferential trade. To those who are curious about the details of his scheme, he intimates that the sooner he receives the imperial mandate the sooner their curiosity will be satisfied.

Although, then, we have no frank and statesmanlike proposals to discuss, yet, by putting various statements together, we are able to know fairly well what Mr. Chamberlain is aiming at, and what is necessary to make his scheme work. In his speech at Glasgow he descended to particulars more fully than before or since. Those particulars indicated quite clearly that he had rather an extravagant expectation as to the degree to which the colonies would sacrifice their manufacturing industries in return for a preference on grain. Some of the natural consequences involved having been immediately pointed out, Mr. Chamberlain sought the easiest avenue of escape by simply repudiating the reports of his speech, notwithstanding that *The Times*, in particular, had taken pains to congratulate its readers on the exceptional completeness and accuracy of its report. But, though Mr. Chamberlain now denies that he expects the colonies to give up any specific industries in favour of Britain, yet along with this denial he indicates that the general outcome of the preferential trade development between Britain and the colonies will be a condition in which they will cease to compete with each other, but will, for the future, simply supplement each other's industries, thus vastly increasing each other's markets. Now this can only mean, as already stated, that the chief lines of British goods will have a free field in the colonies, and the colonies will supply the food and raw materials for Britain.

When we put together Mr. Chamberlain's severe criticism of the present policy of Britain with reference to her foreign trade, and his criticism of the lack of organization and mutual industrial dependence in interimperial trade, when we observe his regretful references to the changes effected in the commercial relations with the Mother Country, during the free trade era, and when we notice how strongly he emphasizes the necessity for restoring the systematic commercial unity of the Empire, as its only salvation for the future, what we recognize is, that Mr. Chamberlain has before his mind a scheme for the future of the Empire which is tantamount to a restoration of the old Colonial System, on its commercial and industrial side at least, with its machinery of mutual preferences, and the ideal of a self-contained Empire with restrictions on foreign trade.

With such an ideal in view, we can understand his policy of first alarming the British public with pictures of their impending ruin through foreign competition, and then of appeasing them with a vision of trade redemption through possession of the colonial markets, whose great present, and still greater future value to them, would be well worth paying for, even at the price of a tax on food.

This fits in, also, with his demonstration to the working men that, even should their food cost a trifle more, which is by no means certain, the very great increase in employment, owing to the opening of the colonial markets, will much more than compensate them in good wages and steady employment.

As we have indicated, Mr. Chamberlain is too much of a politician to give us the details of his scheme,

even should he have them, if he can get his mandate without doing so, and by simply promising everything that heart can wish, alike to the people of Britain and those of the colonies.

Historic Precedents

In default of details, we are induced to ask what light we may derive from the experience of the past, with its numerous attempts to realize just such an outline of imperial prosperity as Mr. Chamberlain has sketched. We shall therefore turn for a time to a brief account of the actual attempts made by Britain, in the past, to realize a unified and self-dependent Empire by mutual preferential treatment and the avoidance of any competition in industries between the Mother Country and the colonies. In so doing we shall not only obtain considerable light upon Mr. Chamberlain's plan, so far as revealed, but we shall have put ourselves in a position to more intelligently discuss any subsequent phases of the preferential idea which may be brought forward.

The old Colonial System

The old Colonial System of Britain was not indigenous to that country, but was borrowed from the policy first put into practice by Spain and Portugal, transferred by Spain to the Netherlands, developed by France, and finally adopted by England. But, from the very beginning of Britain's foreign and colonial enterprise, a different spirit was shown by her naval and colonial pioneers from that which actuated most of the other commercial nations of Europe.

In the days of the Tudors, an elaborate, though unsystematic, machinery of preferences, bounties, and prohibitions was in operation, for the fostering of the Royal Navy. The fishing industry, in particular, was encouraged by bounties, exemptions, and enforced political Lents, while distant voyages, on the part of independent traders, were not only refused aid, but were discouraged, as tending to export treasure and as not furnishing so much visible profit or immediate return. Yet the officially encouraged system led to all manner of frauds and a positive weakening of the navy. On the other hand, the vigorous and permanent development of British naval and commercial supremacy was due to the personal enterprise of the free traders, who insisted on making the world their field. Though these real founders of Britain's naval supremacy were many in number, yet they are chiefly remembered in history by two of their most enterprising and spectacular, albeit somewhat unscrupulous, members—Hawkins and Drake.

After the Stuart Restoration, the Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 became the foundations of the new Colonial System, which, in its well-rounded completeness, like most of the novelties of the time, was imported from France. In this we have, for the first time in Britain, a coherent and systematic view of the relations which, it was held, ought to exist between the Mother Country and its already considerably developed colonial possessions. The new idea was that of a self-contained Empire, in which the colonial possessions should furnish the Mother Country with supplies of raw materials and various products for consumption, not produced at home, which she might either use herself or sell at a profit to other nations, as far as possible for coin or bullion. At the same time, the Mother Country monopolized the colonial markets for manufactured or other goods supplied from the home country, and also found in outward and inward colonial trade an exclusive field for the development of her shipping.

Such a system has always had a special attraction for that class of rulers and politicians who devote themselves to planning narrow and well-disciplined theories of Empire, but have little patience for the study of intricate details and awkward practical problems, which, however, refuse to be ignored in the real world of varied and complex interests. This system had naturally commended itself to the spiritual temperament and national characteristics of the ruling classes in France, Spain, and Portugal. These nations, therefore, naturally made a consistent effort to carry out the attractive scheme of colonial Empire which they had devised. But all the world knows, in outline at least, what became of the large and promising Empires which these nations carved out of the newly explored regions of the earth, upwards of three centuries ago.

The Dutch and English governments, though accepting the system from its original inventors, did not find it altogether in harmony with the sturdy, independent tendencies of their peoples, and were thus less successful in enforcing it in their colonial possessions. The colonial administration of the British in particular, as her theoretic imperialists have been sorrowfully pointing out for the last two centuries and a half, has been but a wayward and ill-groomed thing as compared with the artistic finish long, at least, as they had anything to administer. So far as the British Government was successful from time to time, in bringing its Colonial System into harmony with that of the rest of Europe, it must be admitted that it produced like results, much to the consternation of its advocates. But the prevailing fact has been that, whatever her avowed colonial policy, at least the practice of Britain has been for the most part quite different from that of the rest of the world. The result has been that she stands to-day at the centre of a colonial Empire whose success, in spite of imperialistic blunders, is altogether unique in the world's history.

In order to illustrate the spirit of the old Colonial

Two Presentations of the Colonial System

System at its best, it will be sufficient to take a couple of typical presentations of its central idea, before the

attempt to rigidly enforce it had proved its unworkable character, in bringing about the American Revolution. We shall take one example at the beginning, and another at the end of this period.

In the reign of Charles II., when the Navigation Acts were passed and the new Colonial System introduced, Sir Joshua Child, the virtual ruler, in his day, of the East India Company, was one of the most intelligent advocates of the new policy. About 1680 he wrote an interesting treatise, under the title of "A New Discourse of Trade," in which he dealt with British trade in general and its relation to the new Colonial System. The pioneers of British colonial expansion, having pursued, for the most part, a policy of free and independent trade, as was more or less inevitable owing to the troubles in Britain itself, did not relish the application of the new Colonial System. They were disposed to argue their cause at home while, as far as possible, evading the law in the colonies. Sir Joshua summarized the objections of the colonial traders and planters to the new imperial policy as follows: "The inhabitants and planters of our plantations in America say this Act will in time ruin their plantations if they be not permitted at least to carry their sugars to the best markets, and not be compelled to send all to, and receive all commodities from, England." His reply to the colonial remonstrance is at once significant of the Euro- pean imperial point of view, which was borrowed by England, and in a striking manner voices the object, though not the method, of Mr. Chamberlain at the present time. "I answer if they were not kept to rules of the Act of Navigation, the consequence would be that in a few years the benefit of them would be wholly lost to the nation, it being agreeable to the policy of the Dutch, Danes, French, Spaniards, Portuguese, and all nations in the world, to keep their external provinces and colonies in a subjection unto and dependency upon their Mother Kingdom; and if they should not do so, the Dutch, who, as I have said, are masters of the field in trade, would carry away the greatest of advantage by the plantations, of all the Princes in Christendom, leaving us and others only the trouble of breeding men, and sending them abroad to cultivate the ground, and have bread for their industry." In other words, it would never do for Britain to pursue an independent course of her own; she must of necessity follow the example of the other nations of Europe, or disaster would surely follow. In passing, it is worth remarking that the Dutch, of whom Sir Joshua is so much afraid, occupied in those days, as is evident from what he himself points out in another part of his work, the position which is now held by Britain. Holland was the country with the freest trade, the most extensive shipping, the cheapest goods, the largest amount of capital, the lowest rate of interest, the most honest tradesmen, and the highest standard of living for the people at large.

Notwithstanding the arguments of Sir Joshua Child, the most enterprising English traders and planters did not recognize the special virtues of a rigidly disciplined and self-contained Empire. They were certainly not little Englanders, but neither were they little imperialists. Even in those early days their spirits were strong enough, and their vision clear enough to see that the world at large was not too great a field for English merchants and English seamen with the right stuff in them. Following that conviction, the early English traders and planters had already caused Britain to acquire the foundations of a great colonial Empire, almost in spite of herself, and, whatever orthodox notions as to a colonial policy the Government might adopt from European courts, they, at any rate, were determined to follow what they had discovered by solid experience to be the wisest course of trade, however unsymmetrical, unfashionable, and original it might be. And Sir Joshua Child, shocked as he was at the bold violation of the accepted policy and practice of Europe, which these British-American colonists exhibited, at the same time is forced to admit that their anti-imperial methods had most unexpected results. For, not only had the plantations themselves prospered astonishingly, but they had enriched the Mother Country also, in quite unexpected ways. He therefore frankly confesses himself as quite at a loss to know what should be done with them. In his own words:—"The people of New England, by virtue of their primitive Charters being not so strictly tied to the observation of the laws of this Kingdom, do sometimes assume the liberty of trading, contrary to the Act of Navigation, by reason of which many of our American commodities, especially tobacco, and sugar, are transported, in New-English shipping, directly into Spain, and other foreign countries, without being landed in England, or paying any duty to His Majesty; which is not only a loss to the King, and a prejudice to the navigation of Old England, but also a total exclusion of the old English merchant from the vent of those commodities in those ports where the New English vessels trade." But, after duly exposing the irregularities of the New Englanders, who, being the most enterprising, were also the chief offenders, he closes thus:—"To conclude this chapter, and to do right to that most industrious English colony, I must confess, that though we lose by their unlimited trade with our foreign plantations, yet we are very great gainers, by their direct trade to and from Old England, our yearly exportations of English manufactures, malt, and other goods from hence thither, amounting in my opinion to ten times the value of what is imported from thence, which calculation I do not make at random, but upon mature consideration, and per adventure upon as much experience in this very trade as any other person will pretend to. And therefore, whenever a reformation of our correspondency in trade with that people shall be thought on, it will in my poor judgment require great Tenderness, and very serious Circumspection."

Now the perplexity of Sir Joshua as to how to deal with such highly profitable, but anti-imperial Empire

builders, continued to be the perplexity of the Home Government throughout the whole century from 1665 to 1765, during which period Britain had both stripped and outstripped practically all her colonial rivals. The Colonial System remained unaltered but the practice was very loose, and the trade as profitable as it was irregular. During this period the colonies found it natural and profitable to take the greater part of their manufactured goods, both for their own use and for trade, from the Mother Country, and to supply her in turn with most of the foreign produce and raw materials which she needed. But in the case of certain manufactures, and in their secondary trade, they did not respect the Colonial System. In return for part of their imports from Britain, they sent to her a constant stream of Spanish and Portuguese bullion, the profits, largely, of forbidden trade. This influx of treasure was as much a cause for rejoicing, on the part of the colonial theorists, as the methods by which it was procured were a source of grief to their imperial souls.

Now these American colonies were not enriching Britain at their own expense, but over the head of their own prosperity. Perceiving this rapid expansion of the colonies, the more extreme advocates of the Colonial System and the Navigation Laws, came to regard their prosperity with a jealous eye, conceiving that more of it could be brought to the Mother Country if the Colonial System were more rigidly enforced. They reasoned as Mr. Chamberlain does, that the colonies were not contributing to British trade in proportion to their development. They were satisfying an increasing number of wants by their own exertions and their trade with others, when it should be the privilege of the Mother Country to supply them with manufactured goods, at least. Though the aggregate trade of Britain with the colonies was steadily increasing, the trade per head of the population was not sufficiently increasing. Hence, unless measures were speedily taken to bind the Empire more closely together it would inevitably go to pieces.

Such were the ideas which began to prevail among the new group of politicians who came to the front when George III. ascended the throne, and their ideas are expressed very fully in the new imperialistic literature of the period. At that time another great struggle with France had just closed, and the colonists in America, notwithstanding their very objectionable views on self-government and their irregular trade practices, had come to the assistance of the Mother Country with men and means, to an astonishing extent. Indeed, they had shown such enthusiasm for the British cause and the British connection, that the theoretic imperialists began to talk the language of to-day. They declared it to be both possible and desirable to take advantage of the outburst of imperial sentiment to re-organize the Empire, and to bind it more closely together, by making it economically more self-dependent, by requiring colonial contributions to the imperial navy, and the abandonment by the colonies of their growing tendency to establish manufacturing industries. In all this they were encouraged by a few local enthusiasts in the colonies, themselves mainly people in official positions, or having special interests and connections in Britain, and moving in special social coteries in the colonial capitals. But though they professed to speak for the colonies, they did not understand the tempers and interests of the common people, who were quite well disposed towards the Mother Country till their liberties were threatened. The theorists were sufficiently warned of the folly of their course by the most far-seeing men of their time, by Chatham, Fox, Burke, Shelburne, Cavendish,—men who had broad and enlightened views on colonial questions, as well as on many others. However, their warning was entirely disregarded, in substance they were called little Englanders, and accused of being traitors to the cause of Empire.

One of the calmest and most rational of the numerous statements of the period as to the necessity for re-inforcing the Colonial System and establishing an imperial commercial federation, was presented in a treatise entitled, "Propositions for Improving the Manufactures, Agriculture, and Commerce of Great Britain." This was published in 1763, when the air was full of the imperial enthusiasm which had resulted from the overthrow of the French power in America. This overthrow itself was the inevitable outcome of a long competition between the British colonial practice, and the French colonial theory. Yet, oddly enough, it was immediately followed by the revival of the French colonial theory in Britain.

The sixth of the "propositions" referred to in the treatise before us, was the following: "To give large bounties for the encouragement of a trade with our North American colonies; especially in such articles as shall make for the mutual advantage of both the Mother Country and her colonies." Here is how the argument proceeds: "Since we have made such immense conquests on the North American continent, which are to be guaranteed to us by the present treaty of peace, that mighty Empire, from its situation, is capable of producing the greatest part of the raw materials which are used in all our manufactured goods, which we are, at present, obliged to purchase of foreigners, many of whom, by that means, have a very great balance of trade against us; and therefore the reasons for this proposal are very obvious and convincing. Besides, the natural interest of Great Britain and North America is so closely connected, that their loss must inevitably be our loss; for if we do not assist them in taking off their raw materials, they cannot purchase our manufactured goods, but will purchase what they are in want of from foreigners, who will take those raw materials, and in the end, not only manufacture for themselves, but also oppose us in foreign markets." ... "They have a very flourishing linen manufactory at this time in Boston, supported by all the merchants of that place, and another within twenty

miles of Philadelphia, which is equally encouraged by the Quakers. Besides, there are several woollen manufactures on this coast, which work up the greatest part of the wool of New England. But further, the North Americans, not content with setting up manufactures among themselves, which greatly interfere with the trade and prosperity of their Mother Country, by the connivance of the custom-house officers which we nominate to them, (many of whom employ American deputies, and have their residence in London) smuggle into that continent a large quantity of Dutch, German and French manufactured goods. In fact, above the one third of the manufactured goods that are consumed in North America are the produce of France and Holland, notwithstanding our laws expressly forbid the importation of any manufactured goods into those colonies, but such as are exported from Great Britain or Ireland. Hence, therefore, unless we extend our commerce with these people, and take off the produce of their plantations, necessity will reduce them to permit such nations to come and trade with them, who will take off the produce of their plantations, and, in barter for the same, supply them with such manufactured goods as they are in want of." He proceeds to set forth a list of colonial food products and raw materials on which a special bounty or preference should be given, and continues: "These are the raw materials which should be particularly encouraged in our inland settlements to barter in return for our manufactured goods; especially as we are obliged to import a great quantity of those commodities, from foreign nations, for the use of our manufactures, and thereby give those nations a great balance of trade against us. But further, while we are protecting and encouraging our back settlements we must not forget to divert the thoughts of the inhabitants, in the more populous places on the sea-coasts, from entering into manufactures by giving great encouragement for bringing their raw materials to a British market, especially such as are of general use in our manufactures." He then goes on to show how a judicious preference in favour of the colonies, with a tariff upon similar articles brought from foreign countries, would enable Great Britain to obtain her food and raw materials entirely from her own colonies, and thus render the Empire self-sustaining and independent of the other nations who are the natural rivals of Britain. How strikingly most of this parallels Mr. Chamberlain's policy of to-day, scarcely needs to be pointed out. Though this policy was less objectionable in itself a century and a half ago than it is to-day, yet the attempt to enforce it in the early part of the reign of George III. cost Britain the best part of her Colonial Empire.

The American Revolution, however, did not greatly

Colonial Trade after the American Revolution

alter the previous line of trade development. It chiefly prevented a radical interference with the freer trade practice which had grown up. Yet the advocates of the old colonial policy, in its strict interpretation, professed to rejoice at having severed the connection with the undutiful colonies. As they put it, unless the colonies were either brought into closer dependence upon Britain, or separated altogether, the unrestricted development of colonial trade and industry, with the growing tendency to indulge in manufacturing for themselves, thus developing their natural resources at home instead of adjusting them to the requirements of British industry, must have resulted in the centre of the Empire being transferred from London to Philadelphia. Thus the colonies, not Britain, would have ruled the Empire.

Shelburne and Pitt the younger, Chatham's distinguished son, who became Prime Minister immediately after the American Revolution, understanding fully the nature of the commercial relations which had existed between Britain and the colonies, and the great mutual advantage which had resulted, strongly urged that the old commercial relations with the colonies, which had just become the United States, should be continued as though no political separation had taken place. But the ordinary British member of Parliament was still far from being educated up to that standard of political and economic wisdom. Hence, notwithstanding the efforts of a group of the most enlightened statesmen of the time, the United States was thereafter to be treated as a rival foreign power. This involved the rather peculiar attitude that much of what had previously been regarded as a very natural and profitable trade must henceforth be treated as an equally unnatural and unprofitable one. Indirectly, Pitt managed to preserve a pretty free inland trade between Canada and the adjoining American States. The Navigation Laws, however, prevented the same freedom of trade by sea, much to the injury of the West Indies, which had formerly depended on the revolted colonies for their supplies. It was sought to bodily transfer this trade in West Indian supplies to the remaining British North American colonies, to the immense disadvantage of the West Indies and without any commensurate benefit to the northern colonies. From that time on, notwithstanding that the Colonial System was occasionally relaxed, only to be enforced again, the West Indian trade declined. From being the source and centre of an immensely profitable British trade, it sank gradually into decay, so that when the Colonial System was finally abolished it had become so hopelessly broken and scattered that it could not be recovered. Thus, too, the British North American colonies, in whose interests the West Indies were sacrificed, found no permanent advantage in the sacrifice. In fact, so far as they benefited from the loss to the West Indies, it was simply a case of killing a fat steer for the sake of the hide and the horns. Yet the persistence with which they clamoured at the gates of the Home Government for these perquisites, and the unanswerable argument which they drew from the Navigation Laws and the Colonial

System, furnish an interesting if somewhat tragic chapter in colonial history.

The movement towards the reform of the British Commercial and Colonial Systems, which Pitt had inaugurated and with which Fox, his political opponent, was in complete sympathy, was arrested at the outbreak of the French Revolution. No further reforms of a systematic nature could be attempted until the close of the great struggle with France in 1815. Pitt, however, made a treaty with the United States in 1794, which was the first serious legal encroachment upon the Navigation Acts and the Colonial System, and which was of great advantage to Britain during the war. Nevertheless, it was bitterly opposed by the supporters of the old imperial system, and by those whose special interests were furthered by it. So long as Pitt and Fox lived, the profitable alliance between the American traders, with their advantages as belonging to a neutral power, and the English manufacturers, who supplied the goods with which to trade, was maintained. It was the profits on her rapidly developing industries which enabled Britain, almost single-handed, to defy the combinations and coalitions effected by Napoleon. However, no sooner were those great statesmen removed by death in 1806, than the clamours of the ultra-loyal devotees of the Colonial System and the Navigation Acts, were renewed with great vigour. The weak hands into which the Government of the country had passed, were forced, and the celebrated Orders in Council began their unreasonable course, bringing out the equally absurd Decrees on the part of Napoleon, between them, destroying the neutral trade and ultimately precipitating war between Britain and the United States. During the suspension of intercourse by sea between the United States and Britain, preceding the war of 1812, Canada enjoyed the first of those unnatural bursts of commercial prosperity, due to the forcing of trade between the United States and some other part of the Empire out of its normal channels and into Canadian routes, first by way of Lake Champlain and Montreal, and, later on, by way of the western lakes and the St. Lawrence as well.

After the American Revolution, the British Government had formally renounced the right to tax the British colonies, except for the regulation of trade. The proceeds of these regulative duties were to form part of the revenue of the colony on whose trade they were laid. The other

New Phase of Colonial Policy

portions of the Colonial System were, as we have seen, maintained in their theoretic completeness, and, what is of special significance, they were more thoroughly enforced among the remaining colonies than ever before. To conciliate the colonies, however, the Home Government entered upon a new policy of lavish expenditure in them, and sought also more consciously and directly to build up a system of preferential treatment of colonial produce in the British markets, and in the markets of the other colonies.

In this process very special attention was paid to the remaining colonies in British North America, and to Canada in particular. They obtained preferences and bounties not granted to any other colonies. Thus, for instance, the great preferential systems built up in connection with timber and grain, were never extended to the more distant colonies of Australia, New Zealand, and Cape Colony. Yet these were rivals with British North America in the securing of British immigrants, and were so much more distant from the home markets, that all the arguments advanced in favour of Canada should have told still more strongly in their favour. Nevertheless, the remarkable fact remained, that the Australasian colonies, though infant industries in the colonial business, unpreferred, unprotected, and seriously handicapped, in competition with the long established, highly preferred, elaborately protected, and much nearer colonial establishments of British North America, drew off increasing numbers of immigrants, and, during the latter period of the old Colonial System, were more flourishing and more attractive to emigrants than the American colonies.

Now when we look for the ultimate cause of these remarkable preferential differences, we find that they were due, not to any special desire to favour Canada above all other colonies, but to the connection of Canada with certain strong commercial and shipping interests in Britain itself, who industriously exploited the Colonial System for its own benefit, and enlisted its clients in British North America in the same cause.

In tracing the growth of the preferential system in British North America, we observe that these colonies

Preferential Duties on Timber

inherited from those which had revolted, certain moderate bounties upon timber, hemp, and other naval stores. But, in the matter of timber in particular, these advantages were greatly increased by the preferential system introduced, during the Napoleonic wars, to favour the British shipping and colonial timber interests. As this policy built up a considerable timber and shipping trade with British North America, important vested interests were established in Britain and the colonies, which steadily resisted all attempts to reduce the favours granted. These preferences were modified from time to time, but even as late as 1840 they ranged from five hundred to one thousand per cent, over the rival supplies from the Baltic.

The good and evil effects of the timber preferences, upon Canada and New Brunswick, were hotly debated in those colonies. The capitalists engaged in the timber trade were mainly British residents, who, as one of them confessed before the Colonial Committee, in 1828, and as was frequently pointed out by others, when they made their money remitted it to Britain and ultimately retired there to live. The advantages of the preferences to

the British capitalists and ship owners were admitted by all. But, as to the colonies themselves, the results were of a very mixed character. The timber trade did not, as a rule, contribute to stable and permanent settlement, while it commonly drew away many settlers from the regular cultivation of their farms, and demoralized social and family life. On their return to the settlements from shanty life, too many of the lumbermen spent their money in riotous living, much to the detriment of the morals of the country. The chief contribution which the industry made to the country was in enlarging the home market for grain and salt meat, with which the shanties were supplied. But this was a small return for numerous social and economic injuries, and the destruction of vast areas of the finest timber lands in the world. This destruction was largely due to the most wasteful treatment of the forests. The cutting of only the choicest timber, over wide areas, furnished sufficient dry brush to feed the fires which destroyed the remainder of it. As was pointed out by several of the most public spirited Canadians of that period, the fact that most of the capital derived from the timber industry did not remain in the colonies, accounted in considerable measure for the slow development of Canada as compared with the neighbouring States. Looking at the timber trade from beginning to end of its preferential treatment, it must be admitted that it was of very questionable benefit to Canada even at the time, while, with reference to the future of the country, it simply encouraged the most wanton waste and destruction of one of the most valuable resources which Canada possessed. On the other hand, much of the lavish expenditure of the British Government in Canada was not of a capitalistic nature, and did little or nothing to develop the country. Only part of what was spent on roads and canals was of a productive character.

We turn now to the effects of the Corn Laws and the development of the preferential treatment of colonial grain. When the peace of 1815 had ended the long struggle in Europe and America, it was found that the continent of Europe, in its process of recovery from its exhausted condition, naturally devoted its first energies to agriculture, and sent the produce of its fields to Britain

Preferences on Colonial Wheat

in exchange for manufactured goods. But though the British manufacturers were quite willing to furnish the goods, the British landlords and farmers were not willing that European grain should be received in exchange, since it tended to lower the high price of food, upon which they had prospered. The agricultural interests, being at that time dominant in Parliament, secured the passage of a Corn Law extravagantly severe as compared with anything of the kind which had ever been attempted in Britain. This was the celebrated Corn Law of 1815, under which foreign corn, or meal ground from it, was not permitted to be taken out of bond for home consumption until the average price, per quarter, rose to the following heights: for wheat, 80s. (equivalent to \$2.50 per bushel); rye, pease and beans, 53s.; barley, 40s.; oats, 26s. Above these famine prices, foreign grain might be admitted free.

But it is in this act also that we have the foundation of the subsequent British preferences on colonial food products, though, as far as grain was concerned, they applied only to the colonies of British North America, now included in the Dominion of Canada. The act provided that grain or meal, the growth, produce or manufacture of any British colony or plantation in North America, might be imported for home consumption when the average prices were at or above the following rates per quarter : wheat, 67s. (almost \$2.10 per bushel); rye, etc., 44s.; barley, 33s.; oats, 22s. On wheat this allowed a margin of preference of 13s. per quarter, or nearly 40c. per bush. As grain and provisions were admitted free into Canada from the interior parts of the United States, those portions of the bordering States having an easy communication with Canada were able to share in this preference, not by having their grain sent to Britain, but by having it used as a substitute for the Canadian grain which was sent. But as it was always very uncertain when the price might rise to the point of admitting Canadian grain, the preference was a very speculative boon, and there is no evidence of its affecting beneficially the immigration to Canada.

Immigration at that period was promoted by the direct intervention of the British Government in settling disbanded soldiers in various districts of the colony, much to the misery of many of the veterans, who, after years of military life under the control of their officers, were often quite unfitted to meet the conditions of self-reliant pioneering in the wilds of Canada. Other immigrants came out under the direction of special societies in Britain, in some cases with government assistance and in others without it, the latter usually succeeding best.

The distress in Britain, which followed the imposition of the famine-price Corn Law, led to strong attacks upon the system and numerous efforts to circumvent it. Several propositions were put forward with a view to relieving the prevailing distress without rousing too strongly the all-powerful agrarian interests. In a short treatise on "The Import of Colonial Corn," written by H. T. Colebrooke, and published in 1818, we have apparently the first suggestion of the proposition afterwards carried out by Mr. Huskisson. It was to the effect that, instead of prohibiting colonial grain until the price rose to a certain height and then admitting it free, colonial grain and flour should be admitted at any time, either at a moderate minimum duty, or on a reasonable sliding scale of duties. In support of this policy he urges that it is well to encourage emigration to the colonies

and to promote in them the production of food and raw materials for the use of the Mother Country, and by this means to encourage an increasing market for British manufactured goods. It is significant, however, that such advocates of the colonial preferential trade as Mr. Colebrooke, were setting it forth as an important step towards free trade, both within the Empire and between it and the rest of the world, whereas it is now being proposed as an important step towards an extension of protection. Thus the old and the new advocates meet at the same cross-roads, but travelling in opposite directions. It is worth noting that the preferences on colonial timber came as part of the old British policy of protection, whereas the preferences on grain were all concessions to the coming British policy of free trade.

However, in 1818, the supporters of extreme protection and of the rigid enforcement of the Navigation Laws and the old Colonial System were still altogether in the ascendency. Hence no further relaxation of the Corn Law was permitted, even in favour of the colonies. On the contrary, there arose trouble with the United States once more over a more rigid enforcement of the Navigation Laws, in the matter of carrying produce from the United States to the West Indies. Though, under certain conditions, provisions might pass from the United States to the West Indies, American vessels were not permitted to carry them. This dispute led, in 1818, to the suspension of traffic between the United States and the West Indies, much to the injury of the latter, but with a certain benefit to the shipping interests of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and, to a certain extent, of Canada as well. This abnormal situation was relieved in 1823 when trade between the United States and the British American colonies was permitted in ships of either country, though the trade must be a direct one and confined to certain specified articles.

In the meantime the Canada Trade Act of 1822 had been passed, which for the first time imposed duties on produce passing into Canada from the United States. The rates imposed were: on wheat flour, 5s. per bbl., on rye, pea, or bean meal, 2s. 6d. per bbl. Wheat was left free, but rye, pease and beans were taxed 7d. per bushel. Horses, cattle, and live stock generally, were taxed ten per cent. There were also various duties imposed upon lumber and staves. The result of these impositions, together with the resumption of direct trade between the United States and the West Indies, though subject to an import tariff, was to greatly reduce the St. Lawrence trade in American produce. This led to much vigorous protest on the part of the Canadian grain and produce merchants and shippers. On the other hand, the tax upon American products coming into Canada did not in any way benefit the Canadian farmer. There was therefore a general discontent over this preferential measure.

Huskisson's New Colonial Policy

This encouraged Mr. Huskisson in his new move in the direction of greater freedom of trade and the modification of the Navigation Laws. Mr. Huskisson, in fact, had resumed once more the line of policy which had been begun by Chatham and carried forward by his son, the great Pitt, but interrupted by the prolonged struggle in Europe.

Huskisson's comprehensive policy of 1825 comprised three important features. First, a change in the Colonial System; second, the adoption of a system of freer trade in materials employed in British industry; third, a revision and relaxation of the Navigation Laws.

In the case of the old Colonial System, as pointed out by Huskisson, the ideal aimed at was imperial unity and the confining of the trade of the colonies to the Mother Country. But he maintains that this means the sacrifice of the interests of both the colonies and the Mother Country. The former English colonies in America, now the United States, have immensely prospered under commercial freedom, and British trade with them has greatly increased also. Of late the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America have achieved their freedom. It would therefore be impossible to keep the English colonies as closely tied up as before. If they are given greater freedom of trade they will prosper in proportion, and that will be to the benefit of Great Britain also. By the act of 1823, in addition to a greater freedom of trade with the United States by sea, the colonies were permitted to send certain of their products directly to the other countries of Europe, and to receive directly from these European countries certain specified goods of their own production. However, in the case of all countries except the United States, the shipping in which this trade is conducted must be British. This restriction he would now abolish and leave only the trade between Britain and her colonies, and between one colony and another, to be wholly conducted in British ships. He also proposes to extend to certain ports in the colonies the bonding and warehousing system, in order that the colonies may trade with the other islands and countries in America as advantageously as the United States now does. He will seek to give the West Indies also a wider scope.

With reference to Canada he had a special proposition to make, namely, to admit the grain of that country at all

Reduced Duty on Canadian Wheat

times to the British market on payment of a fixed duty of 5s. per quarter. This proposal was carried out in the special act of 1825. The result of this measure was to introduce a very decided preference on Canadian grain in Britain. Much rejoicing was indulged in throughout Canada and great expectations were entertained as to the

immediate expansion of the country, through the influx of immigrants, the extensive settlements of new lands, and so forth.

Now what would have been the effect of this preference alone it is impossible at this time to say. We have, indeed, a few years later, the opinions of those who were most interested in it and had most experience of its workings, and these are to the effect that it was and had been a failure. But the fact is that several other striking advantages to Canada wholly or partially coincided with the introduction of this preference. In the first place, the very great freedom of colonial trade which was secured by Huskisson's general policy, gave a stimulus to Canadian trade and assisted in introducing a new era of prosperity. Again, the Canada Company had just been formed to take over great tracts of new lands in western Canada, and they set themselves actively and intelligently to work to promote immigration for their own special advantage. The immigrants they introduced were for the most part a very excellent class. Altogether, the operations of the company's first and best period furnish a close parallel to those of the American syndicates who have introduced such a large number of the very best settlers into our North-West. Further, at this time the British Government undertook some very extensive public works in Canada, chief of which was the Rideau Canal, involving the expenditure of large amounts of British capital in the country, thereby greatly stimulating employment for labour and encouraging all kinds of trade. Then, too, from 1826 to 1831, there arose another difficulty between England and the United States over port dues in the trade with the West Indies, resulting once more in the complete suspension of direct trade between American and West Indian ports. Once again, therefore, the West Indies were forced to get their produce partly from British North America, and partly from the United States, round by the Canadian route. Needless to say this was a very serious handicap on West Indian trade and aided much in its destruction. Incidentally, however, it had the effect of causing the British Government to abolish the duties on the import of American produce to Canada which passed out through the St. Lawrence route. This, then, added for a time an extra stimulus to the trade and shipping, not only of Canada, but of the ports of the Maritime Provinces as well.

Under this remarkable combination of favourable circumstances, Canada enjoyed a very prosperous period from 1827 to 1832. But in 1831 normal trade relations between the United States and the West Indies were resumed, and one artificial stimulus was taken away. By this time also most of the public works undertaken by the British Government were completed and another fountain of wealth ceased to flow. Moreover, the rapid development of the trade of the Erie Canal, which had been stimulated by the refusal on the part of Britain to permit the Americans to navigate the St. Lawrence, drew off the greater part of the American western trade from Canadian channels. Incidentally this shows how other adjustments quite obliterated the influence of even so enormous a nominal preference as was granted to Canadian grain in Britain, with the free use of American grain in Canada as a substitute.

Another important consideration is to be sought a little

Relations with United States

further back. The British Corn Law had immensely stimulated the development of manufacturing industry in the United States, and was the chief factor in converting that country from its strong free trade policy, which it had inherited from its colonial days, to an equally strong protectionist one. Yet, even under free trade the Americans had steadily developed vigorous manufactories, and must have continued to do so in a greater degree whatever might be their fiscal policy. However, the Corn Law imposed by the country from which the United States bought the greater part of its manufactured goods, virtually forced the Americans to adopt the policy of establishing the factory alongside the farm, much more rapidly and extensively than would otherwise have been the case. The situation, of course, furnished an irresistible plea for protection to native industry quite beyond its real needs. Had Britain granted freedom of trade with the United States and permitted the continued exchange of manufactured goods for food and raw materials, though she could not have checked the steady and normal development of American manufacturing industry, yet she would undoubtedly have prevented its abnormal expansion. This expansion represented a tax laid upon the people of the United States, but, owing to the great gifts of nature which they inherited, no nation was ever better able to bear such a tax, and, as already stated, when they entered upon that policy they had no alternative.

But, if Britain forced the American development out of one line, she was still able to take advantage of it in another. If she could not export so many goods, she could at least export men and capital, and ultimately their prosperity made a large market for many British goods, in spite of protectionist tariffs. In the Southern States, whence Britain freely took cotton in return for goods, even in the face of the tariff, we see the opposite of these conditions, and, till recently, the free trade tendencies of the Southern States have been fully recognized. In the end, probably both Britain and the United States have prospered quite as much, if not more, in virtue of the actual line of American development, as would have been the case in virtue of any other. Certainly no country's development has been less disturbed by tariffs than that of the United States. There a high protective tariff is chiefly a matter of domestic concern. It causes an unequal division of the joint product of the people, but does not lessen its aggregate amount, and even those most unfairly treated have still plenty to live on. In this unequal

division, too, British capital invested in the United States is usually on the side which obtains the lion's share. For many years past Britain has been bringing home from the United States a large national income, for which, of course, she does not require to make any corresponding return in exports, and which has also furnished her with the means for making many new investments in other parts of the world.

However, at the time with which we are dealing, great as was the stimulus given to Canadian development, most of which unfortunately was temporary and external, the expansion of agriculture, trade, industry, and immigration in the States of the middle west was much more remarkable. It continued also throughout most of the thirties, with such vigour, that it attracted much the greater part of the new British immigration to America, which often merely used the Canadian route as a highway to the west. As the political troubles of Canada, aggravated by the reaction from the late prosperity, continued to increase during this period, an extensive exodus of Canadian settlers took place, these carrying with them, as was complained at the time, much of the wealth of the country, and greatly crippling the banks. Under the various influences combined, the United States expansion became a veritable boom, which inevitably ended in the financial crisis of 1837. But once that was over progress was resumed once more.

Now during all this period it was freely admitted that the high nominal preference on Canadian grain in the *Value of the Preference on Wheat*

British markets had little to do with the prosperity of the period from 1827 to 1832, and certainly did not mitigate the distress which marked the period from 1832 to 1841. The general disappointment over the results of the preference found several expressions in official form. Thus in 1840, when the imperial trade situation was once more under review, the House of Assembly of Upper Canada sent a petition to the Queen reviewing the agricultural situation. It pointed out that the United States markets for grain were often better than those of Canada. But as they were protected by a tariff the Canadians could not take full advantage of them, (as a matter of fact much Canadian grain was sent to the United States). Again, when there is a demand for Canadian wheat in Britain, American wheat comes in to supply the local market, and thus prevents the Canadian agriculturist from having an additional advantage from his own market. With reference to the value of the existing preference to Canada they state: "Your Majesty's faithful Commons are aware that the products of these colonies are admitted into the ports of the Mother Country at a duty of 5s. per quarter, when wheat is below an average of 67s. per quarter; but from the expenses of transportation from the interior to the sea, and thence to the United Kingdom, experience proves they derive very little advantage from this protection."

They also maintained that they did not derive much advantage from the preference established for them in the West Indies, because the distances were too great. They therefore look to the Mother Country to grant them still further favours, to offset the disadvantages in agriculture under which they labour, and which, they claim, are sending immigrants to the States instead of to Canada. First, they want home protection for their agricultural produce to the same extent as in the United States, no duties, however, to be levied on such American grain as comes to Canada to be re-exported to foreign countries. Secondly, they ask that a still greater preference on Canadian grain be given in the British market, by taking off the duty of 5s. per quarter at present retained. They make the usual plea of all good colonials that they consume considerable quantities of British manufactured goods and are anxious to consume still more, also that they are subject to the remaining restrictions of the Navigation Laws.

An act was passed in the legislature of Upper Canada in 1840, to impose a duty on American grain coming into Canada, but it was reserved by the governor.

Lord Sydenham, in a despatch to Lord John Russell in 1841, deals with the growing agitation among the agricultural

Further Preference Desired

class in Upper Canada for the protection of their local markets and the abolition of the remaining British duty on Canadian grain and flour. He refers to the conflict of interests in Canada between the millers and the farmers, and points out that the effect of a duty on American grain would be to prevent the Canadian millers from grinding it into flour for local consumption, which permits the Canadian grain to be sent to Britain. However, all parties would be much gratified if the remaining duty on Canadian grain in Britain could be removed.

A new and very extensive form of preference on Canadian milling and shipping interests was urged upon the Home Government in a petition sent, in 1841, from one hundred and seventy-six merchants of Montreal. In this they evidently hoped to take advantage of the free trade movement which was steadily gaining ground in Britain. We hear of these merchants and millers again, for they afterwards made a terrible uproar in Montreal, protesting by all the gods that they were not aware what direction the free trade van was taking when they boarded it. However, they are simply hailing the van at present. They first propose that the present duties on Canadian produce entering the British market shall be repealed, then duties might be levied upon similar produce coming into Canada from the United States. When thus imported and the duties paid, the produce

should be accepted as Canadian, when shipped to the British market. The articles on which they desired this new form of preference were wheat, rye, indian corn, barley, oats, pease, beans, and other grain, and the meal thereof, also beef, pork, butter, and lard.

Some relief had just been granted to the long-suffering West Indies by permitting them to obtain their provisions on a lower tariff. But as this lessened the preference which Canada and the Maritime Provinces enjoyed at their expense, it was met by a storm of opposition from these quarters, and especially from the shipping ports in the Lower Provinces. It was also claimed by the Montreal merchants as a special injury to them, which might be atoned for, however, by the adoption of the proposed scheme of new preferences.

Lord Stanley, the new colonial secretary in Peel's administration, in a despatch to Sir Charles Bagot, the new Canadian governor, in March, 1842, states that there was to be some advance in the Canadian preference by appointing a lower average price, (58s. instead of 67s. per quarter) as the basis for admitting Canadian wheat at nominal rates of duty. Canadian wheat was also to be admitted into Ireland for the first time. The petition of the Montreal merchants and others is shunted with the statement, that the Home Government did not consider it wise to levy a duty on American wheat coming into Canada, and yet they could not admit all wheat from Canada free, because that would include American wheat also. The Canadian politicians, seizing upon this point, determined to leave the Home Government no excuse in the matter. A bill was therefore passed by the Canadian legislature, in 1842, which in its long preamble gives to Lord Stanley's despatch the interpretation, that it "affords the strongest ground for the confident belief and expectation that, upon the imposition of a duty upon foreign wheat imported into this Province, Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to recommend to Parliament the removal or reduction of the duties on wheat and flour imported into the said United Kingdom from Canada." The duty appointed in the Canadian bill was three shillings per quarter on wheat from the United States.

This bill the governor naturally reserved till the policy of the Home Government should be made known. However, the Quebec Board of Trade, growing nervous as to the possibility of Canadian millers and shippers even temporarily falling between the stools, sent a petition to the Home Government, praying that the royal assent might not be given to the Canadian act, until the free importation of wheat from Canada was authorized.

In a speech on colonial relations, Sir Robert Peel had stated that henceforth the colonies were to be treated as an integral part of the British Empire. A committee of the Canadian legislature seizing upon this, made it the foundation of a series of resolutions to be embodied in an address to the Crown. The resolutions show that at that time the Canadian ideal was free trade within the Empire and taxation against the world, except where the world consented to come through Canada.

In substance, these are the resolutions:

1. They are glad to know that Canada is to be treated as an integral part of the Empire.
2. This object can be attained by removing all duties on the products of Canada going into the Mother Country, and the legislature of Canada will take the earliest opportunity, when the state of the Provincial finances will permit, to remove all duties on the manufactures of the Mother Country.
3. They are confident that the revenue from the tolls on the canals when completed, and on foreign commerce, will enable them to do this in a few years.
4. That to secure the transportation of western American produce through the canals, it is necessary to allow a drawback, (of the 3s. duty to be imposed,) on all grain and flour shipped to Britain by the St. Lawrence route whenever the price of flour at Montreal or Quebec exceeds 30s. per bbl.

But, alas, neither the canal tolls, nor the duties on foreign goods, both expected to come out of the Americans, showed any tendency to rise to the happy fulness here indicated, even after the Canadians obtained practically all they had asked for.

As bearing on this series of resolutions and the effort for a larger preference, there is a very interesting memorial which was addressed both to Lord Stanley, and to the Canadian legislature. It emanated from the North American Committee of the Colonial Society. This Colonial Society was the United Empire League of those days, and was as distressed over the impending dissolution of the Empire two generations ago, as its modern representative is to-day, or its predecessor two generations before that. The Committee finds that the greater part of the British emigration to America, and that part, too, which has the most capital and enterprise, steadily goes to the United States. They cannot understand this very well, but think it must be due to the Empire not being sufficiently bound together. They hope, therefore, that the British Government will take Canada more completely under its protection, give it more preferences, and thereby induce more emigrants to go and settle in it. Then, taking another tack, they solemnly warn the Home Government that, unless the American colonies get these preferences on their agricultural produce, and are thereby induced to confine themselves to such lines, they will surely establish manufacturing industries of their own, and levy duties upon British goods. This will be as disastrous to British interests as the similar practices in the Eastern States. Possibly, in his browsings in the colonial office archives, Mr. Chamberlain has been nourishing his mind on documents such as these, before

producing his new plan of imperial unity.

In 1843 Lord Stanley introduced the Canada Corn Bill which, so far as wheat was concerned, was substantially

Final Preference in 1843

the measure so strongly urged upon the Home Government. It was the more easily granted since the majority of the British members of parliament were rapidly gravitating towards free trade. Undoubtedly without the free trade movement, Canada could never have obtained such a heavy preference on her own grain and that of a neighbouring country. It was inevitable, therefore, that the forces which brought this advantage must, in their logical development, soon take it away again.

Though Lord Stanley's hand had been forced by the Canadian legislature, yet in his speech on the measure he found it convenient to represent the bill as the fulfilment of a pledge, contingent upon Canada's complying with certain conditions. Lord Stanley's speech did not correctly represent the previous preferential system on several minor points, but the main fact was made clear, that, by virtue of this new act, Canadian wheat and flour were to be admitted into Britain on payment of a nominal duty of one shilling a quarter. Flour ground from American wheat was to be admitted at the same rate, being counted produce of Canada, while the wheat from which it was ground, when imported to Canada from the United States, would pay a duty of three shillings a quarter. Considering that American grain or flour, sent directly to Britain, would be subject to the Corn Laws, the preference on American wheat ground into flour in passing through Canada was estimated at six shillings per quarter, or nearly twenty cents a bushel. Though this furnished the last and highest of a series of preferences on Canadian grown wheat, yet it had astonishingly little effect upon Canadian agriculture, and certainly did not stimulate immigration. It did, however, give a very decided stimulus to the Canadian flour and grain trade. Large mills were erected in the neighbourhood of Montreal for the purpose of milling American grain in transit. Owing to favourable harvest conditions they did a particularly large business during the years 1846 and 1847. Though the abolition of the Corn Laws, in 1846, was not to take full effect in Canada until 1849, yet the general financial crisis of 1848 came just in time to aggravate the distress of the Montreal millers and shippers. The abolition of the Corn Laws resulted in little or no change for the Canadian farmers, as regards their wheat. They gained considerably, however, in having many of their other agricultural products admitted to the British market, in virtue of the general reduction of duties in 1846. The disturbances in Montreal and the collapse at Quebec were therefore of almost purely local interest.

Free Trade and loss of Preferences

That the Montreal people, notwithstanding the eagerness with which they contributed to their own predicament, should have felt and talked bitterly against the Home Government, was natural enough. Moreover, it had been customary, for twenty years at least, for every faction in Canada when it failed to get what it wanted from the Home Government, and more particularly when it failed to retain what it had previously secured at the expense of some other interest, to threaten the Government with secession and annexation to the United States. In time' this gave rise to the well-founded belief in Britain, that the inevitable fate of the North American colonies was to break off from Britain, and, possibly, join the United States. Thus to take a few instances :—The people of the Maritime Provinces talked ruin and annexation, when they were not allowed to retain, as permanent, their temporary hold upon the trade of the West Indies. The Reformers of Upper Canada talked both independence and annexation, when denied free institutions and responsible government. The Family Compact talked annexation, when they were threatened with the loss of their power through the introduction of responsible government. And the millers and shippers of Montreal talked annexation, when they were deprived of a temporary preference of abnormal proportions, which was made possible by the uneven working out of the free trade movement in Britain. Yet the sequel proved that, when the abnormal attempts to maintain the unity and self-dependence of the Empire, by mutual preferential treatment and other forms of coddling, were abandoned, the true tie which held Britain and her colonies together was revealed, and, being no longer subject to unnatural straining, was greatly strengthened.

We may now sum up a few of the outstanding truths of British colonial development, so far as they affect the

Results of Colonial System

subject in hand. The most successful of all the British colonies, alike in their own interest and in that of the Mother Country, and both in their planting and in their development, were those which exhibited the spirit of enterprising independence and self-realization in the greatest degree. Yet, in doing so, they naturally seemed, to the honest but narrow visioned advocates of a closely bound and self-dependent Empire, as violating the fundamental principles of imperial unity. Also, that the elaborate and well meant system of subsidies and preferences, though much desired, received with gladness, and cherished with great expectations, invariably resulted in disappointment, followed by clamours for still greater favours. Thus, as Sir William Molesworth pointed out in his great speech on the colonies, in 1848, Britain had gradually worked into a system of

subsidizing colonies all round the world, until she was paying them ten shillings on the pound of her exports to them, for the privilege of selling them goods, and even then they were very far from being satisfied. Again, we observe that the policy which Britain so steadily had in mind, of endeavouring to organize the Empire on Mr. Chamberlain's ideal of the preferential non-competition of the parts, completely failed. Yet the policy of the Mother Country in giving preferences on colonial food, timber, and other raw materials, while claiming a preferred right to supply the colonies with manufactured goods in return, seemed highly reasonable at a stage of colonial development unsuited to the production of anything else. Thus the uniform failure of this policy brings us round to the first point again, and emphasizes the fundamental mistake of the old Colonial System. By constantly inducing the colonies to look to the Mother Country for their economic lead and assistance, and thus making them dependent upon her for their welfare, the colonies were, unconsciously no doubt, but still inevitably, prevented from developing any real economic independence and self-reliance. Their look was always an outward, waiting look, not an inward, resourceful one. The colonial politicians looked to the Mother Country as the source of their power and the justification of their rule. They owed their authority and acknowledged their responsibility, not to the people of the colony in which they lived, and whose chief offices they held, but to the far away authorities of the Mother Country.

The few wealthy men conducting the chief businesses in the principal colonial towns were inclined, though not always explicitly, to regard themselves as in the colony rather than of it. Though faithfully doing their duty by the colony while in it, yet they expected some day to retire with most of what they had made and live a fuller life at the centre of the Empire. Only the common people, labouring in the fields, toiling in the woods, or discharging the more varied functions of the towns, looked upon the colony as of necessity their home. But even they too had acquired the outward glance. They looked eagerly across the Atlantic for all economic direction, encouragement, and bounty. Even after they had been stirred up to achieve political self-management they still looked to Britain for economic support and guidance.

To the south of them they saw others of their own race and birth exhibiting no end of enterprise, turning everything to account, overcoming obstacles with ingenuity and perseverance, using crude devices at first and more refined and ingenious inventions as experience, means, and opportunity provided. The contrast has been noted by every traveller who has left his impressions, and by many Canadians also to whom it was a standing puzzle. But it was simply the difference between a people whose "America is here or nowhere," and a people who looked beyond the seas for those preferences and bounties, so easily to be supplied by the rich motherland.

Now the Canadians were by no means incapable of activity, enterprise, and invention. All that they required was that the spell of imperial economic dependence should be broken, and that emancipation was secured for them by the free traders. Canada had achieved political selfgovernment, the Mother Country gave her economic selfgovernment. In this latter emancipation, it was not merely that the colonies were deprived of their preferences and bounties. They were released from the corresponding trammels imposed upon their freedom of trade in the interest of the Mother Country. They were relieved of the restrictions of the Colonial System and the Navigation Acts. They were free to trade where they liked, with whom they liked, and in whatever ships they liked. Even when, later, Canada and some of the other colonies, contrary to the free trade principles of the Mother Country, imposed increasing tariffs on her goods, though she remonstrated yet she consented to permit the colonies to work out their own fiscal salvation. Only the treaty making power remained unquestioned in Britain's hands until quite recently.

Results of Colonial Emancipation

When the colonies which now compose Canada had recovered from their astonishment, and even dismay, they self-reliantly set to work, and with such growing zest as to surprise even themselves. The situation was admirably summed up by the Honourable (later Sir) A. T. Galt. Writing in 1859, when he was Minister of Finance, and ten years after the consternation of 1849, he said : " Under such distressing circumstances, the only hope lay in the fact that the people had at last the management of their own affairs; and with a country abounding in natural resources, a vigorous and self-reliant effort would yet overcome all obstacles, and restore, upon a more healthy basis, that prosperity which had hitherto been sought through favours granted by Great Britain to her colonies, at the expense of her own people. Canada accepted the policy of England as necessary for the welfare of the Empire; she ceased all applications for aid to be granted to the detriment of others; and she has applied herself to the task of developing her institutions and her resources with a vigour, determination and success, that have rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any other country."

The change was, indeed, most remarkable, and can be fully appreciated only by those who have dipped into the details of the period. As put by another wide awake Canadian of that time, Mr. Thomas C. Keefer, the people aroused themselves from their "ancient lethargy" and began to discover themselves and their country. Here it is impossible to even enumerate the great schemes for the development and expansion of the country which, within a few years, were afloat all over western Canada. Railroads were planned in every direction, and begun in many, notably in the case of the Grand Trunk and Great Western systems. The large canal system, the

outcome of the union of the provinces, was just completed, and further extensions were planned. British capital was being introduced in large amounts. Industries were to be established in every town. Immigrants arrived in great numbers, and land values rose to unheard of heights. Every farmer bought more land, and in a few years the ideas of the people had quite outgrown the limits of the old province of Canada. Relieved from their fixed gaze across the Atlantic, they turned their eyes westward for the first time, and beheld the great plains of the Hudson Bay territories. Scouts were sent in hot haste to spy out the land, and such glowing reports were received that a cry went up from the whole people, demanding that the great west be added to Canada. Before the sleepy old Hudson's Bay Company could quite realize what was afoot, the Canadian legislature was discussing bills for chartering railroad companies, lavishly endowed with lands over which the Canadian Government had as yet no jurisdiction, to connect Lake Superior with the Pacific Ocean. Steamboat companies were to be chartered to navigate the Manitoba lakes and the Saskatchewan. A telegraph company was heading for Alaska to connect with Europe by way of Russia, Japan, China, and India. Of course the east was not neglected either, for the Intercolonial Railway was one of the earliest projects, and the long dreamed of confederation of the British North American colonies was now regarded as simply a matter of details.

Such are merely sample phases of the remarkable transformation wrought in the Canadian people, hypnotized for over half a century by the practical operation of an imperial preferential trade system, undertaken in the best of faith and with the most benevolent intentions, but working, as it has in every colonial Empire in the past or present, the subtle and unconscious destruction of independent and self-reliant enterprise.

The exuberant outburst of energy, which followed the political and economic emancipation of the colonies, led to extravagant, and even flatly impossible attempts to immediately realize all the potentialities which had suddenly opened up before them. The Canadians fully participated, therefore, in the world crisis of 1857, after which, sobered though persevering, they held their breath while the American Civil War raged. They began also to realize some of the difficulties of carrying on responsible government with a democracy made up of two very evenly balanced races of different temperaments and ideals. The solving of the problems of confederation absorbed much of the national energy, and in the meantime limited the possibilities of many economic enterprises.

Only after the firm establishment of a single Canadian nationality could there be a free and uninterrupted course for detailed commercial and industrial development.

In the meantime the Mother Country, after it gave
Reciprocity with United States

Canada its economic freedom, managed to secure for her access to the United States markets on reciprocal terms. Considering the economic stage at which Canada had arrived, this proved a very favourable arrangement. It escaped the distinctively paralyzing effects of the imperial economic dependence, inasmuch as no vague, unbusiness like economic benefits were expected, on purely sentimental grounds. It was frankly understood as simply a bargain between friendly, though independent neighbours, dealing on business terms. Still it developed quite a special economic dependence of Canada upon the United States. The American market was for Canada so large as to take off all her surplus produce in several lines, and the most of it in others. Thus for the time the American market largely moulded Canadian expansion. There was, however, no corresponding dependence of the United States upon Canada, because the Canadian was for them a small market. Although, therefore, the reciprocity system might have been fair enough for both countries, yet the American interest in it could not withstand the combined financial and protectionist movement towards a high tariff which followed the close of the Civil War. While, then, Canada suffered severely from the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty, the United States suffered only slightly and locally. But even in this free and businesslike arrangement, it was found, when all was over, that Canada had lost some of her newly acquired independence and self-reliance. Had the Reciprocity Treaty been maintained down to the present, it is very probable that Canada, while expanding in agricultural and extractive industries, would not have shown much tendency to rise to a higher level, and would certainly have sent over to the large commercial centres of the United States a larger stream of her best youth than has actually gone.

It is quite evident, as a general fact, that Canada through her experience of reciprocal trade with the United States had once more centred her affections too completely on mere external aids to prosperity. Her very eagerness to restore reciprocal trade, caused the Americans to suspect that the greater advantage of any such arrangement must be on the side of Canada, hence the impossible concessions asked as the price of it.

This unfortunate tendency to look beyond ourselves and our country for the basis of our prosperity, never showed

The National Policy

itself more distinctly, in later times, than in our great protectionist experiment known as the National Policy. As already stated, protection has never seriously impeded the progress of the United States, because it had acquired the spirit of a persistent, enterprising, and resourceful development of its own natural capacities,

long before it attempted protection, and it has maintained that spirit throughout its protectionist career. Thus, though many individual industries may have tended to stagnate behind the tariff wall, yet they could not survive long amid the sharp competition maintained in mechanical inventions, improved machinery, better business organization, and more effective location. Again, we find, in the newer parts of the country, the steady rise of unprotected infant industries, which not only successfully make a place for themselves but even force their older competitors to rapidly improve their methods, or go to the wall. Despite protection, therefore, American industries have not only kept in the closest touch with the natural resources of their own country, but have led the world in mechanical invention and industrial organization in their distinctive lines. In Canada, however, the same degree of home centred, self-reliant enterprise did not precede the specific adoption of a protectionist system. As a result, the industries which the National Policy brought into existence were simply foreign importations mechanically reproduced. In the majority of cases the motive power, the machinery, and the raw materials were all alike imported. Such industries diligently exploited the tariff, but left the natural resources of the country pretty much where they were. Naturally the whole movement was very disappointing, and, instead of diminishing, rather increased the tendency to look abroad for assistance.

Yet, during this period, we talked incessantly of our great natural resources. Indeed, we may be said to have established, in connection with them, a regular cult, with a certain definiteness of ritual. Of this cult Sir Charles Tupper was undoubtedly the great high priest, and gathered about him quite a number of very proficient disciples after the letter. From many altars, in clouds of words, incense rose continually before our great natural resources. Few Canadians, however, thought of laying sacrilegious hands on these objects of veneration. Still, we were quite willing that others should do so. Indeed we industriously proclaimed the unparalleled opportunities for acquiring riches which these resources presented. But the world remained most provokingly calm and incredulous. We stretched our hands alternately to the Mother Country and to the United States. We had fits of imperial federation with Britain, and of commercial union with the United States, glanced timorously at independent realization, but had not the courage to try it. We discussed our destiny at great length, and looked to others to achieve it, raising the Macedonian cry for immigrants and capital. We even bought job lots of immigrants at from ten to twenty dollars a head, but they did not realize us to any great extent. Indeed, they often declined to remain with us, which was, perhaps, among the least of our misfortunes. If only Mr. Chamberlain could have come to us in those days, with his gospel of rural contentment for the colonies, we might have become another New Zealand, chuckling in country newspapers of how our exiled Canadian intelligence was coming to the front in the neighbouring Republic.

But no Chamberlain arose, and, in the quiet neglect of the outside world, attention was drawn to the few Canadians

New Industrial Enterprise

who were slowly making a success of native industries. Others took heart and joined them, taking hold of raw materials tumbling out at their very feet, and discovering that, for the man of insight, they contained mints of money. A new and better spirit spread over the country, until we have at last evolved a considerable body of really live and enterprising Canadian manufacturers and financiers, who have an enlightened faith in the country, earnestly searching for knowledge abroad, but applying it with intelligence and discrimination at home.

On tariff matters, it is true, even enterprising manufacturers have nearly as little scruple in hoodwinking the public, as their fellow-tradesmen of the National Policy stamp, who live by the tariff alone. With an exterior of exemplary seriousness they will unburden themselves of such hardships as this. In manufacturing article A, where they use articles B and C as necessary raw materials, they have regularly to pay the normal price for these, plus the duty, while they have to sell their own article in competition with foreigners who pay the duty, and slaughter as well. With equal solemnity manufacturers of B and C tell exactly similar stories.

However, where we have genuine wide-awake enterprise once fully enlisted in the industries of a country, the abnormal taxation of a high tariff is likely to be of comparatively short duration. In living industrial communities, free trade in capital has come to be of far more importance than free trade in goods. If industries are exacting abnormal rates behind the shelter of a tariff wall, capital will come in from without and establish similar industries on a newer and larger scale, furnishing the others with a type of competition at their own doors very much more severe than any operating from over the national borders. It is the protection of exotic industries in a stagnant country that offers the consumer no hope but in the exodus.

Already we have industries in Canada which are able to hold their own in world markets, as well as in home markets, and the protection of such industries will do as little harm, and about as little good, as the protection of agricultural products.

But once our own people had begun to show confidence in their own country, the world also began to get interested in us. Settlers of a much better class than the Government agents could procure, began to come in of their own accord, and their reports brought others. American capitalists invested in our lands to very large

amounts, going about the settlement and cultivation of them in a business-like way. Native and foreign capital alike, is rapidly picking up our most available raw materials and water powers, and beginning to make effective use of them. In view of these developments the anxiety about reciprocity is rapidly growing on the American side of the line. But we can afford to be quite calm on the subject. We have got beyond the stage at which we must have reciprocity at any price. Moreover, we can no longer afford to consider that form of reciprocity which will simply relieve us of raw materials and furnish us with manufactured goods. If we are foolish enough to go in for that, we might as well fall into the hands of Mr. Chamberlain.

The trouble with both the American and the imperialist view of the Canadian future is, that it is to be of the saw

Canada and New Imperial Preference

log, pulp wood, and wheat growing type, with a great market for manufactured goods; and the only question is, who is to capture that market? That a manufacturing future is plainly not suited to our condition, is what Mr. Chamberlain insinuates in the most flattering terms. On grounds of sentiment, of imperial unity, and, finally, of selfinterest, we should be willing to leave the manufacturing to the Mother Country. But, in the first place, sentiment or loyalty affords a very precarious basis on which to do business, or, as in this case, to refrain from doing business. In fact, no more effective method of corrupting, and ultimately discrediting all imperial sentiment could be devised, than to begin trafficking on it. What the imperial preferential advocates, on the two sides of the Atlantic, are trying to do is to divide an expected mutual benefit in such a fashion, that each party shall receive about three-fourths of it, on the ground that the other must concede something extra for the sake of sentiment. A sample of the way in which each party manages to get the best of the bargain may be taken. In Canada we are encouraged to interpret the preference of six cents a bushel on wheat as meaning, that for every bushel of wheat we sell to Britain we shall get six cents more than formerly, or than we should have got without the preference. It is entirely on the strength of this that we are told our vacant lands will be settled. The people of Britain, however, are assured most earnestly that, notwithstanding the imposition of the proposed duty, the price of wheat will not be raised, since it can be shown very clearly that the foreigner pays the duty. In other words, while the price of wheat in Britain will remain practically what it was before the duty was imposed the foreigner will take less for his supply. But the British workman is further told, that the Canadian, in gratitude for not being taxed on his grain, and more particularly on account of his imperial enthusiasm, intends to open up his markets to British goods, devoting himself chiefly to growing wheat, and will thereby greatly increase work for the British artisan and augment his wage fund. Thus the foreigner will pay his taxes, and the colonial furnish him with wages, and his master with profits. As seen from the Canadian point of view, however, the only return which we are to make for the extra six cents a bushel on our wheat is, not to sacrifice our home market to Britain, but to so re-adjust our tariff that we shall divide between Britain and ourselves that portion of our trade which now goes to the foreigner, and the chief foreigner is, of course, the United States. But when we look at the details of our imports from the United States, and see how the millions are chiefly made up of payments for coal, raw cotton, corn, wheat, raw tobacco, cattle, and other live stock, petroleum, twine, carriages, machinery, settlers' effects, fish, farm implements, India rubber, coin and bullion, etc., etc., the irony of the situation is very fine, and the imperial sentiment which infuses it all, is most suggestive of future unity and affection.

As attention is chiefly drawn in Canada to the expected benefits from the preference on wheat, we may look into

The Preference on Wheat and Immigration

that a little more closely. A duty of two shillings a quarter, or six cents a bushel, on foreign wheat imported into the British market, is expected to cause such a stream of immigration to set in to Canada, that it will fill up our North-West lands, make Canada the granary of the Empire, and in a few years render Britain independent of the rest of the world for her food supply. Now, in the first place, this implies that without some such premium on immigration, Canadian territory will attract few settlers, or, competing on even terms with the rest of the world, it must remain uninhabited. Now, though this idea has been published abroad, and emphasized in all sorts of ways in the interest of Imperialism, yet none more false or injurious to the reputation of the country could have been circulated. Any one who knows the facts knows that our lands have been taken up with unusual avidity. Settlement is taking place at a remarkable rate, and the lands are rapidly rising in value. Yet all this has been going on for some years without any preference at all, and is certain to continue in as great a measure as is at all safe or wise, until a series of poor harvests may be encountered, such as may come to any country, and which may check the rate of settlement for a time. Before the recent series of good harvests had established the reputation of the country, our Immigration Department tried all manner of bribery, persuasion, and demonstration of phenomenal returns from farming, compared with which a mere bonus of six cents a bushel would be of small moment, yet all in vain till the actual harvests were produced.

Again, those who know anything of the motives and forces which actuate the settlers now flocking into our

West, know that it is not a question of a few cents a bushel that determines their incoming or location. The right kind of settler does not come to a country as potatoes go to market. He is a home-seeker to begin with, and he chooses his location for very complex reasons, of which climate, soil, transportation, social life, future prospects of the district, are important elements. Thus settlers flock into the Edmonton district, for instance, in preference to regions much further to the east, and much nearer to market, and take eight to twelve cents a bushel less for their produce than can be had in eastern districts, where plenty of land is still to be had, and is declared to be just as good. Similar facts, as we have seen, upset all calculations as to the effects expected from the preferences on Canadian grain in the older period.

Further, no one can possibly tell how a tax of two shillings a quarter put upon wheat in Britain will be distributed. The sources of the British food supply are too varied, and the conditions affecting them too complex to enable any one to say how far the variations in supply and in price may be due to the duty, and how far to other conditions, varying with seasons and countries. While, then, we may admit, in general terms, that the proportion in which the British consumer suffers will be the proportion, though not the quantity, in which Canada as a whole will benefit, yet there will be no telling just what that proportion is, nor how much of what comes to Canada will get as far as the pocket of the farmer. Thus, the effect of the duty being, at the distance of our North-West, hopelessly blended with the ordinary variations in prices, it can have no real influence upon immigration to Canada, which must be determined along the usual lines in America for the past three-quarters of a century.

Again, the ideal of becoming the granary of the Empire is constantly held up to Canada, both here and in Britain, as the guiding star of our ambition, the achievement of

The Granary of the Empire

our destiny. Concerning this picture of our future, one may have the patience to say that any Canadian who finds himself able to accept such an ideal must have a very curious conception of the real greatness of the British Empire, or what it means to have a self-respecting share in it. Doubtless, for all time, the world will cherish the glorious legacy of Athens; but what idea of Athenian greatness had those bucolic barbarians from the north who supplied the city with grain? Under suitable conditions rural life is quite consistent with the richest possibilities of civilization, as Britain herself proves. But the agricultural life, to be adequate, requires a varied industrial and commercial accompaniment, as a support for those elements of civilization which only towns and cities can supply, and in more or less intimate contact with which the best rural life must be developed. The agricultural life is followed by some of the highest and by some of the lowest types of humanity, and the actual sources of the British food supply well illustrate the social range of commercial agriculture. Outside of a few distributing centres, therefore, the people who make agriculture their national occupation must inevitably stagnate intellectually. Whatever spiritual capacities they may have will be lost to themselves and the world, for though they may vegetate they will neither blossom nor bear fruit.

Now, there is no virtue in belonging to the British Empire unless we have a share in its civilization, joining the Mother Country in its cosmopolitan intercourse with the leading nations of the world. But Canada, as the granary of the Empire, precludes all this for the immense majority of her people. Situated as our country is, it means that, in the course of time, most of the enterprising spirits born into the country will leave it, seeking the larger and fuller life elsewhere. Indeed, do we not know places in Canada to-day, where, in virtue of two or three generations of culling out through the exodus, such a condition has been produced, that not even the trumpet of the angel Gabriel could rouse the remaining population from its bucolic slumber?

But what is to be gained by making Canada the granary of the Empire? To this the usual answer is, that Britain may be insured a complete food supply from within her own Empire, and thus avoid all danger from starvation in time of war. But, if Britain is not at war in America, she will not be in any danger of starvation, under present conditions; and if she should be at war with the United States, it is obvious that her dependence upon Canada for her food supplies would be the most unfortunate situation conceivable. For, conceding to our warriors that Canada would have no difficulty in disposing of any possible American invasion of a general nature, yet it would not be difficult for a concentrated force from the United States, choosing its own point of attack over hundreds of miles, to seize and hold one or two positions on the line of communication between west and east, and thus permanently interrupt all transfers of grain from the interior to the sea. Obviously, the wisest policy for Britain, in view of possible wars, must be to maintain as large and varied a source of food supplies as possible. Equally wise is her present effort to enlarge her source of supply for cotton, or other important raw materials.

One need only suggest, also, what difficulties Britain would encounter, if she came to depend almost entirely upon Canada for bread, when, for any reason, there might be such a shortage of the wheat crop in the North-West as to leave Canada little more than enough for her own

Canadian Destiny

needs. Various other difficulties stand in the way of Canada being the granary of the Empire; but the

supreme objection must ever be that Canada cannot accept for herself any such blighted destiny. The self-interest of our eastern manufacturers is likely to save us in part, but it is also inclined to encourage such a fate for the greater West. It is with great regret, from the national point of view, that one observes the narrow and shortsighted conception of the West entertained by a considerable section of the eastern manufacturers. They evidently regard it as a vast region to be filled with agriculturists growing grain and meat for the British market, and to be enclosed with a sufficiently high tariff-wall to make it a close preserve for their goods. This is merely an attempt to do for the west of Canada what Mr. Chamberlain proposes to do for the whole of it. Fortunately for our national future, those manufacturers who cannot recognize the folly and shortsightedness of their attitude are certain to receive poetic justice. Already there is abundant evidence that American capitalists, and some wide-awake Canadians also, will speedily avail themselves of the opportunity to establish industries at favourable centres throughout the West, when the population reaches such numbers as will insure a sufficient market.

Throughout the great border-land between mountain and prairie, some of the vast coal deposits are already being worked, the iron deposits are being investigated; there are many other economic minerals and plenty of wood, as well as opportunities for obtaining other raw materials. Here, then, is as wide and convenient a basis for manufacturing as in the east, and it depends very much upon the policy of the eastern Canadians as to whether its development is to be somewhat prematurely forced, or to be allowed to proceed naturally. But, that the Canadian west will develop industries as surely as the American west, is quite certain, and neither Mr. Chamberlain's scheme, nor its rival eastern Canadian counterpart can prevent it.

For a time the surplus of Canadian grain will increase, and will flow to the British market, preference or no preference. But, as our industries develop and are able to reach out beyond our own shores in increasing volume, the home market for food will begin to overtake the home supply, and we shall more and more leave the feeding of the Mother Country to the less progressive peoples, be they within or without the Empire. So far as we continue to sell food to Britain, it will consist of the higher grade agricultural products and what may be called the manufactured, or specially prepared foods.

We have, therefore, to frankly warn the Mother Country that, whether we adopt a revenue tariff or a *Canada's Economic Relation to Britain* protectionist tariff, we cannot undertake to reserve any portion of our market for her benefit. On the contrary we propose to produce everything that we can for our own use, and for any other markets that are in want of them. At the same time, if Britain continues, as she has long done, to treat our goods more generously than other nations do, we ought very properly to grant her favours in our markets. But these favours must depend upon our own judgment and our own convenience, and be subject to change with these; admitting, of course, the same liberty in the Mother Country. We thus avoid all mutual deception, raise no false expectations, and demand no sacrifices. We avoid, in other words, evils incident to every scheme of Imperialism, old or new.

The special inducements which Canada has to offer to the people of Britain are addressed rather to her capitalist than to her tradesmen. We invite them to be partners in our future development. But, in the interest at once of our country's reputation and of their profits, we would respectfully advise them to employ experienced Canadians or Americans in managing their investments, rather than fellow-countrymen unacquainted with the conditions of Canada. If, however, British capitalists do not care to take advantage of the opportunity to share in our industrial progress, then they cannot complain if, in the near future, they find our perennial sources of power and our large reserves of raw materials passing into the possession of American capitalists. Their chagrin may not be lessened, either, when they observe the American capitalists, under the protection of prospective higher Canadian tariffs, enabled to draw increasing revenues from both man and nature.

Australia, Cape Colony, and New Zealand, owing to their natural conditions, may be confined to a much more limited number of profitable native industries, and may, therefore, be compelled to support a larger foreign trade. Hence they may find it convenient to relate themselves to the Mother Country somewhat differently from Canada. But Canada, like the United States, has within itself such a rich and varied supply of power and resources that it may normally look forward to being a largely self-contained country, of miscellaneous industries, and, therefore, in the course of its development, as already stated, a field for the import of capital in various forms, rather than for the import of goods for consumption.

But, as the only condition giving ultimate meaning to our industry, we must aspire to be a civilized people. And as Britain is still the great centre of our Anglo-Saxon civilization, we may hope to maintain with her a constantly increasing trade in ideas. In this traffic, for a long time, our imports will greatly exceed our exports.

Here, too, we may hope not only for complete free trade within the Empire, but, in and through it, for free trade

Imperial Civilization

with the world. Still, in a very special sense, all the offspring of Britain may unite, in ever-increasing intimacy and harmony, in doing honour to the glorious traditions of our race. Under the inspiration of these

traditions we must hope to work out, freely and naturally in each part of the Empire, ideals of national and private life worthy of our British ancestry, and such as will inspire our newer fellow-citizens of other races to be proud of their British connection. But such a spirit requires for its growth and maintenance none of the machinery of the New Imperialism, least of all that mercenary form of it which, under the cloak of imperial sentiment, makes an appeal to sectional selfishness.

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Ideals of Empire.

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A Public Lecture

Delivered by Mr. W. C. Macgregor,

Barrister, Dunedin. N.Z.,

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"Ideals of Empire."

I am afraid that the somewhat high-sounding title I have adopted for my lecture on this occasion may not clearly indicate to my hearers what is intended to form the subjectmatter of the lecture itself. It will accordingly be necessary for me at the outset to attempt to explain with some approach to precision the message I have to deliver to you this evening. In order to make this definition adequate, I fear that I shall have to go back for a year or two, and inflict upon you a short passage of autobiography.

It is now more than a quarter of a century since I left the Old World for the New—since I exchanged the shores of Scotland for those of New Zealand. During the last ten years of that period it has become increasingly borne in upon me that the problem of the near future—if not of the present—for the Anglo-Saxon race is how to bind Great Britain more closely to her dominions and dependencies beyond the seas. From time to time I have written, as a rule anonymously, on Imperial Federation. For me the subject appeared to possess a fascinating, yet elusive, attraction. Some few years ago—indeed, long before Preferential Trade had become a party by-word—I imagined that I had discovered a solution of the problem in the shape of Freetrade within the Empire, coupled with Protection against outside nations. An Imperial Zollverein then appeared to my limited understanding a simple—and indeed obvious—method of rendering more strong and durable the links that tied the Mother Country and her kindred nations together. Alas for the enthusiasm of ignorance! No sooner had I set myself doggedly to understand this new panacea in all its bearings than I found it so compassed about with difficulties of an economic nature, which votaries of the "dismal science" alone could appreciate, that I tore up my notes in disgust, convinced for the time being that the project was as impracticable as to me it had appeared alluring. About a year ago the Imperialistic idea forced itself upon my mind once more, and I took up my pen with the view of writing a magazine article on the subject from a New Zealand standpoint. Fortunately or otherwise, a pressure of professional work interdicted this new project, and the Premiers in Conference have come and gone without any enlightenment from me on the subject. What the ultimate results of that Imperial Conference may be it would be rash to predict, and I have no desire at present to pose as a prophet either of good or evil. At the same time, the recent Conference has served still further to impress on my mind certain ideas already present there in somewhat nebulous form, and the expression and development of these ideas will accordingly form the groundwork of my remarks to you to-night.

Pardon me for this long and egotistical digression, my sole excuse for which is that it serves in some measure to explain the genesis of the few rambling notes that I have been vain enough to describe as a "lecture," and to dignify with the title of "Ideals of Empire."

To proceed now to the task of defining my terms. We are all aware that, according to the dictionary, by an ideal is meant "the highest conception of anything." By this time you will doubtless have gathered that the "Empire" about which I am speaking is the British Empire. That Empire, like Gaul of old, is "quartered into three halves":—(1) The United Kingdom itself; (2) the great self-governing colonies, or perhaps I should now say "dominions"; and (3) British dependencies, such as India. These divisions do not include the Crown colonies and other miscellaneous possessions, and therefore are neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but they will answer my present purpose. By a simple mental process, accordingly, it may be ascertained that the subject matter of my remarks this evening is "the highest conception of the British Empire—one and indivisible." The subject is indeed a worthy one, but I sadly fear its treatment at my hands may fall far short of the ideal!

We have recently been, told on very high authority that it is our duty, as subjects of the British Empire, to "think imperially." If such be the case, it will be found necessary for most of us, as a preliminary step, to

endeavour to think intelligently—to clear our souls of cant and commonplace, and then strive to ascertain with more or less lucidity the thoughts of Empire on which we ought to fix what we are pleased to call our minds. The task is not an easy one. Most of us have become so accustomed to thinking colonially, or provincially, or even parochially, that it is difficult at the bidding of Mr Chamberlain himself to readjust our mental focus and accommodate our vision to the dazzling glimpses of Imperialism. Prolonged existence in a small and isolated community, such as New Zealand, in some degree tends to unfit one for Imperial thought and action. In time we are too apt to become of those who think "the rustic cackle of their bourg, the murmur of the world." Perhaps the best antidote for the subtle poison which tends thus to narrow our minds and contract our sympathies is the intelligent study of the life work of such Empire-builders as the Earl of Dufferin, Cecil Rhodes, and Lord Cromer, men who in their day and generation were content—nay, were proud—to "scorn delights and live laborious days" in their task of welding our outlying dominions into component parts of the great Imperial chain.

The factors, then, with which we have to deal are three in number:—(1) A small, densely populated, highly civilised and wealthy manufacturing parent state, to which are attached by ties of more or less closeness (2) a number of semi-developed and sparsely populated self-governing colonies of vigorous growth and (3) several conquered countries of great extent and antiquity, and with a poor but teeming population—less highly developed socially and industrially than either the mother country or her distant "dominions." The problem before us is how best to combine more closely these varying elements of nationality into one homogeneous whole, so as (a) to promote and develop mutually their various products and industries, and (b) to protect all parts of this united Empire against foreign aggression and internal dissension.

The first idea which I wish to impress upon you here and now is that we are all citizens of the British Empire thus described. That is the central and inspiring thought from which we must start in search of our "Ideals of Empire." I do not know that this fact is sufficiently appreciated by the average man either in Old England or in New Zealand. Speaking for myself, I am a Scot by birth and training, a New Zealander by adoption, but, before all, and above all, and beyond all, I feel that I am a British subject—entitled to the rights, and bound by the duties, appertaining to the citizenship of that great and glorious Empire.

Flowing from this root idea there are many ideals. I shall not attempt to exhaust the list of these ideals to-night, but will content myself with enlarging for a little on one or two of the more obvious and important.

In the first place, then, the ultimate object or ideal of every patriotic British subject is, or should be, the union, in some form of federation, of all the English speaking races. How or when that ideal is to be attained need not concern us at present. The important point for us now is clearly and firmly to grasp and appreciate the idea itself. The advantages of such an union are apparent. It would at once create a world-power which could dictate terms to the other nations, and would ultimately in all probability ensure international peace, and possibly disarmament. If Great Britain and the United States (with their respective dependencies) were finally welded into one people, bound together by the ties of mutual self-interest as well as of blood, the new nation thus created would possess such a preponderating influence in wealth and in arms as to be able at will to crush any likely opposition—naval, military, or economic. I frankly admit that this magnificent ideal is too remote—too fantastic—to realise at present. At the same time the possibility of its ultimate attainment should always be kept steadily in view by every true citizen of the British Empire, who should at the same time, as one means towards this great end, do all in his power to foster friendly feelings, and to discourage anything approaching to jealousy or discord, between the members of the English-speaking races of the world.

Although the union (or, rather, reunion) I have suggested between the British people and their American cousins may for the present be unattainable, there is a large step in that direction which is not only possible, but in a sense imperative. That step, I need scarcely say is some closer bond of association between the Mother Country and her great self-governing colonies. How that closer bond is to be created, and how maintained, is not for me now to state. I am speaking at present as an idealist, and not as a practical politician. But it is quite clear to those who study the signs of the times that Great and Greater Britain Must be more closely bound together in the near future if the Empire is to maintain its past and present proud position among, the nations of the world. The days of the small, compact state are numbered. The future lies in the hands of the great World Powers, and that statesman who shall conceive and carry out a workable scheme for federating the Empire will earn the lasting gratitude of his fellow-Britons, from London to Melbourne, from Toronto to Calcutta!

Such are some of the ideals involved in true Imperial thinking. How these grandiose ideals are to be reduced to actuality remains for the practical statesmen of the present and future—both in England and her dominions. Theirs will be the great and strenuous task of moulding into some colossal federation the various States now constituting the British Empire, and (if possible) including within that coalition our cousins in the United States of America. The inevitable and glorious result of such an union of States, bound together by ties sentimental indeed, but political and self-serving also, would be to evolve a veritable Dictator of the world. Truly a most desirable and indeed stupendous ideal, worthy of the best efforts of the most enlightened minds of

our common race!

It would be the sheerest presumption on my part even to attempt to formulate a scheme for reducing to practical form so vast and complex a conception. That duty must be left to those better fitted for it by position and training. At the same time I desire to point out as clearly and concisely as I can some of the conditions which must precede and pave the way for the "Imperial Ideal" I have hinted at—some at least of the sacrifices we must be prepared to make before we can hope to attain so grand a consummation. I use the word "sacrifice" advisedly, for, if there is one thing obvious in this great Imperial problem, it is that all three partners—Great Britain, her dominions, and her dependencies—must be prepared to some extent to give up a portion or portions of their several rights to advance and ensure the common welfare. If we are to attain to anything truly great we must make correspondingly great efforts; if we are to achieve, it must be through sacrifice and possibly suffering.

Not once or twice, in this rough island story,
The path of duty proved the way to glory!

Not the primrose path of ease, of indifference, of arrogance or of self-seeking, but the hard and dusty road of toil, of self-sacrifice, of mutual forbearance and brotherly kindness. For we must never forget that Great Britain, together with her colonies and dependencies, form in a very real sense one family, and ought never to fail in the reciprocal duties of family affection. "United we stand, divided we fall" should be our Anglo-Saxon motto for the twentieth century. Perhaps in this commercial age it would be more characteristic to depict the British Empire as a great trading corporation, having its headquarters in England, but with branches controlled by the younger members of the firm in all the 'dominions' and dependencies of the Empire. The directors of such a concern would naturally sit in London and control its world-wide business—guided largely, no doubt, by confidential reports from their partners resident abroad. These foreign partners in their turn would doubtless loyally carry out the instructions received from headquarters, though often conscious that the local interests of their particular branch were to some extent being sacrificed for the good of the business as a whole, or possibly even for the benefit of some less prosperous off-shoot of the firm.

In order to attain any true ideal of federation, the various units of the Empire must, I think, submit themselves to some such form of national partnership. Great Britain shall inevitably remain the predominant partner, dictating the foreign policy of the component parts of the Empire, while leaving each State free to control its own internal affairs. In other words, an attempt must be made to reconcile the spirit of freedom with the desire for unity—two principles which go far to compensate and balance each other in our national existence. As I have said, it is essential, in order to ensure an united Empire, that each of the partners must be prepared at all times cheerfully to give up portions of their individual rights for the sake of the common weal. The great question, which lies as yet in the womb of the future, is whether our democratic States, with their Socialistic and somewhat selfish tendencies, will prove themselves capable of the conquest of petty jealousies, and possessed of the prolonged steadiness of purpose, requisite for the realisation of such a far-reaching aim. The teachings of modern history ought to encourage us in this task of Empirebuilding and Empire maintaining. United Germany is the work of the last generation. Within the last few years also Japan has given to the world an object lesson in the noblest form of patriotism, which Britons all over the world should take to heart and follow; unless, indeed, they are content to remain in that state of mind and body depicted by the Cockney poet:—

They eat, and drink, and scheme, and plod;
They go to church on Sunday;
And many are afraid of God,
And more of Mrs Grundy!

I for one do not despair in this direction. Our true ambitions—our national ideals—are even wider and higher than those of the Germans and the Japanese, and I can see no reason in the nature of things why they should not be attained and realised by the united and intelligent exercise of the same patriotic qualities.

I shall now for a time condescend to something a little more practical. One outcome of the recent Conference of Premiers has been clearly to demonstrate the necessity for some form of Imperial Council, with a central secretariat in London and corresponding branches all over the Empire. The chief business of such a council must inevitably be to supervise and regulate within the Empire—(1) Trade, (2) defence, and (3) foreign affairs. (These names are not of necessity given here in order of merit!) I propose to deal briefly with these

three topics in their order, so as if possible to ascertain how far each of them in turn is capable of realisation.

(1) As to trade, we are still a "nation of shopkeepers." Since Napoleon's day, however, the British shop has increasingly become an emporium, deriving its goods and its customers from all parts and climates of the globe. For this emporium we have as determining factors a free-trading centre, surrounded by colonies—all more or less Protectionist—and at the same time by huge dependencies adapted for supplying foodstuffs and other raw materials for the world's markets. The question is how to frame a tariff, or series of tariffs, so as to give some measure of preference within the Empire, and in this way to stimulate production and manufactures of British origin. As I have already pointed out, the problem is an exceedingly complicated and difficult one. But that it must and can be solved I do not doubt. It is entirely a question for economic experts, of whom we have enough and to spare in Great and Greater Britain. I firmly believe that if the vexed question of Imperial preference were removed from the arena of party politics and referred to an independent committee of trained economists, it could be placed on a workable basis within a year or two. To ensure such a happy result, however, we must first have existing in all parts of the Empire that spirit of patriotic self-sacrifice to which I have already referred at length. Given such a spirit, the evolution of a practicable and beneficial system is only a question of time.

(2) Imperial defence stands on a somewhat different footing. The navy of Great Britain protects the Mother Country, her "dominions," and her dependencies alike. Up to the present time the contributions from the colonies have been ludicrously inadequate to the national insurance provided by the Union Jack. [Since these lines were written I am glad to note that New Zealand's Naval Subsidy is to be voluntarily increased from £40,000 to £100,000 a year.—W.C.M.] But with the advent of the proposed Imperial Council all that will doubtless be changed. Once we have a measure of representation on Imperial matters we must expect corresponding taxation, and no doubt for the future the self-governing colonies would have to bear a larger share of the cost of the British fleet. One has only to think for a moment of the possibilities involved in the withdrawal of the British squadron from Australasian waters to be convinced of the wisdom of cheerfully increasing our Naval Subsidy. What an easy prize would a country like New Zealand, with her harbours and coalfields, present to a foreign maritime Power were it not for the wholesome dread inspired by the ever-present ships and guns of His Britannic Majesty?

Our coastal defences, and territorial forces also, should be to some degree supervised and controlled by the newlycreated General Staff, so that each colony and dependency might form a link in the chain of Imperial defence. Again, it may be found in the not far distant future essential to the preservation of the Empire to prescribe some form of universal military training or service. The word "conscription" is not pleasing to our enlightened and luxurious ears, but its repetition may in the result prove preferable to the roar of hostile cannon on these peaceful shores. Fortunately, in New Zealand our excellent school Cadet system is paving the way for the best form of universal military training, while we have in our Militia Act a method whereby the more supine of our young men may be compelled if necessary to take up arms in defence of their native land. (Should an emergency arrive, however, I trust that our citizen soldiers may not act too literally on the obiter dictum of the late Lord Bowen that "Volunteers are not liable to go abroad except in case of invasion"!) Personally, I am a firm believer in all forms of manly sport, but I cannot help saying that if one-half of the energy and enthusiasm at present displayed towards football in this colony were diverted, and devoted to rifle-shooting and military drill, the necessity for any form of conscription would disappear. The recent war in South Africa has taught us what a latent force of excellent military material lies ready to our hands in Australasia. But here again we are met by the demand for that spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to national duty which should at once underlie and crown the life work of every true son of the Empire.

(3) Regarding foreign affairs, another lesson in political charity has to be learnt by the loyal British subject in the Southern Hemisphere. We in New Zealand (as well as our cousins in Australia) are inclined to forget that we too must bear our share of the "white man's burden." Remote as we are from the world's centre, untrammelled as we fancy we remain from foreign complications, we are far too apt to regard only our rights, and to forget our corresponding duties, as British citizens. To refer to recent and concrete examples, we growl at Downing street for its action, or inaction, respecting the New Hebrides, we pass most stringent laws for excluding the black and yellow races from our shores, and our navigation laws avowedly aim at compelling all British shipping in our waters to pay wages much higher than those paid by their Continental competitors. We forget that by so acting we are possibly imperilling the relations existing between Great Britain and France or Germany, that we are acting in a selfish and unjust spirit towards some hundreds of millions of our coloured fellow-subjects in India (not to speak of our Japanese allies!), and are effectively handicapping our sorely-burdened shipowners in their competition with bounty-aided rivals abroad. I freely admit that anomalies such as I refer to have arisen in the past as a rule from lack of political foresight, and not with any conscious desire to hamper the Imperial Government. For the future, however, such things should not be permitted to take place. The projected Imperial Council in itself should prove a check to any ill-considered local legislation—or even agitation—that might prove injurious to the common interests of our united Empire. There is to me

something grand, and almost pathetic, in the spectacle of statesmen in England, distracted by the maelstrom of party politics, devoting their best energies—and oft times their lives—to the task of directing the policy of this world-wide Empire in all its parts, enveloped as they are on every side by the ambitious, and often unscrupulous, diplomacy, of their great rival nations in Europe and elsewhere. Then in truth England always appears to me as depicted in the solemn and pregnant verses of the mid-Victorian poet:—

The weary Titan, with deaf
Ears, and labour-dimmed eyes,
Regarding neither to right
Nor left, goes passively by,
Staggering on to her goal;
Bearing on shoulders immense,
Atlantean, the load,
Well nigh not to be borne,
Of the too-vast orb of her fate!

At such a time, too, there seems to be truth and force in Matthew Arnold's complaint that the task of arraigning poor old Mother England, which should be left to her foes, is too often taken up by her sons. I for one do not believe that we in New Zealand, at all events, will do anything by word or deed to add to her manifold burdens. Rather should it be at once our duty and our privilege cheerfully to do what we can from time to time to aid in her great destiny of controlling and developing both Great and Greater Britain. Thus, and thus only, can we hope in any true sense to realise the Ideals of Empire, which I have been striving to unfold to you this evening.

My lecture now is almost ended. Like other sermons, lay or otherwise, it should conclude with what I believe is termed a "practical application." But such a conclusion is hard to find. As already indicated, I have been speaking hitherto as a pure idealist, and I fear to descend from the cloudy heights of rhetoric and poetry to the plain of facts and figures. To reduce my ideals to practical form is foreign to my present purpose, as well as beyond my ability. The framework of a scheme of Imperial federation such as I have hinted at must in the end be constructed by one of the master minds of the Mother Country. For an insignificant antipodean to attempt such a colossal task would indeed be remarkably like one joint of the tail trying to wag the entire animal! But it seems to me that at the recent conference our own Prime Minister struck the right note when he pointed out that one practical step towards closer federation was quicker and cheaper communication between Great Britain and her possessions abroad. Ignorance is too often the mother of disaffection; and I feel convinced that more rapid exchange of ideas, as well as of goods and passengers, would do much to tighten the bonds and improve the relations between all parts of this scattered Empire. The "All Red Route" is not a mere alliterative pleasantry, but a vital fact—of social as well as strategic significance. For this practical suggestion alone Sir Joseph Ward deserves the thanks of the Dominion, which assuredly did not suffer in reputation from his dignified and statesmanlike representation of our national views at the historical Conference of 1907. At the same time improved communication is only one means towards a great end—merely a preliminary step towards the framing of a practical project of Imperial Federation. The time is now ripe for such a scheme. Where is the man to be to capable of devising it and carrying it into effect? Who is to be the William Pitt of the present century? We have had political giants in the past—capable of conceiving and carrying through projects of, mighty moment. Surely among our younger statesmen is to be found someone of adequate largeness of vision, content to put aside for a time the tempting bait of party rewards, and prepared to grapple with and conquer the difficulties inseparable from this greatest of Imperial questions. This Empire-builder of the future must be a constructive and experienced statesman, endowed with sympathy as well as imagination, and having an adequate knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the several and divers communities which it will be his task to bring mora closely together. Whatever his political views may be, whether his name be Grey, or Churchill, or Curzon, I feel convinced that at no distant date the Man will be found ready to reduce into actuality some, if not all of the great Imperial ideals of which I have been speaking to-night.

The cynical (and indeed obvious) comment upon many of my somewhat didactic utterances this evening would be no doubt that they are largely counsels of perfection, that I have been indulging in that pleasing mental process known as building castles in the air—the "empty happiness" of the Greeks of old. Such criticism may or may not be true, but one thing certainly is true, that everyone of us Britons—whether in Old England or New Zealand—has his own duty clear before him. That duty is for each of us to realise his individual responsibility to the Empire—that great inheritance which has been handed down to us from our forefathers. British subjects all over the world should never forget that they are "citizens of no mean city." We should

remember also that we now live in an age of fierce international competition—both in war and peace—unknown to our ancestor's, and that should we, through slackness or incapacity, prove unworthy of this glorious inheritance of Empire it will infallibly pass away from us into the hands of firmer and more competent rivals. Here, again, the cynic may shrug his weary shoulders and say: "What has all this got to do with us, insignificant units in a tiny Dominion?" To him I would reply, "You are a partner in that mighty joint stock concern known as the British Empire. Your share may be a small one, but your liability is unlimited!" Each one of us is answerable for his share. Surely, then, it is our bounden duty, however small our holding may be, to be zealous, industrious, intelligent partners, working together to the best of our ability for the common safety and the common profit! The task of our rulers is to see that the Empire does not outgrow its organisation, or (shall I say?) to modify the existing constitution in such a way as to escape the dangers by which we lost the United States. England must continue to be at once commercial and warlike. She must strive to conserve and perpetuate that community of race, of religion, and of interest by means of which she built up her mighty Empire, and by which alone she can hope to preserve it. Our duty as loyal British subjects, on the other hand, is to fit ourselves to be active, intelligent units in that world-wide organisation, to realise and discharge our individual responsibilities as working partners therein, and thus to become and remain Imperialists in the truest and most practical sense of the term.

So much, then, for our Imperial ideals. It is easy for the lazy and the cynical amongst us to sneer at high ideals—whether of life or of Empire. For the benefit and admonition of such lotus-eating persons I venture to quote the words of an eminent modern thinker, who has put my own views on the subject in language which I would in vain attempt to rival:—"Mixed with illusions our ideals may be, and even with fatuities. We may smile at times to think of them in retrospect. But let no one think that they are therefore shadows. Whatever they may become to dreamers, they are to all men of action, whether they be thinking of the betterment of family or parish, of city or of nation, nothing less than the efforts of the human spirit to apprehend that greater and more satisfying reality after which all finite spirits for ever strive."

And now I have come to the close of my lengthy and somewhat rambling remarks. My thanks are due to you all for your patience in listening to them so attentively. I am conscious that I have scarcely touched the fringe of a vast—an important—an inspiring subject. I am conscious, also, of many defects and shortcomings in this lecture, written, as it perforce has been, hurriedly and in the brief intervals of a laborious professional life. At the same time, if I have succeeded to-night in making some at least of my hearers more sensible of their duties, as well as their privileges, as citizens of this great and glorious Empire—if I have assisted you in any respect to think more Imperially than before—if, in fact, I have contributed in any way, however small, to help on the sacred cause of Imperial unity, then, indeed, I shall have the satisfaction of feeling that my labours have not been altogether in vain.

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An Imperial Policy

By James Roberts, M.A., LL.B.

One of the most pressing political problems of our time is that of devising a means of welding together the component parts of the British Empire so that it may be consolidated and be enabled to move along the path of progress holding its own in the intense competition of rival nations and races in the near future. The problem is obscured at home by other questions that now occupy the public mind, such as the education of the people, the struggle for the schools, the functions and indeed the existence of the House of Lords, the taxation of land, and the powers of trade unions. But from time to time the columns of the daily Press deal with this Imperial issue, some papers quoting extracts from the leading Colonial papers, showing at one time in the case of South Africa, at another in the case of Newfoundland or Australia, the necessity for grappling seriously with this as a vital question, for such indeed it is.

The occasion which caused this problem to arise and brought the solution within the domain of practical politics was undoubtedly the South African War of 1899-1901.

That war was the first occasion in the history of our nation on which men from the Queen's dominions The word "dominions" is used in its general meaning. The distinctions between a "Dominion," a "Commonwealth," and a "Union" are quite immaterial in connection with the subjects discussed in these pages. beyond the sea fought side by side with the Regular Army maintained by the United Kingdom, and on which they bore more than their share of the sacrifices made by the Mother Country in defence of a remote part of the dominions of the Queen, The general sympathy and feeling of common interest aroused among all subjects of Her Majesty was far greater than had been anticipated. There is reason to believe that that manifestation was the outcome of a deep and abiding racial and patriotic feeling, which is independent of time or circumstances.

In the years that followed the war this policy of mutual interest was manifested from time to time in the speeches of Colonial Statesmen and in the columns of the Press. In conjunction with the visit of Mr. Chamberlain to South Africa and his policy of co-operation, it gave rise to attempts to consolidate the Empire by means of Imperial Conferences and offers of preferential trade.

Since 1901 the process of Colonial consolidation has evolved the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa. Arrangements are in progress for mutual defence by the co-operation of the dominions oversea in an Imperial Army. These dominions have already taken a generous and patriotic share in the burden of maintaining efficient Naval Defence.

The time has therefore come for an attempt to bind still closer to the Motherland the Daughter States within the Empire.

"The strength of this nation depends on the unity of feeling which should pervade the United Kingdom and its widespread Dependencies. The first duty of an English Minister should be to consolidate that co-operation which renders irresistible a community educated as our own, in an equal love of liberty and Law."—Lord Beaconsfield.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIES.

Before discussing any means of a further consolidation of the machinery for directing the future of the Empire, it will be well to consider very briefly how the Governments of the Colonies are at present related to the British Constitution. The latter is, as we know, an organisation of extremely slow growth; it has been formed in the course of centuries, and has been subject to modifications from time to time. The growth of our Empire has been one of the factors of its development, but it is nevertheless true that in the early life of each Colony its policy was bound to conform to the British Constitution as existing at that time. Thus, at its origin, each Colony was under the complete control of the British Parliament. In that Parliament the Colonies were not represented, nor had they any legislatures of their own. The wishes of the Colonists were neglected. A wrong policy was adopted towards them by Ministers, upon the selection of whom they had no influence whatever. The result of this state of affairs was the loss to England of her American Colonies.

The experience derived from the case of the American Colonies led to a change of policy. From time to time as the Colonies grew in importance they were granted representative Government, and legislatures having power to deal with all the internal affairs of their respective countries were established.

The terms "Colony" and "Colonial" are considered by many to be disparaging; they have no such meaning attached to them in the United Kingdom but are merely descriptive of the position of the States oversea and are fully understood. Sometimes no other word can conveniently be used for "Colonial."

There can be but little doubt that this policy was pursued under the mistaken belief that it was only a matter of time until one by one they should cease to be connected by political ties with the British Crown, and, when strong enough, become separate International States. This view is apparently still entertained by many politicians in the British Liberal Party.

But as time went on the necessity for mutual cooperation among Colonies situated as those of British North America, led to the policy of Federation, as is exemplified in the case of the Dominion of Canada in 1870, and in recent years the Commonwealth of Australia, and lastly in the Union of South Africa. Next to these States in order of development come the Crown Colonies, and then those administered and developed by trading companies under Charters from the Crown. Hence today, the British Empire consists of the United Kingdom and many other countries in various stages of political development.

The present relationship of the United Kingdom and the more advanced Colonies was thus aptly described by Lord Milner at Manchester on 14th December 1906:—

"But the self-governing Colonies are no longer, in anything but in name, under the Colonial Office, or, indeed, under any British authority except the King. They are, in fact, States of the Empire, and the United Kingdom itself is such a State, though no doubt still vastly the greatest and most important, bearing almost all the common burdens and alone responsible for the great dependencies. Still, the difference between the United

Kingdom and the other States, in the view of the Imperialism of the future, of the only Imperialism that can stand, ought to be regarded as a difference which, however great to-day, must tend to disappear."

This change of status from "Colonies" to States of the Empire has been recognised by the Imperial Legislature in the Royal Titles Act by which it conferred on His late Majesty the title of King of the British Dominions beyond the Seas.

FORCES OF DISINTEGRATION.

But during the period in which this development of the several States of the Empire has been in progress other changes have taken place. In the United Kingdom and the several self-governing States the suffrage has been extended and the power of the democracy has increased in consequence. The tendency of measures of Parliamentary representation has been in the direction of "one man one vote," so that a voter in the lowest grade can exercise as much power at the ballot box as one in the highest. One consequence of this is that the choice of our rulers and therefore political power at the present day rests with the more numerous and less wealthy classes of the communities. The "political centre of gravity" has descended, and the future of the Empire lies not so much with its statesmen as with the working men—the democracies in the United Kingdom and in the other States of the Empire.

But men of this class have little or no time for the study of politics, as their energies are absorbed and their time occupied with those more immediate questions which affect their interests, their work, their homes and lives. The tendency of this natural pre-occupation will be to cause the wider issues to be neglected, and so it will be in the direction of disintegration. Again, as time goes on the younger and new generations arising in our oversea dominions will look on the lands of their birth as their native lands, and the term "Mother Country" as applied to England will cease to have any meaning for them, as it has already ceased for the young people now. Thus a second disintegrating force comes into play.

A third such force arises from immigration from foreign countries into the oversea dominions. This will in time produce a considerable proportion of settlers whose traditions are not those of the British race. For some years such immigration has been taking place from the Western parts of the United States to the Western Provinces of Canada.

That circumstance and the policy of an Imperial Customs for purposes of Defence enunciated by the late Mr. Hofmeyer are the proximate causes of the policy of Preferential Imperial Trade.

These forces of disintegration must be met by active work in the political education of the people by statesmen, politicians, and the Press—not only those of the United Kingdom but all within the oversea dominions of the King. If things are allowed to drift, these forces of disintegration will produce the inevitable result of gradually breaking up the Empire. "If we do not draw closer together we must inevitably drift apart." There is no use in going on deceiving ourselves and being deceived by such phrases as "laissez faire," "a policy of masterly inactivity," and so forth, which in most cases are used to cloak political incapacity or the shirking of duty. As Lord Milner said on the occasion alluded to:—

"Unless the public both here and in the Colonies are aroused to a vivid interest in the subject, timidity and vis inertice may prevail. The danger besetting the cause of Imperial Unity is not so much that men are in the abstract hostile to the idea, but it is apt to appear something academic, distant, unreal, the very reverse of what in truth it is, a matter of direct personal importance to the humblest citizen."

But these forces of disintegration are materially intensified by reason of the fact that there is still a large number of politicians who look with complacency on the prospect of a natural severance of the oversea dominions from the Kingdom and the gradual breaking up of the Empire. They are afraid of entering into closer ties of trade relations lest they should introduce friction. Yet they did not hesitate to please a foreign State by giving what was asked without considering the views of our eldest Colonial State whose interests were at stake. This occurred when they framed the issues (including questions of Sovereignty) to be submitted in the recent arbitration with the United States concerning the disputes arising out of the treaties respecting the Newfoundland Fisheries, without previous consultation with Newfoundland itself.

The happy termination of the dispute by the award of the Hague tribunal does not affect this point.

They truly pursue a policy of decomposition in that and other Imperial questions, but if the other causes of disintegration be actively counteracted this one will in time disappear, for these men are very quick to accommodate their policy to the views of the electorate and to throw all responsibility on the latter by their theory of "the mandate."

From the foregoing considerations it will be apparent that in order to effect the closer union of the Empire, the subject must be discussed and considered, not only by our politicians and Statesmen, but by the individual members of each community concerned, for in the long run no solution of the problem can be final which does not receive practically the unanimous support of our Imperial Democracy, not only in the United Kingdom but

throughout the King's dominions beyond the sea. The best, and indeed practically the only means of arousing interest, promoting co-operation, and educating ourselves in regard to this important subject lies in the friendly assistance of the Press throughout the Empire.

The issue was recently forced on our attention with regard to the future of British South Africa and the betrayal of the interests of Newfoundland; to-morrow it may arise in connection with New Zealand; or with Australia and the far East.

HISTORICAL CAUSES OF OUR DIFFICULTIES.

The cause of the present difficulties in relation to the foregoing and other questions lies far back in the history of the development of our Empire, The case of the loss of the American Colonies in 1776, just as well as the questions of Chinese Labour in the Transvaal or the Newfoundland Fisheries, illustrates the underlying evil. It will be found that most, if not all, the cases of friction between the Home Government and the States oversea in relation to questions arising between the latter and other countries, and as to relations between the Home Government and those States themselves, came about because the latter had no direct voice in the Councils of the Crown. It was so with the secession of the United States when the British nation and its King consistently opposed the views and interests of the Colonies in America, and it was also the case when the Transvaal was handed back to the Boers in 1881 in order, as we now know, to keep certain politicians from leaving the British Cabinet.

As has already been pointed out the development of the Constitutions of the several Colonial States has been almost entirely from the point of view of their respective domestic affairs and interests. They have Parliaments to which the Colonial Ministers of the Crown—the advisers of their King's Representatives—are responsible, and, since the control of the Home Government is merely nominal, with regard to all their home affairs their evolution is complete. But notwithstanding all this development in questions of their foreign relations and matters relating to the external policy of these States no advance has been made. His Majesty is advised by a Cabinet of Ministers who in no way represent either the Parliaments or the electors beyond the sea. In such a body these electors have, constitutionally or in fact, no confidence, since they cannot in any way influence or control the selection

The present connection of the United Kingdom and the States oversea may be illustrated by a reference to well-known mechanical laws. Each State may be likened to a pyramid, the base of which represents the more populous working classes of the electorate, and the superstructure the remainder of the political governing classes terminating in the apex of the Crown. In the several communities, as we have seen, the centres of political power lie near the bases of the structures, but they are only united in the Crown. There will be a natural tendency for the several parts to break away unless they are united by bonds, at their sides and bases as well as at the top. Some of these bonds are purely political, such as Imperial Conferences of Premiers—others are informal, such as closer relations by improved means of communication, by conferences of representatives of the Press—by closer trade relations—and by personal ties arising out of the emigration from home—each bond in its own sphere discharging a distinct function, but all tending towards the welding together of the whole. The object of the present article is to indicate how another tie can be created to obviate some of the evils of the existing system of control of Foreign and Imperial affairs, especially those primarily concerning the States beyond

THE RESULTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

The evil results of the anomaly in the Constitutions of the States which results in their having no voice in Imperial affairs, were most conspicuous in the case of the retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881. The circumstances were described by the late Duke of Argyll in the following terms (*Times*, 21st December 1899):—

"As a Cabinet we were most imperfectly informed. The subject was for the most part treated departmentally and from moment to moment. No document with any grasp of the subject, as a whole, was ever put before us so far as I remember....I do not remember ever having seen the exact terms of the Convention of 1881 before it was concluded."

We now know from the published life of Mr. Gladstone that the policy pursued was adopted in order to prevent certain members from leaving the Cabinet. Would this have been possible had there been a member of that Cabinet personally acquainted with and representing Natal and Cape Colony? Is it any different now? It must here be borne in mind that those from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, who endured so much for the Empire from 1899 to 1901, have had no voice whatever in the settlement of the future of the South African States. As to this, Lord Milner expressed his regret on December 14th, 1906:—

"I shall never forgive myself for not suggesting—I do not know that the suggestion would have been adopted, or even welcomed, but at any rate it was my business to make it—that in the settlement of South African affairs after the war, every important step taken by us should be taken in consultation with the other Colonies. It was by their efforts as well as ours that South Africa was kept within the Empire, and the subsequent policy was a clear case for Imperial co-operation."

The friction between the Home and oversea Governments arising from recent arrangements with the United States, in which the sovereign rights of Newfoundland were put in jeopardy without even that Colony being consulted, and the interference with the Government of Natal in dealing with a native rebellion, are also instances of the evil results arising from the absence of Colonial Statesmen from the Councils of the Crown.

Other questions involving the relations of these States to foreign countries will from time to time press on our attention, such as the employment of Asiatics and foreigners on our ships, and the policy of a "White Australia." Imperial issues such as these will, if things remain as they are, be settled by politicians at home who depend for the retention of their seats in Parliament on the variable opinions of the British elector, and on the result of an election which may turn on some question of purely domestic concern such as the control of the liquor traffic, the taxation of land values, or the teaching of religion in the schools.

The present Parliament (October, 1910) well illustrates the position. Owing to the relative strength of parties and groups it is possible without an appeal to the people to substitute a policy of Preferential Trade for that of Free Imports if the farmers of Ireland demand it. They have shown their power by intimating to the Government that the importation into the United Kingdom of live stock from Canada will not be permitted. They have dictated the mode of attack on the House of Lords.

The question of a remedy is one rather for the democracies in the States than for that at home. The continuance of such an anomalous state of affairs as now exists, by which matters of vital interest to an oversea State may be made an election cry in England, can only be justified on the supposition that the British electors, even in regard to such matters, are superior in wisdom, judgment, and character, to their fellow subjects beyond the sea!

TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS.

It is now universally admitted that it is impossible any longer to continue to treat the affairs of these States as matters of merely departmental importance, the concern of the Colonial Office, as was done in 1881; this is seen from the fact that Imperial Conferences of Premiers have taken place in London. This truth seems to be realised in the Transvaal, where the Het Volk party make a demand for participation in Imperial affairs a plank in their platform. As the British electors are under present conditions the sole ultimate tribunal to decide on all questions of Foreign and Colonial policy, it follows that the States are entitled to appeal directly to them on matters more nearly affecting their interests. An instance of this method occurred in 1900 when several delegates came from South Africa to address British constituencies, and recently delegates from, or representatives of, the States oversea have addressed meetings in England on the question of Preferential Trade. Such a proceeding is not only not a matter of "interference," but is perfectly justifiable so long as the British democracy is the ultimate tribunal and returns to power His Majesty's advisers. But there are many difficulties in the way of continuously pursuing this course, although it would be of immense service in educating the people at home and oversea as to the condition and destiny of the Empire.

LIMITATIONS OF IMPERIAL CONFERENCES.

The present plan of holding periodical Imperial Conferences of Premiers can only be regarded as a tentative and temporary expedient. It has two serious and fundamental defects. In the first place, it is merely consultative, and a consultative council without a share of responsibility will only perpetuate anomalies and intensify the feelings of irritation that must from time to time arise. In the second place, the Premiers who attend from oversea have been returned to power through elections which necessarily turned on issues of domestic concern, and, speaking from a Constitutional point of view, they cannot be taken to represent the views of their respective electors with regard to questions with which their Parliaments are not competent to deal. Indeed, it might not be in accordance with the views of these electors to mix questions of Foreign Policy with their questions of domestic party politics.

Lord Milner in speaking of the Imperial Conference then shortly to be held realised its limitations:—

"Our own Ministry, responsible only to that Parliament, is not such a body. But the Conference is. No doubt it is only a consultative body, though from its composition it is a peculiarly weighty one. But people must consult together before they can be expected to act together. It would be an immense step in advance if we could only establish the regular practice of common consultation with regard to all matters of common interest,

and I include among matters of common interest any question arising between one State of the Empire and a foreign State. But the Conference only sits for a brief period at long intervals. During all the intervening time the people of the Empire have no common organ. And in the absence of such an organ matters of common interest are neglected or casually and fragmentarily dealt with. And when a question arises between a Colony and a foreign State there is no means of taking the general sense of the Empire upon it. There is not even any regular system for dealing with it in conjunction with the Colony directly affected. We have had an extraordinary instance of this want of touch in the recent case of Newfoundland."

THE DANGER OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

These oversea States have been developed and have reached maturity during an era in which the British Empire has been at peace with the great European nations. The wars with France in the 18th century were fought out in India and our American Colonies. It was not Canada, but France, that was defeated at Quebec. Would the present system stand the strain of war? Many of our fellow subjects oversea think that, in the event of war between England and a European power, it would be an open question whether their State would join in such a war or not. There could be no more dangerous delusion than this idea. War is a condition of things affecting every subject of our King and every subject of the Ruler who would be opposed to us, or, if at war with a Republic, every citizen of such foreign State. To take a modern instance. In 1870, if either France or Prussia violated the neutrality of Belgium, we were bound by treaty to join the other power to repel the invader. If the Emperor Napoleon marched his troops over the border, a state of war would have immediately resulted, and every Frenchman, that is every subject of Napoleon III., would have become an "alien enemy" to every subject of the Queen. Partnerships of French and English subjects would have been dissolved. Frenchmen could not enforce their contracts in any court in the British Empire! Would the existing ties have stood the strain? Canada could not be neutral. Neutrality would involve secession.

Again, we have now the States oversea voluntarily undertaking a large share in the burden of Imperial defence, both naval and military. A misguided policy at home might precipitate a European war. Is it right that these States should bear the loss and burden of war, sacrifice their sons, and be denied any share in directing the policy which led up to it? Is it right that their soldiers and Statesmen should be debarred from sharing in the government of the Empire?

ONE SUGGESTED REMEDY.

Now it must be conceded that the British Empire ought to present a united front to foreign nations. It should be quite immaterial to them what party is in power in the United Kingdom. The party system, and a regard for party interests, are so ingrained in English public life, that it is too much to expect that Foreign and Colonial questions will not hereafter, as formerly, at times be made more or less subordinate to the interests of party at home. So long as in Foreign and Colonial affairs the King is advised solely by his British Cabinet, depending on the votes of British electors, this must be the case. Yet at home the "man in the street," from ignorance of the conditions involved, cannot be a judge of foreign questions; and, in regard to questions affecting principally the States oversea, there is no reason why he should be consulted more than the "man in the street" of the States. What is wanted is such a Federation as will give the States a share in the direction of Imperial Policy in such a manner as to diminish the temptation to subordinate Imperial questions to party interests in the United Kingdom alone.

The time has therefore arrived for the States oversea to demand (not as a favour, but as a matter of right and justice) a direct voice in the Councils of the Crown, that is, an efficient share in the direction of their own external affairs. In the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in all matters in which the Foreign and Imperial inter-State affairs are concerned the King should have the benefit of the advice of Ministers elected by, and responsible to, the States they respectively represent.

The problem is two-fold: on the one hand there is the admission of Colonial Statesmen to a share in the direction of Imperial affairs, and on the other a corresponding narrowing of the powers at present exercised solely by British Ministers responsible to the British House of Commons and the electorate of the United Kingdom.

In any scheme of combined action on a representative basis there are four chief conditions to be fulfilled, or objects to be attained.

First.—The powers and rights enjoyed by any of the States oversea must not be curtailed or interfered with. This proposition needs no elucidation. The self-government already granted to the States is complete as regards their own domestic concerns, but as they have no *responsible* share in Imperial affairs the proposal now is to give them something in addition, *viz.*, a share in advising the King in all Imperial affairs.

Secondly.—While obtaining a due share in the direction of Imperial affairs the representatives must be few in number. This condition is necessary in order to meet the difficulty arising from the great distances of some of the States, which prevent individual members of the States Governments from being members of the new council, and the difficulty, therefore, of supplying any considerable number of experienced representatives.

Thirdly.—The Statesmen from oversea must have an opportunity of attaining to the highest posts as advisers to the Crown. The stage of development at which the Empire has now arrived, has resulted in the creation of several States oversea in many respects of the same status as the United Kingdom, which must necessarily rank "first amongst equals." It follows, therefore, that the men who have been trained in government in the States oversea, are entitled to an equal status in any joint or federal council.

Fourthly.—The new body or council must be so constituted that Foreign and Imperial affairs will be removed as much from party strife in the United Kingdom, as they now are from party politics in the other States of the Empire. This last condition is not easy of attainment, but is well worth a sacrifice if need be. If Imperial affairs can be kept out of party strife the course of Imperial policy will be more uniform. It is, for example, not in the interests of the Empire that the Navy should be kept at a minimum standard for a period of years, and then be more rapidly increased according to a new standard by means of a loan, after the next election. Other illustrations might be given. Parties are but a means to an end and must exist where a large number of representatives act together. Great issues, such as the unity of the Kingdom, or Protection *v.* Free Imports, directly divide and reconstruct parties, but lesser questions are raised or pushed into prominence in the interests of party.

Suggestions have been made from time to time, and are now revived in connection with the Constitutional Crisis in the United Kingdom, for the creation of a true Imperial Parliament or a Senate in which the States oversea would be represented. Such a Parliament would be truly "Imperial" and would meet for discussion, legislation and finance, and discharge the functions of the present so-called Imperial Parliament in regard to all matters other than the purely domestic affairs of the United Kingdom, which might then be relegated to local Parliaments or Provincial Councils. To such a scheme there are objections of a practical nature. First.—If the representatives were proportional to the population, those of the oversea dominions would be in a minority. Secondly, their interests and points of view would be different from those of the United Kingdom and their representatives would, in many respects, bear the same relation to the whole body, as the Irish Nationalist Party bears to the present House of Commons. Thirdly.—If the number of these representatives were at all adequate it would be difficult to find a sufficient number of leading men to leave their country to attend at Westminster. A journey from Inverness or Galway to London is one thing, one from Melbourne or Christchurch another. Fourthly, the drawbacks of the party system would be perpetuated, and there would be no guarantee that the equivalent of a "General Election" would not cause a sudden reversal in Foreign policy, or policy of Naval or Military Defence; and fifthly, the representatives from oversea could only obtain an efficient share in the Imperial Executive by being involved in the party politics of the United Kingdom. For these reasons this solution of the problem is not now further considered in these pages, but the proposal suggested below is not inconsistent with such a subsequent solution.

AN IMPERIAL CABINET.

The solution of the problem lies in the selection by the several States (as below described) of representatives whose names would be submitted to the King and made by him Members of the Privy Council. These representatives, together with certain British Ministers, would form a consultative body to advise the Sovereign on all matters which do not affect the United Kingdom alone—an Imperial Cabinet in the widest sense of the term. The British members should consist of the British Cabinet for the time being or some of its members. For this purpose it is essential that there be a fixed number of British representatives, either the whole British Cabinet, or a portion when the Cabinet exceeds the fixed number in the Imperial Cabinet.

The number of British representatives should be half of the Imperial Cabinet. They should be selected by the British Prime Minister, and would, as now, be subject to the House of Commons. Inasmuch as the decisions on matters of Defence, and Foreign or Imperial affairs would lie with the Imperial Cabinet as advising the King on these matters, the British Prime Minister must include in his selection of British Imperial Representatives, the following "Chief" Ministers:—The Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, for India, for the Colonies (in future Crown Colonies and Dependencies), for War, and the First Lord of the Admiralty. On a change of Government in the United Kingdom there would be a corresponding change of only the British members of the Imperial Cabinet. At first there would be no change in the mode of selection of these Ministers or as to their responsibility to the House of Commons or their constituents. The British Cabinet would continue as heretofore to advise the King on all matters relating solely to the United Kingdom. As the electors of the United Kingdom now direct all affairs, both domestic and Imperial, through the machinery of Parliament, so they would continue

to do, but not to the same extent in Foreign or Imperial affairs as under the existing system.

Where after a General Election in the United Kingdom a Government was returned on some definite and clear issue of an Imperial nature (such as happened in 1880 in regard to Foreign and Asiatic policy, or in 1900 in relation to the Settlement of South Africa) all its members would be at one on that issue, and in consequence so would at least one half of the members of the Imperial Cabinet, thus giving effect to the expressed wishes of the "Predominant Partner." But where the election issues are domestic, as, for instance, the Education question in 1906 or the Finance Bill of 1910, the members of the British Cabinet may be divided on other issues, such as Naval Defence, and then the consents of the representatives from oversea would have due weight in determining the final policy. Other instances of the working of the scheme might be given.

The members from oversea would not be in the same position as the British, for they would acquire a share in the government of the Empire that they do not at present possess. Therefore the mode of their election or selection need not be the same, and should be left entirely to the respective States to determine according to their respective requirements. In the case of the States oversea, Foreign and other Imperial affairs are now not within the competence of their several Parliaments, and are in consequence and necessarily excluded from direct consideration of the electors, and parties are formed and divided on issues of purely domestic concern.

For instance, parties are returned to power in Australia on questions which concern the domestic affairs of Australia alone. The Ministry of the day will constitutionally represent the wishes of the Australian people on all such questions, but it may not represent their wishes on Imperial questions which are now excluded from Australian politics. If their representatives in the Imperial Cabinet be the nominees of the Australian Premier then one of two results must follow, either it will be possible for them (constitutionally considered) to misrepresent their people, or else these Imperial questions also will become subjects of discussion and voting at their elections, and the grouping of parties will, by a natural process, be readjusted and become based on Imperial as well as on domestic politics as they have always been in the United Kingdom. If the Australian people wish to avoid that result and prefer to keep Foreign and Imperial affairs outside their party politics they may determine to elect or select their Imperial Representatives by distinct and direct elections. The same reasoning applies to each of the oversea States.

Another State, say New Zealand, might prefer to leave the selection of its representatives to the Ministry of the day, or to the Legislature. The duration and tenure of office of these representatives should also be left to the decision of each State; those at a distance might prefer permanent representatives to give expression upon instructions to the views of the Ministry of the day, another might choose one for a term of years, a third (say Canada) being much nearer, might wish to change its representatives more frequently. There is no reason why the same process of selecting the Imperial representatives should, at least in the beginning, be followed in each case. After discussion it may be found advisable to adopt a uniform system, but this is not essential to the inauguration or working of the system.

The essential thing, however, is that the electors of each State should have, by keeping control over their respective representatives, the ultimate decision on all great questions of policy. To effect this the tenure of a seat in the Imperial Cabinet (and consequent tenure of Office if an Imperial Minister) should be under the sole control of the democracy each represents; the mode in which that control is to be exercised is a domestic affair for each State to regulate, and is a detail of the system. For example, the persons selected might be members of the Colonial Government or not even Members of the Colonial Parliament, or they might be chosen from amongst residents in England, preferably not members of the English Parliament. A wide latitude should be given in this respect to meet the difficulties arising from the distance of the States represented.

By whatever mode, or for whatever terms the representatives might be chosen, they would be put forward by the Governor-General of the State on the advice of the King's Ministers in that State (carrying out the wishes of the electorate) for His Majesty's approval, and be made Members of the Privy Council. By this means the existing Constitutions would be the channels through which the people of the oversea dominions would take their share in the control of the affairs of the Empire, preserving at the same time that complete independence in their domestic affairs that they at present enjoy. Just as the British Cabinet at present advises the King on all matters not requiring the previous consent of the so-called Imperial Parliament, such as Foreign affairs, or the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in connection with Imperial affairs, so the Imperial Cabinet would do through its President who would be the Prime Minister of the Empire.

The number of oversea representatives must be small, say one for Newfoundland and two for each of the larger States, nine in all, and ten members of the British Cabinet. The names of the individuals to fill the seats in the Imperial Cabinet, would be submitted to the King through the Governor-General of the State in question, just as now the British Prime Minister submits the names of his proposed colleagues for the King's approval on the formation of his Ministry.

On the inauguration of this Imperial Cabinet the Ministers would necessarily all be members of the British Cabinet. There would then be no marked difference between the new system and the old. The British Prime

Minister would be the President of the Imperial Cabinet, which would practically be the British Cabinet with additional members. He would then be the Imperial Premier.

As the representatives of the oversea States must enjoy equality of status with their British colleagues they must be eligible for the office of one or more of the "Chief Ministers." The Imperial Premier must therefore be free to select for filling any of the above-mentioned posts any member of the Imperial Cabinet. When an oversea representative is selected for one of those posts, say that of Colonial Secretary, then one of the British representatives must be the corresponding Under Secretary. This Under Secretary, being a British Cabinet Minister, will be answerable for the policy pursued to the House of Lords, or Commons, as the case may be, and have as an Assistant Under Secretary a member of the other House who may or may not be also a member of the Imperial Cabinet. By thus enlarging the area of choice of a Minister the Premier would not be hampered so much as at present by narrow considerations such as the personal following of a proposed Minister or the safety of his seat. His choice could depend on merit, as it would be exercised after, and not before, the member had been constituted one of the Imperial Cabinet. But in all cases the predominance of the British representatives ensures that in all vital and great issues the policy followed by the Foreign or other Chief Ministers must be in accord with the views of the British Government.

The tenure of office of any Minister would be determined under the following circumstances. First, at the King's pleasure. This condition exists at present and would continue in like manner under the new system. In modern times no Minister enjoying the confidence of the House of Commons has ever been dismissed, and a like state of affairs would continue. Secondly, by a hostile vote in the Imperial Cabinet, or by voluntary resignation when he cannot agree with his colleagues on vital points. This latter condition prevails in the British Cabinet, and both are essential to any scheme whatever. And thirdly, the resignation of a Minister follows on his being withdrawn from the Cabinet by the Government or State he represents. This condition as regards a representative from oversea corresponds to a hostile vote of the House of Commons in the case of a British Minister. Such a vote now in that House involves the resignation of the Minister, and would continue to do so under the new system, but would not necessarily involve the resignation of the whole British Ministry.

THE WORKING OF THE SYSTEM.

The first subject for the consideration of such a Cabinet would be the Defence of the Empire and the mode in which the oversea States would share in the Imperial Army and Navy. The shares to be taken by the United Kingdom and the several States, whether in services or financially, would be considered in conjunction with the Reports of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The expenditure and estimates would be provisionally arranged and recommended and then would be submitted in due course by the proper members of the respective Governments to the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and the States oversea. There would be no departure from the voluntary system. The splendid patriotism shown by the oversea States in their gifts for Naval Defence gives them a right to be represented on the body which prepares the estimates for Naval Defence. They would thus be assured that their patriotism did not enable the people of the United Kingdom to shirk their due share of taxation for Defence.

The position of the oversea States in respect of Defence has been aptly described by the Canadian Premier in the Dominion House of Commons on 14th of March 1900:—

"If it should be the will of the people of Canada at a future stage to take part in any war of England, the people of Canada will have their way. Of course if our future military contribution were to be considered compulsory—a condition which does not exist—I would say to Great Britain 'If you want us to help you call us to your Councils.'"—(*The Times*, March 15th, 1900.)

Since those words were uttered the States oversea have now undertaken heavy burdens of Military and Naval Defence. In the future this assistance can only fairly be expected when they have had a voice in the direction of that Imperial policy which might indirectly be the cause of war. The South African War was exceptional, for it was a war in which the main issue was a Colonial one, and Colonial troops assisted their fellow Colonists in

Next would come Foreign Policy, which cannot be considered apart from Naval and Military problems, then matters relating to Imperial trade, including the question of Mutual Preference and also commercial treaties; questions relating to boundaries or other matters affecting the dealings of the States oversea with foreign States, and, in short, all questions that do not solely concern the internal affairs of the United Kingdom or the internal affairs of the

THE EFFECT ON THE UNITED KINGDOM.

At first all the Chief Ministers would be members of the British Cabinet. The conditions of their holding

office would be the same as at present, with the additional one that their respective policies must be approved by the majority of the Imperial Cabinet. The temptation to modify a policy to secure the support of a small extreme section of the House of Commons would be greatly diminished and greater stability ensured.

With regard to all questions on which the mind of the electorate is clearly expressed at a General Election or by any other means, the will of the nation can be carried out as under present conditions. As at least half the Imperial Cabinet would consist of representatives of the United Kingdom, the will of the "predominant partner" would prevail. But in matters of Foreign and Imperial Policy such a clearly expressed national opinion is rarely given, and as regards other questions that arise from time to time and are not submitted to the electorate the present conditions will be modified. Just as in the oversea dominions where issues of Foreign Policy and other questions with which their Parliaments are not competent to deal are removed from party strife, so at home there will be a tendency (in a less, but still a proportionate degree) to remove from our party strife questions relating to Defence and Foreign Policy, thus enabling us to present a more consistent and uniform policy with respect to the other nations of the World. The tendency to remove Imperial questions from party strife will follow from the presence in the Imperial Cabinet of members who are not concerned with considerations of parties in the United Kingdom, and the greater uniformity of our Foreign Policy will follow from the fact that those members will not go out of office at a General Election in the United Kingdom. A change of the personnel of the British representatives would not necessarily involve any change in Foreign or Imperial Policy. If the Chief Ministers were representatives from oversea this uniformity and stability would be further secured.

And further, with respect to those matters that do not require the consent of Parliament, such as the exercise of the Royal Prerogative in the grant of Colonial Constitutions, there will be a check on any hasty change of policy, just as there now is in the domestic legislation of the United Kingdom by the existence of the House of Lords. It will then be impossible to override the interests or wishes of our fellow subjects beyond the sea by an election appeal to the passions and prejudices of the electors at home. But in all questions concerning the United Kingdom, such as Electoral Reform, Licensing, Trades Disputes or Land Tenure, the power of the British electors will remain as it is. The general tendency and effect will be to confine party strife to the internal affairs of the United Kingdom. So it ought to be, seeing that the House of Commons represents the United Kingdom alone.

THE EFFECT ON THE STATES OVERSEA.

The States oversea have already recognised the serious nature of the problems of Naval Supremacy and Imperial Defence and the necessity of taking their proper share in the defence of the Empire. The effect of giving them a responsible (as distinguished from a merely consultative) share in the Imperial Government will be wholly beneficial.

This may be illustrated by a comparison with the present system. A policy might now be pursued by the British Cabinet leading to strained relations or even war with a Continental Power. That policy might not commend itself to an oversea State, and there might be a refusal on the part of that State to give any aid beyond the defence of its own territory, which might not be in danger of attack. The strain so set up between the Mother Country and the State might prove too severe for existing ties. It is obviously the interest of rival or hostile powers to raise such questions. Under the proposed scheme, however, the State in question would share in the deliberations, its views and wishes would have due weight, and in the event of war resulting the probability of refusal of aid would be greatly diminished. Foreign States, too, would realise that in negotiating they were dealing not only with the United Kingdom but with a United Empire.

Again, the oversea States will appreciate more fully the bearing of local questions arising between them and their neighbours on the wider and more delicate questions of Foreign Policy as a whole. They will also be able directly to influence the Imperial Government in maintaining their rights against Foreign Powers. It will bring home to the minds of all a realisation of the community of interests between the various component parts of the Empire, and so bind these more closely together.

ADVANTAGES AND LIMITS.

One advantage of the scheme here sketched is that it can be brought into operation without legislation or the creation of a written Constitution. Just as the Cabinet and the present practice as to Ministerial responsibility have been developed without legislation by the consent of all parties, so the consent of all parties in the Empire is sufficient to enable this new step to be taken. The machinery for it already exists. The Imperial Cabinet would be essentially a Committee of the Privy Council on the lines of the Board of Trade in its original form. Secondly, it involves no change in the legislative powers of the Parliaments of the Empire or in their control of taxation; in regard to matters of finance or those requiring legislation the functions of the Imperial

Cabinet would be purely consultative and advisory. But the preliminary mutual discussion in matters requiring subsequent legislation or financial votes would facilitate the subsequent actions of the respective Parliaments. Thirdly, it would in no way interfere with the future development of an Imperial Senate on the one hand or of a policy of devolution within the United Kingdom on the other. It is quite independent of either of these issues and would facilitate either of them,

The scheme here advocated was published in outline in a letter published in the Colonial Press in May 1906.

especially that of devolution, by going a great way to remove Foreign Policy and Defence from the ordinary strife of parties.

Suggestions were made at the last Imperial Conference as to central offices, a Secretariat and other details. These will apply equally well to the scheme here suggested.

It may be objected that this scheme rests on a novel foundation which would (because new) be called "unconstitutional"; namely, the existence of a Cabinet whose members are responsible to distinct Parliaments or States and not to one Parliament only. The term "unconstitutional" is often used to mean little more than "without precedent." But the situation is also without precedent, for there are several separate States—the United Kingdom, Newfoundland, the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Union of South Africa, each with full and separate Parliamentary Government under one Sovereign having (with the exception of the United Kingdom) all their external affairs under the control of a Cabinet responsible to one of them only! A collection of States so situated is "without precedent" in the history of the world. Where is there a precedent for two nations side by side as Canada and the United States are, one of which, as regards their mutual relations, is under the control of a Cabinet whose members hold power by the votes of persons in a distant land? The anomalies of the present condition of things are greater than any that are here suggested, and were aptly described by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on 31st March 1910:—

"Even now . . . the House of Commons has the power and the Government depending upon the House of Commons would have the power, resting on a single-chamber system, to deal with all the vital organs of the State The powers of the House of Commons if they were exerted recklessly and wantonly are still effective, clipped as they have been, to shatter altogether the foundations and the system of the State. War, treaties, defence, supply, patronage, police, all these functions, which in every country in the world have always been held to constitute the essential securities of the State, are still within the control of an Executive resting upon the House of Commons, are still within the control of a single-chamber system."—(*Par. Deb.*, Vol. XV., 1573.)

These words were uttered to show the powers of the present Cabinet unchecked by the necessity of legislation or the House of Lords; they may also be applied to the present problem. The words "war, treaties, defence" cover the field of Imperial politics and include the Imperial affairs of the States oversea. "These functions—the essential "securities of the State—are still within the "control of an Executive resting upon the House of "Commons," that is, resting on the votes of cliques who hold the balance of power. The leader of the Irish Nationalist party has openly dictated to the Ministry the "plan of campaign" to be followed in their attack upon the Constitution, and the Ministry have openly changed their strategy in obedience to such dictator! Are these conditions safe? Can Canada trust a Ministry so supported with her interests in regard to negotiations with the United States about the Panama Canal or other matters, when it is remembered that the funds of the Irish Nationalist party are largely furnished by citizens of the United States?

South African questions arising with regard to their German or Portuguese neighbours—the Congo State Indian Immigration, and so forth are under the existing system settled by a Cabinet whose precarious tenure of power rests to a considerable extent on the votes of those who openly boast that they have no regard for the Empire. So too as regards Australia, our relations with Japan, France, &c., the settlement of questions as to immigration, the employment of aliens on our ships, &c., is under the sole control of a group of British politicians who are not responsible to the Commonwealth of Australia or to the Dominion of New Zealand. True Statesmen will foresee and guard against the dangers above enumerated, mere politicians will let things drift.

DISCUSSION AND PUBLIC OPINION.

The problem is now ripe for solution. The constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom has given an opportunity for raising this question. The opportunity is unique. During the next few months the public will be interested in Constitutional questions. If any solution of our difficulties such as is here sketched out is to be brought within the range of practical politics, it will be possible only by means of public opinion and the free Press. To promote and assist in a discussion of the subject these pages are written. Politicians at home will not take this question up unless a demand for a change comes from the British dominions beyond the sea. It is the States oversea which have most at stake and it is their Statesmen that must demand a change. First, the question

must be raised and urged by the people themselves both by discussion and by the Press, so as to give weight to the demand for simple justice. Then expression should be given to the demand, say, by petitions to the King, from his subjects oversea, for a direct share in the Councils of the Crown, presented through the Governors of their respective States. These would not fail to arouse interest and carry weight at home. Later on, this policy could be advocated in the United Kingdom by representatives from oversea, so as to awaken interest and promote the mutual co-operation of the peoples at home and beyond the sea. The appeal then should be made direct to the electorate, the source of power.

The object to be attained is two-fold:—(1) to give the oversea States an efficient share in directing their own Foreign and Imperial policy, and (2) to free this from the evils and drawbacks of British party government.

Federation on the foregoing lines or some better plan, is a policy that may be followed at home by public men of all political views, Liberal or Conservative, Free Traders or Tariff Reformers. An Imperial Cabinet could discuss and decide on the question of Federation on the lines of Preferential Trade much better than a Conference of Premiers without a voice in the ultimate decision. This policy satisfies the Liberal idea of responsible (as distinguished from merely representative) Government, under which contributions for Imperial purposes and representation go hand-in-hand. Moreover, the ultimate basis of the Imperial Government and source of power throughout the Empire would by this policy be the will of the people of the whole Empire, and not merely the will of those within the narrower bounds of the United Kingdom. For the present, the task of advocating some such change will fall on the Unionist party at home. They must undertake the duty of pressing on the "policy of consolidation" by educating the British people to the importance of the issues at stake—of arousing interest and co-operation with their fellow subjects beyond the sea—and in so doing bind the Daughter States within the Empire closer to the Mother Land.

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Postscript.—Since the preceding pages were set up in type, the writer has learned that the Royal Colonial Institute passed a resolution some weeks ago to urge the Prime Minister to put on the Agenda for the Imperial Conference the question of securing for the oversea dominions a real and effective share in the responsibilities of Empire. Copies of that resolution have been sent to all the Premiers. It is hoped that it may be supported [by public opinion.

With the Canadian Alpine Club.

Reprinted from THE ALPINE JOURNAL, *February* 1910.]
BY Harold B. Dixon.

I. The Club House and the Camp.

'The Alpine members of the British Association who are guests of the Canadian Alpine "Camp" this year include many noted men of the Alpine Club of the British Isles, and the party will be under the leadership of Professor Harold Dixon, F.R.S., of the University of Manchester.'

Such was the official announcement in the *Canadian Gazette*, and the 'party' and its 'leader' had to try to live up to it.

The invitation had been originally made to Whymper, Woolley, Collie, and myself. The letter inviting these four had been sent to the local secretaries of the British Association at Winnipeg, but was only forwarded to the office in London some months afterwards. The Council sent me the letter, asking me (as the senior member of the Association) to make arrangements for any members who wished to climb.

Meantime Whymper had written that he did not intend to go, Collie found himself tied to Skye, and Woolley could not be sure of the time. Thus, by the elimination of the fittest, Dame Fortune transferred the uncertain honours of leadership to me.

As so often happens in getting up such a party, things go swimmingly at first and the disappointments come later. From the descriptions which reached me of the Canadian Alpine camps, I gathered that our party might be called upon not only to walk but to talk; it was therefore very gratifying to receive the definite promise of Haskett-Smith to join us: and while Woolley was still a 'possible,' I felt that the A.C. would be properly represented. But when first Woolley, and at the last moment Haskett-Smith declared they could not go, I began

to think we should be something of an Alpine frost.

I fear I must have sent Wheeler, the president of the Canadians, rather a lugubrious letter, for, in addition to my disappointments, I was *hors de combat* with a torn muscle in my leg and congestion of the lungs. Wheeler, however, replied most cheerily. 'Bring anybody you like, climbers or non-climbers, and we'll give you all a good time.' I hope these pages will show how well he kept his promise.

With returning spring the barometer rose. I found some walking and mild scrambling possible in April; and when I made sure of G. A. Solly, A. L. Mumm, L. S. Amery, G. Hastings, and A. M. Bartleet, I felt happier. Encouraged by Wheeler's letter we made up our numbers with younger climbers and with ladies, and of course at the end I had so many applications to join 'the party' that I had to sternly refuse. Several went out on their own and joined the Club as graduating members, and one or two crossed the Pacific and met us at the Camp.

We arrived at Banff, by the 'Pacific Express,' at 6.20 a.m. on Wednesday, July 28, having disposed of an early breakfast in the dining-car. We were met by the Secretary of the Alpine Club, who soon had our lighter baggage packed on 'skips.' We then packed ourselves on top, and so drove up through the woods, about two miles, to the Club House, which is perched among the pines on the side of Sulphur Mountain. It was hard for us to grasp the fact that less than four months ago the site of this Club House was an unbroken mountain slope. What a substantial monument it is to the energy and capacity of the executive! Here we were welcomed by Mrs. Wheeler, who combines the onerous offices of Quartermaster-General and of Guardian-Angel of the Club, and by Mrs. Parker, whose love for literature and mountains makes her an ideal proselytising secretary. Under their auspices we entered at once on our mountain *régime* by sitting down to our second breakfast, where we were introduced to the members of the Canadian A.C. who were making a stay at the Club House on their way to the camp at Lake O'Hara.

The house itself and the outlook are delightful. There is a large assembly-room, with polished floors, a piano, and a wonderful stone fire-place, and a wide veranda runs round it. Above are a library and smoking-room; at the back are the dining-room and kitchen. Little trails through the wood lead to the frame-tents which serve as our sleeping quarters. The tents stand on neat wooden platforms, and are furnished with two canvas bedsteads and a small wash-hand-stand. The ladies' tents are near the House, and the men's some 60 yards above them. They, the ladies, are out of sight, but we can hear them talking and laughing far into the night. The

Mt. Hungabee, from Lake O'Hara.

H. B. Dixon, Photo.

Scan Electric Engarcing Co., Ltd.

Club provides us with a thin mattress on which we stretch our sleeping bags, and for a pillow we use one of our canvas sacks stuffed with the softest clothing we can find. Of course there is one drawback to this haven of delight: mosquitoes are also guests of the Club, and find we 'make them light and salutary meals.' Dr. Benson, my tent companion, objects strongly to their attentions, so we have a nightly battue after making the door fast. Then we rig up muslin nets to go over our heads, so we are fairly safe during the night; but sleep is coy at first and needs some wooing.

We are royally entertained by our hosts, and live, literally, upon the fat of the land. Most of our party enjoy the national dish—fried bacon and beans. *O dura ilia!* How I envied them. Still, the advantages of vegetarianism ought to be tested, and here was the opportunity.

By day we stretch our limbs on Sulphur Mountain, some 8,000 ft. high, or make boating excursions up the Bow Biver or on Lake Minnewanka. Then we swim in the Sulphur Bath, fed direct with hot-water (with more than a suspicion of H₂S, in it) from the mountain side. A dive into hot water is a delightful novelty. At night there is music followed by impromptu dances, and one night was consecrated to my lantern lecture *on the Rockies*—on behalf of the Club House fund—a performance which caused unexpected amusement. At 4 p.m. on the eventful day I went down with the President to Banff to see that things were ready at the 'Opera House,' carrying my slides and some pretty ones borrowed from Woolley and Collie. The man who was to run the lantern—he answered to the name of Bob—had promised to meet us at 4. No one was about. We got out the lantern (a new one of American design) and managed to put the lenses right and get the thing ready. But no screen and no current was to be found. At 6.15 Bob turned up, optimistic and merry. He knew where the terminals and fuses were to be got at—but he had no connections or appliances for joining up the lantern. However, he sent out for sticking-plaster to cover the wire joints, and swore loudly he would have screen and everything ready by 8, the lecture being advertised for 8.30. So I went back to the Club House for a meal, and when I returned at 8, a screen of sorts, made of four bed sheets quaintly pinned together, formed the proscenium, but no current had Bob succeeded in obtaining. At 8.5 a messenger was sent on the best horse we could find to the electric station—four miles away—to request the services of an electrician. Luckily one was

found and came, but he was in a still merrier mood than Bob. Meantime the audience collected on the veranda of the Opera House, and as the mosquitoes were active, they demanded admittance. I told them the lecture was very unlikely to come off; but they didn't seem to mind *that*, and planked down their 50 cents. Then I got up and explained matters as tactfully as I could, and suggested we should either clear the chairs out of the hall and have a dance, or begin with a concert and see what happened. The audience good humouredly accepted the suggestion of a concert, and various members of the company were kind enough to 'oblige.' At 9 o'clock, in the middle of a chorus, a loud noise at the back of the gallery announced that the electrician had arrived. After half an hour's struggling a half-moon appeared on the screen, so Hastings took the slides to the gallery, and after a few sharp discussions the sheets were illuminated. I climbed the stage and made a start. The lantern was about twice the right distance from the screen, so that only the middle of the picture was visible; and the efforts of the operators to bring the summits into view on the sheet caused shouts of laughter. One elusive peak I chased across the screen with the pointer, but the whole thing disappeared before I could traverse the stage. After half an hour a voice came down from the gallery, 'Sorry, we must put the light out, but the wire's red-hot and the floor is smoking.' So we had a dark interval, during which I told a story, and then, amid great cheering, the light came up again and I rushed along to the end, breathless, but in time. I hope they 'cleared' a few dollars for the Club House out of the 'entertainment.'

Sunday, August 1, was a day of packing and unpacking. The rules of the camp declared that only sacks could be taken up to O'Hara, and the weight was to be limited to 40 lb. per person. Actually the number of sacks allowed appeared, at all events in our case, to be unlimited; and we found that a fair-sized hand-bag would easily go in a sack. So our united luggage made a very handsome pile—more in fact than could be taken up by the horses in one journey. An hour's run by train brought us to Hector station, still a mere shanty in the mountains. There the Club had provided for the ladies a few saddle-ponies, but they were no sooner spied than bags and cameras of every description were strapped on, fore and aft, by the pedestrian crowd. Having started off our party, I returned like a dutiful leader to the station to see our sacks safely packed. Then for the first time this year I shouldered a rucksack and started into the wilds, along the bank of Cataract Brook. After an hour's walk up the path—for a real path had been cut—I came on our ladies, reclined under the trees, watch-

Mt. Odaray and Lake O'Hara.

R. Harmon, Photo.

Scan Electric Engraving Co. Ltd.

ing Hastings brewing tea. Half an hour's rest and refreshment gave us spirit for the next two hours' walk, which brought us to the shore of Lake O'Hara, 6,660 feet above the sea and ten minutes from the camping-ground. It is hard to imagine how a more perfect spot could be chosen for the camp. The lake, wooded to the water's edge, lies in a valley at the feet of three of the boldest mountains in the range—Victoria, Lefroy and Hungabee. Westward the land rises a little to an open meadow just beneath the pine-clad slopes of Mount Odaray. On one side of this meadow we found a Union Jack flying and three tents pitched for the English party. The smallest tent we left for Whymper and other late comers, the other two we divided four in each. Solly, Mumm, Amery and Rohde shared one; Hastings, Priestley, Pilkington and I the other. We soon had our beds laid out on the 'brush,' and our belongings arranged alongside. Here a 'well-brushed' tent does not mean that anything has been swept *out*, but that the soft needley ends of pine branches have been thickly strewn within. It must have been no small business to prepare accommodation for some two hundred climbers, and to supply their daily wants at such a distance from the railway.

The ladies' quarters consisted of some dozen tents arranged like ours. The six British ladies (English, Scotch and Irish) had one tent, so had to lie close. We found the evening meal (I don't say 'tea' because they were all teas) set out on three long tables under a large 'fly-tent.' Pine stems, roughly 'smoothed' with the axe, formed the benches. Here we were waited on assiduously by our hosts, and afterwards were introduced to the 'charmed-circle' of the camp-fire. Seated round the blazing logs, in the centre of an amphitheatre of mountains, and looking up at their snowy peaks, clear-cut against the sky long after the forests below were lost in the black of night, we each fell under the spell and became one of the worshippers. The glow of the huge fire lighted up fitfully the ways to our tents, and soon the last camp-fire song was mingling with our dreams.

Next morning six of us made an early start—not unreasonably early—for Mount Odaray, which had just been struck out from the 'official' climbs on account of a 'blocked' chimney and the danger of falling stones. To qualify as an active member each aspirant has to go up something over 10,000 feet, including rock or snow for four or five thousand feet—There were many 'graduating' members in the camp, all eager to be led up the necessary peak, and the danger from stones was very considerable for a large party. Hastings and I took Mrs. Spence between us, and V. A. Fynn took Pilkington and Priestley. I think we only made one mistake in the ascent-taking a narrow chimney up the first peak, which I found rather small to negotiate even with Hastings to

stand upon. However, I managed to wriggle up, and Hastings came up more in the open. It was annoying to find the other party (who had found the orthodox staircase) sitting above us enjoying our struggles. But we had some consolation in hearing that Solly (whose guiding instinct is almost uncannily developed) took *his* party up the same chimney a few days afterwards. The descent of the first peak into the gap leading to the second needed care, as the rocks were steep and friable, and led on to a small but steep ice slope. A few steps brought us on to the snow and then the blocked chimney was immediately opposite us. This we were told was the crux of the climb, but it was not difficult. It was not easy, however, to get out of the chimney above without sending down showers of rock.

The view from the top was splendid. Victoria, Lefroy, and Hungabee are just across the O'Hara Valley—in which the green lake and our white tents were nestling—with Mts. Biddle and Goodsir to the W. and S.W., and away in the distance the fine peak of Mt. Assiniboine. We came down the blocked chimney accompanied with a meteoric shower of shale, but without difficulty; and we carefully avoided the narrow cleft by which we had wormed up the lower peak. On our return it was announced that Mrs. Spence was the first lady to climb Mount Odaray, and she was gazetted as a 'graduate' with due honours. These honours lists are posted on a large tree just outside the dining tent, together with the lists of the next day's climbs and the 'guides' chosen to accompany each party. We have two Swiss guides, brought over by the C.P.R.—Edouard and Godfried Feuz—and Conrad Kain, engaged by the Club. A. L. Mumm had also brought his Swiss guide, Inderbinnen, and they all had a busy time taking aspirants up Mt. Huber, the official 'graduating climb.'

On Tuesday, August 3, I am asked to 'orate' at the camp fire. As this is the anniversary of Philip Abbot's death (in 1896) and of our first ascent of Mt. Lefroy (in 1897), it is natural that these two climbs should be the chief topics of the oration. The night was fine and the light just enough to allow me to point out the details of our route up the snow-face of Lefroy, which looked down on our camp, and to show the rocks where Abbot fell. And then by way of comic relief I fired off all the stories I could remember, and as they seemed new to an audience very willing to be amused, the oration, begun in seriousness, ended in laughter. Indeed, I believe

View from Mount Huber

Mt. Deltaform Mt. Hungabee Mt. Biddle the camp got an impression that I had an inexhaustible sack full of stories, and at last it was necessary to fall back on recollections of *Punch* to eke out the camp-fire entertainments.

On August 4 we wandered up the valley to the S.W., visiting Lake McArthur at the foot of Mt. Biddle, whose great glacier melts into the lake, throwing off small bergs of white ice to navigate the blue waters. We found a few rocks to scramble about on and made tea in the forest.

On Thursday, the 5th, we all volunteered as 'guides' to take graduating members up Mt. Huber, and Hastings and I were assigned to three novices, Mrs. Spence also joining us. We had a long 2 hrs.' grind up a steep shaley slope to the col below the rocks—eight or ten parties all struggling up by slightly different routes. By the time we reached the col two of our novices were obviously done; indeed, one promptly turned back. And then a storm (which had been threatening for the last half-hour) fell on us with a lash of hail. We huddled under the lee of what cover we could find, and braved it for 40 rains. Then the absurdity of fifty-six people trying to get up iced rocks on such a day, where long waits would be necessary, was borne in on us. We had a short consultation, and the English 'guides' decided to climb down. Our example was quickly followed, and all but three ropes were soon racing down to camp. One party did get up. Two others, after an hour's wait below the 'roped rocks,' gave it up in a state of freezing despair. I believe it would have been dangerous to take more than one novice on a rope under such conditions. The graduating climb gives immense zest to the camp, and many of the men have become good craftsmen by acting as guides, but there is, it seems to me, a possibility of zeal getting the better of discretion where so many novices go together. Again, *one* climb does not make a mountaineer. One learns, I think, very little on one's first climb; it is only on his second or third that a man is able to look about and take notice of how and why things are done. Possibly two or three passes would make a better training than one mountain. But I must admit that the 'graduating climb' gives a wonderful impetus to the Club.

Our failure on Mt. Huber in no way damped the enthusiasm at the camp fire that evening. Amery gave an amusing account of some climbs in Basutoland, and Hastings, after much persuasion, described his attempt on Nanga Parbat with Collie and Mummery. We enjoyed some excellent recitations and songs by members of the Club.

Next day several of our party (Solly and Mrs. Solly, Miss Maclay, Mrs. Spence and I) were escorted by the Vice-President of the Club, J. D. Patterson, on the 'two-day' round. The route was up Abbot Pass between Victoria and Lefroy, down the Victoria Glacier, up the Lefroy Glacier, and over the Mitre Pass to a small standing camp in Paradise Valley. As usual I found the first 2 hrs. rather trying, but recovered when we reached

the snow. We sat by the lovely little Lake Oesa and ate our luncheon, and then had a weary grind up broken shale till we reached the snow. The upper part of the pass is a wilderness of loose slabs ready to slip before you tread on them. On the col I was on familiar ground, at the foot of the snow slope of Mt. Lefroy. Here we saw the last of Hastings, Mumm and Amery, who ran down the snow to Lake Louise *en route* for their long tramp to Mount Robson. We followed more cautiously. To avoid the seracs under Mt. Lefroy we crossed over to our left beneath the hanging glacier of Victoria, and had to wind round several crevasses; but Solly's guiding instinct was not called upon, for the well-worn track of previous parties could not be mistaken.

At the angle of Mt. Lefroy we caught sight of Lake Louise and the 'Chalet,' now grown out of recognition. We went along the Lefroy Glacier at such a pace that we nearly caught the first party' which had started 2 hrs. before us. The Mitre Pass was fairly steep, but the snow was good and we got to the top without difficulty. I *thought* I saw a white tent in the dark wood below. We glissaded down the snow and loose shale, spirited with the thought of a prompt supper at the camp which (we had been told) lay at our feet. Alas! when we reached the valley nothing was visible but a fairly broad stream and a wood. Our 'Vice' thought the camp must be down the river. But the President had told us the camp was visible from the pass and therefore must be across the river and through the forest. So we crossed the river, with some difficulty, and strode into the forest. Then we had out our map, and it was already too dark to see. We lighted a candle and again penetrated into the forest and shouted and howled. It was just coming home to us that we should have to make a very cold and supperless bivouac—quite romantic, as one lady remarked—when another lady suggested we should all howl together. We did make the most discordant yell, with all the agony of darkness, cold and hunger thrown in, and then most musically came to us an answering call from the depths of the forest ahead. A few hundred yards, though we stumbled over bushes and fallen trees, seemed nothing, and there was party No. 1 busy round the fire cooking supper for us and wondering where we had been hiding. We had lost just an hour looking for the camp. Our willing hosts were soon waiting on us, and we turned in warm and refreshed. The night was cold and the blankets not quite enough to go round, so we had to snuggle together for warmth, and were not altogether sorry to get our boots on and take a turn with the frying pan and kettle for early breakfast. We cleaned up the camp, extinguished the fire carefully and nailed up the boxes of provisions and candles, lest inquisitive bears or porcupines should nose out the eatables. Then we marched up the Wastach Pass at the E. of Hungabee and down into the Valley of the Ten Peaks. Turning to the W., we crossed the Wenchemna Pass between Hungabee and Neptuak, and then, after a long descent down scree, we came to the curious rock called the Eagle's Eyrie, where we ate our luncheon, and, as the day was young and the sun hot, we slept peacefully on the grass. Then we ascended the Opabin Pass up a fine snow-slope to the W. of Hungabee and heard a call from Fynn and Oliver Wheeler (son of the President), who had climbed it that morning and were descending the W. face. It was the second ascent of Hungabee, and the first made without guides. The descent of the Opabin Pass was easy until we reached tree level, and then we lost our way half a dozen times and had several fine rock scrambles before we got down to O'Hara.

On reaching the camp we heard that Whympfer had arrived and that he was to give the 'oration' at the camp fire that night. With a voice that age has not weakened, he read to the large listening circle messages from many old members of the Alpine Club, and declared his regret that this was to be his one and only appearance before the Canadian Club. The orator then became an auctioneer, and various items of climbers' outfit were disposed of for the benefit of the Club. True to his word, he departed early on the morrow.

Sunday, August 8, was another day of packing, for the camp was to break up on the morrow. It also turned out a day of unexpected literary effort. After luncheon the President produced a large 'Minute Book' which had been presented to the Club, and declared that it had been kept for me to make the first 'minute' in it. In vain were the protests that a Minute Book was meant to record the resolutions and proceedings of the Club; I had got to make the first entry on any subject I pleased. These 'opening remarks' cost me many a grievous pang throughout the afternoon. Whether it is the high air, or the exercise, or the vegetable food, or a combination of all three which produces this mental atrophy is hard to say. A lithe and grey-haired member of the Club, whom I knew for a week before discovering in him an old Christ Church contemporary, is an ardent vegetarian and preaches the doctrine to all and sundry. 'Look at me!' he exclaims, 'my limbs are not stiff with age, my mind is not worried by thought, I am now a perfect man—a man as God made me.' With the blank page of the 'Minute Book' open before me, and a desire to do anything but think, I imagine I must have been approaching the 'perfect man.'

I wish I could have found words to express in that Minute Book what each and all of our party felt, for we should have liked the Canadian members to know what enjoyment we found in our visit, and what admiration we have for the splendid work the Club is doing for mountaineering and for Canada. I find it, indeed, hard to believe that only twelve years ago I thought the Canadians, as a people, so indifferent to their wonderful mountain heritage, that I could write in this journal, 'I fear the Canadians have not yet reached that state of over-civilisation which drives people to climb for the mere fun of the thing.' This reproach has passed away.

To-day hundreds of Canadians have a living interest in the mountains, and in the preservation of their romance and beauty, thanks to the strong will, the practical sense and the enthusiasm of Wheeler and his officers. More power to their elbows! Of such material is our empire made.

II.

The Yoho Expedition.

At 3 o'clock on August 9 the Yoho party march off along Lake Wapta and turn up into the Sherbrooke Valley. For the first camp, Clausen Otto, the outfitter, takes up horses, though the blazed trail is terribly rough, no vestige of a path being made through the woods. Wild berries are abundant—blueberries and large huckleberries—and we grab them in handfuls as we scramble through and over the timber. As we mount the slopes, thunder begins to rumble over the hills and suddenly a storm bursts on us. We find Otto has begun to unpack the horses, which are frightened at the lightning. Some one rushes at us and snatches our ice-axes, which are declared to be 'most dangerous.' He proceeds to hide them. And then the ladies are placed 'in shelter' under the largest tree. I find in the morning seven axes stuck into this tree just above the ladies' 'sheltered heads.' I feel a strong temptation

Twin Falls, yoho Valley.

B. Harman, Photo.

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to give a professorial lecture on lightning and conductors—but refrain. The 'packers' and 'boys' set to work, and with incredible rapidity have tents pitched, fires lighted, 'brush' and firewood cut, and a meal ready. It was a fine lesson in method and woodmanship. In half an hour the storm was over and we were warm, comfortable and feeding.

Miss Vaux—my Quaker friend of twelve years ago—has joined our party, so, with Mrs. Solly and her sister and Mrs. Spence we have four ladies and twenty-eight men—a proportion the ladies fully appreciate. Next morning four of the more active start for Mount Burgess, while the rest of us move camp across the ridge into the Yoho.

The ponies are sent back to Hector, and Otto has instructions to bring up supplies to the highest part of the Yoho Valley, which we are to reach on Wednesday evening. So for two days everything has to be carried. The 'boys'—all volunteers from the Club—are nobly loaded. One or two carry packs of 60 to 70 lb.; two real boys of nineteen carry 50 lb. apiece. I feel quite ashamed of my light ruck-sack, but soon find that the addition of a lady's camera and of a few other trifles makes up a very reasonable load for a hot day. The President sends us on ahead while the camp is still packing, so I renew my old experience of following a 'blazed' trail. It wants a pretty sharp look-out to spot the slight 'bend over' in the grass and scrub where men have walked, and to see the white notch on the trees every sixty to a hundred yards as the trail twists and turns through the forest. Once above the tree-line one can steer for peak or pass easily enough, and there was no difficulty in ascending the Niles Pass, where we were to wait for the President. It was a hot grind up quite easy slopes and slabs by the west side of Mount Niles. At the top of the pass we looked down a fine snowfield on to the great Daly Glacier. North of us rose Mount Balfour, which I had tried to bag in 1897. As we sat on the col, munching our luncheon and 'cooling off,' we were hardly aware of the black clouds racing up from the south. Within ten minutes the blizzard was searching our bones and the hail cutting our faces as we cowered together under what protection we could find. Then the rear guard came up with the President, who pointed out the position for our second camp, high on the slopes of the Yoho Valley by the ice-fall of the Daly Glacier. Off we started, glissading down the snow, and first one and then another put their feet through and skipped out laughing. With old-world caution two of us roped on to the ladies—but of course we didn't hit upon a crevasse. The President added a touch of grimness to the comedy by lining us up when we reached the ice and calling the roll. 'Twenty-eight. All aboard!' And Harmon stepped from the rank and photographed the regiment as we moved off in file. Diagonally across the great ice-field the line advanced at the 'double,' and reached the rocks just at the right-hand of the blue ice-fall. The narrow ledges were trying to the overladen 'boys'; it was no easy thing to balance on them, and the hand-holds were all rotten. At the foot of the rocks we pitched our camp and were soon busy levelling the soil for our tents. Before we were through, the storm circled round upon us again, and all the packs had to be thrust into one tent. As the night came on it was still wet and cold and the 'boys,' most of whom preferred to sleep in the open on fine nights, crowded into the men's tent. Then the President entered and said the ladies were going to make room for two of us in their tent—and Solly and I were the selected victims. We took our sleeping bags across, stumbling in the dark through a muddy stream. The ladies said they would

require twenty minutes to go to bed, and then they would 'ring' for us by beating on a tin frying pan. I set up a lantern for them with a cardie guaranteed to fall out in forty minutes, and then Solly and I sat over the fire drying our lower halves and getting soaked above. The men had long turned in and their lights were out; but from the illuminated ladies' tent peals of laughter spread into the night and echoed from the cliffs above. Half an hour went by and the laughter waxed shriller. Three-quarters of an hour—and we two grimly watched the moving shadows silhouetted on the canvas. Then sudden darkness fell—the candle had gone—and there was silence for a space. Then a light appeared again under the canvas, and the laughter rippled out again. Ten minutes more and we determined to go over and expostulate. So Solly and I approached. And then the laughter was accompanied by a tocsin on the frying-pan. They were in bed. I opened the flap and spoke a word and addressed them by name. And silence fell on the camp.

I pass over the agonies of the night. As I have said, the ground was slanting and I had to lie across the slope at the mercy of the feet of the sleeping four. Towards morning I found both legs pushed through the tent and my feet freezing. Not often have I got up gladly with the morning sun; but next morning did look glorious, and without wishing to flatter the mountain tops unduly, I think there *was* a little heavenly alchemy in the air outside.

It was the anniversary of our attempt on Mount Balfour twelve years ago. We file off under the President's eye at 7.30. For an hour and a half we carry our sacks, most of the 'boys' heavily laden. Then we reach the edge of the long Balfour snow-field, and we stack our packs on the last rocks. We have a sip of water and a prune by way of second breakfast, and then rope up in a 'four,' a 'five,' and a 'three,' to suit our ropes of 80, 100, and 60 feet. The snow rises gradually and we make good progress, Godfried Feuz leads with Mrs. Spence, J. I). Patterson and myself on first rope. Solly's party is second, and three boys make the third. When we at last reach the Bergschrund a slight detour of forty yards brings us to a practical bridge of good snow, small but sufficient for our wants. The slope above is fairly steep to the ridge, along which we proceed partly on rock and partly on snow until we reach the final summit in four hours and a quarter from the camp. The last half-hour we walked in mist, but the sun soon broke through and we enjoyed fine dissolving views as the cloud cleared first on one side and then on another. Balfour is an easy climb; indeed, it is rather a fine walk than a climb—once you are on it. Our difficulty twelve years ago was that we never got on it. It looked very tempting to go down one of the two sharp rock aretes to the north, one of them almost pointing to our next camp. But our packs had to be recovered. Twenty feet down the north-east face we found a place to sit on out of the wind, and here we took our luncheon and looked down on Lake Turquoise, Lake Margaret and Hector Lake—the scene of our old camp in the Bow Valley. We should have tried Balfour from *there*, and not from our higher camp at the Upper Bow Lake. It is easy to be wise when one is on the top.

We took a short cut to the snow-bridge over the Bergschrund. Thence we followed our steps over the long snow-field, revelling in the glorious sea of mountains before us. Such a confusion of peaks seemed piled together that it required some care to pick out the several ranges we knew so well—the sentinels and lines that keep watch over Lake O'Hara. All too soon the rocks were reached, and we strapped on our packs reluctantly.

Then the guides led us a long traverse to the north, under the Trolltinder—a western spur of Mount Balfour—until we were stopped by steep cliffs. We had to circle back some distance along the edge until we struck a steep couloir which was half filled with hard snow. Godfried led down, followed by Mrs. Spence and myself. Where the snow had melted the couloir was full of loose stones. It was difficult to keep close together. A slide of shale and stones accompanied our movements, but nothing serious happened until we were two-thirds of the way down. Then a cry from above and I saw a huge boulder starting down the gulley. Godfried made a run for it, I gave a hurried look round: it was impossible for us to get out of the gulley in time. So I stood on the right side of the narrow 'shoot,' while Mrs. Spence, a few feet below me, clung to the left wall. I watched the boulder strike twice and come spinning through the air straight at me. I sprang across the gulley, not looking, I fear, exactly where my feet would strike, but watching the boulder fly by about two feet from my head. The boulder had, of course, set a shower of satellites in motion, and whether one struck me or whether my foothold gave way I don't know, but in an instant I was carrying Mrs. Spence down the gulley, and we went down rolling over together in an involuntary but firm embrace. Luckily my side came against the rock wall, and the pressure being distributed over a large area acted as a brake without breaking any bones. Next moment we had stopped and for the first instant were aware only of a pair of eyes close to our own with large notes of interrogation in them. 'Are *you* hurt?' was what the other eyes said. 'If so, I'm so sorry, for *I'm* all right.' And then we picked ourselves up, to the relief of our friends above, and nothing was found broken. We were not sorry to escape from 'Boulder Gulley.'

When we reached tree-line a sharp eye detected the faint blue patch in the opposite forest denoting the location of the third camp. We plunged down through the wood, now, as ever, my idea of purgatory. And when we emerged, out of wind and out of temper, near the foot of the Wapta Glacier, we found a formidable stream before us. After many attempts at finding a stone bridge, most of the party ascended and crossed the glacier;

one of the boys and I took off our stockings and waded the two streams. It was pretty hard to stand against the rush, but the ice-cold water was delicious. We got pretty wet, but soon dried ourselves by the camp fire, I wish one could do this sort of thing with impunity in England! Our camp that night, in the thick forest near the Twin Falls, was one of the most beautiful of our experiences. Most of us slept in the open.

A hot, lazy day followed. Horses to carry our packs again, and no particular peak or pass to bag. So we sat under the Twin Falls, which it seems I was the first to describe in the *Alpine Journal* in my account of the view from Mount Gordon. When we reached camp No. 4 in Waterfall Valley in the early afternoon, we sat in the shade and told stories, and even played 'Who knows?' until sleep stole on us unawares and quotations were hushed—for a time.

The 'boys,' sixteen of them, make an early start next morning for Mount Habel. None of our 'party' join their 'express.' But we wander up the Kiwetinok Pass and look over an unknown district to the west. Then we prospect the north ridge of the President, and resolve to make a first attempt on that side. We luncheon in a rocky canyon by the Little Yoho Falls, and returning find camp No. 5 pitched just across the rushing torrent. A signal to Otto, a whistle to his boy, and a tree is felled and thrown across the stream in less than five minutes. Our President rushes across, fixes a rope as a hand-guide, and in a moment we have a safe bridge for the most doddering of us. We have an early meal and make ready for the return of the boys from Habel. Alldritt, the cook, who is a gymnastic instructor at Revelstoke, comes in first, but within ten minutes they are all back and reclining round the camp fire. We serve them with piles of stew, bacon and beans, and red currant jelly. According to camp etiquette everything is eaten from one tin plate, not necessarily together, but a certain amount of mix is inevitable. They really enjoyed being waited on and they did justice to the fare.

On August 14 we made our longest move. While the 'camp' trekked down the Upper Yoho Valley to the Yoho Pass we walked along the President Range almost parallel with the horses. We all turned out in honour of the President and Vice-President to 'do' their name-peaks. Passing up the snow slopes on the west of the President we struck the northern ridge, and after being foiled by one steep chimney, got round an easier way on to the ridge. Then we had a pleasant scramble, in spite of the friable rock, along the ridge to the summit, which consists of a snow dome and a cornice some forty feet above the last rock and cairn. We had a splendid view, Mount Forbes being particularly well seen to the north and Mount Mummery to the north-west. This was perhaps our best high view, for the Selkirk peaks were plainly visible.

After luncheon at the cairn we deposited the Club 'card,' and then cut steps down the eastern ice-slope and went down steep but broken rock to the col. A short snow slope put us on the ridge of the Vice-President, which we followed to its summit. Then we turned to the south-east, and went down the long snow ridge, enjoying one delicious glissade, until we reached the glacier looking down on Emerald Lake. It seemed an easy descent, but we soon struck lines of crevasses which made a long traverse necessary, and then, when we appeared to be within a few hundred feet of the valley, we were cut off by an impracticable ice-fall. The official descent being barred, we had to ascend the rocks on the left of the glacier and traverse round broken rock until we were above the Yoho Pass before we could find a route down. This accomplished, we emerged on flowery fields, but the usual half-hour's floundering in the forest followed. That half-hour so winded me that I lay in a ball and gasped for breath. But tea and a swim in the beautiful Summit Lake put us in fettle again, and we gathered round our camp fire with a pleasure only dimmed because we knew it was the last. I think everyone contributed something to the entertainment; and I believe I contributed three 'new' stories drawn from a suddenly-remembered past. Even the cook came out as an unconscious (?) satirist: 'Why, I was told I was to take out a party of *scientists*; I soon found out what a mistake *thiat* was.' And so we talked and sang and watched the red sparks from the pine logs glitter upwards into the blue night, while the silent stars looked down. And the spell of it all fell on us, a spell we shall hear calling us back to the West—how irresistibly!

We walked down the Yoho Pass along a good trail, and in an hour and a half reached Emerald Lake and the C.P.R. Chalet. And so we came back to civilisation. It caught us in different forms: some called for beer, some for a daily paper, some for a hot bath. And then we sat down to a sumptuous luncheon, and vegetarianism seemed an absurd doctrine, and life seemed very good. And how the ladies rowed us in boats, and how we drove down in style to Field, and how the English guests entertained their Canadian hosts at a farewell dinner, and how everybody proposed the health of everybody else—surely these things are written in the chronicles of the Alpine Club of Canada, or in that 'Minute Book' in which the British 'Scientist' and 'Leader' wrote the first entry.

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Heresy and Humanity

An Address

Delivered before the "Heretics" Society in Cambridge, on the 7th December, 1909

By Jane Ellen Harrison

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Heresy and Humanity

The word "heretic" has still about it an emotional thrill—a glow reflected, it may be, from the fires at Smithfield, the ardours of those who were burnt at the stake for love of an idea.

Heresy, the Greek *hairesis* was from the outset an eager, living word. The taking of a city, its *expugnatio* is a *hairesis*; the choosing of a lot in life or an opinion, its *electio* is a *hairesis*; always in the word *hairesis* there is this reaching out to grasp, this studious, zealous pursuit—always something personal, even passionate. This comes out clearly in the words to which it is opposed—*hairesis* "choosing," "electing," is opposed to *phage* "flight from," "rejection"; and again, *hairesis* what you choose for yourself, is opposed to *tychê*—the chance from without that befalls you by no will of your own. Only in an enemy's mouth did *heresy* become a negative thing, a sect, causing schism, a rending of the living robe. Free personal choice sounds to us now so splendid and inspiring; why, then, in the past, was it so hated and so hunted? Why instinctively in our minds, when we hear the word "heresy," does there rise up the adjective "damnable"? To be a heretic in the days of Latimer and Cranmer was to burn. To be a heretic in the days of our grandfathers was to be something of a social outcast. To be a heretic to-day is almost a human obligation.

Some portion of this paper was read at the Inaugural Meeting of the Cambridge Society of "Heretics," on December 7, 1909. My thanks are due to the Editor of the *Englishwoman* for permission to reprint it.

The gist of heresy is free personal choice in act, and specially in thought—the rejection of traditional faiths and customs, *quâ* traditional. When and why does heresy cease to be dangerous, and become desirable? It may be worth while inquiring.

The study of anthropology and sociology has taught us that only a very civilised person ever is or can afford to be a heretic. For a savage to be a heretic is not only not safe, it is practically impossible. We all know nowadays that the simple savage leading a free life is, of all mythical beings, most fabulous. No urbane citizen in the politest society is half so hide-bound by custom as the simple savage. He lives by imitation of his ancestors—*i.e.* by tradition. Long before he obeys a king he is the abject slave of that master with the iron rod—the Past; and the Past is for him embodied in that most dire and deadly of all tyrannies, an oligarchy of old men.

See Dr. Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship* p. 84

The past, they feel, has made them what they are; why seek to improve on it or them? In such a society choice, heresy, is impossible.

How came such a state of things to be? Why is it tolerated? Why is it not only not disastrous, but for a time, as a stage, desirable?

Because, at the outset, what draws society together is sympathy, similarity, uniformity. In the fierce struggle for existence, for food, for protection, the herd and the homogeneity of the herd, its *collective* unreflecting action, are all-important. If you are in danger of extinction, you must act swiftly, all together, all but automatically, you must not be a heretic.

We see this clearly in that noblest of latter-day survivals, the "good soldier." The good soldier is not a heretic; he does not, and may not, reflect and make personal choice. To him the order of his commanding officer voicing the herd is *sacrosanct*. Be it contrary to reason, be it contrary to humanity, it must still be obeyed. War has many horrors. To me not the least is this—that it must turn a thinking human being into an at least temporary automaton; it bids a man forego his human heritage of heresy.

What I want for the moment to emphasise is this: that only certain elements in civilisation, which later will be particularised, make heresy safe and desirable; primitive man is always, and rightly, suspicious of heresy. The instinct to burn a heretic was in a sense, and for a season, socially sound; the practice went on perhaps needlessly long. The instinct of savage law is the defence of *collective* the repression of individual, opinion and action.

The milder forms of heresy-hunting, those that most of us remember in our childhood, deserve consideration.

It has puzzled—it has, alas! exasperated—many that society should be so alert and angry, should feel so intensely, about heterodoxy. If I deny the law of gravitation, no one will worry me about it. Privately, and rightly, they will think me a fool; but they will not come and argue at, and browbeat, and socially ostracise me. But if I doubt the existence of a God, or even, in the days of my childhood, if I doubted the doctrine of eternal damnation—well, I become a "moral leper." The expression has now gone out; its mild, modern substitute is

looking at you sadly.

Such treatment naturally makes the honest patient boil with indignation; but the young science of sociology comes to smooth him down by explaining how this *is* and, so long as the strength of society is in its collective homogeneity, *must* be.

Religious views, sociology teaches us, and many other views on matters social and political—in fact, all traditional views—are held with such tenacity, such almost ferocity, because they belong to the class of views induced not by individual experience, still less by reason, but by collective, or, as it is sometimes called, "herd," suggestion. This used to be called faith. The beliefs so held may or may not be true; collective suggestion is not in the least necessarily collective hallucination. Mere collective suggestions—that is the interesting point—have the quality of obviousness; they do not issue from the individual, but seem imposed from outside, and ineluctable; they have all the inevitableness of instinctive opinion; they are what Mr. William James would call "*a priori* syntheses of the most perfect sort." Hence they are held with an intensity of emotion far beyond any reasoned conviction.

See especially a valuable paper by Mr. W. Trotter on "The Sociological Application of the Psychology of Herd Instinct," in the *Sociological Review* January, 1909, p. 37.

To doubt them is at once idiocy and irreverence. Inquiry into their rational bases is naturally, and in a sense rightly, resented, because they are not rationally based, though they may be rationally supported. It is by convictions such as this that a society of the homogeneous kind—a society based on and held together by uniformity—lives and thrives; to attack them is to cripple and endanger its inmost life.

To realise this is clear gain. We feel at once quieter and kinder; all, or most, of the sting is gone from the intolerance, or even ostracism, of our friends. When they look sad, and hint that certain views are not respectable, we no longer think of our friends as unreasonable and cruel. They are *non*-reasonable, *pre*-reasonable, and they are hypnotised by herd-suggestion. They become, not cruel, but curious and interesting, even heroic; they are fighting for the existence of the homogeneous type of herd—a forlorn hope, we believe, but still intelligible. Further, we begin to see what we, as heretics, must do; not reason with our opponents—that would be absurd—but try, so far as we can, to get on to the side we believe to be right this immense force of herd-suggestion. Suggest to people that an unverifiable opinion is as unsatisfactory an implement as, say, a loose tooth; and as to a mental prejudice, it is simply a source of rottenness, a decayed fang—out with it!

Why, and how, has heresy ceased or almost ceased to be disreputable?

Two causes have brought this about, Science and another movement towards what I will call Humanity, and which I shall try later to define.

Science is from the outset the sworn foe of herd-suggestion. Herd-suggestion, being a strange blend of the emotions and imaginings of many men, is always tolerant of contradictions; religion revels in them; with God all things are possible. Science classifies, draws ever clearer distinctions; herd-suggestion is always in a haze. Herd-suggestion is all for tradition, authority; science has for its very essence the exercise of free thought. So long as we will not take the trouble to *know* exactly and intimately, we may not—must not—choose. We must advance as nature prescribes, by slow, laborious imitation; we must follow custom; we must accept the mandates of the *Gerontes*—the old men who embody and enforce tradition. We must be content to move slowly.

We must not be unjust to collective opinion; it does move, though slowly, and moves even without the actual protest of open heresy. Things were said and written a century or two ago which, though no definite protest has been made, could not be written or said now. There has been a slow, unconscious shift. In the regulations of the University of Cambridge it is still enacted that every year a prize be offered for the best poem on the Attributes of the Deity, and that this prize be annually awarded until such time as in the opinion of the Master of *x* College the said Attributes shall have been exhausted. Somehow, nowadays, we should word our regulations differently.

Collective opinion, then, advances, but very slowly. Many people think that to be slow is sure; but our wise copybooks used to say, "Delays are dangerous." You may prop up an ancient building till it topples about your ears; adherence to tradition may land you in straits made desperate by the advancing tide of knowledge. You may delay a reform till the exacerbation caused by your delay is worse than the original evil.

Heresy, then, is the child of Science; and so long as the child holds fast her mother's hand, she may run her swiftest, she will not faint or fall.

Science opens wide the doors that turned so slowly on tradition's hinges, and opens them on clean, quiet places where we breathe a larger air. If heresy has in it too much of the fever and fret of self-assertion and personal choice, our remedy is to enter that "great kingdom where the strain of disturbing passion grows quiet, and even the persecuting whisper of egotism dies at last almost completely away."

Professor Gilbert Murray.

It is well to remember our debt to science—our inward and spiritual as well as material debt, because the generation is passed or passing which saw and was well-nigh blinded by the great flood of light that came last century. But the complete heretic needs more than science, he needs humanity, and this in no vague general sense, but after a fashion that it is important to understand as exactly as may be.

Science broke the binding spell of herd-suggestion. For that great boon let us now and ever bless and praise her holy name. She cleared the collective haze, she drew sharp distinctions, appealing to individual actual experience, to individual powers of reasoning. But by neither individual sense-perception nor ratiocination alone do we live; our keenest emotional life is through the herd, and hence it was that, at the close of last century, the flame of scientific hope, the glory of scientific individualism that had blazed so brightly, somehow died down and left a strange chill. Man rose up from the banquet of reason and law unfed. He hungered half-unconsciously for the herd. It seemed an *impasse*: on the one side orthodoxy, tradition, authority, practical slavery; on the other science, individual freedom, reason, and an aching loneliness.

But life meanwhile was feeling its way blindly to a solution, to what was literally a harmony. Something happened akin to what goes on in biology. The old primitive form of society grew by segmentation, by mere multiplication of homogeneous units; the new and higher form was to develop by differentiation of function—a differentiation that would unite, not divide. Instead of a mechanical homogeneous unity we get a disparate organism. We live now just at the transition moment; we have broken with the old, we have not quite adjusted ourselves to the new. It is not so much the breaking with old faiths that makes us restless as the living in a new social structure.

What is actually meant by organic as opposed to mechanical unity is seen, of course, very clearly—has long been seen, though not rightly understood—in the ever-increasing development of the Division of Labour. M. Durkheim

To the specialist, my debt throughout this paper to the writings of MM. Durkheim and Lévy Brubl will be evident.

has shown that the real significance of this is social and moral rather than economic. Its best result is not material wealth, but the closer, more vital, sympathy and interdependence of man with and on his fellow man. Its influence extends far beyond the supply of material needs. If one man depends on you for his supply of butter and you on him for your supply of tea, you are drawn into a real relation; but if the interchange be of thought and sympathy induced by that material commerce, the links are closer, more vital. This is no metaphor; it is a blessed and sometimes bitter reality. A close companionship withdrawn is a wound to our actual spiritual life: if our egotism and self-sufficiency be robust, we recover from it; if weak, we go maimed and halting, with minished personality.

Division of labour has often been supposed to damage the individual. Anthropology corrects this mistake. To the savage division of labour is almost unknown; each man builds his own boat, carves his own weapons, and makes them scrupulously, religiously, as his fathers made them before him. Yet the savage has the minimum of individuality. It is not in his case that individuality is crushed out by the herd, but that it has not begun to exist, or only in faint degree, because the savage has not begun to co-operate. It is through this co-operation that we at once differentiate and organically unite. This is our new gospel: we are saved, not by science, not by abstraction, but by a new mode of life.

As the individual emerges through co-operation and differentiation the force of tradition is gradually broken. What takes its place? The answer is at first depressing. Fashion, a new and modified collectivism. Under the sway of tradition, as M. Tarde has pointed out, *we copy our ancestors in all things*; under the sway of fashion *we follow our contemporaries in a few*. Fashion, it will escape no one, rules us now, not only in matters of dress or food, but in the things of the spirit; and more and more, it would seem, as we escape more completely from tradition. But the rule of fashion, though sometimes foolish and light-headed, is, on the whole, beneficent, and makes for freedom. It is better to be swayed by our contemporaries, because, unlike the ancients, they lack prestige, and never become sacrosanct; about their heads is no semi-religious halo. Moreover, fashion is fickle, swift to change; small movements and associations grow up to promote particular fads, and die as swiftly as they rose; each association implies a dissociation, and by this frequency of association and dissociation we get rid of the permanent homogeneous class, that insistent incubus of progress. Each person belongs to many temporary associations; and at the cross-roads, as it were, his individuality emerges.

More strange still at first, but assuredly true, is the fact that only through and by this organic individuality can the real sense and value of Humanity emerge. We are humane so far as we are conscious or sensitive to individual life. Patriotism is collective herd-instinct; it is repressive

M. Durkheim (*De la Division du Travail Social* pp. 35 73) has shown with great cogency, in his examination of criminal and civil law, that repression and vengeance are the characteristic and necessary notes of *solidarité mécanique* and that the new justice of a society based on *solidarité organique* has quite other

functions. The same thought has found fine expression in Mr. Galsworthy's *Justice* and in two penetrating and beautiful articles by him on the Suffrage question in the *Nation* March 19 and 20, 1910.

of individuality. You feel strongly because you feel alike; you are reinforced by the other homogeneous units; you sing the same song and wave the same flag. Humanity is sympathy with infinite differences, with utter individualism, with complete differentiation, and it is only possible through the mystery of organic spiritual union. We have come, most of us, now, to a sort of physical union by sympathy and imagination. To torture even an enemy's body would be to us physical pain, physical sickness; there will come the day when to hurt mentally and spiritually will be equally impossible, because the spiritual life will by enhanced sympathy be one. But this union is only possible through that organic differentiation that makes us have need one of the other.

In a word, if we are to be true and worthy heretics, we need not only new heads, but new hearts, and, most of all, that new emotional imagination, joint offspring of head and heart which is begotten of enlarged sympathies and a more sensitive habit of feeling. About the moral problem there is nothing mysterious; it is simply the old, old question of how best to live *together*. We no longer believe in an unchanging moral law imposed from without. We know that a harder incumbency is upon us; we must work out our law from within. The first crude attempt was by agglutination—*Qui se rassemble s'assemble*; differ at your peril. A long discipline of agglutination backed by religious sanctions was needful, it seems, to tame the tiger-cat, egotism within us. Primitive religion, most of us who investigate the subject are now agreed, has made for civilisation mainly because it is the emphasis of *social* values, or, to put it more exactly, of herd-instincts.

But in mere religious agglutination man was not to find his goal. We heretics believe the time for that is past, and that we must adventure a harder and higher spiritual task. Our new altruism involves a steady and even ardent recognition of the individual life, in its infinite variety, with its infinite interactions. We decline to be ourselves part of an undifferentiated mass; we refuse to deal with others in classes and masses. Parents no longer treat their children as children, as a subject-class to be manipulated for their pleasure, but as human beings, with views, outlooks, lives of their own. Children, it may even be hoped, will learn in time to treat their parents not merely as parents—*i.e.* as persons privileged to pay and to protect and at need to efface themselves, but as individual human beings, with their own passions and absorptions. We are dissatisfied now not only with the herd-sanctions of religion, but with many of those later sanctities of law to which some even emancipated thinkers ascribe a sort of divinity. We feel the inherent savagery of law in that it treats individuals as masses. Only in a civilised anarchy, we some of us feel, can the individual come to his full right and function.

My fellow Heretics are, needless to say, not committed to this personal view.

Yet all the time we know that we can, with spiritual safety, rebel only in so far as we are personally sensitive to the claims of other individual lives that touch our own. The old herd-problem remains of how to live *together*; and as the union grows closer and more intricate the chances of mutual hurt are greater, and the sensitiveness must grow keener. Others are safe from and with us only when their pain is our pain, their joy ours; and that is not yet. Meantime, whenever the old tiger-cat egotism snarls within us we should resign our membership of the Society of Heretics, and go back for a season to the "godly discipline" of the herd.

JANE ELLEN HARRISON.

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An Address Delivered before the Graduating Classes at the of YALE LAW SCHOOL,

What the Lawyer Owes to Society

On June 22, 1896,

By Theodore Bacon, LL.D.,

Rochester, N. Y.

HOGGSON & ROBINSON, PRINTERS TO THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CONN.
1896.

Mr. President; Mr. Dean; Gentlemen about to Graduate in Law:

Merely to welcome you to the ranks, already more than crowded, of a profession once deemed learned and honorable, should not be a difficult task for one whose occupation consists largely in the making of speeches. Prospect or retrospect: the look backward over your years of studious preparation, or forward to the hopes and

doubts that overhang the career upon which you now enter,—either is rich in suggestion for an address which marks the close of the preparation and the beginning of the career. Both the forward and the backward glance, indeed, give rise not so much to thoughts as to emotions; and these last, to one charged with this pleasant and honorable duty, might seem fittest for the occasion. For you have had, these years past, instruction enough, no doubt; and one may well guard himself now from being gratuitously didactic.

Nevertheless, while your education has without doubt included, whether by the voice of your instructors, or the books you have read, or, better perhaps than all, by frank and warm discussion with your comrades, the great subject of the ethics of the profession upon which you are now to enter, it has occurred to me that such discussion has commonly adopted a triple division of the subject, and that such division is not exhaustive. It has been usual to consider the lawyer's duty to his client, to the court, and to his adversary, and to assume that, as lawyer, his special duties are comprehended in these classes. Beyond these, it has been thought, his obligations are those common to all men. To me it does not seem so, I believe that in entering upon the privileges and seizing the opportunities of the legal profession you are also assuming obligations, additional to those I have mentioned, which are peculiar to that profession, but which are no more universally discharged or acknowledged by it than those others. Of these I speak this afternoon; and I propose as my subject

What the Lawyer Owes to Society.

Nor do I hesitate, disregarding some risk of ridicule from those outside of this assembly, to support my thesis in part upon the ancient maxim of chivalry that nobility imposes special obligations. For in a society which recognizes no social precedency and no privileged orders, where even the bar is an unorganized class, it has, nevertheless, many incidents to constitute it, if only it were organized, a class of special distinction and of exceptional power. The quasi-theocracy which for two centuries, until the copious invasion of various forms of dissent, gave to the clergy of the "standing order" in the colonies and States of New England a social prestige and a political power of which only vestiges remain to our day, has given way to an ostensibly complete representative democracy. The application of ethical principles to the conduct of public affairs, which in the last analysis must be governed upon ethical principles if organized society is to be better than a pack of wolves or a den of snakes, was enforced by a learned and dignified class, of simple life and manners, engaged in the study and the teaching of morals, and enjoying the confidence of the citizenship.

I am far from deploring the dethronement, which has come within my time, of the class I have spoken of; although this town, and the generation which is passing away, cannot easily forget what services to the nation and to humanity have been rendered under the direction of its pulpits and under the influence of this University, established for the fitting of youth "through the blessing of Almighty God * * * for Publick Employment in both Church and Civil State." Yet the judicious may grieve when it is suggested, as I do yet suggest, that the partial retirement of the clerical class makes room for the entrance of such an ethical director of affairs as the lawyer.

For the fact is not to be disguised that our name—the name which you are about to assume—is not altogether of pleasant savor in men's nostrils. In England, indeed, it is only one branch of our profession which has been for centuries the butt of innumerable gibes, based, one must fear, upon too much fact of greed, of falsehood, of chicanery, of general and extremely varied special depravity. The barrister has largely escaped; partly, perhaps, as soldiers in the southern swamps are said to have defended themselves against mosquitoes by putting a fat and succulent colored infant in the door of the tent. But the attorney has so accumulated infamy upon his class that at last, in England, the name of it has been abolished, and there exists only "solicitors;" upon the principle, no doubt, of a political song of long ago,

"For if we cannot alter *things*,
By George, we'll change their names, sir!"

But in France no such discrimination has been made by anecdotists and pasquinaders. The barrister,—the *avocat*—has not escaped the unmeasured satire which north of the Channel has been aimed almost exclusively at the attorney; and the brotherhood of nations finds new proofs in the identity of jokes, which, tracing their origin to the dark ages and beyond, are repeated to-day as events newly occurring in the bar of South Dakota or of New Zealand.

Whether or not it is the ancientness, the pungency, and the continuity of satirical criticism which has held the French Bar to an especially lofty standard of private and public duty, may not, perhaps, be easily determined. Certain it is, however, that in no country in the world has the legal profession maintained a higher

ethical ideal, none has more constantly, none for a longer period, applied such ideal to its clients, the courts, its adversaries, and exercised its legitimate influence toward the just direction of public affairs, than in France, where until within a century no method of control of such affairs was in the power of private subjects beyond persuasion and protest. The evil tendencies which are inherent in the opportunities that lawyers enjoy had, indeed, been early developed. It is now almost eleven hundred years since the Capitularies of Charlemagne (A. D. 802) had declared that into the order of advocates "none should be admitted but men mild, pacific, fearing God, and loving justice, upon pain of disbarment." Yet even in the thirteenth century it had seemed necessary to forbid by royal ordinance "the citing of judgments which were never rendered, or of rules of common law which did not exist."

Such supervision from the head of the State, intended 'only to regulate and purify, operated also to energize. When, therefore, all France, united at last under a central despotism at the close of the fourteenth Louis's reign, found itself prostrate upon one ignoble level of subjection to absolute power, all parliamentary institutions crushed or wrenched from their legislative use, even the clergy efficient no longer as a restraint but only as a subservient ally of the monarch, the only organized body remaining with such intellectual power and such moral elevation as could effectively protest against further prostration of French liberties was the order of advocates. For organized it was, and strongly; and its organization remained in its own control. The bar of Paris, of Toulouse, of Bordeaux, kept its own roll of membership; it admitted, under strict rules, those only whom it judged fit; it struck from its rolls freely, upon slight delinquency, such as it deemed unworthy. The door of exit was wide, of entrance narrow. On the other hand, the Parliaments, and especially that of Paris, asserted a semblance of political functions; for their registration even of royal edicts, if not essential to compel obedience to them, at least enhanced their moral force; and the Parliaments, which were in their essence merely judicial bodies, were the magistracy, and the bar was nearest of kin to them.

So in that dead and hopeless period of French history which covers all the eighteenth century, except its first and last decades, it seems as if the only sign of life, the only gleam of light, was in the bar and its kin, the bench. When, at the opening of the base and profligate Regency, it was sought to impose upon the Kingdom the bull Unigenitus, which denounced the doctrines of the Jansenists, and would have made free thought as impossible as it was already difficult, it was the bar and the magistracy which carried on for half a century a contest of stubborn resistance. So it was the bar which, by its courageous and resolute attitude, compelled the restoration of the Paris Parliament when, in 1774, it had been for years suppressed by royal decree and replaced by a more subservient body. "The brightest page of French history," says Sir James Stephen, "is that which records the courage, the disinterestedness, and the learning of that company of pedantic lawyers."

I have sought thus to indicate, by an example drawn from a history not closely allied with ours or with the English history which is so nearly ours, how the united force of the class of which I speak has been made efficient for the aid and the defence of society. So also in earlier ages have great advocates, not indeed in co-operation with their professional fellows but in the discharge of their official duties, rendered illustrious service to the State. For the order of advocates, said the Chancellor D'Azuessseau, two centuries ago, is "ancient as the magistracy, noble as virtue, necessary as justice." Thus it was the lawyer Demosthenes who roused Athenian opinion against the Macedonian King; it was the lawyer Lysias who aided in overthrowing the tyranny of the Thirty. It was Cicero the lawyer—trimming politician as he finally turned out to be—who confounded the conspiracy of Cataline and drove into exile as a public enemy the proconsul of Sicily.

Do not, however, understand me to recommend to you that participation in public affairs which consists, not in influencing the opinion, informing the intelligence, or stimulating the conscience of the citizens, but in controlling the machinery through which opinion and conscience should be expressed, so that the elector's ballot, seeming to be free, shall in fact be distorted to ends never meant by him, the sinister designs of his leader and master. To such intervention you are invited by myriad tempters, offering you all the kingdoms of the earth if you will join them in their devil's work. For in no way, perhaps, more effectually than by surrendering yourselves to the management of machinery, can you disable yourselves from the promotion of principles, which is the sole end for which machinery ought to exist. Yet it is the subordination of the end to the means which has already almost expelled principle from the politics of successful parties in this country, and now constitutes a deadly menace to the commonwealth.

But for the instruction of public opinion and the arousing of the public conscience upon all manner of public questions,—for the defeat of evil measures and the promotion of good ones—even for the confusion of evil men sustaining good measures when their success would be disaster to the state—no class possesses loftier qualifications; upon none therefore rest more solemn obligations. To you much is given: of you shall much be required. To the discussion and direction of public affairs men of your order, as a French writer has said, bring "a spirit of toleration, an intelligent liberality, a quickness of apprehension, a hatred of arbitrary power, an intellectual culture, a knowledge of men, possessed by no other profession in an equal degree." And while I have not exhorted you to bring these qualities to the service of any one's political machine, which may indeed

now-a-days present the only method by which such qualities can be brought into the official service of the country, yet I do with all my heart adjure you not to withhold them from that service, if without subserviency and without dishonoring connivance they should be called to it.

For there is a fallacy current on men's lips and in their newspapers against which I distinctly and earnestly protest. It is said, when the members of a state legislature, or even of the National Congress, are classified by occupations, that there are "too many lawyers" among them. I maintain that for the public good, there are not nearly lawyers enough. It depends a little, on what you call a lawyer; and these estimates are based on every man's attribution of himself to this class or that. I remember to have heard counsel, *arguendo* asked by the court whether a recent statute which, in a few lines, established in a neighboring state the whole law of charitable uses and its accompanying doctrine of *cy-pr'es* might be regarded as a legislative declaration of existing law; and counsel suggested, by way of answer, that a personal inquiry might be made of the members as to their several views, beginning with the members of Assembly from the Sixth Ward of the City of New York. By way of guarding against possible offense I will assure you that I know of *one* out of the one hundred and sixty who would have been quite of the opinion that the statute did *not* relate to commercial paper or to trespass *ab initio*; further than this I should not dare to go.

No better evidence, indeed, could be desired that more lawyers are needed in the making of our laws than is afforded by the laws that are actually made. Examine the annual or biennial volumes of any State, the one, for example, that you are best acquainted with; and say then if you find there any, the slightest, work which seems to you as if it could have come from the hand of a jurist,—I do not say from the hand of a Tribonian or a Grotius,—but of any one to whom jurisprudence is not an unknown word. No doubt you will find, slipped into the Practice Act, some unsuspected word or phrase of alteration, by which some cunning attorney-at-law seeks to get an advantage in a pending case he has been having trouble with; but if there is a measure of consolidation, of simplification, of broad amendment and reform of existing law, you know without asking that it is the work of men outside the law-making body, and that those within have let it go by them with an ignorant tolerance in which society finds its highest safety: in the ignorance, that is, which is unconscious how much mischief it might do and how much good it might prevent. What pass for lawyers, indeed, in the bodies where the best work is found for lawyers to do, are well below the picture of the French National Assembly, drawn by Burke, a hundred years ago: "I found that a very great proportion of the Assembly was composed of practitioners in the law. It was composed, not of distinguished magistrates, who had given pledges to their country of their science, prudence and integrity; not of leading advocates, the glory of the bar; not of renowned professors in universities; but for the greater part, as it must in such a number, of the inferior, unlearned, mechanical, merely instrumental members of the profession. There were distinguished exceptions; but the general composition was of obscure provincial advocates, of stewards of petty local jurisdictions, country attorneys, notaries, the fomenters and conductors of the petty war of village vexation." If instead of Robespierre, the briefless advocate of Arras, such men as Berryer and Jules Favre, who in our own day have added lustre to the bar of France and of all lands, had been there to "ride on the whirlwind and direct the storm," what might they not have done for their country and for humanity?

Much of the service I have hitherto referred to as due from you to the community of which you are a part is due specially from you only because, being lawyers, you are also men of the qualities I have mentioned as belonging to your class in a special degree. If others are in an equal degree endowed with those qualities, they are equally under obligation to be useful citizens, to promote the good and resist the bad. But there are some things needing to be done in the State which, if lawyers of large capacity and thorough fidelity do not do them, do not get done at all, or, worse than that, are badly done. There is, as you know but many lawyers, unhappily, do not, a science of jurisprudence; and it is an ethical science, though not merely that. It is a science, too, which grows; whose growth moves civilization forward, and is the measure of its advance. Its growth is the development of the moral sense of the community: and that development is declared—or should be declared—in its statute books, or, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, in the decisions of its courts. If the jurisprudence of a nation is to have an orderly, systematic, well-proportioned growth, consistent with itself in all its parts, it must be developed under the guidance of men who are learned in it; the work of the unlearned will be the work of 'prentices or botches; and its results will be in like manner disastrous as if men of like incompetency were set to work on the engines of an ocean steamer. I do not speak, you understand, of "Acts of the Legislature" *eo nomine*; for of them nine-tenths have no more relation to jurisprudence than a tale of "Uncle Remus." But when the jurisprudence of the Roman Empire was to be reduced to systematic form, it was Tribonian, its most illustrious lawyer, who rendered that memorable service to all future generations. It was the most eminent lawyers in France, not the soldier whose name it bears, who compacted into the sharp and lucid language of the Code Napoleon, bringing it also up to the needs of the present century, the great body of Roman law,

But great constructive work in jurisprudence: is none to be found nearer home? Undoubtedly—if you go far

enough back to find it. It is seldom, indeed, that the work of magistrates upon the bench, however great they may be, aids much in the systematic development of the law. Their work is done, from its nature, narrowly, to fit the isolated case before them: not broadly, with a view that ranges over all the past and far into the future, as well as the immediate present. Undoubtedly, when Lord Holt gave form to the law of bailments in *Coggs vs. Bernard* he was not so much deciding a dispute over a cask of brandy as pronouncing, with the aid of Roman and French juriconsults, a whole system of law upon an important class of transactions. So to Marshall was presented the unique opportunity of supplying authoritative and symmetrical, if not always correct or always irreversible, exposition of a great work, the new constitution of the Union. That constitution itself, certainly one of the most splendid products of the human intellect, was the work of great lawyers,—of lawyers learned in the common law of England at least; and otherwise than by a body mainly made up of English lawyers it never could have been produced.

The service peculiarly due from the lawyer to society may sometimes have been discharged in paying the debt which, it has been said, every lawyer owes to his profession. But I should shrink from urging upon any of you this view, which contemplates your making another lawbook. No doubt the noble Commentaries of Kent, and the erudite—some might say ostentatiously pedantic—treatises of the elder Story, have done much to aid in establishing a system of jurisprudence based upon their own acquaintance with Roman law, based, therefore, on the experience of ages and upon broad ethical principles, and not merely on the collation of narrow and unconnected precedents. In doing this for their profession, they have done it also for the nation, which is interested, not less than the lawyers, but more, in having law scientific, moral, symmetrical. But your work may not, just yet at least, be the work of Kent or Story. Of making many law books there is no end: and of no department of literature is that Greek saying truer, that a big book is a big evil. They come in great proportion too, I observe, from young gentlemen who find time for the work because they are not yet demanded for the service of clients; but that circumstance alone hardly seems enough to commend their work to the service of the bar or the community.

Not merely, then, in the guidance of the courts toward the wise and just declaration and application to specific cases of existing law would I have you find the main duty to the community imposed by your professional character. Indeed, while as advocates you may greatly aid the bench in justly declaring the law by the breadth of your views, the depth of your research, the persuasiveness of your logic, yet, precisely because you are advocates, your action upon the bench can be only one-sided. If you are to aid the advance of the law by judicial decision, in our curious Anglo-Saxon way which is so illogical yet works on the whole so much better than one would think, it can only be through the co-operation of opposing counsel, by the resolution of antagonistic forces, between which the law may sometimes take a forward step, a little as an apple seed is propelled by the squeeze of the thumb and finger. And sometimes sorrow comes to jurisprudence when the "hard case" which "makes bad law" is reinforced by preponderant advocacy. Three-quarters of a century ago, a great lawyer and a greater advocate, seeking to save his Alma Mater from odious legislative meddling, prevailed upon the Supreme Court to pronounce its charter a contract, beyond the power of the legislature to impair; and ever since the bar and the bench have been shaking their myriad heads over it, and the bench has been "explaining" and *u* distinguishing" and "limiting" it, until one begins to doubt whether it may not be a contempt of court to cite *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward* for any purpose except to give it a kick in passing.

So, while I counsel you always, if you can, to present the law as it is and as it should be, I know you will be prepossessed in your view; and I do not reckon on your advancing, in that way, the general cause of jurisprudence, except as a mere casual incident to your immediate purpose of gaining the particular case at bar. This must, of course, be the main work of your lives; if your present aspirations are satisfied it will be, until you reach the bench, your only work. Even in this, if you are broadly learned, if your research is diligent and deep, if you are ingenuous and fair, you will still contribute usefully to the slow judicial development of the jurisprudence of your State or the nation,—to that

*"broadening slowly down
From precedent to precedent"*

which makes its judicial growth.

But I adjure you to do more than this. Law will have also its statutory growth, whether you will help it or hinder it, or be indifferent and aloof. This movement will be the result of opinion; the opinion, perhaps, of the general community, guided rightly or wrongly by the lawyers; in many instances, however, the sinister opinion of one man or a dozen, acting through legislative methods when public opinion is ignorant or asleep. It may be inspired and brought to pass by the wise industry of men who know the solemnity of the responsibility they assume; who have traced the previous history of the law they propose to lay hands upon; who have learned

something of the experience of other lands and other ages, and are willing to avail themselves of their examples. It may come from the restless fussiness of a self-confident "reformer," to whom the ark of the covenant has no such sanctity that he need refrain his destructive hand from it; who is ready at a half hour's notice, not, perhaps, to "take command of the Channel Fleet or perform" a capital operation in surgery, but to destroy *ab into* an entire department of law which was eight hundred years in building, and raise it up again in three days. This is not reform; it is not amendment; it is not growth or development; it is destruction and recreation; and to this only omniscience and omnipotence are adequate.

Aid, then, by all the instrumentalities available to you, in directing the opinion of your profession, and public opinion too, toward true reforms in jurisprudence by legislative methods, knowing that no work which a lawyer can do for his community—none, perhaps, that any man can do—surpasses in beneficence the work of making more just, more clear, or more sure the laws under which his fellow men are to live. Of the English Statute of Frauds, ill-drawn, awkward and confused as it was, a great judge said many years ago that "every line was worth a subsidy." If he had lived and waited till now he might within bounds have added that every word had cost a subsidy; and no example can be fitter to illustrate at once the value of legislative reform and the enormous mischief of reform ill-done than the "Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries."

So I should beg you to be still more sedulous in resistance to all but the most clearly wise and well digested alterations in existing law than active in promoting those changes which are beyond doubt for the better, but for the fact, of universal cognizance, that the legal profession is, almost by the law of its being, averse to change. Why it is I cannot say, but it is the fact, that no class in modern society is more conservative, more timid in promoting, more resolute in resisting, alterations in existing law than the body of which we are members. Perhaps it is—in some part it certainly is—because no one knows as well as they the prodigious evil of ill-considered changes—of wise changes unwisely made—the great cost and incidental harm even of the wisest and most cautious changes, and ultimately the most beneficent, that must accrue before society and business have completed their adjustment. Perhaps it is because they shrink from the necessity of casting aside a quantity of learning painfully acquired, and taking in place of it an infinity of conjecture, out of which may come in the course of generations the judicial construction which shall give to the new legislation something approaching the certainty of the law it supersedes. I have known it to be explained by resolving it into a fear that the simplifying; of the law may diminish litigation. This explanation, apart from the indecency which imputes vile motives to men of whom some, at least, are not quite disreputable, is based on the notion, for which there is some basis, that when a fairly well settled department of law is needlessly upset, the lawyer has no longer, so far as that subject is concerned, an advantage over the layman; but it is because neither layman, nor lawyer, nor judge can do more than guess what answer the courts will ultimately make to the questions which arise under it. And it ignores the indisputable fact that the greatest of all purveyors of work and wealth to the lawyer—greater than the man who writes his own will—is the man who makes new statutes.

And yet it is not always the lawyers who obstruct. In the Great Council of Merton, now nearly eight centuries ago, it was the ecclesiastics who sought to enact the humane rule of the canon law that children born out of wedlock should be legitimated by their parents' marriage; and the lawyers in England then, as in Palestine when a great reformer cursed them twelve centuries earlier, were [*unclear: ecclesiastics*]. It was "the earls and barons," the men of the sword, who with one voice shouted out the famous declaration: *Noiumus leges Angliae murare*—"We will not change the laws of England,"—and with such effect that only after almost eight centuries, and within the past few weeks, has the rule proposed by the men who knew something outside their own parishes, and opposed by the barbarians who could not write their names, passed into the law of the State of New York.

Perhaps this example contains the suggestion of another cause of the dull conservatism of many lawyers. There is a timidity, as every one knows, born of mere ignorance. The case is familiar of the man who hung at midnight from the sill of a window. He could not draw himself upward into safety; his fingers grew bloodless and numb; his heart and brain grew faint as he contemplated the fate of being dashed to a formless mass upon the stones a hundred feet below; and when, as he commended his soul to the Infinite, his nerveless grasp relaxed he found his toes had been all the time two inches from the ground. And so it is the narrowness of vision, the imperfect intelligence, of many lawyers which makes them, and if they are honest, cannot fail to make them, apprehensive of changes which they think untried experiments. It is a main purpose of the education which this great University gives you that you may know there are other systems of law than that single narrow system which prevails in your province or your parish; that there is no system altogether bad, none which may not furnish profitable suggestions, if wisely used, for the amendment of other systems upon the whole far better. And this may have been at the bottom of the barons' resolute veto at Merton. "We will have none of your new-fangled Roman law; English law is good enough for us." The most savage invective of *Junius* against Lord Mansfield denounces him for knowing other laws than those of England: "You have made it your study to introduce into the court where you preside maxims of jurisprudence unknown to Englishmen."

The Roman code, the law of Nations, and the opinion of foreign civilians, are your perpetual theme. * * * By such treacherous acts the noble simplicity and free spirit of our Saxon laws were first corrupted." And in like manner, before Mansfield, Holt, in making liberal quotations, upon the law of bailments, from the civilian Bracton, felt compelled to avert criticism by this singular apology: "This Bracton I have cited is, I confess, an old author, but in this his doctrine is agreeable to reason, and to what the law is in other countries. The civil law is so, as you have it in Justinian's *Inst. lib. 3, tit. 15.*" And again: "I cite this author, though / *confess he is an old one* because his opinion is reasonable, and very much to my present purpose, and there is no authority in the law to the contrary."

Coggs vs. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray., 915, 916.

Continue then, or, if your absorption in other studies has hitherto precluded you from these, begin and pursue, not merely for the personal profit and enjoyment they will bring you but that you may the better discharge your obligation to your country, the examination of all systems, in all ages and in all lands. Your studies may not help you in your next horse case; and if your purpose has no further scope than that I speak to you in vain, and might well regret speaking to such a one at all Nor, if I were to express by a single example my notion of the life which the lawyer, though engaged in gaining and losing law-suits, may yet most nobly live, I could hardly choose better than to refer you to the creator of the science of Comparative Jurisprudence, the author of the treatise on Bailments which, though superseded by the progress of the law, remains a model of fine analysis, of compact, precise, lucid and graceful expression, and of learned and accurate statement, Sir William Jones of the Supreme Court of Bengal. It was of him that Gibbon justly said: "He is perhaps the only lawyer equally conversant with the Year-books of Westminster, the Commentaries of Ulpian, the Attic pleadings of Isaeus, and the sentences of Arabian and Persian Cadhis." Yet was no subject of human interest foreign to him. He would gladly have served the State by active and direct participation in the work of making laws. He stood for the noblest and most honorable constituency in the Kingdom, the University of Oxford; yet he was not acceptable to that illustrious body, which burns her prophets and then commemorates them by a Martyrs' Memorial; which honors her most illustrious sons most when she rejects them; which would none of Canning because he had emancipated the Catholics; which rejected Peel because he had emancipated commerce; which refused Gladstone because he would have emancipated Ireland. From this hopeless contest he withdrew because he had not feared to oppose the subjection of America by war, or to denounce the horrors of the African slave-trade. In this defeat this lawyer served better the State than he could ever have served it by law-making for which the opportunity was gained by subserviency or by silence. If there be not many among you who may reproduce the learning, the wisdom, the power of statement and persuasion of Sir William Jones, his faithfulness and courage are within the reach of everyone. Some of you will attain to it: how many?

The special work, therefore, to which, aside from the necessary work to which you dedicate yourselves to-day, I commend you for all your lives, is the amendment of Law: not merely that which is in the strictest sense juris, prudence, but all law affecting social conditions. No study of social problems can be much better than vague and futile which does not presuppose some knowledge of the positive laws, written or unwritten, which have regulated society in its various conditions. The generation to which you belong will confront, for example, the question, which mine sees only looming on the horizon, of the ownership of land and the unearned increment. To deal with this wisely, no acquaintance with ancient tenures or tenures of strange countries—the several, the communal, the tribal, or whatever infinity of forms tenures may have taken—will be so intimate or minute that any detail of it can fail of aptness or utility to the solution of the momentous questions which this subject must involve. Already has forced itself upon us also the question, subordinate no doubt to that of ownership, of the public registration of titles to land. At the earliest settlement of our colonies our first progenitors, following no English example except in certain narrow districts, such as Middlesex and Yorkshire, but undoubtedly learning also from examples of continental Europe, established everywhere systems of land registration—not by good luck, but by deliberate wisdom, such as brought them, under the divine guidance and to the infinite blessing of generations to follow, to discard the English doctrine of easements of light and air by prescription, and the English rule of the road to turn to the left. That system of registration is now, throughout the older states, breaking down from its own weight. It will be for lawyers, not in their own interest, who find so vast a profit in continuing the abuse, but in the interest of the communities they live in, to find the system that is to replace it. It may well be that the wonderful Australian continent which a few years ago was but a British convict colony, yet has already given a system of elections to more than half our American States, may increase our indebtedness to her by showing us how at once to simplify and to assure the titles to our lands.

So, too, the criminal procedure of every State—nowhere I think the penal law—has come to be, especially as concerns the graver offences, in the minds of all men not lawyers, a disgrace to American institutions and a positive menace to American society. Lawyers, indeed, seeing no further than the tips of their noses, find nothing abnormal in the postponement of punishment of a serious crime for several years after its commission. Every step in the deadly delay they find to be perfectly regular and legal; and how, when each step is legal and

regular, can the appalling delay of justice which is merely the aggregate of several regularities be other than necessary and right? Yet suddenly the wild justice of the popular mind asserts itself; law is crushed under an uprising which dishonors the State and shames all law: and the legal mind looks about in stupid wonder that people cannot sit by in patience while the long dull game the law provides is played out to its distant end.

Somebody—perhaps yourselves—has got to reconsider many a proposition so long accepted without question that it has come to be held as an axiom,—as fundamental to jurisprudence as in mathematics the proposition is that two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. Yet if an accepted axiom does not express absolute and universal verity—if it is based upon obsolete conditions—it may continue when its cause and justification have disappeared from under it. It must then be—it surely will be—re-examined in the light of new conditions, and subverted. To question it, when it is first questioned, will be blasphemy; the blasphemers will become martyrs; but if they witness to the truth, the false maxim will at last be stamped as counterfeit and will cease from currency and from deluding the people. Even our bills of rights, which are largely derived from the conditions of seven centuries ago, when the citizen had few defences against arbitrary power, may need to be reconsidered at a time when everything seems to be done for the protection of the criminal, nothing for the defense of society, left naked to her enemies. And it is interesting to find this ancient commonwealth declining, within these few months, to allow the maxim *nemo debet bis vexari* to be once more used for the defeat of penal justice.

You see that I have sought to add to the ethical commandments which you have already received, and which have always been negative and prohibitory in character, a positive supplement. The injunction which, with neither jurisdiction nor authority, I address to you, is mandatory. When you meet the accounting which must come, be it only with your own consciences, at the close of your career, you may indeed answer like the rich ruler, to the commands "Thou shalt not rob thy client," "Thou shalt not impose on the Court," "Thou shalt not befoul or play tricks upon thy professional adversary," "Ail these have I kept from my youth up;" yet you will not have satisfied the larger and loftier requirements I would impose upon you. Unless you have done something, as your powers and your opportunities shall have served you, toward the promotion of a just opinion in aiding the growth of jurisprudence and social advance through law—still better, toward the restraint and confusion of crude, unwise, and mischievous intermeddling with existing law—you will have fallen short of satisfying the full scope of the obligations you assume to-day.

I am conscious of the burden cast also upon me by the ability and eminence of those who have preceded me in the function to which I have been called to-day. Many of their addresses I have received from the kindness of the Dean, sent, perhaps, as the material from which I might compile a fit discourse. Yet, while I have read with an interest qualified by the painful reflection that these were profound jurists, eminent counselors and advocates and statesmen, and that they had left little for an undistinguished practitioner of law to say after them, I was able to detect, in a phrase used by one of the most distinguished of them, a fallacy which seems to me serious, yet which possesses many minds. Nor shall I deny objecting to it with the more readiness because it comes from a member of the highest court in the nation, and to the carnal mind the opportunity to sit in review of that tribunal is as seductive as it is rare. "The motto," he says, "of your profession is *Justice*," I cannot accept this motto as fitly characterizing our profession; more than that, I even regard it as involving a dangerous perversion of its true purpose and its proper aims. Its motto rather should be *Law*: Law promoting justice—Law effecting justice; but above all things else, above justice even, *Law*. If law can be found to be identical with justice, it has reached its ideal condition; and I have urged you, during all this hour, to devote the active efforts of your lives to make it that. But law, just or unjust,—this it is that you are to enter into a sacramental obligation to obey and to enforce; and when you propose to set your personal opinion of what is just over your obligation to obey the law, you are faithless to your oath, and you are rendering, moreover, a sorry service to the commonwealth. There was a great soldier once, but a most unadmirable statesman, who made one worthy contribution to political science when he said, "The best way to get rid of a bad law is to enforce it." Thus, too, have I heard an eminent judge, urged to some departure from absolute regularity with the words: "I suppose your honor sits here to administer justice," answer fitly and bravely: "No: I sit here to enforce law," The aim of law is, no doubt, or should be, to do universal justice: but human law, like other human instruments, attains only imperfectly its end; and where its imperfections are discovered it is the work of society, through orderly legislation and not through mobs or judicial usurpation, to correct it. But it is the purpose, and if anything a higher and more essential purpose of Law to replace Force. And whenever law is subverted by the individual, whose outraged sense of justice is not content with what law will do for him, or who will not wait for its slow movement; or by the Courts, declining their noble function *jus dicere* for that, *jus dare* which they are forbidden to exercise; or by a passionate mob, which expresses its "justice" with the halter or the scourge: society has suffered a blow—civilization, whose highest crown and development is Law, has received a check, not less but more pernicious and perilous when administered in the house of its friends.

To no nobler avocation could you be welcomed than that upon which you now enter. It is the maintenance,

the enforcement, the study, and the orderly and just development of law, upon which civilization rests, in which it may almost be said to consist; of law, whose "seat is the bosom of God," and which is the negation of cruel Force; of Law, which has brought the world so far, since history's dawn, toward that

*"far-off, divine event,
To which the whole creation moves,"*

and which among nations, as well as in nations, has already gone far, though not yet far enough, toward substituting the brief of the jurist for the club of the bully. And I welcome you to the glorious opportunity which is to come to the men of your generation, of extending to the commonwealth of nations, in greater measure than ever hitherto, the dominion of man's noblest creation; to "the federation of the world," as now to the federation of States or to the several States, where

*"Sovereign Law, the State's collected will,
O'er thrones and globes elate,
Sits Empress, crowning good, repressing ill."*

Illustrations from the Herbert Spencer Lecture 1907

Probability, the Foundation of Eugenics

The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered on June 5, 1907

BY Francis Galton, F.R.S.

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THE request so honourable to myself, to be the Herbert Spencer lecturer of this year, aroused a multitude of vivid recollections. Spencer's strong personality, his complete devotion to a self-imposed and life-long task, together with rare gleams of tenderness visible amidst a wilderness of abstract thought, have left a unique impression on my mind that years fail to weaken.

I do not propose to speak of his writings; they have been fully commented on elsewhere, but I desire to acknowledge my personal debt to him, which is large. It lies in what I gained through his readiness to discuss any ideas I happened to be full of at the time, with quick sympathy and keen criticism. It was his custom for many afternoons to spend an hour or two of rest in the old smoking room of the Athenaeum Club, strolling into an adjoining compartment for a game of billiards when the table was free. Day after day on those afternoons I enjoyed brief talks with him, which were often of exceptional interest to myself. All that kind of comfort and pleasure has long ago passed from me. Among the many things of which age deprives us, I regret few more than the loss of contemporaries. When I was young I felt diffident in the presence of my seniors, partly owing to a sense that the ideas of the young cannot be in complete sympathy with those of the old. Now that I myself am old it seems to me that my much younger friends keenly perceive the same difference, and I lose much of that outspoken criticism which is an invaluable help to all who investigate.

History of Eugenics.

It must have surprised you as it did myself to find the new word 'Eugenics' in the title both of the Boyle lecture, delivered in Oxford about a fortnight ago, and of this. It was an accident, not a deliberate concurrence, and I accept it as a happy omen. The field of Eugenics is so wide that there is no need for myself, the second lecturer, to plant my feet in the footsteps of the first; on the contrary, it gives freedom by absolving me from saying much that had to be said in one way or another. I fully concur in the views so ably presented by my friend and co-adjutor Professor Karl Pearson, and am glad to be dispensed from further allusion to subjects that formed a large portion of his lecture, on which he is a far better guide and an infinitely higher authority than myself.

In giving the following sketch of the history of Eugenics I am obliged to be egotistical, because I kindled the feeble flame that struggled doubtfully for a time until it caught hold of adjacent stores of suitable material, and became a brisk fire, burning freely by itself, and again because I have had much to do with its progress quite recently.

The word 'Eugenics' was coined and used by me in my book *Human Faculty*, published as long ago as 1883, which has long been out of print; it is, however, soon to be re-published in a cheap form. In it I emphasized the essential brotherhood of mankind, heredity being to my mind a very real thing; also the belief that we are born to act, and not to wait for help like able-bodied idlers, whining for doles. Individuals appear to me as finite detachments from an infinite ocean of being, temporarily endowed with executive powers. This is the only answer I can give to myself in reply to the perpetually recurring questions of 'Why? whence? and whither?' The immediate 'whither?' does not seem wholly dark, as some little information may be gleaned concerning the direction in which Nature, so far as we know of it, is now moving. Namely towards the evolution of mind, body, and character in increasing energy and co-adaptation.

I have often wondered that the poem of Hyperion, by Keats—that magnificent torso of an incompleated work—has not been placed in the very forefront of past speculations on evolution. Keats is so thorough that he makes the very Divinities to be its product. The earliest gods such as Coelus, born out of Chaos, are vague entities, they engender Saturn, Oceanus, Hyperion, and the Titan brood, who supersede them. These in their turn are ousted from dominion by their own issue, the Olympian Gods. A notable advance occurs at each successive stage in the quality of the Divinities. When Hyperion, newly terrified by signs of impending overthrow, lies prostrate on the earth 'his ancient mother, for some comfort yet,' the voice of Coelus from the universal space, thus 'whispered low and solemn in his ear . . . yet do thou strive for thou art capable ... my life is but the life of winds and tides, no more than winds and tides can I prevail, but thou canst.' I have quoted only disjointed fragments of this wonderful poem, enough to serve as a reminder to those who know it, but will add ten consecutive lines from the speech of the fallen Oceanus to his comrades, which give a summary of evolution as here described:

As Heaven and Earth are fairer, fairer far
Than Chaos and black Darkness, though once chiefs,
And as we show beyond that Heaven and Earth
In form and shape compact and beautiful,
In Will, in action free, companionship,
And thousand other signs of purer life;
So on our heels a fresh perfection treads
A power more strong in beauty, born of us
And fated to excel us, as we pass
In glory that old Darkness.

He ends with 'this is the truth, and let it be your balm.' The poem is a noble conception, founded on the crude cosmogony of the ancient Greeks.

The ideas have long held my fancy that we men may be the chief, and perhaps the only executives on earth. That we are detached on active service with, it may be only illusory, powers of free-will. Also that we are in some way accountable for our success or failure to further certain obscure ends, to be guessed as best we can. That though our instructions are obscure they are sufficiently clear to justify our interference with the pitiless course of Nature, whenever it seems possible to attain the goal towards which it moves, by gentler and kindlier ways. I expressed these views as forcibly as I then could in the above-mentioned book, with especial reference to improving the racial qualities of mankind, in which the truest piety seems to me to reside in taking action, and not in submissive acquiescence to the routine of Nature. It was thought impious at one time to attach lightning conductors to churches, as showing a want of trust in the tutelary care of the Deity to whom they were dedicated; now I think most persons would be inclined to apply some contemptuous epithet to such as obstinately refused, on those grounds, to erect them.

The direct pursuit of studies in Eugenics, as to what could practically be done, and the amount of change in racial qualities that could reasonably be anticipated, did not at first attract investigators. The idea of effecting an improvement in that direction was too much in advance of the march of popular imagination, so I had to wait. In the meantime I occupied myself with collateral problems, more especially with that of dealing measurably with faculties that are variously distributed in a large population. The results were published in my 'Natural Inheritance' in 1889, and I shall have occasion to utilize some of them later on, in this very lecture. The publication of that book proved to be more timely than the former. The methods were greatly elaborated by

Professor Karl Pearson, and applied by him to Biometry. Professor Weldon of this University, whose untimely death is widely deplored, aided powerfully. A new science was thus created primarily on behalf of Biometry, but equally applicable to Eugenics, because their provinces overlap.

The publication of *Biometrika* in which I took little more than a nominal part, appeared in 1901.

Being myself appointed Huxley Lecturer before the Anthropological Institute in 1901 I took for my title 'The possible improvement of the Human Breed under the existing conditions of Law and Sentiment' (*Nature* November 1, 1901, *Report of the Smithsonian Institute, Washington* for the same year).

The next and a very important step towards Eugenics was made by Professor Karl Pearson in his Huxley lecture of 1903 entitled 'The Laws of Inheritance in Man' (*Biometrika* vol. iii). It contains a most valuable compendium of work achieved and of objects in view; also the following passage (p. 159), which is preceded by forcible reasons for his conclusions:

We are ceasing as a nation to breed intelligence as we did fifty to a hundred years ago. The mentally better stock in the nation is not reproducing itself at the same rate as it did of old; the less able, and the less energetic are more fertile than the better stocks. No scheme of wider or more thorough education will bring up, in the scale of intelligence, hereditary weakness to the level of hereditary strength. The only remedy, if one be possible at all, is to alter the relative fertility of the good and the bad stocks in the community.

Again in 1904, having been asked by the newly-formed Sociological Society to contribute a memoir, I did so on 'Eugenics, its definition, aim, and scope'. This was followed up in 1905 by three memoirs, 'Restrictions in Marriage,' 'Studies in National Eugenics,' and 'Eugenics as a factor in Religion', which were published in the *Memoirs of that Society with comments thereon by more than twenty different authorities (Sociological Papers published for the Sociological Society (Macmillan), vols, i and ii)*. The subject of Eugenics being thus formally launched, and the time appearing ripe, I offered a small endowment to the University of London to found a Research Fellowship on its behalf. The offer was cordially accepted, so Eugenics gained the recognition of its importance by the University of London, and a home for its study in University College. Mr. Edgar Schuster, of this University, became Research Fellow in 1905, and I am much indebted to his care in nurturing the young undertaking and for the memoirs he has contributed, part of which must remain for a short time longer unpublished.

When the date for Mr. Schuster's retirement approached it was advisable to utilize the experience so far gained in reorganizing the Office. Professor Pearson and myself, in consultation with the authorities of the University of London, elaborated a scheme at the beginning of this year, which is a decided advance, and shows every sign of vitality and endurance. Mr. David Heron, a Mathematical Scholar of St. Andrews, is now a Research Fellow; Miss Ethel Elderton, who has done excellent and expert work from the beginning, is deservedly raised to the position of Research Scholar; and the partial services of a trained Computer have been secured. An event of the highest importance to the future of the Office is that Professor Karl Pearson has undertaken, at my urgent request, that general supervision of its work which advancing age and infirmities preclude me from giving. He will, I trust, treat it much as an *annexe* to his adjacent biometric laboratory, for many studies in Eugenics might, with equal propriety, be carried on in either of them, and the same methods of precise analysis which are due to the mathematical skill and untiring energy of Professor Pearson are used in both. The Office now bears the name of the Eugenics Laboratory, and its temporary home is in 88 Gower Street. The phrase 'National Eugenics' is defined as 'the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally'.

The Laboratory has already begun to publish memoirs on its own account, and I now rest satisfied in the belief that, with a fair share of good luck, this young Institution will prosper and grow into an important centre of research.

Application of Theories of Probability to Eugenics

Eugenics seeks for quantitative results. It is not contented with such vague words as 'much' or 'little', but endeavours to determine 'how much' or 'how little' in precise and trustworthy figures. A simple example will show the importance of this. Let us suppose a class of persons, called *A* who are afflicted with some form and some specified degree of degeneracy, as inferred from personal observations, and from family history, and let class *B* consist of the offspring of *A*. We already know only too well that when the grade of *A* is very low, that of the average *B* will be below par and mischievous to the community, but how mischievous will it probably be? This question is of a familiar kind, easily to be answered when a sufficiency of facts have been collected. But a second question arises, What will be the trustworthiness of the forecast derived from averages when it is

applied to individuals? This is a kind of question that is not familiar, and rarely taken into account, although it too could be answered easily as follows. The average mischief done by each *B* individual to the community may for brevity be called *M*: the mischiefs done by the several individuals differ more or less from *M* by amounts whose average may be called *D*. In other words *D* is the average amount of the individual deviations from *M*. *D* thus becomes the measure of untrustworthiness. The smaller *D* is, the more precise the forecast, and the stronger the justification for taking such drastic measures against the propagation of class *B* as would be consonant to the feelings if the forecast were known to be infallible. On the other hand, a large *D* signifies a corresponding degree of uncertainty, and a risk that might be faced without reproach through a sentiment akin to that expressed in the maxim 'It is better that many guilty should escape than that one innocent person should suffer'. But that is not the sentiment by which natural selection is guided, and it is dangerous to yield far to it.

There can be no doubt that a thorough investigation the kind described, even if confined to a single grade and to a single form of degeneracy, would be a serious undertaking. Masses of trustworthy material must be collected, usually with great difficulty, and be afterwards treated with skill and labour by methods that few at present are competent to employ. An extended investigation into the good or evil done to the state by the offspring of many different classes of persons, some of civic value, others the reverse, implies a huge volume of work sufficient to occupy Eugenics laboratories for an indefinite time.

Object Lessons in the Methods of Biometry

I propose now to speak of those fundamental principles of the laws of Probability that are chiefly concerned in the newer methods of Biometry, and consequently of Eugenics. Most persons of ordinary education seem to know nothing about them, not even understanding their technical terms, much less appreciating the cogency of their results. This popular ignorance so obstructs the path of Eugenics that I venture to tax your attention by proposing a method of partly dispelling it. Let me first say that no one can be more conscious than myself of the large amount of study that is required to qualify a man to deal adequately with the mathematical methods of Biometry, or that any man can hope for much success in that direction unless he is possessed of appropriate faculties and a strong brain. On the other hand, I hold an opinion likely at first sight to scandalize biometricians and which I must justify, that the fundamental ideas on which abstruse problems of Probability are based admit of being so presented to any intelligent person as to be grasped by him, even though he be quite ignorant of mathematics. The conditions of doing so are that the lessons shall be as far as possible 'Object lessons', in which real objects shall be handled as in the Kindergarten system, and simple operations performed and not only talked about. I am anxious to make myself so far understood, that some teachers of science may be induced to elaborate the course that I present now only in outline. It seems to me suitably divisible into a course of five lessons of one hour each, which would be sufficient to introduce the learner into a new world of ideas, extraordinarily wide in their application. A proper notion of what is meant by Correlation requires some knowledge of the principal features of Variation, and will be the goal towards which the lessons lead.

To most persons Variability implies something indefinite and capricious. They require to be taught that it, like Proteus in the old fable, can be seized, securely bound, and utilized; that it can be defined and measured. It was disregarded by the old methods of statistics, that concerned themselves solely with Averages. The average amount of various measurable faculties or events in a multitude of persons was determined by simple methods, the individual variations being left out of account as too difficult to deal with. A population was treated by the old methods as a structureless atom, but the newer methods treat it as a compound unit. It will be a considerable intellectual gain to an otherwise educated person, to fully understand the way in which this can be done, and this and such like matters the proposed course of lessons is intended to make clear. It cannot be expected that in the few available minutes more than an outline can be given here of what is intended to be conveyed in perhaps thirty-fold as much time with the aid of profuse illustrations by objects and diagrams. At the risk of being wearisome, it is, however, necessary to offer the following syllabus of what is proposed, for an outline of what teachers might fill in.

The object of the first lesson would *be* to explain and illustrate Variability of Size, Weight, Number, &c., by exhibiting samples of specimens that had been marshalled at random (Fig. 1), or arrayed in order of their magnitude (Fig. 2). Thus when variations of length were considered, objects of suitable size, such as chestnuts, acorns, hazel-nuts, stones of wall fruit, might be arrayed as beads on a string. It will be shown that an 'Array' of Variates of any kind falls into a continuous series. That each variate differs little from its neighbours about the middles of the Arrays, but that such differences increase rapidly towards their extremities. Abundant illustration would be required, and much handling of specimens.

Arrays of Variates of the same class strung together, differing considerably in the number of the objects they each contain, would be laid side by side and their middlemost variates or 'Medians' (Fig. 3) would be

compared. It would be shown that as a rule the Medians become very similar to one another when the numbers in the Arrays are large. It must then be dogmatically explained that double accuracy usually accompanies a four-fold number, a treble accuracy a nine-fold number, and so on.

(This concludes the first lesson, during which the words and significations of Variability, Variate, Array, and Median will have been learnt.)

The second lesson is intended to give more precision to the idea of an Array. The variates in any one of these strung loosely on a cord, should be disposed at equal distances apart in front of an equal number of compartments, like horses in the front of a row of stalls (Fig. 4), and their tops joined. There will always be one more side to the row of stalls than there are objects, otherwise a side of one of the extreme stalls would be wanting. Thus there are two ways of indicating the portion of a particular variate, either by its *serial number* as 'first', 'second', 'third', or so on, or by *degrees* like those of a thermometer. In the latter case the sides of the stalls serve as degrees, counting the first of them as 0, making one more graduation than the number of objects, as should be. The difference between these two methods has to be made clear, and that while the serial position of the Median object is always the same in any two Arrays whatever be the number of variates, the serial positions of their subdivisions cannot be the same, the ignored half interval at either end varying in width according to the number of variates, and becoming considerable when that number is small.

Lines of proportionate length will then be used drawn on a black board, and the limits of the Array will be also drawn, at a half interval from either end. The base is then to be divided centesimally.

Next join the tops of the lines with a smooth curve, and wipe out everything except the curve, the Limit at either side, and the Centesimally divided Base (Fig. 5). This figure forms a Scheme of Distribution of Variates, Explain clearly that its shape is independent of the; number of Variates, so long as they are sufficiently numerous to secure statistical constancy.

Show numerous schemes of variates of different kinds, and remark on the prevalent family likeness between the bounding curves. (Words and meanings learnt—Schemes of Distribution, Centesimal graduation of base.)

The third lesson passes from Variates, measured upwards from the base, to Deviates measured upwards or downwards from the Median, and treated as positive or negative values accordingly (Fig. 6).

Draw a Scheme of Variates on the black board, and show that it consists of two parts; the median which represents a constant, and the curve which represents the variations from it. Draw a horizontal line from limit to limit, through the top of the Median, to serve as Axis to the Curve. Divide the Axis centesimally, and wipe out everything except Curve, Axis, and Limits. This forms a Scheme of Distribution of Deviates. Draw ordinates from the axis to the curve at the 25th and 75th divisions. These are the 'Quartile' deviates.

At this stage the Genesis of the theoretical Normal curve might be briefly explained and the generality of its application; also some of its beautiful properties of reproduction. Many of the diagrams already shown would be again employed to show the prevalence of approximately normal distributions. Exceptions of strongly marked Skew curves would be exhibited and their genesis briefly explained.

It will then be explained that while the ordinate at *any* specified centesimal division in two normal curves measures their relative variability, the Quartile is commonly employed as the unit of variability under the almost grotesque name of 'Probable. Error', which is intended to signify that the length of any Deviate in the system is as likely as not to exceed or to fall short of it. This, by construction, is the case of either Quartile.

(New words and meanings—Scheme of Distribution of Deviates, Axis, Normal, Skew, Quartile, and Probable

In the fourth lesson it has to be explained that the Curve of Normal Distribution is not the direct result of calculation, neither does the formula that expresses it lend itself so freely to further calculation, as that of Frequency. Their shapes differ; the first is an Ogive, the second (Fig. 7) is Bell-shaped. In the curve of Frequency the Deviations are reckoned from the Mean of all the Variates, and not from the Median. Mean and Median are the same in Normal Curves, but may differ much in others. Either curve can be transformed into the other, as is best exemplified by using a Polygon (Fig. 8) instead of the Curve, consisting of a series of rectangles differing in height by the same amounts, but having widths respectively representative of the frequencies of 1, 3, 3, 1. (This is one of those known as a binomial series, whose genesis might be briefly explained.) If these rectangles are arrayed in order of their widths, side by side, they become the equivalents of the ogival curve of Distribution. Now if each of these latter rectangles be slid parallel to itself up to either limit, their bases will overlap and they become equivalent to the bell-shaped curve of Frequency with its base vertical

The curve of Frequency contains no easily perceived unit of variability like the Quartile of the Curve of Distribution. It is therefore not suited for and was not used as a first illustration, but the formula that expresses it is by far the more suitable of the two for calculation. Its unit of variability is what is called the 'Standard Deviation' whose genesis will admit of illustration. How the calculations are made for finding its value is beyond the reach of the present lessons. The calculated ordinates of the normal curve must be accepted by the

learner much as the time of day by his watch, though he be ignorant of the principles of its construction. Much more beyond his reach are the formulae used to express quasi-normal and skew curves. They require a previous knowledge of rather advanced mathematics.

(New words and ideas—Curve of Frequency, Standard Deviation, Mean, Binomial Series.)

The fifth and last lesson deals with the measurement of Correlation, that is, with the closeness of the relation between any two systems whose variations are due partly to causes common to both, and partly to causes special to each. It applies to nearly every social relation, as to environment and health, social position and fertility, the kinship of parent to child, of uncle to nephew, &c. It may be mechanically illustrated by the movements of two pulleys with weights attached, suspended from a cord held by one of the hands of three different persons, 1, 2, and 3. No. 2 holds the middle of the cord, one half of which then passes round one of the pulleys up to the hand of No. 1; the other half similarly round the other pulley up to the hand of No. 3. The hands of Nos. 1, 2 and 3 move up and down quite independently, but as the movements of both weights are simultaneously controlled in part by No. 2, they become 'correlated'.

The formation of a table of correlations on paper ruled in squares, is easily explained on the blackboard (Fig. 9). The pairs of correlated values A and B have to be expressed in units of their respective variabilities. They are then sorted into the squares of the paper,—vertically according to the magnitudes of A horizontally according to those of B —, and the Mean of each partial array of B values, corresponding to each grade of A has to be determined. It is found theoretically that where variability is normal, the Means of B lie practically in a straight line on the face of the Table, and observation shows they do so in most other cases. It follows that the average deviation of a B value bears a constant ratio to the deviation of the corresponding A value. This ratio is called the 'Index of Correlation' and is expressed by a single figure. For example: if the thigh-bone of many persons deviate 'very much' from the usual length of the thigh-bones of their race, the average of the lengths of the corresponding arm-bones will differ 'much', but not 'very much', from the usual length of arm-bones, and the ratio between this 'very much' and 'much' is constant and in the same direction, whatever be the numerical value attached to the word 'very much'. Lastly, the trustworthiness of the Index of Correlation, when applied to individual cases, is readily calculable. When the closeness of correlation is absolute, it is expressed by the number 1.0, and by 0.0, when the correlation is nil.

(New words and ideas—Correlation and Index of Correlation.)

This concludes what I have to say on these suggested Object lessons. It will have been tedious to follow in its necessarily much compressed form but will serve, I trust, to convey its main purpose of showing that a very brief course of lessons, copiously illustrated by diagrams and objects to handle, would give an acceptable introduction to the newer methods employed in Biometry and in Eugenics. Further, that when read leisurely by experts in its printed form, it would give quite sufficient guidance for elaborating details.

Influence of Collective Truths upon Individual Conduct.

We have thus far been concerned with Probability, determined by methods that take cognizance of Variations, and yield exact results, thereby affording a solid foundation for action. But the stage on which human action takes place is a superstructure into which emotion enters, we are guided on it less by Certainty and by Probability than by Assurance to a greater or lesser degree. The word Assurance is derived from *sure* which itself is an abbreviation of *secure* that is of *secura*, or without misgiving. It is a contented attitude of mind largely dependent on custom, prejudice, or other unreasonable influences which reformers have to overcome, and some of which they are apt to utilize on their own behalf. Human nature is such that we rarely find our way by the pure light of reason, but while peering through spectacles furnished with coloured and distorting glasses.

Locke seems to confound certainty with assurance in his forcible description of the way in which men are guided in their daily affairs (*Human Understanding* iv, 14, par. 1):

Man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge for that being very short and scanty, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his Me, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him, he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.

A society may be considered as a highly complex organism, with a consciousness of its own, caring only for itself, establishing regulations and customs for its collective advantage, and creating a code of opinions to subserve that end. It is hard to over-rate its power over the individual in regard to any obvious particular on

which it emphatically insists. I trust in some future time that one of those particulars will be the practice of Eugenics. Otherwise the influence of collective truths on individual conduct is deplorably weak, as expressed by the lines:—

For others' follies teach us not,
Nor much their wisdom teaches,
But chief of solid worth is what
Our own experience preaches.

Professor Westermarck, among many other remarks in which I fully concur, has aptly stated (*Sociological Papers* published for the Sociological Society. Macmillan, 1906, vol. ii, p. 24), with reference to one obstacle which prevents individuals from perceiving the importance of Eugenics, 'the prevalent opinion that almost anybody is good enough to marry is chiefly due to the fact that in this case, cause and effect, marriage and the feebleness of the offspring, are so distant from each other that the *near-sighted eye* does not distinctly perceive the connexion between them.' (The Italics are mine.)

The enlightenment of individuals is a necessary preamble to practical Eugenics, but social opinion is the tyrant by whose praise or blame the principles of Eugenics may be expected hereafter to influence individual conduct. Public opinion may, however, be easily directed into different channels by opportune pressure. A common conviction that change in the established order of some particular codes of conduct would be impossible, because of the shock that the idea of doing so gives to our present ideas, bears some resemblance to the conviction of lovers that their present sentiments will endure for ever. Conviction, which is that very Assurance of which mention has just been made, is proved by reiterated experience to be a highly fallacious guide. Love is notoriously fickle in despite of the fervent and genuine protestations of lovers, and so is public opinion. I gave a list of extraordinary variations of the latter in respect to restrictions it enforced on the freedom of marriage, at various times and places (*Sociological Papers* quoted above). Much could be added to that list, but I will not now discuss the effects of public opinion on such a serious question. I will take a much smaller instance which occurred before the time to which the recollections of most persons can now reach, but which I myself recall vividly. It is the simple matter of hair on the face of male adults. When I was young, it was an unpardonable offence for any English person other than a cavalry officer, or perhaps some one of high social rank, to wear a moustache. Foreigners did so and were tolerated, otherwise the assumption of a moustache was in popular opinion worse than wicked, for it was atrociously bad style. Then came the Crimean War and the winter of Balaclava, during which it was cruel to compel the infantry to shave themselves every morning. So their beards began to grow, and this broke a long established custom. On the return of the army to England the fashion of beards spread among the laity, but stopped short of the clergy. These, however, soon began to show dissatisfaction, they said the beard was a sign of manliness that ought not to be suppressed and so forth; and at length the moment arrived. A distinguished clergyman, happily still living, 'bearded' his Bishop on a critical occasion. The Bishop yielded without protest, and forthwith hair began to sprout in a thousand pulpits where it had never appeared before within the memory of man.

It would be no small shock to public sentiment if our athletes in running public races were to strip themselves stark naked, yet that custom was rather suddenly introduced into Greece. Plato says (Republic V, par. 452, Jowett's translation):

Not long ago the Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper, and when first the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that day might have ridiculed them. . . .

Thucydides (1. 6) also refers to the same change as occurring 'quite lately'.

Public opinion is commonly far in advance of private morality, because society as a whole keenly appreciates acts that tend to its advantage, and condemns those that do not. It applauds acts of heroism that perhaps not one of the applauders would be disposed to emulate. It is instructive to observe cases in which the benevolence of public opinion has outstripped that of the Law—which, for example, takes no notice of such acts as are enshrined in the parable of the good Samaritan. A man on his journey was robbed, wounded, and left by the wayside. A priest and a Levite successively pass by and take no heed of him. A Samaritan follows, takes pity, binds his wounds, and bears him to a place of safety. Public opinion keenly condemns the priest and the Levite, and praises the Samaritan, but our criminal law is indifferent to such acts. It is most severe on misadventure due to the neglect of a definite duty, but careless about those due to absence of common philanthropy. Its callousness in this respect is painfully shown in the following quotations (Kenny, *Outlines of Criminal Law* 1902, p. 121, per Hawkins in Reg. v. Paine, *Times* February 25, 1880):

If I saw a man who was not under my charge, taking up a tumbler of poison, I should not be guilty of any

crime by not stopping him. I am under no legal obligation to protect a stranger.

That is probably what the priest and the Levite of the parable said to themselves.

A still more emphatic example is in the *Digest of Criminal Law* by Justice Sir James Stephen, 1887, p. 154. Reg. v. Smith, 2 C. and P., 449:

A sees B drowning and is able to help him by holding out his hand. A abstains from doing so in order that B may be drowned, and B is drowned. A has committed no offence.

It appears, from a footnote, that this case has been discussed in a striking manner by Lord Macaulay in his notes on the Indian Penal Code, which I have not yet been able to consult.

Enough has been written elsewhere by myself and others to show that whenever public opinion is strongly roused it will lead to action, however contradictory it may be to previous custom and sentiment. Considering that public opinion is guided by the sense of what best serves the interests of society as a whole, it is reasonable to expect that it will be strongly exerted in favour of Eugenics when a sufficiency of evidence shall have been collected to make the truths on which it rests plain to all. That moment has not yet arrived. Enough is already known to those who have studied the question to leave no doubt in their minds about the general results, but not enough is quantitatively known to justify legislation or other action except in extreme cases. Continued studies will be required for some time to come, and the pace must not be hurried. When the desired fullness of information shall have been acquired, then, and not till then, will be the fit moment to proclaim a 'Jehad,' or Holy War against customs and prejudices that impair the physical and moral qualities of our race.

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Individualism and After

The Herbert Spencer Lecture

Delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre on the 29th May 1908

By Benjamin Kidd

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Individualism and After

It is a matter of peculiar satisfaction to me that the honour which has come to me of being asked to deliver the Herbert Spencer lecture before the University of Oxford should afford me the opportunity of speaking to you upon the subject which I have chosen for this address. It is not simply that it is a subject which lies very close to my mind and to my own work. One of the principal objects aimed at in this lecture will be to set out, within the brief limits allowed, reasons for conceiving the time in which we are living as the beginning of a period of development and reconstruction which must have unusual results in the future. To do this it is necessary to discuss the meaning of that profoundly influential tendency which has its roots deep in our history, and which is known, particularly in this country and in the United States, as Individualism. There has been no more characteristic, consistent, and devoted exponent of individualism in its theoretical and scientific aspects than Herbert Spencer. It is with this tendency, and with its relations to the principles of evolution, that his name is most closely associated. If it is necessary for the purpose I have in view to exhibit individualism not as an end in itself, but as a preparation for what is to come after, it will be, I trust, in the true spirit of evolutionary knowledge, and with an ever-present sense of the essential greatness of the work which Spencer has accomplished.

It may be recalled that it is now some three-quarters of a century since John Henry Newman set out on a memorable journey for rest and contemplation in the south of Europe. He was at the time full of the spirit of unrest which was then striving in this University; and he was to return later confirmed in the conviction which had been growing in his mind that there was something wrong in the conclusions which men were drawing from the prevalent tendencies of the time. This conviction, shared in by others and carrying different minds in different directions, was destined later to lead Newman, to the surprise of his generation, to turn his back finally on the principles of what up to that time had been one of the most successful developments in Western history. I refer to this period not because I wish to discuss in detail any of the controversies to which it gave rise, but because I desire to take it as a point of departure.

The time which intervenes between that period and our own has been filled with a series of movements which have extended outwards, apparently from many independent centres. They have come, indeed, to embrace in their influence not only much of the purely intellectual life of our time, but many of its deeper

practical activities. In literature, in politics, in art, in legislation, in our conception of the national life, in our theories of society, and even in the fundamental conceptions of philosophy, the more vital controversies of the time all appear to centre round movements which have a certain feature in common. They are all movements the leaders of which emphasize a direction of progress which seems to be away from the principles of what we have known in the past as individualism. It is of these movements, seen not in isolation, but as the details of a single development related to organic causes, that I wish to speak. Some of the phases of it are described as Reaction, others are spoken of with no less certainty as Revolution. But it is of this development, seen neither as reaction nor as revolution, but as a movement of Reconstruction, quite unusual as it appears to me in history, a movement carrying within itself not only the life of the future, but with equal certainty the meaning of the past, that I desire

Those who come after us will in all probability make allowance for the fact that it must be a very rare occurrence for any one of us to imagine this particular time in which we are now living as it will appear in the future. Any of us, for instance, may still to-day talk to men whose early years take them back to the days before the period of railways, telegraphs, and ocean steamships—to the days, that is to say, when all the activities of the world were still as distant from each other in time and space as they were in the days of Augustus Caesar. Those who are still our contemporaries have known the time when the white races of the world were scarcely more than a third of their present number, and when applied science had not yet begun those surprising transformations through which the face of this planet would appear changed, if it were possible for us to see it from the depths of space. Even those who are middle-aged can go back to the days before the doctrine of organic evolution, as we now know it, had yet been propounded, and to the time when, in all the sciences, the processes of thought were still striving to orient themselves to the conception that the history of the world, and indeed of the whole material universe, was comprised within the brief space of 6,000 years.

The political changes are no less remarkable. They constituted, indeed, the principal and dominant preoccupation of men's minds throughout the whole of the period while this transition was in progress. Looking back over the nineteenth century, we see it now as emphatically the century of political democracy, the period of the incoming of the masses of the people to power. The century witnessed the final stages of that struggle, lasting from the Renaissance onward, in which the doctrines of individualism had gradually broken down in Western countries the religious and civil structure of society inherited from former generations. It was in these final stages, moreover, that effect was given to all the events which had preceded them. This was effected by the admission of the people to voting power in most of the leading nations of the West. What France attempted in the way of a universal franchise in its great revolution, and what the United States began in 1783, England completed by stages only in 1832, 1867, and 1885. Germany made advances towards the same goal in 1867 and 1871; and Italy, Holland, Spain, Belgium, and other countries have each in turn in recent days adopted a wide popular franchise. Scarcely more than a period of a hundred years, that is to say, has witnessed the steps which have effected silently what is probably the most pregnant political change that has ever taken place in the world, namely, the admission of the people to power among the leading nations of the West by forms of electoral franchise which in most cases fall little short of universal suffrage.

It was in the conditions of Western thought in which this revolution was in progress that the doctrine of organic evolution through natural selection was launched in England by Darwin in the second half of the nineteenth century. It will be a fact familiar to most of us who have endeavoured to keep touch with the science and thought of other countries that the effects produced in England by this theory of organic evolution have been from the beginning deeper, more widespread, and more potent than in any other country. This is a result due to causes which are rarely referred to in our literature. I will endeavour here to touch briefly on one of the chief of those causes. It will bring me to the question to which it is one of the principal objects of this lecture to attempt an answer, namely, whether the altogether exceptional conditions of thought in which the doctrine of evolution was launched in Western history have not hitherto operated in preventing us from perceiving in some measure the real application to society of the larger meaning which

In Great Britain the conflict in which the liberty of the individual had been attained had been exceptionally severe and prolonged. The prestige of the results obtained was so great that, as Maine points out, it has profoundly influenced the tendencies of development throughout the modern world.

Popular Government by H. S. Maine.

This is, indeed, the ultimate fact of history, often hidden from sight when in the phrase of the day it is sometimes said that we are living in the age of the Americanization of the world. We have, therefore, to recognize the importance of the fact that the tendencies of thought which had produced individualism in Great Britain and the United States were, in the nature of things, exceptionally developed in both countries. These tendencies may be said to have culminated in England between 1850 and 1860.

One can hardly open any serious political or philosophical book of this period without being impressed with the peculiar intellectual atmosphere of the time. If we take a sober treatise like John Stuart Mill's *Logic* or

better still the same author's *Essay on Liberty* it may be observed how throughout the argument history is made to furnish a kind of lurid background for the great theme which is in the author's mind, namely, the emancipation of the individual from government. We see government in all its forms presented by Mill essentially as a thing of evil. In the opening pages of the *Essay on Liberty* the past is discussed as a time when government might indeed have been necessary to keep other tyrants in check, but in which it always tended to become, as Mill expressed it, 'the king of the vultures no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies.'

On Liberty by J. S. Mill, c. i.

It is essential to remember that this view was not an exceptional one. It expressed the spirit of the dominant political and social philosophy of the period. Henry Sidgwick,

Henry Sidgwick, A Memoir by A. S. and E. M. S., c. ii.

Leslie Stephen,

The English Utilitarians vol. iii.

and many others

Cf. Professor Marshall's *Principles of Economics* vol. i, B.I.

have described to us in detail the remarkable ascendancy in English thought, and at the centres of learning, of the general views represented by Mill at this period. The accepted social and political theories had all the same mark on them. Every kind of government and organized institution in the State tended to be regarded with suspicion by the leaders of the ruling school of opinion. In Herbert Spencer's Autobiography the reader realizes the kind of passionate hostility to all the activities of the State which Spencer inherited from his intellectual ancestry and obtained in particular from the environment of his time. The Synthetic Philosophy in its relation to society is much more than a system of philosophy. It is one of the greatest dramas ever produced by the human mind, a drama, unfolded in many volumes, of the emancipation of the activities of the individual from the rule of all governments and institutions—military, political, social, ecclesiastical, and economic—organized in the State. We have come to talk in these days of attracting the best ability to the service of the State. In the middle of the nineteenth century Mill would have none of it. It might, he said, place a most dangerous kind of premium on bureaucracy. For the more qualified the heads of officialism the greater, he said, would be the hold of the evil upon us.

On Liberty, by J.S. Mil, c.v.

All-embracing State functions, said Spencer, towards the end of his life-work, are characteristic of a low social type. Progress to a higher social type is marked by a gradual relinquishment by the State of its compulsory functions.

Principles of Ethics, 369, see also 365-82.

The spirit of these opinions has pervaded the whole political and economic life of Great Britain in a period through which most of us have lived, at least in part. The emphasis was laid to an extraordinary degree not only on the unrestricted freedom, but on the self-sufficiency of the individual. Emancipated from government, the individual was capable, it was held, of reaching, through unrestricted competition with other individuals equally untrammelled, the very highest possible results in every sphere of human activity. And he was capable, it was said, of thus reaching them not only with the greatest profit to himself, but with the highest good to the greatest number of his fellows. The spirit of unlimited competition, of the most intense individualism, and at the same time of the widest cosmopolitanism, breathed through it all. Mill's principles sanctioned not only the freest exchanges of economic products, but also the freest exchanges of human labour between nations,

Principles of Political Economy B. III. xvii.

even, it would appear by implication, to the extent of working the mills of Lancashire with labour from Central Asia. The merchant, said Adam Smith, is the citizen of no country. It is not the advantage of society, but his own advantage, which the merchant has in view. But the merchant, by following his own advantage, is necessarily led at the same time to serve the best interest of society.

Wealth of Nations, iv.

We speak nowadays of a possible divergence between the interests of the individual under conditions of unrestricted competition and the interests of society, and of the subordination of the individual to society. The principles of the time were incompatible with the meaning which is usually attached to such a saying. 'If,' said Mill, 'all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.'

On Liberty, c. ii.

When Darwin published the *Origin of Species* the firm hold which the doctrine of natural selection almost immediately obtained on men's minds in England was, I think, undoubtedly due in the first place to the resemblance which was discovered in it to the views which had thus come to prevail throughout the whole

fabric of the social, political, and economic life of the time. Spencer, who had to some extent anticipated Darwin, and whose fundamental conceptions had been already developed in his early writings, immediately became the principal interpreter of the doctrine of evolution in its applications to society. The *Origin of Species* dealt principally with the individual struggle for existence in forms of life below human society. It appeared therefore to emphasize the universal self-sufficiency of the individual and the effectiveness of individual competition. Darwin seemed to lift the veil from life, and to present to the gaze of his time, as prevailing throughout nature, a picture of the self-centred struggle of the individual ruthlessly pursuing his own interests and yet unconsciously pursuing them, as it was the teaching of the economic science of the day that he pursued them in human society—to his own perfection and at the same time to the highest possible good of his kind.

The doctrine of evolution, in short, appeared to give the last sanction to individualism and to all the tendencies which from the period of the Renaissance onwards had been making for emancipation. It was taken by many to be a doctrine which justified from the fundamental order of nature the claim of the individual to stand forth—as the extreme advocates of individualism had always insisted— independent of all social powers, organizations, institutions, and creeds, as being himself the end of evolution, the Atlas who carried forward on his shoulders, in the struggle which he waged with his fellows for his own visible interests in his own lifetime, the end and welfare of the whole order of the world which surrounded

The position which I have now to put before you may be described somewhat in this way. I need not here emphasize the importance of the work accomplished in our civilization by the theories of individualism. I have enlarged on that subject elsewhere. Only opinions held with similar strength and extremity of conviction could have achieved such results.

Cf. *Principles of Western Civilisation* New Edition, Introduction and cix-xi.

But the theory of organic evolution was launched in England, as I have here shown, when these theories of individualism had reached their extreme development. The phase of the evolution doctrine which Darwin presented at this psychological moment was a phase dealing almost exclusively with the struggle for existence as between individuals and among forms of life below human society. Darwin attempted no systematic study of society. A species is not in itself a social group, and there is little in any of his works to suggest to us the widely different principles, as I conceive them, which must regulate under the stress of natural selection the integration of social types and in particular of a social type resting ultimately on mind.

Thus in *The Descent of Man* Darwin appears to think that civilized nations, by their practice of caring for the sick and maimed, are tending to suspend the operation of the law of natural selection in society by preventing the elimination of the unfit. There is no discussion of the organic meaning in the integration of society of the growing sense of responsibility to life which is characteristic of the more civilized races, or of the significance in relation to the law of natural selection in social evolution, as distinct from individual evolution, of the deepening of the social consciousness of which this sense of responsibility to our fellow creatures is one of the outward marks.

I am therefore led to this question: Can it be that the meaning of our times, and even the real meaning of the doctrine of evolution in its applications to society, have been hitherto largely obscured from us through seeking to interpret both through the theories of individualism? Or I would put it in this way: Have we still to recognize the fact that the individualism I have been here describing has no final meaning in itself, and that its real significance lies in the fact that it is the doctrine of a transition period preliminary to and preparatory to a more important stage upon which we are already entering?

You will admit, perhaps, that these are important questions. If they have to be answered in any degree in the affirmative, those who are still young among us will probably live to see great developments. In attempting to find an answer to them, it is, perhaps, desirable to turn now for a moment away from the conclusions of theoretical knowledge as they have hitherto prevailed amongst us, and to envisage the actual world of to-day as it exists in the making—the grim, stressful world of life, where movements in thought and action are emerging largely independent of past theories and in obedience only to the forces of growth which are producing them. Let us see how far the exponents of individualism are proving themselves to have been justified in their claim to have explained to us the direction and meaning of our

If we regard existing tendencies in the State, and in particular those movements of the time which most evidently have the life of the future in them, the facts are of a kind to cause reflection. For the past thirty or forty years in England development in the State has been decidedly in a particular direction. So far from witnessing any tendency to the progressive restriction of the functions of the State, which was anticipated in the dominant political theories of the recent past, we have to take note of the rapid and continuous extension in every direction of its power and responsibilities. This development has become one of the most marked features of our time. It extends to all the activities of government, from national and imperial interests to municipal affairs. The enormous extension of the functions of the State is indicated by the increase in expenditure. For two decades, almost though not quite coincident with the sixties and seventies—that is to say, after the

doctrines of individualism had reached their highest influence in Great Britain—the public expenditure of the United Kingdom, we may observe, tended to remain almost stationary. But it has since almost doubled in amount. The rate of increase, also, is most rapid in recent years. This is not by any means occasioned simply by increased expenditure on the defensive services. The increase, for instance, in the large expenditure of the purely civil services of the State has been quite fifty per cent. in the ten years preceding this in which we are living.

The extension in the functions of government indicated by the growth of local and municipal taxation has been still greater. During the past fifteen years the amount raised as revenue by local authorities in the United Kingdom, from rates alone, excluding income from public undertakings, loans, and other sources, has more than doubled. It now reaches a sum equal to the total of the annual national expenditure a quarter of a century ago. I need not enlarge upon the history of the extension of the functions of the State which lies behind these facts. It forms indeed the principal part of the history of our times. One has but to reflect that almost every large contentious question of the day involves some proposal to extend the functions of the State, to realize how considerable the change has been. The development in question touches almost every sphere of the activities of our time. In commerce, industry, finance, public undertakings, education, law, agriculture, health, morals, in all the relations of labour to the State and to Capital, and in the relations of the national activities to those of other countries, we have to notice how the functions of the State are being extended on every hand. It must be confessed that there is no indication here of that progressive relinquishment by the State of its functions which was anticipated by Spencer. The reasons also which J. S. Mill considered cogent and conclusive that there should be a restriction of government to the lowest possible minimum do not seem to have prevailed in practice.

The feeling which may be distinguished in the general mind as prompting these marked changes calls specially for remark. There are a great number of opinions about the extension of the functions of the State, and there is great diversity of view even amongst those who are most active in desiring it. There is, however, I think, a common denominator to which all the views may be reduced in so far as they are submitted in the public interest. They may all be distinguished as urging a more organic conception of society. It was the most fundamental principle of the individualism of the past that the interests of the individual in pursuit of his own ends in competition with his fellows was coincident with the highest good of society. *Laissez-faire* therefore became a first principle of government. What we are apparently now witnessing, with the extension of the functions of the State, is the growth of a conviction that the two things are not the same, and that the highest good of the community is not, and possibly cannot be, reached by unregulated competition between private interests. This is obviously the opinion which is common to all the theories of extension of the functions of government. But it will be observed how it strikes at the central principle of the dominant theories of the past.

The opinion of economists of the ruling English school in the past has been most pronounced. The individual, according to Adam Smith, in following his own advantage, was necessarily best serving the interests of society. But for the past half-century, in the relations between capital and labour on the one hand, and between the State and labour on the other, the corporate consciousness appears to have been gradually withdrawing its assent to this opinion. We have accordingly had in England an increasing tendency towards the interference of the State in the struggle between individuals. Legislative Acts have been passed which have regulated employment in factories, which have forbidden child-labour, which have reduced the hours of labour, which have given the right of combination to workmen, and which have even given official recognition to the principle that in agreements between labour and public authorities there should be a fair wage as distinguished from a competitive wage. Here again it is the more organic view which seems to be prevailing, in that the fact is emphasized that the good of the competitors in a state of unrestricted competition between individuals is not the same thing as the good of society.

When we turn from the State in its relation to labour to the State in relation to capital the facts continue to suggest reflection. The old individualistic theory of the State contemplated, as has been said, the prevalence of practically unrestricted competition as the principle of life in all things. But the sponsors for this view do not seem to have anticipated to any extent the kind of problems arising out of the modern tendencies of the world under stress of competition. One of the most noticeable facts of the time, resulting largely from that shrinkage of the world as regards time and distance already referred to, is the tendency of capital to aggregation and then to forms of oligarchy as an ultimate phase inherent in the conditions of competition.

Those who have anticipated the system of voluntary co-operation, which Spencer said was to take the place of the State in the future, have always given us the instance of joint-stock enterprise as one of the best examples of how the functions of the State were to be superseded by private enterprise. Here it was said we have a voluntary republic engaged in a business enterprise. Every shareholder has the right to vote; the shareholders elect and control the management, and all the benefits are equally divisible. Finally, ownership in modern joint-stock enterprise is becoming more and more widely distributed, and is tending to embrace all the activities

of our time. We have thus in view, it was said, all the stages of the easy and successful accomplishment of what Spencer predicted.

But when we look at the real facts of the world the conditions present something quite different. Under the modern tendency of capital to aggregation, we seem to see nearly every one of the vital principles of co-operation, which it has taken the political State thousands of years of evolution to establish only partially, fundamentally violated, and this apparently by necessity inherent in the conditions. For instance, from long before the days so familiar to us in history, when we see the select body of Athenian citizens assembling in person in the Pnyx as the ultimate source of all law and authority, down to the present day, the continuous struggle in the political State has been a vote for every man, and then for an equal vote not weighted by wealth or position. But the first principle of joint-stock enterprise is of necessity voting power according to the amount of holding. The tendency from the outset is therefore towards oligarchy, this becoming pronounced as aggregation continues.

Problems like representation, the necessity for publicity, the continuity of membership, the identification of the interests of the management with those of the members, and many others which it has cost the State such struggles to overcome, find no solution in joint-stock enterprise. Under the modern conditions of sale and purchase many of them have assumed new phases. It is inevitable, also, that it should be possible for the management to enrich themselves simply by foreseeing, as a matter of course, the rise and fall of the stock-exchange values of their

Driven by the stress of competition, the tendency of capital to aggregation is producing other results that are remarkable. The United States Steel Corporation recently held its annual meeting in America. This corporation has control of revenues and finances which compare with those of a first-class State. It deals with one of the greatest industries in the world, and its shareholders are widely distributed in many countries. In a newspaper report of the meeting we read that the management voted proxies representing some 4,700,000 shares. The number of stock-holders who attended and voted personally was twenty. The report added laconically that all the acts of the management during the year were confirmed.

An example of this kind brings fairly home to the mind how the conditions of the world are moving beyond the older theories. Beneath all the extreme views of the time we may distinguish, I think, the growth of a general feeling that the interests of competitors following their own ends in a state of unregulated competition between capital, equally as in the case of unregulated competition between labour, may possibly not be as economists in the past imagined, the same thing as the interests of society. It is, in short, in this case also, towards some more organic conception of society than was contemplated in the individualistic theories of the past that the facts of the time seem to be carrying us.

If we extend our view into the relation of States to each other, and into the conceptions of the meaning of the State, an equally striking change seems to be taking place in our time. One of the most pronounced characteristics of Western thought towards the middle of the nineteenth century was its cosmopolitanism. That earlier political phase which had been represented in France by the literature of the Revolution, and that other culture phase which had been nurtured in Germany on the universalist conceptions of Kant, Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and other interpreters, had been provided in England with a practical basis. It was insisted that the ideal condition of the world for the maximum production of wealth, and therefore, it was said, for international peace and progress, was one in which the exchanges of both labour and capital would be so absolutely untrammelled by considerations of nationalism that they would move, for instance, between China and England, as Mill said, with the same ease and freedom as between two English counties.

No change which has taken place in the world in our time is more striking than the assertion of what has been called the passion of nationalism against the cosmopolitan ideals of the Early Victorian period. This movement takes in our day innumerable forms.

Compare its expression, for instance, in Mr. G. K. Chesterton's *Napoleon of Notting Hill*.

It extends from the Celtic revival, through many recent expressions of nationalism in Great Britain, the United States, and other countries, up to what is called a policy of imperialism, the latter embracing among ourselves both political and economic proposals for the federation of the British Empire. In these movements the increasing emphasis that is laid on the life-principle of small nationalities is very often contrasted with imperialism, the two tendencies being regarded as antagonistic. I think this view is possibly not correct.

What we are witnessing here also is, I think, the same gradual and general movement of the social mind towards a more organic conception of society. The ideas of growth, development, and progress now coming to be scientifically applied to society are in their very nature inseparably connected with the future. In the case of the social organism, as in the case of the individual, the difference between the more evolved and the primitive mind consists largely in the power of subordinating the passing needs of the present to those more organic needs which include the welfare of the future. A most marked and universal feature of social progress at the present time is therefore the increasing perception of the importance in the evolution of the world of the ideas

which render society more organic in this sense of subordinating the present to the future. They are the greatest, the most lasting, and the most potent asset that a people can possess. It is in the increasing perception of the relation of this fact to all the ideas included under the head of nationalism that we have, I think, the true explanation of the present tendency throughout the world to emphasize nationality as a factor in evolution. It is a tendency which exists side by side with the conception of civilization as a whole developing toward a higher unity. But it is a tendency which is exercising at present a profoundly disturbing influence on many conceptions of the past and in particular on economic

I have endeavoured to represent so far the meaning of our times to consist in a general movement of the Western mind under a great variety of phases towards a more organic conception of society. If I am right in this attempt, it is at this point, perhaps, that I approach most nearly the heart of the subject. It was pointed out at the beginning that when the theory of evolution was launched in England the conditions of thought were peculiar. If I were asked to choose a passage from the literature of the nineteenth century best calculated to exhibit the nature of the change I am attempting to describe, I would select a passage from Herbert Spencer's writings. It represents Spencer's position between what I think will prove to be two eras of the world's thought. The passage in question appears in an article published in 1860

Westminster Review, January, 1860.

, the subject of which was afterwards embodied, although not in such extreme form, in his *Principles of Sociology*.

Principles of Sociology, 212-71.

In this article Spencer examined the conception of the social organism, comparing the principles of its life with those of the individual organism. He found the two in agreement in many conspicuous peculiarities. But there was, he said, one fundamental difference. While in the individual organism the welfare of all the parts is rightly subservient to the welfare of the whole, in society the living units, he said, could never merge their individual interests and consciousness in any corporate consciousness. 'And this,' continued Spencer, 'is an everlasting reason why the welfare of citizens cannot rightly be sacrificed to some supposed benefit of the State. . . . The corporate life here must be subservient to the lives of the parts, instead of the lives of the parts being subservient to the corporate life.'

If we scrutinize closely the terms of this statement we must, I think, recognize it as epitomizing, in a manner so complete as to be found nowhere else, the spirit and meaning of the phase of thought known as individualism. Spencer's saying that the corporate life must be subordinate to the lives of the units, and not the units to the corporate life, represents probably the highest point touched in Western history by the claims of individualism. It marks the distance which had been travelled from the Greek theory of society. But it marks also, I think, no less decidedly the position to which we will in future look back as the starting-point of a new development.

Now if with this passage from Spencer in mind we turn again to the history of our times, nothing can be more significant than the effect which the more organic conception of society may be seen to be producing on the doctrine of evolution itself in its applications to social theories. It will be apparent, on reflection, that Spencer's conception of a corporate life subordinate to the interests of the units comprising it, is in the nature of things invalid. It is the correlative of that conception of the individual struggle for existence which was first presented by Darwin. It is evident that it is impossible to conceive society in any scientific sense as a mere mob of units of this kind whose individual interests could be paramount over the corporate interests.

I have pointed out at some length elsewhere that the first meaning of an organism as such is that its efficiency is superior to the sum total of the efficiency of all its individual units acting as units.

The Significance of the Future in the Theory of Evolution: Two lectures, Royal Institution, London, 1906.

The evolution of society under the stress of natural selection is along the lines of its greatest efficiency, and it follows that in all the struggles of human history what is gradually being evolved is the more efficient—that is to say, the more organic social type. Whether the individual be conscious of it or not, the tendency of the evolutionary process will therefore inevitably render the interests of the units subordinate to the interests of the corporate life.

As soon as we realize this it appears to me that we come in sight of a new set of ideas. What we see is that in society the meaning of evolution can centre only in a secondary sense in the struggle for existence between individuals. As in the case of nationality, though in a deeper sense, the ruling meaning of the social process lies in the causes which are rendering society increasingly organic by subordinating the units to the meaning of the whole and the present to the meaning of the future. It is the ideas and the integrating conceptions of the human mind, hitherto mainly represented in the great systems of religion which are rendering society organic in this higher sense, that furnish the principles round which the process of social evolution centres and that constitute the greatest asset which a civilization can possess. It is here again with the social organism as with the individual organism. The struggle in the primitive stage is for the present life. But as integration continues, the

difference between the primitive and the more evolved consists, as has been said before, largely in the power of subordinating the impulses of the present to the more organic needs in which the welfare of the future is included. The history of the world is not simply a history of the struggle for life. It is to an ever-increasing degree a history of the struggle for the life of the future.

If we look round the world we see most of the leading nations burthened with huge national debts, which often constitute a great encumbrance to their development. It is a matter of general knowledge that no civilized people has yet been able consistently to follow such a moderate policy of subordination of the present to the future as would suffice to wipe out in the course of a generation these heavy mortgages on the future. So little is the social consciousness organic under the influence of motives of this kind. Whether we regard man as a political animal or as an economic animal, we see him in history as Dryden described him,

Unconstant still, and various;
There's no to-morrow in him like to-day.

But there is a point of view from which we get a different spectacle. We see the Western peoples as a whole held in a system of ideas which dates back to the Christian era. The conceptions arising out of these ideas have influenced at every point the development of our political and social institutions, our standards of conduct and our laws. Under their influence generations of men have made the greatest sacrifices of which human nature is capable in order to subserve the ideals, personal, political, and social, which they have set before themselves under this influence. The conceptions in question have so profoundly deepened the social consciousness that for centuries we have been living in a development in which we see the occupying classes unable to offer any serious resistance in yielding their places before the incoming people, first of all in the demand for equal political rights, and now in the demand for the equality of opportunity. Although it is a commonplace of thought, it represents one of the profoundest of sociological truths when we say that these ideas have created the distinctive ethos of Western civilization; for they thereby continue to give direction, even though leaders of movements may often be entirely unconscious of it, to most of the tendencies which are recognized as characteristic of our times.

It would be impossible to conceive any economic or political motive influencing the human mind so consistently and so continuously, and on so large a scale, and producing over so prolonged a period results of such character and magnitude. It has been said of the Synthetic Philosophy that Spencer found little place in it for systems of religion except in relation to our emancipation from the past. But no change which is in progress in our time as the result of the extending conception of society is more striking than that which is taking place in our estimate of the influence in the evolution of society of the integrating conceptions of the human mind hitherto represented mainly in the great systems of religion, which are thus in the deepest sense of all rendering society organic. It would seem as if it is these stones which the builders of social science in the past have rejected that we must place now as the head-stones of the corners.

I must not stay to follow this movement of change into its effects on the current developments in philosophy, and even on our current theories of art. Nor can I wait to discuss the influence on many systems of thought, of the conception that the full meaning of the individual is in the social process, and that it cannot therefore be reached through an introspective study alone of the individual's mind. For it is not so much the human mind which is constructing the social process. It is the social process which is constructing the human mind. I must make allowance for the possibility that I may be speaking ignorantly, and therefore altogether overrating the importance of the change as it appears to me. But these conceptions, as I see them, in their wider applications, seem to imply that we are reaching thereby one of the most pregnant positions in the development of Western thought since the days of Plato.

If I pursue to the end the more direct issues suggested by the line of thought I have here opened, I cannot, perhaps, avoid considering the more immediate practical applications. No one can follow in their relation to the modern socialist movement any of the larger questions of the day without perceiving how serious and far-reaching are the problems which are tending to be associated with this universal deepening of the social consciousness. There are, however, certain facts of the time which add greatly to the difficulties of many in seeking for guidance as to the direction in which new developments may be carrying us. The great authority justly acquired among us of the views hitherto held by exponents of individualism, and the fact that the movement itself has been closely associated with one of the greatest developments in Western history, namely, that which has emancipated the activities of the individual, suggest a great weight of responsibility in giving countenance to any proposal for departure from principles so closely identified with a long era of successful development in the past. These reasons receive additional force and cogency for many persons when they observe the proposals which are often made by leaders on the other side in various contemporary movements.

It is possible that we are yet far from fully anticipating how the principles of the past may in their deeper meaning, though not in their old form, be applicable to the future. It is not improbable that the gains of the past will be seen to be all necessary and preliminary to the next stage, and that continuity with the past will be clearly visible as that transition stage upon which we appear to be entering develops. Let me try to explain briefly what may possibly be before us.

Beneath all the extreme views of the time in many countries, there is a fact which must always be kept in mind. It is not the opinions of men, however earnest, which can give any type of society a permanent place in the world. We may hold any convictions about our Utopias, and we may even convince others as to the expediency of our views; but there is one condition alone upon which any institutions can ultimately prevail. They will have to win out in the stern stress of the world solely in respect of one quality—their efficiency. They must have the compelling merit of being efficient when compared with others.

Now regarding the current world as far as possible detached from prepossessions, we cannot mistake the fact that it is the organic principles and the organic views of society which are thus making headway. Although the prestige of the individualistic view of the world has been great in the past; although governments in many civilized countries seem to be continually protesting they will never consent to any radical interference with its principles; yet in the process of parliaments we seem to see most of them steadily consenting.

We are living, it must be remembered, in the days of organization. The nations who understand the meaning of what Spencer called the long sequences in the social process have the power of producing results never before possible. The instinct which has recently possessed the world of the value of nationality in this new light has been referred to. But it suggests a wider meaning than I have touched on. In the rivalry of nations and peoples it is often as in the rivalry between individual forms of life. When a new environment arises, natural selection often finds the most suitable basis for adaptation in forms which were peculiar to earlier types. It is often overlooked, for instance, in the case of the great success of modern Germany, how much she owes to the fact that, in the current age of organization and long sequences, the institutions of an earlier order of society, largely directed through the State, have survived more completely than in England, where our long era of successful individualism has weakened the ideas on which they rested. Her State railways, for instance, primarily intended for military organization, have lent themselves with extraordinary success to the requirements of modern industry. And so in a hundred other instances in that country.

The case of Japan is a still more striking example. A generation or two ago the peculiar methods of work in that country were counted as no more than an interesting survival from an early age of social institutions. Gangs of Japanese navvies, for instance, in working used their picks in unison and struck their blows to the sound of some rhythmic measure. But when in the present age organization in its deeper sense has become a ruling principle of the world; when we see Western arts, manufactures, science, and industry adopted by the Japanese people, and the results directed through the nation as a whole with similar organic unison of purpose to thoughtout ends in which there is a clear conception of the subordination of the present to the future, we have the surprising spectacle of an Eastern people in a decade or two emerging from the condition of mediaeval Europe and almost suddenly taking its place among the nations as one of the first powers of the world.

The present age, it has been said, is often spoken of as the age of the Americanization of the world, a phrase which implies the importance of a particular phase of our own development. There is, however, a deep and true sense in which the next age will probably be also the age of the Germanization of the world. For it is those lessons of which the first stages have been displayed in the history of modern Prussia which are likely to be worked out in their fuller applications by successful States in the future.

It is in this connexion that the larger meaning of our own history, including the meaning of our individualism in the past, will probably be visible. On the one hand it seems clear that we are moving towards organization in its larger applications, and are therefore reaching the time when the meaning of the interests of society in long sequences will be consistently applied to conceptions of national policy abroad and of social policy at home as they have never been applied before. But on the other hand there is a lesson upon which our history has placed an emphasis no less arresting. We profoundly distrust not only all despotisms, however benevolent, but all oligarchies and bureaucracies, however enlightened, if allowed to reach their ultimate tendencies. Nay, more we know, perhaps more thoroughly than any other people that it is the meaning of the world that we do well to distrust them. It has happened, therefore, that in our history we have displaced all systems of authority as working principles of the State.

Now it is one of the features of all healthy organisms that their vital processes are for the most part subconscious. It is perhaps for this reason that we do not always, even in our textbooks, rise to the level of consciousness of what it is that constitutes the most characteristic, as it certainly is the most vital, of the principles expressed in our own evolution as a people, namely, the principle by which we have replaced all systems of authority in the State. It consists in practice in this: We recognize instinctively that no institution can be trusted to develop its full meaning and to maintain its efficiency except in one condition—the condition of

continuous stress represented by the permanent competitive opposition of another institution in which is embodied a counter-principle. The constitutional struggle between the people and the sovereign in England gave us the parliamentary system with all its counterpoises. The conflict between centralization and decentralization has produced the colonial system of Great Britain and the federal constitution of the United States. And the stress of affairs has developed in English and American law and opinion a theory of the supreme importance of maintaining in all circumstances a free conflict of forces.

But over and above all other results this is the solution which, under the institution of party government, we have found for the problem of political democracy. Probably under no other condition could that problem—the supreme problem of the last two centuries—have been solved after we had displaced the theory of Divine right in the State. By the system of party government we have compelled each of the two permanent parties in the State—which have been in effect the occupying classes and the incoming classes—to organize its case to its fullest value on each side of a line of cleavage in a normal attitude of unchanging opposition. Although we are not yet in the position to fully appreciate the results, for we are still in the thick of the fight, they certainly mark one of the greatest achievements in history. For generations the case of the incoming party amongst us has been separated from its extravagances and absurdities: institutions have been modified gradually, and only as full proof has been shown; each party has retained the respect of the other without bitterness; and the occupying classes have come to accept the modifications which are taking place as part of the progressive order of the world.

It seems to me likely that it is this principle of efficiency which has enabled us thus to solve the transition of the modern world to political democracy—and modern popular government, as Maine said, is of purely English origin—that we are about to carry into the next and greater era of transition in which our problems will be economic rather than political. On the one side we see now a conviction strongly entrenched in all the institutions of our time of the superiority of private enterprise under voluntary co-operation as applied to all the affairs of the world. On the other side we see largely held an opposing conviction that the necessity is developing for greatly extended corporate action on the part of the State, and that the corporate consciousness, acting through the State, can alone carry through those long sequences of the public weal in which the present must be subordinate to the future. We have here two counter-principles which the meaning of our history will, it seems to me, drive us to embody in two normally antagonized policies in the future. Probably in no other way can either policy be trusted to develop its full meaning and its full efficiency in the future.

If it be indeed that the State, under the direction of a more organic social consciousness, can carry forms of co-operative activity to results in the public interest which are beyond the powers of voluntary competitive enterprise, then of one thing we may be certain—there is no principle at present visible in the world which will ultimately prevent the State in successful societies from

I trust I have in some small measure succeeded in the object with which I set out in this lecture. I have endeavoured to exhibit the leading feature of our times as a movement of the world under many forms towards a more organic conception of society. It is a fact becoming visible that the social organism is tending to be regarded as something wider than the political State. It is a fact in evidence that the life of our civilization is more organic than the life of any of the States or nations included in it. And it is a fact of the times also becoming clearer in social science that the fundamental principle of the life of that civilization is a common inheritance in the influence of those conceptions which have produced that progressive deepening of the social consciousness which I have described to you. But while all these things are so, it is probably equally true that never before did the organic principle of nationality count for more as one of the causes carrying us towards that higher stage when the social organism will be identical with civilization. Spencer contemplated voluntary co-operative enterprise as taking the place of the State. But he does not appear to have allowed for the fact that there is a sense in which the purified State may in future stand for the greatest of all voluntary cooperations. This ancient University has witnessed and taken large part in the events through which the main flood of the life of our civilization has come down in no small measure in the channels of our national history. It has seen a small nation expand into a world-wide empire whose constitution is so indefinite that it scarcely exists, but whose life is so incomprehensibly organic that it is able without any principle of compulsion, as we saw it able but yesterday, to summon its kin from the ends of the earth to fight in its cause. Nay, more, the history of this small nation has become the meaning of a larger system of life represented, as it will be within living experience, by two hundred millions, and within a century by four hundred millions, of people speaking one language and inheriting one law and one ethos. To understand these things is to feel the sense of the organic upon us, and to realize deeply what that sense of the organic may accomplish in the future. We are probably entering on a new era of development but we enter on it with an enormous impetus from history behind us.

I do not know, in conclusion, whether you will call me reactionary or revolutionary. If you would apply either adjective I would defend myself by quoting a conclusion reached by Spencer towards the end of one of his books.

The study of Sociology, xvi.

The study of social science, he said, properly followed, had one marked result—it was likely to render the inquirer radical to a degree beyond anything which current radicalism conceives'; but at the same time 'conservative to a degree beyond anything conceived by present conservatism'.

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The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics

By Karl Pearson, F.R.S.

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Prefatory Note

THIS lecture was originally delivered as the fourteenth Robert Boyle Lecture before the Oxford University Junior Science Club, on May 17, 1907. The first edition being out of print, the lecture is now reissued as No. I of a series of papers dealing in non-technical language with the problems of Eugenics.

The Galton Eugenics Laboratory has found the need of some introduction to the science of Eugenics, which shall place the purport of the investigations conducted there in a simple form before the general reader. This will be the aim of the present series of publications.

[An authorised translation of this lecture has appeared in Germany, and a wholly unauthorized reprint in America.]

On the Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics

IT needs more than a little boldness to suggest within the walls of one of our ancient universities that there is still another new science which calls for support and sympathy; nay, which in the near future will demand its endowments, its special laboratory, its technical library, its enthusiastic investigators and its proper share in the curriculum of academic studies.

The prestige of an ancient university does not wholly depend on the extent and novelty of the fields it cultivates, nor even on the external reputation of its doctors and masters. I remember my Savigny well enough to know that historically a university does not express the universality of the learning taught within its walls, but that the word emphasizes the corporate character of its masters and scholars. I also understand—with the experience of four universities behind me—not only the social, but the educational value of the traditional *universitas* of the Middle Ages; that common life of teacher and scholar which we now find preserved in broad outline, if in detail obscured, at two English universities alone.

As your guest to-day, even if I had the necessary knowledge, it would be ill-fitting to praise or to criticize modern Oxford. My intellectual debt to Oxford is too great to make me an unbiased judge; looking back on the stadia of intellectual growth from the days of the Oxford schoolmaster who taught me scientific method and a love of folklore in failing to teach me Greek grammar, the sign-posts are marked with Oxford names, whose moment to me must be a small part of what it formed to the mental life here. I note those: of Mark Pattison, from whom I learnt that the method of science is one with the method of true scholarship; of Henry Nettleship, whose width of view in academic matters aided those of us who were struggling against prerogative and prejudice in London; of York Powell, who taught me that a study of history is incomplete if it pass by the great biological factors which make for the rise and fall of nations; of Raphael Weldon, whose life culminated in Oxford, and whose activity will, I trust, continue to bear fruit there,—of Weldon who taught us that biology is ripe for receiving aid from the exact sciences; who, breaking down yet another barrier, emphasized the unity of logical method throughout the whole field of knowledge.

The calm, critical judgement of these men, their scorn, one and all, for the rhetorical, the superficial, the *idola* of the market-place, have built up my Gentile conception of Oxford and given me a not unwholesome fear of an Oxford audience. Their keen power of sympathy, however, their very intense, if much repressed national spirit—amounting to the truest form of patriotism—would, I believe and trust, have been not wholly withdrawn from me to-day in my endeavour to put before you the claims of this new science of mankind.

I do not demand your attention for this new field of inquiry because a university is expected to embrace all sciences. On the contrary, I do it partly because I think the success of a university, as of an individual, depends largely on specialization in study. Now there is one form of technical education, which, although Oxford is too

modest to give it a name, has yet been largely claimed for this University. I refer to the education of statesmen and administrators. There is need, I venture to hold, of a more conscious recognition of the existence of a school of statecraft, and that recognition must involve a fuller study of what can make and what can mar national life and racial character. We are told by a poet, who, understanding the spirit of his age, carefully balanced himself on the fence which separates the field of true insight from that of conterminous platitude, that 'the proper study of mankind is man'. But he has not helped us to see wherein this proper study of man consists. In all our universities there are branches of study which deal more or less directly with man. We have Philosophy with its discussions of man's mental processes, Ethics with the consideration of man's affections, passions, and conduct; Fichte, Hegel and other ethical philosophers have given us, here and there, luminous ideas, flash-lights on society and state. But has Philosophy, as such, taught us a single law by aid of which we can understand how a nation becomes physically or mentally more vigorous? Has it taught our statesmen to make their folk fitter for its task on the world-stage, or helped a race to meet a crisis in its history? We have had other branches of the science of man, measuring him, classifying him by his hair, by his skin, or by his skull. Yet Anthropometry and Craniometry, while piling up facts and figures, have done little to enable us to see wherein human fitness for its functions really consists. Their professors disagree, much as do those of another branch of the study of man—Political Economy. What weight have Philosophy, Anthropology, or Political Economy at present in the field of statesmanship? Would the man who, rising in the House of Commons to-day, appealed to the laws of economic science, be even sure of a hearing? And if we turn to the study of History, surely more potent than these other branches in the aid it provides for the administrator, is not its lesson rather that of example and analogy than of true explanation and measurement of the causes of national evolution?

If the German people dominate to-day the French; if Japan rise like a mushroom, yet with the stability and the strength of the oak; if Spain and Holland disappear from the fore-rank of nations, can we throw light even for an instant on these momentous facts of history by such studies of mankind as are summed up in Philosophy, Anthropology, or Political Economy? I fear not. As instruments of education, as means of illustrating logical method, or of developing powers of healthy inquisitiveness and effective expression, they may be of value, in part indeed of unrivalled value. But as they stand at present they do not, alone or combined, form a technical education in statecraft.

And here I would like to make a fundamental distinction between what I understand by a technical education and a professional instruction. I do not believe that the university ought to busy itself in the least with the latter. It is taught most effectively in the barrister's chambers, in the architect's office, in the engineering workshop, in the government department, or in the hospital ward. The tendency nowadays to replace apprenticeship by professional instruction in college or university is a fatal one. The academic purpose should be concentrated on the development of the mind as an instrument of thought. It may do this by aid of philosophy, or by aid of language, or by aid of science; but it cannot do it by any form of purely professional instruction. By technical education I mean something very different from an instruction in the facts, formulae, and usages of a profession. It consists, I hold, not in learning an art, but in developing the mind by studying that branch of science which must lie at the basis of each profession. The theory of Elasticity is as potent an instrument for mental discipline if we illustrate it on bridge-structure, as if we confined our attention to metal spels and snips of pianoforte wire in the physical laboratory. The science of Medicine—think for a moment even of such points as immunity, incubation, and crisis—affords material for reasoned observation and leads to a mental alertness, which may be equalled but cannot be excelled in any other branch of biological inquiry. The true test of all technical education lies in whether we can answer in the affirmative the question: Does it provide adequate mental training for the man who has no intention of professional pursuits? If we can, then, and then only, may we assert that it is a fit subject for academic study.

By a superficial knowledge of many things, we break all continuity in education; we may reach a 'topdressing', but the subsoil has never been turned and cultivated. From this standpoint, academic education will, I feel certain, grow more and more technical education; the man who has exercised his mind in thoroughly examining one small field of knowledge, who has seen its solved and unsolved problems, and who has tried his own powers in even some little bit of pioneer work, has received a training which will stand him in good stead, whatever he may afterwards turn his mind to in life. I can conceive a great university for the training of Mind, in which the whole teaching force should be devoted to the manufacture of problems, calculated to exercise and develop the youthful mind, without any regard to their bearing on real knowledge. Such was very nearly the system of the Cambridge Mathematical School of a generation ago. It produced splendid lawyers, subtle theologians, and a few ardent students of science. But the labour expended in the manufacture of problems, the sole purpose of which was to provide material for mental gymnastics, might have achieved European reputation for the manufacturers had it been devoted to the pressing problems of technical science. It is because every university has a duty in the creation of new knowledge, as well as a duty in education, that it seems desirable

that our mental training should take as its problems those which are actually demanding solution in practical life.

If we are to have a school of statecraft, I venture to suggest that a special technical education shall be developed for it. We must not be content with the mental gymnastics which can be provided by philosophy or political history. We must add that study of the biological factors which York Powell saw was so needful to historical investigation. We must approach with the detached mind and calm criticism of Mark Pattison those problems as to the rate of change of races, a knowledge of which Raphael Weldon has told us is 'the only legitimate basis for speculations as to their past history and future fate'.

If we attempt to define the scope of statecraft we enter no doubt the field of controversy, but may we not extend the condition which so fitly expresses the primary need of the individual—the healthy mind in healthy body—to the swarm of individuals with which the statesman has to deal? Taking the word 'sanity' in its broadest sense of health and soundness, the primary purpose of statecraft is to insure that the nation as a whole shall possess sanity; it must be sound in body and sound in mind. This is the bedrock on which alone a great nation can be built up; by aid of this sanity alone an empire once founded can be preserved. There are secondary important conditions—too often regarded as primary—which are undoubted parts of statecraft. The nation must have the instruments and the training needful to protect itself and its enterprises; it must hold the sources of raw material and the trade routes requisite to develop the wealth upon which its population depends; it must have the education necessary to make its craftsmen, its traders, its inventors, its men of science, its diplomatists, and its statesmen the equals at least of those of its rivals on the world-stage. Nay, perhaps as important as all these, it must have traditions and ideals so strong that the prejudices of individuals and the prerogatives of classes will fall before urgent national needs; it requires teachers, be they pressmen, poets, or politicians, who grasp the wants of the nation as a whole; who, independent of class and party, can remind the people at the fitting moment of their traditions, and their special function amid nations.

Yet if we come to analyse these secondary conditions, we shall find in each case that their realization depends on the fulfilment of our primary condition. Without high average soundness of body and soundness of mind, a nation can neither be built up nor an empire preserved. Permanence and dominance in the world passes to and from nations even with their rise and fall in mental and bodily fitness. No success will attend our attempts to understand past history, to cast light on present racial changes, or to predict future development, if we leave out of account the biological factors. Statistics as to the prevalence of disease in the army of a defeated nation may tell us more than any dissertation on the genius of the commanders and the cleverness of the statesmen of its victorious foe. Lost provinces and a generation of hectoring may follow to the conquered nation whose leaders have forgotten the primary essential of national soundness in body and mind.

Francis Galton, in establishing a laboratory for the study of National Eugenics in the University of London, has defined this new science as 'the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally'. The word *eugenic* here has the double sense of the English *wellbred* goodness of nature and goodness of nurture. Our science does not propose to confine its attention to problems of inheritance only, but to deal also with problems of environment and of nurture. It may be said that much social labour has already been spent on investigating the condition of the people; there have been Royal Commissions, Parliamentary and Departmental Committees, and much independent effort on the part of philanthropists, medical men, and social reformers. I would admit all this, and would try to appraise it at its true value. Some of it has provided useful material for eugenic study; much of it is the product of wholly irresponsible witnesses with comments by commissioners equally untrained in dealing with statistical problems. Witnesses, commissioners, philanthropists, social reformers, as a rule, and medical men only too frequently, sadly need that technical education, that power of reasoning about statistical data, which I think will become general when Eugenics has been made a subject of academic study, and minds specially trained to this branch of scientific inquiry are placed at the disposal of our statesmen. I do not, of course, say that there was no eugenic research before Francis Galton invented the word and named the new science. But I believe the day not distant when we shall recognize that he seized the psychological moment to assert its claim to academic consideration; and that in the time to come the nation will be more than grateful to the man who said that the university is the true field for the study of those agencies which may improve or impair our racial qualities. To become a true science, you must remove our study from the strife of parties, from the conflict of creeds, from false notions of charity, or the unbalanced impulses of sentiment. You must treat it with the observational caution and critical spirit that you give to other branches of biology. And when you have discovered its principles and deduced its laws, then, and then only, you can question how far they are consonant with current moral ideas or with prevailing human sentiment. I myself look forward to a future when a wholly new view as to patriotism will be accepted; when the individual will recognize more fully and more clearly the conflict between individual interests and national duties. I foresee a time when the welfare of the nation will form a more conspicuous factor in conduct; when conscious race-culture will cope with the ills which arise when we

suspend the full purifying force of natural selection; and when charity will not be haphazard—the request for it being either a social right, or the granting of it an anti-social wrong. But if we are to build up a strong nation, sound in mind and body, we shall have to work in the future with trained insight: I feel convinced that real enlightenment will only follow a scientific treatment of the biological factors in race development.

There is an element of danger in the study of Eugenics, which I would not have you overlook. If the attention be fixed on the factors which make for deterioration; if we spend our days over statistics of the insane, the mentally defective, the criminal, the tuberculous, the blind, the deaf, and the diseased, the inevitableness of it all is apt to reduce us to the lowest depths of depression. But this is only one side of the picture; the inevitableness is just as marked when we come to deal with health and strength, with ability and intelligence. If the iniquity of the fathers be visited upon the children to the third and fourth generation—assuredly so is their virtue. If this needs emphasis, study the two pedigrees I put before you. In Fig. I we have the pedigree of a family in which eccentricity, insanity, and phthisis have recurred generation by generation—associated occasionally with great ability. A general 'want of mental balance' is the peculiar mark of the stock. In Fig. II we have the pedigree of a family in which

Fig. I. Pedigree of Stock Passing Want of Mental Balance

Pedigree of Abel Family

extreme ability not correlated with such want of mental balance has descended through five generations.

Yet apart from this, to the true man of science, nothing is impure or repulsive. His mission is to study all phases of life; and in the case before us to determine their relation to national fitness and racial degeneracy. I cannot put it better than in the words of Francis Bacon:—

'But for unpolite or even sordid particulars which, as Pliny observes, require an apology for being mentioned, even these ought to be received into natural history, no less than the most rich and delicate; for, natural history is not defiled by them any more than the sun, by shining alike on the palace and the privy; and we do not endeavour to build a capitol or erect a pyramid to the glory of mankind, but to found a temple in imitation of the world, and consecrate it to the human understanding, so that we must frame our model accordingly; for whatever is worthy of existence is worthy of our knowledge; but ignoble things exist as well as the noble.'

Those who have not the courage, or it may be the strength to face life as it is, must avoid Science; or at least the portion of it termed National Eugenics. Those who fear to know humanity in its degradation, as well as in its nobler phases, will scarce reach the standpoint of knowledge from which they can effectively help the progress of our race. They will be ignorant of the essential factors which alone can determine whether a nation shall be sound in mind and body. Disease and Health, Vigour and Impotence, Intelligence and Stupidity, Sanity and Insanity, Conscientiousness and Irresponsibility, Clean Living and Licence,—all things which make for strength and weakness of character—must be studied, not by verbal argument, but be dissected under the statistical microscope, if we are to realize why nations rise and fall, if we are to know whether our own folk is progressing or regressing. Only by such examination can we understand the disease; only by such means can we suggest a valid cure where we find there is that in any community which is making for degeneracy. The study of Eugenics centres round the actuarial treatment of human society in all its phases, healthy and morbid.

In every branch of science there exist, I believe, three chief stages of development. These stages are not always completely differentiated, and forms of the earlier stages may usefully survive into the later periods.

The first stage is the *Ideological*. Men have formed ideas about phenomena on the basis of very limited experience. They spend their time and energy in discussing these ideas without much reference to the phenomena themselves. This discussion of ideas—this wrangling over definitions—is not idle. It not only led in mediaeval times to a philosophy which gave a by no means contemptible educational training; but in some of the most developed forms of science, as in the foundations of our most advanced pure mathematics, ideology can again do work of the greatest service. It corresponds to the pre-Baconian state of most sciences.

The second stage is the *Observational*. It is a reaction against the purely introspective attempt at a natural philosophy. It consists in observing phenomena critically, and recording and describing their sequences. It is a fundamental stage towards any really scientific theory of nature. It will always remain a large factor in scientific work. But while it needs the mind of special width and creative power to invent a reasonable theory,

and demonstrate it by the right type of observation, it is possible for the average man to observe carefully and to go on observing through a long lifetime. The result is the accumulation for decades and decades of observations made with little idea of testing a definite theory of organic or inorganic nature. These observations form a large proportion of scientific literature; and, I fear, are not always of service when the creative scientist desires to test his theories. The time spent in hunting up data, which may after all fail to give the special small detail requisite, would often have sufficed to produce more adequate observations made *ad hoc*. Hence I think there will be, if there be not already, a reaction against purely observational or descriptive science.

The third stage in all science is the *Metrical*. We proceed from observation to measurement, to accurate numerical expression of the sequences involved. It has been more than once asserted that by quantitative analysis you cannot obtain more than lies in the data from which you start. The statement is either merely platitude; or else, if more than idle, it is false. The object of analysis is *not* to obtain more from data than exists therein; but to find out what actually does exist therein; and that is usually far from obvious to untrained inspection. The actual positions of the moon can be observed and recorded day by day. Such are the data. Shall we assert that Lunar Theory as it exists to-day—the product of nearly two and a half centuries of work by some of the finest mathematical intellects—contains no more than the data from which they started? I think we may leave such an attitude to those who do not grasp that the highest aim of science is not the presentation of facts, but the regulating of a world of conceptions, by aid of which we can mentally describe those facts. From the data themselves we have to determine whether this 'statuting of mind' is legitimate within the limits of our observations. 'Analysis cannot get more out of the data than is already in them,' cries the biologist. On the contrary, having added to the data *mind* the combination provides a great deal that had no previous existence. Even Huxley could write: 'Mathematics may be compared to a mill of exquisite workmanship, which grinds your stuff to any degree of fineness, but nevertheless what you get out depends on what you put in; and as the grandest mill in the world will not extract wheat-flour from peascods, so pages of formulae will not get a definite result out of loose data.'

On the contrary, I assert that our modern mathematical methods reach a perfectly definite result when applied to such data; they measure the deviation, the differentiation of pease-meal from wheat-flour; that is to say, they determine quantitatively the exact degree of looseness in the data themselves. Is it fear of discovering the exact degree of looseness in their own data, which leads some votaries of descriptive science to belittle metrical investigations?

Nay, I do not hesitate to assert that any branch of science, until it reaches its third or metrical stage of development, is incomplete and fails to provide the highest mental training possible. There are few departments of scientific investigation which provide so thoroughly for discipline in all the three branches of science, the ideological, the observational, and the metrical, as biology; this is particularly true of its applications to man. What better training in ideology than a study of the theory of the state from Plato, through Aristotle and Hobbes till we reach, in Comte, the view that the science of society is impossible without biology? What fitter training in observation than the biologist provides, when he teaches us experimentally the facts of inheritance and the influences of environment? What more precise exercise for the mind than the actuarial appreciation of these biological factors 'as agencies which improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations'?

Here, I firmly believe, is in broad outline the scheme necessary to form a school of statecraft. The mind must be led through each of the ascending stages of science—till it is able to measure accurately and to describe in fitting words those fundamental biological factors on which the progression and the debasement of human societies alike depend.

But you may ask me if I am not painting a science of the future; if I am not merely repeating the vague words of the old sociologists, from Comte to Herbert Spencer? Where is the material, what are the methods, how definite are the deductions of this new science of Eugenics?

First then: where is the material?

I reply that every large school and university in this country can provide physical and psychical material for the student of Eugenics if he will set to work and observe. Every medical officer in asylum and hospital is in charge of a great Eugenics Laboratory if he would only realize it. And many indeed are realizing it. Quite recently between 300 and 400 pedigrees of tuberculous stock; 400 family histories of insanity; 400 descriptions of parentage and home environment of mentally defective children, with as many of normal children from one district, and upwards of 1,000 from a second district, have reached the Eugenics Laboratory in London. If this seem to lay all stress on the abnormal and defective side, I may add that the Laboratory possesses records of nearly 400 noteworthy families—a part of which have been published—and that I have completed now a series of nearly 300 normal family histories, many of them containing 50 to 100 individuals, with psychical and physical descriptions and entries as to ailments and causes of death. These are but, of course, the beginnings of a collection which one hopes and trusts will one day represent large samples of the physique, the mentality, the fertility, and the disease of wide classes of the nation. The success of this sort of Eugenics Laboratory collection

depends upon spreading widely three convictions: (i) that really useful results have flown, and will flow, from contributing to it; (ii) that individuals, if appealed to frankly, will frankly tell the truth that lies within their knowledge; and (iii) that the individual becomes a non-identifiable statistical unit before the record passes into the hands of the computer.

The Eugenics Laboratory will gladly forward schedules (i) for general family history or (ii) for special family abnormalities to any one interested in Eugenic inquiry and willing to aid.

Beyond the special collections of an individual laboratory there is already available a fair amount of published material. The United States have issued special censuses of the blind and of deaf-mutes. The Edinburgh Charity Organization Society has issued an excellent memoir on the home environment and the physique of 700 to 800 school children; above all, there are the Registrar-General's Annual Reports, the Censuses, the Reports of Fever Hospitals, of Lunacy Commissioners, and of the Medical Officers of Asylums. Of some, but less value, are the Reports of Government Commissions and the works of energetic, but statistically untrained, philanthropists like Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree. Important special researches, like that of Mr. Tocher on the insane of Scotland, or that now being carried out by Dr. Goring on the convicts in His Majesty's Prisons, serve to increase the total data already available or nearly so. While all Eugenics workers crave for more material, and for better quality of material, yet there already exists ample material upon which to base the beginnings for our science.

If we turn from material to method, we note that except in as far as results for animals have application to man, we cannot experiment on individuals, and our methods must therefore be those applicable to mass observations—that is to say, those actuarial methods applied to biological data which we now term the methods of biometry. It is not needful for me to enlarge now or here on these methods. Suffice it to say that they appear to measure effectively the relationship between factors which are not causally linked together. For the explanation of what follows I would state that the arithmetical value of a certain quantity—the so-called coefficient of correlation—is chiefly used to measure this relationship. Starting when the quantities are absolutely independent with zero value, it rises with their complete causal relationship to unity. Table I shows the sort of values taken by this coefficient for various kinds of association, when the variates lack the absolute dependence of pure causation.

From method I turn finally to illustrate the nature of the conclusions which have already been reached by Eugenic inquiry. As a preliminary, I must picture for you what I think evolution means in the case of human societies.

There was a time when, thinking over the marvellous intellectual, artistic, and physical development of ancient Greece, I could wonder how still more ample it might have been had there existed a master spirit or an imperious motive to weld those statelets into one great nation and check the rarely ceasing internal wars and personal feuds. Looking back—from what some of you may consider a less ethical, but I believe a more scientific standpoint—I now see a direct association between the achievements of Greece and the intensity of its intertribal struggles. The *pax romana* did not provide the Greek spirit with an atmosphere as bracing to either bodily or spiritual development, as the instability and storm which accompanied the earlier conditions,

The struggle of man against man, with its victory to the tougher and more crafty: the struggle of tribe against tribe, with its defeat for the less socially organized: the contest of nation with nation whether in trade or in war, with the mastery for the foreseeing nation, for the nation with the cleaner bill of health, the more united purpose of its classes, and the sounder intellectual equipment of its units: are not these only phases of the struggle for existence, the factors which have made for human progress, which have developed man from brute into sentient being? We have been told that 'the cosmic process is opposed to the ethical'! But from the standpoint of science, is not the ethical the outcome of the cosmic? Are not the physique, the intellectuality, the morality of man, the product of that grim warfare between individual and individual, between society and society, and between humanity and nature, of which we even yet see no end? The ethical as the product of the cosmic process will indeed aid us when we pass outside the field of science. But standing well within the boundaries of that field, are men to cry like little children because the world is not 'as it ought

Nach ewigen ehren
Grossen Gesetzen
Müssen wir alle
Unseres Daseyns
Kreise vollenden.

Nay, what has been rather man's method in mastering the physical universe? Has he not studied those brazen eternal laws, and guided the course of his being by that knowledge? Realize that the most valuable part

of that knowledge is scarcely two hundred years old. And when we turn to biology—to the biological factors which control man's life and its relations to that of other organisms—are we not yet at the very dawn of discovery,—a dawn whose actual storm-drifts foretell the coming flood of light?

Plato, in the Fifth Book of the *Laws* describes what he terms a purification or purgation of the state. Permit me for my weakness, not yours, to cite it from Jowett's translation:—

The shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses, or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and without effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill-nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he neglect to purge them away. Now, the case of other animals is not so important:—they are only worth mentioning for the sake of illustration, but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make inquiries, and indicate what is proper for each in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but he who, without a despotism, sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete the work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment or inflicting death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury to the whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows: when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the prosperous—these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able, and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once.'

Now may we not claim Plato as a precursor of the modern Eugenics movement? He grasped the intensity of inheritance, for he appeals to the herd and the flock; he realized the danger to the state of a growing band of degenerates, and he called upon the legislator to purify the state. Plato's purgation, if you will accept the view I have endeavoured to lay before you to-day, has in fact hitherto been carried out by natural selection, by the struggle of man against man, of man against nature, and of state against state. This very cosmical process has so developed our ethical feelings, that we find it difficult to regard the process as benign. A hundred years ago we still hung the greater proportion of our criminals or sent them for life across the seas, not even euphemistically terming it a 'colony'. We shut up our insane, making no attempt at cure; the modern system of hospitals and institutions and charities was scarcely developed; the physically and mentally weak had small chance of surviving and bearing offspring. There was a constant stern selection purifying in Plato's sense the state. The growth of human sympathy—and is not this one of the chief factors of national fitness?—has been so rapid during the century that it has cried Halt! to almost every form of racial purification. Is not this the real opposition which Huxley noticed between the ethical and cosmic processes? One factor—absolutely needful for race survival—sympathy, has been developed in such an exaggerated form that we are in danger, by suspending selection, of lessening the effect of those other factors which automatically purge the state of the degenerates in body and mind.

Do I therefore call for less human sympathy, for more limited charity, and for sterner treatment of the weak? Not for a moment; we cannot go backwards a single step in the evolution of human feeling! But I demand that all sympathy and charity shall be organized and guided into paths where they will promote racial efficiency, and not lead us straight towards national shipwreck. The time is coming when we must consciously carry out that purification of the state and race which has hitherto been the work of the unconscious cosmic process. The higher patriotism and the pride of race must come to our aid in stemming deterioration; the science of Eugenics has not only to furnish Plato's legislator with the facts upon which he can take action, but it has to educate public opinion until without a despotism he may attempt even the mildest purgation. To produce a nation healthy alike in mind and body must become a fixed idea—one of almost religious intensity, as Francis Galton has expressed it—in the minds of the intellectual oligarchy, which after all sways the masses and their political leaders.

Let me put before you a little more in detail the biological aspects of national growth. The Darwinian hypothesis asserts that the sounder individual has more chance of surviving in the contest with physical and organic environment. It is therefore better able to produce and rear offspring, which in their turn inherit its advantageous characters. Profitable variations are thus seized on by natural selection, and perpetuated by heredity.

Now if we are to apply these biological ideas to the case of man, we must have evidence (i) that man varies, (ii) that these variations, favourable or unfavourable, are inherited, and (iii) that they are selected.

Is it needful now to show that man varies? We not only know he varies, but the extent of variation in both man and woman has been measured by the Biometric School in nearly two hundred cases. The variability within any single local race of man amounts from 4 or 5 to 15 or 20 per cent. of the absolute value of the character.

Secondly, are these variations inherited? Of this there is not the slightest doubt. They are not mere somatic fluctuations, but correspond to real geminal differences. The problem of inheritance is closely associated with that of the resemblance of members of the same stock, due caution being paid to the possibilities of environmental influence. Now we may separate the characters in which we are at present interested into three: (*a*) the Physical, (*b*) the Pathological, and (*c*) the Psychical.

Table II gives us the resemblance between parent and offspring for a number of physical characters in man. Please note that the coefficient recorded is zero if there be no relationship and unity, if parent and offspring show an invariable relationship in the character under discussion. We see that the resemblance in the case of man lies between .4 and .5. It is about half-way up the correlation scale. Again the lower part of Table II gives us corresponding measures of resemblance between brethren for like characters, we notice that the resemblance lies between .5 and .6.

For both parental and fraternal inheritance in man we find for physical characters much the same values as we find in the cases of cattle, horses, and dogs. This is illustrated in Table III.

Turning now to diseased or pathological cases, we have at present only three types that have been dealt with. These are Mr. Edgar Schuster's results for the inheritance of deaf-mutism, Mr. Heron's results for the inheritance of the insane diathesis, and my own work on pulmonary tuberculosis. It is worth noting that these results are all first-fruits of Mr. Galton's foundation of a Eugenics Laboratory.

Now it must be admitted at once that these diseased states are far harder to deal with than simple quantitative characters. Their treatment involves more assumptions, and the data are less trustworthy. But from what

I show in this table I think we may safely draw two conclusions: (*a*) the tendency to diseases of mind and body is inherited, (*b*) this inheritance may be slightly greater, it is hardly likely to be less, than the inheritance of quantitatively measurable physical characters.

Fig. III Comparison of Resemblance for Physical and Physical Characters

I now turn to the inheritance of the psychical characters. Here again we tread on more difficult ground. On first investigating the problem myself I worked with school children, and for the following reasons. The teacher compares the individual with his general experience of many children; he thus approaches much more nearly an absolute standard than if we ask for an isolated return as to a single family from this or that relatively inexperienced recorder. Secondly, it is not often that we can find any data of the psychical characters of father and son taken at about the same period in life. If you will look at Tables V and VI and Fig. III you will see that I have not been able to discover any difference in intensity of inheritance between the psychical and physical characters in children.

The tables reproduced here are drawn from my Huxley Lecture or other biometric memoirs.

Mr. Schuster has been able to get over my difficulty at least for one character,

Mothers and No of Children

Fathers and No of Children

that of ability in father and son as judged by the Oxford Class Lists. In a recent memoir published by the Galton Eugenics Laboratory he obtains the results given in Table VII. If we allow for an academic selection of intelligence, we reach values singularly close to those obtained for the physical characters. I have added some results of my own, not hitherto published, taken from my Family Record Schedules. To sum up, there appears no doubt that good and bad physique, the liability to and the immunity from disease, the moral characters and the mental temperament, are inherited in man and with much the same intensity.

As a next stage, I point out—if it be needful to do so—that Figures IV and V show that those who live

longest, and may be presumed to be the healthiest, leave most offspring.

The data are from the records of the Society of Friends, and show with little doubt an *unrestricted* birth-rate.

One link still remains unproven—Are these variations subject to selection? Is the death-rate in man a function of his constitution? Or does man fall in his youth or prime or dotage by the purely random bolt of Death? The possibility of solving this last problem occurred to me when studying the inheritance of longevity. If longevity depended only on the physical constitution, we might expect it to be inherited at the same rate as other physical characters. I found it to be inherited always at a *lesser* rate. The difference could only be accounted for by the partly random character of Death's aim. This was the key to measuring the proportion of the selective and non-selective death-rates in man. Table VIII gives you the results. With these results it appears to me that Darwinism is clearly and definitely established for Man.

It is not so many years ago since a distinguished statesman, speaking within the walls of this University, asserted that 'No man has ever seen natural selection at work'. At that time all the criticism possible seemed, 'Every man who has lived through a hard winter, every man who has examined a mortality table, every man who has studied the history of nations, has *probably* seen natural selection at work.' And thirteen years later I should add: The time has now come for statesmen to inquire whether natural selection is doing its work efficiently; that it applies to man no longer admits of question. Can it possibly be that agencies under the control of the legislator are suspending that Platonic purification of the state which in olden time natural selection worked almost automatically?

Thus between 55 and 75 per cent. of deaths in the case of Man are selective.

This is the next point concerning which Eugenics may have something to tell us. In order that natural selection should be suspended, it is not sufficient to reduce the selective death-rate; it is necessary that the relative fertility of the unfit should be higher than that of the fit. If the unfit variations leave to any state their heritage of unfitness, what can save that state from degeneracy, what hinder a catastrophe when that state has to prove its only title to seizin in deed of the earth?

All childless marriages are excluded except in the last two cases. Inclusion of such marriages usually reduces the average by $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 child.

In Table IX I have placed the fertility of deaf-mute, tuberculous, criminal, and insane stocks, and below them the fertility of more normal classes in the community. It is at once obvious that degenerate stocks under present social conditions are not short-lived, they live to have more than the normal size of family. Natural selection is largely suspended, but not the inheritance of degeneracy nor the fertility of the unfit. On the contrary, there is more than a suspicion of the suspension of the fertility of the fit. If further evidence be needful, look at the results in Table X for the correlation between all that makes for unfitness and the number of children per married woman under fifty-five. Mr. Heron has indeed shown us that the survival of the unfit is a marked characteristic of modern town life. Every condition which makes for bad nurture as well as bad nature seems to emphasize the birth-rate.

These last results show that the infantile mortality of the fertile classes does not compensate for their predominant fertility.

As we have found conscientiousness is inherited, so I have little doubt that the criminal tendency descends in stocks. To-day we feed our criminals up, and we feed up the insane, we let both out of the prison or the asylum 'reformed' or 'cured' as the case may be, only after a few months to return to state-supervision, leaving behind them the germs of a new generation of deteriorants. The average number of crimes due to the convicts in His Majesty's Prisons to-day is ten apiece. We cannot reform the criminal, nor cure the insane from the standpoint of heredity, the taint varies not with their moral or mental conduct. These are products of the somatic cells, the disease lies deeper in their germinal constitution. Education for the criminal, fresh air for the tuberculous, rest and food for the neurotic—these are excellent, they may bring control, sound lungs, and sanity to the individual; but they will not save the offspring from the need of like treatment, nor from the danger of collapse when the time of strain comes. They cannot make a nation sound in mind and body, they merely screen degeneracy behind a throng of arrested degenerates. Our highly developed human sympathy will no longer allow us to watch the state purify itself by aid of crude natural selection. We see pain and suffering only to relieve it, without inquiry as to the moral character of the sufferer or as to his national or racial value. And this is right—no man is responsible for his own being; and nature and nurture, over which he had no control, have made him the being he is, good or evil. But here science steps in, crying, 'Let the reprieve be accepted, but next remind the social conscience of its duty to the race. No nation can preserve its efficiency unless dominant fertility be associated with the mentally and physically fitter stocks. The reprieve is granted, but let there be no heritage if you would build up and preserve a virile and efficient people.'

Here, I hold, we reach the kernel of the truth which the science of Eugenics has at present revealed. The biological factors are dominant in the evolution of mankind; these, and these alone, can throw light on the rise

and fall of nations, on racial progress and national degeneracy. In highly civilized states, the growth of the communal feeling—upon which indeed these states depend for their very existence—has not kept step with our knowledge of the laws which govern race development. Consciously or unconsciously we have suspended the racial purgation maintained in less developed communities by natural selection. We return our criminals after penance, our insane and tuberculous after 'recovery', to their old lives; we leave the mentally defective as flotsam on the flood tide of primordial passions. We disregard on every side these two great principles: (*a*) the inheritance of variations, and (*b*) the correlation in heredity of unlike imperfections.

We are at present only reaching light on what is a very important principle, namely, that stocks exist which show a general tendency to defect, taking one form in the parent, another in the offspring. Neuroses in the parents become alcoholism or insanity in the offspring; mental defect may be correlated with tuberculosis, albinism with imbecility; and one type of visual defect in the father be found associated with a second in the son. We cannot at present give this fact scientific expression, but it would appear that there is something akin to germinal degeneracy which may show itself in different defects of the same organ or in defects of different organs. The solution, perhaps, lies in a tendency to general defect to the gamete. Even now, I doubt whether it is absolutely unscientific to speak of a general inheritance of degeneracy.

The statesman as usual is inert, waiting for the growth of popular opinion. Doctors, we are told, do not believe in heredity. If that be so, they have small idea of the most plentiful harvest yet reaped by modern science. The philanthropist looks to hygiene, to education, to general environment, for the preservation of the race. It is the easy path, but it cannot achieve the desired result. These things are needful tools to the efficient, and passable crutches to the halt; but at least on one point Mendelian and Biometrician are in agreement—there is no hope of racial purification in any environment which does not mean selection of the germ.

If I speak strongly, it is because I feel strongly; and the strength of my feeling does not depend on the few facts I have brought before you to-day. It would be possible to paint a lurid picture—and label it RaceSuicide. That is feasible to any one who has seen, even from afar, the nine circles of that dread region which stretches from slum to reformatory, from casual ward and stew to prison, from hospital and sanatorium to asylum and special school; that infernal lake which sends its unregarded rivulets to befoul more fertile social tracts. But the scope of Eugenics is not to stir the social conscience by an exaggerated picture of racial dangers. Those dangers are not wholly recent, if they are increasing in intensity; they are not peculiar to England, as a brief acquaintance with French and German conditions will suffice to show. Nay, even in the New World men are awaking to the peril which high civilizations risk from their treatment of degenerates. What we leave to private effort, the establishment of a Eugenics Laboratory, they propose in the United States to do by a Government Office. The American proposal to establish a laboratory in the Department of the Interior for the study of the abnormal classes and the collection of sociological and pathological data, has only one, but that a grave defect. No Eugenics Laboratory which confines its attention to the study of the abnormal can fulfil its functions. The positive side is as important as the negative side, and the application of the laws of inheritance to the betterment of the good is as vital as, and far more likely to inspire us with hope of achievement than concentrating our investigations on the excision of the bad.

If we realize the antinomy which Eugenics brings to our notice between high civilization and racial purgation, we ask: How can the dominant fertility of the fitter social stocks be maintained when natural selection has been suspended? I do not think any wise man would be prepared with a full answer to this question to-day. There is no sovereign remedy for degeneracy. Every method is curative which tends to decrease the fertility of the unfit and to emphasize that of the fit. We may find it difficult to define the socially fit, although physique and ability will carry us far; but when we turn to the habitual criminal, the professional tramp, the tuberculous, the insane, the mentally defective, the alcoholic, the diseased from birth or from excess, there can be little doubt of their social unfitness. Here every remedy which tends to separate them from the community, every segregation which reduces their chances of parentage, is worthy of consideration. Strange as it may seem, we are not much beyond the cure suggested by Plato—what is 'euphemistically termed a colony', for the degenerates of each sex. The duty of the man of science is to find out the law, and if possible waken the conscience of his countrymen to its existence. It is the function of the statesman to discover the feasible social remedy which is not at variance with that law.

But, thus far, I have touched on only one side of the problem, the reduction in bad stock. Is not something more to be insisted upon with regard to the increase of good stock? Have we not treated the birth of children as something that concerned the individual and not the state? May not a source of racial greatness lie in a national spirit, like that of Japan, which demands the healthy able child from fitting parents, and looks with sinister eye on those who provide the state with the halt and diseased? I may have overlooked the point, but I have not noticed that this first principle of duty to the race, of national morality, has been fully insisted upon by our ethical writers. I have often heard false pride of ancestry condemned, but I have not seen the true pride of ancestry explained and commended. Surely the man who is conscious that he comes of a stock sound in body,

able in mind, tested in achievement, and who knows that, mating with like stock and maintaining himself in health, he will hand down that heritage to his children—surely such a man may have a legitimate pride in ancestry, and is worthy of honourable mention in eugenic records? It seems to me that those who have the welfare of the nation and our racial fitness for the world-struggle at heart, must recognize that this is the ideal which the racial conscience demands of its saner members.

A clean body, a sound if slow mind, a vigorous and healthy stock, a numerous progeny, these factors were largely representative of the typical Englishman of the past; and we see to-day that one and all these characteristics can be defended on scientific grounds; they are the essentials of an imperial race.

As we have found an antinomy between high civilization and race purification by natural selection, so there appears to be a corresponding antagonism between individual comfort and race welfare. It is again the tendency of higher civilization to suspend the more drastic phases of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fitter. The man of education, or made position, says 'the chances of my children are better if I have but few of them', and we reach the startling condition of America, where the classes of ability—the classes which take as their standard an academic education—are not reproducing themselves, their average number of offspring being less than two; we reach the state of affairs which Mr. Sydney Webb tells us is demonstrable in another intellectual circle in this country, an almost childless population with no inheritance of its ability. And against this we have to set the maximum fertility which is reached by the degenerate stocks! Individual welfare and race welfare, are they really as opposed as they appear? Is it true insight to consider that the fewer children the better is their prospect in life? I cannot think that the time has come when the family is no longer an effective social unit. Is the family of two really in a stronger condition to face the world? Is there not mutual help and strength in kinship, and as age comes on must the old and feeble be left to the care of strangers? Eugenically Mr. Powys, in his fine memoir on fertility and duration of life in New South Wales,

Biometrika vol. iv, pp. 233-92.

has shown that in Australia the longest-lived women are neither the mothers of small nor of inordinately large families. They are the mothers of five to six children. Eugenically we have shown that the two or three first-born members of a family are more

Fig. VI

liable to insanity (Heron), tuberculosis (Pearson), criminality (Goring), and mental defect.

It seems to me that here science has a word to say with regard to reform of an hereditary peagee.

Fig. VI will illustrate this. The excess of pathological cases among the earlier born is very significant. Economically is it not true that if six degenerates are born to two, and not six, sound men and women, those two will have to do triple work to provide—in prison, asylum, institution, and hospital—for this mass of the incompetent? I am not sure that a strong case could not be made out against the small family even on the basis of individual welfare! But I would rather appeal on this point to race instinct and to the social conscience. The progress of the race inevitably demands a dominant fertility in the fitter stocks. If that principle be not recognized as axiomatic by the mentally and bodily fit themselves, if the statesman does not accept it as a guide in social legislation, then the race will degenerate, until, sinking into barbarism, it may rise again through the toilsome stages of purification by crude natural selection. I am not pessimistic in this attitude. I know that the English people has been aroused to self-consciousness more than once in its history, and I believe that now it can be brought to realize that safety lies in a conscious race-culture. If race feeling can be appealed to by men trained to see the bearing of great biological laws on human growth, then we shall not create a mere passing wave of national emotion conveniently satisfied by the appointment, dead before the report, of a Royal Commission. The time seems upon us when the biological sciences shall begin to do for man what the physical have done for more than a century; when they shall aid him in completing his mastery of his organic development, as the physical sciences have largely taught him to control his inorganic environment. To bring this about we need above all two factors. First: a knowledge of inheritance, variation, selection, and fertility in man, and the relation of these results to racial efficiency. To this special branch of biology, Francis Galton has given the name of the science of National Eugenics, and in founding the Francis Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics in the University of London he has been the pioneer in asserting that even from the academic standpoint, 'the proper study of mankind is man.' Eighty years ago there were no physical laboratories in the universities of this country, sixty years ago there were no physiological laboratories, thirty years ago there were no engineering laboratories. To-day there is only one laboratory for National Eugenics. I believe that every university twenty years hence will offer its students training in the science that makes for race-efficiency and in the knowledge which alone can make a reality of statecraft. The Eugenics Laboratory then will require no apology, it will be too well recognized a part of university equipment. The second factor which seems to me

needful is an altered tone with regard to those phases of our sexual life upon which the health and welfare of the nation as a whole so largely depend. In this matter I think we can learn from the spirit of our youngest allies, the Japanese, and from the practice of our oldest allies, the Jews. With both, race-preservation and race-betterment have assumed the form of a religious cult. And one aim of my lecture to-day is that I may appeal to the younger members of my audience, on whom responsibility for forming opinion will shortly fall, to weigh these things well, for they touch closely our national safety. On the one hand I do not raise an alarmist picture of our coming decadence, nor on the other hand would I leave you without insisting that there is grave occasion for earnest thought. I would raise interest in a new and, I believe, potent branch of science; I would call for a strengthening of racial conscience, and a scientific basis for conduct, as our growing civilization stems natural selection as the purifier of the state. Thus it is that Eugenics passes from Science into Practice, from knowledge to a creed of action. This cannot be expressed better than by Francis Galton's concluding words in his *Eugenics as a Factor of Religion*.

'Eugenic belief extends the function of philanthropy to future generations, it renders its actions more pervading than hitherto, by dealing with families and societies in their entirety, and it enforces the importance of the marriage covenant by directing serious attention to the probable quality of the future offspring. It sternly forbids all forms of sentimental charity that are harmful to the race, while it eagerly seeks opportunity for acts of personal kindness, as some equivalent to the loss of what it forbids. It brings the tie of kinship into prominence and strongly encourages love and interest in family and race. In brief, Eugenics is a virile creed, full of hopefulness, and appealing to many of the noblest feelings of our nature.'

Oxford: Horace Hart

Printer To The University

The Question of the Philippines

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE GRADUATE CLUB OF LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY ON FEBRUARY 14, 1899

BY DAVID STARR JORDAN

President of the University

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Prefatory Note:

This address was read before the Graduate Club of Leland Stanford Junior University on February 14, 1899. It was afterwards, by request, repeated before the Congregation of Temple Emanu-El in San Francisco, and before the Berkeley Club of Oakland. It is published for the Graduate Club by the courtesy of Mr. John J. Valentine.

David Starr Jordan.

POLO ALTO, CALIFORNIA. March 15, 1899.

The Question of the Philippines.

I wish to maintain a single proposition. We should withdraw from the Philippine Islands as soon as in dignity we can. It is bad statesmanship to make these alien people our partners; it is a crime to make them our slaves. If we hold their lands there is no middle course. Only a moral question brings a crisis to man or nation. In the presence of a crisis, only righteousness is right and only justice is safe.

I ask you to consider with me three questions of the hour. Why do we want the Philippines? What can we do with them? What will they do to us?

These questions demand serious consideration, not one at a time but all together. We should know clearly our final intentions as a nation, for it is never easy to retrace false steps. We have made too many of these already. It is time for us to grow serious. Even the most headlong of our people admit that we stand in the presence of a real crisis, while, so far as we can see, there is no hand at the helm. But the problem is virtually solved when we know what our true interests are. Half the energy we have spent in getting into trouble will take us honorably out of it. Once convinced that we do not want the Philippines it will be easy to abandon them with honor. If we are to take them we cannot get at it too soon. The difficulty is that we do not yet know what we want, and we are afraid that if we once let these people go we shall never catch them again. With our longings after Imperialism we have not had the nerve to act.

Let us glance for a moment at the actual condition of affairs. By the fortunes of war the capital of the

Philippine Islands fell, last May, into the hands of our navy. The city of Manila we have held, and by dint of bulldog diplomacy our final treaty of peace has assigned to us the four hundred or fourteen hundred islands of the whole archipelago. To these we have as yet no real title. We can get none till the actual owners have been consulted. We have a legal title of course, but no moral title and no actual possession. We have only purchased Spain's quit claim deed to property she could not hold, and which she cannot transfer. For the right to finish the conquest of the Philippines and to close out the insurrection which has gone on for almost a century we have agreed, on our part, to pay \$20,000,000 in cash, for the people of the Islands and the land on which they were born, and which, in their fashion, they have cultivated. This is a sum absurdly large, if we consider only the use we are likely to make of the region and the probable cost of its reconquest and rule. It seems criminally small if we consider the possible returns to us or to Spain from peddling out the Islands as old junk in the open market, or from leasing them to commercial companies competent to exploit them to their utmost. The price is high when we remember that the United States for a century has felt absolutely no need for such property and would not have taken any of it, or all of it, or any other like property as a gift. The price is high, too, when we observe that the failure of Spain placed the Islands not in our hands but in the hands of their own people, a third party, whose interest we, like Spain, have as yet failed to consider. Emilio Aguinaldo, the liberator of the Filipinos, the "Washington of the Orient," is the *de facto* ruler of most of the territory. In our hands is the city of Manila, alone, and we cannot extend our power except by bribery or by force. We may pervert these fragile patriots as Spain claims to have done; or, like Spain, we may redden the swamps of

"Who are these Americans?" Aguinaldo

According to Capt. Gadsby, U.S.V.

is reported to ask, "these people who talk so much of freedom and justice and the rights of man, who crowd into our Islands and who stand as the Spaniards did between us and our liberties?"

What right have we indeed? The right of purchase from Spain. We held Spain by the throat and she could not choose but sell.

"Ambrose Bierce has given an account of this transaction cast in the lines of historical drama, and quite as true, to fact as the best of such records. It runs as follows:

"McKinley—Have the goodness, sir, to remove your hand from the Philippine Islands.

"Sagasta—But, Señor, you have no right to these Islands, and they are worth much money to me.

"McK.—Very well. I mean to give you twenty million dollars for them."

'Sag—Twenty million dollars! God o' my soul! And they are worth a billion!

"McK.—My friend, it is an axiom of political economy that property is worth what it will bring; the Islands will bring you exactly twenty millions.

"Sag—From you?

"McK.—From me. There are no other bidders.

"Sag.—But it is not an open market. If you would stand aside—

"McK.—I am not considering hypothetical cases to-day; we must look at the situation as it is. The Islands are going to bring you twenty million dollars; that, therefore, is their value, and that is what I offer you.

"Sag.—Madre de Dios!—what logic! Señor, you should have the chair of Dialectics in our great university of—

"McK.—It is not impossible; our demands are not all submitted.

"Sag—Nor—Pardon me, Señor—submitted to.

"McK.—I trust in God for that. This war is, on our side, for Liberty, Humanity, Progress, Religion—

"Sag.—Porto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. He who is in God's pay does not starve. Will your Excellency permit me to indulge in a little logic?—not as good as that of your Excellency, but such as we can pick up in illiterate Spain.

"McK.—Well.

"Sag.—Either you have a right to the Philippines, or you have not. If you have, why do you pay for them? If you have not, why do you take them?

And in such fashion the war for humanity comes to a business-like end.

If, at the close of our Revolutionary War, the King of France, coming in at the eleventh hour and driving the English from our Capital, had bought a quit claim deed to the colonies, proposing to retain them in the interest of French commerce, he would have held exactly the position in which our administration has placed the United States.

In that case George Washington would have insisted, as Aguinaldo has done, that only the people who own it have any sovereignty to sell. He would have held his people's land against all comers, not the least against his late allies. He might even have led a hope as foolish and forlorn as that which inspired the late pitiful attack upon our forces at Manila, if, indeed, there was such an attack, for there is not the slightest evidence that hostilities were begun by Aguinaldo.

The blood shed at Manila will rest heavy on those the people hold responsible for it. There is not the slightest doubt where this responsibility rests. A little courtesy, a little tact, on the part of those in power would have spared us from it all. These men have not led a forlorn fight against Spain for all these years to be tamely snubbed and shoved aside as dogs or rebels at the end. If the President had assured Aguinaldo that his people would not be absorbed against their will, there would have been peace at Manila. If he had assured the people of the United States that no vassal lands would be annexed against their will, there would be peace at Washington. The President has no right to assume in speech or in act that the United States proposes to prove false to her own pledges or false to her own history. Unlike the fighting editor, he is sworn to uphold the Constitution.

If we may trust the record, Aguinaldo became our ally in good faith on the belief that we were working with him for the freedom of his people. In good faith our consuls made him promises we have never repudiated, but which, after six months of silence by the casting vote of our Vice-President, we refuse to make good. These promises were in line with our pledges to Cuba. The consuls, like Aguinaldo, supposed that we meant what we said. When we pledged ourselves to give up the prisoners he had taken we acknowledged him as our ally; and our threats to arrest him, for holding his prisoners as shown in the published correspondence of General E. S. Otis, brought on the present wanton bloodshed. In any case, we should have lost nothing through courteous treatment, and our dignity as a nation would not have suffered even though a civil hearing had been given to his envoy, Agoncillo. It may be that Agoncillo is a coward as our funny papers picture him, but that should not make him lonesome in

We know nothing of Philippine matters, save through cablegrams passed through government censorship, and from the letters and speech of men of the army and navy. The letters and cablegrams do not always tell the same story. It is certain, however, that General Otis has been promoted for gallantry at the slaughter of the fifth of February and in the subsequent skirmishes which have left 20,000 natives homeless. This is right if he acted under orders, for a soldier must obey. If he acted on his own motion, he should have been cashiered. He should neither have provoked nor permitted a conflict if any leniency or diplomacy could have prevented it. Even taking the most selfish view possible as to our plans, their success must depend on our retention of the respect and good will of the subject people.

If the Filipinos are our subjects, they have the right to be heard before condemnation. If they are our allies, they have the right to be heard before repudiation. Their rights are older than ours. It was their struggle for freedom before most of our people had even heard of their existence. We may treat these matters as we will, but, in the light of history, we shall appear with the tyrant and the coward, and our act be the fit conclusion of the "century of dishonor." "The wreck of broken promises," says General Miles, referring to our Indian treaties, "is strewn across the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific." We have broken the record now for we have expanded it to the Orient. "Why is it," a friend once asked General Crooks, "that you have such influence with the Indians?" "Because I always keep my word" was the reply.

To be sure Aguinaldo may not be much of a Washington, a Washington of the hen-roost type, perhaps, as the brigand patriots of Spanish colonies have been in the past. As to this we have not much right to speak. We have never heard his side of the case, and we have listened only to Spanish testimony. It is worthy of note that our returned officers from Manila, who are men competent to judge, speak of him in terms of the highest respect. His government, which we try to destroy, is the most capable, enlightened, and just these Islands have ever known. These germs of civic liberty constitute the most precious product of the Philippines. But whatever his character or motives, he has one great advantage which Washington possessed—he is in the right. By that fact he is changed from an adventurer, a soldier of fortune, into a hero, an instrument of destiny. If Aguinaldo betrays his people by selling out to us, the heroism of the people remains. When men die for independence there is somewhere a hero. Self-sacrifice for an idea means some fitness for self-government.

Whatever we may choose to do Aguinaldo is a factor, and our sovereignty over his islands must be gained through peaceful concession if it is gained at all. We could crush Aguinaldo easily enough, but we dare not. "Instans tyrannus!" However feeble he may be while we run our fires around "his creep-hole" he has only to "clutch at God's skirts," as in Browning's poem, and it is we who are afraid. This great, strong, lusty nation is too brave to do a cowardly deed. In spite of the orgies of our newspapers, we are still bothered by a national conscience. We do not like to fight in foreign lands against women with cropped hair defending their own homes; against naked savages with bows and arrows, nor in battles likened to a Colorado rabbit drive.

The Filipinos are not rebels against law and order but against alien control. As a Republic under our protection or without it, they stood apparently ready to give us any guarantee we might ask as to order and security.

We may easily destroy the organized army of the Filipinos, but that does not bring peace. In the cliffs and jungles they will defy us for a century as they have defied Spain. According to Dewey, the Filipinos are "fighters from away back." These four words from Dewey mean more than forty would from an ordinary

warrior. In Sumatra it has cost the Dutch upwards of 300,000 men to subdue Acheen, and its Malay chieftains are still defiant. Three hundred thousand men, of whom two-thirds rotted in the swamps, never seeing a foe or a battle. We shall abandon the struggle in very shame. Four thousand Filipinos fell on the glorious fifth of February. At the rate of 4000 a day, as Mr. Reed calculates, the race will last seven years. A deficit of \$160,000,000 a year will appeal to our people, if the glory and the bloodshed do not. I see in the papers to-day (March 1) that the honorable Secretary has just saved a million of dollars, reducing this deficit in corresponding degree. This he has taken from the return allowance of those volunteers at Manila who will not re-enlist. Such economies touch the hearts of the people. The people will not foot the bills. They are ashamed of shame, and their eyes once opened they cannot be coaxed nor

Let us consider the first of our propositions. Why do we want the Philippines? To this I can give no answer of my own. I can see not one valid reason why we should want them, nor any why they should want us except as strong and friendly advisers. As vassals of the United States they have no future before them; as citizens they have no hope. But even if we could by kind paternalism make their lives happier or more effective, I am sure that we will not. Our philanthropy is less than skin deep. The syndicates waiting to exploit the Islands, and incidentally to rob their own stockholders, are not interested in the moral uplifting of negroes and dagoes. On the other hand I am sure that their possession can in no wise help us, not even financially or commercially.

The movement for colonial extension rests on two things: Persistent forgetfulness of the principles of democratic government on the one hand; hopeless ignorance of the nature of the tropics and its people on the other.

But while I give no reason of my own, I have listened carefully to the speech of others, and the voices I have heard are legion. Their opinions I shall try in a way to classify, with a word of comment on each. And, first, I place those which claim some sort of moral validity, though I acknowledge no basis for such claim. For the only morality a nation can know is justice. To be fair as between man and man, to look after mutual interests and to do those necessary things out of the reach of the individual is the legitimate function of a nation. It cannot be generous, because it has no rights of its own of which it can make sacrifice. Moral obligations belong to its people as individuals. Legal obligations, financial obligations, the pledges of treaties, only these can bind nation to nation. A nation cannot be virtuous, for that is a matter of individual conduct. It must be just. So far as it fails to be this, it is simply corrupt.

It is said that if we do not annex the Philippines we shall prove false to our obligations. Obviously there are two primary pledges which must precede all others; first, the obligation of our whole history that we shall never conquer and annex an unwilling people; second, our pledge at the beginning of the war, that the United States has no disposition to seize territory or to dictate its government.

These were noble words and a noble nation must live up to them: "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Islands, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the Island to its people." The plea that they were intended for Cuba only and do not pledge us to like action elsewhere is too cowardly to permit of discussion.

Several questions arise at once. What are those obligations? To whom are they held? By what responsibility have they been incurred?

To the first question we may get this answer. We are under obligations to see that the Philippines are no longer subject to Spanish tyranny and misrule. In the words of General Miles, "Twelve millions of people that a year ago were suffering under oppression, tyranny, and cruelty are to-day under our protection. It would be the crime of the nineteenth century to turn them back again." Very well, then, we shall not turn them back, nor could we do it if we would. Spain is helpless and harmless. She has ceased to be a factor in the world's affairs. What next? Let us quote further from General Miles: "If you cannot give them government in their own country, if you cannot establish government for them, you can, at least, protect them until such time as they shall be prepared for self-government. And if they do not care to come and be part of this country you can see to it that they have a liberal and free government such as you enjoy yourselves."

This is, perhaps, an average statement of our supposed obligations. If we had adopted this view we should have had no war at Manila and our honor would be untarnished. Some would put it more strongly. Our obligations demand that we take the Islands by force, lest they fall back into the hands of Spain, or, still worse, lest they become victims of the cruel schemes of the German Emperor, ever anxious to try his hand on matters of which he knows nothing. For the House of Hohenzollern, as well as ourselves, is afflicted with a "manifest destiny."

But this German bugaboo is set up merely as an excuse. No nation on earth would dare set the heel of oppression on any land our flag has made free. The idea that every little nation must be subject to some great one is one of the most contemptible products of military commercialism. No nation, little or big, is "derelict" that minds its own business, maintains law and order, and respects the development of its own people. If we

behave honorably towards the people we have freed, we shall set a fashion which the powers will never dare to violate.

We can be under no obligations under our Constitution and theory of government, to do what cannot be done, what will not be done, or ought not to be done.

Still others put the case in this way: "We have destroyed the only stable government in the Philippines. It is our duty to establish another." But if this is really the case we have done very wrong. We were told that the rule of Spain was not stable, that it was not just, and that it was far worse than no rule at all. Our sympathies were with those who would destroy this government of Spain, and our armies went out with our sympathies. Either we were on the wrong side in the whole business, or else we should now respect the rights of the people we set forth to help. If, by ill chance, we have overturned the only stable government, we must help the people to make another. "A government of the people, for the people, and by the people," would be a good kind to help them to establish; one made in their own interest not in ours, even though we think them a sorry sort of folk. We shall not talk in the same breath of our duty to humanity and of the demands of American commerce, not even though both speeches be canting falsehoods. As a matter of fact, of all the people of the tropics the inhabitants of Luzon have shown most promise of fairly wise self-rule. All competent judges speak in the highest terms of the Cabinet and Parliament at Malolos and of their wisdom and self-restraint. At the same time under whatever rule, these people will

To better define these obligations let us find out to whom they were incurred. Nobody in particular lays claim to them. Surely we are not bound to Spain, for she feels outraged and humiliated by the whole transaction. The Filipinos ask for nothing more of us. Doubtless their rulers would return our twenty millions and give us half a dozen coaling stations if that would hasten our departure. It is their firm resolve, so their spokesmen in Hong Kong have declared, that they will not consent "to be experimented upon by amateur colonial administrators." Even our "benevolent assimilation" is intolerable on the terms which we demand.

It was for freedom, not for law and order, that the Filipinos and the Cubans took up arms against Spain. Good order we are trying to bring to the Filipinos, but that does not satisfy. The grave is quiet but it is not freedom. Perhaps it is wrong for these people to care for freedom, but we once set them the example, as we have to many poor people, to strive for a liberty they have never yet won.

More likely we owe obligations to the city of Manila. Her business men look with doubt on Aguinaldo and his Cabinet, with golden bands and whistles and peacock quills to indicate their rank and titles. Doubtless they fear the native rabble and the native methods of collection of customs. But, again, we have as to this only prejudiced testimony. According to Lieutenant Calkins, an honored officer in Dewey's fleet, the life and property of foreigners has been as safe in Malolos as in San Francisco. Moreover, these peddlers from all the world have no claims on us. They have long fished in troubled waters and they have learned the art. The pound of flesh they have exacted from the Filipino in times of peace serves as the insurance against all losses in war. It was not to accommodate a few petty tradesmen, for the most part Chinese, a few English, and a dozen German and Japanese, that we entered into this war. If we owe them protection, they owe something to us. The shelter of the American flag is the birthright of Americans. Maybe it is to Germany and France that we owe obligations. To keep their rulers from falling out over the rich spoils of the Philippines, we are under bonds to take them all ourselves. But these nations are not in the slightest danger of fighting each other or fighting us over the Philippines. The Philippines would be as safe as an independent republic, with our good will, as they would be in another planet. The huge bloodless commercial trusts are afraid of a nation with a conscience. Maybe we are under bonds to England alone. Her advice is "take it," "take it," and those of her politicians hitherto most prone to snub and humiliate us are now most loud in their encouragements. No doubt these clever schemers want to see us entangled in the troubles of the Orient. No doubt England is sincere in thinking that a few years' experience in the hardest of schools will teach us something to our advantage as well as to hers. In our compactness lies a strength which alarms even England. It means our future financial and commercial supremacy. It is England's way to play nation against nation so that the strong ones will keep the peace, while the weaker ones are helpless in her hands.

The essential spirit of British diplomacy is to recognize neither morality nor justice in relation to an opponent. This has been explained and defended by Chamberlain as a matter of course in questions of party rivalry or imperial dominion. The only wrong is failure to carry one's point. This feature of British diplomacy has been exemplified a hundred times. The career of Cecil Rhodes, the struggle with Parnell, the Paris Tribunal of Arbitration in 1893, are all cases in point. This gives the clue to British diplomatic success, and it explains also the cordial hatred the world over for "Anglo-Saxon" methods. From beginning to end of British colonial dealings with lower races there has never appeared the word nor the thought of justice. Law and trade constitute her sole interest in tropical humanity, and law for trade. The thought of human equality, in any sense of the term, is foreign to British polity. To emphasize and perpetuate inequality lies at the basis of British polity.

To give up the idea of "equality of all men before the law" would be to abandon our sole excuse for being

as a nation. We would then become a mere geographical expression or police arrangement, and might logically as well join Canada as a dependency of Great Britain. The hope that we may do so is the source of much English "good-will."

If we feel edgewise toward Germany

Doubtless German industrial jealousy is acute and well-grounded and the loss of many good soldiers each year by emigration displeases German militarism. But these matters have gone on for years and have no relation with the war with Spain.

or if Germany is unfriendly toward us, we have England to thank for it. That is her diplomacy. She means nothing wrong by it. She is our friend, and in politics no water is thicker than her blood. We shall cease twisting the British Lion's tail when we have parts equally vulnerable. We shall not thwart England when we are dependent upon her good will. But all this constitutes no obligation. We did not go into the war on England's account, nor must we settle it to suit her. It is our first duty to follow our own best interests.

I yield to no one in admiration for the British people or the British character. The best thoughts of the world spring from British brains, and British hands have wrought earth's noblest deeds. But British inequality is not the source of lofty thought or brave deed. We may emulate England in all matters of political administration save the very one in which she now urges on us, her cynical advice. It was in protest against British inequality that the United States became a nation. British politics have changed their form, but the basal principles remain, and inequality and injustice are no more lovely now than in the days of '76.

A London journal now pictures America as a rosy-cheeked, unsophisticated youth who has left parental boundaries and now "goes out to see the world." We may accept this "lightly proffered laurel," but we may note that the youth is gaining this experience under the convoy of the toughest old pirate of the whole water front.

Moreover, England welcomes our intrusion in the Orient because she finds in us a necessary ally. We become a partner in her games. More than this our new relations must break down our Protective Tariff, which is most offensive to her, as, perhaps, it should be to us. The possession of Asiatic colonies makes nonsense of our Monroe Doctrine. To realize this fact will teach us needed caution. We shall not go at diplomacy in our shirt sleeves any more as though it were a game of poker on a Mississippi flat-boat. Besides to follow in England's footsteps is the sincerest form of flattery. It gives her methods the sanction of our respectability. It takes from the opposition party in Parliament one of its strongest weapons. But this, again, is no national obligation. If any obligation whatever exists, it is to the Filipinos. It is met by insuring their freedom from Spain. For the rest, their fate is their own.

A higher class of English public men advise us to hold the Philippines because they do not understand the purpose or basis of our government. Our machinery of rule is so constructed that it will not work with unwilling people, nor with people lacking in the Saxon instinct for co-operation. England has no scruples and no ideals. Her only purpose, in the tropics, is to hold the doors open to trade. In this business she has the lead and all gains of all trade swell her wealth. In her capital is the clearing house of all the world. There all prices are fixed and all bills are settled. What is good business for her might be impossible for us who are not, as a nation in business.

Admitting, however, an obligation to do something to somebody, by whom was such obligation incurred? To whom have we given authority to bind us to change the whole current of our history? Who is the mighty agent who brings about such things? The Constitution prescribes methods in which our people may incur obligations by concurrent action of Congress and the President. Have we empowered a commodore or even a rear-admiral to change our national purposes? Did the victory at Manila bind our people to anything? To say that it did is simple nonsense. This was an incident of war, not a decision of peace. Did the action of the President in sending eighteen thousand soldiers to Manila oblige us to keep them there, even if the Constitution of the United States had to be changed to give this act justification? If so, where did the President get his authority? This, too, was an incident of war. Moreover, the President is not our ruler but our servant. The people of the United States are subject to no obligations save those they impose on themselves. Neither the President nor the Cabinet have the slightest right to incur national obligations. None have been incurred.

But it may be that efforts have been made to bind the people to "expansion" in advance of their own decision. The victory at Manila was so unexpected, so heroic, so decisive, that it fired the imagination of our nation. It set the world to talking of us, and it inspired our politicians with dreams of empire. Such dreams are far from the waking thoughts of our people, though while the spell was on us we made some movement toward turning them into action. These steps taken in folly our nation must retrace. It is not pleasant to go backward. For this reason those responsible for our mistakes insist that we are sworn to go ahead whatever the consequences. Political futures are involved in the success of these schemes. And so every effort has been used to rush us forward in the direction of conquest. Our volunteer soldiery is held as an army of invasion to rot in the marshes when summer comes, as brave men once rotted in Libby and Andersonville. Each step in the series has been planned so as to make the next seem inevitable. To stop to reconsider our steps is made to appear as

backing down. The American people will not back down and on this fact the whole movement depends. This movement was not a conspiracy, because every step was proclaimed from the housetops and shouted back from the newspapers and the mobs around the railway stations. No wonder the fighting editor claims to dictate our national policy. The current of "manifest destiny" is invoked as the cover for the movement of Imperialism. At each step, too, the powers that be assure us that they are not responsible for the invisible forces of Divine Providence have taken matters from their hands.

In the one breath we are told that it is the will of God that we should annex the Philippines and make civilized American Christians of their medley population. In another, we must crush out the usurper, Aguinaldo, drive his rebel followers to the swamps and fastnesses and build up institutions with the coward remnant that survive.

All this is in the line of least resistance. Along this line Spain ruled and plundered her colonies. In such fashion her colonies impoverished and corrupted Spain. Because she had no moral force to prevent it, cruelty and corruption became her manifest destiny. It will be ours if we follow her methods. Toward such a manifest destiny, "the tumult and the shouting" of to-day are hurrying us along. The destiny which is manifest is never a noble one. The strong currents of history run deep, and the fates never speak through the daily newspapers. "Hard are the steps, rough-hewn in flintiest rock, States climb to power by." Providence acts only through men with strong brain and pure heart. The hand of Providence is never at the helm when no hand of man is there. Nations like men must learn to say No, when Yes is fatal. To have the courage to stop throwing good money after bad is the way nations keep out of bank-ruptcy. To back out now, we are told, would expose us to the ridicule of all the nations. But to go on will do the same. It is we who have made ourselves ridiculous. We have already roused the real distress of all genuine friends in Europe, because we have given the lie to our own history and to our own professions. That a wise, strong, peaceful nation should rise and fight for the freedom of the oppressed, rescuing them with one strong blow, touches the imagination of the world. The admiration fades into disgust in view of the vulgar scramble for territory and commercial advantage, and the inability of those responsible to guide the course of events in any safe direction.

I know that words of this sort are not welcome. The funny papers have their jokes about Senator Hoar and Cassandra, a person who once took a dark view of things in very gloomy times. But there are occasions when optimism is treason. Only an accomplice is cheerful in presence of a crime. The crisis once past we may rejoice in the future of democracy. It is a hopeful sign to-day that the people have never consented, nor have those directing affairs dared trust the plain issue of annexation either to the people or to Congress. Their schemes must pass through indirection, or not at all.

We need a cheerful and successful brigand like Cecil Rhodes to pat us on the back and stiffen our failing nerves. He is not afraid. Why should we flinch from the little misdeeds we have in contemplation?

Alfred Russell Wallace, in the London *Chronicle* expresses the "disappointment and sorrow which I feel in common, I am sure, with a large body of English and Americans, at the course now being pursued by the government of the United States toward the people of Cuba and the Philippine Islands.

"The Americans claim the right of sovereignty obtained by the treaty and have apparently determined to occupy and administer the whole group of Islands against the will and consent of the people. They claim all the revenues of the country and all the public means of transport, and they have decided to take all this by military force if the natives do not at once submit. Yet they say that they come 'not as invaders and conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, their employments and their personal and civil rights,' and for the purpose of giving them 'a liberal form of government through representatives of their own race.' But these people who have been justly struggling for freedom are still spoken of as 'insurgents' or 'rebels,' and they are expected to submit quietly to an altogether new and unknown foreign rule which, whatever may be the benevolent intentions of the President, can hardly fail to be a more or less oppressive despotism.

"It may be asked what can the Americans do? They cannot allow Spain to come back again, and they are responsible for the future of the inhabitants. But surely it is possible to revert to their first expressed intention of taking a small island only as a naval and coaling station and to declare themselves the protectors of the Islands against foreign aggression.

"Having done this they might invite the civilized portion of the natives to form an independent government, offering them advice and assistance if they wish for it, but otherwise leaving them completely free. If we express our disappointment (as Englishmen) that our American kinsfolk are apparently following our example, it is because, in the matter of the rights of every people to govern themselves, we had looked up to them as about to show us the better way by respecting the aspirations towards freedom, even of less advanced races, and by acting in accordance with their own noble traditions and republican principles."

Do we say that these obligations were entailed by chance, and that we cannot help ourselves? I hear many saying, "If only Dewey had sailed out of Manila Harbor, all would have been well." This seems to me the acme of weakness. Dewey did his duty at Manila; he has done his duty ever since. Let us do ours. If his duty makes it

harder for us, so much the more we must strive. It is pure cowardice to throw the responsibility on him. Who are we to "plead the baby act?" If Dewey captured land we do not want to hold, then let go of it. It is for us to say, not for him. It is foolish to say that our victory last May settled once for all our future as a world power. It is not thus that I read our history. Chance decides nothing. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Emancipation of the Slaves, were not matters of chance. They belong to the category of statesmanship. A statesman knows no chance. It is his business to foresee it and to control it. Chance is the terror of despotism. A chance shot along the frontier of Alsace, a chance brawl in Hungary, a chance word in Poland, a chance imbecile in the seat of power, may throw all Europe into war. In a general war the nations of Europe, their dynasties, and their thrones, will burn like stubble in a prairie fire. Our foundation is less combustible. Our Constitution is something more than a New Year's resolution to be broken at the first chance temptation. The Republic is, indeed, in the gravest peril if chance and passion are to be factors in her destiny.

One of the ablest of British public men, one known to all of us as a staunch friend of the United States through the Civil War when our allies in the present British Ministry could not conceal their hatred and contempt, writes in a private letter these words to me:

"I could not say this in my public writings," he says, and so I do not give his name, "but it seems to me that expansionism has in it a large element of sheer vulgarity, in the shape of a parvenu desire for admission into the imperialist and military camp of the old world,"

This is the whole story. Our quasi-alliance with Aguinaldo obliges us to see that he and his followers do not rot in Spanish prisons. Here or about here our obligation ends, though our interest in freedom might go further. "Sheer vulgarity" does the rest. The desire to hold a new toy, to enjoy a new renown, to feel a new experience, or the baser desire to gain money by it, is at the bottom of our talk about the new destiny of the American republic and the new obligations which this destiny entails.

We have set our national heart on the acquisition of the Philippines to give Old Glory a chance in a distant sea, to do something unheard of in our past history. We look on every side for justification of this act and the varied excuses we can invent we call our obligations. We have saved Manila from being looted by the barbarians. This may be true, though we have not the slightest evidence that it was ever in such danger. But we have made it a veritable hell on earth. Its saloons, gaming halls and dives of vice have to-day few parallels in all the iniquitous world.

But we have incurred, some say, the obligation to civilize and christianize the Filipinos, and to do this we must annex them, that our missionaries may be safe in their work. "The free can conquer but to save." This is the new maxim for the ensign of the Republic, replacing the "consent of the governed," and "government by the people," and the worn out phrases of our periwigged fathers.

But to christianize our neighbors is no part of the business of our government. It is said by Dr. Worcester, our best authority on the Filipinos, that "as a rule the grade of their morality rises with the square of the distance from churches and other civilizing influences." This means that the churches are not keeping up with our saloons and gaming houses. If they are not we cannot help them. Missionary work of Americans as against Mohammedanism, Catholicism, or even heathenism our government cannot aid. It is our boast, and a righteous one, that all religion is equally respected by our State. It has been the strength of our foreign missionaries that they never asked the support of armies. "The force of arms," said Martin Luther, "must be kept far from matters of the Gospel." The courage of devoted men and women and the power of the Word, such is the only force they demand. When the flag and the police are sent in advance of the Bible, missionaries fall to the level of ordinary politicians. It is the lesson of all history that the religious forms of aspirations of any people should be respected by its government. From Java, the most prosperous of Oriental vassal nations, all missionaries are rigidly excluded. They are disturbers of industry.

It is the lesson of England's experience that all forms of government should be equally respected. In no case has she changed the form however much she may have altered the administration. Success in the control of the tropical races no nation has yet achieved, for no one has yet solved the problem of securing industry without force, of making money without some form of slavery. But those nations which have come nearest solution have most respected the religions and prejudices and governmental forms of the native people. Individual men may struggle as they will against heathenism. A government must recognize religions as they are.

It is said again that the whole matter does not deserve half the words given it. We destroyed the government, such as it was, in Cuba and Manila; we must stay until we have repaired the mischief. When we have set things going again it will be time to decide what to do. The answer to this is that it is not true. We are not repairing the damages anywhere, but are laying our plans for permanent military occupation, which is Imperialism. Those responsible for these affairs have kept annexation steadily in view. It is safe to say that there is no intention to withdraw even from Cuba, or to permit any form of self-government there, until American influences shall dominate.

It is not because the governed have some intangible right to consent that we object to this, but because the

machinery of democracy, which is acquiescence in action, will not work without their co-operation.

But we must take the Philippines, some say, because no other honorable course lies before us. Some civilized nation must own them; Spain is out of the question; so are the other nations of Europe, while Aguinaldo and the Filipinos themselves, "big children that must be treated like little ones," are unworthy of trust and incapable of good government.

But, again, what guarantee is there that we shall give good government? When did it become our duty to see that anarchy and corruption are expelled from semi-barbarous regions? When did we learn how to do it? We have had six months in which to think about it. Who has ever suggested a plan? For thirty years we have misgoverned Alaska

Last week, according to the Springfield *Republican* Senator Carter asked unanimous consent for the consideration of a code of laws for Alaska. "Various senators objected. Gallinger and Bate thought a night session for such a purpose a very bad precedent. Mr. Tillman thought the time should be devoted to the anti-scalping bill and Mr. Chandler was anxious to discuss a ticket brokerage bill." There being no senator from Alaska to enter into trade or combination there is no hope for legislation to bring order into the territory.

In a recent address Governor Roosevelt is reported as saying:

"Have you read in the papers that an Alaskan town (Wrangel) wants to be transferred to Canada? It wants to get out from under our flag merely because no one has thought it worth while to give Alaska good government. If we govern the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico and Hawaii as we have governed Alaska, we shall have the same results."

Mr. Brady, the excellent Governor of Alaska, says:

"There are sixty men in charge of the government of the territory. They have no interests in Alaska except to grab what they can and get away. They are like a lot of hungry codfish. Seven of these officials, eleven per cent of the entire government, are now under indictment for malfeasance in office."

with open eyes and even now scarcely a visible sign of repentance. We are not sworn to good government even in our own cities. We give them self-government and that is all. The people everywhere make their own standards. The standard of Arizona is different from that of Massachusetts, and South Carolina has another still. There is no good government in America except as the people demand it. We want good government on no other terms.

China, Corea, Siam, Turkey, Tartary, Arabia and the peoples of Asia generally, "half devil and half child," are none of them under good government. The rulers of Central America, of Venezuela, Bolivia, and, worst of all, the unspeakable Hayti are no more efficient or more virtuous than the Filipinos. As men we may care for these things and work for their improvement. As a nation they are none of our business so long as their badness of government does not harm our national interests. We have no nearer concern in the government of the Philippines, nor can we give their people a government any better than they know how to demand. We might do so possibly, but we shall not. We are not in "knight-errantry for our health," and we are in no mood for trying fancy experiments. Those among us who might lead child races to higher civilization are not likely to be called on for advice.

Others say with swelling breasts that the finger of Providence points the way for us, and we cannot choose but obey. The God of battles has punished Spain for her centuries of cruelty, corruption, and neglect, and we are but as the instrument in His hand.

There is a story of a man and his boys who got their breakfast at a tavern where food was scarce and bills were high. As they left the place they complained loudly of the bad treatment they had received. At last one of the boys spoke up: "The Lord has punished that man. I have my pocket full of his spoons."

"The terrible prophecy of Las Casas," says an eloquent orator, "has come true for Spain. The countless treasures of gold from her American bondsmen have been sunk forever, her empire richer than Rome's has been inherited by freemen, her proud armada has been scattered, her arms have been overwhelmed, her glory has departed. If ever retributive justice overtook an evil-doer it has overtaken and crushed this arrogant power. An army of the dead, larger by far than the whole Spanish nation, stormed the judgment seat of God demanding justice—stern, retributive justice. God heard and answered. This republic is now striking the last blow for liberty in America, an instrument of justice in the hands of an omnipotent power. In the interest of civilization, of imperative humanity, we now go forth to the rescue of the last victim, strong in the consciousness of the purity of our purpose, and the justice of our cause."

Again let us say, "The Lord has punished this nation. We have our pockets full of her spoons."

Doubtless Spain was very corrupt and very weak and very wicked, but that is not for us to judge while we have our pockets full of her

The plain fact is this: the guiding hand of Providence, in such connection as this, is mere figure of speech, intended for our own justification. Doubtless Providence plays its part in the affairs of men, but not in such fashion as this. Providence is our expression for the ultimate inevitable righteousness which rules in human

history. It "hath put down the mighty from their seats and hath exalted them of low degree; "but its voice is not the" sound of popular clamor." "Fame's trumpet" does not set forth its decrees and it is not interested in increasing volume of trade.

The war with Spain was in no sense holy, unless we make it so through its results. Our victories indicate no accession of divine favor. We succeeded because we were bigger, richer, and far more capable than our enemy. Our navy was manned with trained engineers, while that of Spain was not. Our gross wealth made sure the final success of our army in spite of incompetence and favoritism which has risen to the proportions of a national shame. When we have cast aside all hopes of booty we shall be fit to sit in judgment on the sins of Spain. Till then, to say that we alone are led by Divine Providence is wanton blasphemy. Four very different impulses carried us into the war; the feeling of humanity, the love of adventure, the desire for revenge, and the hope of political capital. Strength and wealth and our prestige led us to success. The decision of history to the righteousness of the war will be determined by the motive that finally triumphs.

Again, some say we went to war in the interests of humanity, civilization, and righteousness. In this end we have poured out blood and treasure. It is only fair that we should be paid for our losses. Let us fill our pockets with the spoons. It ceases to be a war for humanity when we have forced a humbled enemy, condemned without a hearing, to foot all the bills.

But we would plant the institutions of freedom in the midst of the Orient. Freedom cannot be confined. Expansion is her manifest destiny. "We are like the younger sons of England who, finding their own country inadequate, have gone forth to fill the unoccupied places of the East, and now the time comes when our children are beginning to face the conditions that hedged around our fathers and made us turn our faces towards the West. The United States on this continent have been pretty well surveyed, explored, conquered, and policed. Shall we not see to it that our children shall have as good a forward outlook as we have? We have proved our capacity to expand. We have proved our capacity to compete with any man. It were worse than folly, yea, criminal, to attempt to set back the onward march of manifest destiny."

So runs the current of yellow patriotism. But if the Anglo-Saxon has a destiny incompatible with morality and which cannot be carried out in peace, if it is bound by no pledges and must ride roughshod over the rights and wills of weaker people the sooner he is exterminated the better for the world. In like strain we are reminded that the arguments against expansion to-day were used to oppose the Louisiana purchase in Jefferson's time and the less glorious acquisition of the provinces of conquered Mexico. If expansion to Nebraska, Kansas, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Dakota, and California was good national policy, why not still further to the Philippines? But the difference between the one case and the others are many and self-evident. The Louisiana territory and the territory of California were adjacent to our States. They were in the temperate zone with climate in every way favorable to the Anglo-Saxon race and to the personal activity on which free institutions depend. They were virtually uninhabited districts, being peopled chiefly by nomad barbarians who made no use of the land, and whose rights the Anglo-Saxon has never cared to consider. The first governments were established by the free men who entered them. Finally the growth of railroads and the telegraph brought this vast region almost from the first into the closest touch with the East and with the rest of the world. If it were not for the development of transportation, unforeseen by the fathers, the arguments they used against expansionism would have remained valid even as against the Louisiana purchase.

It is said that "Jefferson was a rank expansionist." But there is no record that he favored expansion for bigness' sake, the seizure or purchase of all sorts of land and all sorts of inhabitants regardless of conditions, regardless of rights, and regardless of the interests of

The Philippines are not contiguous to any land of freedom. They lie in the heart of that region which Ambrose Bierce calls "the horrid zone; Nature's asylum for degenerates." They are already densely populated—more densely than even the oldest of the United States. Their population cannot be exterminated on the one hand, nor made economically potent on the other, except through slavery. Finally the conditions of life are such as to forbid Anglo-Saxon colonization. Among hundreds of colonial experiments in Brazil, in India, in Africa, in China, there is not to-day such a thing as a self-supporting European colony in the tropics. White men live through officialism alone. There are military posts, so placed as to appropriate the land and enslave the people, but there is not one self-dependent, self-respecting European or American settlement.

Individual exceptions and special cases to the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon or any other civilized race degenerates in the tropics mentally, morally, physically. This statement has been lately denied in some quarters. As opposed to it has been urged the fact that "Thackeray and Kipling, the most virile of British men of letters, were born in India, and many other distinguished men have first seen the light in tropical Africa or Polynesia. Several Stanford athletes are natives of Hawaii, and Cuba has furnished her full share of the men of science of the blood of Spain. But this argument indicates a confusion of ideas. Degeneration may be any one of three different kinds; race decline, personal degeneration, and social decay.

The essential of race degeneration is the continuous lowering of the mental or physical powers of each

successive generation. Such a process is very slow, requiring centuries before it shows itself. It finds its cause in unwholesome conditions which destroy first the bravest, strongest, and most active, leaving the feeble, indolent, and cowardly to perpetuate the species. Military selection, or the seizure of the strong to replenish the armies, has produced race degeneration in many parts of Europe. Such degeneration has been the curse of Italy and parts of France and Switzerland and doubtless of Spain and Germany also. The dull sodden malarial heat of the tropics spares the indolent longest. In the Song of the Plague, written by some unknown British soldier, we find these words as to India:

*"Cut off from the land that bore us
Betrayed by the land we find
When the brightest are gone before us
And the dullest are left behind."*

This is the beginning of race degeneration. The Anglo-Saxon in the tropics deteriorates through the survival of the indolent and the loss of fecundity; but this is met or concealed by a number of other tendencies and is not soon apparent. The birth of a Kipling, a Thackeray, or a Dole could not in any way affect the argument. The British child born in India to-day must be reared in England; and it is to be remembered that not all the regions south of the Tropic of Cancer are to be classed as tropical; most of Mexico, much of India, and the whole Andean region belong to the temperate zone. The equable climate of the Hawaiian Islands is not in any proper sense torrid.

In the tropics the tendency to personal decay is more directly evident. The swarm of malarial organisms, the loss of social restrictions, the reduced value of life, the lack of moral standards, all lend to promote individual laxity and recklessness. "Where there are no Ten Commandments," and "the best is as the worst," there, life is held cheap and men grow careless. Kipling's fable of "Duncan Parenness" tells the story of personal degeneration, and this case is typical of thousands and thousands. Vice and dissipation are confined to no zone, but in the tropics few men of northern blood can escape them.

With individual deterioration goes social decay. Man becomes less careful of his dress, his social observances, his duties to others. Woman loses her regard for conventionalities, for her reputation, and for her character. The little efforts that hold society together are abandoned one by one. The spread of the "Mother Hubbard," crowding out more elaborate forms of dress, indicates a general failure of social conventionalities. The decay of society reacts on the individual. Where it is too warm or too malarial to be conventional, it is too much trouble to be decent. Without going into causes, it is sufficient to say that Anglo-Saxon colonies of self-respecting, self-governing men and women are practically confined to the temperate regions.

The annexation of the Philippines is, therefore, not a movement of expansion. We cannot expand into space already full. Our nation cannot expand where freedom cannot go. Neither the people nor the institutions of the United States can ever occupy the Philippines. The American home cannot endure there, the town-meeting cannot exist. There is no room for free laborers, no welcome for them, and no pay. The sole opening for Americans in any event will be as corporations or agents of corporations, as Government officials or as members of some profession requiring higher than native fitness. There is no chance for the American workman, but for syndicates it offers great opportunities. Yes, for the syndicates who handle politics as an incident in business. But the more syndicates we can induce to leave the shelter of our flag, the better for our people. Let them take their chances without our help.

If it were possible to exterminate the Filipinos as we have destroyed the Indians, replacing their institutions and their people by ours, the political objections to annexation would, in the main, disappear whatever might be said of the moral ones.

For our treatment of the Indian, there is, in general, no moral justification. There is a good political excuse in this—that we could and did use their land in a better way than was possible to them. We have no such excuse in Luzon; we cannot use the land except as

We cannot plant free institutions in the Orient because once planted they will not grow; if they grow they will not be free. We cannot exterminate these people, and if we did we could not use their land for our own people; we could only fill it with Asiatic colonists, Malay, Chinese, or Japanese, more of the same kind, not of our kind. "Any attempt to govern the tropical possessions of the United States on democratic principles," says Mr. W. Alleyne Ireland, one of our wisest authorities, "is doomed to certain failure. It has been already shown that without forced labor, or at least some form of indentured labor, large industries cannot be developed in tropical colonies." Such forced labor can be controlled only by the compulsion of the Government as in Java, or by the activity of great corporations as in

"It is thought by many," says Mr. Ireland, "that though it may be unadvisable to grant the (tropical) colonies

representative government at present, the time will soon come when the people will show themselves capable of self-government. Judging from past experience there would seem to be little hope that these pleasant anticipations will ever be realized. We look in vain for a single instance within the tropics of a really well-governed country."

The notion that in these fertile Islands our surplus working men shall find homes is the height of absurdity. Our labor leaders understand this well enough, and for once they stand together on the side of common sense. Scarcely any part of the United States is so crowded with people as Luzon or Porto Rico; in no part is the demand for labor less or its rewards so meager. Ten cents a day is not a free man's scale of wages; and no change of government can materially alter this relation. In the tropics the conditions of subsistence are so easy and the incentives to industry so slight that all races exposed to relaxing influences become pauperized. It is the free lunch system on a boundless scale, the environment of Nature too generous to be just, too kind to be exacting.

For the control of dependent nations and slave races the fair sounding name of Imperialism has lately come into use. It has been hailed with joy on the one hand for it is associated with armorial bearings and more than royal pomp and splendor. It has been made a term of reproach on the other, and our newspaper politicians now hasten to declare that they favor expansion only when it has no taint of Imperialism. But to our British friends nothing could be more ridiculous. You must have an iron hand or you get no profits. To cast aside Imperialism is to cast away the sole method by which tropical colonies have ever been made profitable to commerce or tolerable in politics. On the other hand these same people tell us that they have not the slightest thought of making States of Cuba or the Philippines, or of admitting the Filipinos to citizenship. But if the Filipino is not a citizen of his own land, who is?

We are advised on good patrician authority that all is well, whatever we do, if we avoid the fatal mistake of admitting the brown races to political equality—of letting them govern us. We must rule them for their own good—never for our advantage. In other words, lead or drive the inferior man along, but never recognize his will, his manhood, his equality; never let him count one when he is measured against you.

These maxims should be familiar; they are the philosophy of slavery, and they only lack the claim of the right to buy and sell the bodies and souls of men. Our purchase of the Filipinos from Spain, and our subsequent treatment of the resultant slave insurrection supplies the missing element.

One plan or the other we must adopt; either self-rule or Imperialism; there is no middle course, and both under present conditions are virtually impossible. Let the friends of annexation develop some plan of government, any plan whatever, and its folly and ineffectiveness will speedily appear. To go ahead without a plan means certain disaster, and that very soon; whatever we do or do not do, there is no time to lose.

Conquest of the Orient is not expansion, for there is no room for free manhood to grow there. It is useless to disclaim Imperialism when we are red-handed in the very act. Annexation without Imperialism is sheer anarchy. Annexation with Imperialism may be much worse, for so far as it goes it means the abandonment of democracy. The Union cannot endure "half slave, half free," half republic, half empire. We may make vassal tribes of the Filipinos, but never free States in the sense in which the name "State" applies to Maine, Iowa, or California. The Philippines can have no part in the Federal Union. Their self-government must be of a wholly different kind, the outgrowth of their own needs and dispositions. What they need is not our freedom, but some form of paternal despotism or monarchy of their own choosing which shall command their loyalty and yet keep them in peace.

"It is no man's duty to govern any other man." Still less is it a nation's duty to govern another nation. All that the weak nations ask of the strong is: "Stand out of my sunlight and let me alone."

We have never adopted the theory that each small nation must be tributary to some other, and that each nation of the lazy tropics must have slave drivers from Europe to make its people work.

Imperialism means such a control of tropical lands that they may be economically productive or that their doors may be thrown open to commerce. It is a definite business, difficult and costly, with few rewards and many dangers. It is fairly well understood by some of those engaged in it. It has been successfully conducted under certain very narrow lines by Great Britain and by Holland, although both countries have the record of many failures before they learned the art. Germany has tried it for a little while, as have also Japan and Belgium, none of these with successful results. Spain is out of the business in final bankruptcy and her assets are in our hands for final disposition. France has made failures only, and this because she has held colonies for her own ends, regardless of their own

"No sooner," says Lionel Dècle, "was the island (of Madagascar) in the hands of these (French colonial leaders) than they closed it to all foreign prospectors. They imposed prohibitive duties on all foreign goods, keeping the country for the French colonists that never came, and that never will come."

Control of the tropics has none of the glories we vulgarly associate with imperial sway. Its details are trivial, paltry and exasperating in the last degree. The more successful as to money, the more offensive to

freedom. In some regions, as Guiana, no nation has yet accomplished anything either in bringing civilization or in making money, while in Java and Trinidad the results, however great, have been financial or commercial only. Every dollar made in Java has been blood money, red with the blood of Dutch soldiers on the one side and with that of the Malay people on the other. In Jamaica, the abolition of slavery marked the end of industrial prosperity.

The voice of common British opinion is that it is our turn to take a hand in the control of the tropics. This idea is assumed in Kipling's appeal, "Take Up the White Man's Burden," and the real force of his verse is a warning that there is no easy way to success. The motive is not glory, but the profit to the world. It is our duty, with the others, to share the burden of tropical control that we may increase the wealth and commerce of the nations. There is some reason in this appeal. It is a business we cannot wholly shirk. I maintain, however, that so far as we are concerned, this is a matter purely for individual enterprise. The American merchant, missionary, and miner have taken up the white man's burden cheerfully; the American Government cannot.

"A certain class of mind," says Mr. Charles T. Lummis, "froths, at the bare suggestion that the United States cannot 'do anything any other nation can.' Well, it cannot—and remain United States. A gentleman has all the organs of a blackguard. But a gentleman cannot lie, steal, bully nor ravish. A republic cannot be a despotism. The Almighty himself cannot make two mountains without a valley between them. The one would cease to be a republic; the other would cease to be two mountains. It is no more to the reproach of the United States that it cannot be a tyrant than to God's shame that He cannot be a fool."

I notice that not one of our tried friends in England, men like Bryce, Morley, and Goldwin Smith, who understand our spirit and our laws, urge the holding of the Philippines. In England, as in America, the call to hold the Philippines is mainly that of the jingo and the politician, the reckless and conscienceless elements in the public life of each nation joining hands with each other.

The white man's burden, in the British sense, is to force the black man to support himself and the white man, too. This is the meaning of "control of the tropics." The black man cannot be exterminated at home as the red man can; therefore, let us make him carry double. The world needs all that we can get out of him. This may be all the better for the black man in need of exercise, but it is the old spirit of slavery, and its disguise is the thinnest.

Our Monroe Doctrine pledges us to a national interest in the tropics of the New World. This is because throughout the New World American citizens have interests which our flag must protect. In matters of legitimate interest no nation has been less isolated than America; but our influence goes abroad without our armies. Force of brains is greater than force of arms, more worthy and more lasting. Of all the recent phases of American expansion the most important and most honorable is that which is called the "peaceful conquest of Mexico." We hear little of it because it sounds no trumpets and vaunts not itself. The present stability of Mexico is largely due to American influences. Every year American intelligence and American capital find better and broader openings there. In time, Mexico shall become a republic in fact as well as in name, side by side in the friendliest relation with her sister republic of broader civilization. It is not necessary that the same flag should float over both. If one be red, white, and blue, let the other be green, white, and red—what matter? The development of Mexico, the "awakening of a nation," is thus a legitimate form of expansion. It is not a widening of governmental responsibility, but a widening of American influence and an extension of republican ideas. The next century will see Mexico an American instead of a Spanish republic, and this without war, conquest, or intrigue.

The purpose of the Monroe Doctrine is not to keep the European flag from America. Its function is to prevent the extension here of European colonial methods, the domination of weak races by strong, of one race for the good of another, of the principle of inequality of right which underlies slavery.

The spread of law and order, respect for manhood, of industrial wisdom and commercial integrity, this is the true "white man's burden," not the conquest and enslavement of men of other races. Expansion is most honorable and worthy if only that which is worthy and honorable is allowed to expand. The love of adventure, a precious heritage of our race, may find its play under any flag if it cannot honorably take our own to shelter it.

The world of action is just as wide to-day as it ever was, and if the red, white, and blue floated over every foot of it, it would be no

If after our conquest of Mexico, while our flag floated over Chapul-tepee, we had never hauled it down but had seized the whole land, we should have gained nothing for civilization. The splendid natural development of the country by which, in Diaz's own words, it has become "the germ of a great nation," would have been impossible under our forms, as under the imperial forms of Napoleon and Maximilian, The modern growth of Japan would never have taken place had she, like India, been numbered with England's vassals. A nation must develop from within by natural processes if it is to become great and permanent.

"The silent, sullen peoples, 'half devil and half child,' shall "weigh us and our God," not by our force of arms nor by our accuracy of aim, but by our loyalty to the sense of justice which exists even under a dusky

skin.

But some urge that we must hold far-off colonies, the farther the better, for the sake of our own greatness. Great Britain is built up by her colonies. "What does he know of England, who only England knows?"

*"Just pride is no mean factor in the state,
The sense of greatness makes a people great."*

The grandeur of Rome lay in her colonies, and in her far and wide extension must be the greatness of the United States.

But the decline of Rome dates from the same far and wide extension. Extension for extension's sake is a relic of barbarous times. An army in civilization must exist for peace not for war, and it should be as small as it can safely be made. A standing army means waste, oppression, and moral decay. Carlyle once said something like this, "It is not your democracy or any other 'ocracy that keeps your people contented. It is the fact that you have very much land and very few people." But this is not half the truth. The main reason of our prosperity is our freedom from war. Our farmer carries no soldier on his back. We fear no foreign invader because we invite none. Were the people of the continent of Europe once freed from the cost of militarism, their industrial progress would be the wonder of the ages. As it is they are ground down by worse than medieval taxation. A French cartoon represents the farmer of 1780 with a feudal lord on his back. The French farmer of 1900 is figured as bearing a soldier, then a politician, and on the back of these a money-lender. Without these, industry would buy prosperity and prosperity contentment; with contentment would rise new hope. The hopelessness of militarism is the basis of European pessimism; men see no end to the piling up of engines

"The forces of darkness," says Dr. Edward Alsworth Ross, "are still strong and it seems as if the middle ages would swallow up everything won by modern struggles. It is true that many alarms have proved false, but it is the steady strain that tells on the mood. It is pathetic to see on the Continent how men fear to face the future. No one has the heart to probe the next decade. The people throw themselves into the pleasure of the moment with the desperation of doomed men who hear the ring of the hammer on the scaffold."

of death. Were the continent of Europe freed from killing taxation, England could no longer hold her primacy in trade. War has destroyed the life of her rivals. Could bankrupt Italy disband her armies and sink her worthless navies the glories of the golden age would come again. Could France cease to be militant she would no longer be decadent. If politics in the army is fatal to military power the army in politics is fatal to the State. No nation can grow in strength when its bravest and best are each year devoured by the army. This has gone on in southern Europe for a thousand years. It is the chief cause of the decline of the Latin nations.

There is no doubt that military selection is the most insidious foe to race development. The destruction of the brave in the Roman wars finally, according to Otto Sech, left the Romans a race of "congenital cowards." In proportion as a nation succeeds in war, it must lose its possibility of future success in war or peace. The greatest loss to America in her Civil War rests in the fact that a million of her strongest, bravest, most devoted men have left no descendants. Such loss has gone on in Europe since war began. If we cannot stop fighting, civilization will have nothing left worth fighting for.

The terrible wastes of war are recognized by Great Britain. These she has tried to minimize by letting alone everything which does not relate to commerce. She has ceased to hope for the impossible and has come down to business principles. The British Empire is a huge commercial trust. England has no illusions. She "neither fears nor admires any nation under heaven." She never fights save when she is sure to win and to throw the costs on her opponent. She has secured all points of real commercial advantage and is making the most of the ignorance and folly of those who strive to emulate her.

Great Britain expands where order and trade extend. Our expansion demands one thing more, *equality of all men before the law*. All expansion of our boundaries brought about by honorable means and carrying equal justice to all men, I, for one, earnestly favor. To that limit, and that only, I write myself down as a "rank expansionist." I see no honor in our seizure of the Philippines, nor prospect of justice in our ultimate rule.

Our British friends speak of the smoothness of their colonial methods, especially in the Crown colonies, which Parliament cannot touch. Everything runs as though newly oiled and the British public hears nothing of it. Exactly so. It is none of the public's business, and the less the public has to say the less embarrassment from its ignorant meddling. The Colonial Bureau

In the journals, to-day, I see a record of a question addressed in Parliament to the British Minister of Finance. "This is the question of government with government," said he, in refusing to answer. In other words, imperial affairs in England are none of the people's business. If they were, there would be fewer of them.

belongs to the Crown, not to the people. The waste and crime and bloodshed do not rest on their heads. But we are not ready for that kind of adjustment. Our Executive is a creature of the public. We have no governmental affairs which are sacred from the eyes or the hand of the people. "Government of the people, for the people, and by the people" implies that the people are to be interested in all its details; every one to the least and the greatest, even at the risk of destroying its smoothness of operation. Hence, colonial rule as undertaken

by us must be marred by vacillation, ignorance, incompetence, parsimony, and neglect. All these defects appear in our foreign relations as well. For the reason of the greater intelligence of our people in public affairs, our government will enter on the control of the tropics with a great handicap. The people want to know all about it. The Administration must keep open books and justify itself at every step. This will act against its highest efficiency. The forms of self-government are not adapted to the government of others. The very strength of the Republic unfits it for complicated tasks, because its power can be brought at once into effect only as the people understand its purposes. Popular government and good government are two very different things. Often they are for generations not on speaking terms with each other.

The advantages of sound nationality over strong government were the subject of the fullest discussion a hundred years ago. The feeble rule of democracy is the strongest of all governments when it has the force of the popular will behind it; when this fails it is paralyzed as all government should be. A monarchy is more effective in foreign affairs and calls out better service than democracy. If that were all we might revert to monarchy and close the discussion. But that is not all, and every move toward centralization costs on the other side. *The essential fact of monarchy is not the presence of the king, but the absence of the people* in all large transactions.

This subject has been ably discussed by Goldwin Smith, who calls special attention to our want of governmental apparatus for the control of dependencies. That we cannot have such apparatus most other British writers have failed to note. Imperialism demands the powers of an emperor. "The British Crown, for the government of the Indian Empire, has an imperial service attached to it as a monarchy, and separate from the services which are under the immediate control of Parliament. British India, in fact, is an empire by itself; governed by a Viceroy who is a delegate of the Crown, exempt as a rule from the influence of home politics and reciprocally exercising little influence over them. Before the Mutiny, which broke up the army of the East India Company, India was still the dominion of that Company; and the transfer of it to the Crown, though inevitable, was not unaccompanied by serious misgiving as to the political consequences which might follow. Even for the government of other dependencies Great Britain has men like the late Lord Elgin, detached from home parties and devoted to the Imperial Service, in her dependencies Great Britain is, in fact, still a monarchy though at home she has become practically a republic. In the case of the United States it would seem hardly possible to keep the Imperial Service free from political influence, or, reciprocally, to prevent the influence of the empire on politics at home. Imperial appointments would almost inevitably be treated as diplomatic appointments are treated now."

"In what, after all," continues Goldwin Smith, "does the profit or bliss of imperial sway consist? The final blow has just been dealt to the miserable and helpless remnant of that empire on which, in the day of its grandeur, the sun was said never to set, and to which Spanish pride has always desperately clung. It may safely be said that not the expulsion of Moriscos or Jews, nor even the despotism of the Inquisition, did so much to ruin Spain as the imperial ambition which perverted the energies of her people, turning them from domestic industry and improvement to rapacious aggrandizement abroad. The political and religious tyranny was, in fact, largely the consequence of the imperial position of the monarchy, which, by the enormous extent of its dominions and its uncontrolled sources of revenue, was lifted above the nation."

In the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations which followed it we have examples of the conditions of colonial rule. At no step since the beginning has the American people been consulted. At no point has consultation been possible. In managing affairs like this there can be no divided councils. The responsible head must rule, and it matters not a straw what is the wish of the people who foot the bills. The only check on the Executive is the certainty that the people will have the last word. What you think or I think or the people think of the whole business cuts no figure whatever in the progress of events, because our opinion can at no time be asked. After all, we are not so much worried because we have not asked the consent of the people of the Philippines. It is because the American people have not been consulted. In a matter most vital to the life of the nation they are represented only by the rabble of the streets. When their consent should be asked they are told that it is too late to say, No!

But there are many wise economists who would make permanent just this condition of affairs. The certainty that success in colonial matters would take them absolutely out of the hands of the people is their argument for imperial expansion as opposed to democracy.

Through concentration of power in the Executive we may be able to make of Havana and Manila clean and orderly cities. Shall we not by similar means sooner or later purify San Francisco and New York? If martial law is good for Luzon or for Santiago, why not for Wilmington, or Virden, or even for Boston?

If military methods will clean up Havana and Santiago, why not use them for the slums of all cities? If it is our "white man's burden" to make the black man work in the tropics, why not make white men work outside of the tropics? If we furnish public employment in the tropics, forcing the unemployed to accept it, why not do the same with the unemployed everywhere? Why not make slaves of all who fail to carry the black man's burden of toil?

To be good, it is argued, government must first be strong, and the difficulties before us will demand and at last secure the strong hand.

Impressed by the weakness and corruption of popular government these economists wish, at any cost, to limit it. To decide by popular vote scientific questions like the basis of coinage, the nature of the tariff, the control of corporations, is to dispose of them in the most unscientific way possible. The vote of a majority really settles nothing, and a decision which the next election may reverse exposes us to the waste which vacillation always entails.

It is said that in the ideal of the fathers our government was not a democracy. It was a representative republic, and the system of representation was expressly designed to take the settlement of specific affairs out of the hands of the people. It was not the part of the people to decide public questions, but to send "their wisest men to make the public laws." Nowadays this ideal condition has been lost. The people no longer think of choosing their wisest men for any public purpose. They try to choose those who will do their bidding.

The daily newspaper and the telegraph carry to every man's hand something of the happenings of every day the world over. On the basis of such partial information every man forms his own opinion on every subject. These opinions for the most part are crude, prejudiced, and incomplete; but they serve as a basis for public action. The common man's horizon is no longer bounded by the affairs of the village, to be settled in town-meeting in accordance with the expectations of the fathers. He knows something about all the affairs of State, and as local affairs receive scant notice in the newspapers it is these which he neglects and forgets. The town-meeting has decayed through the growth of newspaper information, the introduction of the voter to broader interests—interests less vital no doubt to the average man but more potent to affect his fancy.

Having opinions of his own, however crude, on all public questions, the citizen demands that his representatives should carry out these opinions. If he has, or thinks he has, a financial interest in any line of policy, he will vote for men whose interests are the same as his. In such manner Congress has become not an assembly of "the wisest men to make the public laws," but a gathering of attorneys, each pledged to some local or corporate interest, and each doing his best, or appearing to do it, to carry out lines of policy dictated by others. This condition the fathers could not foresee. The telegraph and the newspaper have brought it about. It has great disadvantages, but it cannot be helped and it is with us to stay.

Because of this condition economists of a certain type welcome all extensions of administrative functions. They would prescribe a dose of Imperialism to stiffen the back of our democracy. If we complicate the duties of government, if we plunge into delicate and dangerous foreign relations, our failures and humiliation will increase the demand for skill. The business of horse-stealing quickens a man's eye and improves his horsemanship. In such fashion the business of land-grabbing improves diplomacy. The old idea of representation by statesmen unpledged to any line of action will arise again. The choice of attorneys will be limited to local assemblies, and real leaders of parties will come to the front,

Such a change England has seen since her aggressive foreign policy forced upon her the need of eternal vigilance. Such a change makes for better government at the expense of popular choice. "This may not be republicanism," says Lummis, speaking of the work of Diaz in Mexico, "but it is business." The ruler of England is not the people's choice nor the choice of the Queen. He is the cleverest mouthpiece of the dominant oligarchy. It is currently said that British imperial experiences have caused the purification of British politics and the expulsion from them of the spoils system. For this statement there is no foundation in fact. It is through the growth of individual intelligence in a compact homogeneous nation that higher political ideals have arisen. The conquest of tropical races has accompanied this, but has been in no degree its cause.

In the British system, the Parliament of the people is behind the premier, who can act as freely, as boldly and as quickly as he dare. In the Federal system, the Congress of the people stands first and the President acts behind them and by their permission. Only in time of war are these conditions reversed and then only partially. For this reason the severe blame visited on the President for failure to declare any tangible policy in regard to the Philippines is only par.

A movement toward the British system would require changes in the Constitution, a movement toward further centralization and toward greater party responsibility. This its advocates usually recognize. "It may not be republicanism, but it is business." Such a change, it is maintained, would soon do away with our poisonous and shameful spoils system. It would insure strong, sound, and dignified party administration, because anything short of this would ruin party or country. Under such conditions no paltry place-hunter could hold a seat in our Cabinets, no weakling could thrust himself forward in our Civil Service, and our Presidents would be men who would make public opinion, never supinely wait for it, still less accept its vulgar counterfeit of mob opinion.

With such conditions in the Executive, and an automatic, persistent, competent colonial service, with army and navy to match, we could dictate to the whole earth. We could have our hand in the affairs of all nations, and the diplomacy of all the world would tremble at our frown.

All this in its essence, it is claimed, is to return to the ideals of the fathers before Jackson's vulgarity

corrupted our Civil Service, and before Lincoln's "bath of the people" led the common man to regard himself as the main factor in our government. "Of the people, by the people," were Lincoln's additions. The right word is "Government *for* the people," and by those who know better than the people how the people should be governed.

In this vein we are told that the people have been "debauched by freedom." They have come to fear the bugaboo of too much government, too much army. Because we are "debauched by freedom" we have lost our respect for authority, our respect for law.

Some of our historians now assure us that government by the consent of the governed was only a catch-phrase. We never meant what we said when we took these glittering generalities from the philosophers of France. We governed our Louisiana territory just as we pleased with these phrases in our mouths, asking no advice of the French Creoles. We never sought consent of the Indian. We override the will of the negro even yet. His vote is only a farce. We have never even asked our women, half our whole number, whether they consent to our government or not. All of this is petty quibbling. These exceptions only prove the rule. The principle holds in spite of temporary failures justified by local conditions or not justified at all. So far as women are concerned it is still, right or wrong, the theory of most civilized governments, ours with the rest, that women have no governmental interests at variance with those of men. They consent tacitly but constantly to be represented by their fathers, brothers, or husbands. Doubtless this condition is not eternal, but it exists at present, and no one can claim that "consent of the governed" is reached only by a formal vote.

As to this Lincoln once said: — "the framers of the Declaration of Independence meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all, and revered by all, constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness, and value of life to all peoples of all colors everywhere. " One year later, speaking at Philadelphia, he said that he would "rather be assassinated on the spot than to act in the view, that the country could be saved by giving up the principles of the Declaration of Independence." "Our own country," says Hosea Wilbur, "is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and the west by justice, and where she oversteps these invisible bounds, even so much as by a hair's breadth, she ceases to be our mother." Inside these boundaries our flag is the banner of freedom; outside it is the standard of the pirate. Whether on a stolen guano Mexican island or on a sugar plantation wrenched or bought from Spain, its truest friends shall be the first to haul it down.

Doubtless these imperialists are partly in the right. It is certain that the formation of a colonial bureau and a foreign bureau wholly outside of popular control would make, for the time at least, for better government and stronger administration. Doubtless needs like those of England will hasten British methods of meeting them. But government for the people and not of them has its weakness as well as its strength. The strength of democracy lies not in its apparent force. It lies latent, to be drawn on in times of real need.

Because of its latent power our great blundering democracy, slow in war and simple or clumsy in diplomacy, is strong above all other nations. It can safely try civic experiments the very thought of which, if taken seriously, would throw all Europe into convulsions. The imperial government is a swift express train which will run with great speed on a proper track, but which is involved in utter ruin by a moment's slip of mismanagement. The Republic is an array of lumbering farm wagons, not so swift nor so strong, but infinitely more adaptable, the only thing you can use on a farm.

The beauty of democratic institutions is that without the intelligent consent of those affected by them they will not work at all. All permanent government rests on acquiescence of the people but democracy demands more. It insists on their positive action.

The strength of empire, however disguised, lies in brute force and that alone. That of democracy lies in the self-control and the self-respect of its individual citizens. The work of Great Britain through the centuries has been to teach its people and its vassals the lesson of respect of law. It has been the mission of the United States to teach respect for manhood, a matter vastly more difficult as well as more important.

A nation self-governed is the most powerful of all nations, because she is at peace within herself, and being sound at heart she has taken the first step toward good government, a step by which the best government possible to men must be reached in time. Even the blunders and corruptions of democracy make for good government at last. When the people find out what hurts them, that particular wrong must cease. Even the spoils system with all its waste and shame has its educative value, and tremendous will be the educative value of the process by which it is at last thrown off. The reaction from the conquest of Luzon will save us from Imperialism for the next fifty years.

Democracy is always wiser than it seems. The common politician knows the weaknesses of the people and tries to profit by them. The true statesman knows the strength of the people and tries to lead it, and the results he attains are the marvel of the world. Such a leader of the people was Lincoln. He could touch the noblest springs in our national character. Such leaders will rise when occasion shall demand them. Meanwhile, the men

are not wanting. Sound common sense and devoted patriotism are needed in all walks in life and are found there. The froth on the waves may fill our public offices, but the great deep is below them.

*"Are all the common ones so grand,
And all the titled ones so mean?"*

was asked in 1863 of the Army of the Potomac. "The common men so grand" though all the titled ones be mean is the experience of all democracy. It is far better and far safer than the reverse condition when only titled men are great and all the common men are mean. Such nations are like inverted pyramids resting on the strength of one man.

For a nation to be ruled by leaders may be considered as a survival of primitive conditions, when there was no politics save war. Then all men were warriors and the tribe was but an array with a camp-following of women, children, and civilians.

When militarism gives way to industrialism we have the rise of the individual man at the expense of the relative standing of his leaders; for leadership is necessary only as collective danger threatens, The rulers are transformed from leaders to agents. These are at first under democracy responsible to self-constituted managers demagogues, and bosses who usurp control when no imminence of danger forces the necessity of strong leadership.

From this transition stage, democracy must pass on to settled institutions and good service. In the stage which comes next, the intelligent citizen shall be the trust and head of political affairs with servants elected, appointed, or chosen by competitive examinations to do his bidding and carry out his will. "The citizen is at the head," says Walt Whitman, and President, Congress and Courts "are but his servants for pay." The decay of leadership must accompany the rise of the individual man.

Let us assume by way of illustration a few impossible things. Let us suppose that the Emperor of Germany should die suddenly, and that with him should disappear the whole royal family, the army, the judiciary, and all others in power with all the force over which they had control. Who can say what would happen next? Can we even guess at the map of the next new Germany?—for the German Empire has no strength in itself. It is strong in battle, because it owns millions of fighting men. It has no strength in the hearts of the people. The failure of the force of arms even for a day would mark

On even frailer basis rests the Republic of France. Could such good fortune befall her as the loss of her army and all others in power, no one could foretell her protean changes. If, perchance, the sceptre fell into the hands of the people, the new Republic of France would be very different from any she has ever yet seen.

If in Great Britain the same change could take place what should we see? If every official of whatever grade, all the army, and all the navy were swallowed in the sea can we forecast the result?

Evidently in England herself no great change would arise. Respect for law and respect for tradition are firmly ingrained in the English character. What had been would be established again, and the Commonwealth of England would lose not a whit of its power or stability. But what of the British Empire? Its scattered fragments could never be collected again. Ireland, held by force, would go in her own way, and her different factions would again repel one another. Self-government for Ireland means disunion of the Empire, and this the English statesmen know too well. India is no nearer England to-day than she was a hundred years ago. There is not one of her vassal nations which would not escape if it could. There is not one whose presence does not weaken the British Empire. Shrewd administration has learned to count on this and to find out compensating advantages. A vast business on a small capital is the type of British dominion. No wonder England cherishes her relation to Canada and Australia, elder children of hers, who give her moral help but who take care of themselves. England dare not release Ireland from federal union, because only as a helpless minority can Ireland be controlled. On the other hand she dare not admit the rest of the empire to the same federation lest she be thrown into the minority herself. Sooner or later both these questions will become burning ones. When they are solved Great Britain will be no longer an empire.

"Gladly," says Dr. Woolsey, "would Great Britain limit her responsibilities if she could; but it would be construed as a sign of weakness, and she fears the consequences. She cannot let go." "Imperial expansion," says Frederick Harrison, speaking of conditions in England, "means domestic stagnation. It swallowed the energies of Liberalism and bartered progress for glory." The fabric of Imperialism, whatever its form, is built in shifting sands. The only solid foundation for any government is "the consent of the governed;" and here lies the strength of the United States, the soundest government on the face of the earth. Not the wisest, not the most economical, most dignified, or most just, but the firmest in its basis, and, therefore, the most enduring.

At the close of the Civil War, when more than ever before in its history the nation was dependent on a single man, and he the wisest, bravest, tenderest of all, Lincoln was murdered. The land was filled with sorrow and distress, but there was no alarm in our body politic. It was left to Lincoln, says Brownell,

*"Even in death, to give
This token for freedom's strife*

*A proof how republics live,
Not by a single life,
But the right divine of man
The million trained to be free."*

Our government would have endured, even in that troubled time, had every official of every State fallen with Lincoln.

Should our whole body of officers, our army, our navy, perish to-morrow, all would go on as before. Some veteran of the Civil War, or some schoolmaster, perhaps, would take the chair and call the people to order. The machinery of democracy would be started, and, once started, would proceed in its usual way. We should not have Cuba nor the Philippines, but we should retain all that was worth keeping. This stability of administration would not arise from our respect for law. That feeling is none too strong among our "fierce democracy," Still less would it spring from respect for tradition. We don't care a continental for tradition. We should act on the common sense of the common man. To cultivate this common sense is the chief mission of democracy. In this it is effective, and for that reason our Republic is the strongest and soundest government under heaven.

"I have never learned," says John Brown, "that God is a respecter of persons." There is "God in our Constitution," not in name, but in fact, for by it "all men are equal before the law," which "is no respecter of persons." Men are men, whether white or black or brown or yellow. The British government rests on a foundation of inequality. Its rewards are titles of nobility which imply that the plain man is ignoble. The word law is written on its every page; the word justice occurs only as between equals. Neither the word nor the idea of justice finds place in England's dealing with other nations.

"How long will the United States endure?" Guizot once asked of James Russell Lowell. "So long as the ideas of its founders remain dominant," was his answer. Just so long as her government rests on the intelligent "consent of the governed." When it rests in part on force, no matter how wisely applied, in so far will it be unstable. A standing army contains the seeds of decay. As militarism grows democracy must die. But without the constant pressure of force of arms, law and order and industry have never in any high degree existed in the tropics. Mexico to-day is a land of law and order, but the soldier is everywhere. Every railway train in the Republic carries at least three rurales, or national guardsmen. Every flag station has two or three, and every considerable town has its battalion or its regiment. These soldiers are drawn from the body of the people; very many of them are ex-brigands, reformed to the higher use of the enforcement of law. "This may not be republicanism, but it is business." The conditions of law and order in the Philippines are just the same. You may use native soldiers if you like, but without force order cannot exist.

The cost of this whole business may be urged as an argument against annexation. It will appeal to our people as the discussion of the bill for the enlargement of the army plainly shows. The financial statements of Congress have proved the strongest arguments against persistency in folly. It is clearly evident that the cost of conquest or even military occupation of the Philippines is grotesquely in excess of any possible gain to the government. The whole trade of the Islands for five years, if we get all of it, would not pay for a second-class battle-ship. People who live in straw houses do not make international trade. We may open the way for individuals and corporations to grow rich, but the people can never get their money back.

No possible development of the Islands can profit the people at large. There are no openings in the tropics for the small farmer, none for the American laborer, or in general none for any of the rank and file of the American people; nor can any be made by any act of ours. We cannot alter the conditions of life in the Orient. The question of flag, other things being equal, affects neither commerce nor industry. Trade never "follows the flag" because it is a flag. Trade "flies through the open door" because it is a door. Men buy or sell wherever they can make money.

The whole argument that the needs of our commerce demand the occupation of the Philippine Archipelago is both fallacious and immoral. It is untrue in the first place, and unworthy in the second. The needs of commerce demand no act of injustice and they excuse none. The total cost of maintenance of our proposed government in the Philippines cannot fall short of \$10,000,000 per year and may be far greater. Our actual trade with the Islands now amounts to less than \$500,000 per year, imports and exports together, and the whole trade of the Philippines with all the world is less than \$30,000,000. No form of government could increase this much, and, under republican forms it might fall off. The less compulsion, the less labor. Allowing a net profit of ten per cent on all transactions, a complete monopoly of Philippine trade would leave the people a debt of seven millions for every three millions our trading companies might gain. In time, perhaps, the outlook would be less unequal. Trade might increase, expenses grow less, but in no conceivable event would the people get their money back. The returns either in money or civilization would always be below their cost. The argument for commercial expansion has its roots in our experience of booming towns and has no value with careful financiers. The whole trade of all the tropics will, at the best, be but a trifling part of the commerce of the world. Certain drugs, dyes, and fruits, mainly natural products, with sugar, tobacco, coffee, and tea make almost

the whole of it.

So far as San Francisco is concerned, she has not much to gain or lose from our actions in the Philippines. She will always be a noble city, a great city, but never an enormous one. She will not be the gigantic mart of the Orient, nor even the Chicago of the Pacific. The Pacific may be our ocean, but it is too wide to be an equal of the Atlantic. Besides, San Francisco has too many rival ports. She has little to sell but flour and fruit, and no ships to carry even these. The trade with Manila, consisting now of outgoing transports carrying troops and returning with coffins, will never make San Francisco rich. It is true that conditions may change, but no signs of improvement are visible yet.

Yet it is true that commercial Imperialism might pay if we were free to act as England would with her wisdom, her experience, and her selfishness; but only on a vast and generous scale, considering commercial results only, could we make her policy effective. The function of the British army and navy in these days is not glory nor dominion. It is to clear away the barriers to trade. When England subjugates a nation she lets it alone as much as she can. Interference means waste of men and money. She never meddles with the religion nor the forms of government of her vassals. The people may choose king, or president, or sultan, and each may conduct his own court in his own way, with all the gold lace and peacock feathers that his barbaric taste may demand. England does not care for this. On her coat-of-arms are these three words only, Volume of Trade.

All that England now asks of the nations she calls colonies is this, and this she gets, that there shall be law and order, and all doors wide open to the commerce of all the world. So long as other nations keep closed doors at home, England can undersell them in the markets of the world. Imperialism, then, as Lord Beresford truthfully insists, means with England simply this, Volume of Trade. All the rest is mere flummery. The sole purpose of the British navy, accident aside, is to hold the doors of the world open to British merchant ships. Except as an adjunct to an open door of commerce all foreign possessions are costly and ruinous folly. The maintenance of Algiers, Madagascar and the Indo-China as tariff-bound colonies for Frenchmen to exploit has wrought the financial ruin of France. The militarism these follies made necessary has wrought her civic ruin. But with Great Britain army and navy are but adjuncts used with marvelous skill toward one great purpose, Volume of Trade.

The United States cannot be thus turned into a vast machine for helping its manufacturers and merchants. She has many other interests, and the greatest are educational and moral.

To drop all this and plunge into the promotion of commerce she must cast aside all the checks and balances of her Constitution and to stand unhampered, just as England stands.

The British Government acts on the instant. Its only limitation is the confidence of the people. So long as it holds this by success there is no restraint on its achievements. One doubt or failure throws the power into the hands of the opposing party. This forces to the front the cleverest and strongest men in all England. It forbids incompetence in every branch of government. A paltry Minister of War, a scandal of embalmed beef, a rebellion which tact would have avoided, any of these things would throw the British Ministry out of power. So these things in England never happen.

Our government is not an organism which can think and act as a unit. It is simply the reflex of the people themselves; the mirror of the mass, with all its crudities and inconsistencies. It exists for the purpose of exalting men, not for developing industry or swelling the Volume of Trade. The British flag extends the trade of England because it insures local peace and clears away the rubbish of tariff which obstructs traffic. The Dutch flag helps the trade of Holland because it means enforced industrialism, slavery that pays its way. The American flag, outside of America, as yet means nothing; neither greater industry nor freer commerce, nor yet increased observance of law; our flag stands for something accomplished. To plant it anywhere cannot help our trade.

If we were to follow in England's footsteps let us see what we should have done. Let us begin with the war for Cuban freedom, though with England in our place there would have been no war. She would have found a way of saving Cuba for herself without humiliating Spain.

But the war once on would have been pushed on business principles. Our navy shows the British method. Our army suggests the methods of Spain. Great Britain would have no scandal in her army because she would have no politicians there. There would have been no officials not trained to the profession; no colonels who had not earned their promotion by success. Severe training and faithful service give military precedence in England. Political services or favor of the Minister do not count. They find their reward in titles of nobility. Favoritism on the part of a Minister of War would throw the whole government out of power. In England, political scheming in army or navy or civil service alike stands on the plane of forgery or counterfeiting. The nation could not endure it and live.

The war once finished, peace would be made with the blade of the sword. No civil commission would be sent to wrangle over the details. They would be settled on the instant. Spain would be given a day to relinquish whatever England wanted, and England would speak her wishes in no uncertain tones. What England would do

with these possessions is evident enough. She would put down rioting and brigandage, and she would employ the native soldiery to do it. She would press the strongest leaders into her service, humoring their vanity with titles and making her interests their own. She would let the people form whatever government their fancy chose, with only this limitation, all factions must keep the peace. To show what peace means she would knock down a fortress or two, or blow a few hundred rebels from her guns for an object lesson to the rest.

All this in England's case would have taken place long ago with the sinking of the navies of her foes, and once accomplished the door of commerce would be flung open to all the world. All this has its glories, it may be its advantages, and we have men enough who, with force in hand, could carry out its every detail. But it could not be done under our Constitution, nor under our relation of parties, nor under the administration now at the head of our affairs. To pause in its accomplishment would be fatal. To hesitate is to fail, and our opportunity, such as it was, as well as our imperial prestige, was lost when we made the leaders of the Filipinos our enemies.

"If ever," says Dr. William James of Harvard, "there was a situation to be handled psychologically, it was this one. The first thing that any European Government would have done would have been to approach it from the psychological side: Ascertain the sentiments of the natives and the ideals they might be led by, get into touch immediately with Aguinaldo, contract some partnership, buy his help by giving ours, etc. Had our officers on the ground been allowed to follow their own common sense and good feeling they would probably have done just this. Meanwhile, as they were forbidden by orders from Washington, no one knows what they would

"But it is obvious that for our rulers at Washington the Filipinos have not existed as psychological quantities at all, except so far as they might be moved by President McKinley's proclamation. * * * When General Miller cables that they won't let him land at Iloilo, the President, we are told, cables back: "Cannot my proclamation be distributed?" But apart from this fine piece of sympathetic insight into foreigners' minds there is no clear sign of its ever having occurred to anyone at Washington that the Filipinos could have any feelings or insides of their own whatever, that might possibly need to be considered in our arrangements. It was merely a big material corporation against a small one, the "soul" of the big one consisting in a stock of moral phrases, the little one owning no soul at all.

"In short we have treated the Filipinos as if they were a painted picture, an amount of mere matter in our way. They are too remote from us ever to be realized as they exist in their inwardness. They are too far away; and they will remain to far away to the end of the chapter. If the first step is such a criminal blunder, what shall we expect of the last?"

In grim and graphic fashion the clear-sighted editor of the San Francisco *Argonaut* sets forth the lines on which we may succeed in our schemes of conquest:

"If we persevere in our imperialistic plans, we shall have to rely upon native troops, for the reason that we can not get Americans. It is becoming more and more apparent that the youth of America will not volunteer for regular service in the tropics. We shall have to adopt the same methods pursued by European colonial powers if we continue in our imperialistic groove. We shall have to lay aside a great many scruples to which we now cling.

"For example, in the Philippines we may have to adopt Spanish methods in many ways. We may find it necessary to stir up one tribe of natives against another. Thus we could arm the Visayans, drill them, and ship them to Luzon. The Visayans hate the Tagalos, and we could set the two tribes to fighting together, and with the Visayans we might exterminate the Tagalos. Then, after the Tagalos were exterminated or subjected, we could stir up the fierce Moros of Mindanao against the Visayans. By judiciously fomenting strife we could exterminate the Visayans. There would then remain only the Moros, and probably we could get away with them ourselves.

"Here is another suggestion. The Spaniards have always found it necessary to use treachery, torture, and bribery in the Philippines. We shall probably have to do the same. The Anglo-Saxon methods of warfare do not appeal to the Malay. In pursuance of our imperialistic plans, it would be well to hire some of the insurgent lieutenants to betray Aguinaldo and other chieftains into our clutches. A little bribery, a little treachery, and a little ambuscading, and we would trap Aguinaldo and his chieftains. Then, instead of putting them to death in the ordinary way, it might be well to torture them. The Spaniards have left behind them some means to that end in the dungeons in Manila. The rack, the thumbscrew, the trial by fire, the trial by molten lead, boiling insurgents alive, crushing their bones in ingenious mechanisms of torture—these are some of the methods that would impress the Malay mind. It would show them that we are in earnest. Ordinary, decent, Christian, and civilized methods, such as the United States have always pursued in warfare, will only lead them to believe that we are weaklings and cowards, and that we are therefore to be steadily and sturdily combated.

"This may seem to some of the more sentimental of our readers like grim jesting. It is not. It is grim earnest. We assure them that the Malay race can be ruled only by terror. The Dutch can tell us a little about that

from their experiences in Java. If there be a belief throughout the United States that these medieval methods are unfitted for us, then we shall have to retire from attempting to manage Malays. Malays are more than medieval. They hark back to the old, cruel days of primeval man. They are primeval rather than medieval, and if we want to manage Malays, we will have to do it in such ways that mere murder would be kindness."

Others say that China is soon to be looted by the powers of Europe. We wish to be on hand in the center of the fight to get a share of her land and trade. "I held the enemy down," said brave John Phoenix at San Diego, "with my nose, which I inserted between his teeth for that purpose." The vultures are already at the huge Mongolian carcass. Let the Eagle of Freedom join his fellow buzzards till his belly is full. Too proud to attack for ourselves, we will be close at hand to seize whatever the others may drop in the scramble. Why not? If we do not enter the struggle, they "will forever shut us out of the trade of China." What nonsense this is. Trade demands customers, and China will never have a better customer than the United States. To shut out anybody shuts out trade and the wrangling powers will bid for our markets, even if we leave to them the cost, the waste and the shame of the spoliation of China. To secure our share of the China trade we have only to be ready with something to exchange and ships to carry it. No nation can afford to subjugate China or to hold any part of it under military force. The sphere of influence is the open door. We have only to meet the open door with open door. To hold the Philippines will not make our commerce. Annex them and we shall be just as far from the goal as before. Bind them with our tariffs and we shall leave them practically no commerce at all. In any case, beyond the conveniences of a coaling station they do not enter into the Chinese

The argument that annexation is a violation of our Constitution does not impress me as conclusive. The Constitution is an agreement to secure justice and prudence in our internal affairs. Its validity is between State and State, and between man and man. The hope of this country lies in the intelligence, morality and virility of its people, not in the wisdom of its leaders, still less in the perfections of its Constitution. Constitutions are mere paper at best, unless they rest on the consent of the governed; unless the principles they represent are deep ingrained in the hearts of the people. If the United States is a nation she holds all national prerogatives. As a nation she may do whatever she chooses, if no other power prevents. The Constitution cannot test the wisdom of an action. She may annex barbarous countries, make war on the universe, or do any other wicked or foolish thing if the decision to do so keeps within proper forms of law. If, however, the Constitution offers an effective barrier against folly we shall soon find it out. We may be sure that no weapon against Imperialism will be left unused. Whether the letter of the Constitution forbids the acquisition of vassal provinces and rotten boroughs is an open question. But there is no question that the spirit is opposed to both. Had such conditions been foreseen, the annexation of either would doubtless have been formally forbidden.

I do not myself believe that the annexation of the Philippines will prove fatal to our Constitution or fatal to democracy. It will be endlessly mischievous, but it will not kill. The only poison that can kill is personal corruption, the moral rottenness of our people. The government by the people has wondrous vitality, and it has already survived gigantic crimes. It has outlived the monstrous blunder of secession and the headless spasms of "organized labor." It will outlive the aftermath of this war with Spain. "You cannot fool all the people all the time." This epigram of Lincoln's expresses the final strength of democracy. When the craze of the day has subsided and we have counted our loss in blood and treasure, we shall "walk backward with averted gaze to hide our shame." May this shame be enduring, for it is our guarantee that we shall not do the like again.

Of late the argument of annexation assumes a different form. It is justified because it is inevitable. Let us enter the movement to rule it. Some of our ablest students of political affairs argue in this fashion. The treaty with Spain is sure to be ratified. The Philippines will be ceded to the United States. Cession compels annexation. We are in the current—not of divine Providence nor of abstract destiny, but of inevitable public opinion. It is no more use to struggle against this than against winds and tides. "The King can do no wrong." All the prestige of power is with the administration. The American people are bent upon keeping all the territory won from Spain. It is all a great joke with them, and they will never stop to look at the thing seriously. The one-sided, freakish and chivalrous war has intensified the humor of the situation. As well argue against a cyclone as against a national movement. The American people are fearless and determined. They go ahead to the aim in view, and can take no backward step. They have solved many difficulties in the past by sheer headlong obstinacy. They will solve these difficulties in the same fashion. Let us join the procession. Let us not cheapen our influence by mugwumpery, but accept the inevitable, step to the front as leaders and handle the movement as best we can. Especially, they tell us, we must seize the occasion to emphasize the value of wise methods, and, above all, the vital needs of thorough Civil Service reform.

But Civil Service reform is the special abhorrence of most of the leaders in the movement for annexation. The petty offices the Philippines promise are the basis of half their influence. The promises of the Administration lavishly scattered before nomination as before election are still far in excess of their fulfillment. Because of these outstanding promises our volunteer army has been cheapened and disgraced. Is there any promise of better things when civil rule in the Islands shall succeed martial law and the natives are turned over

to "amateur experimenters in colonial administration?"

As a matter of fact we know that the pressure of the spoilsman has been and is greater than most Presidents can resist. The appointment of civil officials in the Philippines means the carnival of the spoilsmen. The United States must prepare itself for scandal and corruption in greater measure than it has ever yet known. Already such scandals are ripening at Manila, if we may trust the guarded language of our volunteer soldiers. The "embalmed" beef and the rotten commissaries are only the first instalment. What shall follow will not be more fragrant. The universities of California have more than one hundred men in the ranks at Manila to-day, men of culture and education, volunteers who rushed forward at the call of their country. Over these men are some officers brave and manly, a few of them even trained for their business. But those officers placed in authority over our patriotic soldiers are not always gentlemen. Too many of them are men to whom in civil life these same volunteers would not entrust their dogs. Who is to blame for this? Who organized the army to place political pull in place of the training of West Point? Had our volunteers been sent to Cuba or Manila with only corporals chosen by themselves and not an officer of staff or line, brave as some of the latter were, they would have made as good a record as is shown to-day. Officers competent to lead, willing to share privations, could accomplish anything with these soldiers. The tinsel sons of politicians were an insult to patriotism. The feeling of the volunteer army to-day is that of men insulted on every side. Compare this with the feeling of the men who came home from Appomattox in 1865: and the difference is not in the soldiers; it is the work of the spoilsman.

The American soldier will gladly suffer every hardship necessary in the work on which his country sends him. Under real officers, men whose special training makes their orders effective, men who are not afraid to live or die in his company, he will face every danger. But he will not willingly endure imposed hardships which serve no purpose and which he thinks due to carelessness or greed, nor under pasteboard officers who riot in luxury while he rots in the swamps.

Very soon the preacher, the economist, and the politician who now work together for expansion shall part company. The politician does not enter the Philippines to convert the heathen—unless, indeed, he can convert them into coin. He is there for the same reason that the Spaniards were, what he can make out of it. He has shown no signs of repentance in the matter of spoils. He has not joined the economist in devising schemes for a purified automatic colonial Civil Service. When he is mustered out from one place he must be cared for somewhere else.

Let me give an illustration or two from past experience. Some ten or twelve years ago Congress made an effort to protect the buffalo herd in the Yellowstone Park. To this end provision was made for a certain number of experts to act as Keepers of the Park. Professor Baird, of the Smithsonian Institution, wished to have these Keepers drawn from the ranks of trained naturalists, that the Park might be investigated while the animals were cared for. He asked me to nominate one of these and my choice fell on a young man, a person of eminent fitness, a doctor of philosophy in Zoology and a man of physical strength and woodcraft. He is now curator in the Field Columbian Museum at Chicago. When the Congressman from his district in Indiana learned of this choice he demanded the right to make it himself. This the appointing power dared not refuse, and the Congressman proceeded to redeem his outstanding promises. He first chose a man named C—n, who could not accept as he was serving a sentence in the Monroe County jail for larceny. His second choice, H—n, received the notice of his appointment while under arrest for riding a mule into a Martinsville saloon on Sunday morning. The mule was sober and would not go in. H—n died of alcoholism at Mammoth Hot Springs, and the buffaloes were slaughtered in the Absarokie Hills unprotected and unavenged.

In 1890 the Census Bureau asked me to send them an expert in fishery matters, at a low salary, below that offered in the classified service. I suggested the name of a young man from Kansas. At once the representative from Topeka claimed the appointment. He had promised the first plum that fell to his district to Major Somebody, and the Major must have it. So the Census Bureau was obliged to find in the Post Office Department a position at the same salary for the Major. This the Major declined in indignant disgust.

Meanwhile the census of the marine industries went on in the hands of men grotesquely incompetent. They were set to doing things that could not be done. They copied their figures from the magnificent census report of 1880. They made statistics at random, which were changed in the Bureau itself to tally with the records of 1880. The expert wrote me: "However little confidence the outside public has in our census figures, it is vastly greater than the confidence of anyone inside the Bureau." Finally he resigned in disgust. The resignation was not accepted. Then he brought charges of incompetence and falsification against the chief of the division and all his clerks and enumerators save one or two. On investigation all were dismissed and the expert was directed to compile the census of the fisheries for 1890 from the report of the Fish Commission for 1888. The sound and thorough work of Willcox and Alexander was thus utilized, but the whole manuscript of the Census Bureau on the same subject costing several thousands of dollars went into the waste basket. The courage of one clerk saved us from trusting for our information to a lot of "amateur experimenters" in statistics.

The appointment of drunken idlers to positions of trust was an every-day affair in all departments not many years ago. The Civil Service regulations have saved the minor positions, but at the same time they have intensified the pressure on those above the classified list. It is a maxim of our politics that anybody will do for positions outside the country or where newspapers do not send their reporters. All of last year the parlors of the White House were crowded every day with vulgar incompetents, and the Senators forced to stand as their unwilling sponsors. Every one familiar with the facts knows that the day of appointments for merit only has not yet come to Washington. I have purposely chosen two cases from another administration. I can parallel both of these from the present one. I see in Mexico the President and his advisers using every effort to select a wise and effective successor to Matias Romero, their accomplished and manly Ambassador at Washington. They have found, at last, such a man worthy of their country and ours. When we have chosen Ministers to Mexico, with one exception, Pacheco (himself a Spanish-Californian), not one of them has understood the language of the country to which he was sent. Fitness does not interest our politicians. The President at the best is almost helpless in the hands of the Congressional influence. The Administration has rarely tried to rise above it. In the international commissions only, useless and belated as most of them have been, can we see an effort to secure the best service possible. This fact we must recognize, and I do so with real satisfaction.

We may counsel together, economists and preachers; we may discuss in conventions the wise management of alien colonies; we may pass our virtuous resolutions; we may analyze the successes of the Dutch and the failures of the French, but our masters care not for our discussions and our resolutions. Even now the rough riders of our politics do not conceal their contempt of the whole business of good government. They are not in the Philippines "for their health," and our mugwump remonstrances are but as the idle wind which they regard not.

But the deed is not yet accomplished. I have tried to keep up with the progress of events, but I have never heard that we have constitutionally annexed any territories since we absorbed the little nation of Hawaii.

But if annexation is our final decision, the nation must begin at once its life and death grapple with spoilsmen in high places as well as in low.

We are told that the Philippine question is bringing our best men forward and that it therefore, furnishes a needed "stimulus to higher politics." But the higher politics has not yet been shown in our official action. It appears only in the earnest protest of all classes of men who look forward to the inevitable disaster. Their warning voices are outside of politics.

Admitting, however, that somewhere or other a reason exists for taking the Philippines; admitting that we have extinguished Aguinaldo somehow by gold or by sword, what shall we do with them?

Shall we hold them as vassal nations, subject to the sovereign will of Congress? Shall we make them territories, self-governing so far as may be under republican forms? Shall we devise tariffs and other statutes in their interest alone or shall we extend to them unchanged our protective tariff, our navigation laws, and our Chinese Exclusion Act just as they stand, without modification? At this point the Annexationists fall apart one from another. To hold the Philippines as a vassal nation is Imperialism. It is the method of Great Britain and Holland. Its justification is its success. It teaches respect for law, which is the first essential in industrial development. It holds the open door which is the first essential to commerce.

In promoting industrial progress in the tropics we have two successful models: wealth through enforced labor and through contract labor. Neither of these is slavery, as Mr. Ireland has pointed out, but the distinction is not one worth wrangling over. Java, with law and order, perfect cultivation, fine roads and great industrial activity, the fairest garden in all the world, furnishes the highest type of industrial success. The Island is one vast plantation owned by the kingdom of Holland. The natives have lost the title to the land and can not buy nor sell it. The natives pay their taxes to the government in work; the labor is obligatory and the obligation is enforced by law. In such manner the people are rescued from natural indolence. There is prosperity everywhere. The State derives a large revenue, the people are relatively contented, though a stranger to the idea of freedom. With politics the native has nothing to do. Missionaries are excluded from the island and the people have only to work as they are told, and enjoy themselves as they can. "This may not be republicanism, but it is business."

This is a way to a certain prosperity in the Philippines, but with us it is not a possible way. Our temper, our traditions, our machinery of government leave no room for such despotic paternalism. Even this method has failed in other Dutch colonies. It fails with the negroes in the Dutch colony of Surinam. In the midst of the coffee harvest the people go off to the woods for a month of devil worship. The spell comes on them and off they go. The only recourse of the plantation owners is to bring contract labor from China or Japan. This method has failed in Sumatra where the natives still hold out against the civilization that would make money out of their work.

Only through coolie contract labor has industrial success in any of the British West Indies been possible. The natives will not work continuously unless they are forced to work as slaves. But contract labor from the outside means the ultimate extermination of the

In tropical Mexico the industrial situation is not much better. The great haciendas in the sugar and coffee region, cheap as labor is (six to ten cents a day), are never sure of help when needed. Even now Señor Wollheim, Mexican Minister in Japan, is arranging for Japanese contract laborers to work the great coffee plantations of Chiapas and Tabasco. Enforced labor of the natives, contract labor from the outside—between these we must choose, if the tropics are made economically profitable. Both systems are forms of slavery, but slavery is endemic in the tropics. Freedom in the warm countries means freedom from work, but without work there is no wealth in

"If the Antilles are ever to thrive," says James Anthony Froude (as quoted by Mr. Ireland), "each of them should have some trained and skilful man at its head unembarrassed by local elective assemblies ... Let us persist in the other line, let us use the West Indian governments as asylums for average worthy persons to be provided for, and force on them black parliamentary institutions as a remedy for such persons' inefficiency, and these beautiful countries will become like Hayti with Obeah triumphant and children offered to the devil and salted and eaten, and the conscience of mankind wakes again and the Americans sweep them all away."

Concerning Dominica, Mr. Froude says: "Find a Rajah Brooke if you can, or a Mr. Smith of Scilly . . . Send him out with no more instructions than the Knight of La Mancha gave Sancho,—to fear God and do his duty. Put him on his metal. Promise him the praise of all good men if he does well; and if he calls to his help intelligent persons who understand the cultivation of soils and the management of men, in half a score of years Dominica will be the brightest gem of the Antilles . . . The leading of the wise few, the willing obedience of the many is the beginning and end of all right action. Secure this and you secure everything. Fail to secure this and be your liberties as wide as you can make them, no success is possible."

This ideal of Mr. Froude is not without precedent in American Colonial affairs. The wonderful development of New Metlakahtla by William Duncan is the perfection of wise paternalism. Its failure lies in its certain collapse when the strong hand of the founder is withdrawn. The rule of the Pribilof Islands is the same in theory, and under competent men, as it is to-day, it works well in practice. But government by rulers not responsible to the people they rule is Imperialism. It is contrary to our ways and traditions, and our newspapers and politicians alike hasten to repudiate it. It is, in fact, industrial success at the expense of political development. The alternative is to bring the Philippines into politics, to endow them with the rights of our citizens, to give them the services of our own politicians and let natives and carpet-baggers work out their own salvation under our forms of law. I cannot imagine any government much worse than this might be, but it is safer than Imperialism, if these lands and these people become a part of our democratic nation. If we must choose, let us stick to republican forms. A folly is always better than a crime. Confusion, bankruptcy, and failure probably are better in the long run than Imperialism. They are more easily cured. America has ideals in civil government and to these she must be loyal. The Union can never endure "half slave, half free," half democracy, half empire. We cannot run a republic in the West and a slave plantation in the East. We must set our bondsmen free, however unready they may be for freedom. There is no doubt that our forms of law, the evolution of ages, are ill fitted for the needs of primitive men. Doubtless it would be better for themselves to work out their own destiny as we have worked out ours. But if they join us, they must take up with our fashions because we cannot adapt ourselves to theirs.

The Anglo-Saxon is, doubtless, the grandest of races, pushing, effective, successful. But it is not the most lovable, the most considerate, nor the most just when it covets what another possesses. Most Anglo-Saxon achievements are justified only by success. "The efforts of our Anglo-Saxon nations," says Professor Lewis G. Janes "to civilize inferior races by force have always been tragic failures. Witness New Zealand where about 40,000 Maoris survive out of 700,000 who were there a century ago . . . It is not the testimony of history that the best survive. The strongest and ablest resist and are killed off. Those lacking in vitality who supinely submit to the inevitable are the ones who survive ... It is the fate of all people on whom conditions of life are forced in advance of their functional development. Does the tragedy of the passing of these peoples bring any adequate compensation to the world? The sociologist and ethical teacher is compelled to say no. It brutalizes and depraves the conqueror. It perpetuates despotic methods of government. It prolongs the evil region of militancy. It debases labor and gives rise to class distinctions.

"The Maoris, the Hawaiians, the Filipinos, the Cubans, are all more competent to rule themselves than we are to govern them, judged by any test that implies their permanent betterment and survival as a people. We have begun at the wrong end in our efforts to civilize the world . . . The path of conquest is gory with the blood of victors and victims alike."

"True liking between colors is impossible," says the London *Spectator*. But this may depend on how the man of white color

Says Goldwin Smith: "If empire is to be regarded as a field for philanthropic effort and the advancement of civilization, it may safely be said that nothing in that way equals, or ever has equalled, the British Empire in India. For the last three-quarters of a century, at all events, the empire has steadily administered in the interest

of Hindu. Yet what is the result? Two hundred millions of human sheep, without native leadership, without patriotism, without aspirations, without spur to self improvement of any kind; multiplying too many of them, in abject poverty and infantile dependence on a government which their numbers and necessities will too probably in the end overwhelm. Great Britain has deserved and won the respect of the Hindu; but she has never won, and is now perhaps less likely than ever to win, his love. Lord Elgin sorrowfully observes that there is more of a bond between man and dog than between Englishman and Hindu. The natives generally having been disarmed cannot rise against the conqueror, and their disaffection is shown only in occasional and local outbreaks, chiefly of a religious character, or in the impotent utterances of the native press. But the part of the population which was armed, that is to say the Sepoys, did break out into what was rather an insurrection of caste than a military mutiny, and committed atrocities which were fearfully avenged by the panic fears of the dominant race. It is perilous business all round, this of governing inferior races. Nor is it true that the work is done better by the highest race than by one upon a lower level, to which it is not so impossible to sympathize or even fuse with the lowest. 'Some of the tribes of the Philippines are said to be as fierce as Apaches. If that is all Uncle Sam will handle them in his accustomed style.' Is not a warning conveyed in such words? Dire experience has shown that the character of the matter suffers as well as the body of the slave.

"War, the almost certain concomitant of empire, is alleged to have a more blessed effect on the internal harmony of nations. This we are told not only in the press, but free from the pulpit; some going even so far as to intimate that the restoration of national harmony was a sufficient object for this war. The moral world would be strangely out of joint if a nation could cure itself of factiousness or of an internal disorder by shedding the blood and seizing the possessions of its neighbors. War has no such virtue. The victories of the Plantagenets in France were followed by insurrections and civil wars at home, largely owing to the spirit of violence which the raids of France had excited. The victories of Chatham were followed by disgraceful scenes of cabal and faction as well as of corruption, terminating in the prostration of patriotism and the domination of George III. and North. Party animosities in the United States do not seem to have been banished or even allayed by the Cuban War. Setting party divisions aside, no restoration of harmony appeared to be needed, so far as the white population was concerned. Not only peace, but good-will, between the North and the South had been restored in a surprising degree. The Blue and the Gray had fraternized on the field of Gettysburg. It was to harmonize white and black that some kindly influence was manifestly and urgently needed. But all through the war and since the war American papers have been almost daily recording cases of lynching, sometimes of such a character as to evince the last extremity of hatred and contempt. The negro is lymphatic, apathetic, patient of degradation and even of insult. But San Domingo saw that he had a tiger in him; and when the tiger broke loose, hell ensued. There has been at least one instance of the retaliatory lynching of a white man; and now we have a bloody battle of races at Virden. Why should the American Commonwealth want more negroes?"

It is said that we must conquer Aguinaldo because he in turn is unable to subdue the rest of the four hundred or fourteen hundred islands. We tolerate two republics in Hayti and five in Central America. What matter if two or three exist in the vast extent of the Philippine Archipelago? What business is that of ours? These wide-scattered islands never constituted one nation and never will. The most of them were never in the hands of Spain, except in name. Outside of Luzon there are thirty-two different tribes, it is said, each a little nation of itself, each speaking a different tongue. So far from being "paralyzed by centuries of Spanish oppression" as the editor of the "Outlook" describes them, most of these wild folks have never heard of Spain. What harm if our "new-caught" vassal the Mohammedan Sultan of Sulu shall continue to rule his Mohammedan tribes in Mohammedan fashion? We must let him do it anyhow. We cannot do it any better. Why not a republic of Visayas as well as a republic of Luzon? If separate autonomy suits the people concerned why should we fight for unification? Do we believe that Spanish rule was better than freedom? These wild tribes must work out their own destiny or else go into slavery. Perhaps the latter is their manifest destiny. There is no reason why we should make it ours.

As I have said many times, the function of democracy is not to secure good government, but to strengthen the people so that they may be wise enough to make good government for themselves. Not long ago, at the Congress of Religions in Omaha, I had occasion to say:

That government is best that makes the best men. In the training of manhood lies the certain pledge of better government in the future. The civic problems of the future will be greater than those of the past. They will concern not the relation of nation to nation, but of man to man. The policing of far-off islands, the herding of baboons and elephants, the maintenance of the machinery of Imperialism—all are petty things beside what the higher freedom demands. To turn to those empty and showy affairs is to neglect our own business for the gossip of our neighbors.

Men say that we want nobler political problems than those we have. We are tired of our tasks "artificial and transient," "insufferably parochial," and seek some new ones worthy of our national bigness. I have no patience with such talk as this. The greatest political problems the world has ever known are ours to-day, and still

unsolved—the problems of free men in freedom. Because these are hard and trying we would shirk them in order to meddle with the affairs of our weak-minded neighbors. So we are tired of the labor problem, the race problem, the corporation problem, the problem of coinage and of municipal government. Then let us turn to the politics of Guam and Mindanao, and let our own difficulties settle themselves! Shame on our cowardice! Are the politics of Luzon cleaner than those of New York? We would give our blood to our country, would we not? Then let us give her our brains. More than the blood of heroes she needs the brains of men.

"Insufferably parochial," the affairs of free men must ever be. The best government is that which best minds its own business. Our own affairs are always local and devoid of world interest. Only through usurpation and tyranny do governmental affairs attract the fickle notice of the world public.

The political greatness of England has never lain in her navies nor the force of her arms. It has lain in her struggle for individual freedom. Not Marlborough, nor Wellington, nor Grenville is its exponent. Let us say, rather, Pym and Hampden, Maine and Black-stone, Herbert Spencer and John Bright. The real problems of England have always been at home. The pomp of Imperialism, the display of naval power, the commercial control of India and China, all these are as *li* the bread and circuses," by which the Roman Emperors kept the mobs from their thrones. They kept the people busy and put off the day of final reckoning. "Gild the dome of the Invalides," was Napoleon's cynical command when he learned that the people of Paris were becoming desperate. The people of England seek for a higher justice, a worthier freedom, and so the ruling ministry crowns the good Queen as Empress of India.

Meanwhile, the real problems of civilization develop and ripen. They care nothing for the greatness of empire or the glitter of Imperialism. They must be solved by men, and each man must help solve his own problem.

The question is not whether Great Britain or the United States has the better form of Government or the nobler civic mission. There is room in the world for two types of Anglo-Saxon nations, and nothing has yet happened to show that civilization would gain if either were to take up the function of the other. We may not belittle the tremendous services of England in the enforcement of laws amid barbarism. We may not deny that every aggression of hers on weaker nations results in at least some good to the conquered, but we insist that our own function of turning masses into men, of "knowing men by name," is as noble as the function of the open door. The real "white man's burden" is not the control of delinquent and dependent races, the turning of indolence into gold. It is the development of what is sound and sane in human nature, the elimination of war and corruption by the force of healthy manhood. Better for the world that the whole British Empire should be dissolved as it must be late or soon,

"England must take all her colonies into political copartnership (of taxation and of responsibility) or else abandon them, or in the end be crushed by the burden of their care."

than that the United States should forget her own mission in a mad chase of emulation. He reads history to little purpose who finds in Imperial dominion, for dominion's sake, a result, a cause, or even a sign of national greatness.

We may have navy and coaling stations to meet our commercial needs without entering on colonial expansion. It takes no war to accomplish this honorably. Whatever land we may need in our business we may buy in the open market as we buy coal. If the owners will accept our price it needs no Imperialism to foot the bills. But the question of such need is one for commercial experts, not for politicians. Our decision should be in the interest of commerce, not of sea power. We need, no doubt, navy enough to protect us from insults, even though every battle-ship Charles Sumner pointed out fifty years ago, costs as much as Harvard College, and though schools, not battle-ships, make the strength of the United States. We have drawn more strength from Harvard College than from a thousand men-of-war. Once Spain owned some battle-ships as many and as strong as ours, but she had no men of science to handle them. A British fleet bottled up in Santiago or Cavite would have given a very different account of itself. It is men, not ships which make a navy. It is our moral and material force, our brains and character and ingenuity and wealth that makes America a power among the nations, not her battle-ships. These are only visible symptoms, designed to impress the ignorant or incredulous. The display of force saves us from insults—from those who do not know our mettle.

Annexationists now admit that the seizure of the Philippines is a "leap in the dark." But this is not the truth. Every element in the matter is known, and well known, to every student of political science. Our excellent commission can bring us no new facts. What we do not know is which way Congress may decide to leap. Between military rule and democratic anarchy there is all the difference in the world, and the degree of our final disappointment depends on our policy as to conciliation, taxation, and the control of the Civil Service.

Just when shall we begin democratic rule in the Philippines? How shall we make it work with a people alien and perverse, who have no Anglo-Saxon instincts and no relation to our history? It will take some time, some say 20 years, some 500, of military discipline to prepare them to do their part as citizens of the United States, their part in governing us. Military rule is offensive and costly. The longer it endures the less fitted are

the people for civic independence. Are we ready to meet the expense? Some say that we must wait till the Anglo-Saxon is in the numerical majority. That time will never come. With every rod of Luzon soil marked by an Anglo-Saxon grave, the living Anglo-Saxons would be a hopeless minority.

If we go further into details of control of the tropics we shall see that difficulties accumulate. When we consider a tariff policy for the Philippine Islands we find ourselves at once between the devil and the deep sea. The "open door" is the price of England's favor, or rather it is the price of the approval of England's ruling politicians. It is the price of our own commerce. A generous policy as to foreign trade is essential to any kind of prosperity. But the open door to commerce marks the doom of our protective system. It is left for Imperialism to give the death blow to Protectionism. The open door places the veto on our schemes for Asiatic exclusion. To open the doors of the Orient is to open our doors to Asia as well. To do or not to do is alike difficult and dangerous. The feeling that unless we can exploit the Islands and ultimately exterminate their inhabitants we do not want them at all is growing, especially in humanitarian circles. The dead hand of monasticism already holds a great part of Luzon. This we cannot tolerate for it was the head and front of Spanish oppression, nor by our Constitution can we remedy it. We are bound to respect the rights of property, however acquired. Our sole remedy for any ill is freedom. For these problems I see no solution, nor indeed should we hope for any. If the Administration should formulate any policy whatever, two-thirds of the expansionists would repudiate it. There is no scheme on which we can agree which can be made to work.

"Something between an American territory and a British colony," we are told, is to be their final condition. A territory is a waiting State; a colony is land held under martial law or in any other way for the good of trade. To work for something between these is to fail on every hand. As matters are, we shall fall short of Imperialism. On the other hand, we shall fail to give justice. The final result will be a hybrid military imperial-democratic occupation, unworthy the name of government, the laughing stock of the monarchy, the shame of democracy. Toward such a condition the movement of events is swiftly rushing us.

I note in the journals that the Secretary of the Treasury in his estimates takes no account of the revenue to be derived from Cuba and the Philippines. For this the papers justly praise his wisdom. There can be no real revenue from these sources. The only income which any people can receive from colonies is through increase of trade. This goes into private hands but finally swells the wealth of taxables. Since her experience in 1776, England has never taxed her colonies. The more worthless islands we undertake to conquer and rule the further are we from a favorable balance of accounts.

We now come to the final question: If we take the Philippines, what will they do to us?

If we fail, they will corrupt and weaken us. If we succeed and continue our success, they will destroy our national ideals. To rule them as a vassal nation is to abandon our democracy, to introduce into our government machinery which is not in the people's hands. Shall we handle our vassals through the President, through Congress, or through military occupation? Obviously military occupation, under the direction of the Executive, is the only possible way. Congress is too busy with other things. Paternalism degenerates into tyranny, and without the artificial stimulus of honor and titles which England so lavishly uses tyranny becomes corruption and neglect. To admit the Filipinos to equality in government is to degrade our own citizenship with only the slightest prospect of ever raising theirs. It is to establish rotten boroughs where corruption shall be the rule and true democracy impossible. The relation of our people to the lower races of men of whatever kind has been one which degrades and exasperates. Every alien race within our borders is, to-day, an element of danger. When the Anglo-Saxon meets the Negro, the Chinaman, the Indian, the Mexican as fellow-citizens, equal before the law, we have a raw wound in our political organism. Democracy demands likeness of aims and purposes among its units. Each citizen must hold his own freedom in a republic. If men cannot hold their rights through our methods our machinery runs over them. The Anglo-Saxon will not mix with the lower races. Neither will he respect their rights if they are not strong enough to maintain them for themselves. If they can do this they cease to be lower races.

Between Imperialism on the one hand and assimilation on the other, are all unwholesome possibilities. An efficient colonial bureau would be as in England an affair of the Crown, its details out of the people's hands. An inefficient one would be simply spoils in the hands of future Tammanies. Unless represented in Congress and potent in party conventions outlying possessions will be wholly neglected. When the newspaper correspondents are called home nobody cares what goes on in Cuba or Manila. We have not yet framed a code of laws for Hawaii or Alaska.

With the war in Luzon a certain class of obligations have arisen. These should be met in manly fashion. But the final result should not be a Philippine State, which shall rule itself and help rule us. Still less do we want an oligarchy of sugar syndicates, or a rule by military force, or a carpet-bag anarchy like that which once desolated the South, nor the equal corruption of rule under agents and proconsuls sent out from Washington. These alternatives are all abhorrent, and we see no other save that of chronic hopeless guerilla warfare, the condition in Luzon to-day, unless we recognize Philippine independence. This has its embarrassments, too, but they are

honorable ones and can leave no disgrace or regret.

The establishment of a protectorate over the Philippines has many difficulties. It is on the one hand a scheme for finally seizing the Islands, on the other a device to let them go easily. If we assume unasked responsibilities for them, they will be reckless in making trouble. A protected republic is the acme of irresponsibility. Its politicians may declare war against neutral nations, solely "to see the wheels go round." As matters now stand we have no other course before us, and the blunders in dealing with Aguinaldo have made this course not easy. The protectorate is favored by the best judgment of the Filipinos themselves. They ask the help and sympathy of America.

Ramon Reyes Lala, a full-blooded Filipino, born in Luzon but educated in England, an American citizen of standing in New York, is quoted as saying:

"Although I believe we have a great future, I cannot disguise to myself the fact that we are not yet ready for independence. More especially because the Filipinos have not had the preparation for self-government possessed by the founders of the American Republic. And I apprehend that, intoxicated with their new-found liberty, the Filipinos might perpetrate excesses that would prove fatal to the race. I feel this all the more when I consider that the revolutionary leaders, Aguinaldo and his companions, though fervent patriots, do not represent the best classes of my countrymen, who, almost without exception, are for a protectorate, or for annexation.

"And it is this that I, too, a Filipino, desire most ardently. Give us an American protectorate; a territorial government; the judiciary, the customs, and the executive in the hands of Federal officials; the interior and domestic administration in the hands of the Filipinos themselves; and their self-selected officials will rule understandingly and well without friction, which would be wholly impossible for alien functionaries begotten of a Western civilization.

"Of you, Americans, I, a Filipino, therefore, beg to not leave my countrymen as you found them. You cannot, in humanity, give them back into Spanish bondage. You cannot, in justice, sell them to some European power to become subject, most likely, to another tyranny. They feel that they have fought for and won their own freedom, though acknowledging that you have facilitated it. They would, therefore, oppose such disposition to the bitter death. And a Filipino knows how to die! Let a thousand martyrs attest!

"You must help them, you who have so nobly assisted in freeing them; you must make it possible for them to attain their destiny—the realization of the national self."

The following words of Clay McCauley, a British naturalist, are worthy of careful consideration in this connection: "As a result of a study of the situation at Manila I think there are only three ways open to the United States for the solution of the Philippines problem. In the first place the Islands must be annexed by force or purchase. The use of force means that the United States will be plunged into the most disastrous foreign war in their history, a war that would entail great loss of life and treasure and the violation of national honor. Purchase means the recognition of the insurgents as allies during the war with Spain, the reward of the leaders with high office and salaries, the employment of insurgents in military and civil offices, with hack pay as allies for some months, etc. Such purchase would secure a compromising gain of doubtful tenure.

"Generally speaking, the Americans in Manila are opposed to annexations any form. The second way open is to make a complete transfer of the sovereignty in these Islands from Spain to the Philippine Republic, the United States retaining full use Manila Bay and ports—like Hong Kong by Great Britain. This solution means the defenseless exposure of the Philippine Islands to the greed of the world's powers with a consequent acute crisis in Europe over its Far Eastern question. This way is neither honorable nor wise. The third is to recognize the autonomy of the Philippines under an American protectorate. This means independence for the Philippine Republic in the administration of its own internal affairs, the United States taking charge of the supreme judiciary and the republic's foreign relations, such as the power to declare war or to enter into treaties with foreign powers and the control of the customs. This solution might bring about tutelage towards absolute independence in the future or voluntary annexation to the United States. Only by the third way can there be peace and prosperity for both the United States [unclear: and the] Philippines. Immediate action is imperative."

As to our true policy of to-day I give the fullest endorsement to the sane words of Professor Janes, in substance as follows:

1. Let us carry out the solemn pledge made to the world with respect to Cuba, and retain military possession only long enough to enable the Cubans to organize a government of their own. We have no right to insist that our own, or any particular form of government shall be adopted by the Cubans, or to impose qualifications of

2. The same rule should be adopted in regard to Porto Rico.

3. This government should acquire no inhabited country which cannot be made self governing under our forms and ultimately received into the family of States. If, in the future, the people of Cuba and Porto Rico agree with those of the United States that annexation is mutually desirable, the matter can be decided, and in accordance with the provisions of their Constitution and ours.

4. Our policy in the Philippines should be exactly the same. Let the people fit their government to their own

needs with the guarantee of our protection from outside interference for a time, at least.

5. Under no circumstances should distant territory inhabited by an alien population, not self-governing under republican forms, be retained as a permanent possession by the United States.

The immediate necessity of the day is set forth in the petition of the "Anti-Imperialist League:"

"They urge, therefore, all lovers of freedom, without regard to party associations, to cooperate with them to the following ends:

"First. That our government shall take immediate steps towards a suspension of hostilities in the Philippines and a conference with the Philippine leaders, with a view of preventing further bloodshed upon the basis of a recognition of their freedom and independence as soon as proper guarantees can be had of order and protection to property.

"Second. That the Congress of the United States shall tender an official assurance to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that they will encourage and assist in the organization of such a government in the Islands as the people thereof shall prefer, and that upon its organization in stable manner the United States, in accordance with its traditional and prescriptive policy in such cases, will recognize the independence of the Philippines and its equality among nations, and gradually withdraw all military and naval forces."

There is nothing before us now save to make peace with the Filipinos to get our money back if we can, to get a coaling station if we must—and get out. *These people must first be free before they can enter a nation of freemen.*

I may quote in this connection the noble words of Carl Schurz:

"We are told that, having grown so great and strong, we must at least cast off our childish reverence for the teachings of Washington's farewell address—'nursery rhymes that were sung around the cradle of the republic.' I apprehend that many of those who now so flippantly scoff at the heritage the Father of his Country left us in his last words of admonition, have never read that venerable document. I challenge those who have to show me a single sentence of general import in it that would not as a wise rule of national conduct apply to the circumstances of to-day. What is it that has given to Washington's farewell address an authority that was revered by all until our recent victories made so many of us drunk with wild ambitions? Not only the prestige of Washington's name, great as that was and should ever remain. No, it was the fact that under a respectful observance of those teachings this Republic has grown from the most modest beginnings into a Union spanning this vast continent our people having multiplied from a handful to 75,000,000; we have risen from poverty to a wealth the sum of which the imagination can hardly grasp; this American nation has become one of the greatest and most powerful on earth, and, continuing in the same course, will surely become the greatest and most powerful of all. Not Washington's name alone gave his teachings their dignity and weight; it was the practical results of his policy that secured to it, until now, the intelligent approbation of the American people. And unless we have completely lost our senses, we shall never despise and reject as mere 'nursery rhymes' the words of wisdom left us by the greatest of Americans, following which the American people have achieved a splendor of development without parallel in the history of mankind."

The grave responsibility we have assumed, that of bringing freedom to the oppressed, calls us to act with conscience and with caution. We are no longer a child nation, a band of irresponsible human colts, but mature men, capable of wielding the strongest influence humanity has felt. We must shun folly. We must despise greed. We must turn from glitter and cant and sham. We must hate injustice as we have hated intolerance and oppression. We must never forget among the nations we alone stand for the individual man.

The greatness of a nation lies not in its bigness but in its justice, in the wisdom and virtue of its people, and in the prosperity of their individual affairs. The nation exists for its men, never the men for the nation. "I cannot help thinking of you as you deserve," said Thoreau; "O, ye governments! The only government that I recognize—and it matters not how few are at the head of it or how small is its army—is that which establishes justice in the land, never that which establishes injustice." The will of free men to be just, one towards another, is our final guarantee that "government of the people, for the people, by the people, shall not perish from the earth."

The Scope of Social Anthropology

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The Scope of Social Anthropology

THE subject of the chair which I have the honour to hold is Social Anthropology. As the subject is still

comparatively new and its limits are still somewhat vague, I shall devote my inaugural lecture to defining its scope and marking out roughly, if not the boundaries of the whole study, at least the boundaries of that part of it which I propose to take for my province.

Strange as it may seem, in the large and thriving family of the sciences, Anthropology, or the Science of Man, is the latest born. So young indeed is the study that three of its distinguished founders in England, Professor E. B. Tylor, Lord Avebury, and Mr. Francis Galton, are happily still with us. It is true that particular departments of man's complex nature have long been the theme of special studies. Anatomy has investigated his body, psychology has explored his mind, theology and metaphysics have sought to plumb the depths of the great mysteries by which he is encompassed on every hand. But it has been reserved for the present generation, or rather for the generation which is passing away, to attempt the comprehensive study of man as a whole, to enquire not merely into the physical and mental structure of the individual, but to compare the various races of men, to trace their affinities, and by means of a wide collection of facts to follow as far as may be the evolution of human thought and institutions from the earliest times. The aim of this, as of every other science, is to discover the general laws to which the particular facts may be supposed to conform. I say, may be supposed to conform, because research in all departments has rendered it antecedently probable that everywhere law and order will be found to prevail if we search for them diligently, and that accordingly the affairs of man, however complex and incalculable they may seem to be, are no exception to the uniformity of nature. Anthropology, therefore, in the widest sense of the word, aims at discovering the general laws which have regulated human history in the past, and which, if nature is really uniform, may be expected to regulate

Hence the science of man coincides to a certain extent with what has long been known as the philosophy of history as well as with the study to which of late years the name of Sociology has been given. Indeed it might with some reason be held that Social Anthropology, or the study of man in society, is only another expression for Sociology. Yet I think that the two sciences may be conveniently distinguished, and that while the name of Sociology should be reserved for the study of human society in the most comprehensive sense of the words, the name of Social Anthropology may with advantage be restricted to one particular department of that immense field of knowledge. At least I wish to make it perfectly clear at the outset that I for one do not pretend to treat of the whole of human society, past, present, and future. Whether any single man's compass of mind and range of learning suffice for such a vast undertaking, I will not venture to say, but I do say without hesitation or ambiguity that mine certainly do not. I can only speak of what I have studied, and my studies have been mostly confined to a small, a very small part of man's social history. That part is the origin, or rather the rudimentary phases, the infancy and childhood, of human society, and to that part accordingly I propose to limit the scope of Social Anthropology, or at all events my treatment of it. My successors in the chair will be free to extend their purview beyond the narrow boundaries which the limitation of my knowledge imposes on me. They may survey the latest developments as well as the earliest beginnings of custom and law, of science and art, of morality and religion, and from that survey they may deduce the principles which should guide mankind in the future, so that those who come after us may avoid the snares and pitfalls into which we and our fathers have slipped. For the best fruit of knowledge is wisdom, and it may reasonably be hoped that a deeper and wider acquaintance with the past history of mankind will in time enable our statesmen to mould the destiny of the race in fairer forms than we of this generation shall live to see.

*Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart's desire!*

But if you wish to shatter the social fabric, you must not expect your professor of Social Anthropology to aid and abet you. He is no seer to discern, no prophet to foretell a coming heaven on earth, no mountebank with a sovran remedy for every ill, no Red Cross Knight to head a crusade against misery and want, against disease and death, against all the horrid spectres that war on poor humanity. It is for others with higher notes and nobler natures than his to sound the charge and lead it in this Holy War. He is only a student, a student of the past, who may perhaps tell you a little, a very little, of what has been, but who cannot, dare not tell you what ought to be. Yet even the little that he can contribute to the elucidation of the past may have its utility as well as its interest when it finally takes its place in that great temple of science to which it is the ambition of every student to add a stone. For we cherish a belief that if we truly love and seek knowledge for its own sake, without any ulterior aim, every addition we may make to it, however insignificant and useless it may appear, will yet at last be found to work together with the whole accumulated store for the general good of mankind.

Thus the sphere of Social Anthropology as I understand it, or at least as I propose to treat it, is limited to

the crude beginnings, the rudimentary development of human society: it does not include the maturer phases of that complex growth, still less does it embrace the practical problems with which our modern statesmen and lawgivers are called upon to deal. The study might accordingly be described as the embryology of human thought and institutions, or, to be more precise, as that enquiry which seeks to ascertain, first, the beliefs and customs of savages, and, second, the relics of these beliefs and customs which have survived like fossils among peoples of higher culture. In this description of the sphere of Social Anthropology it is implied that the ancestors of the civilised nations were once savages, and that they have transmitted, or may have transmitted, to their more cultured descendants ideas and institutions which, however incongruous with their later surroundings, were perfectly in keeping with the modes of thought and action of the ruder society in which they originated. In short, the definition assumes that civilisation has always and everywhere been evolved out of savagery. The mass of evidence on which this assumption rests is in my opinion so great as to render the induction incontrovertible. At least, if any one disputes it I do not think it worth while to argue with him. There are still, I believe, in civilised society people who hold that the earth is flat and that the sun goes round it; but no sensible man will waste time in the vain attempt to convince such persons of their error, even though these flatteners of the earth and circulators of the sun appeal with perfect justice to the evidence of their senses in support of their hallucination, which is more than the opponents of man's primitive savagery are able to do.

Thus the study of savage life is a very important part of Social Anthropology. For by comparison with civilised man the savage represents an arrested or rather retarded stage of social development, and an examination of his customs and beliefs accordingly supplies the same sort of evidence of the evolution of the human mind that an examination of the embryo supplies of the evolution of the human body. To put it otherwise, a savage is to a civilised man as a child is to an adult; and just as the gradual growth of intelligence in a child corresponds to, and in a sense recapitulates, the gradual growth of intelligence in the species, so a study of savage society at various stages of evolution enables us to follow approximately, though of course not exactly, the road by which the ancestors of the higher races must have travelled in their progress upward through barbarism to civilisation. In short, savagery is the primitive condition of mankind, and if we would understand what primitive man was we must know what the savage now is.

But here it is necessary to guard against a common misapprehension. The savages of to-day are primitive only in a relative, not in an absolute sense. They are primitive by comparison with us; but they are not primitive by comparison with truly primæval man, that is, with man as he was when he first emerged from the purely bestial stage of existence. Indeed, compared with man in his absolutely pristine state even the lowest savage of to-day is doubtless a highly developed and cultured being, since all evidence and all probability are in favour of the view that every existing race of men, the rudest as well as the most civilised, has reached its present level of culture, whether it be high or low, only after a slow and painful progress upwards, which must have extended over many thousands, perhaps millions, of years. Therefore when we speak of any known savages as primitive, which the usage of the English language permits us to do, it should always be remembered that we apply the term primitive to them in a relative, not in an absolute sense. What we mean is that their culture is rudimentary compared with that of the civilised nations, but not by any means that it is identical with that of primæval man. It is necessary to emphasise this relative use of the term primitive in its application to all known savages without exception, because the ambiguity arising from the double meaning of the word has been the source of much confusion and misunderstanding. Careless or unscrupulous writers have made great play with it for purposes of controversy, using the word now in the one sense and now in the other as it suited their argument at the moment, without perceiving, or at all events without indicating, the equivocation. In order to avoid these verbal fallacies it is only necessary to bear steadily in mind that while Social Anthropology has much to say of primitive man in the relative sense, it has nothing whatever to say about primitive man in the absolute sense, and that for the very simple reason that it knows nothing whatever about him, and, so far as we can see at present, is never likely to know anything. To construct a history of human society by starting from absolutely primordial man and working down through thousands or millions of years to the institutions or existing savages might possibly have merits as a flight of imagination, but it could have none as a work of science. To do this would be exactly to reverse the proper mode of scientific procedure. It would be to work *a priori* from the unknown to the known instead of *a posteriori* from the known to the unknown. For we do know a good deal about the social state of the savages of to-day and yesterday, but we know nothing whatever, I repeat, about absolutely primitive human society. Hence a sober enquirer who seeks to elucidate the social evolution of mankind in ages before the dawn of history must start, not from an unknown and purely hypothetical primæval man, but from the lowest savages whom we know or possess adequate records of; and from their customs, beliefs, and traditions as a solid basis of fact he may work back a little way hypothetically through the obscurity of the past; that is, he may form a reasonable theory of the way in which these actual customs, beliefs, and traditions have grown up and developed in a period more or less remote, but probably not very remote, from the one in which they have been observed and recorded. But if, as I assume, he is a sober enquirer, he will never

expect to carry back this reconstruction of human history very far, still less will he dream of linking it up with the very beginning, because he is aware that we possess no evidence which would enable us to bridge even hypothetically the gulf of thousands or millions of years which divides the savage of to-day from primæval man.

It may be well to illustrate my meaning by an example. The matrimonial customs and modes of tracing relationships which prevail among some savage races, and even among peoples at a higher stage of culture, furnish very strong grounds for believing that the systems of marriage and consanguinity which are now in vogue among civilised peoples must have been immediately preceded at a more or less distant time by very different modes of counting kin and regulating marriage; in fact, that monogamy and the forbidden degrees of kinship have replaced an older system of much wider and looser sexual relations. But to say this is not to affirm that such looser and wider relations were characteristic of the absolutely primitive condition of mankind; it is only to say that actually existing customs and traditions clearly indicate the extensive prevalence of such relations at some former time in the history of our race. How remote that time was, we cannot tell; but, estimated by the whole vast period of man's existence on earth, it seems probable that the era of sexual communism to which the evidence points was comparatively recent; in other words, that for the civilised races the interval which divides that era from our own is to be reckoned by thousands rather than by hundreds of thousands of years, while for the lowest of existing savages, for example, the aborigines of Australia, it is possible or probable that the interval may not be greater than a few centuries. Be that as it may, even if on the strength of the evidence I have referred to we could demonstrate the former prevalence of a system of sexual communism among all the races of mankind, this would only carry us back a single step in the long history of our species; it would not justify us in concluding that such a system had been practised by truly primæval man, still less that it had prevailed among mankind from the beginning down to the comparatively recent period at which its existence may be inferred from the evidence at our disposal. About the social condition of primæval man, I repeat, we know absolutely nothing, and it is vain to speculate. Our first parents may have been as strict monogamists as Whiston or Dr. Primrose, or they may have been just the reverse. We have no information on the subject, and are never likely to get any. In the countless ages which have elapsed since man and woman first roamed the happy garden hand in hand or jabbered like apes among the leafy boughs of the virgin forest, their relations to each other may have undergone innumerable changes. For human affairs, like the courses of the heaven, seem to run in cycles: the social pendulum swings to and fro from one extremity of the scale to the other: in the political sphere it has swung from democracy to despotism, and back again from despotism to democracy; and so in the domestic sphere it may have oscillated many a time between libertinism and monogamy.

If I am right in my definition of Social Anthropology, its province may be roughly divided into two departments, one of which embraces the customs and beliefs of savages, while the other includes such relics of these customs and beliefs as have survived in the thought and institutions of more cultured peoples. The one department may be called the study of savagery, the other the study of folklore. I have said something of savagery: I now turn to folklore, that is, to the survivals of more primitive ideas and practices among peoples who in other respects have risen to a higher plane of culture. That such survivals may be discovered in every civilised nation will hardly now be disputed by anybody. When we read, for example, of an Irishwoman roasted to death by her husband on a suspicion that she was not his wife but a fairy changeling,

This happened at Ballyvadlea, in the county of Tipperary, in March 1895. For details of the evidence given at the trial of the murderers, see "The 'Witch-burning' at Clonmel," *Folk-lore*, vi. (1895) pp. 373-384.

or again, of an Englishwoman dying of lockjaw because she had anointed the nail that wounded her instead of the wound,

This happened at Norwich in June 1902. See *The Peopled Weekly Journal for Norfolk* July 19, 1902, p. 8.

we may be sure that the beliefs to which these poor creatures fell victims were not learned by them in school or at church, but had been transmitted from truly savage ancestors through many generations of outwardly though not really civilised descendants. Beliefs and practices of this sort are therefore rightly called superstitions, which means literally survivals. It is with superstitions in the strict sense of the word that the second department of Social Anthropology is concerned.

If we ask how it happens that superstitions linger among a people who in general have reached a higher level of culture, the answer is to be found in the natural, universal, and ineradicable inequality of men. Not only are different races differently endowed in respect of intelligence, courage, industry, and so forth, but within the same nation men of the same generation differ enormously in inborn capacity and worth. No abstract doctrine is more false and mischievous than that of the natural equality of men. It is true that the legislator must treat men as if they were equal, because laws of necessity are general and cannot be made so as to fit the infinite variety of individual cases. But we must not imagine that because men are equal before the law they are therefore intrinsically equal to each other. The experience of common life sufficiently contradicts such a vain

imagination. At school and at the universities, at work and at play, in peace and in war, the mental and moral inequalities of human beings stand out too conspicuously to be ignored or disputed. On the whole the men of keenest intelligence and strongest characters lead the rest and shape the moulds into which, outwardly at least, society is cast. As such men are necessarily few by comparison with the multitude whom they lead, it follows that the community is really dominated by the will of an enlightened minority

I say "*an* enlightened minority," because in any large community there are always many minorities, and some of them are very far from enlightened. It is possible to be below as well as above the average level of our fellows.

even in countries where the ruling power is nominally vested in the hands of the numerical majority. In fact, disguise it as we may, the government of mankind is always and everywhere essentially aristocratic. No juggling with political machinery can evade this law of nature. However it may seem to lead, the dull-witted majority in the end follows a keener-witted minority. That is its salvation and the secret of progress. The higher human intelligence sways the lower, just as the intelligence of man gives him the mastery over the brutes. I do not mean that the ultimate direction of society rests with its nominal governors, with its kings, its statesmen, its legislators. The true rulers of men are the thinkers who advance knowledge; for just as it is through his superior knowledge, not through his superior strength, that man bears rule over the rest of the animal creation, so among men themselves it is knowledge which in the long run directs and controls the forces of society. Thus the discoverers of new truths are the real though uncrowned and unscathed kings of mankind; monarchs, statesmen, and law-givers are but their ministers, who sooner or later do their bidding by carrying out the ideas of these master minds. The more we study the inward workings of society and the progress of civilisation, the more clearly shall we perceive how both are governed by the influence of thoughts which, springing up at first we know not how or whence in a few superior minds, gradually spread till they have leavened the whole inert lump of a community or of mankind. The origin of such mental variations, with all their far-reaching train of social consequences, is just as obscure as is the origin of those physical variations on which, if biologists are right, depends the evolution of species, and with it the possibility of progress. Perhaps the same unknown cause which determines the one set of variations gives rise to the other also. We cannot tell. All we can say is that on the whole in the conflict of competing forces, whether physical or mental, the strongest at last prevails, the fittest survives. In the mental sphere the struggle for existence is not less fierce and internecine than in the physical, but in the end the better ideas, which we call the truth, carry the day. The clamorous opposition with which at their first appearance they are regularly greeted whenever they conflict with old prejudices may retard but cannot prevent their final victory. It is the practice of the mob first to stone and then to erect useless memorials to their greatest benefactors. All who set themselves to replace ancient error and superstition by truth and reason must lay their account with brickbats in their life and a marble monument after death.

I have been led into making these remarks by the wish to explain why it is that superstitions of all sorts, political, moral, and religious, survive among peoples who have the opportunity of knowing better. The reason is that the better ideas, which are constantly forming in the upper stratum, have not yet filtered through from the highest to the lowest minds. Such a filtration is generally slow, and by the time that the new notions have penetrated to the bottom, if indeed they ever get there, they are often already obsolete and superseded by others at the top. Hence it is that if we could open the heads and read the thoughts of two men of the same generation and country but at opposite ends of the intellectual scale, we should probably find their minds as different as if the two belonged to different species. Mankind, as it has been well said, advances in *échelons*; that is, the columns march not abreast of each other but in a straggling line, all lagging in various degrees behind the leader. The image well describes the difference not only between peoples, but between individuals of the same people and the same generation. Just as one nation is continually outstripping some of its contemporaries, so within the same nation some men are constantly outpacing their fellows, and the foremost in the race are those who have thrown off the load of superstition which still burdens the backs and clogs the footsteps of the laggards. To drop metaphor, superstitions survive because, while they shock the views or enlightened members of the community, they are still in harmony with the thoughts and feelings of others who, though they are drilled by their betters into an appearance of civilisation, remain barbarians or savages at heart. That is why, for example, the barbarous punishments for high treason and witchcraft and the enormities of slavery were tolerated and defended in this country down to modern times. Such survivals may be divided into two sorts, according as they are public or private; in other words, according as they are embodied in the law of the land or are practised with or without the connivance of the law in holes and corners. The examples I have just cited belong to the former of these two classes. Witches were publicly burned and traitors were publicly disembowelled in England not so long ago, and slavery survived as a legal institution still later. The true nature of such public superstitions is apt, through their very publicity, to escape detection, because until they are finally swept away by the rising tide of progress, there are always plenty of people to defend them as institutions essential to the public welfare and sanctioned by the laws of God

It is otherwise with those private superstitions to which the name of folklore is usually confined. In civilised society most educated people are not even aware of the extent to which these relics of savage ignorance survive at their doors. The discovery of their wide prevalence was indeed only made last century, chiefly through the researches of the brothers Grimm in Germany. Since their day systematic enquiries carried on among the less educated classes, and especially among the peasantry, of Europe have revealed the astonishing, nay, alarming truth that a mass, if not the majority, of people in every civilised country is still living in a state of intellectual savagery, that, in fact, the smooth surface of cultured society is sapped and mined by superstition. Only those whose studies have led them to investigate the subject are aware of the depth to which the ground beneath our feet is thus as it were honeycombed by unseen forces. We appear to be standing on a volcano which may at any moment break out in smoke and fire to spread ruin and devastation among the gardens and palaces of ancient culture wrought so laboriously by the hands of many generations. After looking on the ruined Greek temples of Paestum and contrasting them with the squalor and savagery of the Italian peasantry, Renan said, "I trembled for civilisation, seeing it so limited, built on so weak a foundation, resting on so few individuals even in the country where it is dominant."

F. Renan et M. Berthelot, *Correspondence* (Paris, 1898), pp. 75 [*unclear: sq*]

If we examine the superstitious beliefs which are tacitly but firmly held by many of our fellow-countrymen, we shall find, perhaps to our surprise, that it is precisely the oldest and crudest superstitions which are most tenacious of life, while views which, though also erroneous, are more modern and refined, soon fade from the popular memory. For example, the high gods of Egypt and Babylon, of Greece and Rome, have for ages been totally forgotten by the people and survive only in the books of the learned; yet the peasants, who never even heard of Isis and Osiris, of Apollo and Artemis, of Jupiter and Juno, retain to this day a firm belief in witches and fairies, in ghosts and hobgoblins, those lesser creatures of the mythical fancy in which their fathers believed long before the great deities of the ancient world were ever thought of, and in which, to all appearance, their descendants will continue to believe long after the great deities of the present day shall have gone the way of all their predecessors. The reason why the higher forms of superstition or religion (for the religion of one generation is apt to become the superstition of the next) are less permanent than the lower is simply that the higher beliefs, being a creation of superior intelligence, have little hold on the minds of the vulgar, who nominally profess them for a time in conformity with the will of their betters, but readily shed and forget them as soon as these beliefs have gone out of fashion with the educated classes. But while they dismiss without a pang or an effort articles of faith which were only superficially imprinted on their minds by the weight of cultured opinion, the ignorant and foolish multitude cling with a sullen determination to far grosser beliefs which really answer to the coarser texture of their undeveloped intellect. Thus while the avowed creed of the enlightened minority is constantly changing under the influence of reflection and enquiry, the real, though unavowed, creed of the mass of mankind appears to be almost stationary, and the reason why it alters so little is that in the majority of men, whether they are savages or outwardly civilised beings, intellectual progress is so slow as to be hardly perceptible.

Thus from an examination, first, of savagery and, second, of its survivals in civilisation, the study of Social Anthropology attempts to trace the early history of human thought and institutions. The history can never be complete, unless indeed science should discover some mode of reading the faded record of the past of which we in this generation can hardly dream. We know indeed that every event, however insignificant, implies a change, however slight, in the material constitution of the universe, so that the whole history of the world is, in a sense, engraved upon its face, though our eyes are too dim to read the scroll. It may be that in the future some wondrous reagent, some magic chemical, may yet be found to bring out the whole of nature's secret handwriting for a greater than Daniel to interpret to his fellows. That will hardly be in our time. With the resources at present at our command we must be content with a very brief, imperfect, and in large measure conjectural account of man's mental and social development in prehistoric ages. As I have already pointed out, the evidence, fragmentary and dubious as it is, only runs back a very little way into the measureless past of human life on earth; we soon lose the thread, the faintly glimmering thread, in the thick darkness of the absolutely unknown. Even in the comparatively short space of time, a few thousand years at most, which falls more or less within our ken, there are many deep and wide chasms which can only be bridged by hypotheses, if the story of evolution is to run continuously. Such bridges are built in anthropology as in biology by the Comparative Method, which enables us to borrow the links of one chain of evidence to supply the gaps in another. For us who deal, not with the various forms of animal life, but with the various products of human intelligence, the legitimacy of the Comparative Method rests on the well-ascertained similarity of the working of the human mind in all races of men. I have laid stress on the great inequalities which exist not only between the various races, but between men of the same race and generation; but it should be clearly understood and remembered that these divergencies are quantitative rather than qualitative, they consist in differences of degree rather than of kind. The savage is not a different sort of being from his civilised brother: he has the same

capacities, mental and moral, but they are less fully developed: his evolution has been arrested, or rather retarded, at a lower level. And as savage races are not all on the same plane, but have stopped or tarried at different points of the upward path, we can to a certain extent, by comparing them with each other, construct a scale of social progression and mark out roughly some of the stages on the long road that leads from savagery to civilisation. In the kingdom of mind such a scale of mental evolution answers to the scale or morphological evolution in the animal kingdom.

From what I have said I hope you have formed some idea of the extreme importance which the study of savage life possesses for a proper understanding of the early history of mankind. The savage is a human document, a record of man's efforts to raise himself above the level of the beast. It is only of late years that the full value of the document has been appreciated; indeed, many people are probably still of Dr. Johnson's opinion, who, pointing to the three large volumes of *Voyages to the South Seas* which had just come out, said: "Who will read them through? A man had better work his way before the mast than read them through; they will be eaten by rats and mice before they are read through. There can be little entertainment in such books; one set of savages is like another."

J. Boswell, *Lift of Samuel Johnson*⁹ (London, 1822), iv. 315.

But the world has learned a good deal since Dr. Johnson's day; and the records of savage life, which the sage of Bolt Court consigned without scruple to the rats and mice, have now their place among the most precious archives of humanity. Their fate has been like that of the Sibylline Books. They were neglected and despised when they might have been obtained complete; and now wise men would give more than a king's ransom for their miserably mutilated and imperfect remains. It is true that before our time civilised men often viewed savages with interest and described them intelligently, and some of their descriptions are still of great scientific value. For example, the discovery of America naturally excited in the minds of the European peoples an eager curiosity as to the inhabitants of the new world, which had burst upon their gaze, as if at the waving of a wizard's wand the curtain of the western sky had suddenly rolled up and disclosed scenes of glamour and enchantment. Accordingly some of the Spaniards who explored and conquered these realms of wonder have bequeathed to us accounts of the manners and customs of the Indians, which for accuracy and fulness of detail probably surpass any former records of an alien race. Such, for instance, is the great work of the Franciscan friar Sahagun on the natives of Mexico, and such the work of Garcilasso de la Vega, himself half an Inca, on the Incas of Peru. Again, the exploration of the Pacific in the eighteenth century, with its revelation of fairy-like islands scattered in profusion over a sea of eternal summer, drew the eyes and stirred the imagination of Europe; and to the curiosity thus raised in many minds, though not in Dr. Johnson's, we owe some precious descriptions of the islanders, who, in those days of sailing ships, appeared to dwell so remote from us that the poet Cowper fancied their seas might never again be ploughed by English keels.

*In boundless oceans, never to be passed
By navigators uninform'd as they,
Or plough'd perhaps by British bark again.*

The Task, book i. 629 sqq.

These and many other old accounts of savages must always retain their interest and value for the study of Social Anthropology, all the more because they set before us the natives in their natural unsophisticated state, before their primitive manners and customs had been altered or destroyed by European influence. Yet in the light of subsequent research these early records are often seen to be very defective, because the authors, unaware of the scientific importance of facts which to the ordinary observer might appear trifling or disgusting, have either passed over many things of the highest interest in total silence or dismissed them with a brief and tantalising allusion. It is accordingly necessary to supplement the reports of former writers by a minute and painstaking investigation of the living savages in order to fill up, if possible, the many yawning gaps in our knowledge. Unfortunately this cannot always be done, since many savages have either been totally exterminated or so changed by contact with Europeans that it is no longer possible to obtain trustworthy information as to their old habits and traditions. But whenever the ancient customs and beliefs of a primitive race have passed away unrecorded, a document of human history has perished beyond recall. Unhappily this destruction of the archives, as we may call it, is going on apace. In some places, for example, in Tasmania, the savage is already extinct; in others, as in Australia, he is dying. In others again, for instance in Central and Southern Africa, where the numbers and inborn vigour of the race shew little or no sign of succumbing in the struggle for existence, the influence of traders, officials, and missionaries is so rapidly disintegrating and effacing the native customs, that with the passing of the older generation even the memory of them will soon in many places be gone. It is therefore a matter of the most urgent scientific importance to secure without delay

full and accurate reports of these perishing or changing peoples, to take permanent copies, so to say, of these precious monuments before they are destroyed. It is not yet too late. Much may still be learned, for example, in West Australia, in New Guinea, in Melanesia, in Central Africa, among the hill tribes of India and the forest Indians of the Amazons. There is still time to send expeditions to these regions, to subsidise men on the spot, who are conversant with the languages and enjoy the confidence of the natives; for there are such men who possess or can obtain the very knowledge we require, yet who, unaware or careless of its inestimable value for science, make no effort to preserve the treasure for posterity, and, if we do not speedily come to the rescue, will suffer it to perish with them. In the whole range of human knowledge at the present moment there is no more pressing need than that of recording this priceless evidence of man's early history before it is too late. For soon, very soon, the opportunities which we still enjoy will be gone for ever. In another quarter of a century probably there will be little or nothing of the old savage life left to record. The savage, such as we may still see him, will then be as extinct as the dodo. The sands are fast running out: the hour will soon strike: the record will be closed: the book will be sealed. And how shall we of this generation look when we stand at the bar of posterity arraigned on a charge of high treason to our race, we who neglected to study our perishing fellow-men, but who sent out costly expeditions to observe the stars and to explore the barren ice-bound regions of the poles, as if the polar ice would melt and the stars would cease to shine when we are gone? Let us awake from our slumber, let us light our lamps, let us gird up our loins. The Universities exist for the advancement of knowledge. It is their duty to add this new province to the ancient departments of learning which they cultivate so diligently. Cambridge, to its honour, has led the way in equipping and despatching anthropological expeditions; it is for Oxford, it is for Liverpool, it is for every University in the land to join in the

More than that, it is the public duty of every civilised state actively to co-operate. In this respect the United States of America, by instituting a bureau for the study of the aborigines within its dominions, has set an example which every enlightened nation that rules over lower races ought to imitate. On none does that duty, that responsibility, lie more clearly and more heavily than on our own, for to none in the whole course of human history has the sceptre been given over so many and so diverse races of men. We have made ourselves our brother's keepers. Woe to us if we neglect our duty to our brother ! It is not enough for us to role injustice the peoples we have subjugated by the sword. We owe it to them, we owe it to ourselves, we owe it to posterity, who will require it at our hands, that we should describe them as they were before we found them, before they ever saw the English flag and heard, for good or evil, the English tongue. The voice of England speaks to her subject peoples in other accents than in the thunder of her guns. Peace has its triumphs as well as war: there are nobler trophies than captured flags and cannons. There are monuments, airy monuments, monuments of words, which seem so fleeting and evanescent, that will yet last when your cannons have crumbled and your flags have mouldered into dust. When the Roman poet wished to present an image of perpetuity, he said that he would be remembered so long as the Roman Empire endured, so long as the white-robed procession of the Vestals and Pontiffs should ascend the Capitol to pray in the temple of Jupiter. That solemn procession has long ceased to climb the slope of the Capitol, the Roman Empire itself has long passed away, like the empire of Alexander, like the empire of Charlemagne, like the empire of Spain, yet still amid the wreck of kingdoms the poet's monument stands firm, for still his verses are read and remembered. I appeal to the Universities, I appeal to the Government of this country to unite in building a monument, a beneficent monument, of the British Empire, a monument

*Quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
Possit diruere, aut innumerabilis
Annorum series, et fuga temporum.*

The Faculties and their Power A contribution to the History of University Organization

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Horace Hart Printer to the University

The Faculties and their Power

A Contribution to the History of University

Organization

SINCE the question of reorganizing the Faculties and giving them larger powers is now under the consideration of the University, it will not be out of place to put together some account of their past history here and their present organization elsewhere.

Our present Faculties have no connexion with the earlier Faculties which existed in mediaeval Oxford, but the history of those bodies, and of the causes which led to their decadence, throws some light on the present

As Dr. Rashdall points out, the early constitution of this University was in the main an imitation of that of the university of Paris: 'the constitution of Oxford may be said to represent an arrested development of the Parisian constitution.' But at Oxford 'the predominance of the Faculty of Arts was still more conspicuous than at Paris'. At Paris 'this predominance was broken down by the growth of the Faculties into organized bodies'; at Oxford 'the superior Faculties never acquired a separate existence of this kind'. We do find occasional instances of the separate Faculties at Oxford, as at Paris, making statutes for the regulation of their own internal discipline, but they are very rare.

'As a general rule, statutes relating to all Faculties—even those dealing with educational details or with internal discipline—were enacted by the Congregation of the whole University. The want of independent corporate life on the part of the superior Faculties and their complete subordination to the inferior Faculty of Arts, is one of the most remarkable peculiarities of the Oxford University constitution.'

And again:

'The greatest constitutional peculiarity of Oxford—more remarkable even than the position of the Chancellor—is the almost entire absence of separate Faculty organization. At Oxford we find, as we never find at Paris, the University itself settling every detail of the curriculum and internal discipline of all the Faculties.'

The result was the degradation of the higher degrees.

'The practical extinction of all the higher Faculties in the English Universities is partly due, no doubt, to the absence of endowments for University teachers and to the presence of these endowments in the Colleges, enabling them to monopolize that instruction which the Universities themselves were unable to supply. Partly, too, it is accounted for, as regards the legal Faculty, by the non-Roman and unscientific character of English Law, and as regards Medicine by the comparatively small size of the University towns. But the suppression of all effective instruction in the higher Faculties was also promoted by the control which here alone, among the Universities of the world, the Regents in Arts—that is to say, after the decay of University lectures, the youngest Masters—had acquired over the degrees in the higher Faculties. In other Universities each Faculty regulated the conferment of its own degrees. At Oxford and Cambridge an unlimited power of dispensation was vested in the Regents of all Faculties, the majority of whom, of course, were Regents in Arts. The extent to which this power was abused, even in the middle of the fifteenth century, was already such as to prepare the way for the total suspension of the residence and study required by the Statutes for these degrees, while the Professors lacked the power or the inclination to convert the remaining "exercises" into effective tests of competence. The higher degrees continued to be taken almost as much as formerly especially degrees in Theology. In many cases College statutes bound the Fellows by the most solemn obligations to study and graduate in some superior Faculty, and the title of Doctor has always been more or less in request. But mere "standing" was at last unblushingly treated as equivalent to residence and study.'

Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ii, 370-2,

Of these old Faculties little remains now save titles, and some ceremonial relics, such as the robes of the higher degrees and the pokers of the bedells, but the causes which prevented the development of the corporate life of these Faculties in mediaeval Oxford still exist to-day. It is only by diminishing the power of Congregation over the curriculum, and by effecting some agreement with the colleges about the teaching, that the independent development of our present Faculties is possible. For that reason, in discussing the re-organization of the Faculties, it is necessary to consider the constitution of the University too, and the relations which should exist between University and College teaching.

Our present Faculties and Boards of Faculties are nominally the creation of the second University Commission, and date from a statute made by the Commissioners in 1882.

. *Statutes*, ed. 1908, p. 118. Tit. V. Section i.

But their real origin seems to go back to the Boards of Studies established by the University about 1872. By a number of statutes passed during 1871-2 the various examinations then existing were placed under the supervision of ten Boards. There were three for the First Public Examination, viz. one for Honours in Classics, one for Honours in Mathematics, and one for the Pass School. That for the Pass School still exists. There were seven Boards for the supervision of the Second Public Examination, viz. for Literae Humaniores, for

Mathematics, for Natural Science, for Jurisprudence, for Modern History, for Theology, and, finally, for the Pass School and the Rudiments of Faith and Religion. The Board for the Pass School survives, subdivided into two committees.

The Boards first appear in the *University Calendar* for 1873,

These Boards were composed on the principle of taking the professors of the subjects concerned, and adding an equal number of other persons. For instance, the Modern History Board consisted of the Regius Professors of Modern-History and Ecclesiastical History, the Chichele Professor of Modern History and International Law, the Rawlinsonian Professor of Anglo-Saxon, and the Professor of Political Economy. To them were added the three examiners in the Modern History School for the time being, and not more than three persons co-opted by the Board itself. The powers of these Boards were limited to prescribing books, periods, and special subjects, but they were not content with this modest function, and assumed 'the position of being charged with the general academic interest' of the studies their examinations concerned. They had been practically invited to assume this position in 1873, when the Vice-Chancellor sent a circular to them and to the professors in general asking them to state the requirements of the studies they represented.

See *Statement of the Requirements of the University adopted by the Hebdomadal Council on the 19th of March 1877, with the papers upon which it was founded.*

The result is well stated in the evidence of Mr. J. R. Thursfield before the Commission of 1877.

Minutes of Evidence taken by the Commission, 1881, p. 116.

1,921. (Chairman): What is your view with regard to the function of boards of studies?—With regard to that subject, boards of studies are, it appears to me, charged in this statement of the requirements of the university with a great many functions which certainly were not contemplated when boards of studies were originally constituted. As I understand, boards of studies were established in the university mainly for the purpose of supervising the conduct of the examinations, prescribing the subjects which should be recognized in the schools from time to time and so forth. Now it seems to be thought desirable that boards of studies should hold the position of being generally charged with the general academical interests of such studies as well as with the examination interests of the branches of knowledge with which they are specially connected. I am not quite sure that the present structure of boards of studies fits them for the latter function quite so well as it did for the former function, for which they were originally constructed.

1,922. (Professor Smith): You think that the great predominance given to actual examiners in the boards of studies does not fit those boards for the wider range of duties which it has been proposed to assign to them?—I would not say that it unfitted them; but if we had been constructing boards of studies for the purpose of exercising a general supervision over the branches of knowledge and studies represented by them we should probably have constructed them originally in a somewhat different way.

1,923. (Mr. Bernard): Could you suggest any remedy for that?—I should not be prepared at this moment to say exactly how I would amend their constitution, but I think that it might be altered. The point which I wish to make clear is that we constructed the boards of studies for one purpose and devote them to another purpose and another set of duties, for which they are *ipso facto* not so well constituted or qualified as for the original purposes.

1,924. Do you not think it almost inevitable that a board of studies having been created for the purpose contemplated by the statutes should come to be considered as the representative of the group of studies which belonged to it?—I think, certainly, it is almost inevitable; but I am not sure that it is altogether desirable.

1,925. I understood you to say that if that tendency is to take effect it might be well to modify the constitution of the boards of studies?—That is certainly my view. It should be quite understood what their function is, and if it is to be enlarged so as to comprise the general interests of the studies they represent, their meetings should be more formal and their transactions should be more systematic, and they should not depend as they do at present on the precarious and irregular attendance of the various members; moreover, they should be strengthened, I think, by a larger element of persons known to be interested in particular studies, but not necessarily having or having had any direct relation to the examinations.

1,926. (Chairman): Do you think that all the intercollegiate lecturers in the different subjects should belong to the Boards of Studies?—That would make the Board a little unwieldy I should think, but it is proposed in the Cambridge report that 'the intercollegiate lecturers recognized by any board who are not university readers shall be entitled to choose two of their number to represent them on the board by which they are recognized.' That is a device for reducing the number of the board, and increasing its efficiency, which might perhaps be adopted with advantage.

1,927. It has been recommended, has it not, by the Hebdomadal Council, that all the university readers should be on the Boards of Studies?—Yes, I think that is so.

1,928. Is it now one of the functions of each Board of Studies to arrange the order of courses of lectures?—No, it has nothing to do with it.

1,929. Would it be desirable for the sake of good organization as to time and subjects that that should be done?—It is certainly desirable that it should be done by some agency; whether by the agency of the actual lecturers meeting and discussing the subject themselves, or meeting in concert with the Board of Studies, I am not prepared to say at this moment.

1,930. Would it also be important that the different boards or the lecturers in the different classes of subjects should arrange it together?—That is already done with regard to intercollegiate lectures. We meet terminally and decide the general range of subjects which shall be treated by the association in the ensuing term.

1,931. How are the professors' lectures taken into account in those arrangements; do they communicate with the professors, and learn what they propose?—Not always. In some cases the professors are members of the associations, and from them we generally learn what they propose to do; in other cases it has occasionally been difficult to obtain information of what the professors intend to do.

1,932. Then there is no concert?—No; that I think is a disadvantage.

1,933. (Mr. Bernard): However, the old faculty organization seems tending to revive again in some form?—Yes.

1,934. And you think it desirable to methodize it?— Yes. I do not know that the old faculty organization was the best, but to methodize it in some new form would certainly be desirable.

Minutes of Evidence, Oxford University Commission, 1878.

Whilst the Boards of Studies were thus practically claiming the position of Boards of Faculties, some reformers put forward schemes for the organization of Faculties with powers resembling those possessed by such bodies in German Universities, This proposal was set forth with admirable clearness in the evidence of Sir E. Ray Lankester. A suggestion for something like Faculty organization was also put forward by some of the teachers of Modern History. Mr. Boase asked that the intercollegiate lecturers on that subject should 'be organized as a University body', and that something of the nature of 'an educational council which would enable the teachers to combine' should be established.

In response to these various demands the Commissioners made the Statute of 1882. It created four Faculties: Theology, Law, Arts, and Natural Science, making the Faculty of Natural Science include Mathematics and Medicine, and that of Arts 'those studies now included in Arts which shall not be included in any other Faculty'.

Power was given by this Statute to subdivide the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Science into two or more Faculties, and to institute new Faculties.

Statutes, 1908, p. 118: Tit. V. Sect, i (5).

In accordance with this provision the University, in 1885, divided the Faculty of Arts into three divisions, viz. Literae Humaniores, Oriental Languages and Modern History, and the Faculty of Natural Science into two, viz. Medicine and Natural Science.

Statutes, 1908, p. 121: Tit. V. Sects, ii, iii.

By another Statute the Commissioners created the Common University Fund, and ordered that the Delegacy for its administration should contain, in addition to *ex officio* members and persons nominated by Council and Congregation, 'so many other members as there shall be Boards of Faculties, one such member being nominated by each Board.' This gave the Faculties a limited and indirect power in financial matters, by enabling them to represent to the Delegates of the Fund the needs of the studies they represented.

Statutes, 1908, p. 377: Tit. XIX. § 6 (3).

The Statute of the Commissioners creating the Faculties charged their respective Boards with the duty of drawing up a list of the lectures to be given every term in the subjects of the Faculty, and a limited power to alter or exclude lectures in certain cases.

By the Commissioners 'Statute the University was empowered' to give the Boards such further duties and make such further provision for the performance of such duties, as well as of the duties hereby assigned to them', as it should think expedient, provided its regulations were consistent with the provisions of the Statute.

Statutes, 1908, p. 119: Tit. V. Sect, i (10).

However, the University made very little use of this power. At the moment all it did was to transfer to the Boards of Faculties the duties hitherto performed by the Boards of Studies, by substituting the words 'Faculty', or 'Board of Faculty' for the words 'Board of Studies' in the Statutes relating to the various Honour Schools. The Boards of Faculties were little more than the Boards of Studies 'writ large', and charged with the task of drawing up terminal lecture lists, as well as supervising examinations.

On the other hand the composition of the New Boards of Faculties differed from that of the Boards of Studies. In the first place they were very much larger bodies. The examiners were no longer members, and the number of elected members was greatly increased. The Statute of the Commissioners laid down a rule with regard to relative strength of the *ex officio* and the elected elements. The number of elected members, they said,

'shall in no case exceed that of the *ex officio* members.' They did not fix the exact proportion which the two elements should bear to each other, but appear to have intended to give the *ex officio* element a slight superiority. Otherwise there was no meaning in the definite provision that the elected members should never be a majority of any Board. The University was evidently in some doubt how to carry out this rule in its own regulations, and was uncertain what numerical relation between the two elements was most desirable. Council had no policy. It left the question to be settled by a sort of plebiscite. At the first election of the Boards of Faculty, which took place on February 3, 1883, it ordered that the matter should be left to chance. The Registrar or the Secretary to the Boards of Faculty was to tell the assembled electors for the Board what was the number of the *ex officio* members, and they were to vote for as many elected members as they thought fit.

'The number of places to be filled up by election shall be determined by each elector writing on a voting paper the number he prefers. . . . The number in favour of which most votes shall be given shall be the number of places to be filled up.'

The result was a certain variety in the constitution of the Boards. According to the *Calendar* for 1885, the Theology Board was then composed of 8 *ex officio* and 5 elected members, the Law Board of 7 *ex officio* and 6 elected members, Natural Science of 14 *ex officio* and 10 elected members, Literae Humaniores of 12 *ex officio* and 10 elected members, Modern History of 10 *ex officio* and 8 elected members, Oriental Languages of 7 *ex officio* and 6 elected members. The relative proportions of the two elements thus varied according to the circumstances of each particular study. In 1885, however, a statute was passed by the University providing that 'the number of places to be filled up at an election of members of the Board of any Faculty shall be the number which, added to that of the elected members of the Board whose places are not vacant, will equal the number of *ex officio* members for the time being'.

This rigid rule had many disadvantages. It made no allowance for the different conditions which prevailed in different studies. Its object was to secure that the number of teachers appointed by colleges should exactly equal the number of teachers appointed by the University, but in educational as in political affairs the attempt to create an exact balance of powers usually produces a deadlock. In practice the rigidity of the rule leads to results which can hardly have been intended. Supposing a nonresident professor is made an *ex officio* member of a Board (as, for instance, the Professor of Poetry is of the Literae Humaniores Board) it becomes necessary to elect at once some college teacher as an equivalent. As the elected member is always a resident the theoretical balance of interests is at once destroyed. In the case of the Modern History Board the result of the rule has been to give the elected members a majority of about three to two. For of the fourteen *ex officio* members whom the University has placed on the Board, five at least represent studies not directly connected with Modern History, and in no way represented in the curriculum of the Modern History School or the examination the Board supervises. Consequently they have no motive for attending, and do not attend, but the presence of their names in the list necessitates the addition of an elected member for each of them. The result is that the college teachers forming the elective element of the Board can determine every question connected with the study of Modern History exactly as they please. It is plain that a regulation which produces this result in practice is directly contrary to the intention of the Statute made by the Commissioners, and was not contemplated by the University when it made the regulation. In view of the demand that the powers of the Faculties should be increased, the question of the composition of the Boards of Faculties needs reconsidering.

The very limited powers previously enumerated were all the Faculties possessed during the first thirteen years of their existence, but they soon began to imitate the action of their predecessors, the Boards of Studies, and to desire larger powers. Their members were not content to be mere supervisors of an examination and constructors of lecture lists. This feeling was the natural consequence of bringing together in one room a number of men interested in a particular study, and giving them very little power to promote its progress. In response to this feeling the tendency of University legislation has been steadily to increase the powers of the Faculties. In 1894, when the statute creating the research degrees was introduced, it proposed to create a special Delegacy to supervise the work of candidates and award the degrees. The Delegacy was to consist of the Vice-Chancellor, the proctors, and twelve members of Convocation. But in the passage of the measure through Congregation an amendment was introduced which made the several Boards of Faculties the authorities charged with the management of those degrees, and ever since this work has formed a steadily growing part of their ordinary business. By the same statute a step was taken towards the establishment of a Board representing the Faculties in general, for it led to the creation of a Committee which contains representatives of the seven Boards of Faculties and two Boards of Studies. The duties of the Committee, however, are confined to examining the qualifications of intending candidates for the degree of B.Litt.

During the period which has elapsed since the passing of this statute, the authority and influence of the Faculties have steadily grown. Council has inquired their opinion on measures before it, and has referred questions to them for discussion and report with increasing frequency. Furthermore, in a tentative and unsystematic way the legislation of the University is beginning to give the Faculties some of the other powers

which similar bodies possess elsewhere. Nearly all the statutes and regulations relating to new foundations show a tendency to give the Faculties a direct voice in the appointment of University teachers, by giving them the right *to* elect a representative to the appointing Committee in addition to the *ex officio* representatives of the particular study. Thus the Faculty of Medicine appoints an elector for the professorship of Human Anatomy and for the professorship of Pathology. The Board of Natural Science appoints one elector for the professorship of Pathology and two for the Lee's Readerships. The Board of Modern History appoints two electors for the Beit professorship and lectureship, and three for the Ford lectureship. The Board of Theology appoints three of the seven electors for the Speaker's lectureship in Biblical Studies. Three different Boards of Faculty appoint electors for the Wilde lectureship in Natural Religion. Even Boards of Studies and Diploma Committees have been in two instances given the same right (*Statutes*, pp. 456-7).

The same thing is happening in the case of scholarships, prizes, and other endowments, founded recently to encourage particular subjects. Two of the five managers of the Charles Oldham scholarship are elected by the English Board of Studies, and two of the managers of the same benefactor's prize by the Literae Humaniores Board. The Squire scholarships in Theology are entirely under the management of the Theology Board. The Board of Oriental Languages elects one of the managers of the Revision Surplus Fund and one of the Max Müller Memorial Fund.

Thus, during the last five or six years the University seems to have accepted the principle that whenever it is possible Faculties shall be given a direct voice in the appointment of the teachers of their subject and the management of its endowments. This historical survey seemed desirable in order to show that the demand for the grant of larger powers to the Faculties is not the result of the agitation of a few reformers, but the outcome of a natural movement which has been in progress for many years. It is now time to consider what the powers of Faculties are in other universities, and how far it is possible or desirable to give them similar powers here.

Since the example of the German universities exerted most influence at the time when the revival of the Faculties was first seriously discussed in Oxford, the German Faculties should be first described. These powers are thus described by Professor Paulsen.

'The different Faculties possess important functions as self-governing bodies. The full professors, who are the Faculty's administrative body, annually elect one of their number as dean to act as their presiding officer. . . The Faculty manages the scholarships and conducts the examinations prescribed for them, announces the subjects for prize essays and awards the prizes. It also has supervision of instruction, and must above all see to it that all subjects are fully represented during each term, and suggest additions to the teaching staff whenever necessary. Again, and most important, it holds the examinations for the academic honours and confers the degrees through the dean. It also extends the *venia legendi* to young scholars, which means that it confers upon them the privilege of teaching in the Faculty as *Privatdocents*, admitting them thereby into the larger academic teaching-corps. Finally, when a vacancy occurs in the chair it must nominate candidates for the vacancy to the Ministry of Education.'

Paulsen, *German Universities*, p. 79 (English translation).

After a short digression on the position of the German professor, the author goes on to describe the composition of the teaching body in a German University, which may be thus summarized. It comprises two kinds of teachers whose legal status is thoroughly distinct: (i) Professors who are appointed and paid by the State; (2) *Privat-docenten* or independent instructors upon whom the Faculties have bestowed the privilege of teaching but who have no official duties and receive no salaries. Before the privilege is given the Faculty tests the capacity of the candidate by examining specimens of his original work known as *Habilitationschriften*. The bestowal of the *venia legendi*, if it follows, signifies the candidate's admission into the teaching body of scholars, but not into the State's official corps of instructors. In other respects the *Privatdocent* is on an equality with the professors as a teacher. He has the use of the University buildings and laboratories; his lectures and classes are announced in the official list, and are, in case the student is formally enrolled in the course, accepted as regular work. When *Privatdocenten* have for a time taught successfully, and a salaried position is not open, it is customary to confer upon them unsalaried extraordinary professorships as a mark of recognition.

Paulsen. pp. 79, 104, 165.

The organization of the German Universities naturally attracted the attention of English reformers, but it was obviously impossible to transfer the German faculty system in its integrity to Oxford. Accordingly, in 1878 Sir E. Ray Lankester laid before the second University Commission a scheme for the organization of Faculties and the combination of University and College teaching which was an attempt to adapt the German system to English conditions. It was not received with much favour by the Commissioners, but it deserves attention because it distinguishes clearly between the private teaching which it is the function of the College to give, and the public teaching which the University has the right to control. In his evidence he put the scheme forward as affording the basis of a concordat between University and Collages.

5,149. . . . Some such plan as this of an alliance between the colleges and the university is what I wish to

advocate. Such a plan is not limited to a simply nominal recognition, but involves the following details of organization; and unless details similar in kind to these are specially enacted and enforced by an authoritative body like the Commissioners, it seems to be impossible that an effective organization of combined teaching can be brought into existence. I have drawn up such a possible scheme merely as a suggestion. . . .

5,150. (Mr. Bernard): Will that paper explain what you mean by recognition?—Yes. I suggest that the status of university teacher shall be accorded to every professor in the university, and to every lecturer appointed by a college to a fellowship tenable on the condition of teaching, or to a lectureship of a definite annual value. Then I propose that these university teachers should be grouped into certain boards of studies or faculties according to the subjects taught by them, and corresponding to the schools of the university, namely a faculty (1) of theology, (2) of law, (3) of medicine, (4) of literature and history, (5) of physical science and mathematics. Further, I suggest that certain powers should be accorded to those faculties, and that the faculties so constituted should have very definite duties. The constitution of faculties similar to those which I suggest might differ in some details of their organization, according to circumstances, without abandonment of the general principle.

5,151. May I ask whether you propose any control by the university over the appointment of college teachers?—No, only so far as the faculties would exercise control upon the admission of new individuals to their number.

5,152. (Chairman): That is to say, if the college appointed a tutor the faculty should have the power of rejecting him?—Yes.

5,153. Would that disqualify him for being a college tutor?—No; it would disqualify him from exercising the powers of a member of the faculty.

5,156. (Earl of Redesdale): If a man is to be rejected by the faculty, and is still to continue a teacher of the college, you would at once create a double system?—He would not be rejected by the faculty except for very grave reasons, and if such an institution as the 'faculties' were once started, a college would not be likely to present a man who was not admissible. Of course he would not be rejected merely on the ground that he was somewhat inferior.

5,157. My question had merely reference to what you stated, viz. that the rejection of a man by the faculty was not to prevent his being a tutor of a college?—In spite of any difficulty which might arise in that matter, I think it is necessary to give the college that power, because otherwise such an arrangement as the creation of the faculties would be very distasteful to the colleges. It would be something like taking all power out of the hands of the colleges.

5,158. (Mr. Bernard): Do you mean by grave reasons manifest incompetence?—Yes, not merely inferiority but manifest incompetence.

5,159. Supposing that the number of teachers of a given subject is already, in the opinion of the faculty, quite large enough, that I presume would not be a reason in your view?—No; but I think there might be some plan arranged by which the faculties could control or suggest to the colleges what should be done in that way.

5,160. (Professor Smith): Would you propose that a college tutor or lecturer so admitted to the faculty should retain the same duties, which he has at present with reference to the students of his own college?—Yes, he might have special duties such as the supervision of the students of his own college. I think that each member of a faculty, whether collegiate or professorial, should have one vote in the meeting of his faculty. The faculties should meet each separately, twice only in each term for the transaction of business. The faculties should supersede and assume all the powers of the present Houses of Convocation and Congregation.

5,161. (Chairman): Do you mean all the powers of every kind?—That is what I should wish, but of course that is not a necessary item.

5,162. (Professor Smith): I presume you mean all the powers with relation to the particular study of the faculty?—Yes, with relation to the teaching and the administration of the funds bearing upon their study. The business of each faculty should be to decide by a vote of the majority the following matters:—(1) The admission of new members to the faculty, namely such as might be from time to time qualified by college nomination. (2) The election to all professorships (including those at present elected to by special boards) from time to time vacated or created by the faculty. (3) The preparation at the end of each academic year of a complete programme of the lectures and other course of instruction to be given by the various members of the faculty in the ensuing academic year, such programme to be published, and to be subject to revision by the faculty, the majority having power to reject or modify the lectures proposed by any member of the faculty. This would be the most necessary and important function of the faculty.

5,168. Do you mean such programme to be compulsory upon all members of the faculty?—Yes, in some measure compulsory. There might be exceptions in favour perhaps of the full professors in the faculty who might have somewhat more discretion, but there should be some compulsion. That would be the chief object of such a faculty. (4) Another duty would be the fixing of the fees (which would be larger than are at present

charged by university professors) to be charged for each course or for combined courses (curriculum), such fees to be paid by the students to the faculty (directly or through their colleges) and through the faculty to the teacher. (5) The appointment of examiners in the schools subject to the faculty, and of examiners for university scholarships in subjects related to the faculty. (6) The arrangement of the number and the subjects of examination, with power to abolish any of the present arrangements which may be considered objectionable, such as competition for 'classes', and to institute any further degrees, such as the degree of doctor in the faculty, open to candidates who have been bachelors for two years; such doctor's degree to be awarded in consideration of an approved thesis, containing the results of original investigation. I mean that the faculty might come to the conclusion that the competition for classes such as we have now is not desirable. Such questions as that I should wish that the faculty might be allowed to settle. (7) The assignment of laboratories, lecture rooms, and museums to the use of particular teachers. That appears to be a particularly necessary function of the faculty. (8) The appropriation (subject to the approval of the combined faculties or the council of the university) of university revenue for the purpose of from time to time building lecture rooms and laboratories, purchasing apparatus and other appliances for teaching and research. Lastly, the recommendation to the council of the establishment of new professorships, of the payment of salaries for assistants or readers, and of other financial dispositions. Those who may object to many of the particulars in the plan which I have above sketched out will yet see the necessity for some system of compulsory co-operation between the various colleges themselves, and between each and all of these and the university when the working of the present system is carefully examined.

Ray Lankester, *Oxford University Commission*, 1878, Evidence, p. 338.

The suggestion that the institution of Faculties would afford the best basis for combining University and College teaching was very just, but it produced little result. The Commissioners carefully evaded the difficulties of the problem by creating nominal Faculties, and leaving the University to determine whether they should have any real power or not.

Elsewhere the examples supplied by the organization of teaching in other Universities exerted more influence. The constitutions of the newer English Universities present certain differences of detail but are all of one type. All are organized on the basis of Faculties, though in some the Faculty system is more highly developed than in others. The number of Faculties they possess varies. All five possess Faculties of Arts, Science, and Medicine. Liverpool and Manchester add Law, and the latter has also a Faculty of Music. Each of the five has a technical Faculty of some kind. Two call it the Faculty of Technology, another Applied Science; Birmingham has a Faculty of Commerce, Liverpool of Engineering. In each University there is a Council and a Senate. The latter is composed of professors and representatives of the Faculties. It is empowered to review and control the proceedings of the Faculties, and charged with interests common to all the Faculties. The Faculties consist of the professors of the subject, and of those lecturers who satisfy certain conditions as to tenure, status, and responsibility; to these are added some of the assistants and junior lecturers, appointed by the choice of the Senate or Council. Each Faculty is charged with the regulation of the teaching and study of the subjects assigned to it. In the case of Liverpool, where the powers of the Faculties are greatest, the clause relating to them runs as follows:—

'Each Faculty, subject to a review by the Senate, and to the Statutes and Ordinances of the University, shall be responsible for courses of study and regulations as to degrees, diplomas', certificates, scholarships, and prizes falling within the province of the Faculty, and shall report upon the qualifications of candidates for professorships, lectureships, and examinerships within the Faculty, shall nominate the Deans and other officers of the Faculty, and the tutors, fellows, and other scholars of the Faculty, and shall in general transact business pertaining to the Faculty.'

A professor who is a member of the Arts Faculty at Liverpool thus describes the work of that body.
Professor Ramsay Muir.

'I believe the Faculty system is more highly developed with us than anywhere else. The Faculty consists of all responsible teachers, with a few junior men picked out for one reason or another. It practically controls all academic questions arising within its sphere. All legislation about courses, &c., initiates with it, and is knocked into shape by it, and all the detail of administration comes before it. Much of its business is finally determined by itself. But the more important business requires confirmation by Senate (which includes the Professorial members of the other Faculties) and by Council (a body mainly lay). Nine-tenths of the business goes through these bodies quite formally without discussion. There is sometimes discussion of a new piece of legislation, and oversights are occasionally remedied. But I do not remember any important piece of legislation of the Faculty of Arts being referred back by either Senate or Council. Appointments are always practically controlled by Faculty. The minor appointments do not need any higher confirmation. Professorships and Lectureships-in-charge require the assent of Senate and Council. The procedure' always is that Faculty sends up a report and a nomination. I do not remember a single instance in which the nomination of a Faculty was not confirmed, practically without discussion. Indeed this is only conceivable in cases where there had been an

acute division of opinion in the Faculty. The Faculty also is invariably called upon to draft the terms of appointment of any newly-created post; on this sort of point there is likely to be discussion in the higher bodies, because the precedent of one Faculty affects others. We have never been able to obtain an independent control of finance; over this the Council keeps a close hand, and I do not think it will ever be persuaded to divide out its income in agreed proportions among the various Faculties. Every May each Faculty sends up a list of needs in the way of new equipment or additional staff; and it is the business of the Council to determine among these rival claims. The Dean is the executive officer of the Faculty in all respects. His work is so heavy that, *me teste*, it takes up two-thirds of his time. The Deanship is therefore an office to accept which demands a good deal of sacrifice, and, I think I may say, the definite abnegation of any original work. Its tenure is for three years. Nobody ever wants a second term in the Arts Faculty, though elsewhere it is different/

In Manchester the Faculty system is less highly developed than in Liverpool. This is partly explained by the earlier history of Manchester, and partly due to the influence exerted by the example of the French Universities on some of the founders of Liverpool.

See Professor J. M. Mackay's Report on the Faculty of Arts of Liverpool, 1897, pp. 14-48-

The transformation of higher education in France during the last thirty years has been so remarkable and so fruitful an event that it deserves some attention in Oxford.

When the statesmen of the Third Republic took in hand the remaking of France after the war of 1870, they found that the reorganization of higher education was not less essential than the reorganization of the army. There were special schools of great merit in existence, but instead of Universities only isolated Faculties, small teaching bodies, scattered in little groups all over the country—institutions without any independent life, without any connexion with each other, and without any higher aim than training candidates for the degrees which the State required as a qualification for certain posts and certain professors. Out of these they had to construct the fifteen Universities established in 1896. The first thing needful was to raise the aims of the teaching given in the Faculties. 'Elles avaient été surtout des écoles professionnelles. Il fallait qu'elles devinssent en même temps des écoles scientifiques.' To do that they must have more independence, and be freer to determine their own curriculum and their methods of teaching, instead of having every detail regulated for them by a superior authority. 'Ni les arrêtés ni les décrets,' it was well said, 'ne feront faire à l'enseignement supérieur de véritables progrès; ces progrès se feront par les changements qui s'opéreront dans les idées; la discussion seule rendra ces changements sérieux. Il faut que les corps se sentent responsables, qu'ils aient confiance dans leur autorité, qu'ils sachent dire ce qu'ils veulent et pourquoi ils le veulent; qu'ils se critiquent; qu'ils s'apprécient; qu'il se forme ainsi un esprit d'activité et de progrès et que cet esprit soit assez fort pour obliger l'administration à le suivre.'

Liard, *L'Enseignement supérieur en France, 1789-1893*, ii, 391.

So these bodies were given more liberty and a new spirit grew up in them.

Next, between 1885 and 1893, followed a series of changes which gave the Faculties larger powers and more self-government. They were incorporated and given the right to hold and inherit property and to receive benefactions; they were given the power to administer for themselves the annual grant made by the government instead of having its disposition settled for them. At the same time a 'general council of the Faculties' was established in order to enable these hitherto isolated bodies to cooperate. At first this 'General Council' was charged merely with the distribution of common funds amongst the different Faculties; later it was given educational functions to perform also.

The result of giving the Faculties higher aims, larger powers, and greater freedom was seen in the transformation of the teaching. Everywhere and in every subject there was progress and experiment: more scientific methods were adopted not only in scientific but in literary subjects too. In the Faculties of Letters, for instance, the lecture was supplemented by the 'cours pratique', and the lecture-room by the 'salle d'études'. At Paris for instance:—

'Il fut visible qu'il y avait quelque chose de changé dans l'enseignement supérieur des lettres le jour où, au voisinage de la Sorbonne, à quelques pas des grands amphithéâtres, toujours ouverts au public et toujours fréquentés, s'élevèrent, en attendant mieux, des baraques provisoires à trois compartiments chacun, une salle de conférences, sans chaire monumentale, un cabinet pour le professeur et, attenante, une salle d'études, avec ses livres, pour les élèves. Ce fut plus visible encore le jour où l'on put lire sur les affiches, à côté de l'annonce des cours publics, des mentions comme celle-ci: "Le professeur dirigera les exercices pratiques des étudiants."

'A partir de ce jour, dans beaucoup de facultés, l'école était faite, et elle allait grandir, non pas partout de la même venue, mais partout d'une croissance régulière, les fonctions s'amplifiant et s'élevant à mesure que se développaient et se coordonnaient les organes: tout d'abord, pour les besoins les plus étendus et les plus faciles à satisfaire, la production des licenciés; puis bientôt après, avec les licenciés d'élite, la préparation aux concours d'agrégation; enfin, pour l'élite de cette élite, la pratique des méthodes savantes, les travaux personnels, les

recherches originales.'

Liard, ii, 404-S.

The government did not cease to remind the professors and teachers who formed the Faculties that the object of higher education was not merely the transmission but the enlargement of knowledge.

'La préparation aux grades est utile,' said a circular issued in 1883, 'mais y borner son ambition serait méconnaître les devoirs les plus élevés de l'enseignement supérieur. Ses maîtres ont d'autres obligations envers l'État; une des premières est le progrès de la science et de la haute culture intellectuelle. Ils doivent y concourir par leurs travaux et par ceux de leurs élèves . . . Les réformes accomplies jusqu'ici étaient nécessaires; elles en ont rendu d'autres possibles. ... Tout en enseignant les connaissances nécessaires pour la licence et l'agrégation, les facultés doivent choisir des jeunes hommes d'avenir qu'elles prépareront et armeront de telle sorte qu'ils deviennent des maîtres et que, dès l'école, ils aient en vue des œuvres personnelles où ils pourront par la suite donner leur mesure.

'Ainsi, dans tous les ordres de facultés, deux degrés d'études: à la base, et pour la majorité des élèves, des cultures professionnelles; au sommet, et pour une élite, des recherches savantes. La science devenait ainsi, au-dessus des besoins et des intérêts particuliers qui séparent, l'idée qui rassemble et unit. Avec elle, chaque faculté portait désormais en soi son unité; en elle, les facultés diverses, placées côte à côte dans la même ville et si longtemps isolées l'une de l'autre, pouvaient trouver enfin la raison d'une vie commune.'

Liard, ii, 407-8.

The completion of the process was not long delayed. The General Councils of the Faculties received larger powers, both financial and educational; they were incorporated as the individual Faculties had been eight years earlier, and they were reorganized so that they might represent better the common interests of the United Faculties. Thus in 1893 the fifteen groups of Faculties became practically Universities, and in July 1896 the name too was given them.

Monsieur Liard's book, previously quoted, was published in 1888 before the movement which he describes had reached its goal. Its later history is traced and its earlier history summarized in an article by him, entitled 'Les Universités Françaises', published in vol. ii of *Special Reports on Educational Subjects* issued by our Education Department in 1898, and separately in *Special Reports on Education in France* issued by the same Department in 1899.

It is not necessary to enlarge on the great results produced by these changes on higher education in France. Any one who compares the figures given in the annual issues of *Minerva*, or in other books of reference, can trace the rapid increase in the number of students in every department and every Faculty, and any one who knows the work produced in any branch of learning by men trained in the French Universities during the last thirty years can estimate the value of the training given there. In the two subjects with which I am personally concerned, English Literature and Modern History, the value and amount of the work published during that period is very great, and it is the direct result of a reorganization of higher education based on scientific lines and inspired by a definite purpose.

The purpose which these Universities are intended to fulfil is set forth with French clearness by the historian of the process that created them.

'Aujourd'hui on peut dire que les Universités françaises ont vraiment conscience de leur triple fonction, ou plutôt des trois degrés de leur fonction scientifique: être au premier degré des milieux de culture générale, au second des milieux de préparation professionnelle, et au sommet, pour l'élite des étudiants, des milieux des recherches

All these Universities have been built up by the development and union of Faculties, and each Faculty performs in its smaller sphere the same functions as the University and is trusted with power and freedom to fulfil them. Take the statement of the aims of a Faculty of Letters, as set forth by another distinguished French teacher, in an address to the students forming part of it.

'D'abord, une Faculté des Lettres est un lieu d'apprentissage pour les jeunes gens qui désirent contribuer à l'avancement des sciences historiques et philosophiques; on y apprend à faire, conformément aux bonnes méthodes, des travaux originaux, et pour cela (car il n'y a pas d'autre procédé pratique) on y fait réellement des travaux originaux;—en outre, une Faculté des Lettres est un lieu d'apprentissage pour les jeunes gens qui se destinent à la carrière de l'enseignement secondaire: on y apprend ce qu'il faut savoir pour enseigner, en même temps que l'art d'exposer et de communiquer ce que l'on sait;—enfin, une Faculté des Lettres n'a pas seulement le double caractère d'un atelier des recherches et d'une école normale professionnelle: c'est aussi, c'est surtout un milieu où s'acquiert la haute culture intellectuelle, et un foyer de pensée.'

Ch. V. Langlois, *Allocution aux Étudiants en Sorbonne*, November 8, 1897, in *Questions d'Histoire et d'Enseignement*, 1902, p. 158

It is unnecessary to enlarge on the difference between a Faculty which is a mere abstraction defined as 'a study or aggregate of studies' and a Faculty which is a corporate body composed of students as well as teachers;

or on the difference between the aims of a Faculty charged with the highest educational duties and one which is merely charged with educational details and restricted administrative functions. The contrast explains much. The origin of our Boards of Faculties and the nature of the powers and functions entrusted to them help to account for their neglect of the highest duty of any body of University teachers, viz. the advancement of knowledge and the training of young men to contribute towards it by the production of original work. The increase in their powers which took place in 1895 produced some improvement in this respect, though not enough.

A general phenomenon, such as the universality of a particular form of government, is not the result of an accident but of some general law. In all modern Universities the multiplicity of different subjects studied and taught side by side has produced much the same kind of organization, because it is the only kind of organization which corresponds to the complex needs of modern education. The system of self-governing Faculties has been adopted everywhere,

For an account of the organization of the typical Faculty in an American University see President Eliot's *University Administration*, 1909, chap. III.

because it permits each separate study to develop itself with freedom, and is yet compatible with a certain amount of control exercised by some central body representing the common interests. We are trying to work a modern University with mediaeval machinery, patched up every moment with boards and committees. What the old ship wants is a new set of engines.

In conclusion it is necessary to state the powers which the Faculties should possess, supposing the reorganization of University teaching to be seriously attempted.

I. Central Organization.

The Faculties are at present a number of isolated bodies representing different studies, with no central organization to represent them all, and to enable them to consult and co-operate in matters of common interest. In foreign Universities this co-operation and consultation is ensured by giving all Faculties representation on the higher body which deals with general University interests-In a German University the Faculties are represented in the Senate by their Deans, who are *ex officio* members of that body. In the University of Paris the council which governs it consists of the Deans of the six Faculties and, in addition, of two prof essors elected by each of them. In the rest of the French Universities the organization is the same.

In his *Principles and Methods of University Reform*(p. 24) the Chancellor gives various reasons for thinking it inexpedient to alter the constitution of our Council so as to make it represent the Faculties. There is, however, an alternative plan, which would attain the object of securing that Council should give due weight to the opinion of the Faculties, and that is the creation of some intermediate body, representing all the Faculties, between Council and individual Faculties. Such a body would fulfil many of the functions discharged by the Senate in the newer English Universities, which considers the recommendations made by a particular Faculty, and reports on them to Council with the authority naturally attaching to a body in which the interests of all the Faculties are represented. Questions relating to the subdivision of existing Faculties and the creation of new ones also fall within the province of the Senate, which is better qualified to determine them than are an executive body like the Council, or an interested body like the Faculty concerned. Some organization of this kind is also required to deal with questions in which the interests and opinions of the various Faculties conflict. Here when a matter arises which touches the interests of all the Faculties, Council usually refers it to them for an opinion: but each Board is separately consulted, and each debates and reports separately. Some machinery is wanted by which representatives of the different Faculties could discuss together questions which concern them all, and could report, after hearing the views of the representatives of each study, how far the desires of the teachers of one were compatible with the interests of the others. At present a question of this nature is decided either by a body on which the Faculties are unequally represented, or by a body on which they are but indirectly and very imperfectly represented. A General Council of the Faculties, or a simple committee containing representatives of all the Boards, will prove to be a necessity if their powers are increased, and it is the only way in which their co-operation can be ensured. The need for such co-operation has greatly increased since the University entrusted to the Boards of Faculty the management of the Research Degrees. The standards of merit adopted by the different Boards in awarding them vary too much, but there is no machinery designed to secure their co-ordination. The existing Committee of the Boards of Faculty, which is appointed to deal with these degrees, is concerned with the question of admitting candidates to begin reading for them.

In financial matters the Common University Fund performs a function similar to that which the General Council or Committee of Faculties above suggested would perform in educational matters. It hears, through their representatives, the statements of different Faculties as to their pecuniary needs, and endeavours to balance and harmonize their demands, and considers them in the light of the general interest. Accordingly it has been proposed, on the one hand, to transfer the powers of the Delegates of the Common University Fund to the suggested General Council or Committee of the Faculties; and on the other hand, to entrust to the Delegates of

the Common University Fund, after some change in their composition, the powers which it is suggested should be given to the General Council. The Chancellor has pointed out various objections to either course.

Principles and Methods, p. I 37.

It is, perhaps, best to keep educational and financial functions in the hands of different bodies. But apart from any question whether the functions of the Common University Fund should be enlarged or transferred, that body requires reorganization to make it a better informed and a more impartial judge of the questions it has to deal with at present. Reorganized it could fulfil all the functions of a financial Committee of the Boards of Faculties. But at present only about one-third of its members are elected by the Faculties, several studies are not represented upon it, and several others are over-represented.

II. Subdivision of Old and Creation of New Faculties-Other Universities find a few strong Faculties the best instruments for conducting education and promoting knowledge. The excessive subdivision of studies, caused by regarding everything from the point of view of examinations, is one of the chief defects of our present system. If it is perpetuated it will render it impossible to organize efficient Faculties. For it will not be found possible to give large powers to Boards representing but one of several kindred studies, or only one part of a study. Further, the conflict of interests between separate sections of teachers will be intensified instead of lessened, if the organization adopted emphasizes the differences which divide them, rather than the ties which unite them. It is suggested that the Literae Humaniores Board should be divided into three parts. Whether this change be expedient or not it affects the interests of the Faculties in general, and would alter the representation of the Faculties on the Common University Fund. It is a question on which the Faculties in general should be consulted, and affords another argument for the creation of a General Board of Faculties.

It is also proposed that the Board of Studies for the English Language and Literature, and that for Modern Languages and Literature, should both be made Boards of Faculty. But it may be questioned whether it would not be better to make them into one Board of Faculty, and let them manage their lecture lists and regulations by subdividing the Board for that purpose. The essential connexion between the subjects is shown by the fact that eight of the ten *ex officio* members of the English Board are also members of the Modern Languages Board. The real interests of both studies are the same, and the cooperation of their teachers would enable them to promote those interests better. The change suggested would facilitate the comparative study of modern languages and literatures which is the natural basis of both schools.

With the same object the various Committees for the management of special courses of study should, wherever possible, be brought into closer connexion with the Faculty or Faculties naturally representing the subjects those courses include. Political Economy and Political Science, for instance, might be associated with Modern History, Geography and Agriculture with Natural Science.

III. Powers of Individual Faculties.

(i) At present each Board of Faculty is restricted to a definite number of statutory duties, and its power to fulfil those duties adequately is further diminished by the nature of the University constitution. The first essential is that each Faculty should be given the right to discuss all the needs and interests of the studies it embraces, and to make what representations it thinks expedient thereon. At present it may give an opinion if it is asked to do so by Council: it should be empowered to take the initiative and offer one. A clause like that in the Leeds Charter is wanted to affirm this right.

'Each Faculty shall have the power of presenting recommendations and reports to the Senate upon all matters connected with the subjects of study embraced by the Faculty.'

(ii) A Faculty should be made responsible for all grades of instruction given in its subject. Provision for the training of advanced students and for the promotion of research is part of its proper business. Here it has become customary to assign these functions to a separate Committee appointed for the purpose, either by statute, like the Committee for Classical Archaeology, or by the Common University Fund, like the Committee for advanced Study in Mediaeval and Modern History. As soon as the Boards of Faculties have been reorganized the powers of these Committees should be transferred to the Boards.

(iii) Each Faculty should be given greater freedom to regulate the examinations, curriculum and teaching of the particular study it represents. At present the authority of a Board of Faculty is generally restricted by a statute which binds it to include certain ancillary subjects in the examination as necessary or optional. Its power over the curriculum is frequently limited to defining periods, fixing special subjects, and prescribing books. It is not at liberty to vary the method of examination in order to adopt the method it thinks best. It has no control over the teaching save the power to disallow lectures in certain cases, or to recommend alterations.

For changes in the curriculum or examination of the study under its charge, a Faculty usually has to obtain the leave of several other bodies, viz. Council, Congregation, and finally Convocation. Council is a body on which the Faculties are only accidentally represented, and it often happens that some particular Faculty has no representative on Council when questions affecting its interests come before that body. Nevertheless it is undesirable to diminish the authority of Council to supervise and control the studies of the University. But it is

desirable that in practice it should attach greater weight than it now does to the opinion of experts, as formulated by the Boards of Faculty representing particular studies. Council would attach more weight to the opinions of individual Faculties if they were endorsed by some intermediate body on which all Faculties were represented; and, if such a body existed, a Faculty which did not happen to be represented on Council would feel more confidence that its interests had been adequately considered when its recommendations were rejected. The chief obstacle to the development of the autonomy of the Faculties is Congregation. Faculties are represented in that body in proportion to the number of teachers they possess, and the influence of each particular Faculty depends on its voting strength. At present the Literae Humaniores Board has more representatives in Congregation than all the rest put together, and consequently no legislation introduced at the desire of a particular Faculty can be passed without the leave of one division of the Arts Faculty. The remedy for this is to give the various Faculties by statute larger power to control the studies they represent. The growth of a habit of leaving each Faculty to determine its own regulations would be facilitated by the establishment of the General Board or Committee of Faculties suggested above.

(iv) Scholarships and Prizes. In modern Universities in general the Faculty determines the conditions on which the prizes and other pecuniary rewards attached to the particular study it represents shall be awarded, and awards the prizes. The desirability of this is *recognized* here in the case of recent foundations. In the case of older foundations it is not so recognized, but there is usually a clause permitting the University to vary the conditions within certain limits. It is desirable that the University should avail itself of this clause to give the Faculties a larger voice in the management of the endowments in question, and the opportunity of considering from time to time how they may be employed to better advantage. In any re-arrangement of the Scholarship system, as suggested by the Chancellor,

Principles and Methods, pp. 91-2.

a certain number of senior scholarships should be assigned to each subject to encourage post-graduate work, and should either be awarded directly by the Faculty concerned with that subject, or under conditions approved by that body.

(v) Appointment of teachers.

A Faculty should have a voice in the appointment of all teachers giving public instruction in the subject under its charge. Otherwise its responsibility for the efficiency of the teaching given in the subject cannot be a reality.

I. University Teachers. Some Boards, as we have seen, have recently been given a direct share in the choice of teachers appointed by the University. But the precedent should be carried further, and the composition of the different boards of electors appointed by University statutes should be revised, in order to give a voice to the particular Board of Faculty representing the study-concerned. In the case of appointments made by the Common Fund the Faculty concerned should be asked to recommend persons, or report on the qualifications of candidates. It is also desirable that in the case of appointments made by the Crown the Faculties should be enabled to represent their opinion as to the needs of the subject, and to suggest names for consideration. In the German Universities professors are appointed by the government. 'The Faculty, however, has the right, based upon tradition and also for the most part upon statutory regulations, to co-operate in the appointment in the following manner. When a vacancy occurs in a chair, the Faculty suggests, as a rule, the names of three men who, in its judgement, are suitable for the position. But the government is not bound to confine its choice to those names, and as a matter of fact they are not unfrequently disregarded.'

Paulsen, *The German Universities*, p. 83.

The University might petition to be granted a similar privilege.

2. College Teachers. As in the case of University teachers so in the case of College teachers the Faculties should have a voice in selecting the persons appointed to give public instruction in the studies under their charge. At present the greater part of the public teaching given in the University is given by intercollegiate lecturers. A college appoints a man nominally to lecture to its own members and perform other domestic functions. The man thus appointed has acquired by prescription a right to lecture to the members of the University in general, and to take part in the management of a particular study. Neither the University whose members he instructs nor the Faculty whose affairs he helps to manage have any voice in his appointment, and both must take his fitness on trust. But since he performs these public functions it is fair to ask that the University through the Faculty should have some share in his selection and some guarantee of his fitness.

Two ways of attaining those ends have been suggested. One is to require that a lecturer should be approved by the Board of Faculty representing his subject, in order to obtain the right to act as an elector for that Board, or to have his lectures inserted in its official lists. This plan, which would give the University a sort of veto on these appointments, would be an improvement on the existing system, but it would not have much practical result. It would not produce 'the more systematic and economical organization of University and College teaching' The essential is to give the University a positive rather than a negative influence in the selection of

those who will become public teachers. The College meeting which appoints them at present is often not a good judge of the special qualifications of candidates. It does not always know what the particular branch of the subject is in which the University most wants a lecturer. There is no reason to believe that the College would not consider the needs of the University as well as its own, if it knew them. Hence the desirability for some method of election in which the needs of the study and the qualifications of candidates could be officially represented to the College by the Board of Faculty for which the man is intended to lecture. It is suggested, therefore, that a system something like that which exists in the case of the Lee's Readers at Christ Church should be adopted by Colleges in appointing teachers intended to be public lecturers.

The terms 'lecture' and 'lecturer' are meant here to include forms of public instruction such as classes or practical courses.

The appointment to a Lee's Readership is made by three representatives of the College, and two persons nominated by the Board of Faculty which represents the study, and the Board in question also specifies the particular parts of the study in which the person appointed is to give instruction.

Statutes, 1908, p. 92.

By the adoption of this plan, or some modification of it, the interests of both College and University would be taken into account in choosing, though the final selection would still be in the hands of the institution which found the money.

The two proposals stated would only affect future appointments. The problem how to secure co-operation at present between existing intercollegiate lecturers and University teachers, and how to organize the public teaching of the University most efficiently would still remain unsolved. The only way to do it is to empower the Boards of Faculty (on which both classes of teachers are represented) to determine what lectures the needs of the particular study require and what persons should be asked to give them. It is suggested that when an intercollegiate lecturer is permanently employed by the Faculty to lecture in this way he should be paid an annual salary by the University, and given the title of University Lecturer; and that when he is temporarily employed to deliver a single course of lectures he should receive payment from the University for them. As vacancies occurred, and according to merit, temporary lecturers should be promoted to the higher class and given the higher title.

Adequate remuneration by the University for the performance of public functions is an essential to the success of any scheme. Little will be gained by merely re-labelling some of the intercollegiate lecturers, nothing by re-labelling them all. So long as they were paid by the College and not by the University for their public lectures they would remain College officers, considering in their teaching rather the needs of the College than those of the University, and the requirements of examinations rather than the advancement of knowledge. It is necessary to elevate their aims by making them in spirit and in fact officers of the University, so far as the public instruction they give is concerned.

The remuneration should be a real payment for the services rendered, not a nominal sum. The creation of University lectureships worth forty or fifty pounds a year on the Cambridge plan will not serve the purpose. At present the Common University Fund has not at its disposal sufficient money to defray the cost of organizing teaching upon University lines. All it can do is to provide money for starting new studies, and to supplement or assist the teaching given in older studies by occasional grants. The obvious source from which to provide the salaries of the proposed University lecturers is fees paid by students. In other Universities students pay fees to the University for the instruction they receive; here, except in a few cases, they only pay fees to it for degrees or examinations. But the University has not relinquished the right to charge fees. They are charged by the University for the instruction given in Science and in many new or special subjects. The University has given the power to charge fees to eight or nine Committees or Boards. 'The Committee shall have power to require such fees to be paid by students for attendance at lectures and instruction as it may deem expedient' is the phrase usually employed in the Statutes. A similar power to charge fees should be given to the Boards of Faculties, or to the Common University Fund as representing them. The amount necessary would vary in different studies, and should be fixed by the Common University Fund after report from the Board of the Faculty concerned. The sum realized should be paid into the University Chest, and distributed by the Common University Fund acting on the recommendations of the Boards of Faculty.

In practice it would probably be expedient not charge a separate sum for each lecture, but to commute these fees for a fixed payment of so much per term, or per year, from each student taking the instruction provided by a particular Board of Faculty. The payment of a capitation fee of this kind would not increase the cost of education to the undergraduates: it would in practice come from the annual tuition fee which they pay to their Colleges. This is what happens at present in the case of Science, Modern Languages, English, and some minor subjects.

The sum needed would, of course, be much less in the case of other subjects than it is in the case of Science. In the case of English the Committee appointed by the English Board calculates that the cost of the

lectures and language classes necessary (in addition to those provided by the University) can be defrayed at present for £6 per student per annum. But this represents a minimum, and does not include any provision for the cost of seminar-libraries and other equipment necessary for the teaching of language and literature on scientific lines.

To generalize this system is the only way to provide for the payment of University lecturers without touching the endowments of the Colleges.

It is not suggested here that this system of University lecturers should be introduced *per saltum* and without regard to existing interests. In new subjects, where there are only a very few intercollegiate lecturers, it might be introduced at once. In older subjects, where there are many intercollegiate lecturers, all that should be done at first is, on the advice of the Board of Faculty concerned, to appoint a limited number of the best of them University lecturers, and to procure enough money to pay them by the method pointed out. The number of such University lecturers should then from time to time and by degrees be increased till all the necessary public teaching in the subjects referred to has thus been provided. By proceeding in this cautious fashion the University could meet and solve as they arose the minor practical difficulties attendant on the change—difficulties which naturally loom very large in the minds of those whose interests might be affected by it.

IV. The Faculty Franchise.

The right to vote for the elective members of a Board of Faculty is determined by regulations passed by the University in 1885, which can be altered at will. At present there are two classes of electors (1) teachers certified by the Vice-Chancellor as authorized by the University to give instruction. (2) Teachers certified by Heads of Colleges as authorized by their Colleges to give instruction.

Statutes, 1908, p. 123.

By this provision the Colleges have been allowed to usurp one of the chief functions of the University. Colleges have a right to choose who they please to instruct their own students within their own walls. But they are not entitled to give a man the right publicly to instruct members of other Colleges. Only the University is entitled to give that right.

'When I first came to Oxford no college tutor would have lectured publicly to any man outside his own college: It would have been considered an infringement of the professorial privilege.' Max Müller in *Minutes of Evidence, Oxford University Commission, 1878, p. 7.*

Once it gave the right by conferring the degree of M.A. Now it should give the right by conferring the privilege of voting for the election of members of a Board of Faculty, and thus making a man a member of a Faculty. Each Board of Faculty should examine the qualifications of persons proposed as public teachers, and certify its approval to the Vice-Chancellor. There is no reason why it should not in a similar way examine the qualifications of assistants employed by professors to lecture for them, and approve or disapprove. The present is a favourable opportunity for the University to resume one of its essential rights. But in order to facilitate the resumption there should be a proviso saving the rights of existing public teachers or lecturers.

V. Composition of the Boards of Faculty.

At present the normal Board of Faculty consists of *ex officio* members, that is teachers appointed by the University, and elected members, that is teachers appointed by the Colleges, in equal proportions. The drawbacks of the system of requiring that the numbers of the two sections of a Board should be exactly equal have been already pointed out. The system perpetuates a conflict, and often produces a deadlock, which is fatal to progress. It has been suggested that this should be remedied by a regulation that the elected members should not be more than two-thirds or three-fifths of the *ex officio* members. But the question would assume a different aspect if the elected members are persons whose qualifications have been certified by the Faculty on behalf of the University, and still more if they are persons in whose original appointment to teach the University has had a voice. The distinction at present maintained between the two classes of teachers would then lose its importance. But it is unreasonable to ask the University to grant the Boards of Faculties larger powers, unless the majority of each Board are persons of whose fitness to exercise these larger powers the University has some adequate guarantee.

VI. Relations of the Faculties to Undergraduates.

All undergraduates studying for an Honour School or taking any Diploma or Degree course of a similar standard, should be enrolled as students in some particular Faculty, and a proper register of their names and subjects should be kept by each Board. At present the University has no means of knowing the exact number of students engaged in a particular study, or the amount and nature of the teaching they need. The figures supplied are usually based on the numbers presenting themselves for examination at a particular time, and are inaccurate calculations.

It should be made clear that the students of a particular subject are members of the Faculty, representing it just as much as the teachers.

I have offered, perhaps too freely and too fully, my personal views on the problem of the best way to organize University studies and to co-ordinate University and College teaching. My excuse is the definite invitation of Council published in the *Gazette*, and addressed to all members of Congregation. The question of improving our organization is one which particularly affects teachers responsible to the University, but it is also a question of national as well as local or personal interest. At present the richest University in the country does not perform its educational duty as efficiently as England expects it to do. The chief reason is the nature of its constitution. In reality the University is little more than a geographical expression. There is a weak central government, intermittently attempting to carry out an educational policy. What authority it possesses is parcelled out amongst a multitude of Boards and Committees, having neither adequate power nor adequate responsibility. Behind these *simulacra* are the real authorities: twenty independent bodies which appoint teachers, control students, and expend the money men pay for their instruction. As they ultimately control legislation too, all the powers of sovereignty are in their hands, and they can nullify the authority of the central government at will. We are in the condition of Germany after the Treaty of Westphalia or the Congress of Vienna, and what is needed is to convert this loose confederation into a federal state.

The remedy is in our own hands. We are limited by laws made for us by an external authority, but still free enough to reorganize ourselves if we have a definite purpose before us. The University cannot set its house in order till it is master in its own house. To reform anything we must strengthen the central authority at the expense of the minor authorities. Colleges must surrender part of that control over the public teaching and the fees paid by students which they now possess, and seek compensation for what they sacrifice by sharing in the increased strength and prosperity of the University. The two institutions the last Commission gave us, the Faculties and the Common University Fund, supply the needful basis for the work of reconstruction. By building up these institutions we shall be following the lines which the experience of other Universities, and the tendency of the last few years in this, prove to be the natural lines of development. The alternative to this course of action is not the continuance of the present system, but the reorganization of the University by an external authority; and a reorganization carried out by the Chancellor and Council is preferable, if it is sufficiently thorough.

Thrift

An Address

Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Edinburgh Savings Bank

DECEMBER 28, 1908

By Lord Rosebery

Edinburgh: David Douglas 1909

The National Position

LORD ROSEBERY said:—

I have great pleasure in moving the adoption of this report, all the more as it marks an unprecedented occurrence in my own life, which is that, reversing a process by which the son is supposed to walk in the footsteps of the father, I am to-day walking in the footsteps of my son, who, I believe, moved this resolution last year. (Laughter.) I hope I may be able to speak as persuasively about thrift as he did on that occasion. (Laughter.) My Lord Provost, I think we must all feel that this is an eminently satisfactory report. The deposits have increased over a million in the last ten years, and we are now, as Mr. Wood has just told us, second only to Glasgow in the amount of the deposits lodged with the Government. Well, there is a traditional jealousy between Edinburgh and Glasgow, which I sometimes think is exaggerated—(hear, hear)—but at any rate we are quite satisfied to be second to Glasgow on this occasion, because we must remember that if Glasgow has saved more than we have, Glasgow has a great deal more to save from than we have. (Hear, hear.) But even if we are satisfied with ourselves, I am not sure that we figure quite favourably in regard to other nations as regards the proportion of depositors to population, I see from the returns that Sweden, and Norway, and France, and Belgium, and Germany, all exceed us in that proportion, and I think that we ought not to be satisfied as a country until we rank with that little but robust nation of Norway, which stands at the head of the list. (Applause.)

Old Age Pensions

Now, sir, you have expressed a doubt as to whether the new provision for old age pensions is likely to promote thrift in the community. I am not going to follow you on that burning and hazardous ground which

approaches too near to party politics for an occasion of this kind, but after all, some of the anomalies might almost point to the fact that the encouragement of thrift in the sense of accumulation is one of the objects of the old age pension scheme, because when you see that those who have saved £800 or even £1000 are rewarded by receiving an old age pension of 5s. a week, no one can feel that the whole scope of this scheme is the discouragement of thrift. (Laughter and applause.) Some people, according to their party, call it a wasteful experiment, and some call it a wise and far-reaching experiment. I shall not take either side, but shall content myself with saying that it is experimental in its nature, and that we shall have to wait some little time before we can pronounce confidently on its operation.

A Definition of Thrift

Now on these occasions the mover of the report, as I observe my son did last year, is expected to say a few words upon thrift. Thrift is one of these virtues which are, perhaps more than we think, much easier to preach than to practise, and to a Scottish audience, our reputation in the world being what it is, it would seem almost like carrying coals to Newcastle to advocate thrift in any shape or form. Well, I will content myself with repeating, in the words of Shakespeare, what comprehends, after all, the whole root of the matter, that 'thrift is blessing,' not merely because of the accumulation of substance, but because of the foundation and strengthening of character. (Hear, hear.) Now, as regards the financial aspect, I am not anxious to say a great deal on this occasion. From the financial point of view my definition of thrift would be this—getting full value for your money and looking ahead. Of course, the historic definition which has given so much comfort and encouragement to thousands is that of Mr. Micawber in *David Copperfield*. I copied out the words last night that I might be perfectly certain that I should have them right this morning, with the disastrous result that I got so interested in *David Copperfield* that I found it difficult to return to the consideration of thrift, (Laughter and applause.) What did Mr. Micawber say to David Copperfield on a famous occasion? 'Annual income, £20; annual expenditure, £19, 19s. 6d.—result, happiness. Annual income, £20; annual expenditure, £20, 0s. 6d.—result, misery.' (Laughter.) Well I suppose that is practically true. It means in reality that a man who is beforehand with the world to even a small degree occupies a very different position relatively to the rest of the world as compared to the man who is behindhand with it to as small an extent. Of course, on the financial view of thrift we know it is the foundation of all prosperity, even of those colossal fortunes which we hear of in America, but which we never realise in this country. (Laughter.) It is perfectly true, I think, that Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who began in the very humblest situation in life in the town of Dunfermline, has worked his way up to a fortune which I cannot even attempt to estimate, but which I know, from the beneficent expenditure, must be enormous, mainly by a beginning of thrift. This morning, in the newspapers, we had another example of a lad who landed in South Carolina sixty-three years ago with 12s. in his pocket, and died worth ten millions sterling yesterday. I do not mean to argue—I am not such a fool as to argue—that it was by mere thrift that these immense fortunes have been accumulated; but I am here to argue my profound faith that they were in the commencement founded on thrift, and on nothing but thrift—(hear, hear),—and that when by thrift a small but substantial sum was accumulated, it was so utilised by the genius of speculation as to amount to these enormous fortunes.

The Generosity of the Thrifty

Now, I want to make an exception before I go any further. Whatever thrift is, it is not avarice, There is a broad distinction between thrift and avarice. Mr. Micawber in his definition expressly, as it seems to me, excludes avarice, because the accumulation of sixpence at the end of the year, which he indicates as amounting to happiness, would certainly not satisfy any dream of avarice. Moreover, avarice is not generous; and, after all, it is the thrifty people who are generous. (Applause.) All true generosity can only proceed from thrift, because it is no generosity to give money which does not belong to you, as is the case with the unthrifty. And I venture to say that among all the great philanthropists, all the great financial benefactors of their species of whom we have any record, the most generous of all must have been thrifty men. (Applause.) Well, now, I pass from the financial value of thrift, which to me is not the greatest, to that which results in the formation of character. I know that many people when they read speeches about thrift say, 'How can the poor be thrifty? They have nothing to be thrifty upon.' But, the exact reverse of the case is the truth. Strangely enough, in your report which you have just read, and which is before us to-day, we have the proof of the contrary, By the experience of Edinburgh and by the experience of Glasgow, and by the experience of Manchester—I think these are the cases you mention, Mr, Wood—it has been found that periods of stress and not periods of prosperity are the most favourable to thrift, as shown in the deposits in the Savings Bank.

Thrifty Scotsmen and their Funerals

But the case of Scotland, our own country, is a much more emphatic illustration of this than any particular Savings Bank in however large a town it may be situated. In Scotland the eighteenth century, the time of perhaps her direst poverty, at any rate as compared with other countries in the world, was the period of our greatest thrift. A hundred and forty years ago there were probably not more than two or three hundred thousand pounds of current coin in the whole of Scotland; and when you compare that with the fourteen millions of deposits in the two Savings Banks of Edinburgh and Glasgow you may arrive at some computation of what the difference of prosperity is between the Scotland of to-day and the Scotland of that day. But that was the time of Scotland's greatest thrift, this time when her whole current coinage did not amount, as it is calculated, to £300,000—so much so that in these days we read that the one great object of a Scottish peasant was thrift, not for the sake of livelihood but for the sake of his funeral—(laughter)—to amass enough money to obtain a decent funeral, which was calculated at, I think, about £2. This patient and self-denying people amassed enough for what after all is the most insignificant event in our lives—toiled and spun and spared themselves for that purpose. Much more than that, they maintained their own aged, their own parents, their own relations. They thought it shame to take any money from the public or the State. (Applause.) They had a spirit of independence, which is at least equal to any spirit of independence which we boast of now. They scorned to take assistance, they scorned that any should maintain their families but themselves. They gave a little surplus in charity, for there were plenty of recipients in the beggars and tinkers on the road. But the nation at large was thrifty, independent, self-respecting to a degree perhaps known in no other nation at no other period in the world. (Applause.) Why, sir, when things were in this impoverished state in Scotland the Scottish people were a source of terror to their southern countrymen.

An Old English Caricature

Only yesterday I lit upon a caricature, an English caricature, I need hardly say, of the date of 1780—you see, ten years after the time I am speaking of, when the current coin was so small in number. It represents a Scotsman only half clad—the caricature is quite decorous—(laughter)—with his shoes on his one shoulder, and an essential part of his dress on the other—(laughter)—barefooted, on his way to England, And underneath it is written:—

*Tho' Sawney's breeks are on his shoulders,
So plainly seen by all beholders,
Half-starved, half-naked, but one shoe,
Yet, by and by, he 'll ride o'er you,*

Yes, our great-grandfathers—my great-grand-father at any rate was living at that time, and in possession of his estate—our great-grandfathers did great things in those days on a mess of pottage. They had no more. But with it they helped to mould the Empire. They maintained their poor without legal compulsion. They sought nothing from external help, and they laid in their nakedness and their barrenness the foundations of the prosperity which reigns in Scotland at the present moment. (Applause.) I should not care to live, we none of us would care to live, as they did. Some of the poorest in our country would shrink from the manner of life which was endured by some of the noblest in these days. We should not care to share their privations; but we should not be unwilling to be convinced that we possess their independence, their self-reliance, and their self-respect. (Applause.)

Thrift and Independence

And, my Lord Provost, I regard that as the greatest blessing resulting out of thrift—Independence of character. Whether Scottish pride arises out of Scottish thrift, or whether Scottish thrift arises out of Scottish pride, I really cannot decide, but they are closely intertwined, so closely that you cannot perhaps separate them; but at any rate the combination produces the character which has governed the country, (Applause.) Again when we talk of thrift producing character, we are at a loss to know whether it is not thrift that is a sign of character. Thrift implies care, foresight, tenderness for those dependent on you. Whether these qualities produce thrift, or whether they are produced by thrift, I will not venture to say; but at any rate of this I am certain, that they are inseparably intertwined. You remember what the last words were of Oliver Goldsmith, one of the greatest geniuses that ever lived in this island. You remember he wrote *The Vicar of Wakefield*, if I remember

aright—that masterpiece which has survived so many masterpieces—to pay off a creditor, his landlady or another,—for he was always in financial difficulties,—and when he lay dying, some one said to him, 'Is your mind at ease?' and he replied, 'No, it is not.' These were his last recorded words. You may be sure that if he had united genius to thrift, his last words would have been something very different.

The Wickedness of Waste

But, ladies and gentlemen, I said a moment ago it was a question, rather, how can the poor be thrifty? Well, I will not go into that question, except to say that, as I think I have demonstrated, it has been in the power of the poorest to be thrifty in our country in the past. But there is, at any rate, one sort of thrift which is in the power of the very poorest, and which is to refrain from waste. If I wanted to train up a child to be thrifty, as I have apparently trained my eldest son—(laughter)—I should teach him to abhor waste. I do not mean the waste of money. That cures itself, because very soon there is no money to waste. But I mean waste of material, waste of something which is useful, which may not represent any money value to the waster. Then there is waste of what does not belong to us, which is a very common form of waste. There is waste of water. Indeed, Edinburgh ought to know something about the waste of water. I am not speaking of the waste caused by the pollution of our rivers, though that, perhaps, is the most criminal form of waste that exists in our midst. There is not a river that flows round Edinburgh, there is not a river that flows through Mid-Lothian, that is not hopelessly polluted, and wantonly polluted, so that it cannot be used for any cleanly purpose. I am not speaking of the waste of water in that way, but the waste in private families, among individuals, who waste that precious element in a way which compels Edinburgh to go seeking every twenty years or so for a new source of supply. I remember being a member of a small municipality in the south of England when this question of waste came before us. We found that water was allowed to run, and that every form of waste was indulged in, because it cost nothing; and so the result was a water famine when summer came on. Again, let us take the waste of gas and things of that kind, I believe Edinburgh Town Council has recently adopted a stringent measure for the prevention of the waste of gas, but I am not a resident in the city, and so I have not experienced its rigour; but at any rate we all of us must see that there is a constant waste of things which cost nothing to waste, but which are in reality an offence against ourselves and against the economy of the world.

The Thrift of Burns, Scott, and Gladstone

Now, ladies and gentlemen, if you wish your children to be thrifty, I would beg of you to impress upon them the criminality of waste. (Applause.) What is the example we learn from great men in this respect? I take three foremost men of their countries. I take Washington, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon—Washington, a thrifty man of business as ever lived; Frederick the Great more than thrifty; Napoleon, thrifty in detail to the utmost possible extent. And then I take three other names, three names familiar to Scotsmen—three names of great Scotsmen, and there I find more difficulty. I take Burns, and Walter Scott, and Gladstone. Of course the toughest nut to crack is Burns. We worshippers of Burns are not accustomed to think of him as thrifty, and, undoubtedly from some points of view he was not thrifty, though he had uncommonly little to be thrifty upon. But no one could see the enormous output of work that Burns did without seeing that he must have had a great thrift of time, which is perhaps the most important form in which we can be thrifty. But I will abandon Burns as a difficult subject. (Laughter.) Walter Scott, as we know, died ruined. But Walter Scott was eminently thrifty. The trouble of Walter Scott was that he was ambitious, and endeavoured to found too large a structure on his labour and his thrift, went into business which he did not understand, and, therefore, the whole structure toppled over. Now, of Mr. Gladstone I can speak with personal knowledge. There was no man so careful and thrifty in his expenditure, combined with great generosity, and great liberality. (Applause.) No one who ever saw that great man at work could believe that it was anything but a sin to waste anything, more especially time. (Applause.)

Thrift and the Empire

I do not want to detain you too long; but I want to take you to a larger sphere of thrift, and that, after all, is the main point on which I want to insist to-day. All great Empires have been thrifty. Take the Roman Empire which in some respects, as a centralised Empire, was the greatest in history, which lay like an iron clamp on the face of Europe. That was founded on thrift. When it ceased to be thrifty, it degenerated and came to an end. Take the case of Prussia, which began with a little narrow spit of sand in the north of Europe, 'all sting,' as some one said referring to its shape and the fact that almost all its inhabitants were armed men. It began with a narrow spit of sand. It was nurtured by the thrift of Frederick the Great's father, who prepared a vast treasure and a vast army by economy, which we should call sordid, but it was the means by which the greatness of

Prussia was founded, from which the present German Empire has arisen. Take the case of France. In my humble belief, France, in spite of the returns I quoted at the beginning of my speech, is in reality the most frugal of all nations. I am not sure that the French always put their money into savings banks, and therefore they do not figure so well in the proportion of depositors to the nation as some others may do. But after the disastrous war of 1870, when France was crushed for the time by a foreign enemy and by a money imposition which it seemed almost impossible that any nation could pay, what happened? The stockings of the French peasantry, in which they had kept the savings of years, were emptied into the chest of the State, and that huge indemnity and cost of war were paid off in a time incredibly short. The other two nations I have spoken of were made by their thrift; and France was saved by her thrift. (Applause.)

The Government and Thrift

Now we come to our own country. What have we to say of her in the way of thrift? We have a financier who is also a member of Parliament here present, Sir George M'Crae, who would give us more enlightenment on that point than I could, because I sit in a House which is privileged only to pay the taxes and not to vote them. (Laughter.) But I am bound to say that, speaking from that external point of view, I am not quite sure that thrift is a governing consideration of our Parliament at this moment. There used to be a very considerable man, who was mocked at in his time—he was a prophet, though a minor prophet—I mean Joseph Hume. He was a very severe and rigid economist, who was a terror to all persons who were guilty of anything like extravagance in the public service. Joseph Hume was so minor a prophet that he does not seem to have left a mantle behind him; at any rate, no portion of its texture has fallen, I am sorry to say, on any present member of the House of Commons. (Laughter.) So much so, to such a degree, has the absence of thrift proceeded, that it is now a subject of joy to economists, when votes are passed under the guillotine, because when any vote comes up for discussion, there is no question of its diminution, but a hundred voices for its increase; and therefore, although I know politicians are apt to complain of so many votes and so much expenditure being passed under the rigid rule of silence imposed by the guillotine, the economist secretly rejoices that such is the case. I cannot embark upon that topic to-day. Indeed, I have embarked upon enough topics already, but I do think it is incumbent on those who have the governance of our affairs to remember that great nations and great empires only live so long as they are thrifty; that the moment they begin to waste or disperse their resources the day of their end is at hand. That is a fact abundantly proved in history, proved up to the hilt, I think, by two of the examples I have given you, and though I do not pretend to preach thrift from any exalted standpoint, I do beg those who are here present and those outside these walls whom my words may reach to remember that thrift is the surest and the strongest foundation of an Empire—so sure, so strong, and so necessary that no great empire can long exist that disregards it (Applause.)

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The Value of Ancient History

A Lecture Delivered at Oxford May 13th, 1910

By John L. Myres

Gladstone Professor of Greek, and lecturer in ancient Geography in the university of Liverpool

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'The purpose of the enquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus is this; to prevent the works of men from becoming obliterated by time, and to ensure that great and admirable deeds, some performed by Greeks, some by foreigners, should not lose their renown; and, more particularly, why they fought with one another.'

SUCH is the brief preface with which the Father of History inaugurates his work: so brief, that it reads more like a title page than a preface; and indeed deserves to be set out as such some day on the first leaf of an edition. But this title-page to all History is also more than a preface; it is the announcement of a discovery, and the definition of a science and an art.

Inspired by the National exaltation of soul which carried the Greeks through their Birth-struggle, the first Pan-Hellenic Act since the Trojan War, Herodotus writes in the calm after the storm, with adjustment and expansion still active around him; and looking back, as Milton could look back over the Elizabethan Age, or Victor Hugo over the Napoleonic, he sees that Heroic Age far enough off to be contemplated whole, yet near enough still for the Divine Justice and Mercy to be very real and terrible.

The purpose of his enquiry was consciously present to him. His title-page and preface are the key to his

whole book; their significance does not end here. 'Great actions,' he would say, 'like the recent events, have value and interest for mankind; they are *memorabilia*, and therefore *memoranda*; #ò ####ò# is ##### and #ò ##µ##o# ###o# is also #ò #####o#.'

Good, admirable, memorable; these three. That is his first point; and the second stands very near to it. For Herodotus, it makes no difference at all whether the doers of deeds, which have won their way to the heroic, were Greeks of his own blood, or not. Greece had won, but Persia was an enemy worth beating—*fas est et ab hoste doceri*—and his portraits of great Persians—Harpagus, Zopyrus, Megabazus, Artabanus, Darius himself, above all perhaps Mardonius—are there to show how well he practised what he preached. It begins, this second discovery, as matter of common honesty, of historical impartiality; an inheritance too from the Epic, with its Hector and King Priam; but its excellence is in his sense of the dramatic balance and proportion in which events stand to one another. It can degenerate, no doubt, into exaggerated craving for symmetry, an ingenuous weighing of souls like those of Polycrates and Oroetes against each other; but it can also explain and excuse the pageantry of Oriental life by which he is ever labouring to force home on a work-a-day audience the realities of the Persian Empire. Aeschylus alone comes as near to make us understand the Great King with his Empire and his Elders; and Aeschylus too was a Master of the Pageant; a great stage-carpenter, as well as a pupil of Homer.

His third point is different, and it is here that Herodotus shows most his originality; is most truly the Father of History. T## ## #####, ##î #i' ## #i'##. Human actions spring from causes, and these causes are reasons why: they are the ends which men propose for their aims and acts to realise. Thucydides could distinguish, afterwards, that there may be #àí## ##î ##o#####i#: *causa*, that is, clear enough to the spectator, who is the historian, but unperceived by the actors in the drama; but also *motives*, which the men themselves felt, and confessed, to be their impulse to act; these too, therefore the historian must verify. But that is subsequent analysis Herodotus' original programme, í##o#í## ##ó#####, is already inclusive and clear. There can be a philosophy of History, based upon accurate knowledge of great deeds; appealing ever to experience and humanity; accepting uniformities of Nature and of human behaviour as History unveils them, but utilizing these discoveries to state and restate the Noteworthy Fact with new precision, new comeliness, and so new claim to remembrance and admiration. How often, on the other hand, when Herodotus hesitates to record ##µ####ó# ##, is his apology just this—oú# ##### #î##î# #####

But to what end will he expend all this labour? This does not come out explicitly in the preface, but it is clear in the body of his book. Uniformities in the past, accurately established, and, no less, our experience, gained by accurate observation, of the very unexpectedness of human behaviour, have practical value, as well as aesthetic and scientific.

This aspect of great deeds as effects and, in their turn, as causes, must needs have determined for anyone who saw it as clearly as Herodotus, the choice of his ##µ#####` and #`#####. No one of course acts always up to the high level of his determination: Herodotus was often led by seeming connexions to set things down in his book, which it surprises us now to find in it at all, or at any rate, to find where they stand. But to admit this is a very different thing from condemning Herodotus as garrulous or irrelevant; he would rather be a wise agnostic, who would say, 'When we know a little more, for certain, about the canons of relevance in pre-Socratic Greece, about relevance in Pindar, and in the Tragedians, we will return with some confidence to the digressions and " asides " of Herodotus. When we know as much of Corinth or Periander as Herodotus might assume that any public of his would know—we may pardon him if he forgot that his book might live!—we shall perhaps be at a standpoint to enjoy the oft-told tale of Arion and the Dolphin, as he himself enjoyed it when he retold it first in public (in I. 13) with Periander, not Arion, in the hero's part; we shall appreciate no less, if we are historians at all, the old man's pride that other time when he could add óµo##o### ##` oí ##`###oi.'

That great deeds, then, have inherent value for us; that this value is wholly independent of the accidents of race or environment; 'fire burns,' as we say, 'here and in Persia,' and here and in Persia virtue shines too; but that on the other hand their value depends essentially on their interest as causes and effects—this is the simple faith of Herodotus of Halicarnassus; and I do not know that modern historians have greatly improved upon it.

To support this impression, I summarise very briefly the profession of faith of a great living historian: it is the more apt to my purpose because Dr. Eduard Meyer has traversed, as no one else has, that portion of antiquity with which Herodotus deals.

Edyard Neter. *Zur Theorie and Methodik der Geschichte*. Halle, 1902.

'All history,' he says, 'is a presentation of processes, or, more accurately speaking, of changes which take place in time ... The primary and fundamental task of the historian is the transmission of facts which were once actual.' We seem to catch Ionic resonance:## #####à #####ó##### #`à##### ## ##ó## ##í##### #####.'

There is a stress, even, in the word ##óµ### on historical facts as process which might strike us as modern, if it were not so thoroughly Greek.

Then arises the fundamental question, 'which of the processes, of which we have record, are "historical"?'

and to this the reply is, that 'that is historical which really is or was....' On what, then, rests the further selection which each historian actually makes among them? Here also only the Present can give the answer; the selection rests on the historical interest which the Present takes in any effect or result of development (##### μ##### ## ##î ##μ#####) so that it feels the need of investigating the motives which brought it about (##à ## ### ##î #i' ## #î#i###). 'The wider the circle is, over which the effects of a historical event extend, the more important is it, and the greater therefore the interest which we attribute to it.' Clearly, therefore, events which are international are of higher historical interest than any parochial occurrence; and if so, we may fairly catch again the Herodotean echo, #à μ#`# #E##### #à #è #####oi#i à#o#####. This is notable agreement between historians of earliest and latest date; and it gives us approximately a definition of history which may content us, and at the same time be a first answer to the question what constitutes the value of history, and of a historical fact.

It will be clear already, I think, that history—whether ancient, as for Eduard Meyer, or modern, as for Herodotus, who was writing in the first instance about the events of his own parents' lifetime—has, as a form of knowledge and enquiry, a twofold aspect. As an investigation of what really happened, it is as thoroughly a science as geology or botany, or any other non-experimental branch of learning. But as a science which selects from among the things which have happened the things which are of human interest, and regards only those things as being of interest which are seen to have been instrumental in bringing about 'the present,' History stands alone; or rather, takes rank among those other branches of knowledge, like the study of Art and Morals, which are concerned not solely with the discovery and record of facts, and the ascertainment of the relations between them; but also with the application of a standard of value. History is a science of observation, it is true; but it is also a critical science. Its standard is one of value as well as of relevance; it relates its facts not only to other facts, but to the judgment and to the service of Man. It is also, as we shall see shortly, an Art; and as such is concerned not with criticism only, but with creation; the creation of a picture of Man's work. History, then, is only conceivable on an anthropo-centric basis; in relation, that is, to ourselves; the historical value of each occurrence depends upon our judgment of the influence which it has had in bringing about the present state of things. But, as we have seen already, 'the larger the circle is over which the influence of a historical occurrence extends, the more important is it, and so also the greater is the interest which we attribute to it.' There are of course, as Eduard Meyer goes on to point out, in the passage from which I have quoted, great occurrences in the growth of civilization, such as the rise of a new religion, or the creation of a great work of literature or art, whereby Man, or rather that section of Mankind which includes ourselves, has been permanently enriched and fortified in the struggle to live well. But these, though the circumstances of their origin are a historical fact, yet tend, when once originated, to pass out of general history, and become the subject of what we currently describe as the special 'history' of *them*. There is a history of Mohammedanism, for example, and there is a history of Poetry or of Iron, in which the standard of relevance and of human interest is set, not by the End of Man, but by the conception of Man as employer of iron, creator and appreciator of poetry, and the like. But apart from these occurrences of high rank, whereby Man has accumulated his instruments for living (as Aristotle might have put it), the most decisive occurrences are those which we call political. These have the strongest because the deepest and intensest influence upon the course of events; and it is on this ground that we regard political history, in the large Greek sense, as the central branch of the study.

The reason for this pre-eminence is clear. Among all the suggested definitions of Mankind, as we know, none so clearly hits the mark as that of Aristotle, that Man is a #o#####ò# ###o# Man's unique and supreme instrument for living at all, and still more for living well, is his power to associate himself with others of his kind, to subordinate personal to corporate aims, and in rare cases to discover new corporate aims, and create associations which can achieve them. Popular language also, I think, supports us here: when we speak of the 'great men' of a people or of a period, it is, I think, only in the second place that we think of the poets, and the other inventors and discoverers; what we mean when we speak of someone as a 'great man' without further qualification, is primarily this, that he did great deeds—##### ##### ## ##î ##μ#####—in the Herodotean sense; that he took a leading part in shaping or guiding or preserving his State; either in making, that is, or in using for its true end, that supreme association of which the purpose is to ensure that its members shall live well. We now come to a rather disconcerting fact. After the 'great men' of action, who (as we commonly say) 'make history,' those who stand next in the hierarchy of greatness are the 'great men' of thought, the makers of ideas and standards, the poets, and the founders of creeds and schools; and clearly prominent among these come those 'great men' who in every age have made, not history, but *histories*. To have transmitted to posterity authentic record of the great deed, and of the reason why, is a claim to remembrance, and to historic importance, only less imperative than to have done the great deed itself, or to have conceived the idea which inspired it; and such a record itself will be of greater or less historic interest and value, according as it affects a wider or a narrower circle. It follows that the work—that is to say, the 'works' in the literary sense—of the great historians in the past stands, for the historian in the present, on a plane of historic value only less high than the historic deeds which they commemorate. In this respect, History stands almost alone among the critical

sciences; for it is only in the rarest instances that the works of a historian of painting or poetry can in any sense be said to transmit to us authentic record of the works of art or literature whose meaning they interpret. A work of art or literature must itself survive: but History lives in the historians.

History, as we have seen, is a critical science; and like all other critical sciences partakes also of the nature of an Art. Like the criticism of literature or morals, the practice of it presumes experience and experience of two kinds. A historian's training is a double task. He must learn to write history; to ascertain his facts with as rigorous accuracy as a geologist, or a naturalist; and to interpret their importance by his standard of historical value, as a moralist interprets conduct by his standard of right and wrong, or as a critic interprets a poem or picture by his standard of fair and foul. But he has first to ascertain his facts; and, in most branches of History, a large proportion of his facts are transmitted to him by other historians more or less consciously acting with intent to preserve remembrance of great deeds, according to their own standards of ##### μ##### ## #î##### The student of history needs therefore not only to have his own standard of historical interest, but also to, be able to estimate and criticise the standards of other persons, who may be posed in any conceivable plane in tie perspective.

All history, therefore, like all critical science, demands critical insight as well as technical accuracy and constructive ability. But all these are only acquired by experience. In history, indeed, as in all other forms either of critical or of creative activity, all lectures and text-books are essentially and merely introductory They can illustrate the methods of history; they can supply you with the materials; but history itself the; cannot teach you; still less can they make you into historians any more than into philosophers or painters or good men. It is only by making histories for your selves that you can hope either to become historians, or to do justice to the work of the men who have made histories before you.

II

So much for that general conception of what history is, and of its value, with which, I think, we shall come most safely to the study of it. All that I have said so far, however, has been intended to be equally applicable to all history—ancient and modern alike—and if, later on, I have occasion to contrast our actual methods of dealing with different periods of history, it must needs be either to regret anomalies, or to justify their existence.

But now we come to more special considerations. The terms ancient and modern history do, after all, stand for a very real distinction. Ancient history does not merely deal with an earlier period in the general history of mankind; it has to discover and verify its facts under conditions of study which are peculiar; and the facts, when discovered, turn out to belong, for the most part, to rather special classes. Consequently 'ancient' historians are under strong temptation to fill the gaps in their knowledge, which they are every day more free to admit, from adjacent sources of learning, and consequently also, it is essential for students of ancient history to start with clear ideas of the functions of History itself, and also of its frontier lines towards these neighbouring fields of knowledge.

But we must go further than this. Ancient history does not merely deal with facts of a special kind, ascertained under special conditions, and belonging to a special period of time. Not all the facts belonging to this period are included in its domain at ah; and those which are included are defined and characterised quite as precisely by the place as by the time of their occurrence. There is a good reason, which it is for the historian to discover, why Greek history falls within the particular centuries which it fills; but there is equally good reason why it falls in the Mediterranean region, and round the shores of the Aegean Sea. Even if we knew the history of the Mississippi as we know that of the Nile, it could never rank in the same sense as ancient history; but would remain, as now, a matter of indifference to historians. In reality, the geographical area within which events count as historic during the periods which are claimed by ancient history, is very narrowly and very precisely limited; nor is it easy to conceive in what way these geographical limits can ever be seriously challenged. So rigid is the control which nature has imposed upon the most successful enterprises even of an animal so migratory and intrusive as Man. Let me explain very briefly what I mean.

The main current of human history has passed (from the point where we can first trace it) through three principal phases, and is now, I think, entering upon a fourth; and each of these phases stands intimately related to distinct geographical surroundings.

The paragraphs which follow are abbreviated from § iv of a paper on the *Place of Classical Geography in a Classical Curriculum*, read in 1999 at a meeting of the Classical Association of Scotland.

The first stage is one in which the sole centres of advancement are provided, and defined, by great river valleys, with alluvial irrigable soil. The precise course of events in Mesopotamia and in Egypt has depended, in detail, upon external factors; but the common character of what the historians group together as the Ancient East, is that of detached riparian and agricultural civilizations, in recurrent peril from the men of the desert and

the mountain, and only in intermittent touch with each other.

Each of these self-centred and almost self-sufficient worlds has its own special type of civilization adapted to the local conditions; but each is in its essentials the duplicate of the other. Outside these twin sources of light lie for the most part darkness or satellites.

The second phase of history opened when the dwellers round the shores of a Midland Sea, and above all, on the islands secluded within one gulf of it, began to make interchange of commodities, and thereby grew up to the conception of the habitable world as a *κόσμος*, an *Orbis Terrarum*, a ring of countries convergent about a single basin of water; adjacent indeed to the Ancient East, but essentially averted from it. That this conception of a ring of lands lasted so persistently and produced in Greek and Roman life the practical consequences which it did, is due to the fact that it did actually represent the geographical conditions in which Greeks and Romans lived; for if we look at the great civilisation which grew up in the Mediterranean lands, I think we shall see that each principal phase of that civilisation was obviously and emphatically a Mediterranean one; and that it owed its greatness to its conformity to Mediterranean conditions. The empires of Minos, of Athens, and of Rome are but three attempts to realise a civilised *Orbis Terrarum*, convergent round the margin of a single water-basin. The momentary efforts of Alexander, of Augustus, and of Trajan, to transcend these limits, die with their authors, or before them. Only the genius of Caesar could see that when he crossed the Rhone and created the New World called Europe, he was discovering a world which faced not towards the Elbe, but towards the Atlantic: *vergit ad septem triones*.

The third phase opens, then, when Caesar's galleys with oars, pine-built, from the Midland Sea, met the oaken sail-craft of the ocean-going Veneti. It passes by long transition of northern sea-powers in strife with southern, Northway against Midgard, to the point where northern and southern sea-powers, in league and rivalry, demonstrate simultaneously, by their discovery and colonization of the Americas, that the Atlantic, like the Mediterranean and the old Aegean, is no Outland Sea, but an Inter-continental Gulf, between the 'United' and the 'Dis-united' States; that the Circumambient Ocean of an earlier age is itself in turn the avenue, beyond its own Pillars of Heracles, the Gates of Horn and of Good Hope, into what might well seem at last to be a real Ocean.

A fourth phase into which the world is now again passing, with the occupation of Australia and the westward coasts of America, and with the introduction of Western thought into India, Japan, and China, raises anew the question: Is not, after all, what seemed to Nelson and Washington to be an Outer Sea, itself landlocked like its prototypes? Have not the Eastern and the Western halves of our Mercator's projection served their turn long enough as coasts of a Midland Atlantic? Ought they not now, in fact, to be transposed, to be the inward-facing shores of a Pacific World?

III

Let us now go back to the questions of method in Ancient History, which we had to put on one side, in order to survey the field of its operations, and fix its position both in universal history and in relation to ourselves.

We saw that in all historical work, some of the materials are transmitted to the historian directly, and another part through the medium of previous historian; more or less worthy of the name. But the ratio of the matter from the one source, to that supplied by the other, may vary almost infinitely. Here we strike upon one marked contrast between the two great departments which we call 'ancient' and 'modern': namely, that the balance which exists, in all history, between its two aspects, between the direct writing of history, and the critical appreciation of history already written, is quite differently adjusted in each of them.

In almost all modern history, it is still possible to go behind the work of previous historians; to begin approximately where they began, and to repeat, in our own persons, experiences like theirs. The materials for history are still there; perhaps less copiously, perhaps through some accident more copiously, than when our predecessors sat down to write; but it is from materials, not from our predecessors' work, that we set out; and it is in the light of our knowledge of the materials themselves, that we permit our own judgment to be guided, if at all, by that of other historians, whom we have learned, by this method, to respect.

In ancient history, it was long quite otherwise; and because it is inevitably otherwise, ancient history is still sometimes felt to be of a different quality from modern, and is assigned a different place in our systems of knowledge. It is an obvious example of this feeling, that whereas we have in Oxford a separate Final Honours School of Modern History, Ancient History forms only one section of the composite School of *Litterae Humaniores*, in which a large part of your time is devoted to the systematic study of philosophy, and another large part to the literary criticism of certain ancient authors. The only reason for this which will make any appeal to historians is that in ancient history a very large part of the work actually done consists simply in the

attempt to rediscover from the historians themselves, what were the materials upon which they were working, irrespective of the further questions, first, how far these materials of theirs represented, at all adequately, the real state of the case; and then, how far the periods or topics about which these authors write were the only periods or topics worth studying, or even the most important. Thucydides, for example, believed that the Peloponnesian War was *best worth expounding*,—Herodotus would I think, have said, *best worth the telling*; what *we* on our part are concerned in the very first place to discover, is whether, and in what sense, the Peloponnesian War deserved this high estimate; and what grounds Thucydides had for making it.

This interpretation of ancient historians we have for long been accustomed to effect in the light of two main classes of evidence. In the first place, we have the internal evidence of the historians themselves, and, closely allied to this, the witness of one historian for or against another. In the second place, we have a fragmentary collection of literary materials for history, over and above the statements of any historian in the stricter sense of the word. It is all that has been saved, piecemeal, from the wreck of the old world; it is of all degrees of historical, that is, of critical, human interest; much of it, also, comes to us from the hands of men whose outstanding service was that they knew so little of history-writing, as the great masters conceive it, that they left standing on their pages whole paragraphs and chapters which Thucydides would surely have excised. With such materials for history, and such only, at our command, it would clearly be lost labour to apply the methods of the historian of modern times. Glimpses of ancient history they might give us, here and there; but they are quite insufficient for any reconstruction of antiquity, as history, such as is presented to us, for example, by Thucydides.

This again is the only reason, which will at all move the historian, for the local cult of prescribed periods and 'set books.' It explains the close interdependence of periods and texts, and the very subordinate part which is commonly assigned, even within a prescribed period, to episodes or phases which the 'set books' omit or neglect. Examples of all kinds of limitation will come before you, soon and often, in your 'Greats' reading; and it is well that you should be prepared for them from the outset: otherwise you may think you have 'covered the ground,' when you have only crossed it on a few well-worn stepping-stones. You may not have time or inclination to plunge into these dark corners of your subject, but it is well for your own mental honesty, that you should know under what limitations you are working; the first step to knowledge is to realise that there are things, even within your 'period,' which you have not tried to know.

Now, as long as it was really the case that a few very great historians, themselves ancient, were your only sources, this handling of ancient history as a branch of ancient literature—for it really amounts to no less—was defensible in the main; and if we consider for a moment that those ancient historians included Herodotus, Thucydides, and Tacitus, we can see that the inherent defects of it were minimised. The practical exclusion of Polybius, because either he wrote a century too soon, or Tacitus a century too late, suggests less gracious thoughts, and the consolation that if you may not read an author for 'the Schools,' you are at all events masters of your leisure.

It is seldom safe for a historian to say that anything is out of date; but he is not going beyond his business if he points out that circumstances alter cases. Even when Grote was writing, in the forties and fifties of the last century, the first-fruits were already being gathered of the great harvest of inscriptions: the stores of coin lore which had been amassed by Eckhel and Mionnet were beginning to be supplemented copiously; and, what is more, were being used intelligently, since the economic researches of Boeckh. Grote himself, it is true, did not think it necessary to go to Syracuse, before writing about Epipclae and the Great Harbour; but Leake and Gell had already laid new foundations for classical topography, and Curtius was applying to Mediterranean lands the geographical methods of Ritter and the Humboldts. Ludwig Ross had navigated the Cyclades; Pashley (in default of our own Liddell) had traversed Crete; Penrose was at work on the Parthenon; and Cockerell was applying, to the construction of our University Galleries, lessons learned on the spot at Athens, Aegina, and Phigaleia.

The movement of which these were symptoms had its origin, as we all know, outside the circle of the Humanities; but I do not think we can fairly say that the Humanities responded less promptly than Natural History to the new call when it came. Ancient history which for long had been but little else than a branch of ancient literature, or at best a large department of classical studies, broke out, in fact, in the middle of the last century, into a wide group of 'historical sciences,' all alike concerned with the collection and arrangement of new classes of materials for history; the significance, and in some cases even the existence, of which had been little appreciated before. The new harvest has been copious in all fields. It has been abundant, as you will see soon enough, in the periods which are prescribed for special study in Oxford; but it is in some of those which are not, that the growth of knowledge has been greatest. Consequently, it is now far more nearly possible than it was, to attempt historical reconstruction of periods and aspects of the Ancient World, which have not had a Thucydides or a Polybius. At the same time, it has become more probable—if indeed it had ever been really

doubtful—that no presentation of the ancient world, not even the Thucydidean or the Polybian, can ever be final; that old problems are open still for discussion and new research; that new problems emerge, which have been unsuspected before; and that new materials, still coming to hand, are copious enough, and of sufficiently historical interest, to justify fresh solutions.

Above all, the ancient historians, who for so long had been regarded mainly, if not wholly, as the *artists* of our picture of the old world, are being steadily pushed back themselves into the picture. Instead of viewing ancient history by their light, we come to study them in the light of ancient history; and thereupon the distinction, formerly perceptible between Ancient and Modern History, begins to collapse and disappear. At best it was a provisional one; a confession of our impotence, never the resignation of our beliefs and hopes.

IV

This change in the position occupied by the great ancient historians is only one phase of the change which was inevitable in the authority of all literary sources, as soon as non-literary sources, of whatever kind, were available, and recognised as being so. This change would not perhaps have been so noticeable as it has actually been, had it not happened that the literary oracles, who had for so long been so nearly all-in-all, turned out to be surprisingly silent, when we appealed to them to interpret the new evidence. Nothing, I think, has brought home so forcibly to students of ancient history the fragmentariness of all literary sources, as the discovery that so many new things, which were not in the literature at all, were knowable about the ancient world; and the result has been to demonstrate, with peculiar insistence, the existence of two quite distinct points of view from which to regard the history of an ancient people.

On the one hand, clearly, we may take such a people at their own valuation, and base our estimate of them on the story which they told about themselves. We may take our start from their historical literature, and formulate from this the conception which the nation itself formed of its mission in the world, of the difficulties which it encountered, and of the guidance, human and other, through which it believed that it overcame those difficulties, and attained its object. But if we take this road we shall do well to remember that, in the life of a nation, as in that of an individual, there will certainly be many things, of which the subject of the autobiography was but imperfectly aware, even if they were consciously realised at all; that the standard of values will necessarily be a personal one, and that occasionally, even in the best-balanced natures, the wish may be father to the thought. It is not always the principal actor in a scene in which emotions run high, and ideals stand out clear and near, who is the best witness afterwards as to the things which actually happened. We shall also have to keep in mind that a nation, even more than an individual, is a very complex thing, and that a large part of its growth takes place, as in the other case, unconsciously. While the great thinkers and creators at the top are living the life of reason and emotion, there is a vast mass of living tissue at the bottom which has little time for either; it lives, and moves, and has its being, but it takes no further part in the matter; except that one fine day it inflames, or rots, or is crushed or amputated beyond repair; and the last people to tell you how it all happened are those who were advancing head in air and enjoying the view. Not one of the statesmen or historians of antiquity was able to explain, any more than he could remedy, that 'distress of nations with perplexity,' that nightmare of pessimism beyond all temporary or local alleviation 'for fear of those things which were coming on the earth.' They put it down to the gods, to misgovernment, to original sin, to national processes of birth, and growth, and decay; they did not know—nor did we till yesterday—that the bow in the cloud could bring death to man as well as life; that Nature was cutting off the water.

The other way of enquiry is that which is followed perforce in the study of inanimate nature; in the study of the other animals; and indeed in the study of nine-tenths of humanity as well. It consists in collecting, first of all, the extant remains of the peoples themselves, and of their works; and in constructing, from the data supplied by these remains, a presentation of the origin, the history, and the characteristics of their civilisation. If the extant remains include a literature, that is of course an enormous gain; and if the literature includes a historian, our gain is greater still. But this source of evidence is not indispensable to the method; and if a literature does in this way come under review, the first question which we put to it is, 'how far is its record in conformity with the rest of the evidence'? Were the people, that is, good judges of themselves, and of their place in the world? And clearly it will be only in proportion as the literature or any part of it sustains this test, that the literary documents will be admitted as evidence at all.

Broadly speaking, the mode of study which I am now trying to describe is that which in the case of living races we call anthropology; in the case of peoples whose career is over, we call it archaeology, which is anthropology in the past tense: not forgetting, however, that in current speech archaeology is always tending to have two other usages, more specific and limited, according as the distinction is drawn between the literary evidence on the one hand, and the non-literary on the other; or between evidence for the mere daily life of the

people, and for higher thought and feeling.

Now, obviously, in either of these narrower interpretations, archaeology is just as much in danger of presenting a one-sided and imperfect picture, as is the exclusive study of the literary evidence. It may give us an outline of the conditions of material life, of the arts and manufactures, warfare and commerce; of the masses of the population, and also, with good luck, of the minority who live in kings' palaces; it will measure ups and downs of national prosperity so far as imports and exports can measure them, of national morality so far as honesty in workmanship, or exchange, is a clue to that; of the standard of taste, so far as this is expressed in decorative art employed upon some durable material. But it will necessarily fail to distinguish the fool from the sage; the poet, or the prophet, or the patriot, from the prodigal, or the man with the muckrake. The last in fact will be, if anything, the most conspicuous of them all; for his goods, at all events, cannot follow him where he is gone; but remain to divert the archaeologist.

Now the ideal state of things would exist if we were able to apply both these methods concurrently to a people as it grew; to watch literary achievement accumulating on the one hand, and potsherds piling up on the other; to feel the pulse and listen to the cries of infant genius, and to construct a history which should be autobiography and ethnology in one. But the child of genius is not born with a thermometer in his mouth, and the only civilisation which we are privileged to study *de die* is that of the early twentieth century.

Next best would be the case in which the whole of the surviving records should be thrown pell-mell into our lap; physique, artefacts, and literature, all in one heap, to disentangle at our will; and there are instances in which almost this has happened, by the sudden accident of discovery; as for example in Minoan Crete, or in the sand-buried sites of the Taklamakan. For here, at all events, neither side of the evidence would be at advantage in face of the other; or at least it would be our own fault or misfortune if we allowed any class of data to possess us, to the exclusion of any other.

Far commoner is it that either the material evidence has come to us in abundance, and the literature—the men's own story—eludes us yet; as we have it for the most part in Egypt, in Central and Northern Europe, and among the illiterates of Outland; or else, where the literature, and all that that brings with it, has survived, but the soil has closed over cities and temples, and the land is left without inhabitant. In either case, there is obviously grave danger that it may become customary to apply methods of enquiry which, however suitable to their immediate purpose, stop short of a point which would qualify the student to deal with new and heterogeneous material, if it came, merely because method itself has become atrophied on one side or other, for sheer want of corrective evidence; while the skill of the enquirer has become specialised in the direction where there was most to do.

A good and extreme instance of this atrophy is the history of Jewish history. For some two thousand years a great original literature was the subject of persistent and detailed study, on literary lines, though with the additional limitation that certain prevalent beliefs as to the character of this literature prevented certain advances, even in literary criticism, which had been made in the study of other literatures, as for example in those of Greece and Rome, from being regarded as applicable to the interpretation of this one. Still less, as may well be imagined, were lines of investigation which either started from, or took account of, evidence other than literary, regarded as capable of leading to conclusions of the same validity as those which resulted from the specialised literary method. In the meantime political circumstances which had nothing whatever to do with the matter at issue, had the effect of cutting off the students of Jewish literature for more than a thousand years from all opportunity of access either to the archaeological evidence for Jewish history, or to any other branch of ancient Semitic literature. At home, besides, an inadequate hypothesis of the relation of Man to Nature, and a similar divorce of tradition from observation in the study of Greek antiquity, prevented the great majority of students even from conceiving how great was the blank in their knowledge.

It is only within the last two generations, therefore, that the political decay of the Turkish Empire on one side, and the irruption, on the other, of the methods of the geologist, the geographer, and the evolutionary biologist, into the fields of literary criticism, of language and of mythology, have re-written from end to end the history of the Jews, as an integral part of an ordered History of the Nearer East, conceived as the history of two great riparian cultures, their intercourse with each other, their influence on their neighbours, and their perils at the hands of men from the plateaux and the steppes. This larger history has indeed but one chapter still not wholly written—that, namely, which shall deal with the ancient peoples of the plateau heart of Asia Minor; for Egypt, for Babylonia and Assyria, and for all the principal divisions of the Syrian highland, its outlines are not only traced, but for the most part filled with detail. Yet all this has been done with materials for history which were only in small part literary; even where they were literary at all, they had but the slightest claim to rank as history in themselves.

The call to wake up to a view of history which was less purely autobiographical came, as we have seen, to the historians of the last century mainly from the naturalists. The new materials themselves too, no less than the processes by which they were accumulated, resembled closely those of other descriptive sciences, such as geography; and particularly those, like geology and palaeontology, in which the series which the data can constitute are sequences in time. So it need not surprise us that historians have experienced a strong temptation to assimilate the methods and aims of their own study to those of these natural sciences; to insist upon quantities and statistics, uniformities and recurrences; perhaps even to go in search of them; and, in general, to work towards the establishment of broad generalisations, worthy of the name of Historical Laws. This tendency has by no means exhausted its force as yet; and it is important that we should be clear as to its working for it is as true in history as it is in chemistry that, unless you are very careful, you will find what you set out to seek.

History, by common consent, deals with the fortunes of human societies and their members; the performances of individuals, when they do not involve the fortunes of the rest, may be matter for biography, or for a history of morals; but they are not history in the strict unqualified sense. History, I mean, is essentially ethnographic, social and political, rather than ethical and anthropographic. But all societies, as Aristotle knew long ago, in their lowest terms they represent Man's alliance with other men against insistent nature; at their highest, his alliance with men against insistent wrong; and there is every gradation between.

Now, the mere struggle for existence against the forces of nature stands, of course, in the same class of occurrences with the struggle of any other animal. It is consequently matter for just such generalisations as are familiar to biologists. There is nothing, either, to prevent us from regarding it from the same impersonal standpoint, the standpoint of nature itself, as any other 'natural' occurrence. It is therefore indifferent to the ethnographer and even to the sociologist whether we are studying the conditions of life, and the course of advancement, in the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates, or in those of the Mississippi and the Yangtze; in the Mediterranean and the Aegean that we know, or in other Mediterranean Seas—the Carib Sea, and the Great Lakes of North America—or in the giant archipelago and submerged islands of Malaysia. But when we are looking at the higher functions, a difference appears; and a greater difference, in proportion as these functions approach the highest. The Nile and the Euphrates differ profoundly, in value to ourselves, from the Amazon, or even from the Yangtze and the Ganges; the Carib Sea belongs to fiction, to Rousseau, and Man Friday; but the Mediterranean is nearer to us still; as a theatre of history it stands in a place which is unique; for it is the very nursery of our own world, and its human societies are relatives and ancestors of our own. It is the kind of difference which we admit, between this or that old man, and our own grandfather.

It is here, then, that history parts company simultaneously from ethnography and from sociology, the most intimate and the closest clinging of its associates in the order of the sciences. The anthropologist treats Man just as any other sort of biologist must treat another part of the animal kingdom, *sub specie naturae*; as an important chapter, truly, but still only as one chapter in the grand treatise—'On how things grow.' History, on the contrary, treats Man and his works as related to the present and to us. It is essentially anthropocentric; if I may extend my former metaphor a little, not merely are the ancient historians 'in the picture,' but we ourselves too are in the very plane of the canvas; at the junction, that is, of the past with the present.

This is how it comes about that whole cycles of real history—it may be, even of written history—do not find their way as yet into the historian's library, but remain on the shelves of the anthropologist. A good recent instance is Mr. Torday's reconstitution of the political history of the Bushongo. The long history of the Maoris is another, and that of other groups of the Polynesians falls into the same category. 'What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba'?

Anthropological occurrences however, may, of course, and often do, enter into the historian's consideration as illustrations of occurrences belonging to the Mediterranean or the Nearer East. No one who wishes to come to close contact with the institutions of Sparta, for example, can afford to neglect those of the Iroquois or the East African Masai; or the organisation of Mexico or Peru, if he is concerned with that of ancient Persia. In the same way, both the obscure movements of barbarous peoples across the mountain barrier which limits the Mediterranean region on the North, and the still more obscure movements which we can now trace taking place along it, find close and instructive analogies in the history of the mountain frontiers of Northern India and Persia, and of the chains of South-East Asia, and of the American Rockies.

It is instructive also to notice how Natural History itself may develop anthropocentric phases as the conception of utility widens. Current developments of bacteriology are cases in point. The old toas, 'Here's to Scientific Discovery, may it never be of use to anybody,' is rapidly passing into a by-word.

The distinction between the two branches of science is now clear; and we have only to bear it in mind. Never has history been in greater need of a sound sociology, and, for that matter, of a sound anthropology also, if it is to do to-day and to-morrow its Danaid's task of interpreting the past to the present. But for the same reason, never has there been more urgent need for care lest the rival attractions of culture or economics, or

politics either, distract the historian from his own proper business, which is that of writing, not sociology or politics, but history.

VI

Hitherto I have been dealing only with those new sources of material for history, which have been opened in the search for traces of Man's own handiwork, or by the comparative study of societies and institutions. To collect these materials, and still more to master the meaning of them, historians have had to borrow methods from the natural sciences, and have been led into entanglements with branches of the knowledge of Man, which agree in essential respects from other departments of biology in their aims and the quality of their results. The data, however, which I have had in view down to this point, are all derived from the direct and specific study of Man himself and his creations.

Yet there is another aspect of human activity, which concerns the historian directly, but in the study of which not only the method, but a great part of the data, comes from a non-human and at first sight even a non-historical science, in the sense in which I have described as 'historical' the sciences of geology and palaeontology.

Common knowledge, as well as metaphysic, testifies that all human activities occur in space as well as in time; man being a terrestrial animal, all history finds its materials in some region of the planetary surface. All history, therefore, has a geographical aspect. It asks, of course, primarily 'what was it that happened, and how?' But just as it necessarily asks '*when*,' so also must it ask '*where*.' The converse is of course true also. All geographical facts occur 'somewhen' as well as 'somewhere'; all geographical knowledge takes account of processes in time as well as distribution! in space, and consequently needs must have a historical aspect. At first sight, therefore, there is complete overlap between the History and the Geography of Man.

But, as we have seen already in the case of anthropology, this overlap does not trouble the historian. The geography of Man considered as one department of the study of the earth's surface, has its standard of interest within itself, like any other branch of natural science. If I may coin a phrase, it is geocentric; for the geographer, that is, ~~### ##### ###o#~~ History, however, as we have already seen, is anthropocentric; no fact of human distribution, or human activity in space, is of concern to the historian at all unless it stands in intelligible relation with man's present efforts to achieve. To take an extreme instance, it would be a discovery of the first importance to geographers, if it were shown that there are men in Mars; but though it might be shown that these had been there from the beginning, it would need a cosmic revolution to bring Martians within the ken of history.

What determines, then, whether this or that region, or locality, has value for the historian? or to put the same question another way, what is the geographical distribution of historical interest? This distribution is clearly quite independent of time; it may vary, there-fore, and we know very well that it has varied, from one period of history to another.

Now we have seen already, in tracing the line of demarcation between history and anthropology, that all the varied forms of human activity—and we may now add, the geographical distribution of each of them—are consequences of one fundamental activity of man, which is concerned, as in the case of other animals, simply with the attempt to preserve life in the midst of nature; or at best is the struggle to perpetuate human life at a stage slightly in advance of that at which it stood before. That struggle to maintain life takes a specific form and direction in each region of the earth. But the precise form that it assumes is not the result of human reason unaided and uncontrolled; it depends no less on the quality and degree of many forces of nature; on the external, non-human circumstances of fauna and flora, of climate and surface-relief. In each given case the struggle has issued as it has only because human reason, applied to one central ever-present problem of preserving human life at all, has hit upon the particular plan which on the whole maintains human life in the best way under the circumstances of the particular region. Now many—in fact immeasurably the larger number—of the occurrences which make up the human struggle for existence happen with such uniformity in all habitable regions that they resemble rather the daily round of an animal's existence than the performances of a reasonable being. All these, and the distribution of them, are still the care of the geographer and the sociologist. Others, again, are more specially and more and more fortuitously distributed, until at the further end of the series, we reach the 'historic event,' which occurs once for all, and only in one place, and never repeats itself; presumably because the conditions for its repetition cannot be assembled again, either there or anywhere else.

It is at this other end of the series that the historian's interest is highest. It is the historian's business—as we are accustomed to see by this time—to select from among the rest, and to present intelligibly in their true proportions and relations, just those events which are the real turning-points. These events are of more or less

importance historically; partly according as they affect a wider or a narrower circle of humanity; partly, again, according as the subsequent course of events differs profoundly, or not, from that which may be shown to have been likely, if the event in question had happened otherwise; most of all, perhaps, according as the historian is forced, by his own skill and experience, to decide that the crucial factor was the human factor; that, to all outward appearance, the Great Man, or the Great People, was, in popular language, 'free to choose' between different courses of action. In such cases, it is often possible even for contemporaries to form a reasonable and accurate opinion as to the consequences of an opposite decision.

These moments of crisis, of equipoise, present the great problems of history, for they are the occasions when humanity has been active in its highest function, in the persons of the men who make history. Croesus as we say, is at the Halys, or Caesar at the Rubicon, or Augustus at the Rhine; or Pericles or Fabius carries Peace—or War—upon his tongue. Those which are of really first-rate importance are few in number, and old acquaintances. To discover a new one, indeed, whether in ancient or in any other history, would be a greater achievement than to discover a chemical element or a new mode of energy. But though they are old acquaintances, and though each historian in turn attempts a solution, they remain, as problems, perennial: to solve one of them finally, to eliminate it, or to subsume it in another, as can occasionally happen, is, again, as great a triumph of science as to eliminate or transmute

It would be only too easy to slip from this position which we have found to underlie the definition alike of Herodotus and of Eduard Meyer, into a conception of History as an exclusive study of the Influence of Great Men; and the course of historical writing in the past offers much to support such a view. Man's interest in himself has never been less keen than his interest in nature; and his knowledge of himself, though not always so early reduced to such system as his knowledge of nature, has outrun it appreciably, in depth and truth, in most ages of the world. We have, therefore, to expect that there should be in the main a greater risk of an enslavement of history to biography than to geography; interpreting the latter term as the inclusive study of non-human processes and changes upon this earth. But we may reasonably expect on the other side that an age like our own, distinguished beyond all predecessors by great advances in its knowledge of nature and by huge new problems of human need face to face with nature, which its own social growth, as well as its very knowledge of nature, has set before it, may be inclined to lay stress upon the study of the regional environment of societies, for the same reason as impels it to lay stress within those societies themselves, less upon the voices of the great men, than on the clamour or the response of the masses.

VII

I have spent as much time as this, upon the relations between History and Geography, for two particular reasons. The first is that so far as it is possible to look ahead, it seems likely that this application of geographical criticism to historical problems—this insistence on the question 'Why did what happened *thus* and *then*, happen also precisely *here*, and *here*, and not *there*'?—may in the near future become a popular aspect of historical study, perhaps even a dangerously popular one. It is, however, one of the rare privileges of the historian, as of the poet, and the painter, to be always interpreting old facts, old problems, and old situations, to new minds; and to be interpreting them always, too, in the light of new knowledge, cast upon them from a fresh point of view. It is our duty, therefore, as well as our temptation, to take full toll of current knowledge, and the fresh discoveries of our time. At one moment they will be coming from literary criticism; at another, from material remains; at a third, from the comparison of institutions or social habits. Each wave of experience casts up its treasures at our feet; the pearls are to be worn, not trampled on; provided we gather them, what matters their order upon the string? But it is our temptation as well as our duty; and if so, it is well to be fore-warned, and to know what we are doing. Geography is not history, and cannot be confused with it; but geographical facts are among the first materials for history, and in the equipment of a historian geographical experience is indispensable.

In the second place, the special conditions under which Ancient History is studied in Oxford seem to me to justify some insistence on a geographical point of view. I have already assumed the liberty of criticising a system of knowledge, and of education, which includes the History of the Ancient World in a composite group of Classical Studies, and still tends sometimes to treat it as if it were merely a branch of Ancient Literature. The system, however, has gain as well as loss. On the one hand, it tolerates a popular conception of history which is in any case narrow and specific, and seems also a low one. On the other, from the beginner's point view there is gain. No man, it has been truly said, can be a historian merely; in proportion as anyone has attempted this, he has merely failed to be a historian at all. Considered, therefore, as a preliminary course for a man who intends hereafter to devote himself to History, a mixed course like that of 'Greats' has obvious peculiar advantages.

Not least among these advantages is the opportunity which it offers for the treatment of selected periods of

History on broad regional lines; for the treatment of Greek and Roman History, that is, as the history of Man in the Mediterranean region.

The conception of a regional treatment of a subject, though familiar now to historians as to naturalists, comes in the first instance from the geographers; but I do not think that I shall be trespassing appreciably if I explain quite briefly what I mean.

In geography as in other branches of learning, it is possible, of course, to treat the whole subject-matter in order analytically, taking our examples of the interaction of natural forces indifferently from all portions of the planet. But modern geographical teaching proceeds increasingly, and I think, inevitably, on a regional basis. Brief introduction to the main classes of geographical facts, and to the main features of their planetary distribution, qualifies an intelligent person to watch and disentangle the principal geographical factors in a given geographical region; experience thus gained, whether of theory or of method, though acquired almost wholly in a limited region, is found to be clear, coherent, and applicable easily to enquiries elsewhere; and current geographical teaching inclines steadily towards this regional method of study as the most efficient, as well as the most economical in respect of time. The method, as we see at once, presents close analogies with the use of 'set books' in teaching a language; after brief analytical study of the forms, we confront even beginners with the 'fine confused feeding' of grammatical constructions as they flow from the pen of Xenophon or Caesar.

Look now at the regional method as we apply it to the study of History. The historian's business is to describe Man's experiences and achievements, so far as these are of historical interest; that is, so far as they serve to explain how Man has reached the present stage of his struggle to live well. Now it cannot be too strongly insisted that in dealing with the civilisations of the Ancient East, and no less with the civilisation of Greece and Rome, we are dealing with civilisations which are correlated in a strict and intimate way with particular geographical regions; and that the reason why classical studies in particular have been regarded so widely as having parted company with reality and practice is that they have been pursued far too regardless of this regional geographical control.

There is of course historical reason for their neglect. In the early days of the Renaissance the scholars themselves were mainly of Mediterranean origin, or at least had made pilgrim's acquaintance with Mediterranean conditions. There was therefore little need for the interpreters of the classics to dwell on the physical surroundings of the ancient world; in essentials they were the same as those of the Revival of Learning. But as the centres of humanist activity shifted beyond the Alps, and the Turk laid more jealous hold on Greek lands, empirical knowledge faded, and classical weather, classical allusions to flowers and herbs, still more to those classical customs and institutions, such as seasonal warfare, a national drama, and democracy itself, which depended on Mediterranean conditions for their realisation, passed, with much else that was admittedly in-capable of realisation on the Atlantic sea-board, into the common heritage of scholarship.

No wonder if, with this inherent defect and omission in the classical tradition as it reached these northern lands, and in the equipment of the scholars themselves, the idea went abroad among the larger world which only heard of scholarship from its school-children, that the 'ancient world' of Greece and Rome lies in some mysterious way on the other side of a great gulf.

No wonder, either, if, even now, many who are attracted by the beauty or the truth of classical literature or art, and are convinced that these things are indeed real and living and useful to the modern world, yet feel themselves held aloof, if they try to come nearer, by something of this same unfamiliarity, this queerness and unearthliness of outlook, and are baffled, they know not why.

I am prepared for the objection that, to many of us, Greek and Roman life does not seem queer at all; any more, you will admit, than the behaviour of the beasts in Aesop's fables, or a large part of early Jewish History. But that is because in all these cases our whole upbringing has been among heirlooms; it does not alter the queerness of the things which we accept so dully as part of the furniture of our world. But make the experiment for yourselves. Try Aesop's Fables upon a slum child; try Homer or Herodotus, or even Plutarch, upon the hard-headed student who has come straight up the 'ladder,' from the primary school of an industrial town, into this beans talk-country of the humanities, and I think you will see what I mean when I describe the old world and its civilisation as queer. Try another experiment, too. Go, in travel-books, if not in steamers, to the modern East, or even to the remoter parts of the modern Mediterranean; go to Egypt, if you can, in the spirit in which Herodotus went, or to any pagan country, in the spirit in which he went to Scythia, searching out ##### μ##### ## ##î ##μ#####, and I think you will get glimpses—certainly that is how I began to get them—of the realities which give rise to this strangeness. It was one of the best moments in the course of my teaching in Oxford, when I asked an old pupil, newly back from India, some commonplace question, how he liked the East; 'Oh, India is fine,' he said, 'it's just like Herodotus.'

Now it seems to me that one chief reason why ancient history is valued as it is, in our scheme of education, as well as in our scheme of knowledge, is precisely this strangeness and aloofness—and at the same time that the reason why so many people go through the ordinary classical course without much profit is precisely

because they have let themselves take this feature of it for granted, instead of letting it wake them up, and search out the reasons for it. Let me say frankly on the other hand that it is from students of the type I have described, who have come to these things later and unhardened, or who have succeeded in retaining till they came up to the University something of their first child's wonder at the ancient world, that I am indebted for some of the best side-lights on ancient life.

Now I believe that it is possible to bring home to such students as these—and the type will be recognised, I think, as a more and more familiar one—this vital fact, that it is precisely because Greeks and Romans were in all essential points human with our humanity, and rational as we count reason, that they wove about themselves in their daily walk with nature in a Mediterranean—not a North Atlantic—world, a civilisation which appears to us in so many ways incomprehensible. The very reason, in fact, why the ancient world seemed to us all, at first sight, so remote, is not that the men were different; least of all that they belong, in any sense, to any curiously gifted branch of the human race to begin with. It is rather this, above all, that in the Mediterranean region nature herself was, and is, different from the nature that we know in these islands of the Atlantic sea-board; and that the problem, not merely of living well, but of maintaining human life at all, present different aspects and demanded a different solution in the geographical circumstances of Greece or Italy, from that which our no less human intellect and experience have discovered and instituted here.

VIII

I hinted just now that I have known cases where Herodotus has taught men to see India; that the attempt to realise and interpret that international exhibition of his, in the sense in which he felt its instructiveness, is good discipline in what I might describe as regional history. I do not mean to say that your commentary on those earlier books of his, in which the scene is most crowded with the Babylonians, the Egyptians, and the Persians, ought to trespass at all on more strictly historical enquiries if you have already the materials and the right point of view. But I do feel very strongly that at the outset of 'Greats' work, when there is still elbow room, and much sunshine between you and the Schools, you can do worse than expatiate rather freely; and with Herodotus among your set books, you may do it with a good conscience. You need have no fear that knowledge of Herodotus will damage your feeling for Thucydides; behind that tense reserve there is wider knowledge of Greek lands than you suspect until you begin to know Greece well; just as there is clearer insight, closer grip, and more coherent thinking than you would guess, until you know Greece well, in the table talk and museum talk of Herodotus.

No one expects you, now, to read ancient history as you would read it if you had to stop and be examined this June. You are beginning your course; it is foundations, not pinnacles, that you should be building; and you cannot lay foundations without materials; without *materia* in its old Roman sense. Remember also that foundations are not meant to show; only to be solid and wide. At this stage, you can hardly read too widely, within the regional limits of the old world; and you may easily go beyond it without wasting your time. Books like Hollis' *Masai* and Shwye Yeo's *Soul of a People* were not written when I read 'Greats'; but we had *Eothen* and *Hadji Baba*; and Codrington's *Melanesia* came out in my third year. There was already some Ramsay, and a copy of *Devia Cypria* was going about; but we still read Conybeare and Howson, and Smith's *Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul*; and of course *Sinai and Palestine*, and Layard's *Nineveh*, and Moltke's *Letters from Turkey*.

You can hardly go wrong either, at this stage, in plunging into historical questions of the hour. It is your privilege to begin 'Greats' in 1910, as it was mine in 1890; when we labelled the Lion Gate 'Phrygian,' and assigned the rest of Mycenae to the Carians of Thucydides; when we grew warm over *Mirage Orientale* and the Matriarchate, and heard from Cambridge the first rumblings of Totemism, and read *the Gotten Bough* and the *Politeia*; you will remember that they were new books almost together. We went a good way with Müller - Striöbing on Thucydides, and a good way with Professor Sayce on Herodotus, but I remember one early question that perplexed us even then:—'If Herodotus is such a fool as they seem to make out, why do they go on setting him for "Greats"?'

These were some of our third year foundations for history; the foundations of twenty years ago. 'Wood, hay, stubble,' you will say. Well, it is a question of degree. Some of us may live to see Mommsen's Caesar—to speak only of the dead—go the same road as Grote's Cleon and Alexander. Meanwhile, we must live when we can; and provided we are alive, what matter if it be in Mommsen's Rome?

It matters, in fact, much less what men think, than why they think it. The precise content of their thoughts depends far too much upon temporary and local conditions, and changes only too promptly in response to the changes of these. It is the point of view from which they approach the new problem; the predispositions which they bring; the training which their faculties have acquired through their previous experiences, which make the

outcome of their thinking in any given case so incalculable, often, beforehand; so easy, afterwards, to explain in the light of a larger survey; so real to them; and of so permanent an interest to the historian.

But it is the wider survey to which the historian aspires, which permits and authenticates the explanation of the things thought. What neither the historian nor the psychologist can hope to do is to explain the thinker of them, the hero or the genius. That phenomenon remains presupposed; a *primum mobile*, with effects indeed, but no causes within human view: and the historian's business is twofold. To follow forward the effects of the great man's interference in affairs; but also to follow backward what we *can* trace backwards, the antecedents of the other factors, society, culture, and environment, among which, at this particular moment, the new personality intervened; the *μ*#####, #μ##### and other, with which he strove to effect what he had it in his mind to imagine; though the work of art, when done, was not often quite what the artist started to create. Of the actual deeds, and words, and even of the thoughts of great men in the old world, we are never likely to know much more than we do now; but the increase in our knowledge of the other factors still seems limitless. Till limits appear, these are our contributions to the problem #i' ### #i#i### #'#o##μ##### à#####o###; it is in the new light of them that we restate what Herodotus knew.

That is how history grows evergreen. It is our own experience that we bring to it, our personal enthusiasms that we lavish on it, which make it historically real. Like the grand-parents in the *Blue Bird*, the old people are always there when we think of them; but it is we who make them wake up; and each time we go to see them, it is we who have grown—sometimes almost out of recognition. One time it is with pick and basket that we go to them; another, we take our churingas to play with; and we generally end, like Tytyl, in making the old place a bear garden. But next time anyone goes, he finds the old people once more, as Tytyl did, 'just like when they were here.' It is only they, who find him altered. So I sometimes imagine Herodotus too, somewhere in the old place, asking us, each time, to 'come again soon,' still eager to hear ##### μ##### ## #i##### of his grandchildren in history; still demanding of us, Greeks and Trojans alike, in our warfare over him, #' ## #i#i### #'#o##μ##### #'#####o###.

The Romanes Lecture 1903 *Modern Views on Matter*

By Sir Oliver Lodge, HON. D.Sc., F.R.S.

Delivered

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Foreword

IN this edition the Romanes Lecture itself is reprinted without appendices, a clear distinction having been drawn therein between what is certain and what is uncertain or speculative.

The time is not yet ripe for dealing with the uncertain portions in a definite manner; while to treat them in their present stage would introduce technical difficulties and require much space; consequently it is thought better to issue the original lecture simply, as adequately representing the ascertained position to-day, and sufficiently suggesting further developments.

Fuller information can be gained from the author's treatise on 'Electrons.'
December, 1906.

Modern Views on Matter

THE nature of matter has been regarded by philosophers from many points of view, but it is not from any philosophic standpoint that I presume in this University to ask you to consider the subject under my guidance. It is because new views as to the structure and properties of what used to be called the ultimate atom are now being born, and because these views, whether they succeed in ultimately establishing themselves in every detail or not, are of surpassing interest, that I have chosen this very recently deciphered chapter of science as the subject-matter for the lecture to be given this year in remembrance of a man whom I knew as a friend, and whose mind, if he had been alive to-day, would have been widely open to these most modern developments of Physical Science. Nor would the admittedly speculative character of some of the hypotheses now being thrown out have deterred him from hearing about them with the keenest interest.

If I may venture to say so, it is the more philosophical side of Physics which has always seemed to me most suitable for study in this University; and although I disclaim any competence for philosophic treatment in the

technical sense, yet I doubt not that the new views, in so far as they turn out to be true views, will have a bearing on the theory of matter in all future writings on Philosophy; besides exercising a profound effect on the pure sciences of Physics and Chemistry, and perhaps having some influence on certain aspects of Biology also.

In admitting that I am going to promulgate a speculative hypothesis, that is, a hypothesis for which there is evidence but not yet conclusive evidence, I must not lead you to suppose that the whole of what I have to say is of this character. On the contrary, much of it is certain, that is to say, is accepted by a consensus of opinion to-day among those who by reason of study are competent to judge. I will endeavour carefully to discriminate between what is in this sense certain and what must still be regarded as doubtful and needing further support.

To treat the subject properly, to give all the evidence as well as the results, would need a volume, or a course of lectures; and in order to be brief I must frequently be dogmatic, but I shall only intend to be so in those places where I feel sure that the physicists present will agree with me. When I have a dogma of this kind to propound I shall call it a thesis. The more speculative opinions I shall plainly denominate hypotheses.

1. My first thesis is that an electric charge possesses the most fundamental and characteristic property of matter, viz. mass or inertia; so that if any one were to speak of a milligramme or an ounce or a ton of electricity, though he would certainly be speaking inconveniently, he might not necessarily be speaking erroneously.

In order to have any appreciable mass, however, an electric charge must either be extremely great or must be extremely concentrated; and, unless it is to be utterly masked by the matter with which it is associated, it must be concentrated: that is to say, it must exist on bodies of far less than ultra-microscopic size. The mass or inertia of a charge depends upon two factors—the quantity of electricity in it, and its potential—and by concentrating a given charge on to a sufficiently small sphere, the latter factor can be raised theoretically to any value we please, and thus any required inertia can be obtained; unless a stage is reached at which it becomes physically impossible to concentrate it any more.

2. The next thesis is a very simple and familiar one, and dates virtually from the time of Faraday, though the conception has gradually gained in clearness and solidity: it is that every atom of matter can have associated with it a certain definite quantity of electricity called the ionic charge, that some atoms can have double this quantity, some treble, and so on, but that no atom or any piece of matter can have a fraction of this quantity; which therefore appears to be an ultimate unit, a sort of 'atom,' of electricity. The ratio of the charge to the weight of a material atom is measured with accuracy in electrolysis, in accordance with what are called Faraday's laws; and in so far as the mass of the atom itself is otherwise approximately known, the quantity of electricity which can be associated with it is known with a similar degree of approximate accuracy.

3. Now mathematical data were given by J J, Thomson in 1881 which enable us to say that if the charge of electricity usually associated with a single monad atom of matter were concentrated into a spherical nucleus one hundred-thousandth of an atom's dimension in diameter, it would thereby possess a mass about one-thousandth of that of the lightest atom known, viz. the hydrogen atom.

Such a hypothetical concentrated unit of electricity, especially if it can exist without a material nucleus, it has become customary to call an 'electron': a name invented by Dr. Johnstone Stoney to designate the so-to-speak 'atom' or smallest known unit of electric charge. Every electric charge is to be thought of as due to the possession of a number of electrons, but a fraction of an electron is at present considered impossible; meaning that no indication of any further subdivision has ever loomed even indistinctly above the horizon of practical or theoretical possibility.

The electrification of an atom of matter consists in attaching such an electron to it, or in detaching one from it. An atom of matter possessing an electron in excess is called an 'ion'; and there is reason to know that, considered as a charged body, its charge is that which we have been historically accustomed to designate 'negative'; whereas an atom of matter with one electron in defect is that which has historically been called a 'positive' ion.

This inversion in the natural use of the names positive and negative is inconvenient but accidental and not really serious; it dates from the time of Benjamin Franklin.

These ions or travelling particles of matter have been long known. A liquid or a gas conducts because of the locomotion of its charged particles. The particles travel in an electric field because of their attached charges, all the positive going one way, and all the negative the other way; and each kind of matter possesses an intrinsic or characteristic ionic velocity, when urged by a given field through a given solution. The charges may be likened to horses or other propelling agency, and the atom to the vehicle or heavy body which is dragged along. The speed of travel through liquids is very slow, but through gases is considerably quicker, partly because there is less resistance, and partly because it is easier to maintain a steep gradient of potential in a medium where the ions are not too numerous.

The act of production of such ions is styled 'ionization.' and the process has been employed to explain very many facts in both Physics and Chemistry.

As an example, Röntgen rays passing through air ionize it and so render it conducting for a time:

where-fore they are able readily to discharge electrified bodies, in this secondary way.

It may be convenient here to emphasize the dimensions of an electron as above specified, for the arguments in favour of that size are very strong though not absolutely conclusive: we are sure that their mass is of the order one-thousandth of the atomic mass of hydrogen, and we are sure that if they are purely and solely electrical their size must be one hundred-thousandth of the linear dimensions of an atom; a size with which their penetrating power and other behaviour is quite consistent. Assuming this estimate to be true, it is noteworthy how very small these electrical particles are, compared with the atom of matter to which they are attached. If an electron is represented by a sphere an inch in diameter, the diameter of an atom of matter on the same scale is a mile and a half. Or if an atom of matter is represented by the size of this theatre, an electron is represented on the same scale by a printer's full stop. It is well to bear this extreme smallness in mind in what follows.

An atom is not a large thing, but if it is composed of electrons, the spaces between them are enormous compared with their size—as great relatively as are the spaces between the planets in the solar system.

4. My next thesis is that these electrons or minute charged corpuscles can exist separately, for they can be detached from their atoms of matter at an electrode, not only in electrolytic liquids but also in gases, and when thus released from their thousandfold more massive atom, they fly away from the negative electrode with prodigious speed, because they are acted on by the same electrical propelling force as before, but now have hardly anything to move.

These isolated flying particles travel a long distance in rarefied gas, and are known as cathode rays. They were studied by Varley, Hittorf, Crookes, Lenard, and others, both inside and outside vacuum-tubes, and they are now known to be flung off spontaneously from many substances. When stopped suddenly by a massive obstacle, they give rise to the X-radiation discovered by Röntgen. At first these cathode rays were thought to be atoms of matter, though their extraordinary penetrating power rendered such a hypothesis difficult of belief, and caused matter in a fourth state. They are, however, certainly energetic bodies, being able to propel light windmills, to heat platinum to redness, and to charge an electroscope; they are also able to penetrate thin sheets of metal and to affect photographic plates or phosphorescent substances on the other side. They are not so penetrating, however, as are some of the Röntgen rays.

The final definite establishment of the fact that these flying particles are not atoms of matter, but are bits chipped off the atoms, fractions of an atom as it were—the same identical kind of bits being chipped off every kind of chemical atom, their mass always about one-thousandth of that of a hydrogen atom, and moving under favourable circumstances with something not much less than the speed of light—is due to the researches of Professor J. J. Thomson and his coadjutors in the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge, and represents a long series of measurements devised and executed with consummate skill.

I have no time to go into detail concerning these important and elaborate and most interesting investigations. Suffice it to say that portions of them are due to your own Wykeham Professor of Physics, Professor Townsend, working in conjunction and collaboration with others, under the leadership of Professor J. J. Thomson; and that this whole series of Cavendish Laboratory researches may be said to constitute the high-water mark of the world's Experimental Physics during the beginning of this century.

5. I must not dwell upon the properties and powers of electrons, nor upon the experimental means by which these measurements were made, for it is far too large a subject I must exhibit a few diagrams, and briefly summarize a few main facts:—

Electrons have been shown to be shot off from any negatively charged body, especially from negatively electrified metals, when exposed to ultra-violet light.

When shot into a mass of air they dissociate and ionize that air for a time, and render it electrolytically conducting; also of course they can discharge positively electrified bodies themselves, and can thus be most readily detected in small numbers.

Electrons in orbital motion have been shown to constitute the mechanism by which atoms are able to radiate light; and a great mass of semi-astronomical facts concerning these orbits and their perturbations have been obtained by immersing the source of light in a strong magnetic field, and observing the minute but very definite changes of spectra thereby produced: a branch of science with which the names of H. A. Lorentz of Leyden, and Zeeman of Amsterdam, will be inseparably associated.

In all these and other ways the electron has become a familiar object. It constitutes the ionic charge of matter. Multiples of it, but no fractions, are possible. Its mass, its charge, and its speed have been frequently measured by different processes, and always with consistent results. It is the most definite and fundamental and simple unit which we know of in nature.

It has thus displaced the so-called atom of matter from its fundamental place of indivisibility. The atom of matter has been shown capable of losing an electron, of having at least one chipped off it. The electron has been shown to possess in kind, though not in degree, the fundamental properties of the original atom of which it had

formed a part; and it becomes a reasonable hypothesis to surmise that the whole of the atom may be built up of positive and negative electrons interleaved together, and of nothing else; an active or charged ion having one electron in excess or defect, but the neutral atom having an exact number of pairs. The oppositely charged electrons are to be thought of, on this hypothesis, as flying about inside the atom, as a few thousand specks like full stops might fly about inside this hall; forming a kind of cosmic system under their strong mutual forces, and occupying the otherwise empty region of space which we call the atom occupying it in the same sense that a few scattered but armed soldiers can occupy a territory—occupying it by forceful activity, not by bodily bulk.

6. The hypothetical part of the statement about the size of an electron is the following. Whereas both the mass and the charge of an electron is known, it is not yet quite certain that the mass is *wholly* due to the charge. It is possible, but to me very unlikely, that the electron, as we know it, contains a material nucleus in addition to its charge, so in that case it need not be so concentrated, because a portion of its mass would be otherwise accounted for.

I say 'accounted for,' but it would be equally true to say unaccounted for. The mass which is explicable electrically is to a considerable extent understood, but the mass which is merely material (whatever that may mean) is not understood at all. We know more about electricity than about matter; and the way in which electrical inertia is accounted for electromagnetically, and localized in the ether immediately surrounding the nucleus of charge, is comparatively clear and distinct.

There *may* possibly be two different kinds of inertia, which exactly simulate each other, one electrical and the other material; and those who hold this as a reasonable possibility are careful to speak of electrons as 'corpuscles,' meaning charged particles of matter of extremely small size, much smaller than an atom, consisting of a definite electric charge and an unknown material nucleus; which nucleus, as they recognize but have not yet finally proved, may quite possibly be zero. [By 1906 it has proved to be zero.]

The chief defect in the electrical theory of matter at present is that the *positive* electron, if it exists, has never yet been isolated from the rest of an atom of matter. It has never been found detached from a mass less than the hydrogen atom; whereas the negative electron is constantly and freely encountered flying about alone, its mass being little more than the thousandth part of an atom of hydrogen.

Until a positive electron can be similarly isolated, the hypothesis that an atom is really composed solely of electricity—that is to say, of equal quantities of positive and negative electricity associated together in some unknown way, the negative at any rate being a grouping of concentrated charges of electricity of known amount—must remain a hypothesis.

7. It is a fascinating guess that the electrons constitute the fundamental substratum of which all matter is composed. That a grouping of say 700 electrons, 350 positive and 350 negative, interleaved or interlocked in a state of violent motion so as to produce a stable configuration under the influence of their centrifugal inertia and their electric forces, constitutes an atom of hydrogen. That sixteen times as many, in another stable grouping, constitute an atom of oxygen. That some 16,000 of them go to form an atom of sodium; about 100,000 an atom of barium; and 160,000 an atom of radium.

On this view all the elements would be regarded as different groupings of one fundamental constituent. Of all the groupings possible, doubtless most are so unstable as never to be formed; but some are stable, or at least relatively stable, and these stabler groupings constitute the chemical elements that we know. The fundamental ingredient of which, on this view, the whole of matter is made up, is nothing more or less than electricity, in the form of an aggregate of an equal number of positive and negative unit electric charges.

This, when established, will be a unification of matter such as has through all the ages been sought; it goes further than had been hoped, for the substratum is not an unknown and hypothetical protyle, but the familiar electric charge. Nevertheless, of course, it is no *ultimate* explanation. The questions remain, what then is an electric charge? what is the internal structure and constitution of an electron? wherein lies the difference between positive and negative electricity? and what is their relation to the ether of space? Definite questions these, and doubtless some day answerable; indeed, powerful methods of attack on this position have been already contrived by Dr. J. Larmor and others; but they are questions of a higher order of difficulty than those which occupy us to-day, and it must remain for a future Romanes Lecturer to report progress in these directions, whenever adequate progress has in fact been made.

8. That is the end of the first half of my lecture; and, six months ago, that, somewhat expanded, might have been the whole of it, because the next portion would have seemed too fanciful; but discoveries have been made, chiefly in France and in Canada—some of the most striking of them within the present year—which remove the treatment of the next part of my subject from the realm of fancy to the region of probability, and justify my proceeding further with some of the theoretical consequences deducible from an electric theory of matter.

I referred above briefly to the origin of radiation, saying that by the method of applying a powerful magnet to a source of light, and examining the minute perturbations in the lines of the spectrum thus produced, it had been proved that the real source of radiation was an electric charge in rapid orbital motion; and I now go on to

say that by careful measurement of the amount of perturbation it has been definitely proved that it is our friends the negative electrons, with a mass about one-thousandth of the smallest known atom of matter, that are responsible for the excitation of ether waves or the production of light. Larmor and others have indeed shown mathematically that whenever an electric charge is subject to acceleration, an emission of some amount of radiation is inevitable, by reason of the interaction of its electric and magnetic fields; and it is probable that there is no other source of light or radiation possible except this change in the motion of electrons. It is known, for instance, that the violent acceleration or retardation of electrons when they encounter an obstacle is responsible for the excitation of Röntgen rays. All light, and all the Hertz waves or pulses employed in wireless telegraphy, are due to electric acceleration, and the greater the rate of change of velocity the more violent is the radiation emitted.

The charge may oscillate, as in a Hertz vibrator; or it may revolve, as in a source of ordinary light such as a sodium flame. In order to emit perceptible radiation by revolving, it must revolve with extreme speed in a very small orbit, so that its rate of curvature or centripetal acceleration may be considerable; for it is on the square of the value of the average acceleration that the energy of radiation depends.

9. All this is of the nature of a definite and certain thesis; but now we are going to apply it to our hypothesis that the atom of matter is either wholly or partially composed of electrons in a state of vigorous motion among themselves. Such revolving or vibrating electrons are subject to acceleration, either radial or tangential, and must therefore to a greater or less extent necessarily emit radiation; it becomes natural to inquire whence comes the energy that is radiated away.

Now in ordinary familiar cases it is the irregular agitation of molecules which we call 'heat' that is being radiated away; and in that case the result is a mere cooling, or diminution of the molecular agitation, which can readily be made up by receipt of similar energy from the enclosures or from surrounding bodies; or, if not made up, it can produce the ordinary well-known effects of 'cold.' But to the motion of the internal parts of an atom the ideas of heat and temperature do not apply. The atom, if it lose energy, must lose what is to it an essential ingredient; and hence this inevitable radiating power of the constituents of an atom seemed to constitute a difficulty, for it suggested that an atom of matter was not really a permanent and eternal thing, but that it contained within itself the seeds of its own decay and ultimate dissipation into the separate electrons of which it was composed. The process might indeed be exceedingly slow, the radiation loss might be almost imperceptible, but, in so far as an atom is composed of revolving electrons it is inevitable that radiation of energy must go on from it, and that this must in the long run have some perceptible degenerative result.

10. That result has quite recently, I believe, been experimentally discovered, and is a part of the phenomenon known as 'radio-activity.'

So now we come to the most remarkable and probably the most interesting step of all.

The phenomenon of spontaneous radio-activity, discovered first by Becquerel in uranium and thorium, and greatly extended by the brilliant chemical researches of M. and Mme. Curie which resulted in the discovery of radium, was at first supposed to consist in the emission of a sort of X-ray or ether pulse; and was subsequently assumed to consist chiefly in the bodily emission of electrons, which were shot off from the radio-active substance as they are from a negative electrode in a vacuum-tube, or as they are in air when ultra-violet light falls upon clean negatively charged surfaces.

As a matter of fact both these modes of radiation—the wave form and the corpuscular form—are emitted by radio-active bodies but they turn out to be of subordinate importance, and must be regarded as secondary or subsidiary consequences of the main phenomenon.

The main fact of radio-activity has been shown by Professor Rutherford of Montreal, in a paper published in the month of February this very year, to consist in the flinging away with great violence of actual atoms of matter: atoms electrified indeed, but not negatively like electrons, and not small or penetrating like them, but full-sized atoms, such as are easily stopped by a thin sheet of metal, or even by a sheet of paper—atoms which are positively charged and possessed of a remarkable amount of energy, ionizing the air which they bombard to an extraordinary extent, and likewise generating quite a perceptible amount of heat wherever they strike; producing indeed a flash when they strike a suitable target, as Crookes has shown, quite like the impact of a cannon-ball on an armour-plate. Their speed, indeed, far exceeds that of any cannon-ball that ever existed, being as much faster than a cannon-ball as that is faster than a snail's crawl; a hundred times faster than the fastest flying star, these atomic projectiles constitute the fastest moving matter known. This furious bombardment from a radio-active substance continues without intermission, and apparently without sign or diminution or cessation. There is every reason to believe that a minute scrap of radium, scarcely perceptible to the eye, may go on emitting these energetic projectiles for hundreds of years.

II. At first sight the fact that it is merely atoms of matter which are being flung off by most radio-active substances, and that ethereal and other effects are subsidiary to this emission of substance, seems to lessen the interest attaching to the phenomenon, reducing it to something of merely chemical importance, and suggesting

a resemblance to scent or other volatilization from solid bodies- But Professor Rutherford, with great skill, succeeded in determining approximately the atomic weight of the utterly imperceptible amount of substance thrown off, as well as its speed, and found that it was not by any means the radio-active substance itself which was evaporating, but something quite different.

Plainly if an elementary form of matter is found to be throwing off another substance, it becomes imperative to inquire what that substance is, and what it is that is left behind. Now the atomic weight of radium, or of thorium or uranium, or of any known strongly radio-active substance, is very high—in each case over 200 times the atomic weight of hydrogen—whereas the atomic weight of the substance flung off appears to be more nearly of the order 1 or 2; in other words, the substance thrown off is more likely to be either hydrogen or helium than it is likely to be radium. (It is just possible, as Rutherford and Soddy suggest, that the inert chemical elements are all by-products of radio-activity.)

Now clearly here is a fact, if a fact it be, of prodigious importance. Undoubtedly the measurements require confirmation, but for myself I see no reason to doubt them, at least as regards their order of magnitude. The atomic weight of radium being say 225, and that of the projected portion being say 2, the residue must represent by its atomic weight the difference between the heavy atom of the original substance and that of the light atom or atoms which have been flung away: unless indeed it be assumed, as it will almost certainly be assumed by some sceptical chemists, those who derided argon and other chemical discoveries when made in a physical manner, that the substance flung away is some foreign ingredient or impurity—a hypothesis, I venture to say, already strongly against the weight of available evidence.

The substance left behind in the pores of the radio-active substance has been examined even more completely than the projected portion: it is volatile, it slowly diffuses away, and it behaves like a gas. It can be stored in gas-holders when mixed with air, for in amount it is quite imperceptible to all ordinary tests; and yet it can be passed through pipes and otherwise dealt with. It condenses not far above the temperature of liquid air, and it is itself radio-active, but in such a way that its power decays rapidly with time. Its radio-activity seems to consist likewise in throwing away part of itself and leaving yet another residue, likewise radio-active; and one of the residues so left, in its convulsion, flings away electrons as well as atoms of matter. It is not to be supposed that thorium and radium and uranium all behave alike in details. The emanation of one may lose its activity rapidly, and give rise to another substance which retains its power for some time; the emanation of another element may last some time and generate a substance whose activity rapidly decays; but into these details it is not now the place to go.

12. Assuming the truth of this strange string of laboratory facts, we appear to be face to face with a phenomenon quite new in the history of the world. No one has hitherto observed the transition from one form of matter to another: though throughout the Middle Ages such a transmutation was looked for. The transmutation of elements has been suspected in modern times, on evidence vaguely deducible by skilled observers from the spectroscopic details of solar and stellar appearances. The evolution of matter has likewise been suspected by a few chemists of genius: it was perceived, on the strength of Mendelejeff's law, that the elements form a kind of family or related series, and it was surmised that possibly the barriers between one species and the next were not absolutely infrangible, but that temporary transitional forms might occur. All this was speculation; but here in radio-active matter the process appears to be going on before our eyes. Professor Rutherford and Mr. Soddy, who in Canada during the present year have worked hard and admirably at the subject, have adduced facts which point clearly in this direction; and they initially describe what appear to be the first links of a chain of substances, all produced in hopelessly minute quantities reckoned by ordinary tests, but which yet by electrical means can easily be detected, and their boiling-points and other properties investigated. Moreover the investigators of these strange substances are able to dissolve and precipitate, and perform ordinary chemical operations on, these utterly imponderable and hopelessly minute deposits of radioactive substances, because of the powerful means of detection which their ionizing power puts into our hands—even a few projected atoms being able by their ionizing power to discharge an electroscope appreciably.

13. Thus then it would appear that our theoretical conclusion concerning the inevitable radiation and loss of energy from electrically constituted atoms of matter, a loss which must involve them in necessary change and dissolution, meets with quite unexpectedly rapid confirmation; and it is for that reason that I feel willing to accept, tentatively and as a working hypothesis, this explanation of radio-activity. For how is radio-activity to be explained? It looks as if the massive and extremely complex atoms of a radio-active substance were liable to get into an unstable condition—probably reaching this condition whenever any part of it attempts, or is urged, to move with the velocity of light, I have shown elsewhere

See *Nature* for June 11. 1903.

that the mere fact of radiation will act as a resisting medium and increase the speed of the particles automatically, on the same principle that a comet would be accelerated if it met with resistance; since the

inverse square law applies to electrical central forces. Electrical mass is not strictly constant: it is a function of speed, but in such a way that it is practically constant until the velocity of light is very nearly attained. That is a critical velocity, which apparently cannot be surpassed. When this critical speed is reached, any electrified body becomes suddenly of infinite mass, and something is bound to happen. What that something is, it is not easy theoretically to say; but the partial or incipient disintegration or dissociation of the atom, and the flying away of a portion with a speed comparable to that of light, is no unlikely result.

Out of the whole multitude of atoms, even of the atoms of a conspicuously radio-active substance, it is probable that only a very few get into this unstable or critical condition at any one time; perhaps not more than one in a million million; nevertheless, just as occasional though rare encounters take place in the heavens, followed by the blaze of a new and temporary star, so, though probably not by the same mechanism, here and there a few out of the billions of atoms in any perceptible speck of radium arrive in due time at the unstable condition, and break down into something else, with energetic radio-activity during the sudden collapsing process; emitting, in the process of collapse, not only the main projected substance, but likewise also a few electrons, and those X-rays which always accompany a sudden electric jerk or recoil. And the X-rays so emitted are of the most penetrating kind known, being able to pass through an inch of solid iron in perceptible quantity,

14. The hypothesis concerning radio-activity which is now in the field, then, is that a very small number, an almost infinitesimal proportion, of the atoms are constantly breaking up; throwing away a small portion, say one per cent of themselves, with immense violence, at about one-tenth of the speed of light; the remainder constituting a slightly different substance, which however is still extremely unstable, and therefore radioactive, going through its stages with much greater rapidity than the radium itself, because practically the whole of it is in the unstable condition, and so giving rise to fresh and fresh products of its own decay, till a comparatively stable state is reached, or till the process passes beyond our means of detection.

Roughly, the process may be likened in some respects to the condensation or contraction of a nebula. The particles constituting a whirling nebula fall together until the centrifugal force of the peripheral portions exceeds the gravitative pull of the central mass, and then they are shrunk off and left behind, afterwards agglomerating into a planet; while the residue goes on shrinking and evolving fresh bodies and generating heat. A nebula is not hot, but it has an immense store of potential energy, some of which it can turn into heat, and so form a hot central nucleus or sun. A radium atom is not hot, but it too has a great store of potential energy, immense in proportion to its mass, for it is controlled by electrical, not by gravitational forces; and just as the falling together of the solar materials generates heat, so that a shrinkage of a few yards per annum can account for all its tremendous emission, so it has been calculated that the collapsing of the electrical constituents of a radium atom, by so little as one per cent, of their distance apart, can supply the whole of the energy of the observed radiation—large though that is—for something like 30,000 years.

15. It does not follow that the life of a piece of radium is as great as that; the data are uncertain at present, but there is absolutely no ground for the popular and gratuitous surmise that it emits energy without loss or waste of any kind, and that it is competent to go on for ever. The idea at one time irresponsibly mooted, that it contradicted the principle of the conservation of energy, and was troubling Physicists with the idea that they must overhaul their theories—a thing which they ought always to be delighted to do on good evidence—this idea was a gratuitous absurdity, and never had the slightest foundation; but the notion that radium was perhaps able to draw upon some unknown source or store of energy, without itself suffering loss, was a possibility which has not yet wholly disappeared from some minds. Sir W. Crookes, for instance, suggested that it might somehow utilize the most quickly moving atoms of air, after the fashion of a Maxwell demon—a possibility that should always be borne in mind as a conceivable explanation of the power of some living organisms. It is much more reasonable to suppose, however, that radium and the other like substances are drawing upon their own stores of internal atomic energy, and thereby gradually disintegrating and falling into other, and ultimately into more stable, forms of matter.

Not that it is to be supposed that even these are finally and absolutely stable: these too are subject to radiation loss, and so must be liable to decay; but at a vastly slower rate, perhaps not more than a few hundred atoms changing and diffusing away each second—a process utterly imperceptible to the most delicate weighing until after the lapse of millions of years; so that for all practical purposes, and for times such as are dealt with in cosmic history, they are permanent, even as the solar system and stellar aggregates appear to us to be permanent. Yet we know that all these systems are in reality transitory, as terrestrial structures like the Pyramids or as the mountains and the continents themselves are transitory: of all these things it may be said that in any given form they have their day and cease to be. But whereas geological and astronomical configurations pass through their phases in a time to be reckoned in millions of years—the active life of a solar system covering perhaps no very long period—it is probable that the changes we have begun to suspect in the foundation-stones of the universe, the more stable elemental atoms themselves, must require a period to be expressed only by millions of millions of centuries. For in such a time as this, at the rate of a hundred atoms per

second, a bare kilogramme—a couple of pounds only—of matter, even of heavy matter, would have drifted away. And yet this period is a million times the estimated age of the earth.

16. If we allow ourselves to speculate, on the strength of the slender experimental evidence as yet forthcoming, instead of waiting, as to be wise we must wait, for confirmation and thorough examination of the facts, we should say that the whole of existing matter appears liable to processes of change, and in that sense to be a transient phenomenon.

Somehow, we might conjecture, by some means at present unknown, it takes its rise: electrons of opposite sign crystallizing or falling together, perhaps at first into a manifestly unstable form; these forms then pass on from one into another, going through a series of transitional states, and abiding for a long time in those configurations which are most stable; giving a process of evolution inconceivably slow in its later stages, comparatively rapid in its early ones: and yet not so rapid, even in a substance like radium, but that its life as such may be reckoned by thousands of years.

If such a transitory existence is ever established for the forms of matter as we know them, it by no means follows that the process goes on in one direction only, or that the total amount of matter in the universe is subject to diminution. There may be regeneration as well as degeneration.

The total amount of radio-activity in a substance is singularly constant. If the radio-active portion is removed, a fresh supply makes its appearance at a measured rate: that rate being expressible by a decreasing geometrical progression, and being precisely equal to the rate at which the power of the removed portion decays.

Whether the total amount of matter in the universe is constant likewise, as much disappearing at one end by resolution into electrons as is formed at the other end by their aggregating together, is at present quite unknown; and indeed it is clear that we have now become far immersed in the region of speculation. Nevertheless it is speculation not of an illegitimate character, for it is very consistent with all that we know about the rest of the material universe.

Astronomy tells us that the cosmic scheme, though it looks permanent, is subject to constant flux. In the sky we see solar systems and suns in process of formation by aggregation out of nebulae; we see them rise in brilliancy, maintaining a number of planets in health and activity for a time, and then slowly become subject to decay and death. What happens after that is not certainly known; it may be that by collision a nebula may be reconstituted, and the process started again; though so long as there is only a force of one sign at work (gravitation only) it would seem that ultimately the regenerative process must come to an end. The repellent force exerted by light upon small particles, however, must not be forgotten: it can overpower gravitation when it acts on small enough bodies; and there are other possibilities. Among the parts of an atom certainly the forces are conspicuously not of one sign; inside an atom there exist both attractive and repulsive forces; the resolution of an atom into its electron constituents, and the aggregation of these constituents into fresh atoms, are both perfectly thinkable. All we have to do is to ascertain by careful and patient investigation what really happens; and my experience has led me to feel sure of this, that whatever hypotheses and speculations we may frame, we cannot exceed the reality in genuine wonder. And I believe that the simplicity and beauty of the truth concerning even the material universe, when we know it, will be such as to elicit feelings of reverent awe and adoration.

Front Cover

Letter from J Ellis McTaggart to Robert Stout. 20 August 1910

"Dare to be Wise"

An Address

Delivered before the "Heretics" Society in Cambridge, on the 8th December, 1909

By John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart

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"Dare to be Wise"

At the other end of the world is a University

The University of New Zealand.

which has adopted for its own the motto which best expresses the nature of a University: Sapere Aude. It is of the duty laid on our Society to follow this injunction that I wish to speak.

Our object is to promote discussion upon religion, philosophy, and art. And in discussing religion and philosophy there is a special significance in the command, Dare to be wise. In seeking truth of all sorts many virtues are needed, industry, patience, humility, magnanimity. And courage also is often needed in the search,

since the observer of nature must often risk his life in his observations. But there is another need for courage when we approach religion and philosophy.

And this need comes from the tremendous effect on our own welfare, and the welfare of our fellow beings, of those aspects of reality with which religion and philosophy are concerned. This effect is, in the first place, a characteristic of that reality, the problems about which would usually be called religious. But it spreads to all philosophy, for there is, I think, no question in philosophy—not even among those which border closest on logic or on science—of which we can be sure beforehand that its solution will have no effect on the problems of religion.

The profound importance to our welfare of the truth on these questions involves that our beliefs about those truths will also have a great importance for our welfare. If our lives would gain enormously in value if a certain doctrine were true, and would lose enormously in value if it were false, then a belief that it is true will naturally make us happy, and a belief that it is false make us miserable. And happiness and misery have much to do with welfare.

The practical importance to our lives of these matters has not always been sufficiently recognised of late years. This error is due, I think, to excessive reaction from two errors on the other side.

The first of these errors is the assertion that, if certain views on religious matters were true, all morality would lose its validity. From this, of course, it would follow that all persons who believed those views and yet accepted morality would be acting illogically and foolishly. That this view is erroneous seems to me quite clear. Our views on religious questions may affect some of the details of morality—the observance of a particular day of rest, or the use of wine or of beef, for example. But they are quite powerless either to obliterate the difference between right and wrong, or to change our views on much of the content of morality. At least, I do not know of any view maintained by anyone on any religious question which would, if I held it, alter my present belief that it is right to give water to a thirsty dog, and wrong to commit piracy or to cheat at cards.

Another form of this same error is the assertion that certain beliefs on religious matters, though they might not render morality absurd, would in practice prevent those who accepted them from pursuing virtue persistently and enthusiastically. This view seems refuted by experience, which, I think, tells us that the zeal for virtue shown by various men, while it varies much, and for many causes, does not vary according to their views on religious matters. The men who believe, for example, in God, or immortality, or optimism, seem to be neither better nor worse morally than those who disbelieve in them.

The second error is the view that certain beliefs on religious matters would destroy the value, for those who accepted the beliefs, of many of those parts of experience which would otherwise have the highest value. Tennyson, for example, maintained that disbelief in immortality would destroy the value of love, even while life lasted:—

*And love would answer with a sigh,
The sound of that forgetful shore
Will change my sweetness more and more,
Half-dead to know that I shall die.
In Memoriam.*

Here, again, it seems to me, there is certainly error. Our views as to the ultimate nature and destiny of the universe may affect our judgments as to the generality of certain forms of good, or as to their duration, or as to the possibility of their increase in intensity hereafter. But I do not see how they can affect our judgment of the goodness of these good things, as we find them here and now. Indeed, if we do not start with the certainty that love for an hour on earth is unconditionally good, I do not see what ground we should have for believing that it would be good for an eternity in heaven.

These views, then, I admit to be errors, and those do well who reject them as errors. But the reaction from them, as I said, goes sometimes too far, and leads to a denial of the practical importance of the problems of religion. And this is, again, a great mistake. Whatever may be the true answer to the problems of religion, good will be different from bad, and right from wrong, and much of what we do and feel in this present life will be good, and much will be bad. But if we ask how much good exists in the universe and how much bad; if we ask if the main current of the universe is for right, or for wrong, or indifferent to both; if we ask what is the eventual destiny of the universe or of ourselves—all these questions must be answered one way or the other according to the solution we adopt of religious problems, and of those problems of philosophy which bear on religion. Are there any questions which affect our welfare more than these? It is true that what primarily affects our welfare is the truth on these matters, and not our knowledge of the truth. But a belief that things are well with the world brings happiness, a belief that things are ill with the world brings misery. And this involves the intense practical

importance of our beliefs on the problems of religion.

Let us consider what some of these problems are which we call religious. In the first place, there is the general question of optimism or pessimism. Is the universe as a whole more good than bad? It is, of course, possible to maintain that it is impossible for us to answer this question. But some systems maintain that it can be answered, and some of them answer that the good prevails, and some of them hold that it is outbalanced by the evil. The practical importance of the truth on this question does not require to be enforced. For the goodness or badness of the universe is the whole of which every other matter of practical importance is a part.

Our belief on the subject, therefore, must have great influence on our happiness. So far, indeed, as I am only concerned with my welfare in this life, or with that of my friends, the more general question will have little influence, for in these limited fields we have empirical means of judging the present or inferring the immediate future, which are more certain than inferences from the general nature of the universe. But few people limit their interests entirely to those whom they know personally. And then there is always the question whether my own life, and those of my friends, may not, perhaps, extend indefinitely further than that short period in our present bodies which is all that we can now know by observation.

And there is another question, equally important. Does the universe become better or worse as time goes on, and, if it becomes either, which does it become? This is of equal importance, because it is a disposition of our nature—apparently a fundamental and inevitable disposition—to regard good and evil in the future with very different feelings from those with which we regard good and evil in the past. If the world were known to be more evil than good on the whole, we should still regard it cheerfully, if we believed that most of the evil lay in the past, and that the future was predominantly good. And, though the world as a whole were known to be more good than evil, that would afford us but little comfort if that part of its course which still lay in the future were more evil than good.

Then, to come to less general questions, there is the question of immortality. Our beliefs on this subject, also, will profoundly affect our happiness. Some desire annihilation, some shrink from it, but very few are indifferent. And even of these, I suppose, none would be indifferent as to the further question of what kind the future life would be, if there were a future life at all.

Then there is the existence of God. The importance of this question for our welfare has, no doubt, been exaggerated, through a failure to comprehend the alternatives. It has been supposed that the only alternative to a belief in God is a belief in some Scepticism or Materialism which would be incompatible with any hope that the universe as a whole was coherent, orderly, or good. But this is a mistake. There are systems which hold the universe to be all this, although they deny the existence of God. And, on the other hand, the existence of God would certainly not be by itself a guarantee that the universe was good. That there is some evil in the universe is beyond doubt. If it is there because God did not object to it, how do we know how much evil he may tolerate, or even welcome? If it is there—as most reasonable Theists would say now—because God could not help it, how do we know how much evil it may be beyond his power to prevent? Theism may possibly form a link in a chain of argument leading to Optimism, but it is far indeed from being a complete proof of Optimism.

But in spite of all this it cannot be denied that to many people the belief that there is or is not a God is most intimately connected with their happiness. And even those who are indifferent on this point would certainly not be indifferent on the question whether, if there is a God, he is such as he was supposed to be by the early Jews, or, again, by the Jesuits or the Calvinists of the sixteenth century.

Our beliefs on religious questions, then, do profoundly affect our happiness. We can conceive—indeed, we know in history, and in the thought of the present day—beliefs the acceptance of which would make life almost intolerably miserable to anyone whose interests reached beyond the immediate present and his immediate environment. And here we find the need of courage. For, if we are to think on these matters at all, we must accept the belief for which we have evidence, and we must reject the belief for which we have no evidence, however much the first may repel or the second allure us. And, sometimes, this is not easy.

When we deal with the knowledge of science, or every-day life, we have no similar struggle. In the first place, it is here often very indifferent to us *what* the true solution of a problem may be, provided that, whatever it is, we can know it. It may be of great importance to us to know what sort of building will best stand the shock of an earthquake, but comparatively unimportant what sort it is, since, whichever it may be, we can build in that manner in earthquake districts. It may be very important to know which of two medicines will cure a disease, but quite unimportant which it is, so long as we know it and can use it.

If, indeed, we have to put the question, Is there *any* medicine which can cure this disease? then, indeed, it may matter very much to us what the answer is. And in such a case we may be tempted, for a short time, to believe that a cure has been found, when in point of fact it has not. But the temptation does not last for long. When the medicine is tried, and fails to cure, then conviction comes to all except the weakest. But there is no corresponding help in religion and philosophy. For, if there is ever to be any experimental verification of our beliefs on such subjects, at least it will not be on this side of death. If through cowardice we depart from the

right path, we must not hope for experience to take us back.

The strain is so hard that often and often in the history of thought men have tried to justify their weakness by asserting that we were entitled to believe a proposition if its truth would be very good, or at any rate if its falsity would be very bad. Over and over, in different forms, this demand meets us—not infrequently in the work of the men of whom we should least expect it. But, whenever we find it, we must, I maintain, reject it. It may well be that the universe, if this or that belief were false, would be very bad. But how do we know that the universe is *not* very bad? There is no intrinsic *à priori* connection between existence and goodness. If we can show that the nature of existence is such that it *is* good, so much the better. But then the question of the nature of existence is the one which we are setting out to determine, and we have no right to begin by assuming that that nature is good.

Nor can we fall back on the argument, which is often used, that our desires for the good—those desires the thwarting of which produce the misery we are avoiding—are as real as anything else in the universe, and form as sound a basis for an argument as anything else. Unquestionably they are real, and form a basis for an argument; but the question remains. What argument can be based on them? If they were to be any good here, the argument would have to be that, because they really exist as desires in us, therefore the universe must be such as will gratify them. And this is invalid. The existence of a desire does not involve the existence of its gratification. Each of us has had many desires which were not satisfied, and which can now never be satisfied.

We cannot argue, then, from the pain that a belief gives us to the falsity of that belief. And, if we decide to think freely on these subjects, we run the risk of arriving, as others have arrived before us, at conclusions the pain of which may be very great. It is true that, so far as I know, no person who has thought freely on these subjects has arrived at conclusions so maddening as those of some traditional theologies now fading into the past. The ideas of an endless hell, of an unjust God, are fruits of ancient tradition, or of interpretation of alleged revelations—never, I believe, of independent reasoning. But to find no more hope, no more purpose, no more value in the universe than was found by Hobbes, by Hume, or by Schopenhauer—the pain of this, especially to one who has hoped for better results, or, perhaps, has once held them gained—the pain of this is sometimes not trifling.

Why should we not endeavour to escape it? Why should we not accept, without inquiry, some traditional faith? There may be arguments for it, there may be arguments against it. But others have accepted it without inquiry into these arguments. Why should not we?

Such a suggestion has greater attractions than it would have had two generations ago. In Europe, in the present age, a man is not likely to accept any religion in this way, except some form of Christianity. And the Christianity of sixty years ago, while no doubt such that many men could honestly *believe* it to be true, was such that no man could *wish* it to be true, unless he was devoid either of imagination or of humanity. Much Christianity of the present day is still of this type. But it would be most absurd and unjust to deny that the type of Christianity which becomes every year relatively more powerful is very different. Its view of the universe is one which might well entitle us to call the universe good. Why should we not accept it without the risks of inquiry?

Or, if we cannot do that, why trouble about these problems at all? Is not the world we see big enough to occupy lives so short as ours? Shall we not enjoy the good, strive to increase it and to share it, and ask no questions about what is behind, beyond, and—perhaps—above?

Yet some follow after truth. And what shall be their reward? May we answer, in words which were written about Spinoza, and which are worthy to have been written by him: "Even that which true and fearless men have preached through all the generations to unheeding ears. Seek the truth, fear not and spare not: this first, this for its own sake, this only; and the truth itself is your reward—a reward not measured by length of days nor by any reckoning of men"?

Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy*, chap. ix.

It is most beautiful and most true, but it is not the whole truth. For knowledge of the truth, though a great good, is not the only good, nor perhaps the highest good. If my friend is in pain or estranged from me, if the universe is worthless or worse than worthless, it is no adequate consolation to know that at least I see the evil clearly.

And then, is truth always the reward for seeking the truth? Always it cannot be, for if some have attained, the others must have failed who disagreed with them. The reward of the search—are we sure that it will be anything but the search?

Can we give any other bidding than that which was once given to a search yet more sacred?

- Come—pain ye shall have, and be blind to the ending !
- Come—fear ye shall have, mid the sky's overcasting !
- Come—change ye shall have, for far are ye wending !
- Come—no crown ye shall have for your thirst and your fasting,

- But—

William Morris, *Love is Enough*.

And here we must stop, before the promise that follows. The crown of our thirst and our fasting may be the opened heavens and the Beatific Vision. It may be nothing but the thirst and the fasting itself.

No great inducement, perhaps, all this? And no inducement is needed. There are those who long for truth with a longing as simple, as ultimate, as powerful as the drunkard's longing for his wine and the lover's longing for his beloved. They will search, because they must. Our search has begun.

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