The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 40

Naval Intelligence in Relation to the Protection of Commerce

Naval Intelligence in Relation to the Protection of Commerce.

Under this head the intelligence required is—

1st. The general laws, which under normal conditions, govern the distribution of British sea commerce over the world, both as regards time, place, and value.

2nd. The particular influences which any particular wars are likely to produce on the direction and value of British commerce passing over different sea lines. The blockading of a coast, for example, would prevent the laws of supply and demand being satisfied by means of sea communications terminating on that seaboard; the imports which would otherwise have been absorbed by the ports blockaded will, to a greater or less degree, according to circumstances, seek other markets and be diverted into new channels, 1 thus causing a variation in direction and value of sea-commerce.

3. The careful and continuous observation of the development and resources of grain-producing lands, the periods of the harvests, and the visible supplies available for export.

I have so often dwelt on the all-important question of the critical position of the food supply of the United Kingdom in war, that I cannot stop now to add very much to what I have previously stated, except in a general way. We have Mr. John Bright's authority that between 1879 and 1880 "out of every four loaves of bread eaten by "the people of the United Kingdom three loaves came from abroad"; 2 in other words, over the sea. 3 Had we been at war during that period, therefore, whether the three loaves ever reached the mouths of our population would have been a matter entirely dependent on our naval means of protection, and on the accuracy of our naval intelligence. I would here point out that the geographical position of the source of our main supply has, within the last few years, shifted several thousand miles from east to west, from the districts of the Euxine to

1 The war in the United States furnished an example : as the "Southern States "did not draw down the usual suppy of grain from the Northern," grain had to seek another market, the result being that it found its way to the United Kingdom, and to use the phrase of a commercial journal of 1863, "put out of gear the cycle of "high to low prices." The same journal goes on to say, "Whatever injury America has inflicted upon this country by the blockade, we must count the enormous supplies of grain which she poured into our ports last year as some compensation." One effect of the war was to cause the Northern States to send us a great increase of bread, and to draw from us a great increase of lead.

2 See his letter dated 18th March, 1881.

3 I give Mr. John Bright's statement, because his words carry such weight In this case, however, he has overstated facts as to the proportion of foreign and home bread consumed.—J. C. R. C.

the Western States of America. 1 The direction, length, and value of our food lines has recently entirely changed, and that change will influence our naval arrangements in war. I have often seen discussions of a purely naval or military character based on the assumption of a war with the States. I would, however, beg you to look beyond the professional limits of such a supposition to the great national question of its present, practical impossibility. We are at present dependent on the States for an enormous proportion of our food, and the British Empire, possessing grain-producing lands, now lying idle, yet capable, if populated and developed, of feeding hundreds of millions of human beings, could hardly resist the will of the States, because misery and starvation of the masses would reign in England, as a direct consequence of attempting to do so. But there is yet another great change impending in the sources of food supply. Thanks to the energy of Canada, with a population rather less than that of London, the construction of a British Pacific Railway has begun in earnest. Before long our food supplies may be grown under our own flag. 2 It would not be difficult to show that in war this railway, with its attendant and possible results, would give our naval position greater strategical security and strength than an extra half dozen "Inflexibles."

4. Next conies the collection of information and continuous observation of the direction of coal exports from England and her colonies, also from such countries as export coal for steam sea traffic, the average supply and demand, and the ratio of increase at all British and foreign coaling places. As a Royal Commission has been sitting for nearly two years, charged with the special consideration of the state and defences of our coaling stations, I will not make further reference to them, and for the first time out of the many I have spoken from this place, it is satisfactory that such public action in the matter enables me to do so.

5. Next, the details of construction and speed of every merchant steamer in the world possessing power and capacity for adaptation as a war cruiser of attack, should be carefully and continuously collected. 3 The nature of ordinary peace employment, and the ownership should be known, no matter under what flag she sails. The transfer of such vessels from one flag to another, is the operation of minutes only, involving private arrangements, payment of money, and the signing of names. The Peruvian vessels, for example, were so transferred the other day by private enterprise, to the flags of Germany and Russia. The whereabouts and movements from port to port, of all foreign steamers capable of conversion into efficient weapons of attack, should be at all times known at our Admiralty, and so far as is practically possible, by Admirals commanding abroad. It

1 It is remarkable that the Turkish troops at Volo were the other day supplied with bread stuffs from the States.

2 The imports of grain coming as part cargo in steamers from Australia is steadily increasing, but such supply is but a drop in the great ocean of our food demand.

3 To some this may appear beyond the scope of what is practically possible. It should, however, be remembered the enormous interests at stake; and further, that there are not so very many steamers under foreign flags suitable for conversion into efficient war cruisers. We own about two-thirds of the steam tonnage of the world, the total (gross) of which is in round numbers 6,700,000 tons.

The following is a sufficient illustration of its distribution :—
Under British flag 4,200,000 tons.
Under American flag 630,000 tons.
Under French flag 420,000 tons.
Under German flag 290,000 tons.
Under Spanish flag 200,000 tons.
Under Russian flag 130,000 tons.
All other 830,000 tons.
Total 6,700,000 tons.

These figures include all shapes and sizes of merchant steamers. I may also add that the best foreign steamers are as a rule built in Great Britain.

is only by the most plodding methodical daily collection and digestion of such intelligence during peace, that we shall on the outbreak of war avoid surprises by the issuing from unexpected and unobserved quarters of cruisers bought at one place, armed and equipped at another, and destroying our commerce somewhere else. Were our system of naval intelligence as complete and as far-reaching as the necessities of our huge commercial interest require, we should be able to prevent most of such vessels getting to sea on errands hostile to us: either by our immediate purchase of all such as are suitable for conversion, from owners who can be tempted to sell or, if outwitted in this by our enemy's agents, then by shutting the vessels up in port.
No nation with its direct sea route stopped by blockade, will long continue to purchase merchant steamers for conversion into armed cruisers, if the result be that most of them rot in the neutral ports, owing to the efficiency of a British Naval Intelligence Department unceasingly but quietly at work, and the careful attention of British ships of war which, from the very commencement of hostilities, if not before, dog suspicious characters from port to port. They must have speed, staying power, and strength enough to do so. We are now trusting to our material resources, and the mere possession of great national wealth to save our commerce somehow or other in the hour of its peril; but if we do not use our national brains, even to the extent of recognizing the necessity for establishing a great and far-reaching system of naval intelligence, that peril when it comes will, I venture to think, speedily terminate in the ruin of our carrying trade. It is the very first stage, rather than the closing scenes of maritime war, which decides the fate of such trade. American war fleets floated triumphant on the sea long after the American carrying trade—terrified by ocean fires kindled by an uncaught "Alabama"—had taken to itself wings and fled. 1 Moral effect is the great force to be reckoned with in considering the protection of commerce. If the first few weeks of war shakes that ignorance which blindly hopes that our naval arrangements for war are commensurate with our commercial necessities, the British mercantile marine will probably disappear in a

1 A practical illustration may be useful. Taking the June quarter of 1860, two-thirds of the commerce of New York was carried in American bottoms; in the same period of 1863, three-fourths was carried in foreign bottoms.

reaction of panic. 1 What will happen during these first few weeks, depends primarily upon the accuracy and extent of our naval intelligence. Peace affords the only opportunity of organizing and systematizing such intelligence, and maturing our plans. That opportunity will be gone when many submarine cables are dumb, when excitement reigns on British Stock Exchanges, in two hemispheres, and merchants and shippers crowd Whitehall clamorous for naval intelligence. Are they then to be referred to the Military Intelligence Department in Pall Mall, to obtain full details as to the roads to Berlin?

6. It is also of importance that all particulars concerning the exact position, nature of bottom, and depth of water in which submarine cables are laid, should be collected and furnished to naval commanders, so that they may know where to cut or tap them, or prevent others from doing so.

7. The necessity for collecting and rapidly disseminating information at all times as to the movements of foreign ships of war is so obvious as to require no explanation. It is to be hoped our method has been improved during the last twenty-seven years. Facts which I have come across in the course of my investigations, have astonished me in the overwhelming testimony they bear to national carelessness in this matter during the Crimean War. For example, as I have elsewhere stated, the officials at a most important naval outpost were left to learn that England was at war, from chance newspapers, and to the end of the war no official instructions were sent to them. In another quarter of the world, though we had steamers on the station, a Russian frigate rode at anchor in the middle of an English squadron, months after the Guards had been cheered through the streets of London, on their way to the East. Seven weeks after her parting company with the English squadron, she passed on the high seas under the stern of an English man-of-war. I happen to know the latitude and longitude where the curious scene occurred of an English vessel of war dipping her ensign to the frigate of a Power we had been fighting for months. Had there been any real attempt at the organization, collection, and communication of naval intelligence before and during our last war with Russia, disaster and defeat of British naval forces in the North Pacific would not now stand recorded in that same "Times" containing the telegraphic news of the Balaklava Gale, and the official despatch announcing our military survival at Inkermann. We did not then choose to have systematic naval intelligence as to the movements of enemy's ships, and the nature of fixed naval positions, and naturally we paid dearly for our neglect with the lives of Englishmen. "The wild roses and purple" hooded bells nodding," 2 over long rows of English graves in the "green grass valleys" of Kamtschatka, mutely appeal for better naval

1 In 1860 13,638 tons of shipping were transferred from the American to the English flag. Month after month the number of Ions transferred increased. In 1863 252,579 tons were so transferred. Between 1860 and 1861 the American tonnage was reduced by some 2,000,000 tons.

2 See "Tent Life in Siberia." Kennan.

Imports. Diagram illustrating average variation in volume, according to period of year.

Imports. Diagram illustrating average variation in volume, according to period of year.

intelligence. In 1855, we were unsuccessful off the coast of Asiatic Russia. The whole Russian squadron and garrison evacuated the position we had made great preparations to attack. It avoided one of our fleets, and was found by another, but escaped. All this was due to the absence of organized naval intelligence. Ten years later, and in the regions where all these scenes occurred, and where Russia is now wisely accumulating war cruisers, the wrecks of thirty Federal ships 1 strewed the shores of Behring's Straits, testifying to the naval intelligence possessed by the commander of the "Shenandoah," and to its total absence in Federal naval arrangements. To examine closely one of the foregoing sub-heads of naval intelligence necessary for naval efficiency, would require a whole series of lectures, and therefore, I can now only—by way of illustration—pick out one or two more prominent features of some for special notice.

As regards value, Table I shows the value of imports and exports of the United Kingdom from and to ocean districts in one year (1879), it further distinguishes between the values passing from and to the foreign and British seaboards in those districts into which I divide the world, their geographical limits being as follows :—

Northern Seas District.—On the west by a line drawn from Dunkerque towards the Pole through Dover, the eastern boundary being the seaboards in the German Ocean and the Baltic Sea.

North-East Atlantic District is bounded on the west by 30° meridian W., on the south by the Equator, and on the east by the continuous seaboard from where the Equator strikes the West Coast of Africa to Dunkerque where it meets the limits of the Northern Seas.

North-West Atlantic District includes all the North Atlantic Ocean west of the 30° meridian.

South Atlantic District includes the seaboard of British South Africa with the Atlantic Ocean lying south of the Equator.

Indian Seas District takes in the water area enclosed by the continuous coast line from the north-east of British South Africa to Singapore, thence by a line, including Java, towards the South Pole and back to Delagoa Bay.

North Pacific District.—All the Pacific north of the Equator between the Indian Seas District and the American Continent.

South Pacific District.—All the Pacific south of the Equator between these limits.

The chief lesson to be learnt from Table I is the great disproportion between the value of exports and the value of imports from and to the foreign seaboards in districts where there are both foreign and British seaboards, while they nearly balance in the case of the seaboards which in these districts are British.

Where, therefore, the import or "homeward" route and the export or "outward" routes are not from physical causes geographically identical, there is a difference in the financial value to us between the lines to and the lines from foreign seaboards, while in the case of those to or from British seaboards, there is practically none. It is

1 Whymper saw them, vide his "Alaska."

this sort of fact and many others which underlie it, of which naval intelligence should constantly be investigating and taking cognizance of.

Table II gives the number of steam and sailing British ships, which, in one year (1879) entered and cleared the United Kingdom from and to seaboards in the several ocean districts with cargoes, while Table III gives in the same manner British ships in ballast. These figures, including as they necessarily do repeated voyages, are not the actual number of individual ships, but relatively they are strictly accurate. It is necessary to remind you, I am, in order to avoid confusion, at present confining my observations and figures to the trade and shipping of the United Kingdom only; presently I shall refer to the trade of the Empire.

Now, there are several lessons conveyed by these Tables II and III. I can, however, only refer to one or two selected for the purpose of giving continuity to these general illustrations, leaving those who choose to study them, to find out the others. As regards vessels carrying cargoes, it appears from Table II that the arrival and departure of sailing ships from and to foreign ports nearly balances, while the clearance of steamers with cargoes was about one-fourth greater than the arrivals; on the other hand, in the case of British ports abroad, while the sailing ships also about balance, the steamers carrying cargo from the United Kingdom to those ports were more than double the number of those arriving.

Reference to Table III shows that out of 7,000 representing the steamers which came to or left our shores empty, only 73 entered and cleared empty from ports of our Empire. Further, out of over 4,000 empty ships which entered and cleared, but 450 came from or went to British possessions. Where, therefore, the sea lines to foreign ports do not geographically coincide with those to our possessions, the empty British ships will almost exclusively be found on the foreign sea lines. Here, again, we have a fact it should be the duty of naval intelligence to watch and digest, for sea commerce is not constant in its operation. The last columns of Table II teach a still more important lesson, showing as they do the variation in the proportion of steam to sailing British tonnage employed in the trade of the several ocean districts. In the North Seas District, the proportion is about 12 steam tons to 1 sailing; in the North-East Atlantic District, 8 to 1; in the North-West Atlantic District, 5 to 2; and in the South Atlantic, 7 to 5 only; the conditions as regards Indian Seas are reversed, there being more sailing than steam tonnage employed; in the North Pacific, there are 3 tons sailing to 1 steam; and in the South Pacific, 5 tons sail to 1 steam. These facts are important in many ways. It is impossible, however, to dwell now upon more than one or two considerations they suggest. The limits of danger to merchant ships in war as regards operations on the high seas lie between the port of departure and arrival, and as steamers traverse this area of danger at a greater speed than sailers, they are exposed to danger, in proportion to their speed, for a less time. If, over a threatened sea line a steamer can pass in six weeks while the sailer on the same line takes three months, the risk to the sailer is double that of the steamer. Again, the steamer can, in proportion to her power, vary her route, while the sailing ship is forced, by atmospheric and other influences, into certain beaten tracks. The steamer can avoid a menaced area, the sailer cannot. I am only dealing with strategical matters, and therefore do not allude to the obvious tactical helplessness of a sailing merchant ship when in sight of an enemy's steam cruiser, while the position of a merchant steamer in the same situation may not be one of danger if her speed be greater than that of her vulture opponent. Under these circumstances, to push enquiry no further, it may be said that the danger to which our sea commerce is exposed in any ocean district is proportionable to the preponderance of steam or sail tonnage. Taking the Table (I) of value with Table (II) of shipping together, it may, by way of general illustration, be assumed that, other things equal, though the total value to the United Kingdom of the North Seas District is three times that of the South Pacific, the clanger to which the United Kingdom commerce in the South Pacific would be exposed in war is five-fold as compared with the North Seas. We have here, again, matters requiring vigilant and constant observation at the hands of naval intelligence, for the proportion of steam to sailing tonnage is never the same, it is steadily increasing, 1 but not uniformly in all trade directions. Every ton of steam substituted for sail tonnage is a gain to the strength of our naval position in war, provided our naval intelligence and arrangements are sufficient to prevent its being frightened under a foreign flag by failure to protect our commerce at the commencement of hostilities.

The first line of Table IV gives, in round numbers, the total values of ocean districts to the United Kingdom already given in full in Table I. The second line gives the values of ocean districts to India and the colonies, exclusive of their trade with the mother country. Had these two islands been sunk beneath the sea, or otherwise disappeared from the map of the world during the year 1879, the figures on the second line of Table IV would still have represented the values of surviving British exports and imports during that year, the aggregate being nearly 200,000,000 l. The third line adds together the figures on the first two, thus giving the Imperial values of the several ocean districts. Thus, it will be seen that the total value of British commerce to be protected in war is about 800,000,000 l.: more than one-fourth the sea trade of the whole world, British Empire included. It has been estimated that some 70 per cent, of the sea trade of the world is carried in British ships, and that the value of

1 The number of steam and sailing vessels (British) engaged in foreign trade in 1869, as compared with 1879, illustrates the above statement:—

1869—810 steamers, 6,963 sailing.
1879—2,027 steamers, 4,832 sailing.
2,183 decrease.

During the years 1877-80 the number of British steamers increased 22½ per cent., of French 25 per cent., German 17½ per cent.

British shipping is some 100,000,000 l. I should here remind you of the consequent enormous number of British ships employed carrying goods from foreign ports to foreign ports of which we have no account, but which will equally require protection in war. To conclude remarks on the simple values of ocean districts and shipping, it is desirable to observe that while the annual value of British sea trade is some 800,000,000 l., and though the value of British shipping on the oceans and seas is worth some 100,000,000 l. 1 more, we are without any organized system of naval intelligence necessary for its safety in war, and the popular national idea seems to be that were the "Inflexible's" sides only made thick enough, her guns big enough, and the Admiralty worked cheap enough, she should almost single-handed provide safety for such gigantic trade.
But the simple values of ocean districts already given docs not represent the real value of British commerce which passed over them in one year. There is a process of accumulation due to the movements of commerce over the area of some ocean districts in passage to or from others. Table V shows the oceanic accumulations resulting from the movements of British commerce in 1879, from hemisphere to hemisphere only. There are other and minor accumulating processes which must here be passed by. I compute the value to British commerce of the great passes from hemisphere to hemisphere as follows:—
Viâ Suez Canal £82,600,000
Viâ Cape of Good Hope 50,000,000
Viâ Horn 33,400,000
It will be seen from this table that while the simple value, for example, of the South Atlantic district is but 28,700,000 l., the volume of trade passing viâ the Horn and Cape raises that value to 112,200,000 l.; and, in like manner, there is an increase of simple values, as shown by the table, in the case of the South Pacific and the Indian Seas districts. As regards the North-East Atlantic it is obvious that, as the southern and western seaboards of the United Kingdom are situated in that district, and as the United Kingdom trade with all districts, except the North Seas, is 449,500,000 l., these figures represent the accumulated value of the North-East Atlantic to the mother country only; but as the rest of the Empire has a trade in this North-East Atlantic district of 26,900,000 l., and also a North Sea trade passing over it of 1,400,000 l., the Imperial accumulated value of this North-East Atlantic district is 477,000,000 l. The actual value of the waters of the United Kingdom is, of course, represented by its total trade with all districts, viz., 600,000,000 l. odd. I cannot say more on the variations of values as regards place, but must pass on to illustrate variations as regards time. Accumulations are not simultaneous, and it would be the function of naval intelligence always to know not only where the major and minor accumulations are taking place, but also when and how. As the movement of the protecting force must be ruled by the movements of commerce, to be without such intelligence kept up to date is, to

1 The value of British goods, &c., on the sea in each year exceeds our total National Debt!

my mind, to court terrible national disasters on the outbreak of war. At Lloyd's it is daily known where British ships are 1 in certain districts, and probably on the declaration of war that association would telegraph telling merchant ships where our war vessels were when last heard of. But these war vessels will change positions; perhaps they may be looking for enemy's cruizers whilst our merchant ships are looking for them, as did Federal war vessels which never caught the "Alabama" until she was driven into Cherbourg by need of repairs. The system at Lloyd's is perfectly adapted to Lloyd's business—insurance for the protection of individuals directly concerned against the risks of the sea: it could daily furnish much valuable data necessary to naval intelligence required for the protection in war of our greatest national interests.
The diagram headed "Imports" illustrates in a simple manner the increase and diminution of volume varying with the seasons of the year. It is not necessary to point out the original causes producing the results here exhibited. Every one knows that the harvests of the world are not simultaneous, and that when in one hemisphere they are reaping in the other they are sowing. But there is another influence which determines the period of the year at which the crop reaches us, the sea distance it has to cover before it reaches us. For example, the wheat which comes to us from the North Pacific States of America is grown within a comparatively short distance from that which finds its way viâ the North-West Atlantic, from the neighbouring districts of the United States; but from the date of "export" from those seaboards respectively until the date of its arrival here there is a difference of three and a half months. A grain vessel leaving Portland, Oregon, for the United Kingdom will, as regards time, be in war exposed to risk of capture for four and a half months, while the grain vessel simply crossing the North Atlantic will only be so exposed for one. North Pacific wheat will be accumulating in the South Pacific in the last quarter of the year, and more Australian wheat exposed to capture "off the Horn" when the trees are budding in Hyde Park than at any other time. The dates and extent of maximum accumulations of our wheat, raw cotton, and wool at various points in the ocean can be broadly arrived at from this diagram. I shall merely draw attention, however, to three general facts. From a successful attack on our commerce in the North-West Atlantic in the autumn we should suffer most as regards food. If that attack was delivered

1 Through the kindness of the Secretary of Lloyd's, I am informed of the following facts showing progress of our mercantile marine and Lloyd's system :—

Number of Reports of Sailing Arrivals, &c., Lloyd's Lists, 1860 and 1880.
Sailings. Arrivals. Speakings.
1860 33,899 158,921 11,507
1880 288,919 373,822 24,258

two or three months later the hands in Manchester cotton mills would suffer the heaviest blow; if, however, in the spring of the year our commerce passing over the South Atlantic was interfered with, Yorkshire operatives would be the greatest victims. The export diagram shows how the flow of precious metals is to some ocean districts constant, and to others variable as the seasons change. An import diagram of gold and silver would show a different distribution, but about the same amount coining as going; the South Pacific column would not be a blank, as on an average some five millions a year comes from Australia. The coal diagram shows the tremendous absorption of British coal by seaboards in the North Seas and North-East Atlantic districts, which are, with small exceptions, foreign not British. It will be seen from this that on the outbreak of hostilities there would not be much difficulty in the supply of British coal to enemy's cruisers, it can be easily trans-shipped at neutral ports and sent in foreign bottoms where needed. On an average, 1,300 British and 1,100 foreign coal-laden ships leave our shores in each month for the several ocean districts according to their demands. Whether in war our enemy's cruisers get British coals to enable them to operate against British commerce will entirely depend on British naval intelligence. The commander of a cruiser knowing his business would be fully aware at what points out of sight of neutral seaboards he could calculate on capturing from one to perhaps fifteen British coal ships per week; while a British naval commander, perhaps in search of him, and with coal bunkers half empty, might be on a main route, say 100 miles outside, and not know where to find coal on the sea, because he has never had an opportunity of learning, and no naval intelligence is organized to put in war, complete instructions on this and other matters into his hands with his sailing orders. It may be asked, how is the hostile cruiser's Captain to know where to go to? The answer is simple. The interest of trade necessitates the publication of complete information for its own purposes. The operation of enemy's cruisers and the instructions to their commanders will unquestionably be carefully calculated and prepared from information collected long before and up to date from voluminous papers and returns—some official and others non-official—daily published in England, that great centre of the world's trade and great national defaulter in this matter of organized naval intelligence for war.

I would here take the opportunity of expressing my obligations to Mr. Woods, the editor of "Dornbusch's Lists;" Mr. Turner, of the "Mark Lane Express;" Messrs. Gooch and Cousins, of the great wool warehouses; to the editor of "Brown's Export List," and others too numerous to mention, who have enabled me to accumulate more facts than I could possibly make use of in a single paper here. I am also greatly indebted to the Peninsular and Oriental, the Royal Mail, the Anchor and the Pacific Navigation, and other companies, for much information kindly and readily afforded. In order to give some idea of the importance of our sailing trade, and for reasons which will presently appear, I have made out Table VI, which shows roughly the average number of grain and wool laden sailing ships on passage per week in each quarter of the year to the United Kingdom from three ocean districts. I have omitted the wool trade of the South Atlantic, because the larger proportion of Cape wools comes as part cargoes in regular steamships; also the North-East Atlantic, because the grain and wool from the Euxine and Egyptian seaboards comes also in steamers as a rule; last year, for example, the average number of grain-laden sailing ships passing Constantinople for the United Kingdom was about eight per month, while the average number of steamers so passing with parcels of grain as part cargoes, was twenty-two per month. With reference to the shifting of the sources of our food supply from the east of Europe to the Western States of America, I may incidentally state that over 1,400 British ships (to say nothing of foreign) carried grain to us from the single port of New York last year. This sailing ship table is compiled from the best trade sources of information; but at best the figures can only be an approximation very far short of the actual numbers, and are only produced here for the sake of rough illustration.

I would observe that the diagrams and the table of sailing ships on passage represent the averages not for one year, but of a series; in the case of the diagrams the last six, in that of the table the last three years. Time compels me to abstain from further illustration, or from following up the complication of lessons those so rudely drawn, teach. A great variety of very important matter I am obliged to leave wholly unnoticed. With the facts and figures herein offered I put in juxtaposition an extract from the speech of a most able naval administrator of our own time. "When," said the Duke of Somerset in the House of Lords, "I was at the Admiralty, the little squabble about the

"'Trent' question happened. One of the Lords asked me what would

"be done in case of war. I replied, 'I can tell you one thing I shall

"'do—you will have to sleep on the Admiralty Board table, for I won't

"'let you away. 1 In full view of even the outline of facts I have produced, and with this statement staring us in the face, I would ask, should not the unfortunate Naval Lord on the table—sleepless with work and crushed with an Atlas burden of responsibility—have at least the assistance of an organized and far-reaching system of naval intelligence? As regards information concerning the naval means and preparations of foreign Powers, I have no wish to raise a discussion as to whether a separate department of the Admiralty should be created for this special purpose, because the subjects for digestion are so various and so essentially different, that most probably it would be better for each branch, such, for example, as the construction or gunnery branch, to collect information relating to its own peculiar functions, rather than endeavour to lump every description of information in one single department. It is, in short, a purely departmental question, which those acquainted with the internal working of the Admiralty are alone competent to discuss. I do, however, venture to maintain that our huge sea commerce requires a special and distinct Intelligence Department so constituted as to be in a position to ensure that the

1 Vide "Times," February 17, 1871.

Admiralty shall at all times have at its command the fullest and most complete information respecting the positions of our commerce on the sea, and the best possible intelligence relative to all those special matters to which I have referred. Further, I submit that such a department to be really efficient must absorb in itself the active, practical co-operation of the representatives of the great commercial interests to be protected on the sea in war. I may briefly outline my idea as to its constitution evolved by many years' consideration. I should wish to see established a Commercial Intelligence Council. The President to be an Admiral with a seat at the Board of Admiralty, but whose sole time should be devoted to the collection, organization, and digestion of intelligence necessary for the direct defence of sea com-merce; he should have no other duties, for assuredly he would have more than enough to do. The members of the council of which this Admiral would be president, should all be representatives of the greatest shipping and chief export and import interests, and the position and emoluments of these members should be such as to secure the services of those who have the fullest confidence, and the most intimate knowledge of the interests they represent, so that a seat on this council should be deemed to be of importance to the nation and a high honour to the individual. The Admiral would then be in direct communication with the best sources of information, and his naval knowledge and experience would enable him to sift and lay information before the Board of Admiralty in a form available for practical application. There must, however, be subordinate departments in our great colonies, presided over by naval Officers of superior rank, and civilian members chosen on similar principles, for there is nearly 200,000,0001, of British commerce on the sea which finds neither source nor destination in the United Kingdom. These minor councils must work on the same lines as that at headquarters, and supply the Admirals on the station with all information. It may be exclaimed that this would involve expense. My reply is, most certainly; but surely a Power having 100,000,000 l. worth of shipping and 800,000,000 l. worth of goods on the sea in each year, and which freely spends some 6,600 l. a-year on "Military Intelligence," cannot grudge 15,000 l. or 20,000 l. a-year for the purpose of collecting and organizing intelligence necessary for the safety of such wealth. The trade and shipping interest in Parliament is doubtless able to ensure the passing of a vote for the purpose so deeply concerning itself.
But even assuming that these centres of naval intelligence are established, one great question still presents itself for consideration. How is it to be communicated in war to naval commanders stationed perhaps in mid-ocean and merchant ships on passage? It is hardly within the bounds of possibility that we can spare swift vessels to run about the world with no other object but communicating orders and intelligence to fleets, squadrons, and ships. I cannot close without come brief remarks upon this most important branch of my subject. In the first place, it appears to me that in the direct protection of commerce, two main conditions have to be fulfilled: 1st, the protection of the main ocean routes; 2nd, the protection of the water areas

Sketch Map of the Atlantic Ocean

Sketch Map of the Atlantic Ocean

lying between the main ocean routes and the trading seaboards. We have, therefore, in maritime war to provide for three great naval operations, each having special circumstances peculiar to itself: 1st, the blockade of the enemy's coast; 2nd, the securing of the ocean routes of the world; 3rd, coast covering operations off neutral seaboards to provide safety for our commerce on passage between such seaboards and the ocean routes. I must confine my remarks entirely to intelligence on the ocean routes. Reference to the sketch map I have prepared of the Atlantic Ocean very roughly indicates the main routes. I take this water district of the world for example, because it is, as we have seen, the area of greatest accumulation, and, further, because it is in a strategical sense the simplest to deal with. The shaded portions indicate what may be termed the "dead water areas" where they appear in mid-sea, and "coast covering areas" where they have land for one or more boundaries. The unshaded channels represent roughly the sailing waters, the arrow heads indicate the direction of the route, and the circles indicate the junctions of one or more of these routes, the black lines crossing the shaded parts of the Atlantic Ocean are certain steam lines. To shorten and simplify my illustrations so as to save time, I shall only allude now to the southern portion of this sketch. I must, however, remind you that the areas enclosed by these circles must be held secure; that while their strategic value in a geographical sense does not change, the pressure of commerce, so to speak, varies in some cases with the seasons of the year; that there are in this one section of the ocean six circles, and each would require a considerable squadron to provide adequate safety, and that there is over and above all, this one great main route across the North Atlantic with its own special peculiarities and naval needs. I might remark also that the diameters of these circles are not all equal; nor is the value of commerce passing over them the same; nor will the greatest, periodic accumulations of commerce within these areas take place simultaneously; nor will the distribution of the squadrons protecting the areas be uniformly the same, as each has its own peculiarities of physical circumstances. I may call attention in passing to the fact that, as Table V indicates, some hundred millions' worth of our commerce annually passes over that part of the Equator enclosed by the circle on the sketch; in extent it is some 600 miles, and, therefore a 12-knot steamer would take over two days simply to go from one end to the other, a considerable squadron would therefore be required for the adequate protection of this most important position. But, as also shown on the sketch map the great steam track to the Cape crosses the Equator a long way to the east of this circle, and as a general rule on every ocean in proportion to the power and endurance of the steamers employed, so do their routes vary and diverge from the sailing trade, for the more independent are they of these influences which rule the direction of the sailing trade. Now also in proportion to endurance and power are steamers efficient as weapons of war, and unless in war all the great steam lines are compelled to conform as far as possible to the sailing routes, we shall waste force, leave our position weaker than it need be, and debar

naval intelligence from being passed with rapidity and certainty along our lines. It is useless to hold the fixed positions and "strategic areas" of the sea, however securely, unless the intervals between them are efficiently patrolled; it is absolutely necessary to do both, so that a cruiser will be driven to seek the waifs and strays of our commerce in "dead water areas"; where her game will not be worth the candle, or rather the coal, or have to seek her quarry off coasts where she should be dealt with by the coast covering force. Unless the Admiral in command of an ocean fleet is kept constantly informed of the probable dates of accumulations of commerce over the various positions in his district, he must more or less be working in the dark. For example, the weekly average of grain ships due to arrive here from the South Pacific during last August was thirty. It is known in the City what number of vessels and what quantity of food stuffs are on passage and from whence and when these ships are due to arrive at our ports. These South Pacific grain ships would have been due to arrive within the limits of the equatorial circle in July, and a naval commander there might have known even the names of the vessels and all particulars about them six weeks before they came within the limits of his command. More than this, if the great steam lines conform to the sailing routes in war, each steamer would not only bring intelligence from squadron to squadron on the line, but would collect by observation a great deal of information as to the commerce en route, and communicate it to the squadron in passing. No cruizer could appear at any point of the routes without its being thus very soon known even to Admirals hundreds of miles away and in mid-ocean. Now it appears to be assumed that the best of our merchant steamers are to be armed, not for the purpose of continuing to follow their ordinary avocations in defiance of "Alabamas," but for general service here, there, and everywhere, supplementing our regular squadrons or carrying military expeditions. I would, therefore, submit for discussion very brief observation on this matter. To avoid any misapprehension, I must first say my conviction as to arming merchant ships is this,—that the exigencies of maritime war will necessitate our arming not merely a careful selection of the best, but every ocean-going British steamer. We must prepare in peace to give them at home and abroad armaments and trained instructors, on the declaration of war and then bid them follow their avocations and let our enemy's know we mean to carry on our sea trade "in spite of their teeth," under the banner, if you like, of "Defence not Defiance." I see no reason why, for example, the Peninsular and Oriental Comany, with its twenty steamers a fortnight oil the oceans, could not answer for the patrol and intelligence duties on Indian and certain Australian routes without any very serious interference with the ordinary duties of their trade, provided the trained gunnery instructors, guns, fittings, and magazines be forthcoming at once, when wanted at points along the lines. Now, if on the other hand, the best of this Company's steamers are taken off the line in war and attached to the Royal Navy for general service, the gold and silver so constants in its flow as shown on the diagram must be carried in

inferior vessels, less capable of fighting or even running away from an enemy's cruiser, you thereby increase the chance of capture, and every capture will frighten so many merchant ships under a foreign flag. To an Empire unconsolidated for purposes of common defence, maritime war may prove a severe strain; it is largely through colonial subsidies, the vessels employed in the Imperial Mail Service are so efficient, so capable of adaptation as weapons of war. Will their removal off the line in the hour of colonial peril, produce that confidence essential to willing co-operation? As Sir Alexander Gait pointed out the other day, the colonies take more of our manufactures than all Europe; by removing the best of the regular colonial steamers, you force a considerable proportion of some fifty millions worth of exports to the colonies and India, into the holds of the lame ducks of steam companies' fleets, and thus deliberately increase the chances of capture.

I submit such views to the examination of those who think that for general service the Royal Navy can be largely supplemented with the best of our merchant steamers, and, therefore, conclude that the deficiency in strength of the Royal Navy can be made good in a hurry by drafts on the steam mercantile marine. I venture to think that the full gravity of the problem of protection of our commerce is not even faintly realized by the country, and that what its solution involves, is not in the smallest degree understood. It is a matter with which national ignorance likes to fiddle, but which national intelligence apparently fears to face. It would be very desirable that some practical experiment in order to rouse national attention should be tried. We have had manoeuvres to test our readiness for invasion, why not test our readiness to guard the people's food? Such an experiment would cost but little, and might thus be carried out. Take the "Hecla," or hire a merchant steamer, give her a roving commission, such armament as she can carry, and a plentiful supply of red or white paint. Let her put to sea and disappear. Give notice to the Admirals abroad, and allow them ample time to make their arrangements to protect commerce from this pretended hostile cruiser, which, instead of capturing and burning, might be authorized to paint on the side of any British vessel boarded at discretion, either a large C for capture, or B for burnt. Of course, if brought within range of a war ship of superior gun power, the experiment must terminate, as the cruiser's career may be presumed to have finished, but by all means let her go on marking British ships until that happens, even though C's and B's crowd our ports. This experiment would be of more value than a hundred papers such as this to determine the question whether systematic organized naval intelligence is or is not a great national necessity.

Designation of Districts. From and to Foreign Countries in District. From and to British Possessions in District. Total value Imports and Exports grouped in Ocean Districts. Value of Imports. Value of Exports. Value of Imports. Value of Exports. £ £ £ £ £ Northern Seas District ............... 78,420,941 72,082,722 NIL. 1 Nil. 1 150,503,663 N. E. Atlantic " .................. 78,277,323 55,215,551 801,010 2,540,074 136,833,958 N. W. Atlantic " ...................... 93,521,458 31,544,755 17,718,615 9,140,023 151,924,851 South Atlantic " ................... 6,041,890 9,229,204 4,682,409 6,417,921 26,371,424 Indian Seas " ................ 2,040,116 2,449,796 21,681,286 26,429,791 52,600,989 North Pacific " ...................... 17,646,906 9,266,247 1,357,085 3,208,227 31,478,465 South Pacific " ........................ 8,100,603 2,486,116 21,964,440 17,959,705 50,510,864 284,049,237 182,274,391 68,204,845 65,695,741 600,224,214 1 It is to be observed that Heligoland and the Channel Islands are excluded from these Tables, being considered as parts of the United Kingdom.

Table I.— Value of Imports and Exports to and from the United Kingdom only, from and to Seaboards of the World, grouped by Ocean Districts, and for one Year only (1879), also distinguishing Foreign from British Seaboard Commerce in these Districts.

Ocean Districts. From and to District Foreign Ports. From and to District British Ports. Total entered and cleared to all Ports. Tonnage entered and cleared to all Ports. Entered. Cleared. Entered. Cleared. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Northern Sea District. 6,547 2,025 8,262 2,193 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 11,809 4,218 7,275,364 659,931 N. E. Atlantic " 8,342 2,903 10,476 4,266 35 29 538 59 19,391 7,257 8,529,765 1,147,509 N. W. Atlantic " 1,455 1,628 1,174 648 270 1,639 330 1,013 3,229 4,928 5,562,524 2,991,519 South Atlantic " 162 231 220 586 73 67 91 286 546 1,170 712,620 503,785 Indian Sea " 2 52 16 72 235 486 488 648 741 1,258 1,090,282 1,394,647 N. Pacific " 84 210 3 78 1 14 .. 22 88 324 134,162 315,745 S. Pacific " 25 259 24 254 24 300 38 458 111 1,271 234,557 1,087,629 Total....................... 16,617 7,308 20,175 8,097 638 2,535 1,485 2,486 38,915 2 20,426 23,539,274 8,100,765 1 It is to be observed that Heligoland and the Channel Islands are excluded from these Tables, being considered as parts of the United Kingdom. 2 1,444 British vessels passed through Suez Canal.

Table II.— Number of British Vessels Entered to and Cleared from United Kingdom (including repeated Voyages) with Cargoes from and to Seaboards of the World, grouped by Ocean Districts and in one Year only (1879), distinguishing Foreign from British Seaboard Commerce in those Districts, and also Steamers from Sailers; and showing Aggregate Total Tonnage of all.

Ocean Districts. From and to District Foreign Ports. From and to District British Ports. Total entered and cleared to all Ports. Total Aggregate Tonnage entered and cleared to all Ports. Entered. Cleared. Entered. Cleared. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Steam. Sail. Northern Seas Districts 2,526 678 346 335 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 1 .. 2,872 1,013 1,711,827 296,232 N. E. Atlantic " 3,084 1,701 842 599 10 2 2 3 3,938 2,305 1,588,165 388,486 N. W. Atlantic " .. 1 204 711 .. .. 24 443 228 1,155 275,426 870,882 South Atlantic " .. 1 9 7 8 .. 14 3 31 11 53,963 5,163 Indian Seas " .. 1 1 .. 2 .. 7 4 10 5 6,055 4,655 North Pacific " .. .. 7 .. .. .. .. .. 7 .. 3,706 South Pacific " .. .. 4 .. .. .. 6 1 10 1 3,864 714 Total..................... 5,610 2,382 1,413 1,652 20 2 53 454 7,096 4,490 3,643,006 1,566,132 1 It is to be observed that Heligoland and the Channel Islands are excluded from these Tables, being considered as parts of the United Kingdom.

Table III.— Number of British Vessels Entered to and Cleared from the United Kingdom (including repeated Voyages) in Ballast, from and to Seaboards of the World grouped by Ocean Districts, and in one Year only (1879), distinguishing Foreign from British Seaboard Commerce in those Districts, and also Steamers from Sailors; and showing Aggregate Total Tonnage of all.

North Seas. North-west Atlantic. North Pacific. South Pacific. Indian Seas. South Atlantic. North-east Atlantic. Totals. £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ United Kingdom trade (vide Table I) ....... 150,500,000 151,900,000 31,400,000 50,500,000 52,000,000 26,300,000 136,800,000 600,000,000 Indian and Colonial (exclusive of that with United Kingdom) .............. 1,400,000 22,200,000 22,400,000 38,400,000 77,100,000 2,400,000 26,900,000 190,000,000 IMPERIAL VALUE .... 151,900,000 174,100,000 53,800,000 88,900,000 129,700,000 28,700,000 163,700,000 790,000,000

Table IV.— Showing Value of Trade of United Kingdom by Ocean District; also the Value of Indian and Colonial Trade (exclusive of that with United Kingdom); and further the Imperial Value of the Ocean District.

South Pacific. Indian Seas. South Atlantic. North-east Atlantic. £ £ £ £ Imperial value (vide Table IV)........................................................... 88,900,000 129,700,000 28,700,000 163,700,000 From and to North Pacific in transit viâ Horn............................................ 5,000,000 " " " " Cape and Canal........................................................... .. 26,400,000 " South Pacific " " " ........................................................... .. 23,500,000 " North and South Pacific in transit, viâ Horn........................ .. .. 33,500,000 " North and South Pacific and Indian Seas in transit, viâ Cape. ........... .. .. 50,000,000 " " " " Canal...................... .. .. .. 82,600,000 Accumulated values caused by transit between hemispheres.................................. 93,900,000 179,600,000 112,200,000 246,300,000

Table V.— Showing Oceanic Accumulations caused by Movements of Commerce between the Hemispheres during Year 1879.

From North east Atlantic. From North Pacific. From South Pacific. Grand Total Weekly Average Number of Ships. With Wheat. With Maize. With Flour. Total. With Wheat. With Flour. Total. With Wheat. With Flour. With Wool. Total. 1st Quarter of Year................................... 26 30 6 62 154 9 163 66 .. 138 204 429 2nd " ".................................. 42 42 8 92 91 12 103 149 3 156 308 503 3rd " ".................................. 71 78 5 154 41 7 48 123 4 58 185 387 4th " ".................................. 66 66 4 136 81 6 87 85 4 78 167 380 1 For the three years 1878-9-80.

Table VI.— Weekly average 1 Number of Grain and Wool Sailing Ships on Passage to United Kingdom from three Ocean Districts in each Quarter of the Year.