

Love in Religion: A Mystery.

By H. K. Rusden.

[Read before the Free Discussion Society 16th April, 1882.]

"God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life"—[John iii, 16].

"Christ died for the ungodly."—[Romans v, 6].

"Let love be without dissimulation."—[Rom. xii, 9],

"Behold I show you a mystery."—[1 Cor. xi, 51].

Even accepting Christian doctrines as true, there is surely something very anomalous in the fact, or rather statement, that God *so loved* this *wicked* world—so much better than his own *good* son—that not only did he scourge him and put him to grief, but actually caused him to be murdered—for the benefit of the wicked !! Now if God *be* a *good* being, how can he *love* the world, which is said to be so desperately *wicked*, and the sinners in it in particular, and sacrifice for their benefit his own only son—said to be without spot or blemish? Why is it that he *loves* sinners and ruffians exactly ninety-nine times better than virtuous persons? "There is more joy in heaven," Jesus said, "over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance." (Luke xv, 7). One would have thought that such *preference* and *love* of *sinners* instead of good persons would rather have been characteristic of *hell*, and that in *heaven* one righteous man would have been preferred to at least ninety-nine sinners. The moral apprehension of the world, though greatly susceptible of improvement, has certainly made a considerable advance upon that of Jesus, and of Christianity—the religion of sinners. Let us hope that the *next* religion may be one adapted to the requirements and advantage of *good moral* men, rather than of the worst. To love the evil better than the good is not only obviously immoral, but is *possible* only in complete misconception of good and evil, and can produce none but immoral results.

But though this doctrine of divine love was confessedly devised in the particular interest of *sinners*, can it be shown to have resulted in any advantage to *them*? Though God gave his own *good son* for the special benefit of all these *bad sinners* that he loved so much better, yet it appears not to have benefited *them* at all; for they have still to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling just the same as before. In fact they are now much worse off; for they have not only still to save themselves as best they can, but they have the additional difficulty put in their way of having also to believe that Christ has already saved them, though they have still to save themselves. I fail to see any honesty or propriety in *wishing* to be saved from the appropriate consequences of one's own acts. *We could not then learn wisdom*. What we *should* want is justice and fair play as we earn it—which is scarcely to be expected from a God who loves the evil ninety-nine times better than the good, apparently for the exquisite pleasure of torturing them eternally afterwards.

What, then, has this divine love done for *any one here*? Has it, as stated, introduced peace on Earth and good-will to men? Nay ! I tell you—in the words of Jesus—it has brought "not peace, but a sword : "

Mat. x, 34.

had he been a real prophet, he might have added—the flames of Smithfield, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the tortures of the Inquisition. Christianity is remarkable for having, even more than any other religion, aroused what the prince of historians calls "the exquisite rancour of theological hatred."

Gibbon's "Decline and Fall," Vol. II, 438.

How is it, then, that *love* has been put forward as the leading feature of Christianity, unless to take away our breath at starting with a monstrous *camel*, so that every other absurd doctrine may be afterwards swallowed whole, and with ease, as a mere insignificant gnat? What love, what respect, what feeling but of radical antipathy can possibly subsist between the creator of a hell and those for whose torture he created it? Or between moral beings and one who loves the wicked ninety-nine times better than the good? Why is the word *love* used in such a connection at all, when the word HATE would evidently be so much more appropriate? The man most like the Christian God is, in my mind, Frederick the Great, who once, it is said, had a man flogged for saying he deeply respected His Majesty. "But I want you to love me, you rascal," exclaimed Frederick, "and I'll make you!" So he ordered him fifty lashes to compel him to love him!!!

There can be nothing more immoral or absurd than the teaching of Jesus on the subject. He says, in nearly the same words, In Mat. v, 43-4, and Luke vi, 35, "Ye have heard that it hath been said thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you." And in Luke xiv, 25-6, we read,— "And he turned—(yes, he *turned*)—and said unto them, 'If any man come unto me and *hate* not his father and mother, and wife and children, and brothers and sisters,—yea and his own life also, *he cannot be my*

disciple." Thus you are to *love your enemies* and *hate your friends and relations!!!* Could any teaching be more outrageously immoral and absurd? Whence came such contradictory and incongruous nonsense?

"Behold I show you a mystery."

The word LOVE originally meant—and still mainly means—SEXUAL FEELING; and its use now in religion is altogether extravagant and illegitimate, not to say hypocritical. It was at first, and is still, so used,—not because it represents a truth, as we have seen that it does not, but because it appeals most powerfully to human sensual sympathies, and was—and is, therefore—the most efficient engine of priestcraft. Of course the love of God is now represented as of that less passionate description which is known as filial, or parental rather than sexual; though the terms used to describe it are frequently as extravagant as if it were sexual. And the fact is that there is less justification for the former than the latter; for the sexual feeling had far more than the æsthetic faculty to do with the origin of religion, and was the main basis of it for thousands of years before the invention of the doctrines of a future state of existence, or even of a personal God. And this was not unnatural. The fact of facts which attracts and engrosses the attention of philosophers today, almost as much as it did in the childhood of the world is *the reproduction of organic beings*. The generative power in Nature has excited the wonder of philosophers, as well as of the superstitious, in all ages; and it is not very surprising that its instrument should have formed the first object of worship, or that the cunning should—as its priests—have traded upon the ignorance of their neighbours. In all ancient mythologies this was a universal and prominent feature—to an extent which it is scarcely compatible with modern ideas of decency even to mention. Rites and ceremonies now regarded as too obscene for description, but which are not without mention in the Bible,

1 Kings xv, 12. 2 Kings xxiii, 7, &c.

were certainly public and compulsory in Egypt and Syria, and probably everywhere else. It is to such *religious sacraments* that allusion is made in Genesis vi, 2-4, where it is stated that "when the sons of God"—which *really means* the *priestly caste*—"saw the daughters of men that they were fair, they took them wives of all which they chose. There were giants in the Earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of God"—(*the priests*)—"came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown," For reviving similar *mysteries* long afterwards in Rome, the worship of Isis, which had been there introduced from Egypt, was prohibited. Hence originated the numerous stories of heroes divinely born of virgins ages before the similar birth of Jesus; and hence naturally arose ACCIDENTS like that *for which Joseph was minded to put away his wife privily*. These were anything but idle fables. They had everything to do with the origin of religion, and particularly with that of the doctrine of divine love. There is much of this in the Bible which I cannot even quote, for the same reasons that make it so difficult now-a-days to follow this clue, and discover that for which there is yet ample evidence, but which it is next to impossible to publish outside a Free Discussion Society.

Religion, as ancient historians confess, was *originally invented* as a means whereby the few who then held a monopoly of knowledge—the *then priestly caste*—might control and govern the ignorant masses. It is also certain and admitted that religion for ages consisted of a system of double doctrine—the esoteric,—which was the secret or sacred doctrine and knowledge held by, and taught exclusively to, the initiated in their mysteries; and the exoteric, which was thought safe and proper to be, and was, taught to the people. The esoteric secret doctrine it was made heinously criminal to reveal to the uninitiated; and thus not only was the esoteric knowledge, which was power indeed, preserved as a priestly privilege and monopoly, but thus also has this come to be now only with great difficulty ascertained. Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, Plutarch, and many other ancient authors mention the fact, and tantalise us by frequently touching upon forbidden subjects, but stop short, adding that it is not permitted to reveal more. Upon the best authorities, we know that the severest penalties were threatened and executed upon any of the initiated who divulged the secret doctrine, and upon any of the uninitiated who attempted to learn it. This seems to me obviously the true key to the story of the Garden of Eden, in which knowledge was absolutely prohibited, and those who presumed to divulge and to learn it were both eternally cursed. The plural Elohim—mistranslated as the singular Lord God (who had not then been invented) means the *PRIESTLY CASTE*; and all the absurdity in the 22nd verse of Gen. III thus vanishes. It was *the priests*—not the Lord God—who said, "Behold the man has become as *one of us*, to know good and evil, and now, lest he" get more, let us degrade him to the servile class for ever. Had he gone a little further, and taken an apple off another tree, death would have been the inevitable penalty.

There is no room to doubt that an ancient people subsisted, *pre-historically*, who had made considerable progress in arts and sciences, of which its rulers—a *priestly caste*,—carefully maintained a strict monopoly. The site of their power is known to have been somewhere between the 40th and 50th degrees of north latitude.

See Sir Wm. Drummond's works; Godfrey Higgins' "Anacalypsis"; Bailly's "Astronomic Ancienne"; Proctor's "Saturn and his System" (appendix).

It was there that they used the lost parent language, from which most European languages, including Greek and Latin, and, of course, English, &c., were derived, in common with the scientifically constructed but now

obsolete language—the ancient Sanscrit, the recent study of which has thrown a flood of light upon this subject. The power of this ancient people was apparently destroyed by some means in pre-historic times. Its name, language, and precise location are alike unknown. The approximate date of the collapse of its power, and of the migration of its probably lineal descendants (the Brahmans) thence to India—where alone is maintained to this day its identical system of Caste—is reckoned by Bunsen at some six to eight thousands of years ago, which is most likely a considerable under-estimate. We know that this people existed. We know, philologically, that "there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone forth through all the Earth, and their words to the end of the world."—(Psalm xix, 3). We know astronomically that the oldest observations preserved in India of rising and setting stars are calculated for a high latitude, and indicate, so far, their location as about latitude 50°.

See Bailly's "Astronomic Ancienne," and "Astronomic Indienne;" and Proctor's "Saturn and his System" (appendix).

We may discern also that many of our customs and conventional ideas can, from their persistence and strength their peculiar nature, and even their unreasonableness, have had their origin only, in the very remote past, in such a parentage.

The religion of this ancient people—judging from the rigid persistence, and almost universality, of some special modes of thought and action which they have bequeathed to us, and which still prevail among us, though utterly incongruous with the later acquisitions and present tendencies of the human intellect, must have been the original parent of nearly all other existing religions. It is known to scholars as the obsolete *Phallic worship*, the relics of which abound, recognised or unrecognised, throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and even in America, although the worship itself has long been superseded. But in India we find still subsisting the veritable esoteric Phallic worship itself—surviving as Lingam worship—among those Brahmans who brought it with them from Upper Asia many thousands of years before the date of the Christian and Jewish alleged Creation;—the Brahmans being, there is thus reason to believe, the direct descendants of the governing class of the old Phallists. Their religion was based entirely upon sexuality. Its representative emblem was also the actual object of worship, as it is—as the Lingam—in India to-day; and by means of a system erected upon this basis they appear to have tyrannised over their ignorant slaves to an almost incredible degree,—probably so much as at last to provoke their own destruction. Their method consisted of *exoteric* imposition of arbitrary restrictions upon sexual commerce, and the enforcement of them to an extent which is now scarcely comprehensible. Although the system has been more or less transformed or disguised in Europe for many thousands of years, the relics are visible at every step. Gigantic Phallic emblems used to be placed singly or in pairs, upright at the doors of the temples; and this is the real origin of all our church towers and steeples,

See Dulaure "Histoire abrégée de differens Cultes," vol. 2, page 84, and R. Payae Knight's "Worship of Priapus," and "Symbolical language in Ancient Art and Mythology," page 172.

and of the curious unsymmetrical position that they frequently occupy, which has, I believe, no other explanation. The cross itself was a Phallic emblem ages before Christianity. Thus some of the most prominent ornaments of our city are really genuine Phallic emblems. This is scarcely surprising when it is known how the whole Bible teems with Phallic legends. The manorial right of *cuisseage*, which survived to the fourteenth century, was a survival of Phallism, though it had relaxed into mere mercenary extortion.

I have already pointed out that the story of Eden is one descriptive of punishments for intrusions upon the sacred mysteries. That the first effect of the acquisition of knowledge by Adam and Eve should be the perception of *their own nakedness* is very peculiar and *unaccountable* unless as a direct Phallic allusion. There is no room to doubt that many of our other conventional notions of decency are not only entirely artificial, but arose in Phallism alone. The strength of a prejudice is an infallible symptom of its age. Children are at first quite unconscious of any feelings of this sort, though they soon acquire them with facility. Such a feeling, therefore, is not original at all, but learned; and the strict method of Phallism—of enforced early exoteric instruction—was obviously the most certain to create the public opinion in which their power, as that of a small minority—lay, and the best fitted to hand down what they taught to a distant posterity. Would those who are now so unnaturally shocked at the sight of a nude human form be as confident in upholding their prejudices as moral if they knew that they were but mechanically conforming to a tyrannical exoteric precept of obscene Phallism, as they would call it?

Phallism existed solely by *exoterically* prohibiting—or licensing—to the uninitiated what was *esoterically* the sacred monopoly of the privileged caste. What was kept SECRET became sacred; and "sacred" has meant ever since, simply, *protected from, free criticism*. Many of our conventional notions on the subjects of modesty and chastity are indisputably due to the same source, and even the rapid growth of the principle of individual liberty has as yet done little towards breaking down ancient Phallic exoteric prohibitions, though their effects are beginning to be seen to be both immoral and pernicious. What was strictly forbidden exoterically to the people was sacred and legal within the temples to the initiated. The general prostitution in the Phallic temples

of Babylon, Syria, and Egypt, and the worse practices at Jerusalem and elsewhere—for which we have the testimony of the Bible—(1 Kings xv, 12, and 2 Kings xxiii, 7, &c.),—were there honorable and holy, as at this day in India. The deep degradation of European civilisation in its PROSTITUTION is the exoteric brand originally imposed for the profit of the Phallic temples. It is *my deliberate opinion that, until the subject is understood in this light, nothing effectual can be done towards the removal of this putrid sore of modern society, which I nevertheless believe to be quite preventible*—HENCE THIS PAPER. Our practice is even more demoralising than that of Phallism or Brahmanism. For the essence of immorality consists in doing what is admitted and felt to be wrong and evil. "There is NOTHING unclean of *itself*; but to him that *esteemeth* anything to be unclean, *to him it is unclean.*" (Rom. xiv. 14). The consistent recognition of this principle is essential to the successful treatment of this subject.

Now the Christian Church has been the principal means of exaggerating and intensifying the evil of the legacy left us by the old Phallic priesthood, and is to-day the great obstacle to all improvement. It is itself a natural offspring of Phallism, and of the worst part of it—its ignorant exoteric side. It maintains many of its tyrannical prohibitions against freedom of individual action, and blindly condemns altogether what Phallism condemned only exoterically. It has not only perpetuated but actually *sanctified* a prostitution of a far more degraded type (because esteemed to be unclean, and therefore—to it—actually unclean) than even that of Phallism and Brahmanism, which was not esteemed to be—and therefore was not—unclean. By its contradictory introduction of love into its theology it has added insult to injury, and has furnished a bitter satire upon good intentions generally, which Paul seems almost to have had in view when he wrote, "Let love be without dissimulation." The men who did this evil thing doubtless meant well, like the old Phallists. It is the results of the system that I condemn and proceed to expose.

Phallism was the origin and parent of nearly all known religions. It probably began in wonder at the mysterious phenomena of organic reproduction. Able and energetic men arose far superior to the herd of ignorant slaves and half animals by whom they were surrounded, whom they found it impossible to enlighten, but whom it was necessary to govern. They found that the sexual instinct was a means by which they could most effectually control the stupid masses, and—doubtless with the best intentions—they traded upon it,—probably for the good of all. They did so by enforcing a strict monopoly of the superior knowledge which they possessed and assiduously cultivated. They governed the people—probably well at first, for they brought them through a long period when progress must have been most difficult. But in doing so they inevitably organised and firmly established a *priestly caste*, and then naturally followed abuse of the enormous power they wielded. Then, after long ages of tyranny, the people, goaded to desperation, and probably assisted by traitors among their governors, rose in their numerical might, and destroyed not only the power—but also the civilisation and culture of their oppressors. These had certainly lasted for ages; for a system which has left such enduring vestiges behind it *must* have prevailed for many thousands of years. When afterwards the Phallic power was annihilated, some remnants of the ruling caste migrated to India and established themselves there; while their exoteric doctrines overspread the nations of Europe, which adopted as real religion—being unable to divest themselves of—the fictions that had been taught them. Doubtless a few of the priestly class were also dispersed through Europe, and made the most of their superior knowledge as priests and hierophants. The mythologies and traditions of which we have the earliest historical intelligence were the result of several thousands of years of confusion of conflicting systems; but all had a common phallic source, and preserved the leading characteristics of Phallism. These were, first—a *dominant priestly class*, who maintained (and of course abused) the monopoly—as far as possible—of knowledge; secondly, the practice of *sacrifice*, which originally was provably nothing but contributions exacted from the uninitiated by the priests—first in their own behalf, but afterwards in the name of Gods; and thirdly, together with the worship of a host of personified local deities, that of the *supreme generative power of Nature* generally identified with the Sun, as the obvious periodical regenerator of life. In many places Phallism itself survived for some thousands of years, and even into historical time. We have distinct accounts of it at Babylon, in Syria, and in Egypt. The worship of Isis and Osiris was entirely Phallic, and so was that of Mylitta, Atys, Adonis, Demeter, and Bacchus. At Byblos Venus was at first adored under the form of a plain round black pillar—a true phallus; but eventually the worship of personal deities superseded that of the phallus itself. Through pre-historic ages the Phallus had been adored at Mecca, and Mahometanism was an unconscious attempt to restore the primal worship of the Great Original generative power in a personal form. The subordinate deities were abolished as idolatrous, but the sacred white and black stones which the faithful Hadjis now kiss in the holy Caaba at Mecca are really the old Phallus and Cteis themselves. The worship of Priapus, which was nearly identical with Phallism, was common—later—not only at Rome, but through the greater part of Europe; and the emblems are to be seen by any one to-day in the exhumed cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, although elsewhere they have been generally removed on grounds of decency. Up to the middle of the last century it was customary in some Italian churches, till attention was called to the fact by visitors, for pious women to make votive offerings of waxen phallic

emblems, of which a full description is given by Payne Knight in his work on the worship of Priapus. Similar Phallic emblems, but said to be made of gold, were, you will remember, placed by the Philistines in a coffer by the Ark of God at Ekron, according to the 6th chapter of the 1st Book of Samuel, which is essentially a phallic legend like all the early Jewish books. The then Jewish God—who, as a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night, was plainly the Phallus itself—was evidently pleased with those phallic offerings, and accepted them, though he slaughtered 50,070 Jews because some one looked into the ark. The Jews are clearly proved by their own books to have been Phallists from the beginning up to the time of the captivity, when the books (so-called) of Moses were first produced, and Jehovah, as a great original generator or phallus, the *pillar* of cloud by day and of fire by night, was promoted over the local phalli or wooden ashera—mistranslated *groves* in the Bible to disguise the fact. These ashera or genuine phalli were set up *in the temple* itself, and the women wove hangings for them in the phallic houses that were by the temple.

2 Kings xxiii, 7.

The phallism is unmistakable through the books of Samuel

1 Sam. vi.

and Kings

1 Kings xiv, 24; xv, 12.

and Ezekiel

Ezekiel xvi, 16-17.

also. Circumcision was obviously a phallic rite, and the asserted conception and birth of Jesus—may not improperly be called—a *phallic wrong*.

The idea of a future life appears, according to Diodorus Siculus, to have arisen in Egypt, and to have spread thence almost within historical time. The doctrine of love is of course phallic in origin, but the æsthetic or spiritualised form of it, adopted by Plato first and afterwards by Christian enthusiasts, was evidently only one feature among others derived from Buddhism, which has a superior title to be called the Religion of Love, as it is without the incongruities and many of the extravagances that disfigure and stultify Christian theology. Buddha's affection was really that of a good man for men, and pity for their besotted ignorant miserable condition. I know nothing phallic about Buddhism. To assert the subsistence of anything of the nature of love between an almighty good deity and bad men is to ignore the moral attainments of man and court solecism on every hand. Christianity preserves more of Phallism than *Buddhism*, and deserves rather to be called the religion of *hate*, whether as exhibited in the alleged relations of the Deity and his creatures, or in the conduct of its votaries to each other.

Both inductively from history and deductively from doctrine it thus appears, then, that *love* is entirely out of place in religion, and has been improperly associated with it—either "with dissimulation" or in utter ignorance of its origin and effect. Yet there can be no doubt that there is an intimate connection between the religious sentiment and sexuality, whether it originated in Phallism or not. No religion was ever initiated without some attempt to innovate upon or qualify the relations of the sexes. The Nunawading prophets and the Wroeties here, the Shakers, Spiritualists, and Perfectionists in America, the Muckers in Germany, and the Saints of the Agapemone in England, all illustrate this observation in various ways. The larger sects (Buddhism alone excepted) equally corroborate it and prove a connection between the phenomena. Mahometanism and Mormonism were both revolts—the former against ancient, and the latter against modern, monogamy as the expression of exoteric Phallic prohibition. The Great Protestant Reformation was simply the culmination of the persistent struggle—during more than 1,000 years—between the Christian Church on the one hand and the Clergy and Laity on the other; the Church insisting upon clerical celibacy (which meant general prostitution), and the Clergy and people fighting for clerical marriage. History bears witness that the Christian Church maintained this struggle, not to enforce the ascetical principles upon which celibacy was first ostensibly introduced, but with a *purely mercenary object*; for it tolerated and encouraged illegitimate sexual connections of the Clergy, so long as they did not marry; while the Clergy, to their credit be it said, and the Laity also (for obvious reasons), contended for clerical marriage to obviate the necessity for illicit connections. The mercenary object of the Church was this: From the early part of the 4th century married priests almost always misappropriated for their families and themselves the revenues of the Church, and so detracted from its wealth and power."

Lea's "History of Sacerdotal Celibacy," pp. 148-9, 324, 342-8, 396, and 401.

The interest of celibate clergy centred in the Church, and they could excuse themselves to their lay charges in the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. ix, 11). "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we shall reap your carnal things." To such an extent did they reap them that the monasteries and convents had become, in the fifteenth century, huge brothels; that in some places the children of the Clergy are known to have outnumbered those of the lay population

Ib. p. 349.

; that some bishops were known to have from 60 to 70 natural children, while others kept as many concubines
pp. 322, 349.

; that the priests, until the 16th century, customarily paid a regular license called "*cullagium*" to keep
concubines, whether they did so or not;

(n) pp 271, 389, 422, 423.

and that there are numerous historical proofs that it was a usual thing throughout Europe for the parishioners of
a new pastor to assemble and insist, for the protection of their wives and daughters, upon his taking a concubine
forth with.

pp. 324, 855, 386.

It was for such irregularities that indulgences were openly sold *by the Church*, until the people could stand it no
longer, and the Reformation ensued—not, as pretended, to vindicate freedom of religious opinion, but to secure
protection from the wholesale prostitution of the women of Europe by the Christian priesthood,

The Emperors Maximilian and Ferdinand represented this fact to the Pope and begged him to remedy
it.—[See Lea, p. 457-61.]

The Church, to get temporal wealth and power, had actually converted Europe into a sacred brothel as
completely as if every chapel or convent had been a Phallic temple, and these facts constitute the only real title
of the Christian Church to be called the Religion of Love! This is the way that the Clergy used to keep up—as
the Bishop says—the *morals of the people!!!* Public opinion compels secrecy in such matters now, but it is
impossible to doubt that the same rule prevails.

This is not, however, all that the Christian Church has done to saturate European Society with sanctified
prostitution. Its perpetuation of the Phallic Institution of marriage as an ecclesiastical ceremony, and, as an
indissoluble contract, has contributed largely to the same result, and the Protestants are therefore, of course, so
far implicated, as much as the Roman Church. This evil is culminating in England, and a social revolution to
remedy it is but a question of time. For the excess of the number of women is nearly 4 millions now, and is
rapidly increasing; while, maugre the augmenting population, the number of marriages is steadily and not
slowly diminishing. This is the work of the *religion of love!!* Marriage is too often miserably unhappy, and
must remain so while legally *indissoluble*. Inducement is thus offered to *misbehaviour*. Marriage should
last—like any rational contract of association—*solely during good behaviour*, for which a reason would then
exist; and the contract should be at once dissoluble *without expense*—at the desire of either party to it. The
evident tendency of modern opinion, and even legislation towards increasing the liberty of individuals, and the
steady though slow decline of religion, afford some prospect of progress in the direction of rational morality in
this respect. The obstinacy, however, of prejudices derived from sources so ancient as Phallism is necessarily
enormous, and is the principal cause of the delay. Our Phallic inheritance appears also in the conventional
objection to modern Malthusianism; the sole feasible defence against poverty. Good things come, and bad
things go; but very slowly.

To summarise. The doctrine of love in Religion, and in Christianity in particular, is not only a contradictory
absurdity, but also a cruel insult to those who are treated as if they were hated. It is a direct though
unrecognized relic of obscene phallism, which is really also the basis of all our religions (except Buddhism),
and of most of the errors in our notions of Morality; such as *sanctity*,— meaning—protection from criticism;
modesty and decency,—which mean simply—hypocrisy, for *they veil no foulness that they do not create*; also
chastity—which is really public tyranny in strictly private matters, and respecting which public opinion is
notoriously one-sided and divided. Its unequal application stamps it as an error, and its evil physical results,
together with its social product—*Prostitution*— demonstrate it to be a monstrous evil. All these have their
bases, not in utility but solely in ancient Phallic exoteric tyranny, and should be fearlessly examined and
treated. The Christian Church has—for mercenary objects— perpetuated the foulness of phallism under the
cloak of ascetic and æsthetic piety. A strictly rational morality is possible solely by understanding the whole
subject of prostitution in its origin and history, as I have endeavoured to trace them under obvious difficulties. I
have taken much pains to acquire this information—of which I have given you only the heads—respecting the
causes of prostitution; with the view of cleansing our society from the foul stain upon our vaunted morality.
There is no other way.

I hold that one who is not prepared to trust and follow his intellectual judgment, wheresoever it may lead, is
unworthy of its possession. In asking you to discuss my conclusions, I hope for free criticism to test them in
every possible way. I cannot expect you to apprehend my position perfectly from such a short and inadequate
account of it, but if I stimulate enquiry into the matter, I scarcely look for more at present. That will be a great
step gained; for the problem appears to have been generally given up as hopeless. And remember that "*There is
nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean.*"

[My principal authorities are, Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, Plutarch, the Bible, Wilkinson's "Ancient
Egyptians," Bailly's "Astronomie Ancienne" and "Astronomic Indienne," Higgins' "Celtic Druids" and

"Anacalypsis," Sir Wm. Drummond's "(Edipus Judaicus," Dupuis' "Origines de tous les Cultes," Dulaure's "Histoire abregee de differens Cultes," R. Payne Knight's "Worship of Priapus" and "Symbolical Language of Ancient Art and Mythology," Dr. Inman's "Ancient Faiths embodied in Ancient Names" and "Ancient Faiths and Modern," Colonel Kennedy's and Coleman's works on "Hindoo Mythology," "The Dabistan," Sale's "Koran," and—an invaluable book—H. C. Lea's "History of Sacerdotal Celibacy."—H.K.R.]

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Piety and Pilfering.

By H. K. Rusden.

[Read and Debated at the Free Discussion Society's Meeting on Sunday, 4th Dec., 1881.]

[Matthew xxi (1). Then sent Jesus two disciples. (2). Saying unto them, Go ye into the village over against you and straightway ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her. Loose them and bring them unto me. (8). And if any man say aught unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them; and straightway he will send them.]

In all the strictures upon the recent ease of Thorpe, the bank robber, I have been much disappointed at finding a complete lack of apprehension of the real causes of his conduct. 1st. Some wonder how a person of such pious principles could possibly be guilty of theft or embezzlement. 2nd. Some say that the holding—conscientiously or otherwise—of such principles greatly aggravates the turpitude of his offence. 3rd. Others seem to think that a person of so much piety could scarcely do wrong; and therefore that some one else must be to blame. I have thought it right to improve the occasion by examining and asking you to discuss these different views, and to ascertain if there is not another theory more accordant with the facts, and with our fundamental notions of right and wrong.

That there is a radical confusion of thought in all these aspects of the matter must be apparent; and the fundamental fallacy in all of them, I shall have, I think, little difficulty in showing, is the unwarrantable assumption of the identity of moral and religious principles. I shall show their accurate antagonism; that moral principles are essentially irreligious, and religious principles immoral. I shall support my position by a brief analysis of those principles, by citations from the Bible as the standard of the current religions, and by appeals to experience and your natural common sense.

Now it is plain that religion concerns our relations with a supposed God; morality concerns our relations with our neighbours—with Society,—two particularly different things. It may be urged that it does not thence necessarily follow that religious and moral interests do not coincide. I undertake to show their radical antagonism. I am aware that not a few advocate religion simply on account of the support that they *assume* that it gives to morality. That is the main reason why they advocate religion. But they are deceived by the fact that religious teachers have always professed to teach moral laws. But if they did so, that was simply to serve their own purposes. What they really wanted was to promulgate certain religious theories of their own. They may have had moral ends in view. I do not accuse them all of hypocrisy. But being ignorant that they actually confused and weakened morals by connecting them with any speculative religious notions, they probably thought they were doing good when they were doing immense harm. They felt in any case that no one would listen to them unless they professed to teach morality; for all good men desire to promote morality. Therefore they adopted the current morality and incorporated it with their own theoretical views; sometimes proposing as improvements whatever advancing public opinion demanded; generally some innovation upon the relations of the sexes. This is how these two incongruous things became mixed. Bentham and Grote, however, in their masterly analysis of the Influence of Religion, have clearly demonstrated the impropriety and mischief of the alliance, and the absolute failure of the religious sanction to affect morals;—which are swayed entirely by—and are really only the expression of—public opinion. Of course religion and public opinion sometimes coincide; and THEN, without trying them separately, it is obviously impossible to distinguish the real effective cause of action. But when opposite conduct is sanctioned by religion and by public opinion, it is clearly the latter, and not the former, by which action is determined. Fornication, duelling, simony, and swearing are decisive instances in which religion, which positively forbids them, is entirely disregarded, and prove that public opinion alone rules practice.

Morality is for the good of Society; and those who love Society and the world promote it as much as they can. Religion is for the glory and benefit of God, who is glorified by the sufferings of the damned in hell, and their crimes on Earth, as much as by the joys of the blest elsewhere. No one has expressed more strongly than Jesus the necessity for hating the world and everything in it, if you would be his disciple. (Luke xiv. 20.) You cannot serve God—and Mammon, which is the good of the world, (Matthew vi, 24; Luke xvi, 13.) If any man love the world, the love of the father is not in him. (1 John ii, 15). Religion insists that you should love God *first* and entirely; and man,—*if at all*, secondarily and less. I say —*if at all*, because if Jesus sometimes said that

you should love your neighbour and your enemies,—he also said that unless you hate your father, mother, sister, and brother, you cannot be his disciple. (Luke xiv, 26). And his indiscriminate injunction to love your neighbour is as immoral as that to love God best. (Matthew xxii, 7-9; Mark xii, 30-1; Luke x, 27-8.) Morality demands, on the contrary, that you should always discriminate, and *love those only* who are *worthy* of love, irrespective of personal relationship. God may be no respecter of persons (Acts x, 34), and treat the just and the unjust exactly alike, as Jesus therefore, enjoins his disciples to do;

Matt. V, 45.

but if so, God is certainly not a moral being, and should be neither loved nor respected by moral beings. Morality, however, consists in accurately distinguishing good from evil on every occasion, and in marking our estimation of each as pronouncedly as possible. Jesus, to his eternal disgrace, openly preferred—not 99 sinners to 1 righteous man—which would have been bad enough,—but 1 sinner to 99 righteous men who need no repentance. (Luke xv, 7.) Morality would, on the contrary, prefer 1 righteous man to 99—and even 999—criminals. Nothing could be more immoral than these principles of Christianity. Moral government of course demands that the retributive consequences of good or evil acts should be (as they are) accurately appropriate—present—immediate—inevitable—and intelligible to moral reasoning beings. That they are so is a natural fact that the world is only just beginning to understand, though it has always instinctively acted upon that principle more or less, even while professing the opposite religious doctrine. Jesus evidently concluded that such is not the case, He even said that God treats bad and good alike here; that is, he lets them alone to work their good or evil will, without interfering in any way.

Matt XXX, 30

He makes his Sun to rise upon the evil and the good alike, and he sends his rain upon the unjust as much as upon the just. (Mat. v, 45). He lets the wheat and the tares grow together until the final harvest, which Jesus certainly never dreamed would be 1800 years in coming. (Mark xii, 30; Luke xxi, 32). The idea of the moral government of this world by (rod never entered into Jesus's conceptions. When it was suggested to him he contradicted it flatly. "No!" he said. "Suppose ye that those Galileans—(whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices)—were sinners above all the Galileans because they suffered such things? I tell you nay; but except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish. Or those eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you nay—but except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish." (Luke xiii, 1-5). Not by the fall of a tower on them by accident here, but in some final compensation in another world, which has not come yet and never will. Now this is not moral government at all of this world,—not at any rate such as would benefit this world and make Society better; nor such as any rational being could understand. But no inventor or proclaimer of any religion ever rose to the apprehension of the actual—natural—moral government of the world, or he would not have ignored and endeavoured to supersede it by a system which abandons all hope of improvement here, and reserves all compensation for a final adjustment; when punishment—having no admonitory or prospective value, would be indistinguishable from malicious revenge; and reward—of whatsoever it might ultimately consist, would be so distant, obscure, and uncertain, as to be powerless to compete here with present urgent temptation. We know well that moral conduct here infallibly secures an ample, exactly appropriate, immediate, certain, and intellectually discernible reward, and that immoral conduct is simply self-destructive. But this truth was indiscernible in the time of Jesus, or at any rate by him. Its apprehension is a modern intellectual achievement, proving great moral as well as logical advance. Can we avoid suspecting that it was much delayed by the promulgation of such false doctrines as those of "Repentance" and the "Forgiveness of Sins,"? which, by implying that the consequences of bad acts might be thereby evaded, were directly calculated to impede its conception. Jesus could not have known that Nature never forgives; that natural penalties for disregard of its teaching are amply moral; being certain, inevitable, and intellectually discernible. He would not have otherwise taught the accurate opposite, that the moral administration of the world is perfectly indiscriminate, or that repentance would secure forgiveness of sin, and forgiveness save from natural consequences. It is moral to love the world and the good people in it, and to avoid and condemn sinners; though immoral to damn any one finally, which would benefit nobody. It was immoral to say—"Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the father is not in him." (1 John ii, 15). Jesus inculcated the exalted love of God above all (Mat. xxii, 37-8; Mark xii, 29-30; Luke x, 27-8), and said that no one could be his disciple except he hate his father, mother, wife, children, brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also. (Luke xiv, 26). Now we are compelled to say that a man who would do this—love his enemies and hate his friends,—though it were to follow Jesus, would be vilely immoral. We know that the men who have done most good to humanity, like Harvey, Jenner, Stephenson, Priestly, Newton, Watt, Faraday, &c., were moral just so far as they loved the world and the things connected with it; and that had they been engrossed with their religion and heavenly interests, they could not have benefited the world as they did. On the contrary, those who have busied themselves most with God's business—and religion, like the Spanish Inquisitors and all religious

persecutors,—have been the greatest scourges to humanity. "No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." (Mat. vii. 24).

Having so far marked the broad distinction between moral and religious principles, let us consider whether it is reasonable to wonder that a person of such pious principles as the bank robber Thorpe could be guilty of theft or embezzlement. I affirm, on the contrary, that it is just such persons that do such things; and the proposition is an induction from experience. In the last 25 years in Melbourne there has scarcely been one bank defaulter out of a considerable number who has not been a Sunday School teacher, or an elder, or a preacher, or a particularly religious person. Some will argue that Thorpe's conduct proves him a hypocrite, and that had he acted up to his professions, he would not have swindled. Well, I say by their fruits ye shall know them, Thorpe was a long time before he was found out, and it is only a question of time and temptation till all like professors shall be found out, too. There is no ground for charging Thorpe with hypocrisy. The charge is made—not from the facts—which go to disprove it,—but in defence of the principles of those who make it, and have not yet been—like him—found out. It is quite as legitimate a deduction that all who hold the same principles are equally hypocrites. But Christianity itself repudiates and invalidates this defence of it. It professes to be the religion of sinners and to be specially adapted and competent to turn the hearts of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just. Christ said he came to call—not the righteous—but sinners, to repentance. If therefore the greatest sinners, with whatsoever motives, subject themselves so fully to its influence, and are afterwards immoral, it proves either that Christianity fails in its professions, and is inefficacious under favorable circumstances, or else that the immoral results are due to its influence.

But I shall now show deductively that the results in Thorpe's case were just what should have been expected from his principles. He was a Bible reader, and almost all the characters held up to special admiration in the Bible were liars and swindlers, and the only men whom it represents as exhibiting good moral feeling are condemned. The whole tenor of the Bible is the same. Adam and Eve were prohibited the knowledge of good and evil—moral knowledge, and for getting it were punished. Abraham is specially praised for his readiness to cut his son's throat in servility to his barbarous superstition. Jacob was approved and rewarded by God for deliberately swindling his own brother out of his birthright. David, though loss of a coward, was still more immoral, and yet is called the man after God's own heart. Esau and Saul, whose only faults were apparently good nature and liberality, are the best characters mentioned in the whole of the Old Testament, and yet for their very virtues they suffered punishment. The most respectable of all the prophets was Jonah, who objected to be obliged to go and prophesy lies, and was punished accordingly. Jeremiah himself says, "A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land. The prophets prophesy falsely and the priests bear rule by their means." (Jer. v, 30-1). Moses deserves some credit for propounding a system of worldly instead of posthumous rewards and punishments; but, judging by the record, his narrow-minded application of the principle more than balanced any good in his pretended adoption of it. He has the doubtful credit of promulgating the decalogue, but he is stated on the same authority to have violated, and instructed the Jews to violate, nearly every one of the laws composing it which had any moral bearing. The occupation at his bidding by the Jews of the land of the Canaanites was in direct defiance of every moral law—even of those given by himself. The circumstances under which they left Egypt wore infamous; and even Moses seems to have been ashamed of the spoiling of the Egyptians under false pretences, for he takes care to fix the responsibility upon the Lord by alleging repeated particular instructions to "speak in the ears of the people, and let every man *borrow* of his neighbour, and every woman of her neighbour, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment. And ye shall put them upon your sons and upon your daughters, and ye shall spoil the Egyptians. And the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians, so that, they lent unto them such things as they would." (Ex. iii, 23, xi, 2-3, xii, 35-G). A grosser fraud was never perpetrated. But having the sanction of religion, it in any case offers an effective example to the pious of all ages, which they are only too ready to follow. I should scarcely be surprised if some one here to-night were to be demoralised and pious enough to defend or excuse it.

David, the man after God's own heart, was as great a swindler as Jacob or Moses, if not worse, and, like them, was encouraged and protected by God. When, to avoid Saul, David fled to Achish, King of Gath, who had given him Ziklag for a residence, "he invaded the Amalekites, (Achish's subjects) and smote the land, and left neither man nor woman alive, and took away the sheep and the oxen, and the asses, and the camels, and the apparel, and returned, and came to Achish. And Achish said, whither have ye made a road to-day? And David said, against the south of Judah, and against the Jerahmeelites, and against the Kenites. And David saved neither man nor woman alive to bring tidings to Gath, saying, lest they should tell on us, saying, so did David. And Achish believed David." (1 Sam, xxvii, G-12). David's conduct to Uriah was notoriously even more infamous. He contrived his faithful servant's death in battle to get possession of his wife, and accomplished both outrages with unblushing villainy. The Lord professed to disapprove of this, but upon David's admission of the crime, it was freely forgiven on the spot. This is a typical instance of the method of priestcraft. The worst crime is

nothing, so long as confession and perfect submission to the priest are made. However monstrous—it is forgiven in a moment, provided subservience to the priest is professed. But when Saul justified, by an appeal to common sense, his personal clemency to Agag and other captives, his independence met with relentless persecution. Another example of this is David's mean admission of having committed a crime, when he had really done a wise act in taking a census. His subservience was then farther secured by allowing him to choose, as the penalty, a pestilence—which was infamously selected by David—among the innocent people—instead of personal punishment of himself. The object was to make him feel as a sinner even when innocent. This shows why there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety-nine just persons who need no repentance. A sinner is a more servile workable instrument, and to save himself will do far more infamous acts when bid by the priest than any man of conscious rectitude and purity. I am not, however, concerned to recount David's crimes, further than as they explain the operation of the religious sentiment. From all this it should be clear that, so far from there being reason for wonder at pious persons committing crimes, they are just the ones of whom crimes should be expected.

In the New Testament the text I have chosen precisely corroborates my position. Jesus himself sends two disciples to a village, and deliberately directs them to steal a donkey with a foal, and bring them to him. And he said—"If any man say aught unto you, ye shall say '*The Lord hath need of them,*'" *the Lord being himself*, mark you. Being the Lord, he needed not to take another person's donkey, not even to fulfil the prophecy; for he could have made one for the purpose. If Thorpe could have made money as easily, he might not have robbed the Bank. But observe—the *Lord* is always—*oneself*,—and *oneself*—the *Lord*. "*I am that I am*"—is pretty plainly *the Lord myself*. When once a man has worked himself up in fervent piety till he believes—like Jesus—that he is *in the father* and *the father in him*, he feels himself justified in doing any mortal thing that may appear desirable to him; and he then does it with enthusiasm and gusto, as if he liked it—as Calvin burnt poor Servetus alive on a fire of green faggots, and as Charles IX perpetrated the massacre of St. Bartholomew for the love of *the Lord myself*. The fanatic believes he has a right to everything he wants, and when an opportunity offers for taking it, whether it be a donkey and a foal, or £2,000 in Bank of Victoria notes, he cries—"The Lord hath need of them; the Lord hath delivered them into my hand." After all it seems not improbable that if Jesus was really crucified at all it was for donkey stealing. Was he not crucified between two thieves, one of whom he invited to supper the same evening in Paradise?

Theft! Jesus did not call it stealing! "Convey—the wise it call." And Thorpe said, "I go from this dock *a sacrifice for others*." How often did Jesus say the same? Was there much to choose between them? Surely not in Thorpe's opinion, nor in mine. And why? Because any amount of piety justifies to *oneself* any amount of pilfering, if the *Lord myself* have need of it. We know the sympathy shown with Thorpe by the Rev. M. Rentoul and the *Southern Cross*. Why? Are they not also pious? And if the *Lord myself* had need of it, who shall say that they would not tomorrow go and do likewise? Has any one not afflicted with this immoral disease of piety shown sympathy with Thorpe? Or Jesus?

Some may think that there are scarcely grounds for comparing Jesus thus with Thorpe, But I feel bound to do so. For Jesus is (most improperly) held up to us as a model of immaculate virtue for our *imitation* as well as veneration; and before we either venerate or imitate him, we should err gravely were we not strictly to inquire into and estimate his moral character. Now it is admitted that he commonly associated with sinners and harlots, a practice that would have ruined Thorpe entirely; and there can be no question as to the nefariousness of the appropriation of the donkey. We do not hesitate to condemn the Israelites and Moses for swindling the Egyptians, Jacob for swindling Esau, and David for swindling Achish and Uriah. And why are we not to say what is as obviously true of Jesus?—particularly when we are desired to imitate him? Thorpe made no pretensions of this sort. If it be said that this ease of the donkey was an isolated one, remember that Thorpe was convicted for his first offence, which was held to constitute him at once a dishonest man. But it is also written that Jesus, besides, encouraged his disciples to help themselves to other people's corn on the Sabbath day (Mat. xii, L; Mark ii, 23). It must not be forgotten also that, as I said before, Jesus needed not to steal a donkey, as he could have created one if he wanted it. Thorpe had no such power. It is said that Jesus cured a number of sick and impotent folk; but if so, it cost him nothing to do it, and was only what every one should do if he had the power. It would be an almost impossible crime to neglect to use such a power, and I know no man so bad but who would do the same if he could. We have no materials for judging how Jesus would have filled a position of trust or responsibility, for he never held one; but his conduct to his mother was rude and ungracious. Still if his teaching had been wise and moral, that might have been overlooked; but I am about to show that, on the contrary, it was destructive of self-reliance, it falsified all logical notions of responsibility, and made men, otherwise moral, commit unheard-of crimes for religion's sake.

Now I must not be misunderstood to say that Jesus habitually thieved, or taught his disciples to thieve, or that theft and immorality are religious duties. Neither Atheism nor Religion will make a man good who is naturally bad. Atheism, however, will never make a man do bad acts who is not naturally bad; for, as Lord

Bacon says, "Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputations, all of which may be guides to an outward moral virtue though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and erecteth an absolute monarchy in the midst of men. Therefore Atheism never did perturb States; for it makes men wary of themselves as looking no further." (Essay on Superstition). But religion has often made people who were otherwise good do most immoral acts on account of religion. This has been demonstrated in the cases of Philip II, who was naturally humane, the Spanish Inquisitors, men of proved incorruptible integrity, and Calvin, an upright conscientious man. All these good moral men were horribly immoral and criminal—*for religion's sake*.

It is not, however, solely upon the example of Jesus, nor his precept and justification given in this particular case, that I rely to establish my position. I maintain that the general teaching of Jesus tends the same way, and doubtless causes the notoriously frequent pilfering of the pious. This is not a fancy of my own—it is a statistical fact. Last year in Victoria, while Protestants furnished 13, Jews 11, and Pagans 12 criminals in every 10,000 of our population, 30.36 was the proportion of criminal Roman Catholics, who are notoriously those of the population the most subservient to the priest and the most, religious. On the other hand the proportion of criminals of no religion, or very little, was no more than 6 in 10,000; or less than half as much as the Protestants, and only one-fifth as much as the Roman Catholics; and probably if those of no religion had been distinguished from those of very little, the 6 would have been found among the latter. (See Victorian Year-book, p. 278.) This is inductive evidence that the pilfering is in direct proportion to the piety. To revert to the deductive proof :

What are the leading doctrines of Jesus? 1st. Belief in, and reliance upon, God. If we cast all our care upon phallic legend like all the early Jewish books. The then Jewish God—who, as a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night, was plainly the Phallus itself—was evidently pleased with those phallic offerings, and accepted them, though he slaughtered 50,070 Jews because some one looked into the ark. The Jews are clearly proved by their own books to have been Phallists from the beginning up to the time of the captivity, when the books (so-called) of Moses were first produced, and Jehovah, as a great original generator or phallus, the *pillar* of cloud by day and of fire by night, was promoted over the local phalli or wooden ashera—mistranslated *groves* in the Bible to disguise the fact. These ashera or genuine phalli were set up *in the temple* itself, and the women wove hangings for them in the phallic houses that were by the temple.

2 Kings xxiii, 7.

The phallism is unmistakable through the books of Samuel

1 Sam. vi.

and Kings

1 Kings xiv, 24; xv, 12.

and Ezekiel

Ezekiel xvi, 16-17.

also. Circumcision was obviously a phallic rite, and the asserted conception and birth of Jesus—may not improperly be called—a *phallic wrong*.

The idea of a future life appears, according to Diodorus Siculus, to have arisen in Egypt, and to have spread thence almost within historical time. The doctrine of love is of course phallic in origin, but the æsthetic or spiritualised form of it, adopted by Plato first and afterwards by Christian enthusiasts, was evidently only one feature among others derived from Buddhism, which has a superior title to be called the Religion of Love, as it is without the incongruities and many of the extravagances that disfigure and stultify Christian theology. Buddha's affection was really that of a good man for men, and pity for their besotted ignorant miserable condition. I know nothing phallic about Buddhism. To assert the subsistence of anything of the nature of love between an almighty good deity and bad men is to ignore the moral attainments of man and court solecism on every hand. Christianity preserves more of Phallism than *Buddhism*, and deserves rather to be called the religion of *hate*, whether as exhibited in the alleged relations of the Deity and his creatures, or in the conduct of its votaries to each other.

Both inductively from history and deductively from doctrine it thus appears, then, that *love* is entirely out of place in religion, and has been improperly associated with it—either "with dissimulation" or in utter ignorance of its origin and effect. Yet there can be no doubt that there is an intimate connection between the religious sentiment and sexuality, whether it originated in Phallism or not. No religion was ever initiated without some attempt to innovate upon or qualify the relations of the sexes. The Nunawading prophets and the Wroeties here, the Shakers, Spiritualists, and Perfectionists in America, the Muckers in Germany, and the Saints of the Agapemone in England, all illustrate this observation in various ways. The larger sects (Buddhism alone excepted) equally corroborate it and prove a connection between the phenomena. Mahometanism and Mormonism were both revolts—the former against ancient, and the latter against modern, monogamy as the expression of exoteric Phallic prohibition. The Great Protestant Reformation was simply the culmination of the

persistent struggle—during more than 1,000 years—between the Christian Church on the one hand and the Clergy and Laity on the other; the Church insisting upon clerical celibacy (which meant general prostitution), and the Clergy and people fighting for clerical marriage. History bears witness that the Christian Church maintained this struggle, not to enforce the ascetical principles upon which celibacy was first ostensibly introduced, but with a *purely mercenary object*; for it tolerated and encouraged illegitimate sexual connections of the Clergy, so long as they did not marry; while the Clergy, to their credit be it said, and the Laity also (for obvious reasons), contended for clerical marriage to obviate the necessity for illicit connections. The mercenary object of the Church was this: From the early part of the 4th century married priests almost always misappropriated for their families and themselves the revenues of the Church, and so detracted from its wealth and power."

Lea's "History of Sacerdotal Celibacy," pp. 148-9, 324, 342-8, 396, and 401.

The interest of celibate clergy centred in the Church, and they could excuse themselves to their lay charges in the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. ix, 11). "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we shall reap your carnal things." To such an extent did they reap them that the monasteries and convents had become, in the fifteenth century, huge brothels; that in some places the children of the Clergy are known to have outnumbered those of the lay population

Ib. p. 349.

; that some bishops were known to have from 60 to 70 natural children, while others kept as many concubines
pp. 322, 349.

; that the priests, until the 16th century, customarily paid a regular license called "*cullagium*" to keep concubines, whether they did so or not;

(n) pp 271, 389, 422, 423.

and that there are numerous historical proofs that it was a usual thing throughout Europe for the parishioners of a new pastor to assemble and insist, for the protection of their wives and daughters, upon his taking a concubine forth with.

pp. 324, 855, 386.

It was for such irregularities that indulgences were openly sold *by the Church*, until the people could stand it no longer, and the Reformation ensued—not, as pretended, to vindicate freedom of religious opinion, but to secure protection from the wholesale prostitution of the women of Europe by the Christian priesthood,

The Emperors Maximilian and Ferdinand represented this fact to the Pope and begged him to remedy it.—[See Lea, p. 457-61.]

The Church, to get temporal wealth and power, had actually converted Europe into a sacred brothel as completely as if every chapel or convent had been a Phallic temple, and these facts constitute the only real title of the Christian Church to be called the Religion of Love! This is the way that the Clergy used to keep up—as the Bishop says—the *morals of the people!!!* Public opinion compels secrecy in such matters now, but it is impossible to doubt that the same rule prevails.

This is not, however, all that the Christian Church has done to saturate European Society with sanctified prostitution. Its perpetuation of the Phallic Institution of marriage as an ecclesiastical ceremony, and, as an indissoluble contract, has contributed largely to the same result, and the Protestants are therefore, of course, so far implicated, as much as the Roman Church. This evil is culminating in England, and a social revolution to remedy it is but a question of time. For the excess of the number of women is nearly 4 millions now, and is rapidly increasing; while, maugre the augmenting population, the number of marriages is steadily and not slowly diminishing. This is the work of the *religion of love!!* Marriage is too often miserably unhappy, and must remain so while legally *indissoluble*. Inducement is thus offered to *misbehaviour*. Marriage should last—like any rational contract of association—*solely during good behaviour*, for which a reason would then exist; and the contract should be at once dissoluble *without expense*—at the desire of either party to it. The evident tendency of modern opinion, and even legislation towards increasing the liberty of individuals, and the steady though slow decline of religion, afford some prospect of progress in the direction of rational morality in this respect. The obstinacy, however, of prejudices derived from sources so ancient as Phallism is necessarily enormous, and is the principal cause of the delay. Our Phallic inheritance appears also in the conventional objection to modern Malthusianism; the sole feasible defence against poverty. Good things come, and bad things go; but very slowly.

To summarise. The doctrine of love in Religion, and in Christianity in particular, is not only a contradictory absurdity, but also a cruel insult to those who are treated as if they were hated. It is a direct though unrecognized relic of obscene phallism, which is really also the basis of all our religions (except Buddhism), and of most of the errors in our notions of Morality; such as *sanctity*,— meaning—protection from criticism; modesty and decency,—which mean simply—hypocrisy, for *they veil no foulness that they do not create*; also chastity—which is really public tyranny in strictly private matters, and respecting which public opinion is

notoriously one-sided and divided. Its unequal application stamps it as an error, and its evil physical results, together with its social product—*Prostitution*—demonstrate it to be a monstrous evil. All these have their bases, not in utility but solely in ancient Phallic exoteric tyranny, and should be fearlessly examined and treated. The Christian Church has—for mercenary objects—perpetuated the foulness of phallism under the cloak of ascetic and æsthetic piety. A strictly rational morality is possible solely by understanding the whole subject of prostitution in its origin and history, as I have endeavoured to trace them under obvious difficulties. I have taken much pains to acquire this information—of which I have given you only the heads—respecting the causes of prostitution; with the view of cleansing our society from the foul stain upon our vaunted morality. There is no other way.

I hold that one who is not prepared to trust and follow his intellectual judgment, wheresoever it may lead, is unworthy of its possession. In asking you to discuss my conclusions, I hope for free criticism to test them in every possible way. I cannot expect you to apprehend my position perfectly from such a short and inadequate account of it, but if I stimulate enquiry into the matter, I scarcely look for more at present. That will be a great step gained; for the problem appears to have been generally given up as hopeless. And remember that "There is *nothing* unclean of itself; but to him that *esteemeth* anything to be unclean, *to him it is unclean.*"

[My principal authorities are, Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, Plutarch, the Bible, Wilkinson's "Ancient Egyptians," Bailly's "Astronomie Ancienne" and "Astronomic Indienne," Higgins' "Celtic Druids" and "Anacalypsis," Sir Wm. Drummond's "(Edipus Judaicus," Dupuis' "Origines de tous les Cultes," Dulaure's "Histoire abregee de differens Cultes," R. Payne Knight's "Worship of Priapus" and "Symbolical Language of Ancient Art and Mythology," Dr. Inman's "Ancient Faiths embodied in Ancient Names" and "Ancient Faiths and Modern," Colonel Kennedy's and Coleman's works on "Hindoo Mythology," "The Dabistan," Sale's "Koran," and—an invaluable book—H. C. Lea's "History of Sacerdotal Celibacy."—H.K.R.]

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The Power of the Pulpit A Lay Sermon

Dedicated to the People And Clergy of Victoria.

BY H. K. Rusden.

Printed by request.

"The truth shall make you free."—JOHN vii. 32.

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The Power of the Pulpit.

A Lay Sermon delivered before the Sunday Free Discussion Society, in the Trades' Hall, Melbourne, 28th January 1877.

By. H. K. Rusden.

"He feedeth on ashes; his deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot deliver his soul nor say, Is there not a lie in my right hand?" Isaiah xlv. 20.

St. Paul—who had far more than Jesus to do with the institution of historical Christianity, is very explicit as to the qualities which he considered to be indispensable in a preacher of the Gospel. He says (1 Cor. i. 21), "it pleased God by the *foolishness* of preaching to save "them that believe." As David, when about to encounter the giant Goliath, rejected the approved weapons of war, and was afterwards victorious, because—unarmed—he came simply "in the name of the Lord;" so St. Paul conquered the world by *knowing nothing* save Jesus Christ and him crucified. He proceeds (verse 26), "For ye see your calling, brethren, how that *not* "many *wise* men after the flesh, *not* many *mighty*, *not* "many *noble*, are called. (27) But God hath chosen the "*foolish* things of the world to *confound*, the *wise*; and God "hath chosen the *weak* things of the world to con-"found the things which are mighty. (28) And "*base* things of the world and things which are despised, "hath God chosen; yea, and things which *are not*, "to bring to nought things that *are*." This is quite explicit—and so are many other texts—as to the kind of instruments which God prefers to do his work, and bear his messages to men. He hides his counsels from the wise and prudent, and reveals them solely unto babes. St. Paul says also plainly, that even he himself, who was "not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles" (2, Cor. xi. 5), "came NOT *with excellency of speech or of wisdom*, declaring unto you the testimony of God. (2) For "I determined," he says, "*not to know anything* among you, "save Jesus Christ and him crucified. (3) And I was "with you in *weakness*, and in *fear* and in *much trembling*. "(4) And my speech and my preaching was *not with en-"ticing words of man's wisdom*, but in demonstration of "the Spirit and of *power*. (5) That your faith should *not* "*stand in the wisdom of men*, but in the *power* of God." (1 Cor. ii. 1—5.)

Surely then the *Argus* and the Bishop of Melbourne gravely err as to the style of men whom it is desirable

to select and employ to preach the Gospel—to save souls,—and to do credit to the Church. They do gross injustice to the clergy in attributing the decay of the power of the pulpit to the want of education and ability of its occupants.

See the *Argus* for the 12th, 15th, and 16th January, 1877.

They are grievously mistaken who would choose for the pulpit men gifted with *excellency of speech and wisdom*, which are specially condemned by the best possible authority—St Paul himself—as absolute disqualifications. I quote St. Paul as the highest authority, because though he was the only one of the Apostles who was ever suspected of any pretensions to cultivation, or of excellency of human wisdom, and though he was indisputably a more effective preacher than all the others, yet he specially repudiated everything of the kind, and attributed his superior success entirely to the influence of God, who uses the *foolish* things of the world to confound the *wise*. Education, learning, and intellectual ability are therefore altogether out of place in a preacher of the Gospel; for the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. (1 Cor. iii. 19.) Jesus himself says unto his disciples, "Take no thought how or what ye shall speak, "for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall "speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the spirit of "your Father which speaketh in you." (Matt. x. 19, 20). Here is the explanation of the statements of St. Paul. For if omniscience produces our thoughts, and our very words are furnished by the divine Logos itself, the super-fluousness of human accumulations of wisdom, and of the excellency of speech,—is obvious enough.

So much for their precepts. Now for their practice.

Where did Jesus go for recruits for his band of missionaries? To the college or the university? No! Thence came the *scribes and pharisees, hypocrites*; to whom the *harlots* were preferred in his kingdom. Did he import Masters of Arts and Doctors of Divinity from the antipodes? No ! He picked up his bishop (Peter) in the fishmarket, and the rest of the Apostles were neither educated nor respectable. And if Jesus were in Melbourne now, unless he has altered as much as his Church, the place to find him would assuredly be neither in St. James's Cathedral nor at Government House, nor even at Bishops court; but rather in the Eastern Market, the Lockup, or the Lunatic Asylum. The Trades' Hall is the only Temple in Melbourne where he would be permitted to do as was his wont,—dispute with all comers, "both" hearing them and asking them questions."

It should—in this aspect—be easy enough to see *why* the Power of the Pulpit is now so weak. The clergy—in Victoria at least—have far *too much* of the excellency of man's wisdom. I have the pleasure of knowing several of them, and I can confidently testify to their general ability, their superior education, their respectability, and their wisdom of this world. Their everything in fact which Jesus and Paul asserted that they ought not to have. I, for one, am far from wishing to depreciate the value of these important qualifications for worldly usefulness, but it is nevertheless a fact that for a man to understand sufficiently his own personal position in relation to the great problems of existence, he certainly does not require a classical education, nor an intimate knowledge of all the sophistical nonsense with which religion has been gilded and philosophy mystified. His responsibility bears a strict proportion to his capacities. All he really wants is an average share of plain common sense, and a determination to apply it freely and vigorously to every *thing*, and every *idea*, which can be proposed for his consideration.

Well—it may be said, If that is all that is necessary for the people, why will it not also answer in the pulpit; and why cannot both then go on harmoniously together? Well—why don't they? What are the facts? Why—we find that exactly as common sense increases among the people, so does their respect for the pulpit decline; notwithstanding that at the same time the increase of common sense is really shared more or less by the occupants of the pulpit! and this—which at first sight would seem calculated to keep them in harmony with the people, is the very thing that widens the breach. For though the clergy gain, as I said—common sense at the same time as the people, it appears in their *conduct*, and *not* in the *pulpit*; with the principles of which their practice appears in ever increasing contrast. The growing antagonism is obscured by various causes from the apprehension of the clergy themselves, and the bulk of the *people* are still slow to appreciate it. But both of them have acquired enough of the wisdom of this world to make them really prefer and rely upon that as the one thing needful. And the people too often—like Jesus—make no allowances for the clergy, and attribute to hypocrisy in them, what is due simply to habit and association. The more the people have of human wisdom, the less do they care for or tolerate anything else in the pulpit; but the more the pulpit acquires of common sense, the less is it pulpit. The story of the Garden of Eden is true for all time. The pulpit has always said, "*Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it : for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.*" (Gen. ii. 17.) The people however eat it hungrily, and find that so far from being death to them, it is their life. It agrees with them. They like the taste of Eve's apple, and feel the benefit of the knowledge of good and evil. All they want is more. They have actually ventured to doubt that knowledge is bad for them. The assertion of the pulpit,—which it puts into the mouth of God—that they shall therefore surely die, is proved and admitted to be false. (Gen. iii. 22) They die—if at all before life ceases to be worth living—from *ignorance*; and without *knowledge* they never would have lived "*as gods knowing good and, evil.*" They have

begun to value and love it,—and *therefore* to experience the opposite feeling for the pulpit, which calls it "*foolish-ness with God.*"

This antagonism is plainly radical. It is no wonder that the pulpit feels uncomfortable and anxious; for not only would foolishness even with God give it but a poor living without the help of the people and their forbidden knowledge of good and evil; but it cannot fail to perceive that its very existence is really at stake. Its struggle is for life.

Now there is no other profession which is practised at such an advantage as the clerical; in the preparation for which more pains, wealth, and ability are expended; none in which the worldly rewards are higher, or the inducements to pursue them stronger; preachers have not only every advantage of education and learning themselves, but they have actually had the privilege for many centuries of educating the rising generation to honor and respect them—irrespective of personal desert. They have also immense support from the State and from public opinion; and they have an established organisation, which should enable them to overcome all opposition, and make their supremacy stronger and more overwhelming day by day. But in spite of all this the clergy cannot but feel that they are *losing ground*. They admit it. They more than suspect that they are even disbelieved. By some they are plainly told so; but can they avoid seeing that even those who profess to believe them, flatly contradict in their practice the principles to which they yield a deferential, a careless, or a hypocritical assent? Are not even some of the clergy sometimes forced to suspect and ask *themselves*, with Isaiah's god-maker, "Is there not a *lie* in my right hand?"

Those who know the power of habit, association, and interest, in determining action, will not be surprised at the small number of the clergy who think of asking themselves this question, and the smaller number who answer it candidly; and boldly and honorably determine to act upon their new-found consciousness, and *cast their lie behind them*. The large majority never see it; and assume, as they have been taught, that even to suspect the perfect truth of the principles that they have learned to glory in teaching—would be a sin. So "he feedeth on ashes; his "deceived heart hath turned him aside, that he cannot "deliver his soul nor say 'Is there not A LIE in my right "hand?'" Their eyes are blinded, so that they are unable to perceive that their prior duty is to test and prove—before they assume the responsibility of asserting and teaching—EVEN THE TRUTH ITSELF. Yet they cannot but feel that they are *losing ground* with the people, to whose depravity they sometimes attribute the fact. And lose ground they must and will, so long as they call the wisdom of this world—foolishness, and devote their energies to vainly endeavouring to reconcile incompatibilities and to expound impossible ways of "*making the "best of both worlds.*" But as Jesus has told them, "No "man can serve two masters. For either he will hate the "one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one "and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mam-"mon." (Matt. vi. 24.) "For where your treasure is, "there will your heart be also." (Matt. vi. 21.)

Jesus and his followers preached,—and with complete success,—against the then endowed clergy, whose conduct presented as glaring a contradiction to their preaching as that of the clergy of to-day. The power of the new pulpit then was fully equal to the demand; though without any advantages of organisation, respectability, or endowment; and without any prospects of preferment or bishoprics. The learned rabbis and wealthy priests had *no power* in their endowed pulpits to oppose it, and could only ejaculate in amazement—"Behold! the world is gone "after him !" "Perceive ye how ye prevail nothing?" (John xii. 19.) What was the reason? It was their *practice* and *not* their *preaching* that Jesus condemned. He himself professed to preach and to fulfil—the very same law that they preached, not one jot or one tittle of which—he said—could be broken. He reproached them with their inconsistency in practice. "The scribes and pharisees," said he, "sit in Moses' seat; *all* therefore "whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; "*but do not ye after their works, for they say—and do not.*" (Matt, xxiii. 2—3.) They make broad their phylacteries "and enlarge the borders of their garments, and love the "uppermost rooms at feasts and the chief seats" (*i.e.*, pulpits) "in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets, "and to be called of men Rabbi, Rabbi" (*i.e.*, Reverend.) "*But be not ye called Rabbi*, for one is your master, even "Christ, and all ye are brethren." (Matt, xxiii. 5—8.) Was there ever a more exact description and condemnation of a clergy,—of a rich clergy in general, and of a Christian clergy in particular? "He sent them to preach "the kingdom of God, and to heal the sick, *and he said "unto them, Take nothing* for your journey, neither staves "nor scrip, neither bread, neither money, neither have two "coats apiece." (Luke ix. 2, 3.)

What was the result? His preachers—*having none of these things, had POWER*, of which together with their pulpits, they dispossessed their rich predecessors; they carried all before them; and while they were as poor and as ignorant as the people, they had their confidence. They even tried to practise the communism that Jesus taught, though in that of course they failed. But their *successors*, like their *predecessors*—acquired *wealth*, and as their pulpits became swept and garnished, they *lost power*. Then went they and took to themselves seven other substitutes (such as learning, rhetoric, wisdom, wit, excellence of speech, organisation, and respectability), more disqualifying than the first, and they entered in and dwelt there; and the last state of that [pulpit] was worse than the first.

Now, are not the causes of the power of the pulpit, and of its failure, accurately illustrated by Jesus in the

descriptions which I have quoted; of his missionaries on the one hand, and of the scribes and pharisees on the other? Surely there can be no two opinions about it. Doubtless circumstances have somewhat changed, but the most important coincidence and difference have certainly escaped the attention of the *Argus* and the Bishop. The coincidence is this. The clergy, now as then, preach principles directly opposed to their practice. The difference lies in the fact that the people are not so ignorant now as then, and therefore demand a different style of teacher instead of the pulpit. The antagonism between what the pulpit preaches and what the people require is as great now as ever. The people want no pulpit at all now. When they were ignorant enough to want a pulpit, Jesus and Paul perfectly met the demand, with preachers as ignorant, who superseded the previous educated inconsistent hypocritical priesthood, and endeavoured to practise the principles which both had taught. Their successors did not attempt it, for the principles had been proved impracticable in, or destructive of, society, as I shall soon show. *Now*, the people are more enlightened, and require—not only the downfall of the pulpit, but also preachers of new principles adapted to moral practice. Professor Huxley is an example of the sort of preacher now required. He expounds the wisdom of this world which is destructive of the power of pulpits, and which men find as they gain common sense is the one thing needful for their welfare and happiness. The "people are destroyed"—*now*, as in Hosea's days—" (iv. 6)—" for *lack of knowledge*." The pulpit preaches ignorance, depravity, and improvidence, while the preachers themselves are seen to respect and value knowledge, self-respect, and prudence. If the clergy were consistent as well as sincere, would they not *teach* that which they *practise*, or *practise* what they *teach*? the question is—which should it be? Is the preaching or the practice wrong? If they were to *preach* what is *right*, would not the pulpit be respected, even though its occupants might by opposite conduct, incur contempt? But I shall show that this is not the case. The clergy are, in my opinion, as a rule, able, intelligent, upright, earnest, if not consistent, men; and it is not OUT of the pulpit, but IN it, that they are losing ground and earning contempt. Not the men, but what they teach—is defective and wrong; wholly incompatible with the spirit of the time, with the people's needs, and with sound morality. I am satisfied that any clergyman who would descend from his pulpit, and turn his church into a Free Discussion Temple, and give moral, social, and scientific—instead of religious—lectures, inviting free question and criticism on the spot of all that he propounds, would soon regain all the respect and the power than his pulpit has lost, and do more good to himself and to every one else, than could possibly be done by any pulpit teaching of even truth itself.

But—*he would have to reverse his teaching in nearly every particular*. He would have to teach that wisdom is not to be repudiated and contemned, but *learned* and *practised*; let whosoever will call it foolishness. He must teach that forgiveness of error—which is impossible in nature, should be so in morals; and that there could be no more pernicious fallacy than the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins. He must on the contrary teach the fact that any human action can be no more divested of its natural consequences than it can itself be undone when past; and that men can never learn to be moral, until they clearly apprehend that acts are good or bad solely as they necessarily produce good or bad results. He must teach the grave *moral duty* of taking *earnest careful "thought* for the "morrow;" of being *humanly provident* and prudent; and that reliance on divine providence—is culpable improvidence. He must teach that it is as immoral to love our enemies—or the bad, as to hate the good—who should be our friends; and that the first duty of man as a social rational being, is to mark his sense of moral good and evil as plainly as possible on every occasion, and to love or hate accordingly. So far from teaching "Judge not—that ye be not judged," he must teach that it is no less a duty to judge others freely, than to invite judgment of oneself. He must teach that faith, if a theological virtue, is really an intellectual vice. He must teach that a man's supreme duty is to HIMSELF; and that if he so act as to attract to himself,—by prudence, the goods of this world; by beneficence, the good will of other men; by social activity—the respect of society; by temperance—the blessings of health and long life; and by intellectual exercise—the highest pleasures of which the human mind is susceptible; no one will ever think of asking him to sacrifice himself for the benefit of others; and this world will become so important and agreeable to him that he will have neither time nor inclination to trouble himself about another,—which he would notwithstanding be none the less fitted to enjoy. He must teach that if we all do the very best for ourselves, physically, morally, and intellectually, we cannot possibly do better for our neighbours. If he learn to teach and practise this, he will inevitably learn and teach too, that the pulpit never could accomplish 100th part of the good or produce a tithe of the pleasure, that is to be gained by the power of FREE DISCUSSION, which is indefinitely multiplied by every addition to the number of its participants.

To farther illustrate the utter incompatibility between the teaching of the pulpit and the moral duty of man (and the practice of most clergymen also), I will just ask you to imagine Bill Sykes brought up before Mr. Sturt for murdering Nancy; and Mr. Sturt saying to him, after the case had been proved—"Go in peace, Bill, thy sins are for-given thee. God's grace is sufficient for thee." And when called to account by the Executive Council for his neglect of duty,—saying—" Let him that is without sin "among *you* cast the first stone." This sounds absurd. Yet Mr. Sturt believes—or thinks he believes—that if he does not forgive the trespasses of others,

neither will his heavenly father forgive him his trespasses. And he is also bound to do it by the golden rule which is so irrationally admired; and which—if practised, would be the destruction of Society. "Do to others as ye would that others "should do to you." Mr. Sturt—in Bill Sykes' place, would of course desire to be let go in peace, and well he knows it. But this does not apply to Mr. Sturt alone, nor even only to every magistrate in the colony. No constable in the police force could arrest any criminal, or do his proper duty for a day, were he to act in accordance with the leading principles of Christianity. And *ice* only pay magistrates and constables to act *for us*, because we happen to be otherwise engaged. We could not delegate this duty, if it were not really our own.

Imagine our new bishop (Dr. Moorhouse) trying to be perfect even as his father in heaven is perfect, insisting upon substituting his innocent only son upon the gallows for the next murderer to be hanged at the gaol! I fancy I see him—urging Sir Samuel Wilson, Mr. Austin, Mr. Hy. Miller, and Mr. Clarke, to sell off *all* they possess and give it to the poor, that they may have treasure in heaven! Would those good Christians comply with his request? Is there now so much power in the pulpit?

Imagine the clergy sending a deputation round to the mercantile men of Melbourne, or only to the most pious Christians among them, those who reckon their calling and election sure,—to take no thought for the morrow, and to cast all their care upon their heavenly father; would they not seem to our merchants as they that mock or are insane? I would ask the most pious of all my Christian readers whether, if assaulted by a rough in the street tonight, he would ask him to hit him on the other cheek, and present him with his coat and cloak also?

Matt. v. 39, 40.

Would he not rather give him in charge, and prosecute to conviction? And if he didn't, would lie not be neglecting his bounden duty to society?

But this question is not one of a few precepts, though those I have alluded to are the most important and distinctive of Christianity. The whole general rule of conduct—of clergy as well as Christians in general, is now not only positively anti-Christian, but essentially irreligious,—absolutely atheistic. We—*every one of us*—now,—clergy, bishop, governor, and all, rely upon *human providence alone*, really and truly; and do not trust at all in divine providence; and the Church is supported merely from habit and association, and not from practical conviction. All of us are ready to stigmatise real reliance upon God's providence as being—what it is in fact—*improvidence*, and much more likely to lead to the Insolvent Court than to heaven. Who now really relies upon the nightly guardianship of God and his holy angels? No one. Prayers are cheap, or surely they would be disused; for we *all* take care in practice (and so does the bishop), to pay wages to a constable, to give money for a watch-dog, to buy locks for our doors, to incur the expense of mosquito curtains, and to insure our lives and houses. This indispensable human providence practically demonstrates that we have all really discarded God and his providence; the utter inutility of the fiction having been gradually proved as we have discovered substitutes that answer the same purpose infinitely better.

The opening of people's eyes to this logical conclusion is only a question of time, and the decay of the power of the pulpit furnishes ample proof, if men would only candidly and rationally examine the evidence and adopt the plain and necessary consequence.

The clergy are, I think, less in fault than the people. How can we possibly expect the clergy to recognise the delusion by which they make a good living (and which therefore is to them so far no delusion) when the people don't—who have to find the money? Too few there are who can confidently and truthfully say that they have ever even asked themselves the question—"Is there not a lie in my right hand?"

For the sake of precision I will recapitulate the steps of my argument. I have shown that according to the highest religious authorities, a pulpit—to have *power*—must be *without* excellency of speech, wisdom, respectability, and wealth. Therefore the clergy of to-day, prevail nothing with the people against Professor Huxley, &c., just as the chief priests prevailed nothing against Jesus and Paul. The difference between Jesus's time and ours is—that the people know more now than they did then. When they were ignorant, miserable, and poor, they had no confidence in any preacher that had not the same characteristics. Now that they have acquired knowledge enough to make them desire more, they want no ignorant ascetic pulpit, but teachers with knowledge and ability, who teach—not foolishness, self-distrust, ignorance, improvidence, poverty, and depravity; but self-respect, wisdom of this world, prudence, and energy. They will have none who say and do not; who exhort to faith instead of to understanding; none who teach what would be inimical to the physical and moral well-being of society. Religion—inasmuch as it depreciates and prohibits knowledge, comfort, worldly happiness—for the chance of a larger quantity of a hypothetical future life,—I have shown to be accurately antagonistic to morality; which I define as the *most profitable worldly conduct*. All agree that it is neither immoral nor foolish to use a mosquito curtain; but to how many is it given to discern that having actually got one, it is impious as well as stultificatory to pray to God to do for us what we have thus completely done for ourselves? what *we know*, if we did nothing, *could not save us from a mosquito*? If those who both work and pray, get what they want, how are they to discover by which process they get it? Those only who have tried

working without praying, and *vice versâ*, are in a position to judge And before we can judge, we must learn. We are all really Atheists now, though only some of us are yet aware of it. I have shown why we all have already unconsciously, but really, discarded religion; and that we are now as it were one by one waking up to the consciousness of having done so. Some who are shocked at this conclusion now, would be far more shocked to learn the fact, that it is only by an inconsistency which—if conscious—would be dishonesty, that they are prevented from accepting it as logical and true. I may remark that the excellency of speech which St. Paul depreciated and prohibited, though he cultivated it himself, is one thing that the people want much, and can best secure by the simple means of exercising their intellects in Free Discussion.

decorative feature - leaves

Mr. Bradlaugh's Conviction for Free Printing on the Population Question.

A LAY SERMON, BY H. K. RUSDEX.

Read to the Sunday Free Discussion Society, on 26th August, 1877. Trades' Hall, Melbourne.

Introduction to the Lecture.

AMONG many tracts on the Population Question, I possess two copies of the now celebrated "Fruits of Philosophy; or, the Private Companion of Young Married People," by Dr. Knowlton, of America. One copy was published in London, by James Watson in 1843, the other also in Loudon by F. Farrah, at a subsequent date not given. It is said that this tract was published in-London about 1843, and has ever since been sold unrestrictedly.

Dr. Knowlton, recognising that poverty becomes overwhelming to those who have more children than they can provide for, and therefore demoralising to society, recommends a plan by which people can prevent the evil, and have no more children than they desire. His expedient is one which might be recommended as a simple measure of cleanliness. But I consider some later books as much better—notably, the "Elements of Social Science," in which five expedients are named (Dr. Knowlton's being one), but of which the one attributed to M. Raciborski, I consider and recommend as far preferable to the others. A pamphlet entitled, "Poverty, its Cause and Cure," is the next best. In this fire methods are suggested, of which the last, M. Raciborski's, is, I think, by far the best. I can inform anyone wanting either of these publications where they are to be got.

When Mr. Watson died, the plates of Dr. Knowlton's tract were bought by Mr. Charles Watts, who sold copies until the 9th January last, when he was suddenly arrested, and committed for trial on 5th February for publishing the book. After first agreeing with Mr. Bradlaugh, by whom he was employed as sub-editor of the *National Reformer*, that the publication of the book should be defended, he appears to have become frightened, and pleaded guilty to publishing an obscene book, and got clear at a cost of £200.

Mr. Bradlaugh was highly indignant at this cowardly surrender of the right to print freely on the population question for the relief of the poor, and the benefit of the world. He said he would not have published the book as he did not like it; but that it was dishonorable and injurious to the cause of freethought to admit the right of anyone to dictate as to what is to be printed. In March last, therefore, he and Mrs. Besant agreed, in spite of the great disadvantage of the recent condemnation of the book as immoral by its former publisher, they agreed I say, magnanimously, to republish the book at once, and encounter the results.

On the 23rd March, Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant published the book, personally delivering the first copies to the Chief Clerk to the Magistrates at Guildhall, to the head office of the City Police, and to the Solicitor of the City of London, giving notice that on the 24th they intended to sell it at a certain place and hour. On that day, at 4 p.m., they began to sell, and sold 500 in the first 20 minutes, and have since sold, it is said, 120,000 copies. On the 29th March they were arrested, and bailed in sureties of £100 each, and themselves in £200 each, to appear on the 17th. The case occupied some days, but on the 26th both were committed for trial, and released upon their own recognisances; the magistrate remarking that the proceedings should not have been by arrest, but by summons. On the 4th May, Mr. Bradlaugh applied for and obtained a writ of *certiorari* to take the case before the higher Court of Queen's Bench, his personal security for the costs being accepted The case was tried on the 18th June, and particulars are given in the *Times* and *Home News*. The Chief Justice, in summing up, said that it was a most ill. advised prosecution. There was not a word in the pamphlet, he said, calculated to excite the passions. The verdict of the jury was, nevertheless, to the effect that the book was calculated to debase public morals, but they entirely exonerated the defendants from any corrupt motives in

publishing it. On the 28th the Chief Justice, after saying that they might have been released on their own recognisances had they not persisted in pushing the sale of the book after the verdict, passed the sentence on each defendant of six months' imprisonment, with a fine of £200, giving also security for good behaviour to the amount of £500. At the same time execution of the sentence was postponed, pending the decision of a writ of error to quash the original indictment. Considering that the verdict was in direct opposition to the wording of the indictment, it seems probable that the appeal would be successful, and if meantime the sale of the book has been stopped, there are better books in circulation, which I have already indicated.

The subject of the pressure of population is far the most important and necessary to be discussed by the people, and Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant deserve not only to have their expenses freely paid, but the blessings of the people, for stepping into the breach at their own risk to save the people the right of freely discussing it.

The Lecture.

"My people are destroyed—for lack of knowledge."

Hosea, iv., 6

THUS we find that this most important truth, that the "people are destroyed for lack of knowledge," was not unknown 2000 years ago. Yet at the present day there is none which is more persistently ignored and contravened, and particularly I regret to say by English people. Though our countrymen boast so loudly of their political freedom, there is no people on the face of the earth in more abject slavery to a blind and tyrannical conventionalism; which for peace sake the more rational among them would perhaps not trouble themselves to oppose, were it not for the cruel wrongs of which it compels them to be not only spectators, but in part also even perpetrators. But those who have eyes to see, heads to understand, and hearts to feel for the grinding poverty—the degrading vices, and the too frequent crimes of so many of their neighbors, together with the heartless indifference with which their hard fate is regarded by nearly all who are fortunate enough to escape it themselves,—would be criminal indeed, could they stand tamely by and see the "people" thus "destroyed for lack of knowledge" without raising their hands and voices to save a remnant at least from destruction. I believe there is no other nation which so deliberately constitutes it a crime to disseminate among those who perish for want of it—knowledge of the most important description; the lack of which is the immediate cause of crimes without number and misery untold. No other nation is so irrational and so cruel.

In France, Germany and Italy, *political* printing may be under restriction or prohibition, but there is none upon what is of much more importance,—physiological investigation and experiment. In England, the freedom of political printing has been secured by the determined efforts of a few men like R. Carlile, Holyoake, and Bradlaugh, who valued intellectual liberty even more highly than their personal freedom; but let anyone be known to attempt to communicate or to gain—among English people—scientific or social knowledge of the most urgent importance, and he is at once visited with social pains and legal penalties. It is more than doubtful whether the English are as well governed as even the French. They have the satisfaction of imagining and saying that *they govern themselves*; but it is a grave question how far this privilege is a gain or a loss; used as it is to drive others to commit crimes simply for lack of knowledge, and then to punish them for doing what they have been driven to do. The fact is that politics is invested in England with an entirely fictitious importance—by those who make it a trade, and by the *press*, to which it furnishes so much extra matter to print. In Sergeant Sleigh's late letter (13th August) to the *Argus*, he shews how here as well as in England, the actual number of persons who really interest themselves in the subject is altogether trifling. We well know how very few good men can be induced to take a part in politics, and how when they do, they are immediately elbowed out by inferior men. And why? It is really not worth their while—not worth their attention. There is much more good to be done otherwise, by work like ours here. We tend to form public opinion, of which politics is only a result. But in England it would seem that the ingenuity and energy that are wasted on politics, might be far better bestowed on physiological and social investigations and experiments, which though prohibited in England, receive due attention on the Continent. The extra personal freedom of Englishmen is mainly exercised in tyrannically preventing others from prosecuting such scientific and philosophical enquiries as have a direct and special bearing upon social improvement. And mark with what result. There can be no more important branch of knowledge than physiology; as Pope said—

"The proper study of mankind is man."

Yet in England the thorough practical study of it is almost interdicted, and if anyone there were known to thoroughly prosecute physiological study in its most important branches by experiment, he would assuredly be himself prosecuted under an Act which I shall quote as furnishing a striking illustration both of the doubtful advantage of British self-government, and of the way in which the dissemination of the most useful knowledge is prohibited. The Imperial Vivisection Act of 1876 was intended to prevent inhumanity. What between the

intolerant action of the rabid suppressors of scientific knowledge and of the mild efforts of those who risked their positions by endeavoring to prevent mischief, the following is the result as described by Mr. Robert Lowe in the *Contemporary Review* for October last. The result of "the efforts of the two houses of Parliament to introduce *humanity* into our law as regards animals stands thus: It gives, 1st—Absolute liberty to torture all domestic animals *except by way* of scientific experiment. 2nd—Practical liberty for anyone who can afford to pay £5 to torture domestic animals, *except by way* of scientific experiment; and 3rd—No punishment for painful experiment *except by leave* of the Secretary of State."

Now if British self-government and political liberty, effectuate only such insanely abortive measures as this, what great advantage in legislation have we over our continental neighbours? *Theirs can* be no worse. And as regards *humanity* the Continental delegates at the last Prison Reform Conference were shocked at the barbarity of our best prison system as compared with their practice.

But the French and Germans are not neglectful in some other respects of the claims of others than criminals. *They* lay no embargo on scientific Experiments for the benefit of suffering humanity, and do not dream of prohibiting Vivisection or anything else, if done clearly for that beneficent purpose. Nearly all we know of embryology, has I believe been learnt from the Continent, because the necessary experiments were conventionally impossible in England, and would, if known to be attempted there, ruin the Experimenter. Other experiments are imperatively demanded by the needs of the people, which it would be difficult and dangerous to attempt in England—the boasted land of liberty;—but I shall venture to indicate them to-night.

It is very remarkable that in France where physiology is most systematically studied by means of Vivisection, the population principle is notoriously best understood and practically observed. Families there are consequently small, the population is stationary, poverty comparatively unknown, and savings therefore usual and considerable. To these circumstances is certainly due the unprecedented facility with which—though half paralysed by a disastrous war—France to the astonishment of Europe, collected and paid over to Prussia more than £200,000,000, and scarcely felt the loss. These are significant results of a wise recognition of the principle of population, that merit the serious attention of the world.

Now it is a heavy indictment against the politically free English press, that while for its profit it largely contributes to invest politics with an exaggerated and fictitious value, it also almost without exception panders to the morbid conventional taste which blindly prohibits the study and publication of the most important knowledge; which brutally prefers to punish rather than prevent crimes that it mainly creates; and visits with pains and penalties the very class of men by whom the liberty of the press was really achieved; such as Richard Carlile, Holyoake, and Bradlaugh. In this the servile meanness and base ingratitude of the press cannot be too strongly reprehended. The press has consistently done its worst to suppress Mr. Bradlaugh, the leading champion of free speech and free printing. It rarely mentions him but to discredit and malign, or when his name cannot be excluded from law reports, &c. The London correspondent of the *Argus* furnished a mild example of what I mean on Saturday week, though it is honorable mention compared to the misrepresentation and slander that used generally to accompany his name. He was there styled "an intolerant and egotistic lecturer on many subjects, who manages to make himself very objectionable to all his opponents." Now Mr. Bradlaugh is emphatically the champion of tolerance in England, and is not at all more egotistic than his position necessitates. That he makes himself objectionable to his opponents is of course strictly true, for as a rule he clearly refutes them in argument, which few like to endure; but the obvious ill-natured implication of offensiveness in the manner of doing so, has I believe no further ground whatever. To the credit of the *Home News* I must say that it gives a very fair report of the trial; but the *European Mail* has not a word upon the subject, though there was then no more important item in the news. The attitude assumed by the *Saturday Review* is specially despicable.

So in Melbourne Mr. Bradlaugh has been nakedly represented lately as prosecuted for publishing an obscene book, which he denied was obscene; with holding the fact that from the first it was solely the RIGHT TO PRINT for which he contended; and that the particular book is one which he would not have published if the right to print it had not been cravenly surrendered by its former publisher to escape the legal consequences. He then magnanimously undertook the publication of a new edition of the proscribed book, simply to defend and test the right to print *any* such book on the population question for the benefit of suffering humanity; and his work has been as ably executed as it was wisely conceived. I think he deserves not only to have his whole expenses paid, but that the press should principally contribute to pay them. In fact, in one way he has made it do so, if the statement be true that 120,000 (£8000 worth) of the pamphlet have been sold since March. But he is richly entitled also to the thanks and blessings of the poor, specially, as well as generally of the human race. For it is the *people*—the *people*—who are destroyed for lack of this particular knowledge. The people are all therefore vitally interested in this matter. For what is the population question in a few words?

The principle of population, first expounded definitely by the Rev. Mr. Malthus eighty years ago, is—that as the rate of reproduction of the human race is enormously greater than that of the means of subsistence,

prudential restriction upon human reproduction is the only way of proportioning it to the available means of subsistence, and of superseding the *natural* or *positive* checks upon it; namely—extreme poverty, starvation, disease and war. The constant operation of these positive checks is all that has prevented the human race from long since covering the whole earth shoulder to shoulder; the lowest estimate of the rate of increase being far more than sufficient to do so from a *single pair* in less than 1700 years. The wholesale slaughter of the innocents by these checks being insufficient to keep the population down to the level of the means of subsistence, it was formerly further reduced by the *universal* practice of infanticide. The deliberate universal practice; and if it be not universal now, I doubt if many exceptions beside *France* can be admitted. I suppose it is nowhere more illegal than in England; yet it was lately stated without challenge before the Dialectical Society of London, that 30,000 or one-fifth of the children born annually in Loudon, are "put away"—that is murdered—*by their parents*.

National Reformer, 10/6/77. p. 355.

Is it likely to be less prevalent where the law is less stringent? We know that in savage countries and even in China, infanticide is recognised as the necessary means by which the adult population saves itself from starvation, and saves the bulk of its children from a more painful existence and protracted death; and if it is forbidden by our law, how much is gained by preserving the majority of the children who are not sacrificed in spite of it, for the life of misery, and often of crime, to which by the same means, their parents are often also reduced? Both, doubtless, err from ignorance, for

"My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge."

But I put it to you—whether that Society is excusable which actually interdicts the use of a rational preventative of the wholesale murders which it vainly prohibits and cruelly punishes? The savage knows no better, and yet relieves *his* society with far less expenditure of suffering.

Wise, observant, and humane men, have long sought diligently for the best means of obviating both the cruel preservation of infants for a miserable existence and protracted death, and also infanticide *before* as well as *after* birth; *of preventing*, instead of remedying the evil. Various mechanical means have been suggested by which men and women are enabled at least to use their rational judgment in producing no more children than they can support and educate properly; and notwithstanding the law, millions of tracts describing the means—have been circulated ("thousands by me) for many years with that object. For the republication of one of these tracts "The Fruits of Philosophy" by Dr. Knowlton, Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant have just been sentenced to six months' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of £200 each, besides the enormous costs of defending the case. Remembering, however, that though the Jury found that the book was calculated to deprave public morals, it entirely exonerated the defendants from evil intention; that the Lord Chief Justice said that the prosecution was "most ill-advised," and that there was "nothing whatever in the book to excite the passions," but that if the jury thought the book calculated to debase public morals, he must direct it to find a verdict of guilty, whatever might have been the intention of the publishers; that the defendants were discharged for a week, and that the Chief Justice then said, in passing sentence, that they might have been discharged on their own recognisances had they not in the interim pushed the sale of the boob; but that upon the defendants promising to stop the sale, they were again discharged; and lastly that the proceedings have amply disclosed how respectably and extensively the defendants were supported by public sympathy; remembering all these circumstances I cannot believe that the penalties will be inflicted at all, whatever may be the decision upon the writ of error.

But whatever the result to Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant, their prosecution cannot fail to do immense public good. I think that nothing could have happened better calculated to secure the free and open discussion in the future of this most important of all social subjects, and to open the door to the ventilation of others in their turn. To have the case argued exhaustively in open court was a great point; but it was still better to see the list of subscriptions published weekly in the *National Reformer* (£1050 odd to the 12th of Aug. made up of threepennys, sixpences, and up to five guineas—from many thousands of all classes) and the published expressions of encouragement and sympathy from many leading men including Professor Bayne and General Garibaldi; this is of more significance than even the discussion of the question; for it proves that public opinion is already largely modified on the subject, and therefore prepared for modification on other social subjects not yet touched. For what is called *morality* is only the *present public opinion* as to what acts are proper or not; that public opinion is modifiable;—and the bringing of all human actions and customs to the one test of reason and utility as this one has been brought, is the one point to be attained to ensure their modification. Prostitution, marriage, the slavery of women and of the human mind, and the treatment of crime, religion, lunacy and pauperism, all demand to be brought to the same tribunal, and *shall* be brought to it—all in good; time and Charles Bradlaugh has done more than any other man unless perhaps Voltaire, and Mrs. Besant more than other woman to bring about this transcendent good. Their action in this matter was simply magnificent.

The principle of population as expounded by Malthus, is simply that population naturally tends to increase

enormously faster than the means of subsistence can be produced. This is demonstrable by facts as well as by figures, and Malthus considerably understated his case for the sake of giving it arithmetical definiteness. He has for this reason, I think, failed to secure general recognition of the great principle, whereas a simpler and more convincing way of bringing it home to the popular comprehension is to quote familiar cases, and point out how they exemplify the general law. Population really increases much faster than Malthus assumes—that is, it doubles in less than 25 years. It has been known to double in much less time, in spite of the positive checks which always operate; and the means of subsistence can be only arbitrarily estimated as conforming to any particular ratio of increase; therefore the precise ratios adopted by Malthus, though much understated, are frequently distrusted by many who are wholly unable to invalidate them. It is also foolishly assumed by objectors (on the same principle as that on which the ostrich hides its head in the sand instead of trying to escape from its pursuers) that because *they* do not happen to feel inconveniently the pressure of population, therefore there is none to be felt by others. It is even alleged that consideration of the subject may be safely postponed for a few centuries till the whole earth is populated. Whereas the pressure is present and constant, and as perceptible now as it ever will be to those who survive. It does not affect those who can earn enough to support themselves easily, or who have pecuniary or other advantages. It is felt by the very poor, the vicious, the diseased, who are unheard, and, lastly, the exterminated, who are silent. It is as heavy upon any man in Melbourne if he have ten children, and no food for them, as by anyone in the same position in London or China. It has pressed and is now pressing millions out of existence in a peculiarly cruel manner, and causes nearly the whole of the poverty, crime, disease, and misery, under which humanity groans. Surely it is evident to the meanest comprehension, that in any house where there is only one man, if he have no food, *there* the population is in advance of the means of subsistence. How much more when he has a wife and children more or less? Do not *THEY* feel the pressure? What benefit is it to them if butchers and bakers live on either hand, if they have no money to buy? And how often is that the case from an interminable variety of causes? It is invariably the case, more or less, wherever population concentrates in large masses, which is the inevitable condition of civilisation. There is doubtless plenty of room in the country, and it may be asked, and is asked, why are men so stupid as to starve in towns when that is the case? Obviously because it is precisely those who are starving who cannot move. There is ample room in America, Africa, and Australia, for all the poor of Britain a thousand times over; but how are they to get there? The fact that they are starving is a pretty sure indication that they have, more or less, large families, which prevent their moving. The wealthy can, but do not feel it incumbent upon them to go abroad. The poor cannot, however much they may desire to do so. But the voices of those who feel the pressure, are not heard. They are all either dead or dying. Consider that the rate of wages is determined necessarily by competition of single persons, and the demand for their labor, not by the needs and responsibilities of the laborer. If employers can get single men at £3 per week, is it likely that they will pay £15 or £20 to a man who has been reckless enough to have ten or twelve children? A single man may save one or even two pounds of the three, but what can a man save with ten children? With one pair of arms he has twelve mouths to feed, twelve backs to clothe, and ten heads to educate. *HE* feels the pressure of population, and so do *THEY*, whoever else may not. Even if they are clothed and fed they must lack education, and become less fitted than their father to compete for wages, and more fitted for the gaol if they escape the cemetery. And this is where society feels it, and should recognise it, and discuss the question of relieving the individual from the pressure which is demoralising others, as well as destroying *him*. Generally the most of the ten children are squeezed out of the way by the others. Often the man's back is broken by their weight, while only half rearing those who have the better fortune to die early. And the mother! Poor thing! Her back is probably broken first, to say nothing of her health and her heart. In fact, the unfortunate mother is too often thus destroyed for lack of this knowledge *without any poverty at all*, and all women are therefore in urgent need of salvation from this evil.

Now, I ask, would it not be far better for all parties, if some of those ten or twelve children had not been born? Two—or perhaps three, with extra hard work and economy, might be made useful, happy members of society, without killing their parents and brothers and sisters by protracted misery and starvation. The children of the poor die three times as fast as those of the rich (Dr. Drysdale, see *Home News*), and they neither live nor die for nothing. Respecting the 30,000 children that are annually destroyed in London by their parents; whether is it better or more humane to starve them miserably by inches in five years or so,—to "*put them away*" quietly as is now done,—*or*, to PREVENT their miserable existence? Can any humane or rational person hesitate as to the preferable alternative? Surely not. But now *prevent* it? This is the question for solution. The great problem of the age. Here Mr. Malthus steps in as the real saviour of humanity, for he first placed the principle of population before the world. But his apostles, who have really brought the true saving gospel to the poor of England, are James Mill, Richard Carlile, James "Watson, Edward Truelove, Robt. Dale Owen, the author of the "Elements of Social Science," and last, not least, Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant. I know not who in France deserves equal credit with the Marquis Condorcet, Raciborski, and Gamier.

Mr. Malthus only recommended the postponement of marriage till 30 years of age or upwards, until means to support a family have been accumulated, without knowing of how many the family might consist. But it is not in human nature to postpone marriage thus, particularly when statistics prove (Dr. Drysdale says in *National Reformer*, 10th June) that to delay it after 21 is to shorten life by six years! And remember that the postponement of marriage means prostitution, and that stringent measures to suppress prostitution only multiply the number of illegitimate births !

Now all children come unbidden, and come simply to kill others by over-crowding, or to be killed themselves. For even those comfortably born increase the exterminating pressure upon those who are not. This is an indisputable fact. It is also a fact, that not only is the best method of obviating this wholesale and peculiarly cruel kind of infanticide yet doubtful or unknown, but discussion of the subject is prohibited, and experiments to ascertain the best means are punishable by law. But the discussion can no longer be prevented. The whole subject must be discussed, and the experiments will soon be imperatively demanded. It is infamous to human nature, or rather *in* human nature, that no efforts should be made to prevent this barbarous but quite preventive slaughter of the innocents.

The amount of intellect hired at an enormous expense to persecute Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant for recommending its prevention, would suffice, if better directed, to go far towards solving the question. Being obviously the most important subject of the day, it should be discussed daily; as it is of supreme importance to the poor, it should be discussed most by the poor; as the pressure is heaviest upon women, it should be discussed particularly by women; as it is of vast importance to all, it should be freely discussed by all; and I hold that the State should institute skilled experiments, which should be continued and extended until successful, to ascertain the best and most certain method of avoiding the production of children, unless at the dictate of the deliberate rational judgment, and that alone.

The present exaggerated value which is placed upon human life is only the mischievous survival of a feeling proper and necessary when life was not plentiful, and when every one was of importance to the State. Now that human life is excessively redundant,—now that—so to speak—the market is glutted with it, its intrinsic value must therefore, like that of anything else—over-produced, and at a discount,—be proportionately less; and though society should certainly not relax the security which it maintains for lives which are clearly valuable, it should certainly not *force those to be bom, or to live*, whose lives *must* be painful to themselves, and hurtful or destructive to others. The attempt at suicide is proof of uselessness; and the stupidity of endeavouring to prevent it, by punishing for not succeeding in it, is obvious. Is it not equally stupid to punish for infanticide—which so far relieves the pressure of population, and is therefore so far beneficial to society? And ought we not rather to reprobate and punish for adding recklessly to the excessive population, and its demoralising and destructive pressure?

How "*my people are destroyed, for lack of knowledge!*" this particular knowledge! What blind folly to assert that if this knowledge were common, a bad use *might* be made of it by some persons! Now, who are those persons? Certainly not those who neither need nor desire, and therefore would not use—this particular knowledge. They must then be those who, for want of it, do much worse now than they might do with it, and certainly cannot do worse with it than they do without it. But the evil that they do, would by the use of such knowledge be restricted to themselves; and its disastrous and demoralising consequences would—by the prevention of the perpetuation of their evil kind, be saved to society largely and to posterity entirely. If we cannot make them moral, we can and ought at least to prevent them from being mischievous. It would be as reasonable to prohibit to all the use of medicine, money, knives and matches, because some persons might misuse them. But knowledge is different from all these things, in that the use of it is always good. If a bad use of knowledge could possibly be made, there can be but one reason? Simply that the knowledge is inadequate, and that more is necessary. Knowledge makes good people better—not worse; and is the only thing competent to make bad people good. It is the defect of knowledge alone that is the universal evil.

But how? my over-virtuous Society for the Suppression of Vice—forsooth, and other irrational persecutors of those who would *prevent* the greatest of all the evils that afflict humanity? Are YOU your brother's or your sister's keeper? Have you thought—can you not see, that if you take upon yourselves to withhold this knowledge from your now erring sisters and brothers, *you* actually assume to *yourselves*—and undertake—the grave moral responsibility for *their* consequent *errors* and *crimes*? for their *infanticide*, their *prostitution*, their *thefts*, their *murders*; which you now do nothing to prevent, but those who would prevent them, you do much to hinder! I say the voice of their innocent blood cries against you from the ground! The only way in which you can possibly vindicate your particular responsibility in this matter, is by helping those who want it—to the all-important saving knowledge by every means in your power. Give them that knowledge, and with it, you lay upon THEMSELVES the proper responsibility for their own errors; but you cannot otherwise shift it from *your guilty shoulders*! Your Vice Society is a Vicious Society. A. vice creating and vice perpetuating Society.

The Free Discussion Society sent £8 by the September mail to the Bradlaugh and Besant Defence Fund,

and I sincerely wish that I could send £100 more. I trust that all their expenses will be freely paid; for it is for the suffering human race, and its rescue from cruel poverty, that they have nobly worked and suffer.

decorative feature - leaves

E. Purton & Co., Printers, 106 Elizabeth.st., Melbourne.

Altruism, Utilitarianism, and Selfishness.

[Price Threepence.]

[A Lay Sermon read to the Sunday Free Discussion Society, Masonic Hall, Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, 11th January, 1880, by H. K. Kusden. Printed by request.]

ECCLESIASTES II, 24.—" There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his *soul* enjoy good in his labour. This also I saw that it was from the hand of God;" which, being rationally interpreted, means—that it is a law of nature.

I propose to justify this sound philosophy, which has been unwisely depreciated and falsely abused under many names, such as Epicureanism, Hobbism, but more particularly *as the selfish theory*, in contradistinction to that hyper-moral system which has been adopted by most religions as well as Christianity, which is concisely embodied in what is called the *golden rule*, and has received the modern name of "*Altruism*" or *living for others*—from the great French Positive Philosopher, *Comte*. I must, however, guard myself when advocating the general principle of utility as the *end of individual action*, against being misunderstood as adopting the formula in which it was expressed by its greatest expounder, Jeremy Bentham, as *the proper end of the legislator*—The "*greatest happiness of the greatest number*." That object may doubtless be achieved by a follower of Epicurus, of Solomon, or of Hobbes. But I maintain that it is an error to recommend such an end as a *universal PRIVATE motive*, Bentham's work, I admit, tended to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but that was not his *motive*. It was the reason that he gave to others for accepting what he taught. His sympathies were moral and social, and it gratified him so to labour. His motive was the gratification that that labour gave him; in plain English—Selfishness. And when I advocate *utility* as a rule of individual action, I mean utility, NOT to the greatest number, but to the *individual agent*, whose proper spring of action I hold to be *selfishness, self-conservation*, or having a single eye to one's own advantage. I say selfishness plainly, and not *egoism* with Mr. Herbert Spencer or *Hedonism* with Mr. Sidgwick, because I abhor compromise, and call a spade a spade. I mean *bona fide* selfishness; not mistaken, short-sighted selfishness — which is really self-sacrifice and not selfishness at all; but the most far-sighted, wise, discriminative, and esthetic selfishness. This is not putting a new meaning on the word; for it is plain as I said, that imperfect or mistaken selfishness is not selfishness at all, but self-sacrifice. I wish to correct the general misapplication of the term selfishness. If a man by miscalled selfish conduct makes himself hated, or ruins his constitution, he does himself a manifest injury which no really selfish man would do. Such conduct should be called ignorant, stupid, self-sacrificing, or working for others; anything but selfishness. I propose to show that a wise, enlightened selfishness is the only proper and efficacious principle of human action; that therefore it is a mistake to deprecate it, and to attempt to lead men to act upon any other principle; and that as a matter of fact all the good that has been done in the world has been done on that principle. I shall show on the other hand that *Altruism*, or working for others, is, as a principle not only hypocritical and false, but necessarily abortive; and historically has, therefore, done more evil than good. Although good actions have been recommended and bad ones deprecated, the reasons adduced for good conduct having been false, less good has resulted than if the sound and effective principle of self-interest had been inculcated instead.

The hypermoral theory of altruism, or working for others, is full of anomalies and contradictions, so that if consistently pushed to its legitimate results it would be found to involve much more than self-destruction. So that although a person were to sacrifice himself for the good of others, which of course should be the highest virtue according to the principle of altruism, still if he recommended all others to act on the same rule, and they *were* to act upon it, obviously universal self-destruction would follow, and the object would be defeated. This is scarcely a perfect result. But suppose that only those who *admired* the rule were to act upon it—and *that* is more than are ever likely to do so—then those only who were capable of the highest virtue would accomplish their own destruction, and those incapable of it would alone be preserved. This result would perhaps not be actually so bad as it should be deemed by those who advocate altruism; for the altruists would be exterminated, and the *others* for whom they had sacrificed themselves would alone, as the fittest, survive to judge of and profit by the results. Each one should then, for the sake of the *others* as well as of himself, see the radical viciousness of the principle, and should at least enquire whether some moral principle could not be discovered upon which others might be recommended to act without encountering the destruction or disadvantage not only of themselves but also of all who adopt and act upon their rule of life.

I do not pretend that all or any Altruists push their principle to these consistent logical conclusions from it. That they do not is that of which I complain; because they are bound to apply it consistently if it be true, and" if its consistent application lead to obvious absurdities which have to be rejected by its advocates, the principle itself must be regarded as false. But I shall examine other modifications of the principle of altruism and see whether or not they are to be involved in the same condemnation.

I will take the golden rule itself as embodying the principle, so far as it is accepted by Altruists, including Confucians, Buddhists, and Christians of all denominations—"Do to others as you would that they should do to you." I must, however, remark that on the face of it this rule has reciprocity so obviously in view that those who advocate it should be the last to object to the principle of utility. The words "as you would that others should do to you" clearly imply the return to be expected from others, and that that is the reason of the conduct recommended. But whether thus interpreted by the principle of utility or not the rule is bad, and would lead to both personal and social destruction. I admit that there are such people as professed pessimists, who say that life is not worth living; and that to them the achievement of such results should be the highest virtue; but I am not aware that any pessimist has ever consistently advocated the practice of the golden rule upon that ground. Pessimists are, however, in such a minority and so particularly inconsistent that I shall leave them out of consideration. If the golden rule be adopted irrespective of the utilitarian expectation of reciprocity, it becomes an invitation to depredation, and is consistent altruism, or self-sacrifice for the sake of others. Not that the good of others would be really served without reciprocity. *It would NOT.* You could achieve virtue yourself according to this standard by stripping yourself and giving all to the poor. But were all to do the same, no one would have anything, and as there would be no wealth to support more population than in primitive savagery, population must fall to that level, and, as I said before, personal and social destruction would result. But without supposing such an absurdity as that men would generally act so unnaturally, it is easy to see that similarly evil results would follow a much more limited practice of the altruistic principle. If those whom society deposes to preserve order and security; if our gaolers, police, and magistrates were to act upon the golden rule, no offender would be arrested, not to say punished, crime would be unchecked, and social disorganisation must result. If only those who profess to believe it to be a duty to sell all they have and give the proceeds to the poor, were to do so, the same results to a large extent would follow. The precept is on the face of it absurd, being impracticable universally; for obviously if all were sellers and givers there would be no buyers. The less stringent instruction, however, to do as you would that others should do to you, would, as I have said, disorganise society, for no constable or magistrate could perform his duty and observe the rule. Let us now suppose that the rule were to be practised to a limited extent by all. Let every man retain just enough for his own necessities, and give only the surplus away, though it is a question whether he should ever have a surplus, it is clear that in any case there would then be no wealth. Now it should be obvious that without wealth in the hands of individuals there would be no surplus accumulations employed in creating the means of civilisation, without which no more population could subsist than in savage countries where they are unknown. There could certainly be no railways nor telegraphs," no libraries, banks, universities, post-offices, manufactories, ships, nor even any large establishments, nor businesses. Civilisation would be an impossibility, and nine-tenths of the present population could not be supported. The present extra population subsists upon the surplus wealth earned and saved by comparatively a few, and invested by them so as to enable them to live upon the interest. They cannot do so without making the principal benefit society. Were the wealth-savers to do to all the thriftless as they in the place of the thriftless would wish to be done to them, the wealth would be divided as soon as, or rather before, it accumulated, and could not be available in the quantities necessary to civilisation. The investment of this wealth gives employment and the means of living to millions who otherwise could never have existed, and who now would starve were the investment of wealth to cease.

The golden rule is a rule of Communism, and is incompatible with the existence of wealth or the well-being of society. The utilitarian rule of the *greatest: happiness for the greatest number* is obviously an amendment upon the golden rule, but it has been in my opinion constructed more with an eye to the good of society and to negating the defects of the golden rule than to the enunciation of a strictly accurate rule of private life. Altruism doubtless was aimed at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and was also intended to include that of the agent also; but much is lost in truth as well as simplicity by stating as a rule of action what is really only a collateral result of virtuous conduct, and what is certainly not effective with, or felt or approved as a motive by, a majority of men. There can be no doubt that the large majority of men leave the greatest happiness of the greatest number TO the greatest number, and look almost exclusively after number one, and that alone. And they are perfectly right in doing so, and only wrong in doing so imperfectly. They too commonly misconceive their own best interest, and therefore fail to further that of the greatest number, with which their own is necessarily identified. It is a man's true interest to be perfectly truthful, not because it is a fact that it is good for society, and therefore for him as a part of it that he should be so; but because it is a fact that by misrepresenting facts to others, and still more by appearing to gain by doing so, he more or less destroys

his own judgment of truth and falsehood, and of what is wise and foolish. He cannot deceive another without laying the foundation of a self-destructive habit which with every step becomes more incorrigible. If he fail in deceiving, the mischief to himself may not be so important; for though the habit still tends to form, the result does not justify the policy. But if he succeed in deceiving, and gain some pecuniary or other present advantage, the injury to himself is irreparable; for he has actually experimentally achieved an argument for believing that falsehood is of more value than truth, and his judgment cannot fail to be distorted, and the habit of deceit to be strengthened, in proportion to the apparent present gain. The degeneration of the judgment is the more sure in that it is wholly insensible, and that there is no chance of retrieving it but by more often repeated failures in deceiving, though even that is more likely to be attributed to clumsiness or accident, or any but the true cause. Dr. Maudsley—one of the highest authorities on Insanity—expressly states that a habit of deceit is conducive to insanity; and anyone may remark how childishly and absurdly persons of even good original abilities often commit themselves at last when the habit of deceit is confirmed. The degeneration of judgment is inevitable and rapid, and affects the intellect generally, as the result—insanity—implies. Truthfulness, in my opinion, covers all that is most important in morality. The social advantages of a reputation for truthfulness and honesty are obvious enough, and in view of the conflicting speculative opinions on the subject, popular proverbs speak the general conviction, based upon experience, with remarkable plainness. "Honesty is the best policy," and "truth will out," are axioms admitted by every one to be generally certain, and only supposed to be liable to exceptions in particular circumstances by those who are ignorant of the extent to which all social and moral phenomena are inter-related and dependent, and how appropriate, uniform, and inevitable are the remotest and most complex sequences of cause and effect. The vast importance to us of true information in any matter in which we are required to act is obvious enough, if only from the pains which men take to secure it, which prove, I think, that a higher value than formerly is now and will in future be placed upon human veracity. Moral feeling is an instinctive habit, of slow growth, and precedes the conscious philosophy of the process, which however is but the discernment of self-interest as the real motive power in every case. But who will question that it must be every one's real true interest in every way to be perfectly wise and virtuous? There is no person living who would not be so if he could, and if evil habit were not too strong for the deliberate dictates of experience and reason. Who does not see that self-interest lies in securing the good opinion and gratitude of others by acts fitted to command them? Who does not know that a single act of perfidy or cruelty will outweigh and negative in social estimation years of consistent moral conduct; and that therefore the only way to secure a reputation for virtue and beneficence is to *be* habitually as virtuous, wise, and beneficent as possible? Nay, independent of reputation, it is better to **BE** wise and efficient for one's own sake, in order to **BE** as powerful as possible in act; and no man can be as powerful in act as he who can command the hearty and united action of his fellow-men. And whoever would command it must entitle himself to it by prior beneficence to them. Not that I wish to imply that reputation is everything, or anything to compare with the self-satisfaction sometimes found in setting public opinion at defiance. The sacrifice of income or reputation to one's own respect is rarely required; but the maintenance of one's self-respect at the sacrifice of reputation and income brings a superior self-satisfaction, besides generally securing an exalted reputation with a minority whose opinion is best worth having.

Now, whoever would benefit mankind must act so as to make them wiser and more efficient in action, more civilised, in fact. No man has done this so effectually and largely as those who have laboured with no object in view but that of making *themselves* as wise and powerful as possible; and those who have pretended to labour to make others wiser and better directly, and not solely to make themselves so, have not only done less to make men generally wise and efficient, but have as a rule made them less so than have those who had no object in view but to make themselves wise and efficient. My opinion to this effect would be worth little enough unless in so far as it is supported by history and experience, and to them, therefore, I shall refer.

It is commonly and truly said, that Julius Cæsar did more for the civilisation of Europe than any other individual; and few will contest that what he did was done solely for his own aggrandisement and not for the advantage of others. It is equally notorious that the advantage of even the Roman people was entirely a subordinate consideration with him. But there is no doubt that his purely selfish work contributed largely to spread among all the different peoples of Europe a knowledge of each other, the Roman moral feeling, the Roman law, and Roman speech, which prepared the way for commerce the great agent of civilization, and imbued them with a regard for law and order which is its necessary condition. Sir Isaac Newton worked for others as little as did Julius Cæsar. He simply exercised his natural faculties to the top of his bent without thinking of others at all. Yet his mathematical and astronomical discoveries not only facilitated ocean navigation and therefore commerce unprecedentedly, but gave men such new views of the universe, as to revolutionise their conceptions of its conditions, its duration and its origin, and to contribute more to the abolition of superstition than he himself would have liked to believe possible. James Watt, George Stephenson, and Wheatstone have in my opinion done more than almost anyone else to improve the morality of mankind by

multiplying their means of communication, their relations and ideas, and teaching them insensibly how mutually dependent they are upon each other, and how indissolubly their interests are connected. Yet there was nothing in their motives beyond the indulgence of their particular hobbies, and if they foresaw at all the possible benefit of others in the resolute selfish prosecution of their work, it certainly was not their motive, which was simply to follow their special inclinations. I have elsewhere proved that even John Howard the celebrated philanthropist did the same, and that to say that he was *disinterested* in devoting himself to the work in which he confessedly felt most *interest*, is a contradiction in terms. Howard's only son offers a striking contrast to his father. After wild dissipation in early youth, while his father was too busy about felons and prisoners all over Europe to watch the result of the extra pious education he provided for his son, young Howard became a lunatic for ten years before he died. Now his was a genuine case of *self-sacrifice* with the natural appropriate result. Howard neglected his son if not himself; and yet while professing to work for others only, he obtained a higher reputation than any other man, and indulged himself in his particular whim to the top of his bent. But unfortunately as I have elsewhere shewn, the work that he did has really tended to demoralise society, by creating a sympathy for criminals—a disregard of the interests of honest people—and a rapid degeneration of posterity. The appalling increase in the proportion of lunacy is largely due to Howard's hypermoral action. The rate of increase of lunatics in England is such that the total should overtake the total number of the population in less than 300 years.

See Journal of Mental Science October 1879, page 310.

And here the rate of increase is more than double that in England. (*Argus* 17th Jan, 1880). Ignorant of his own real motives, Howard pretended that he acted from a love of God; but those whose eyes are open—see, that if God *is* loved, it is not even professed to be for nothing, or less than even an infinite advantage; and thus self interest is still the only real efficient motive.

The allegation of hypermoral altruistic motives is then a false and hypocritical pretence. Still if like results followed, it would be hypocritical to quarrel with the motives. But as I have just said the results are not alone deceptive and mischievous, but abortive besides. In the same way all religious rules of action are equally faulty. The rule of action should relate to the actor himself, and not falsely pretend to anything else. The rule of human action should coincide with that which nature plainly and universally dictates, and aim at self-conservation simply and candidly. Seek ye first your own best interest, mental and bodily, and all social virtues shall be attained by you in realizing that, which obviously really includes them. When Jesus directed men to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and said *all these things shall be added unto you*, that is food, clothing, and all other necessities, he certainly indirectly put it upon the footing of self-interest, but falsely; for it is certain that when men *neglect* to take thought for the morrow—of what they shall eat and drink, and wherewithal they shall be clothed, all those things *are* NOT divinely provided for them. It is precisely because they would otherwise certainly be cold and hungry, that men feel called upon and are really obliged to provide them for themselves and those dependent upon them. What would become of a man, not to say of his children, if he followed Jesus' injunction to imitate the lilies of the field, and take no thought for the morrow? Giving to him that asketh of thee, and from him that would borrow of thee, turning not away, would abolish wealth and disorganise society. This is what I call hypermoral teaching, and though if a man were to follow it he would soon find himself in the watch house, it is absurd only in so far as it attempts to go beyond the dictates of an enlightened self-interest. The results were comparable, though on a larger scale, to what followed Howard's hypermoral conduct. People went in bald-headed for piety and neglected morality. Jesus' teaching was exactly calculated to destroy society, and society was soon, in fact, entirely destroyed. Self-interest and self-improvement were entirely neglected, and nothing but piety was thought worth practising; that is by the minority of saints, of whom advantage was of course not unnaturally taken by the majority, who appreciated the practical advantages of being sinners. Jesus objected to wealth and civilisation. He was either quite ignorant of the advantages of civilisation, or he knowingly taught its extirpation. Wealth was the way to hell, and the kingdom of heaven was for the poor. If his omniscience acquainted him with possible railways and telegraphs, which *we* know are the best moralising as well as civilising agencies, he was silent about them. He objected to wealth. The result was that the civilisation which the Romans had introduced into Europe gave place to the ignorance, vice, and degradation of the middle or dark ages. Self-interest is essentially the rule of commerce; and until commerce arose, superstition reigned triumphant, and improvement was impossible. Virtue and morality were falsely held to concur in demanding the sacrifice of worldly to heavenly interest. It was commerce that first taught the essential interdependence and concurrence of all men's interests, and proved that to make a nation wealthy, all that is necessary is for individuals to mind their own business. Political economy has proved that attempts to make the state wealthy otherwise, only make it poor. It is a man's best and most enlightened self-interest to be truthful to others that he may be so to himself, and not destroy his judgment by distorting his knowledge. It is his interest to *be* what he wishes to be *thought* to be, because he cannot then appear to be anything else, and runs no risk of failure in playing a false and difficult part. It is his interest to

accumulate wealth, and it is quite as much, if not more, the interest of others that he should accumulate it. It is his interest to be beneficent to his neighbours in order to command the services of everyone in return. Some men, I have admitted, have worked *as they thought* for the good of others, but invariably have done more harm than good. It is obviously no man's highest interest to be a liar, a thief, or a murderer; and if men do act in such ways against their own interest, it is from a grave misapprehension of it, or from weakness of mind, or the force of habit, in present temptation.

But no one will deny, in any case, that men as a rule are more impressible by their own *apparent* self-interest than by altruism, and it is therefore irrational to recommend them to act upon motives which have no weight whatever with them. Now every man instinctively acts for his own self-interest, even when he alleges to others and even to himself that the good of others is his motive; and it is mere waste of energy to suggest to men any motive less certainly and universally operative. There is no other motive so universally operative or so powerful as the instinct of self-conservation, however men may have disingenuously attempted to take credit to themselves by alleging *quasi* higher but fictitious ones.

We all know this well enough, and act upon it too, whatever opinion we may profess. If starting a son in business the bishop would give him the same advice as I would. He would NOT say—My dear boy, I send you as a sheep among wolves, for whose benefit you are to work, and let them eat you if they will, taking no thought for the morrow. Imitate the lilies of the field; "they toil not, neither do they spin, and yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Shall not God much more clothe you, oh ye of little faith?" If any one asks you for your coat, give it to him, together with your waistcoat, at Once; and lend for the Lord's sake any money you may have to anyone that wants it. If you live at all it should be for others, not for yourself. And if you earnestly teach others to do the same, and they believe you, they will perhaps not ask you for more than you have got. Such would be true altruism. Religious altruism might induce the bishop to say—that for every sacrifice of himself for the good of others God will hereafter return sevenfold into his bosom. Seven hundred per cent, is not bad interest for an altruist. But you would find that the bishop would no more recommend such nonsense than would I. In advising a son, we both would say—*speculative opinion aside*—My boy, you are now to begin life for yourself, and your success depends upon yourself. If you are industrious and prudent you will gain a good position; if you are idle, thriftless, and intemperate, you will not deserve to get on, and you won't. If you are temperate, truthful, and honourable, you will have the respect and esteem of your neighbours, and what is better, of yourself. If you are mean and lie, you will be hated. If you are kind and beneficent you will be loved and happy also; as surely as if you steal and murder you will come to be hanged or to wish you were so. Your happiness is in your own hands, whether you be rich or poor. If you are unhappy it will be your own fault. To secure your own prosperity and happiness, act towards others so as to engage them to vie with each other in doing you service. And remember that you will be what habit makes you. You can't indulge sometimes or once, without beginning a habit, for habits begin in isolated acts. One dishonest act makes a man a dishonest man, but many honest acts will not make him an honest man again. The bishop would perhaps say from habit that good conduct would secure the blessing of the Lord. But it is easy to see that it is really the blessing of society that he means. Jesus said that the Lord's blessings are quite impartially distributed, like the sunlight and the rain, for he is no respecter of persons, bad or good. The only way in which good and evil as such are appropriately compensated, is by social reciprocity, which rarely errs.

The religious doctrine of the depravity of man is now happily, almost exploded, being based upon a fallacy which scarcely any one would advocate to-day. For it was assumed in that doctrine, that it is the worldly interest of men to be vicious and immoral. This is now known to be the reverse of the fact. It is now almost universally known that vice and immorality necessarily involve social injury and personal destruction; that it is every one's true worldly interest to be invariably truthful, honest, liberal, active, temperate and respectable; and that it is not only stupid but suicidal to sacrifice the solid advantages that these qualities secure, to the passing whim or sensuous gratification of the present moment. Religious people are unconsciously quite aware of this. You don't find them selling all they have and giving it to the poor. No—they are just religious enough to secure the profitable reputation for it by persecuting those who expose the duplicities and hypocrisies of religion, but they are so extremely ready to accept the *worldly* rewards of *moral* conduct, that the suspicion is unavoidable that they distrust the reality of the *heavenly* ones promised to those who *forego* them. Man is naturally ignorant, but without religion he is not depraved. He necessarily for his worldly advantage, desires to be esteemed, and natural egotism besides compels him to desire to deserve to be so. Religion which teaches him that he is depraved is the thing that thereby depraves him. Religion alone leads him to wish to profit by his neighbour's loss; not so much to gain a pretended heaven by consigning every one else to a fictitious hell hereafter, as to secure the present *WORLDLY* power—which the reputation of piety gives; by coercing non-conformists—by misusing the the powerful engine public opinion to perpetuate ignorance, to choke free enquiry and to consecrate hyper-moral fictions. But when rogues fall out honest men come by their own. The multiplication of religions is the ruin of all of them. Men now enquire if any are right and find all equally at variance with each

other and with nature. The demands of nature and society are best satisfied when a man does the best for himself physically and intellectually. Does Society suffer any more than he by his becoming wise healthy, and wealthy? No! both gain enormously. The only thing is, that such a man needs no priest; and therefore the priest and even Jesus Christ made these crimes. He cannot inherit the kingdom of God which is for the poor, the miserable, the helpless and the believer of the priest, who tells him to be content, but if he has anything, to sell it, and give to others. When men recommend you to work for others, note that they are the others for whom you are desired to work. I say suspect them. I say work for yourself; make yourself as wise, healthy, and wealthy as you can; and observe that the best means of doing this is to make all those about you your friends, and active and wise helpers of yourself. What is the difference between a man starving alone on a desert island, and a happy social man, but that one is surrounded by active, wealthy, and wise men and the other without them? There are others around him of course, neither active, nor wealthy, nor wise. But they are not useless to him, if his eyes like the wise man's are in his head. A man to become wise without them would himself have to try by experiment the bad effects of thieving, murdering, lying, drinking, incivility, extravagance, penuriousness, and intemperance, if *others* were not so obliging as to serve as examples to him, by *working for others*, and *sacrificing themselves*, in this particular way. Is it not strange that with so many warnings and examples before them, men so frequently go and do likewise, instead of becoming wise thereby? This is not only because they inherit from all their ancestors the shortsightedness and proneness to mistake their apparent and immediate pleasure for their real ultimate advantage; but also because they are mis-taught that their best worldly interest is contrary to their ultimate interest; that nature which universally prompts to self-conservation, is wrong, and that the priest who urges him to work for others, *including the priest*, is right. But if men would only wisely discern their own best worldly interest and strive vigorously to achieve it, they would benefit society far more than by hypocritically pretending to work for others.

There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul (that is his intellect) enjoy good in his labour. This also I saw, that it was the law of his nature.

decorative feature - leaves

E. Purton & Co., Steam Printers, 106 Elizabeth-st., Melbourne.

This paper having been written in compliance with a request, is now published together with the note with which it was returned declined. The reader will judge whether the reason given was a just and true one.

MELBOURNE SOCIAL SCIENCE CONGRESS. Office—Custom House. Melbourne, 18th Nov. 1880.

Dear Sir,

I am directed by the Committee of the Economy Section of No. 5 Department to return to you the Paper enclosed, and to inform you that they do not consider the subject treated therein one which comes within the scope of the Economy Section.

Yours faithfully,

J. S. Greig,

Hon. Sec.

H. K. Eusden, Esq.,

Poverty and Wealth.

It is commonly said that there should be no poverty in such a place as Victoria, yet it undeniably exists here. How is this? All are not poor here. Some are wealthy; some are not wealthy; but some are poor. What is poverty? Poverty is comparative. The same man who possesses what would make him not other than poor in a civilized—might find it wealth in a poorer—place. Poverty is having not only less than other people of the means of subsistence, but absolutely insufficient to maintain oneself in efficiency and health. To say then that poverty exists, is equivalent to saying that conditions are unequal.

Well, men are born naturally unequal, and if they could all be made equal tomorrow, which they cannot, they would not remain so five minutes. To make men equal, they must be of the same size, health, strength and wit; as well as wealth; and though a lack of one may be compensated by plenty of another, men differently constituted cannot properly be called equal.

Men are born unequal. But as regards wealth the main point is this. Some men are born with THRIFT, while the majority of men are without it, or have less of it than others. All men desire wealth, and would have it if

they could. But those who are without thrift will never have wealth; or if it come to them by any odd chance, it is ten to one that they will not keep it. There is no cure for the lack of thrift. Those who have not thrift, the natural knack of accumulation, will never acquire it. Thrift is a moral quality, and like all moral qualities it is congenital—inherited. Thrift is not economy alone, nor industry alone nor cleverness alone, nor a combination of these, though they may often be concomitants. But thrift seems to me to be what I have called it, 'a special faculty or *knack of accumulation*. A thrifty man is one whose pleasure lies less in spending than in accumulating, and whose abilities minister to his desire. Let him be born ever so poor, he will become wealthy, whatever the circumstances in which he may be placed. In whomsoever *thrift* really exists, it will tell; whether associated with benevolence and generosity as in Robert Owen and Leclaire, or on the other hand with habits of laziness and even drunkenness.

There is no error more common than the supposition that wealthy men become so at the expense of other people. The converse is nearer the case. Without thrifty men, no wealth could be accumulated; and no civilization nor numerous population would be possible. The numerous population subsists therefore by means partly of the wealth which the thrifty accumulate; and were the thrifty and their wealth annihilated, or were they prevented from accumulating, the numerous population must dwindle quickly or slowly down to the numbers which can subsist without civilisation and wealth. Fifty years ago Melbourne maintained less than one savage for every thousand of its present inhabitants; and were wealth and thrift to disappear the people would die off to the numbers of the aboriginal inhabitants, who had not only no thrift, but no idea of property. If, therefore, it is the interest of many people to live, it is their interest that some thrifty people should accumulate. For the thrifty man does not live upon his principal, but upon interest gained by passing it to the hands of others to use for the benefit of the community. He himself uses the interest only, but cannot do even that without giving the use of his principal to others, the use of it by whom, to enable them to pay the interest to him, *must* benefit the whole community. The interest upon which he lives is a trifle to that which the circulation or use of the principal realises for all. Every member of the community benefits by it; for everyone may for a trifle telegraph or travel by railway or steamer to the antipodes by means which were created by the thrift of a few. Thus not only the comfort and prosperity of the community, but the very existence of a dense population depends upon the thrift of some; for no dense population can subsist without the accumulation of wealth by some. The unthrifty dense population therefore lives rather at the expense of the thrifty, than the thrifty at the expense of the unthrifty. Large numbers of persons earn so little or save so little, that they are barely self-supporting, and even their labour, would often be of no worth to the community, were it not directed by others, who if not thrifty themselves, are employed by the thrifty for the purpose.

Society is thus composed of a mass of people, a few of whom are thrifty and wealthy, but many of whom are less so in differing degrees. Some few are over thrifty and never enjoy the benefit of the wealth their thrift produces to the community. When combined with penuriousness, it produces little happiness to the saver himself, though the benefit to society by the accumulation of his savings is none the less. The bulk of society, I think it may be said, are not thrifty, but are sufficiently prudent to raise themselves, at least in later life, above the level of the poor. But there are large numbers in every community who are naturally entirely incapable of thrift, notwithstanding that some of them work hard and are not imprudent. The children of thriftless people are at a special disadvantage in inheriting unthrifty habits, besides wanting the knowledge which is power. They never save from what they earn, and often earn scarcely enough to save anything. The industrious and the prudent—although not actually thrifty, will not be poor, unless from special causes such as misfortune or ignorance. But the idle, the lazy, the improvident, those who take no thought for the morrow, will without thrift be poor and remain so. Nothing will make them otherwise, unless shame or misery create in them a desire to improve.

The private evils of poverty it is not my purpose to dilate upon. The personal privation, discomfort, disease and loss of respect, are notorious results, too often aggravated by their infliction on a whole family. But the public social aspect of them is of more importance and affects all classes. The crime, disease, lunacy, and drunkenness, which are more or less necessary concomitants of poverty, permeate all classes and deteriorate the race. The enormous increase of lunacy and the prevalence of drunkenness are gigantic evils which affect every class of rich and poor, and I have brought them to the notice of other sections of this congress, and proposed remedies the advantages of which were not and could not be disputed; and the alleged impracticability of which consists in nothing more than the disinclination to use them.

I propose now to examine the causes of poverty, which are all divisible into primary and secondary. I shall call those primary which are congenital and therefore irremediable defects, such as the lack of thrift, the lack of sense, and the lack of energy. We see people every day with these natural defects, which they recognise and would remedy if they could; but feel themselves—or simply are—incapable of doing so. All desire wealth, and would do almost anything within their capacity to get it. But few have the faculty of thrift; and if more have intelligence it has generally a very limited special direction; while energy without sense or thrift is wasted

unless under the direction of the sense or thrift of others. We find these faculties combined—or existing separately in various degrees in the majority of people, so as to prevent their falling into absolute poverty. Those who are without them, and who inherit besides habits of idleness, vice and dissipation, fall inevitably into poverty, and too often recruit the ranks of immorality and crime. I have elsewhere recommended what I consider the only practicable course which I think that society can and should pursue to prevent this general degradation of the moral average of the people, by permanently eliminating the lowest on the scale when selected by themselves and the law as criminals or lunatics.

But there is a secondary cause of poverty and degradation which *is* remediable. This is the lack of knowledge which is power. Knowledge is of immense value and assistance both to the thrifty, the wise, and the energetic. Knowledge enables them to minimise their difficulties and to maximise their action. But as it is of more consequence to avoid pain than to achieve pleasure—to repel poverty than to accumulate wealth, so knowledge must be regarded as of even more value to assist those to avoid, poverty who are without thrift, wit and energy, than to help to wealth—those who possess those qualities. Knowledge how to avoid poverty is attainable. The sense and resolution to apply it are another matter, and are beyond the reach of those who have not inherited thrift, wit and energy. For them there is no help. But there are vast numbers of people who have just enough sense and resolution to save them from poverty, if they only had also the necessary knowledge. To save them—to prevent them from swelling the numbers of those at the very bottom of the moral scale, and thus surely the lowering of the moral average, is then the object I have in view : and I consider it the duty as well as interest of those who desire to prevent the degradation of the moral average, to assist to spread this knowledge as widely as possible.

The knowledge most effective to preserve from poverty, is unquestionably that of the law of population and its consequences as expounded by modern malthusianism. That law is, that population in excess of the means of subsistence must die off, and poverty is the painful process. It is not necessary that a whole country shall be over-populated to produce the result. Wherever in any country or in any house, there is insufficient food for the population, the process begins at once. Extermination commences with privation, and privation is poverty. Now where among us does privation begin?

If a young single person cannot earn a good living and save a little out of it, it must be from a physical, mental or moral defect, which being hereditary is incurable. Instances constantly occur in which individuals with no special advantages but the natural talent of thrift, attain from the lowest rank to wealth and eminence. But without the special talent of thrift, an individual may, by industry, energy, and temperance, maintain himself in a respectable position and keep himself from anything like poverty. But when an average man who can get no more than a single man's wages, has with one pair of hands, to provide for eight or ten mouths, backs, and feet, he is obviously at an enormous disadvantage. His wages are determined by the competition of single persons, and unless he can do the work of five or six, how can he provide properly for a large family? And if he has a difficulty in providing for the necessities of their bodies, how can he furnish their minds with knowledge in which he himself is deficient? This is where it touches society. If children must thus be bred up in ignorance and helplessness, if not in want and squalor, what is the prospect for the next generation? and is it surprising if they resort to immorality and crime for a living. The enormous increase of lunacy and drunkenness cannot much longer be passed over with customary apathy. Society still declines to interfere; and if individuals do not know how to help themselves, there is no other help available. If their means are limited, they must learn to limit their responsibilities; and the only way to do so is by recognising the principle of the law of population, and acting upon it with determination. Even temperance and frugality will not enable one pair of hands to provide properly for eight or ten children.

The law of population is based on the fact that human increase takes place in a geometrical ratio. Population doubles itself in a few years, while food can only increase slowly by dint of arduous human labor. The consequence is that the population must die down to the level of the means of subsistence; not of food alone, but of care in infancy and sickness. It does so under all circumstances, Sometimes by famine as in Ireland and India, by poverty as in England, by pestilence as in many other places, by infanticide nearly all over the world. The population in England doubles in about forty years, notwithstanding that 256,000 die yearly under 20 years of age. It *really* doubles in less than 20 years, but the means of subsistence cannot be increased to keep up with it, and it necessarily dies down to their level; the weakest, the rising generation being crushed out of existence in the struggle, being deprived of the care which their parents are unable to afford. This is proved by the fact that the children of the poor die three times as fast as the children of the rich, while those of the rich die many times as fast as they ought. They are destroyed by ignorance of the law of population.

Now I contend that the wanton over production of children in the face of their enormous preventable destruction, is equivalent to wholesale murder, causes nearly all avoidable poverty, and incalculable sorrow and unhappiness, to say nothing of the enormous waste of labour in half rearing thousands who must inevitably die prematurely. Were this wholesale overproduction and consequently unnecessary murder of the innocents

prevented, an immense amount of human sorrow, immorality, and wasted labour would be saved. Most of it is saved in France, and therefore can and should be saved in England. The means are within everybody's reach, and the knowledge of them has—in the face of foul abuse and ignorant persecution—been published by men and women who have had sense to perceive that the welfare of civilised mankind depends upon its promulgation. Mr. J. S. Mill, says (*Political Economy* p. 226)—"Civilisation in every one of its aspects is a struggle against the animal instincts." Note—"Little improvement can be expected in morality until the producing large families is regarded with the same feelings as drunkenness or any other physical excess." Yet there are many people who pretend to moral feelings and principles, who insist that men ought to be guided in this matter by their animal instinct alone, and not by the intellectual judgment of the wise and prudent! "But while" Mr. Mill proceeds "the aristocracy and the clergy are foremost to set the example of this kind of incontinence, what can be expected of the poor?" Now I think much may be expected of the poor if only they possess the necessary knowledge. For the poor need not be poor, if they will use this knowledge which is to them inestimable by placing their fate in their own hands but this does not affect the poor alone. Society is deeply interested in lessening poverty as the cause of crime and immorality. One of the best and most direct means of lessening poverty, crime and immorality, is the wide circulation of the knowledge of how to prevent the excess in one's own house—of population in excess of the means of subsistence; and I shall be happy to communicate to anyone the names of the publications devoted to that end, and where to get them.

H. K. Rusden.

decorative feature

E. Purton & Co., Steam Printers, 106 Elizabeth-st., Melbourne.

Free Agency.

THE subject advertised by Mr. S—to be discussed on Sunday, the 21st of June, 1868, was Free Agency; and the writer hereof, having undertaken on the previous Sunday evening to show the absolute incompatibility of Free Agency with Moral Responsibility, read nearly the following words; almost double the usual time having been accorded to him for the purpose, by a stretch of courtesy on the part of Mr. S—and the meeting:—

"For *it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.* [Phil. ii. 13]:—

A more emphatic and distinct contradiction than is expressed in this verse, of the whole theory of freewill, can scarcely be conveyed by words. The real responsibility for all human acts good and bad, is here clearly laid upon God. For if it be attempted to evade this conclusion by alleging that the words were addressed to a class or number of persons limited in number and exceptional in virtue;—it is still as obvious that it is thereby implied that others, wanting in that virtue, were so solely for want of the requisite operation of God in them in their original construction if not after. But as Paul, with ordinary theological inconsistency, flatly contradicts here the basis of the Christian and every other religion, and as he constantly furnishes authorities for various Christian sects mutually to refute and condemn each other, I shall turn to the logical aspect of the matter, and be satisfied with showing the radical inconsistency and absurdity of the freewill doctrine in itself.

I believe that to Mr. Buckle belongs the credit of having first indicated the intimate relationship that subsists between the doctrine of freewill, and the superficial notion of chance; and between the doctrine of predestination, and the empirical conviction of the necessary sequence of natural phenomena. Freewill is simply chance personified; and predestination is the personification and deification of causation. Chance and freewill both imply that some events are not the necessary results of their antecedents; that is that they are uncaused. This is of course utterly irreconcilable with the indisputable axiom that *every thing must* have a cause. Fatalism and predestination on the contrary, both imply that some future event, no matter how presumed or inferred, *must happen*, whatever may be done to prevent or avert it. This also clearly involves a glaring absurdity; namely, that the present is determined, not by the past, but by the future; the antecedent by its consequent; which is equivalent to reversing the relations of cause and effect as completely as the dogma of freewill ignores or denies them.

The necessitarian doctrine, on the other hand, assumes no more than facts prove,—that under like conditions, like effects must follow; and that under any given conditions, alternatives are really impossible. It is as absolutely impossible under any given conditions that any other result *can* follow than that which actually *does* follow, as that *both* of two incompatible results can follow.

For as Hobbes has well proved, *any sufficient cause must* be also a *necessary cause.*" I hold that to be a *sufficient cause*, to which nothing is wanting to the producing of the *effect.* The same also is a *necessary cause.* For if it be possible that a *sufficient cause* shall not bring forth the *effect*, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the *cause was not sufficient*; but if it be impossible that a *sufficient*

cause should not produce the *effect*, then is a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause, for that is said to produce an effect *necessarily* that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced, is produced *necessarily*; for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also, *voluntary* actions are necessitated. Lastly, that ordinary *definition* of a *free agent*, namely, *that a free agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it*, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be *sufficient*, that is to say *necessary*, and yet the *effect* shall not follow."—Hobbes' Works, vol. iv., p. 274.

The necessitarian holds that the future results of present conditions, though necessitated, can only be inferred, in so far as those conditions resemble others previously experienced. Under new conditions, therefore, we cannot predict the results; and the supposed perfect foreknowledge of God which is not pretended to have been acquired by experience, has therefore no cause—no basis, and is merely something magical, and naturally impossible. Were it however real and absolutely certain, the course of *events* must obviously be so too; all man's actions and thoughts must necessarily be pre-determined also, and man of course could not be responsible for either. Any attempt to hold him responsible would be the depth of injustice. I am to shew that responsibility is as impossible under the freewill theory as under that of predestination.

To enable you to look at the question from a new standpoint, I will ask each of you to imagine himself for once in the position of a creator. This should give every advantage to the theological position, for as a creator you would be likely to exact more than as a creature you might like to concede. But there is also a natural diffidence or reserve experienced in judging of the relations of creatures to a creator when viewed from the standing of the former, which fetters, intimidates, and therefore incapacitates the reason more or less, for impartial judgment. We shall for every reason I think make a fairer estimate of those relations by regarding the subject from the supposed creator's level, or any other rather than from the more common one of the creature. But my arguments against freewill are as strong and valid with respect to any possible creator, and even viewed from the creature's standpoint. It is mere evasion to say we are not, and cannot place ourselves, in a position to judge of our Creator. In *one* important sense, certainly, we cannot, and do not. If the creator were producible, together with proof that we are his creatures, we should have something tangible to go upon and criticise, though there might then be really some presumption in doing so. But as it is we have absolutely nothing beyond *human ideas* of a creator and creations to deal with; and *human ideas*, are of all things, the most eligible and profitable for human criticism. For thus knowledge is best gained and corrected. It cannot be shewn that we have anything more—any farther basis for the argument—than human ideas; my argument is, in fact, a challenge for the production of anything farther; because, failing its production, the mere assertion upon no other evidence of a creator and a creation, is entirely gratuitous, baseless, and therefore in contempt of veracity.

Well, suppose you have created your creature and endowed him with perfect freewill. Then in whatever circumstances you place your free creature,—on what principle of justice can you possibly *blame* him for acting in *any conceivable* manner? *The freedom, you give him is his entire Justification.* DESTROY THAT FREEDOM by ever so slight a tendency or inducement one way or another,—by precept, by command, by promise of reward or threat of punishment,—and however slight the influence so produced, it *must necessarily* operate and determine, in the absence, as supposed at first, of any counteracting tendency or power. For any power of resisting such influence must have a cause, which by the freedom from predisposition you conferred, you precluded from arising in himself. Every motive tends to determine. Freedom is the absence of determining motive; and therefore every motive, influencing or resisting, *must destroy freedom.* And every motive, influencing or resisting, must have a cause; and any obstacle to the operation of a good influence sufficient to prevent its dominance, must be a prior, stronger evil tendency; which must result either from a defect in the original constitution or in the materials of which it was formed. But in neither case can the defect be chargeable upon the creature, by any principle of justice; but obviously upon the ignorance, incompetence, or deliberate intention of yourself as creator, in selecting or manipulating your materials. Clearly as creator, you must be responsible for any original tendency in your creature towards good, or towards evil; as well as for the circumstances in which you place him, and also for any susceptibility in him to be influenced by them. If you give him an evil constitution and associations, you can easily predict a corresponding result. Make him good, and he cannot become bad; unless subjected to subsequent influences so bad as to overpower his goodness.

Observe,—that as regards your responsibility, it makes no difference whether you are an omniscient creator or not. If you are, you are of course the absolute sole cause of the results whatever they may be. But if not, and you in ignorance of possible consequences, take upon yourself to create creatures, you are no less the sole cause of, and therefore quite as much responsible for, all the evil that may ensue.

Now as regards man. HE is susceptible to innumerable influences, from, and *even before* his birth as to which he has no control or option whatever, but which absolutely determine his, fate. And, observe—that any one of these influences **MUST DESTROY**, his freedom; for each, when present, **MUST** infallibly sway him entirely, unless counteracted by a stronger one, whencesoever derived.

It has been, and may be contended, that man's freedom consists in the power of choosing by which of two equal influences he shall be swayed. Allow them to be equal; and if he then choose either, he must do so without any reason, or motive, or cause. If there be a reason, or cause in himself at all, it constitutes necessarily a predisposition, which was excluded by the premisses. But *suppose* such a power of choice to exist;—is it good or bad? Surely that must depend wholly on the badness or goodness of the being in which it exists; for power is but a latent quality, the activity of which constitutes the being in which it exists, good or bad, according to the results. If this power be indifferent, it can neither be good nor bad; therefore not moral, and responsibility is impossible. If responsibility is, or can be obligatory, freedom from obligation of whatever kind, must be irresponsibility. A *free will* then means simply an *irresponsible will*, and *freedom is essentially, irresponsibility*. But say that the man or his will determines his choice to good or bad. If he be free, surely he is free to choose one as much as the other, and *his freedom is his full justification*. If not free, surely it must then be because he is *subject* to some influence either good or bad; but in either case he is only the *subject*; for anything which excites or influences him to act destroys his freedom. To call a man *free*, is then simply to call him—not only neither good nor bad, i.e. meritorious or the contrary—but *incapable of being either, until he lose that freedom*. But we feel and know that *men are really and intrinsically good or bad*—moral beings in fact; but they are and can be such, in so far only as they are freely susceptible to good or bad influences, and as they are not free to select them.

What does the strikingly pregnant word CHARACTER mean? If not the *inherent moral constitution of a man which determines the quality of his actions, and in conformity with which he necessarily acts in a way absolutely incompatible with the supposition that he is free to act otherwise*? The word character has absolutely no meaning or significance whatever, under any other theory. How could we ever distinguish, and what essential difference would there be, between a good and a bad man, if either were free to be the other? Free, not only to *do as he liked*, but to *like to do* good or bad acts, indiscriminately or by chance, or otherwise than as his natural constitution may determine? What is education, business, daily life, argument, but discerning the motives or influences which move other men, and furnishing fresh ones to induce them to act as we desire? And what is our desire? Can we *choose* our desires? If we could, action would be superfluous. Can we choose not to thirst, when dry? Not to hunger when fasting? Can we, by *choosing*, be rich or learned, when we are the contrary? Who would not be both, if *choosing* would do it? And who would not cease to desire, what when unattainable, makes the heart sick to yearn for,—*if he could*? Can we *by choice* or *at will*, NOT desire to be rich or wise, when we are satisfied of the solid advantages of riches and wisdom? Can we *by choice*, be careless of the good opinion of others, and of the advantages of upright conduct, when experience has proved to us their superlative value? Then what *merit* is there in being virtuous? Can a poor wretch, ignorant of those advantages, *choose* to be so wise as to see what his experience never plainly taught him—that honesty is the best policy, and that lying and cheating are a most self-destructive policy? Then how can we justly *blame* him for dishonesty? Can Mr. S..... *at will* believe in Atheism? He may say that he can, *if he likes*. But *can he like*, at will? No more than I can believe in the Bible, which I long tried hard to do. Can either of us, *at will*, *believe* or *like*, otherwise than as we *do* believe and like? We can do whatever is within our power, IF WE LIKE and WILL; but we have clearly NO CHOICE whatever as to WHAT *we shall will or like*. Allow the strongest and most universal of reasons to exist—and *no one can believe what appears to him to be untrue, or disbelieve that which appears true*. Were Mr. S—to get £10,000 a year for it, he could not believe that I am now standing on my head, nor for ten times that amount can I believe that any proposition which is self-contradictory can be true; or that to evade or shelve the difficulty by calling it a *mystery*, is not a miserable evasion, and a cowardly abdication of reason, in fact the rankest infidelity! For CONSISTENCY is the only means attainable among men whereby they may be saved—from falsehood and error; and nothing can be more radically inconsistent and contradictory than the dogma of freewill, or the best human conception of a Deity. But plainly it would be simply iniquitous to punish or to hold responsible any man for his belief; which must depend upon the amount and nature of the evidence, and the *natural capacity* for apprehending it, which no one has within his choice; and therefore no one can deserve the slightest credit or discredit, praise or blame, for believing or disbelieving anything whatever.

But morality means manners, not belief; and moral responsibility therefore relates to actions solely, and not opinions. Man is obviously not responsible for the amount of knowledge he possesses, which is the basis of his opinions; for notoriously *every man would if he could, know everything*. He may take greater or less pains to get knowledge according to the natural strength or weakness of his desire for it, (which he cannot choose); he may apply it to good or to bad purposes, according to the goodness or badness of his natural constitution, and of his education and experience; but nothing is more certain than that he would, *if he could, know everything*. Man is also morally responsible exactly in proportion to his knowledge, and physically responsible to the extent of his power of action, and of his liability to the consequences of his acts. But his responsibility extends no farther. Were he a free agent, as far as words have any meaning, he could not be responsible at all;—for his acts being

on that theory *uncaused*, or the result of chance, reward and punishment could have no useful, uniform, or certain effect upon him; and responsibility, if nominally supposed, could not be enforced, and therefore could not practically exist. But though reward and punishment on the theory of freewill, are absolutely useless and absurd, on that of necessity their efficacy must be both proper and necessary; and greater or less according to circumstances. Every event being the necessary result of its antecedents, reward and punishment MUST affect future events, as part of their antecedents. But if man were free, and his acts not necessary consequences of their antecedents, reward and punishment would no longer be such, as they would bear no relation to their antecedents or consequences; and for this reason while men believe in freewill, they are and must be deprived of the benefit of much of the salutary effect which reward and punishment would otherwise produce.

Whence then arose this senseless doctrine? Apparently it was an invention of pious intolerance, in order to provide a reason for hating and persecuting people of a different opinion.. Blame is simply the imputation of wickedness, and the expression of hatred and all uncharitableness, for it proceeds upon the gratuitous supposition that under the same conditions we *can* act otherwise than as we do; but it is entirely inapplicable on the necessitarian principle. Men's actions being necessary effects of causes which they cannot select, all blame and hate are improper, unjust, and pernicious. But the inconsistency, and therefore absurdity of the doctrine of freewill is obvious, as soon as it is perceived to be identical with that of chance; for with as good reason might a man blame a pair of dice, as his neighbour, for acts produced by an illimitable chain of occult causes. But no one is so foolish as to suppose that the sides of dice turn up without adequate causes, though we may be unable to trace the links of the chain; and the causes of man's acts are just so much more difficult to trace, as he is a more complex being than a die. Load the die—weight one side, no matter which, more than the other, and you give a tendency which makes it necessarily preponderate like a motive in a man, and you can foretell the result, as you can a man's act; but only by destroying the so-called freedom of each: which is obviously only imaginary and assumed for convenience in both cases. But theologians arbitrarily isolate man from nature, and gratuitously assert that he is the sole initial cause of his acts; endeavouring by this specious but contradictory device to relieve their imaginary creator from the imputation of causing the evil done by man, whom they still call the work of his hands. They are too blinded by piety and habit to see, that if God be omniscient as they assert, he *must have foreknown* the evil to be produced by his handiwork; and thus consciously caused it, though being omnipotent, he of course needed not to do so to accomplish any of his purposes. Their own success in governing man is ample proof that through man's ignorance and credulity he is easily influenced to suit their purposes, and that his asserted freedom is wholly powerless to resist.

They have however only removed the difficulty, if at all, a single step; for if it be possible that man's acts are caused by himself, and not by antecedent circumstances entirely beyond his control, most assuredly *he* is not caused by himself, and theologians insist, when it seems to suit them, that he was made by God; thus completing the chain of causation and responsibility, which they fancy they can break by merely disconnecting parts of the same proposition. They have thus gratuitously invented an unhappy pretext for introducing into the world all that intolerant hatred, which has deluged it with more spitefulness and blood than any other cause ever did. But on the principle of the necessity of [*unclear*: n] actions, all hatred and uncharitable imputation of wickedness would be abolished. No room would be left for them, for each man being simply a medium for the transmission of communicated force, no one would be blameable. Punishments would still be necessary, and more useful; more effective, because better understood, introducing fresh circumstances to influence men for good; teaching practically to offenders the evil consequences of bad acts; deterring hesitating possible criminals from a career of vice; and protecting the good from the depredations of the bad; in the same way that nature, *which never blames*, never fails to punish for any disregard of her penalties.

Mr. S.....often asserts with the Bible that God is a free being, and at other times, on the same authority, that he is not. He says that it is *impossible* for God to lie, or sin. If so—if he be *incapable* of evil, he deserves no credit, and cannot be called virtuous, for doing good. If he were necessarily and uniformly good, though he could not be called free, we should at least know what to expect from him, and what to do to please him. But the assertion of God's freedom is equivalent, as in the case of man, to a denial that he is a moral being, or capable of good or evil—that we can even guess what he might do or require at any moment. Thus, however derogatory to, or irreconcilable with the idea of a God some persons may deem the necessitarian system, the freewill theory is certainly as much, or more so, and destructive of it altogether. For if God be *free*, his acts must be uncaused, and it must be exactly an equal chance whether any act of his be good or bad. The utter irreconcilability of the doctrine of freewill in man, with that of fore-knowledge in God is so obvious in itself, and has been demonstrated so clearly by Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Dr. Priestley, that it is unnecessary for me to do more here than refer those who fail to recognise it, to those writers.

From some confusion of ideas, or inattention to the subject, necessitarian principles are too commonly regarded as equivalent to fatalism. But they are really as distinct from fatalism as from freewill and chance, which are nearly synonymous. The necessitarian recognises the inevitable operation of every cause or force.

The fatalist denies or ignores that of all but those which predominate in his diseased imagination. The necessitarian confesses his ignorance of the future result, but ceases not to endeavor to modify it, confident in the certain effect, more or less, of every attempt to do so. The fatalist on the contrary assumes an imagined future result to be as absolutely certain as the past, while ignorant that the slightest effort of himself or others to effect it, must be followed by necessary, though while future, unknown consequences. Thus while activity is the product of necessitarian principles, apathy or paralysis is the essential condition of the fatalist. The necessitarian finds by experience that like causes are always followed by like effects: that a consequent can have no causal influence over its antecedent; in fact, that causes are Antecedent, and effects consequent. The fatalist asserts that the present is governed by the future—the antecedent by the consequent—the cause by the effect; which carried one step farther means that effects cause their causes, and that causes are consequences of their effects ! Let not then my necessitarian doctrine be confounded with such a ridiculous absurdity, to which it is so entirely antagonistic. I may here say that it should be clear that pre-destination, or even only fore-knowledge on the part of God, is and can be nothing more nor less than blind fatalism personified; for both essentially imply that a merely assumed future event must inevitably take place, whatever be done to prevent it; the direct effect of the personification of fatalism as God, being to make it the conscious, and therefore malevolent author of all evil. The blasphemy thus essentially involved in Christian dogmas is commensurate with their inconsistency.

But I think that a little attentive study of physiology furnishes the most concentrated practical proof of the impossibility of freewill. It has been demonstrated by experiment that for every nerve of so-called voluntary motion, there is a distinct corresponding nerve of sensation; and these nerves of sensation form the sufficient media by which motor nerves are brought into a state of activity. External impressions thus form perfectly adequate causes of all nervous action; and to suppose that what is called man's *will* creates nervous force exclusive of that produced through his nerves of sensation, is to suppose two adequate causes of the same effect; than which nothing could be more absurd.

Addenda.

The only plausible objections made to the foregoing were that I had omitted to consider, firstly, man in his twofold nature: and secondly contingent events; cases in which it was contended that man's will was really free.

As to man's twofold nature, I think those who gratuitously assert it should prove it to be a fact, before they quote it as proving anything else. Such a doctrine would be as destructive of moral responsibility as pre-destination or freewill. Responsibility essentially depends upon the absolute unity and singleness of the subject. Paul certainly, but in appearance inadvertently, let fall an expression (Rom. vii. 19, 20) by which he might seem to countenance such an opinion. "The evil which I would not that I do. Now if I do that I would not, *it is no more I that do it*, but sin that dwelleth in me." But what is this but an overt, not to say impudent attempt to evade all responsibility entirely? He lays the blame not on himself, but, on sin; and he says in the 28th verse, that no one can deliver *him* from this sin but Jesus Christ. Sin, however was obviously nothing but the quality, real or supposed, of his act; and if for that he was not responsible, who else could be so, unless either Jesus in not delivering him from sin (as he says he only could), or God—who he says in my text works in us *both to will and to do* of his good pleasure? Paul constantly got into this dilemma, and seemed to fancy that he could get out of it by simply avoiding the consideration of both the horns of it at once. In any view the passage is nonsense. But a man who in any *court of JUSTICE* should plead that an offence with which he might be charged was due to his "second nature," would be treated as a rogue rather than a fool, and very properly too. Such a method of trifling with the basis of moral responsibility would be too dangerous to society to be tolerated for a moment in any practical matter; and never was considered admissible except in theology and in metaphysics, which Hobbes has well described as that wherein a man may contradict himself without perceiving it. Those who assume a dual nature in man can scarcely appreciate or perceive the pernicious consequences, any more than they do the gross inconsistency into which the exigencies of a defective argument betray them.

As to *contingent events*, it should be clear that those two words are improperly connected. *Events* cannot be contingent in themselves, and are only said to be so, in relation to our ignorance of their causes, in the future or the past. A future event can only be said to be contingent upon one or other of two doubtful, because unknown, alternatives. If we are ignorant of certain causes, it is not wonderful that we should not foreknow the effects, which are to us therefore, and therefore only, contingent. If all antecedent conditions are known, contingency is excluded. To adduce contingency as an argument for freewill is merely to beg the question; for both are equally antagonistic to the absolute uniformity with which effects follow causes, without which experience and knowledge would be impossible.

A common and at first sight plausible argument against the adoption of the necessitarian, or any theory of

the will different from the popular one, is that necessitarians and libertarians both sow in order to reap, and send for a doctor when sick; and that as both thus *act* alike, the particular theoretical principle upon which they act can be of no essential importance. And this is true as regards acts which regard *self* only, for which natural instinct is generally an ample guide irrespective of speculative principles. But in our *social* conduct when we judge others by our experience and knowledge epitomised in principles, the case is altogether different. For evidently the libertarian's principles compel him to blame (which is equivalent to hate) those who offend or differ from him; whereas the necessitarian acquits, and simply desires to instruct and furnish superior motives to those whose conduct he disapproves.—Thus it is obvious that their social conduct will be essentially different, and that the one will be intolerant, and therefore immoral, while the other will or should be tolerant and therefore moral. The question thus, instead of being, as it is too commonly supposed, one of mere theoretical speculation, becomes one of universal and the very highest practical importance, and cannot be too earnestly investigated or too widely discussed.

It may be desirable to explain that I have used the word *blame* as imputing *voluntary badness*, and the word praise, *voluntary goodness*, as they are never applied except to supposed free agents. The imputation of *voluntary* goodness or badness, is, of course, baseless on the necessitarian theory. Hobbes certainly says, that to praise a thing is only to say it is good. But he thus deprives the word of its special import; which is, not only that the object of it is good, but that *he is so, because* with the same antecedents *he might have been bad*, had he not chosen to be otherwise.

Hobbes seems to have overlooked that praise and blame are not appropriated but to imagined free agents; for horses, tables and chairs are called good or bad, but are neither praised nor blamed, their goodness in the admitted absence of freewill being allowed to be intrinsic and necessary.

Man's self conceit

In the *Fortnightly Review*, for 1st August, 1868, Professor Bain traces the notion of freewill to *pride*, a slightly less offensive name for the same thing.

alone seems to furnish him with the idea that he is worthy or meritorious, and those who differ from him the contrary.

Blame and praise have been defended as being useful motives to form men's wills; but they merely minister to his self-conceit,—create uncharitableness,—and are based as I think I have shewn, on essentially false pretences, which alone should secure their condemnation. Praise is injurious as reproducing the self-conceit from which it arose, and as causing contempt of others; blame is worse, as creating hatred and all uncharitableness. Let us be content with being if we can, good, without claiming merit for it. This is a description of humility which I conceive to be incomparably more genuine and even really aesthetic, than the Christian vanity disguised under the name, which not only indirectly repudiates goodness, unless meretriciously adorned with the imaginary quality of merit, but actually also exacts undeserved and over-payment in a fictitious heaven. The imaginary right to merit and such reward is only secured by consigning others to the contrary. But what good man except a Christian would not cheerfully relinquish all claim to merit, while reserving the privilege of doing good? and to a heaven, the idea of which supposes a hell for nearly all his neighbours? Let those who exclaim that to deny the reality of merit and demerit, desert and sin, is degrading to humanity; pause when they reflect that it is their theory alone which constitutes man, the only animal in the known universe guilty of voluntary crime. This should surely teach his spurious pride humility.

Original Sin.

ANOTHER Sunday evening the subject was "Original Sin," which gave occasion to some remarks such as the following:—

Respecting original sin, Mr. S——has rightly informed us that the originator of anything, is he who gives beginning to it, or is the source whence, it proceeds. This being so, reference to the Scriptures will furnish us with a clear solution of this stumbling block. Isaiah says, "I make peace and CREATE ERA; I THE LORD do all these things," It is thus impossible to avoid the conclusion, according to the Bible as well as Mr. S....., that the Lord alone is the cause, creator, and originator of sin. Both of them thus establish the Lord as the only *original sinner*; and if the Bible be God's word, the Lord is plainly convicted out of his own mouth, as being the *sole original arch sinner*. The intervention of man, or even the devil, can be no more than instrumental and secondary; for both are asserted by the same authority to have been created by God, who is indeed positively asserted to have made all things. He is said to have deliberately made both man and devil, 'with *full fore-knowledge of all the evil consequences which must ensue!* He cannot plead the excuse,—that man certainly has if not the devil,—of ignorance; for he created (THEY SAY) the devil, man, and sin, with *full and complete knowledge of all the evil consequences!* If he so *foreknew* it—it follows that *they* could not act

otherwise. For he could not possibly foreknow, what it was possible might never happen. From this there is no escape. By asserting an omniscient creator of all things, full and entire responsibility for all evil is unavoidably fixed upon, and imputed to him; man and devil are made mere instruments and puppets, and deprived of all responsibility whatever ! What pernicious nonsense ! Yet these are not only the legitimate, but the necessary consequences of the consistent application of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity!

The basis of the absurd doctrine of original sin, is confessedly the childish story related in Genesis of Adam and Eve in Eden. But a critical examination of that story should convince any unbiassed person that it was written for entirely opposite purposes, *by a worshipper of the SERPENT*. Possibly by Moses, but perhaps not. It is wholly absurd as related, but less so if regarded as an imperfect version of the legend of Prometheus. Observe—that it was the SERPENT that desired to confer upon man the inestimable boon of the knowledge of good and evil; and that it was the LORD (*or* EVIL DEMON) who wanted to keep it from him ! The SERPENT succeeded—the LORD failed. It was the SERPENT who truly foretold that the result would be to place man comparatively in the position of a god—knowing good and evil.

Acknowledged by the Lord himself!—Gen. iii. 22

It was the LORD who falsely predicted that man would surely die on the day he ate the apple.

Nothing can be more absurd and immoral than the climax of the story, namely—the punishment of Adam and Eve. For as it is expressly stated that they only *acquired* a knowledge of good and evil *by* eating the apple, they could not possibly have erred consciously in eating it. They must therefore have been necessarily innocent, and unjustly punished. It is a principal feature in the story that they had no such knowledge, till they ate the fruit. They therefore, obviously, could not know any good or evil in obeying or disobeying, or in anything else. In fact every thinking man must know that such knowledge can only be acquired by experience and comparison of both, and that he can judge of the quality of any action solely by its results.

Is it not clear that this fable was stolen by the stupid Jews,—entirely misunderstood by them, and mis-appropriated to wholly foreign and opposite purposes? Or that it was "borrowed" by Moses, and ignorantly distorted afterwards? For we should remember that Moses is said to have "made in the wilderness, a brazen *Serpent* for the Jews to fall down and Worship that Moses' rod (or god) took the form of a *Serpent* which swallowed or overcame those of the Egyptian magicians; But the circumstance that the benevolent Serpent, like Prometheus, was cursed for conferring a benefit on man suggests, if it does not prove, that the story was of extra Jewish origin; but stupidly misconceived—and stultified, and spoilt in the process of un-naturalization. There could be scarcely stronger proof of the dull incapacity of the Jews to appreciate or comprehend any relations of right and wrong—of good or bad—than the way in which in this story, they made their god guilty and convict himself of gratuitous malevolence, falsehood, and injustice; and imputed at the same time truthfulness and benevolence to their own conception of an evil being, whom they made to suffer for the good he did to man !

Obtuse however as were the Jews, Christians are as bad, and worse. They out-Herod Herod. The Jews began by sacrificing innocent animals to appease their cruel demon god, Jehovah, in important cases slaughtering human beings to placate his wrath; but it was reserved for Christians to impute to a god of justice and of love, the stupid inversion of all notions of right and wrong; by which the wicked are to be put on a level with the virtuous, on condition that the punishment that they deserve, shall be suffered—not by them—nor by himself for making them so sinful, but—by the best and most virtuous of beings,—his own innocent son ! If anything could be worse than the original sin of the creation of evil, it must be this. For observe the pernicious consequences of this principle. It obviously becomes the interest of men to be among the wicked, and to have an innocent person sacrificed in their stead ! To be virtuous would be to provoke similar treatment to that experienced by Jesus. For what else can be expected of a being who crucified his own innocent son, because he was angry with bad men, for whose bad conduct he was himself, as their creator, solely responsible? What more natural than to expect, that if he should take a fancy to redeem some devil from hell—he would require the blood and sufferings of another virtuous man as the necessary ransom? We can only judge of the future, by the past.

But common sense itself teaches us that the idea of sin, original or otherwise, is absurd. For evil deeds invariably cause their own retribution, as virtue brings its own reward. Consequently no one would sin, or rather do evil, but from a defect of knowledge; and obviously every man would, *if he could*, know everything. Errors therefore must in every case be errors of judgment, not intentional. If our most definite and invincible notion of cause and effect be really true, as we cannot but deem it, it should be of universal application; and if so, it should be clear that man cannot possibly act otherwise than as his original constitution impels, and as circumstances (including knowledge) admit. How many drunkards would give anything for the *power* to refrain from drink? Who would not be rich, healthy, learned, and virtuous, *if he could*? Knowledge of what is good, of what constitutes one's own real true interest, is the one thing needful,—to create the desire for it; the essential preliminary to the endeavor to secure it. Therefore that knowledge is what every man should above all things

strive to get, to give, and to extend.

Morality and Religion.

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An Essay read before the Sunday Free Discussion Society, on the 5th November, 1871, in the Masonic Hall, Lonsdale-street, Melbourne.

Mat. vi. 24. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.

I LIKE this text. There is about it an aspect of "no compromise," which at once engages the sympathy and commands the assent of lovers of straightforwardness and plain dealing. For compromise is the bane of the present age, and the main cause of the prevailing want of integrity. By comparison it is positively refreshing to read of the times when men—thinking it right to mutilate themselves and burn their neighbours alive for the kingdom of heaven's sake—did so;—and blessed God for every opportunity of maiming and sacrificing for his glory, his asserted children made by him in his image. If their belief was savage—it was certainly sincere—for their conduct was consistent with it. Contrast Calvin sacrificing poor Servetus on a slow fire of green faggots—with the Rev, Thomas Binney writing a book on, "How to make the best of both worlds !" How to serve God and mammon too ! Imagine Jesus—in lawn sleeves and a carriage and pair—preaching the community of goods, and woe to the rich.

The fact is that the progress of knowledge and the struggle for civilized existence now compel men to be so practical—that they have little time to be pious; and the upholders of religion find that comfort and common-sense are gradually becoming so much more popular than asceticism and faith, that they are compelled to yield point after point; and their tactics are now reduced to attempts to compromise matters between obsolete doctrines...and the certain revelations of science. They are at their wit's end to serve both, God and mammon !

My object is to show that Jesus was right;—that religion—or the love and service of God—is incompatible with the love and service of mammon—or of the world;—with morality;—That morality and religion are thus in inverse proportion to one another;—that a moral man cannot be religious; and that a religious man must be so far immoral.

Religion may be defined as a sanction—or something which binds—to a certain line of conduct which is called godliness. Such conduct has special relation to a supposed God and future life of rewards and punishments; and erects them as objects of exclusive regard and attention. If the principle of religion be consistently pursued, the worldly interest of one's self and one's neighbour must be subordinated and even sacrificed without hesitation to God's glory and our own heavenly interest. Morality means—the manners of men in relation to each other—to Society; and the word *morality* has come to mean—*good* social conduct;—*immorality*—*bad* social conduct. The principle of morality requires that the paramount object of men should be to promote their own interest and that of Society at large, *in the world in which they find themselves*; it pronounces asceticism and intolerance to be equally crimes; affirms the identity of ultimate interest of each and all; and asserts that while vice causes its own ample punishment—virtue is its own best reward. But the absolute antagonism between our moral and our religious duties and interests is not more broadly laid down and forcibly insisted on thus by me—than it was by Jesus in my text (whatever Mr. Binney may say.) Ye cannot serve God and mammon !

Religion requires allegiance to God alone, and—so far—contempt for the ties of humanity and defiance of social authority. Witness the judicial murders of Socrates and Jesus—the wholesale massacre of St. Bartholomew—and the assassination of Henry the Great of France by Ravallac. Witness also the holy zeal with which Philip H. of Spain, devoted half his life to devastating the fairest portion of Europe, and pitilessly sacrificing to God by sword and fire and stake—thousands upon thousands of his innocent subjects, whom he believed that he was divinely commissioned to convert—or destroy. Yet Philip was naturally a humane man. At his first battle he vowed he would never witness another, and he never did. Religion made him hate for God's sake, and act the part of a devil as a sacred duty.

Morality on the contrary inculcates conformity to social ordinances, and universal forbearance and tolerance. As Lord Bacon says—"Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to "laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to outward moral "virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all "these and erecteth an absolute monarchy in in the minds of men; "therefore Atheism never did perturb states; for it makes "men wary of themselves as looking no further; and we see the "times inclined to Atheism, as the the time of Augustus Cæsar, were "quiet times; but superstition hath been the confusion of many "states, and bringeth in a new first motive cause that ravisheth all "the spheres of Government." Bacon uses the word *superstition*. But as Hobbes has well said,—Superstition—is any religion but

ours;—Religion—is our own superstition. Bacon shows plainly that religion is—while Atheism is not—inimical to morality. It is however my present purpose to recommend—not Atheism, but—morality, simply.

Religion teaches that virtue consists in self-mortification and in foregoing worldly advantage for the sake of the glory of God and future heavenly bliss. It is herein radically inconsistent, for if it were really true that self-mortification is virtue, man ought to study and to act so as ultimately to reach hell, and he would thus be most virtuous when most vicious! All disinterestedness is thus proved to involve a positive contradiction of the premisses. And those premisses are based upon as great fallacies—from which all religions start. All hold not only the doctrine of sin—but also that God created sinners; which necessarily involves God's entire responsibility for all sin,—on the very same principles by which it is imputed—illogically—to man. All religions also assume that it is possible to act in either of two opposite ways in the same circumstances; in other words—that the same causes may produce different effects. Whereas every act of man—being but a link in the infinite chain of causes and effects—could not possibly be different without a break in the chain. These absurdities are inherent in every religion, and form the basis and apology for all intolerance and persecution; than which nothing can be more immoral.

The first of these fallacies—namely—that virtue consists in self-mortification, or say merely in the foregoing of advantage, proceeds upon another false assumption—that the interest of an individual is or may be opposed to that of others. If this were true, morality would be a problem—hopeless and impossible of solution. But the simple fact that the manners of men *have improved*, is a guarantee that a sufficient reason for the improvement exists. That the intercourse of men is advantageous to the mass, is learned by experience of their necessary and complete interdependence, and of the benefit that each evidently derives from the multiplication and closeness of his relations with others. If their interests were really antagonistic, the multiplicity and completeness of these relations would lessen instead of increase—individual advantage. The improvement made therefore—demonstrates that the real interests of each and all are necessarily identical. And it should not be necessary to prove this by an elaborate argument, for it is practically admitted to be proved—as a general principle—by experience; and it is only contested in special and apparently anomalous instances, in which observation does not penetrate beyond superficial appearances. *But*—the great need of scientific education and habits of consistent reasoning among all classes, is shown in nothing so much, as in the general want of confidence in general principles. If a general principle is of any real value at all, it admits of no exception whatever; and apparent exceptions merely indicate that further investigation is required. To give confidence in general principles is the main thing for which a scientific education is of value. And general principles are of greatest value, inasmuch as nothing else can give stability to morality. Nothing else can give an adequate guarantee in exceptional circumstances, that the true interest of every one *must* lie in being virtuous. It is only in such exceptional circumstances that men err and come to grief,—simply because they have no confidence in their own principles, and have no time or inclination then to reason back to them. That two and two make four, is not to me more certain, than that the true interest of every one lies necessarily in being moral virtuous, *under any circumstances*.

Religions as a rule teach that repentance, or perhaps restitution, may annul crime and avert evil consequences. Nothing can be more false—absurd—and pernicious. Experience teaches in the interest of morality that evil results of bad acts can by no possibility be evaded;—and thus—instead of provoking repetition by impunity,—proves—that every error causes its own inevitable retribution. But priests fatten by imposing—with this glaring fallacy—upon weak minds. Hence—conscience money;—the miserable subterfuge by which fools try to justify to themselves their past *and future* crimes,—and blindly do more thus to destroy their own judgment of wise and foolish—of right and wrong, than even the inventor of the immoral doctrine himself. That doctrine offers a direct premium to crime, and it is difficult to over-estimate how much it causes.

Religion essentially teaches the efficacy of prayer,—which those who are moral but irreligious enough to reason—are compelled to discard. Cromwell's injunction to his soldiers expresses the contradiction involved as clearly as my text condemns it. "Trust in" providence—*BUT keep your ponder dry!*" Religion in the first clause—morality in the second. Serve God—but—in any case—serve mammon! The fact that religionists (including priests) *work* to attain their objects, is proof that *practically* they disbelieve what they preach. I do not say but that *theoretically* they may believe it. The advantage they derive from teaching it, is quite sufficient to give a practical color to their theoretical belief. The glaring inconsistency—if not impiety—of doing *one's self* what one has prayed God to do, is not only proof that the belief is merely theoretical, but indicates the truth;—that the Deity invoked is really—our own egotism simply, projected and personified by an exalted and diseased imagination.

What is the *prayer of morality*? WORK!

The doctrine of a superintending providence is fundamental in religion. In ordinary circumstances, what is this—but a stupid apology for apathy, or an attempt to evade responsibility for failure?

But what becomes of it in face of the Earthquake of Lisbon? with its half million victims? The decrepit and the infant—the strong man and the delicate woman—the atheist and the priest—the innocent and the guilty,—all whelmed in one common destruction! Where was justice? or discrimination? or tender mercy? What was the lesson to be learned? Even the chattering priest is silent and abashed. What if we are thus to learn that the fool—is he—who hath said in his conceit, THERE, is a God!

Another phase of this same fallacy I must not neglect.

Imagine, for the nonce, all human institutions for the maintenance of morality at once and completely abolished—our laws, courts, magistrates, police, gaols, and penal establishments suddenly annihilated. What would result? would all the elaborate machinery and most strenuous efforts of our religious establishments prove of the slightest efficacy in restraining the immorally disposed from indulging their propensities at the expense of their neighbours? Would our property or our lives be safe for a single day? No—not for an hour. Now let me put the converse proposition.

Suppose on the contrary, our human moral Government intact, but our religious institutions suddenly and entirely obliterated:—that every priest, bible, church, and religious idea were to vanish from the earth. Would our social moral machinery for the repression of crime be in the least degree less efficacious than before in protecting our lives and property? Not a bit. The fiction being exploded, the truth would be more efficient.—In fact the existence and maintenance of social checks upon immorality, prove the general practical disbelief in the efficacy of any others—even though divine. A constable is felt to be far more potent than a theoretical God, and a Lockup—immeasurably more useful than an imaginary hell.

When a George Stephenson by patient labor—*on every Sabbath*—invents railways;—when a Priestley discovers gas and the constituents of the air we breathe;—when any man devotes his time and energy to add to the worldly comfort and happiness of his fellows,—*he serves mammon*, and is rightly charged with doing so by pious people. If anyone devotes his attention to such objects, he contravenes the religious obligation to hate the world, and to set his affections on things above. For he cannot serve God and Mammon. Had Galileo, Harvey, Jenner, and Watt been engrossed with their heavenly interests only, we might now have been ignorant of the movements of the solar system, of the circulation of the blood, of vaccination, and of steam power. But how did religion affect them? It made them suffer cruelly for the good they effected. What could more distress a man with such a keen appreciation of the value of truth as had Galileo, than to be compelled to testify publicly and solemnly to a deliberate falsehood? Harvey and Jenner were denounced as atheists, and lost their practice. I have no time, however, to shew how all the great mammon servers, who have blessed humanity, have been rewarded with pious curses, stripes, and flames—in the interest of religion—by God servers. By their fruits ye shall know them. That my view that such conduct is in strict accordance with the fundamental principles of religion, is curiously corroborated by nearly every ancient religious text book. The bible begins by relating how the being that it states procured for man his best and most valuable knowledge—that of good and evil,—was cursed by God for doing so. And in another mythology, Prometheus, for giving the knowledge of fire and of various arts to man, was punished by Zeus or God, by being chained fast, with an eagle constantly tearing at his liver. These pregnant fables prove the early instinctive recognition of the essential antagonism between God service and Mammon service,—between religion and morality. The same antipathy is exhibited to-day in the consistent opposition of religion to science, and the pious hatred shown by the servants of God to those of humanity. No wonder. It is the struggle for life.

I propose now to anticipate a few objections to my theory, and in doing so to continue my own argument.

First it may be said that what I attack, is not religion, but the abuse of it. I reply "By their fruits ye shall know them." If my opponents do not approve of the lengths to which Philip II., John Calvin, and the founders of the Spanish Inquisition carried their principles, let them beware themselves of halting between two opinions, and endeavoring to serve both God and Mammon. The fact is, as I before said, that no principle can be trustworthy or true, unless it will bear pushing to its ultimate consequences. Like Philip II., and Calvin, the founders of the Spanish Inquisition are known to have been men of "undeviating and incorruptible integrity;"—they were naturally moral.—Yet we find that their merciless cruelty in carrying out their religious principles—spared neither age, sex, nor innocence; and that therefore for their crimes—their immorality—scarcely a parallel can be found in history. On the other hand we find men who have worked all their lives for the good of humanity, were either of no religion, or of the most various religions; in the latter case the good they did was exactly proportioned to the extent to which God service was subordinated by them to mammon service. There could not be a greater mistake than to suppose that religious persons are naturally more cruel or immoral than others, or that they are less kindly or virtuously inclined than the victims they sacrifice. As I have said, Philip was exceptionally humane, Calvin an upright conscientious man, and the Spanish Inquisitors were unimpeachably moral. Yet these men stand out in history as monsters of cruelty, in matters in which religion swayed their conduct. Did not Calvin labor as disinterestedly as Servetus himself, for what *he thought* the best interest of man,—nay of Servetus himself? If he acted immorally to Servetus, it was

because he desired to act piously towards God, and made that his principal object.

It may be said, also, that religions teach morality; and it is a fact that every religion has incorporated in its teachings various moral rules. But why? not because those rules were a part of—essential to—or identified with—the religion, but simply because, without the plausible pretension of teaching morality of some kind, no men on earth would receive any religion. Not only so, but the morality taught is mostly in general terms, and frequently directly contradicted by their religious principles. If they say, Do good to all men, and love *the brotherhood*,—they say also that you must hate the world, your nearest kin, and your own life also, or you cannot be a genuine disciple. Such conflicting alternatives arise constantly in social life, and were, doubtless, the reason of the adoption of the hermit's life, as the only chance for virtue. But is uselessness no crime?

Perhaps my opponents will point to the laws, among others, of Moses. In the first place, it is certain that as societies existed long before Moses, so the immorality of murder, theft, and lying, must have been recognised, and prohibited. Moses repeated what he was taught, as we do to-day. But I will not thus pass the decalogue. The first four laws

Thou shalt have one God—Make no images—Swear not—Keep the Sabbath, and why.

are religious; not moral—but rather immoral. For they place supernatural duty above natural duty. The fifth, Honor thy father and mother, &c.,—is simply vicious. For it asserts that we should honor certain persons—not because—or in so far as—honorable, but because they stand in a certain relation to ourselves! Nothing could be more destructive of a proper sense of right and wrong. It is just what old savages would inculcate to maintain their own authority in their tribe. The 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th, (Thou shalt not kill,—nor commit adultery,—nor steal,—nor bear false witness;) were—as I said before—not part of Moses's religion, but adopted into it to give it respectability and credit. But the 9th is very imperfect, and does not inculcate truthful speaking under *any* circumstances. The 10th, Thou shalt not covet,—is evidently supplementary, and intended to compensate—which it cannot—for the defects of the 7th and 8th against stealing and committing adultery. But the Bible relates that immediately after the promulgation of these laws, the Jews were specially commanded by God, through the same Moses, to violate all those of a moral tendency—point blank and wholesale. And they were all broken again with impunity by their vile king David, the man after God's own heart; to say nothing of less prominent instances. Nay, God himself is said to have repeatedly violated the 9th, against false witness, both directly, and by speaking falsely through prop ets. (See Genesis ii, 17, I Kings xxii, 23, Ezekiel xiv, 9.) So much for the Old Testament. In the New Testament he is asserted to have broken the 7th with Joseph's wife. (Matt, i, 18, 20.) And is it to be wondered at that the servants of God are bloodthirsty—break their own laws and solemn engagements, and are unjust and cruel,—when they believe that their master has notoriously done the same? He never fulfilled his promises to Abraham, nor to any other man. First he agreed—by a spontaneous offer, after knowingly making man so that he *must* sin,—to accept the blood of innocent animals as a solace to his wounded vanity, (for "vanity" is commonsense for "glory.") He broke that agreement, and afterwards required and accepted human blood. (2 Samuel xxi. 9.14.) Insatiable still, he repudiates that self-dictated engagement, and nothing will satisfy his morbid taste but the blood of his own perfectly virtuous son! He seems to have hated virtue even more than man. Even this last covenant he is asserted to have repudiated, and to have discovered that the atonement for sin—proposed by himself as sufficient, is really valueless. In spite of all these solemn covenants—capriciously altered and broken from time to time,—he still requires that man shall after all *himself* expiate in hell—the imaginary sins for which repeated expiations had been exacted and accepted.

Jesus himself sums up the whole law by saying, "Thou shalt "serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, "and with all thy mind, and with *all* thy strength, This is the "1st commandment." (The God that I have just described!) "And the second is *like*, namely this, Thou shalt love thy "neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment "greater than these." Mark xii., 80.1. Why he calls the second LIKE the first it is difficult to see. It is more *like* Falstaff's half-penny worth of bread to the intolerable deal of sack. But as Jesus says in Luke xiv., 26, that we must hate—beside our father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters,—*our own life also*, the love for our neighbour must be less than none at all! (Luke xiv., 26.)

I have written this paper because I think a spade should be called a spade, and that truth demands that if we have given up the essentials of religion, we should not retain the name. If we recognise the absurdity of its main doctrines of prayer and a providence, and that good or evil conduct causes—in this world—its own ample reward or punishment;—we are not entitled to say that we have only improved or developed our religion, when we have really cast it aside, and obtained something infinitely better. If we have eaten the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, we should not be ashamed to admit being naked. If Adam and Eve were ashamed, they were obviously in error. For they were no *more* naked than they were before, and the responsibility for their nakedness (by the story) was not theirs but their creator's, who, if any one, should have been ashamed. We are unworthy of the privileges we have gained, if we are ashamed or afraid to acknowledge them.

I know that many think the religious faculty in man, is too important and useful to be discarded. Not so. In

the first place, its absence in many intellectual men proves that it is not a necessary or original one, and that it is but a fictitious compound of imagination and emotion. *These*, if diverted from religious fictions, may be made useful to morality. But their mis-direction by religion in such cases as that of Ravailac, must be admitted by nearly all; and I have shewn that the like mis-direction of them by religion is more or less universal. And the same elements can easily be shewn to constitute the spring of action in every case of crime, theft, murder, &c. When they are duly subjected to the direction of an exercised reason, better results may be expected, but not before. To claim to be religious, when in fact we are not, is to be ashamed—and unworthy too—of being clothed and in our right mind; to assert that we are naked when better clad than ever; to dishonor a good cause, and to claim consideration under false pretences. But we cannot consistently so serve God and mammon.

Finally I would point out, that as there are no men whom it does not take all their time and all they know to be properly moral—or to do all the good they can to themselves and to their neighbours;—so for them to devote any attention to the concerns of another hypothetical life which religion concerns, is to neglect their duty as well as their interest. And here I shall again quote Jesus. "Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," (Mat. vi. 34.) and I think still more the work thereof. This precept of Jesus, we all feel to be nonsense if applied literally to tomorrow,—to a year,—or to less than our probable life. It cannot refer to the past, and the only reasonable interpretation, or rather the only interpretation which can make it reasonable, is to take it as applying to the distant hypothetical to-morrow which religion invents. Let us then devote our exclusive attention to promoting morality here, and fear not that that will ever prevent our being amply religious hereafter, if the appropriate season should ever arrive.

But verily, verily, I say unto you, except our righteousness (morality) excel the righteousness of the *religious* scribes and pharisees,—we are not fit for the kingdom of EARTH.

Hokor.

Robert Bell, Printer, 97 Little Collins Street East.

The Moral Effects of Clerical and Secular Instruction

Forecast and Compared by the Statistics of the last Census of Victoria. See the Government Statist's "Notes on the Colony of Victoria 1875." First see paragraph 295, p. 117. Of those Over 15 years of age who fell into the hands of the Police, about a fourth could read and write well; but of these only 1 in 41 was possessed of superior instruction. When the last Census was taken, all the population over 15 years of age, except about a seventh, were returned as able to read and write. Nearly a fifth of those at the same age arrested were unable to write. At the Census less than a tenth of the population at that age were similarly uneducated. These facts speak for themselves in respect to the connection which has often been alleged to exist between crime and the absence of education. Then find at page 87 a Table showing the comparative ignorance of certain sects in children between 5 and 15 years of age:—

Thus the Roman Catholics were 2 to 1 more ignorant than the Jews, and 3 to 2 more ignorant than the Protestants. Then see page 185, "Signing Marriage Register with marks, 1864 to 1874:"

Shewing the Roman Catholics as 8 times as ignorant as the Jews, and 3 times as ignorant as the Protestants. Next, see page 196, showing the Religions of Prisoners, 1874:—

Thus the Roman Catholics, Pagans, and a small number of "other sects," were 2 to 1 more criminal than the Protestants, and 3 to 2 more criminal than the Jews; *but 6 to 1* more criminal than persons of no religion!!!

Mark this, you who would introduce religious teaching into our State Schools! Tour own statistical records of facts warn you not to permit SACERDOTAL INTERFERENCE with the primary instruction of your children. If you suffer it, beware lest your Protestants become as criminal as your Roman Catholics.

But note above—that if your Protestants are only about half as criminal as your Roman Catholics, Protestants are 3 *times*, while Roman Catholics are 6 *times* as criminal as persons of *no religion*!!! Shall we have sacerdotal instruction and 30½ criminals in every 10,000 people, or exclude religious instruction, and reduce criminality to 5½ *in every* 10,000 *people*? If you fancy that this prospect is hopeless, turn to page 85 of the same volume, and note there grounds for thinking differently. While from 1861 to 1871 Protestants increased at about the same rate as the whole population—35 per cent, the Roman Catholics at 55½ per cent, Wesleyans at 102½ per cent, Episcopalians at 21½ per cent, Presbyterians at 29½ per cent, Independents at 42 per cent. Baptists at 81 per cent, and Jews at 23 per cent, we find that the persons of *no religion*, whose criminality was only 5½ in 10,000 people, increased in numbers at the rate of 388 *per cent*!!! If this ratio and that of the increase of population continue, in 1910 (only 30 years) the population should be 2½ millions of no

religion, and with only 1375 criminals, or 225 fewer than we have now!

Permit clerical interference with primary instruction, and we may then have instead 554 times that number, or 762,500 criminals, or more than our whole population at the last Census!

'The Subjection of Women.

By Hokor.

Printed for Private Circulation Only. Melbourne: 1870.

The Subjection of Women.

MOST people are aware that Mr. John Stuart Mill has recently published a little book entitled "The Subjection of Women," in which he has effectively proved this position—"that the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the sexes—the legal subordination of the one sex to the other—is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other." Mr. Mill has restricted himself mainly to showing most forcibly that the position of abject slavery in which women are now held, is utterly *unjust*, being based on the principle that *might makes right*; and he argues strongly for the abolition of all the legal disabilities of women.

Some might wish that he had extended his plan, and entered upon the natural history of this subjection, and its causes; as well as exhibited more fully its pernicious result. But he probably rightly thought that his book would be much more widely read in its present shape, and also that it would meet with less antagonism. Possibly for these reasons it is calculated to do most good, and to influence the largest number to a greater or less extent. But I imagine that the members of this Association are so much more advanced in liberal principles, that less reserve is necessary in dealing with the general question here, than Mr. Mill thought desirable towards the British public; and I think I should have his support in advocating in such a field as this, a much more radical reform of the relation of the sexes.

But I prefer to base my objections to those relations, upon the principle of *utility*, rather than that of *justice*; and for the following reasons:—Justice appears to me to be not only a wholly inadequate test of right and wrong, but by being made to supersede and obscure the true one, to become a mischievous delusion; and I undertake to show that those who nominally make it the test of right and wrong, actually, though unconsciously, make utility, real or imaginary, the criterion of justice. The principle of utility is thus of anterior and superior value. I must however explain this. We hang a murderer. Why? we cannot restore the dead to life, as strict *justice* would require; and if some of the ancients sacrificed the murderer to the manes of the deceased, we have long since quite relinquished the notion that we can annul a crime by imitating or repeating it. We recognise that the deceased cannot be affected by our act, and we hang the murderer solely for our own security; to deter intending murderers from following the example set them. By so doing, we recognise the principle of *utility*; and also, that men's future acts will be affected thereby—that they are, in fact, produced by circumstances. Hence it follows that circumstances produced the murderer's act, which was the indirect or direct result of his constitution, state of knowledge, and collateral events combined; severally constituting causes culminating in the murder as their effect. This is an important point, and is, in fact, the key to all moral questions. "We all, *practically*, admit that every event is the necessary effect of its antecedents or causes. For all knowledge is nothing but the apprehension of various applications of the axiom, that under given conditions, the same result must inevitably follow. To suppose any fact to have occurred differently, involves that its causes must have been different also—their causes also again, and so on, throughout the preceding eternity. Nothing, therefore, could have happened, or can happen otherwise than as it did—or does. Either this is infallibly true, or else experience can furnish no certainty or even a balance of probabilities, as to the consequences of events, and knowledge is impossible and absurd. Every intelligent act, however, is based upon invincible conviction of the uniformity and inviolability of causation, and experience consistently justifies this confidence. This being the case, however, to punish a murderer who is but the tool of circumstances, would be distinctly *unjust*, in the moral meaning of the word; and the murderer should go altogether free, if on the principle of *utility*, we were not to make a scarecrow of him, to deter probable or possible future murderers from murdering. Thus, where the principle of justice fails us, we instinctively fall back upon that of utility, which is also the real basis of justice, where that principle serves our turn.

Now I grant that Mr. Mill has irrefragably proved on the principle of justice, that our treatment of women is cruelly unjust, but I think he has scarcely given sufficient prominence to the pernicious consequences which thence ensue to society generally, and to man in particular. Condorcet, nearly eighty years ago, anticipated Mr. Mill's views, and mine also, in a noble passage of his Sketch of the Progress of the Human Intellect. He considered that one of the most essential requisites to human happiness and progress, was the destruction of

those prejudices which establish between the sexes an inequality of rights, which is disastrous even to the one that it appears to favor. He asserted that that inequality originates solely in the *abuse of force*, which no sophistry can excuse. He held that men would never be well educated till their mothers were so also; that equality would abolish many crimes caused by present relations of the sexes, and would produce an improvement of manners—impossible while the criteria were false modesty and religious terrorism. Now I think that this view of the origin of the inequality, in the abuse of force, requires a little revision. It seems to me that the word abuse is applicable rather to the maintenance than to the origin of the inequality. It would be more discriminative and accurate to say, that ignorant man, emerging from savagery, on first acquiring ideas of property, desired to *monopolise* the services and the person of woman, being naturally ignorant of one of the last and greatest discoveries of modern civilisation; namely, that the state of equality, of absence of restriction, was best for both, being favorable and necessary to the highest state of activity of each. Being ignorant, and the strongest, he naturally enslaved woman, and to the same extent he demoralised himself as a necessary consequence. To say he *abused* his force, implies that he consciously oppressed poor woman, and profited by doing so; whereas the injury to her was as unintentional as the equal if not greater injury to himself;—both were the inevitable results of ignorance. That ignorance to a lamentable extent still exists, and Mr. Mill and others are laboring to expose and abolish it.

Mr. Mill remarks that the progress of civilisation has brought about a very slow but constant amelioration of the condition of woman; not I think, from any feeling in man of justice, but rather from an unconscious instinctive selfishness, or more enlightened self-interest; the only thing indeed in *him*, from which *she* has anything to hope. To a savage, civilised or uncivilised, she is a mere beast of burthen. It is curious (and all the more so when we remember that at the time to which I am about to allude, our ancestors were very far behind the Hindoos in civilisation), to regard poor woman's status according to the earliest records that I have lately been able to find of the then highest phases of refinement. In the ancient Brahminic laws these sentences occur among others even more opprobrious, too much so to quote:—"A man, both day and night, must keep his wife so much in subjection, that she by no means be mistress of her own actions; if the wife have her own free will, notwithstanding she be sprung from a superior caste, she will yet behave amiss." Again—"Women have six qualities; first, an inordinate desire for jewels and fine furniture, handsome clothes, and nice victuals; the second, immoderate lust; the third, violent anger; the fourth, deep resentment, (i.e., no person knows the sentiments concealed in their heart); the fifth, another person's good appears evil in their eyes; the sixth, they commit bad actions." Yet—even in that condition of society, the law distinctly provided that a woman should hold property in many ways in which in England now, she *cannot* ! Let us remark here that these laws were those of a *priesthood*, a class which has always refined and disguised tyranny, by availing itself of the most powerful of all the engines of terrorism—the imagination of the weak-minded, the one to which unfortunately enslaved woman is naturally most susceptible. Hear, to the same effect, a distinguished modern divine, who adopts Condoreet's idea of woman's degradation being the result of an abuse of force, and corroborates my own, that religion has always been a principal means of effecting it. (Theodore Parker's "Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology," p. 135). "In all forms of religion that I know, from the book of Moses to the book of Mormon, from Confucius to Calvin, woman is degraded before man; for in all forms of religion hitherto *force* has been preferred above all things, and the great quality which has been ascribed to God has been an omnipotence of force. That is the thing which Christendom has worshipped these many hundred years,—not love; a mighty head, a mighty arm,—not a mighty heart. As force is preferred before all things in God, so in man; hence in religion; thence in all human affairs. And as woman has less force than man, less force of muscle, less force of mind, has more fineness of body, superior fineness of intellect, has eminence of conscience, eminence of affection, eminence of the religious power, eminence of soul; as she is inferior to man in his inferior elements, and superior in his higher,—so she has been prostrated before him. Her right of nature has been trodden under foot by his might of nature. This degradation of woman is obvious in all forms of religion; it is terribly apparent in the Christian church. The gospels Paul and Peter, the book of Revelation, have small respect for woman, little regard for marriage. The Bible makes woman the *inferior* of man, his *instrument* of comfort, his medium of posterity; created as an afterthought, for an '*help-meet*' for man, *because*, 'it was not good *for man*—to be *alone*.' Marriage in the New Testament is only for time; in the kingdom of heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage;' it is a low condition here; celibacy is the better of the two; it is not good to marry; only—all men cannot receive this saying. The Christ was represented as born with no human father—his birth a slap at wedlock. The Christian church has long taught that marriage is a little unholy; and woman was bid to be ashamed of that part of her nature which made her a daughter first, and afterwards a wife and mother. What do Jerome, Augustine, Aquinas, and the Popes say of connubial love? They have Paul as warrant for their unnatural creed. All this depreciation of woman comes from the idea of a god with whom *might is more than right*; the idea of a god that is mighty in his head, in his outstretched arm, but feeble in his conscience, and feeble in his heart; a most unmotherly god !"

Observe how Theodore Parker himself, with true priestly cunning, flatters poor woman to the top of her bent—but *his own* God was a MALE after all! The ancient Greeks made no such invidious distinction; they deified their standards of excellence without regard to sex.

But I wish to point out that our sexual customs are not our own invention or selection; they are no achievement of modern knowledge or perfected civilization, but are merely a legacy from local savagery; the very strength of the deeply-rooted popular prejudices on the subject is ample proof that we inherit them from the most remote and uncouth barbarism through countless prehistoric ages. Christianity attempted no alteration, or at any rate effected no improvement in the tyranny it found already firmly established. It has certainly made woman more powerless and hopeless than before, by rivetting the fetters of marriage upon her for life, and depriving her of the small rights to property yielded elsewhere; and the poor consolation of a little extra flattery—of merely verbal adulation—I can only regard as the addition of insult to injury. Monogamy we received from Paganism in frigid Europe; where it was adopted, sanctified, and called its own by exploiting Christianity, which exaggerated its principle of tyrannical monopoly to establish and confirm the slavery in which it held both mind and body. Polygamy is indigenous to warmer Asia, and is just as much inculcated and utilised by priestcraft for its own purposes. Evil as both are—the one being a concentrated, the other an extended tyranny—the principle of monopoly, the pernicious basis of both, is older than either, and will therefore be more difficult to subvert. But subverted it must be, by civilisation, reason, and time. Man will at last see that to the same extent that he enslaves or monopolises woman, and restricts her freedom, he demoralises himself. The principle laid down in Wilhelm von Humboldt's "Sphere and Duties of Government," is becoming daily more widely apprehended and popular:—that the State should promote intellectual activity, and do so solely by removing obstacles to activity. To restrict one class to benefit another, must really be disastrous to both. Buckle has expressed this in very strong terms, and confirmed it powerfully by illustrations. He says the only laws which ever did unmixed good, are those which repealed others. Both authors concur in recommending the abolition of everything like restriction upon free action, and in showing how enactments of the kind inevitably defeat their own purposes. Buckle, in particular, shows lucidly how the laws in England respecting oaths are a source of national corruption, have diminished the value of human testimony, and shaken the confidence which men naturally place in their fellow creatures; how legislators in every attempt to uphold particular principles, have not only failed, but have brought about results diametrically opposite to those which they proposed. He shows that their laws in favor of industry have injured industry; those in favor of religion have favored hypocrisy, those to secure truth have encouraged perjury, and those enacted to prevent usury and keep down the interest of money have invariably increased usury and raised interest. And this is true of, and applicable to, every department of social regulation—of conventional custom as well as of law. Thus—by arrogating to himself a monopoly of one or more women, and maintaining the idea that infringement of it is a kind of sacrilege, man precludes himself from remedying any matrimonial mistake he may have made in his inexperienced, mistaught, and precipitate youth. By making women slaves generally, he has caused himself to inherit the degraded feelings and aborted capacities of a slave. Mr. Mill has abundantly shown the enormous evil results of constant association with our slaves; and that association on any other than equal terms must be injurious and fatal to both, and most deteriorating to the superior. I shall here, therefore, only strongly recommend his book to careful attention. But by the factitious notions of modesty which man has invented and encouraged to enthrall the minds as well as the bodies of the other sex, he has made himself, as well as them, the victims of dreadful diseases from which few are exempt; while by superadding exclusive permanent monogamy; he has succeeded in producing—in *Prostitution*, a mental and physical evil which exceeds everything else in the appalling degradation in which both male and female participators are involved.

But what *is* modesty? In any notion of modesty, is not indecency an essential element or part? Is it not altogether a mystic creation of a morbid imagination? "To him that *esteemeth anything* to be unclean, to him (and to him only) it is unclean." Thus modesty suggests and *Creates* its own opposite:

There is also another essentially vitiating constituent of the idea of modesty, which I feel can never be compensated by any or all of the advantages which may be imagined to flow from it. The conception of modesty involves that acts may be good and virtuous if done in secret, that are dishonorable and vile, if done in the light of day and before the world. This is inseparable from the idea of modesty; and this alone would make me suspect and condemn it as the very antithesis and foe of all ingenuousness and truth,—even if I were wholly ignorant of the gigantic evils which are its direct results. Morally,—by a morbid fear of misplaced shame, which regards external reputation instead of intrinsic worth, it saps truth and honesty from the hearts of men and women, imposing itself upon (hem by the hypocritical assumption of sanctity and virtue. Physically,—it exposes both sexes through the ignorance which it enforces, to life-destroying diseases, precluding their prevention as well as their cure; and, worst of all, it imposes insuperable barriers to the acquisition of the most important knowledge, by those most interested in obtaining it. This is what stamps it as essentially evil in its nature; and what compensation has it to offer, beyond a morbid gratification in restricting by uncharitable

criticism, the natural actions of our neighbours, and imputing *to them* the *uncleanness* which it has really produced in our own ideas? We not only approve, but we admire and even *envy*, the innocent unconsciousness of any such feeling as modesty in an infant or young child. Thus is proved—not only that the feeling is not natural, or more than a mere conventionalism, but that it comes only with the loss of innocence, real or supposed; that, in fact, there is no basis for it outside a morbid and depraved imagination. The operation of modesty as a pernicious embargo on knowledge, is obviously only a relic of the esoteric principle upon which those who of old held the monopoly of all knowledge, deemed it best, if not necessary to govern the ignorant by means of their ignorance, instead of dissipating it, and so making government superfluous.

Modesty and chastity are certainly not products of modern civilisation, or even of Christianity; but their genesis and highest development are easily recognised and traced in the same universal cradle of senseless asceticism and visionary mysticism, from the sacred books of which I have already quoted a disgusting libel on female character. To quote the least offensive precept of the kind in the same code—"A woman must always veil her face whenever she laughs!" How unspeakable should be our gratulation that this law is inoperative here! The absurd distinctions of metaphorical cleanness and uncleanness have their origin in the same nursery of superstition, but have proved too puerile for more adult humanity. In fact, M. Jacolliot has lately traced a surprising number of our most uncouth and barbarous customs, laws, and superstitions to the same source. The clumsy plagiarisms in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, from the ancient Hindoo books, he has identified with great clearness and minuteness. Time and the diffusion of knowledge are gradually dissipating the thralldom in which these inherited superstitions have held the human intellect for so many centuries, but much progress can never be made, until utility be recognised as the sole valid criterion of good and evil. "When the vast mass of mankind was sunk in the grossest ignorance, the demand for checks and restrictions upon its rude inexperienced energy doubtless created the supply. But the history of the world shows that as knowledge increases, the doubtful necessity for restrictions upon activity disappears, and even proves all abnormal restrictions upon activity to be absolutely pernicious. Public opinion and our more æsthetic morality will inevitably have to undergo an eliminating process similar to that to which our religions or superstitions have been subjected. Mr. Mill's proposals amount to conferring upon woman, rights, as regards property, fully equal to those of men; and the reduction of all marriage to a legal partnership dissoluble at will. Recognition of the perfect individual right to exercise natural personal functions without subjection to impertinent obloquy, when the consequences are not clearly injurious to society, must I think follow the knowledge of the fact that abstinence is as evil in its consequences, and therefore as vicious, as excess. Though I am more than sanguine of the best results from such knowledge, and action based upon it, still in the absence of experience, their strong probability is all that can be contended for. But on the other hand an opponent of my views is quite as incompetent for the same reason to assert them to be erroneous. Were I, however, to argue upon the principle of justice, I should point out that for society to prohibit any individual from the moderate exercise of a natural function, precautions being taken to guard against injury to society, is merely to enforce a vicious tyrannical monopoly; by which an unappropriated slave must not dare to infringe upon the possible future monopoly of each possible proprietor,—no, not even to save life or health, until some one of them shall please to assume possession. Could anything be more accurately the opposite of justice?

In casting about for an adequate illustration of the tyrannical monopoly enforced by male society over an unmarried woman the fable of the dog in the manger naturally occurred to me. Though it falls immeasurably short of the conditions of the case, it appears though not perfect, really not unapt. The lover fairly represents the cow, and every other man, or society, the dog; while the person principally concerned, occupies no more-important position than the straw! I think this represent the *justice* of the case with singular felicity.

I shall now only touch upon one point. Our knowledge in the past, though comparatively small, sufficed to advance us in the path of progress to the point we have attained. Can anyone who contemplates the geometrically increasing ratio of the expansion of our knowledge, fear to place now in the hands of individuals, power which was possessed by our ignorant savage ancestors? or to remove restrictions upon individual activity imposed by comparative ignorance? Knowledge is spreading, and must spread; and its rapid dissemination creates the demand for power, the exercise of which, well or ill, produces the most valuable knowledge. To those who fear that this knowledge or power may possibly be dangerous, I would point out that knowledge and its results comprise all the advantages which place the civilised man above the savage or the child. I certainly recognise a reason for insisting on the dissemination of political knowledge before conferring political power. For his own experience may suffice for an individual, but that of all civilisation is necessary for a nation, and the ignorant are numerically and physically the strongest in every known state. But the young, particularly of the female sex, are physically and numerically the weakest, and are at even a greater disadvantage from the prohibition upon the knowledge they most want. But it should not be overlooked that it is less liberty or power, than knowledge simply, that I desire to confer; or, rather, merely to remove the pernicious restrictions imposed upon it. Knowledge on the subject of sexual relations is very different from political knowledge, in being

all-important to every private person. Individual liberty is also very different from political liberty, as the happiness of the individual only is involved in the former,—that of society in the latter; and so far as the happiness of society is concerned, the more liberty the individual has, the better; yes—whether he exercise it to his own best advantage or not. If he do, all are benefitted; if he do not, society learns an invaluable lesson at his expense. There appear to be no reasons for apprehending evil—or any but the best results, from the widest dissemination of the most complete knowledge on sexual subjects among all classes, but most especially among those by whom it is most required—the female sex. Innovations seldom occur to the human imagination before changes are required; and even if possibly premature, unlike that worst of evils—stagnation, they necessarily tend to correct their own defects. Activity alone seems to be the one constant desirable condition, whether of mind or of body,—of individual or of race. As I once before took occasion to observe before this Association, Activity is virtue, and reason is its highest form.

decorative feature

E. Bell, Steam Printer, 97 Little Collins Street East.

Statistical Inquiries Into the Efficacy of Prayer.

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AN eminent authority has recently published a challenge to test the efficacy of prayer by actual experiment. I have been induced, through reading this, to prepare the following memoir for publication, nearly the whole of which I wrote and laid by many years ago, after completing a large collection of data, which I had undertaken for the satisfaction of my own conscience.

The efficacy of prayer seems to me a simple, as it is a perfectly appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific inquiry. Whether prayer is efficacious or not, in any given sense, is a matter of fact on which each man must form an opinion for himself. His decision will be based upon data more or less justly handled, according to his education and habits. An unscientific reasoner will be guided by a confused recollection of crude experience. A scientific reasoner will scrutinise each separate experience before he admits it as evidence, and will compare all the cases he has selected on a methodical system.

The doctrine commonly preached by the clergy is well expressed in the most recent, and by far the most temperate and learned of theological encyclopædias, namely, "Smith's Dictionary of the Bible." The article on "Prayer," written by the Rev. Dr. Barry, states as follows: "Its real objective efficacy is both implied and expressed [in Scripture] in the plainest terms. We are encouraged to ask special blessings, both spiritual and temporal, in hopes that thus, and thus only, we may obtain them It would seem the intention of Holy Scripture to encourage all prayer, more especially intercession, in all relations and for all righteous objects." Dr. Hook, the present Dean of Chichester, states in his "Church Dictionary," under "Prayer," that "the general providence of God acts through what are called the laws of nature. By his particular providence God interferes with those laws, and he has promised to interfere in behalf of those who pray in the name of Jesus We may take it as a general rule that we may pray for that for which we may lawfully labour, and for that only."

The phrases of our Church service amply countenance this view; and if we look to the practice of the opposed sections of the religious world, we find them consistent in maintaining it. The so-called "Low Church" notoriously places absolute belief in special providences accorded to pious prayer. This is testified by the biographies of its members, the journals of its missionaries, and the "united prayer-meetings" of the present day. The Roman Catholics offer religious vows to avert danger; they make pilgrimages to shrines; they hang votive offerings and pictorial representations, sometimes by thousands, in their churches, of fatal accidents averted by the manifest interference of a solicited saint.

A *prima facie* argument in favour of the efficacy of prayer is therefore to be drawn from the very general use of it. The greater part of mankind, during all the historic ages, have been accustomed to pray for temporal advantages. How vain, it may be urged, must be the reasoning that ventures to oppose this mighty consensus of belief! Not so. The argument of universality either proves too much, or else it is suicidal. It either compels us to admit that the prayers of Pagans, of Fetish worshippers, and of Buddhists who turn praying wheels, are recompensed in the same way as those of orthodox believers; or else the general consensus proves that it has no better foundation than the universal tendency of man to gross credulity.

The collapse of the argument of universality leaves us solely concerned with a simple statistical question—are prayers answered, or are they not? There are two lines of research, by either of which we may pursue this inquiry. The one that promises the most trustworthy results is to examine large classes or cases, and to be guided by broad averages; the other, which I will not employ in these pages, is to deal with isolated

instances. An author who made much use of the latter method might reasonably suspect his own judgment—he would certainly run the risk of being suspected by others—in choosing one-sided examples.

The principles are broad and simple upon which our inquiry into the efficacy of prayer must be established. We must gather cases for statistical comparison, in which the same object is keenly pursued by two classes similar in their physical, but opposite in their spiritual state; the one class being prayerful, the other materialistic. Prudent pious people must be compared with prudent materialistic people, and not with the imprudent nor the vicious. Secondly, we have no regard, in this inquiry, to the course by which the answer to prayers may be supposed to operate. We simply look to the final result—whether those who pray attain their objects more frequently than those who do not pray, but who live in all other respects under similar conditions. Let us now apply our principles to different cases.

A rapid recovery from disease may be conceived to depend on many causes besides the reparative power of the patient's constitution. A miraculous quelling of the disease may be one of these causes; another is the skill of the physician, or of the nurse; another is the care that the patient takes of himself. In our inquiry, whether prayerful people recover more rapidly than others under similar circumstances, we need not complicate the question by endeavoring to learn the channel through which the patient's prayer may have reached its fulfilment. It is foreign to our present purpose to ask if there be any signs of a miraculous quelling of the disease, or if, through the grace of God, the physician had showed unusual wisdom, or the nurse or the patient unusual discretion. We simply look to the main issue—do sick persons who pray, or are prayed for, recover on the average more rapidly than others?

It appears that, in all countries and in all creeds, the priests urge the patient to pray for his own recovery, and the patient's friends to aid him with their prayers; but that the doctors make no account whatever of their spiritual agencies, unless the office of priest and medical man be combined in the same individual. The medical works of modern Europe teem with records of individual illnesses and of broad averages of disease, but I have been able to discover hardly any instance in which a medical man of any repute has attributed recovery to the influence of prayer. There is not a single instance, to my knowledge, in which papers read before statistical societies have recognised the agency of prayer either on disease or on anything else. The universal habit of the scientific world to ignore the agency of prayer is a very important fact. To fully appreciate the "eloquence of the silence" of medical men, we must bear in mind the care with which they endeavor to assign a sanatory value to every influence. Had prayers for the sick any notable effect, it is incredible but that the doctors, who are always on the watch for such things, should have observed it, and added their influence to that of the priests towards obtaining them for every sick man. If they abstain from doing so, it is not because their attention has never been awakened to the possible efficacy of prayer, but, on the contrary, that although they have heard it insisted on from childhood upwards, they are unable to detect its influence. Most people have some general belief in the objective efficacy of prayer, but none seem willing to admit its action in those special cases of which they have scientific cognisance.

Those who may wish to pursue these inquiries upon the effect of prayers for the restoration of health could obtain abundant materials from hospital cases, and in a different way from that proposed in the challenge to which I referred at the beginning of these pages. There are many common maladies whose course is so thoroughly well understood as to admit of accurate tables of probability being constructed for their duration and result. Such are fractures and amputations. Now it would be perfectly practicable to select out of the patients at different hospitals under treatment for fractures and amputations two considerable groups; the one consisting of markedly religious and piously befriended individuals, the other of those who were remarkably cold-hearted and neglected. An honest comparison of their respective periods of treatment and the results would manifest a distinct proof of the efficacy of prayer, if it existed to even a minute fraction of the amount that religious teachers exhort us to believe.

An inquiry of a somewhat similar nature may be made into the longevity of persons whose lives are prayed for; also that of the praying classes generally; and in both these cases we can easily obtain statistical facts. The public prayer for the sovereign of every state, Protestant and Catholic, is and has been in the spirit of our own, "Grant her in health long to live." Now, as a simple matter of fact, has this prayer any efficacy? There is a memoir by Dr. Guy, in the *Journal of the Statistical Society* (vol. xxii. p. 355), in which he compares the mean age of sovereigns with that of other classes of persons. His results are expressed in the following table:—

MEAN AGE ATTAINED BY MALES OF VARIOUS CLASSES WHO HAD SURVIVED THEIR 30TH YEAR, FROM 1758 TO 1843. DEATHS BY ACCIDENT OR VIOLENCE ARE EXCLUDED.

The sovereigns are literally the shortest lived of all who have the advantage of affluence. The prayer has therefore no efficacy, unless the very questionable hypothesis be raised, that the conditions of royal life may naturally be yet more fatal, and that their influence is partly, though incompletely, neutralised by the effects of public prayers.

(1) The eminent men are those whose lives are recorded in Chalmers's Biography, with some additions

from the Annual Register.

It will be seen that the same table collates the longevity of clergy, lawyers, and medical men. We are justified in considering the clergy to be a far more prayerful class than either of the other two. It is their profession to pray, and they have the practice of offering morning and evening family prayers in addition to their private devotions. A reference to any of the numerous published collections of family prayers will show that they are full of petitions for temporal benefits. We do not, however, find that the clergy are in any way more long lived in consequence. It is true that the clergy, as a whole, show a life-value of 69 49, as against 68 14 for the lawyers, and 67 31 for the medical men; but the easy country life and family repose of so many of the clergy are obvious sanitary conditions in their favour. This diffidence is reversed when the comparison is made between distinguished members of the three classes—that is to say, between persons of sufficient note to have had their lives recorded in a biographical dictionary. When we examine this category, the value of life among the clergy, lawyers, and medical men is as 66 42, 66 51, and 67 04 respectively, the clergy being the shortest lived of the three. Hence the prayers of the clergy for protection against the perils and dangers of the night, for protection during the day, and for recovery from sickness, appear to be futile in result.

In my work on "Hereditary Genius," and in the chapter on "Divines," I have worked out the subject with some minuteness on other data, but with precisely the same result. I show that the divines are not specially favoured in those worldly matters for which they naturally pray, but rather the contrary, a fact which I ascribe in part to their having, as a class, indifferent constitutional vigour. I give abundant reason for all this, and do not care to repeat myself; but I should be glad if such of the readers of this present paper who may be accustomed to statistics would refer to the chapter I have mentioned. They will find it of use in confirming what I say here. They will believe me the more when I say that I have taken considerable pains to get at the truth in the questions raised in this present memoir, and that, when I was engaged upon them, I worked, so far as my material went, with as much care as I gave to that chapter on "Divines;" and lastly, they will understand that, when writing the chapter in question, I had all this material by me unused, which justified me in speaking out as decidedly as I did then.

A further inquiry may be made into the duration of life among missionaries. We should lay greater stress upon their mortality than upon that of the clergy, because the laudable object of a missionary's career is rendered almost nugatory by his early death. A man goes, say to a tropical climate, in the prime of manhood, who has the probability of many years of useful life before him, had he remained at home. He has the certainty of being able to accomplish sterling good as a missionary, if he should live long enough to learn the language and habits of the country. In the interval he is almost useless. Yet the painful experience of many years shows only too clearly that the missionary is not supernaturally endowed with health. He does not live longer than other people. One missionary after another dies shortly after his arrival. The work that lay almost within the grasp of each of them lingers incomplete.

It must here be repeated, that comparative immunity from disease compels the suspension of no purely material law, if such an expression be permitted. Tropical fever, for example, is due to many subtle causes which are partly under man's control. A single hour's exposure to sun, or wet, or fatigue, or mental agitation, will determine an attack. Now even if God acted only on the minds of the missionaries, his action might be as much to the advantage of their health as if he wrought a physical miracle. He could disincline them to take those courses which might result in mischance, such as the forced march, the wetting, the abstinence from food, or the night exposure, any one of which was competent to develop the fever that struck them down. We must not dwell upon the circumstances of individual cases, and say "this was a providential escape," or "that was a salutary chastisement," but we must take the broad averages of mortality, and, when we do so, we find that the missionaries do not form a favoured class.

The efficacy of prayer may yet further be tested by inquiry into the proportion of deaths at the time of birth among the children of the praying and the non-praying classes. The solicitude of parents is so powerfully directed towards the safety of their expected offspring as to leave no room to doubt that pious parents pray fervently for it, especially as death before baptism is considered a most serious evil by many Christians. However, the distribution of still-births appears wholly unaffected by piety. The proportion, for instance, of the still-births published in the *Record* newspaper and in the *Times* was found by me, on an examination of a particular period, to bear an identical relation to the total number of deaths. This inquiry might easily be pursued by those who considered that more ample evidence was required.

When we pray in our Liturgy "that the nobility may be endued with grace, wisdom, and understanding," we pray for that which is clearly incompatible with insanity. Does that frightful scourge spare our nobility? Does it spare very religious people more than others? The answer is an emphatic negative to both of these questions. The nobility, probably from their want of the wholesome restraints felt in humbler walks of life, and from their intermarriages, and the very religious people of all denominations, probably from their meditations on hell, are peculiarly subject to it. Religious madness is very common indeed.

As I have already hinted, I do not propose any special inquiry whether the general laws of physical nature are ever suspended in fulfilment of prayer: whether, for instance, success has attended the occasional prayers in the Liturgy when they have been used for rain, for fair weather, for the stilling of the sea in a storm, or for the abatement of a pestilence. I abstain from doing so for two reasons.

First, if it is proved that God does not answer one large class of prayers at all, it would be of less importance to pursue the inquiry. Secondly, the modern feeling of this country is so opposed to a belief in the occasional suspension of the general laws of nature, that an English reader would merely smile at such an investigation.

If we are satisfied that the actions of man are not influenced by prayer, even through the subtle influences of his thoughts and will, the only probable form of agency will have been disproved, and no one would care to advance a claim in favour of direct physical interferences.

Biographies do not show that devotional influences have clustered in any remarkable degree round the youth of those who, whether by their talents or social position, have left a mark upon our English history. Lord Campbell, in his preface to the "Lives of the Chancellors," says, "There is no office in the history of any nation that has been filled with such a long succession of distinguished and interesting men as the office of Lord Chancellor," and that "generally speaking, the most eminent men, if not the most virtuous, have been selected to adorn it." His implied disparagement of their piety is fully sustained by an examination of their respective biographies, and by a taunt of Horace Walpole, quoted in the same preface. An equal absence of remarkable devotional tendencies may be observed in the lives of the leaders of great political parties. The founders of our great families too often owed their advancement to tricky and time-serving courtiership. The belief so frequently expressed in the Psalms, that the descendants of the righteous shall continue, and that those of the wicked shall surely fail, is not fulfilled in the history of our English peerage. Take for instance the highest class, that of the Ducal houses. The influence of social position in this country is so enormous that the possession of a dukedom is a power that can hardly be understood without some sort of calculation. There are, I believe, only twenty-seven dukes to about eight millions of adult male Englishmen, or about three dukes to each million, yet the cabinet of fourteen ministers which governs this country, and India too, commonly contains one duke, often two and in recent times three. The political privilege inherited with a dukedom in this country is at the lowest estimate many thousand-fold above the average birthright of Englishmen. What was the origin of these ducal families whose influence on the destiny of England and her dependencies is so enormous? Were their founders the eminently devout children of eminently pious parents? Have they and their ancestors been distinguished among the praying classes? Not so. I give in a footnote

Abercorn, Argyll, Athole, Beaufort, Bedford, Buccleuch, Buckingham, Cleveland, Devonshire, Grafton, Hamilton, Leeds, Leinster, Manchester, Marlborough, Montrose, Newcastle, Norfolk, Northumberland, Portland, Richmond, Roxburghe, Rutland, St. Albans, Somerset, Sutherland, Wellington.

a list of their names, which recalls many a deed of patriotism, valour, and skill, many an instance of eminent merit of the worldly sort, which we Englishmen honour six days out of the seven—many scandals, many a disgrace, but not, on the other hand, a single instance known to me of eminently prayerful qualities. Four at least of the existing ducal houses are unable to claim the title of having been raised into existence through the devout habits of their progenitors, because the families of Buccleuch, Grafton, St. Albans, and Richmond were thus highly ennobled solely on the ground of their being descended from Charles II. and four of his mistresses, namely, Lucy Walters, Barbara Villiers, Nell Gwynne, and Louise de Querouaille. The dukedom of Cleveland may almost be reckoned as a fifth instance.

The civil liberty we enjoy in England, and the energy of our race, have given rise to a number of institutions, societies, commercial adventures, political meetings, and combinations of all sorts. Some of these are exclusively clerical, some lay, and others mixed. It is impossible for a person to have taken an active share in social life without having had abundant means of estimating for himself, and of hearing the opinion of others, on the value of a preponderating clerical element in business committees. For my own part, I never heard a favourable one. The procedure of Convocation, which, like all exclusively clerical meetings, is opened with prayer, has not inspired the outer world with much respect. The histories of the great councils of the Church are most painful to read. There is reason to expect that devout and superstitious men should be unreasonable; for a person who believes his thoughts to be inspired, necessarily accredits his prejudices with divine authority. He is therefore little accessible to argument, and he is intolerant of those whose opinions differ from his, especially on first principles. Consequently, he is a bad coadjutor in business matters. It is a common week-day opinion of the world that praying people are not practical.

Again, there is a large class of instances where an enterprise on behalf of pious people is executed by the agency of the profane. Do such enterprises prosper beyond the average? For instance, a vessel on a missionary errand is navigated by ordinary seamen. A fleet, followed by the prayers of the English nation, carries reinforcements to quell an Indian mutiny. We do not care to ask whether the result of these prayers is to obtain

favourable winds, but simply whether they ensue in a propitious voyage, whatever may have been the agencies by which that result was obtained. The success of voyages might be due to many other agencies than the suspension of the physical laws that control the winds and currents; just as we showed that a rapid recovery from illness might be due to other causes than direct interference with cosmic order. It might have been put into the captain's heart to navigate in that course and to perform those acts of seamanship which proved links in a chain that led to eventual success. A very small matter would suffice to make a great difference in the end. A vessel navigated by a man who was a good forecaster of weather and an accomplished hydrographer would considerably outstrip another that was deficient in so accomplished a commander, but otherwise similarly equipped. The perfectly instructed navigator would deviate from the most direct course by perhaps some mere trifle, first here, then there, in order to bring his vessel within favouring slants of wind and advantageous currents. A ship commanded by a captain and steered by a sailor whose hearts were miraculously acted upon in answer to prayer would unconsciously, as by instinct, or even as it were by mistake, perform these deviations from routine, which would lead to ultimate success.

The missionaries who are the most earnestly prayed for are usually those who sail on routes where there is little traffic, and therefore where there is more opportunity for the effects of secret providential overruling to display themselves than among those who sail in ordinary sea voyages. In the usual sea routes a great deal is known of the peculiarities of the seasons and currents, and of the whereabouts of hidden dangers of all kinds; their average risk is small, and the insurance is low. But when vessels are bound to ports like those sought by the missionaries the case is different. The risk that attends their voyages is largely increased, and the insurance is proportionately raised. But is the risk equally increased in respect to missionary vessels and to those of traders and of slave-dealers? The comparison between the fortune that attends prayerful and non-prayerful people may here be most happily made. The missionaries are eminently among the former category, and the slave-dealers and the traders we speak of in the other. Traders in the unhealthy and barbarous regions to which we refer are notoriously the most godless and reckless (on the broad average) of any of their set. We have, unfortunately, little knowledge of the sea risks of slavers, because the rates of their insurance involve the risk of capture. There is, however, a universal testimony, in the parliamentary reports on slavery, to the excellent and skilful manner in which these vessels are sailed and navigated, which is a *prima facie* reason for believing their sea risks to be small. As to the relative risks run by ordinary traders and missionary vessels, the insurance offices absolutely ignore the slightest difference between them. They look to the class of the vessel, and to the station to which she is bound, and to nothing else. The notion that a missionary or other pious enterprise carries any immunity from danger has never been entertained by insurance companies.

To proceed with our inquiry, whether enterprises on behalf of pious people succeed better than others when they are intrusted to profane hands, we may ask,—Is a bank or other commercial undertaking more secure when devout men are among its shareholders,—or when the funds of pious people, or charities, or of religious bodies are deposited in its keeping, or when its proceedings are opened with prayer, as was the case with the disastrous Royal British Bank? It is impossible to say yes. There are far too many sad experiences of the contrary.

If prayerful habits had influence on temporal success, it is very probable, as we must again repeat, that insurance offices, of at least some descriptions, would long ago have discovered and made allowance for it. It would be most unwise, from a business point of view, to allow the devout, supposing their greater longevity even probable, to obtain annuities at the same low rates as the profane. Before insurance offices accept a life, they make confidential inquiries into the antecedents of the applicant. But such a question has never been heard of as, "Does he habitually use family prayers and private devotions?" Insurance offices, so wakeful to sanatory influences, absolutely ignore prayer as one of them. The same is true for insurances of all descriptions, as those connected with fire, ships, lightning, hail, accidental death, and cattle sickness. How is it possible to explain why Quakers, who are most devout and most shrewd men of business, have ignored these considerations, except on the ground that they do not really believe in what they and others freely assert about the efficacy of prayer? It was at one time considered an act of mistrust in an overruling Providence to lightning conductors on churches; for it was said that God would surely take care of his own. But Arago's collection of the accidents from lightning showed they were sorely needed; and now lightning conductors are universal. Other kinds of accidents befall churches, equally with other buildings of the same class; such as architectural flaws, resulting in great expenses for repair, fires, earthquakes, and avalanches.

The cogency of all these arguments is materially increased by the recollection that many items of ancient faith have been successively abandoned by the Christian world to the domain of recognised superstition. It is not two centuries ago, long subsequent to the days of Shakespeare and other great names, that the sovereign of this country was accustomed to lay hands on the sick for their recovery, under the sanction of regular Church service, which was not omitted from our prayer-books till the time of George II. Witches were unanimously believed in, and were regularly exorcised, and punished by law, up to the beginning of the last century. Ordeals and duels, most reasonable solutions of complicated difficulties according to the popular theory of religion,

were found absolutely fallacious in practice. The miraculous power of relics and images, still so general in Southern Europe, is scouted in England. The importance ascribed to dreams, the barely extinct claims of astrology, and auguries of good or evil luck, and many other well-known products of superstition which are found to exist in every country, have ceased to be believed in by us. This is the natural course of events, just as the Waters of Jealousy and the Urim and Thummin of the Mosaic law had become obsolete in the times of the later Jewish kings. The civilised world has already yielded an enormous amount of honest conviction to the inexorable requirements of solid fact; and it seems to me clear that all belief in the efficacy of prayer, in the sense in which I have been considering it, must be yielded also. The evidence I have been able to collect bears wholly and solely in that direction, and in the face of it the *onus probandi* lies henceforth on the other side.

Nothing that I have said negatives the fact that the mind may be relieved by the utterance of prayer. The impulse to pour out the feelings in sound is not peculiar to man. Any mother that has lost her young, and wanders about moaning and looking piteously for sympathy, possesses much of that which prompts men to pray in articulate words. There is a yearning of the heart, a craving for help, it knows not where, certainly from no source that it sees. Of a similar kind is the bitter cry of the hare, when the greyhound is almost upon her; she abandons hope through her own efforts, and screams,—but to whom? It is a voice convulsively sent out into space, whose utterance is a physical relief. These feelings of distress and of terror are simple, and an inarticulate cry suffices to give vent to them; but the reason why man is not satisfied by uttering inarticulate cries (though sometimes they are felt to be the most appropriate) is owing to his superior intellectual powers. His memory travels back through interlacing paths, and dwells on various connected incidents; his emotions are complex, and he prays at length.

Neither does anything I have said profess to throw light on the question of how far it is possible for man to commune in his heart with God. We know that many persons of high intellectual gifts and critical minds look upon it as an axiomatic certainty that they possess this power, although it is impossible for them to establish any satisfactory criterion to distinguish between what may really be borne in upon them from without and what arises from within, but which, through a sham of the imagination, appears to be external. A confident sense of communion with God must necessarily rejoice and strengthen the heart, and divert it from petty cares; and it is equally certain that similar benefits are not excluded from those who on conscientious grounds are sceptical as to the reality of a power of communion. These can dwell on the undoubted fact, that there exists a solidarity between themselves and what surrounds them, through the endless reactions of physical laws, among which the hereditary influences are to be included. They know that they are descended from an endless past, that they have a brotherhood with all that is, and have each his own share 'of responsibility in the parentage of an endless future. The effort to familiarise the imagination with this great idea has much in common with the effort of communing with a God, and its reaction on the mind of the thinker is in many important respects the same. It may not equally rejoice the heart, but it is quite as powerful in ennobling the resolves, and it is found to give serenity during the trials of life and in the shadow of approaching death.—FRANCIS GALTON.

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Science and Miracle.

By H. K. Rusden.

[Read before the Free Discussion Society on 21st May, 1882.]

Bishop Moorhouse's late lecture on this subject of "Science and Miracle" is not the least remarkable of those with which he has astonished his auditors and readers. The Bishop is an intelligent man, and cannot but be forcibly impressed by the vast additions which are daily being made to exact knowledge or science, and the consequent detractions which are made from inexact or confused knowledge, or, as he says, speculation. Like his great prototype Bishop Berkely, however,—to save his particular theories by which he lives, and moves, and has his being as a church dignitary,—he takes refuge in metaphysics; and by calling *that* science which is not science, but confused knowledge or speculation, he makes true, exact science appear as uncertain as speculation. He thus loses or obscures the important distinction between the two, and then makes believe that there is no real difference between them. Science and superstition, however, are like oil and water; you may shake them up in a rhetorical bottle, and pour them out then, apparently, a homogenous fluid; but let them remain at rest for but a little time, and regard them with attention, and you will see them resume their natural and distinct relative positions. I propose to show the line of demarcation which naturally subsists between them,

and how the Bishop has managed to mix them together. Bishop Berkely began this metaphysical confusion, and turned it to great account; and so dexterously that many men to-day who should know better are deceived into thinking that the mixture is permanent, if not natural. Let us see what are its constituents, and what are their natural relative positions.

The Bishop began by explaining his idea of Science. "Let us ask," he said "what it is that we know." Now instead of regarding as Science that kind of knowledge which has advanced civilized man above the savage,—the careful observation of external Nature, and the checking of that observation by exact measurement, experiment, and verification of the relations, of the actual objects before us, he follows Berkeley's method of introspection, and says that we know nothing but states of consciousness! Now a state of consciousness is not an object of scientific knowledge—such exact knowledge as I allude to as having helped man forward in civilisation; it is but a means by which we arrive at that knowledge. To say we know states of consciousness only is to mistake the means for the end. States of consciousness are means only by which we observe the actual objects—the knowledge of which is profitable. If we really regarded a state of consciousness as the object of knowledge, we should never get beyond it. We should know nothing of the real object; as the Bishop says that we now know nothing of it. But I maintain that we have knowledge of external objects; and more certain useful knowledge of them by observation and experiment than we have or could have by following the Bishop's introspective method, which is calculated merely to confuse and deceive.

Let us take a few examples. I see the Moon. Only by sight do I know it at all. Taking the state of consciousness produced by it as the object of knowledge, I find that it is pleasant to look at, and I can imagine anything I like about it. I can imagine the subjective impression peopled by similar introspective—angels or lunatics, gods or devils. But this is not knowledge, nor the way to it. It is simply introspection, speculation, folly. But if I observe not my own subjective impression—my state of consciousness, but, instead, the Moon itself as a veritable external object—if I carefully note its nightly change of altitude and form, and the places of its rising and setting, and compare them with other facts of astronomy, I find that the position of the Moon at a given time will inform me of my exact latitude and longitude in a ship at sea, when, perhaps, all other means fail me. Now this is what I call real knowledge, exact knowledge, or science,—our guide in life,—which is wholly different in kind from a mere metaphysical investigation into a state of consciousness, which would teach me little that would be useful, and might introduce another state of consciousness as unpleasant as that produced by a ship-wreck. Say I feel the want of a dinner. This is a state of consciousness. If I regard it solely as such, it is likely to be permanent, as I cannot dine upon it satisfactorily. If I disregard the state of consciousness, and look about for such external objects as bread and meat, and succeed in getting them, I arrive at more pleasant states of consciousness without so much as thinking of them. In fact, states of consciousness exist only for the metaphysician; for other people are *unconscious* of them, and therefore for them they cannot consistently be called even states of consciousness. The introspective method of seeking knowledge in states of consciousness is a mistake of the means for the end. Practical, exact, scientific knowledge is as different from that as oil is from water. It regards the knowledge of objects themselves as alone useful and real, and leaves the study of states of consciousness to the metaphysician and the theologian. If it recognise them at all, it takes them to be simply the impressions made upon our sensitive bodies by external actual objects, of the existence of which outside us they are the evidence and proof. Even then our states of consciousness have so little of the nature of real knowledge in them, that we know that nothing is more deceptive and fallacious unless we carefully compare them together and reject what is contradictory; and have even to compare them with those of other people before we can rely upon them at all as giving us true information of external objects themselves. The Bishop, however, dwells upon our states of consciousness as being all that we can possibly know, though he admits that they are altogether unlike the things *which, as I suppose, he says, produce them*. How can he possibly *know* that they are unlike our impressions of them if he knows *them* not at all, but only knows the states of consciousness which *he only supposes* represent them? The things—the external objects, the Moon, wood, iron, dinner—are mere supposition, you observe. Of course they are themselves unlike the impressions they produce in us, as the letters h-o-r-s-e are unlike a horse. Yet you will observe that when I see those letters, the sight of them produces in me a state of consciousness—not of the letters, but of a horse; but they would have *no* meaning in my state of consciousness but for the *previous practical knowledge* of the actual external object—a horse; and the connection, in experience, of those letters with such an external object. The letters are but a *means* not the object of knowledge, exactly as my state of consciousness itself is a means only of knowledge, and not the object observed and known.

But, says the Bishop, "you may say, what is the matter which moves? and what and whence is the motion of that matter? I cannot tell, he continues, no man can ever tell. We are obliged to speculate on what matter is—and what motion is—whence these are, and how they are;"—but, he says, "*we can never know* anything about them, *because they are outside our consciousness!*" Of course we can never know anything about them by the introspective metaphysical method, which mistakes the mere *means* for the *matter* of knowledge, and

refuses to recognise the actual objects as such at all—those objects with which Science actually alone concerns itself.

The Bishop then quotes Professor Huxley as supporting him, and following Berkeley, and calling "motion a name for certain changes in the relations of our sensations; and matter—the hypothetical substance of physical phenomena, the assumption of the existence of which is as pure a piece of metaphysical speculation as is that of the existence of the substance of mind." It is a melancholy fact that Huxley does follow Berkeley in this metaphysical unscientific method. Yet all that Professor Huxley knows of his favourite science of Biology is based upon the recognition of the objects of it as real. If their existence is a mere assumption, what becomes of his science?

The Bishop proceeds—'Men must speculate upon the fundamental problems of existence. But then remember," he says,—" the sum of their speculations is *not science* but *philosophy*. Science is the sum of our knowledge, and we only know the states of our consciousness.' On the contrary—Science is the knowledge of objects; exactitude is attained by observation, comparison, measurement, experiment, and verification, which are possible solely as applied to external objects, but which it is impossible without external objects to apply to states of consciousness. Metaphysic dreams about states of consciousness as being knowledge, but philosophy is not metaphysic. Philosophy is the rational instead of the introspective application of scientific knowledge to the moral problems of existence. The Bishop here gave an extra snake to the metaphysical bottle of oil and water. It is a trick of his trade. Then, having thus mixed science and metaphysic, he calls states of consciousness *impressions*, and asks what Science knows about them? and replies that Science knows only that they follow each other according to certain rules which she grandly calls Laws of Nature. As I have said, Science recognises such impressions as being produced in us by external objects, with which it alone concerns itself—leaving the impressions to the metaphysician, who takes stock of them alone. Just as Hobbes said of words—" They are the counters of wise men; they do but reckon by them"; but they are the money of fools that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

The Bishop continues,—" Science says, for instance, Combine oxygen and hydrogen *under given conditions* and you will get water; and Science is always justified by the event. Do as she tells you, and always, in spite of what any one may do, you will get water." So far, he is strictly correct. He proceeds—" Has she the right, then, to say that the result can never fail? That the rules which she has discovered are of such eternal necessity that they can never be broken? That what happens in the ordinary course of things must always happen? Certainly I say she is; with the proviso, admitted by the Bishop "*under given conditions*," the same result will always recur. But he next says—"That God himself, who fixed the rules, cannot break through them?" Science knows the rules alone, but nothing of God, or of any maker of the rules or Laws of Nature, which she has learned, from experience, are never and cannot be broken. Besides, the Bishop should not have overlooked that the introduction of a God would be a new condition not included in the premises, and therefore not in the assertion, that *under given conditions* the same result will always recur. The Bishop says you will never hear a scientific man who is also a philosopher say this. Not Professor Huxley, not Tyndall. But the assertion is, with the proviso, perfectly impregnable, as I think I have shown.

The Bishop proceeds to quote Professor Mozley as showing why it should not be said that a miracle is impossible, namely—that the irresistible but merely instinctive conclusion that the same antecedent will and must always be followed by the same consequent—is *one for which "no reason whatever can be assigned."* It is curious that the Bishop should mention in such close juxtaposition the names of Professors Mozley and Tyndall, and yet be apparently unaware of the brilliant refutation by Tyndall of the very assertion he here quotes from Mozley. It is contained in the *Fortnightly Review* for 1st June, 1867 The assertion of Professor Mozley is, however, made in contempt or forgetfulness of the grounds of all reasoning. No proposition would be valid in reasoning unless, under the same conditions, it *continued* to be always true; and the Laws of Nature are on precisely the same footing as the laws of reasoning. That 2 and 2 make 4 is a natural law as well as a law of reasoning; and all laws of Nature are as certainly true. It is of course an abstract proposition, but it is a proposition which *one* practical instance to the contrary would invalidate, like any other natural law. But such is the simplicity of the terms of the proposition, that we know that in any alleged instance to the contrary the example must be false, or the conditions must be different, which is the same thing. So it is in every instance cited by the Bishop. The Bishop, however, calls the conviction of the inviolability of the course of Nature a *vast assumption for which no reason can be given*. When an assumption is made by a scientific man, he calls it an hypothesis and nothing more, *until he can explain the reason*. But when he understands the reason, and verifies it by rational experiment, he knows that it is true. And, as Professor Tyndall says in his refutation of Mozley—"The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequence in Nature. The further question intrudes itself with resistless might; whence comes the sequence? What is it that binds the consequent with its antecedent in Nature? The truly scientific intellect never can attain rest until it reaches the *forces* by which the observed succession is produced. It was thus with Torricelli; it was thus with Newton; it is thus

pre-eminently with the real scientific man of to-day. In common with the most ignorant, he shares the belief that Spring will succeed Winter, that Summer will succeed Spring, that Autumn will succeed Summer, and that Winter will succeed Autumn. But he knows still further—and this knowledge is essential to his intellectual repose—that this succession, besides being permanent, is, under the circumstances, *necessary*; that the gravitating force exerted between the Sun and a revolving sphere with an axis inclined to the plane of its orbit *must* produce the observed succession of the seasons. Not until this relation between forces and phenomena has been established is the law of reason rendered concentric with the Law of Nature, and not until this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in *peace*."—(*Melbourne reprint*, page 27.)

The other Laws of Nature are as certain and invariable as that by which we know that 2 and 2 equal 4, and always must equal four. The laws of Nature are often much more complex and therefore harder to discern; hence the invariable necessity of the proviso mentioned at first—but afterwards apparently forgotten by the Bishop,—"*under given conditions*." He says what he says and thinks what he thinks because he is *under given conditions*.

Since the reduction of human knowledge to exactitude—since it became worthy to be called Science—there have been no miracles. The word "miracle" means, etymologically, *a wonder*, and belongs to the age of ignorance. Scientific men are not satisfied with wondering—they work and experiment till they *understand*. Theologically, the word 'miracle' means an interference with natural laws, which Science regards as quite as possible as that 2 and 2 should make anything but 4. The Bishop alleges that there are exceptions to natural laws, quite forgetting the proviso that natural laws are always true *under given conditions*, as he at first said. So if you interpose an extra unit when adding 2 to 2, you make 5 of it instead of 4. But any one can see that that happens only by the interposition of a new condition, and that the natural law remains intact. Miracles are now just as possible as ever, where the people are ignorant or incompetent, and wonder instead of testing by experiment. Miracles never did occur where the spectators were scientific men, or even ordinarily well informed, unless strongly biassed in favor of faith. Even the Bishop thinks they never happen now, though, as a Bishop, he holds that God *can* still perform them though he *does not*. This is an unscientific position, and I think it is scarcely even a theologic one. For to those who have faith all things are possible—*in imagination*. So the Bishop now restricts miracles to subjective phenomena—the most obscure and untestable of all; and, by the introspective metaphysical method, I should be surprised if he were unable to fancy that he was conscious of an occasional miracle in himself. Many regard it as a wonder or miracle that a man in his position should be so far affected by the progress of exact knowledge as to recognise the inutility of praying for rain. Logically, miracle means neither more nor less than an impossibility.

But the methods of Science and Theology are as opposed as their conclusions. Religions all inculcate faith; Science inculcates scepticism. The Bishop has faith in miracles in the ignorant age of the origin of the New Testament. Science cannot admit them at all, for with one Bible author, at least, it holds "that the thing that hath been is that which shall be; that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the Sun." Science finds no ground or excuse for admitting an origin of natural laws, and even the Bishop would scarcely contend that there ever was a time when 2 and 2 would not make 4 without the fiat of a Creator. Yet that is but one of the simplest of all natural laws, which are none of them less certain and eternal. The Bishop then quotes the fact that water ceases to contract, and expands, when below 40 degrees of Fahrenheit's thermometer, as an exception to the law of the contraction of bodies by cold; and makes great capital of it as proving that there are exceptions to natural laws. But his fallacy is transparent enough. There are no exceptions *under given conditions*. If the natural law is that water always expands at a given temperature, and always contracts at another, there is no exception shown. If water at a given temperature expanded at one time and contracted at another time, whether by the operation of prayer of a Bishop or not, all that would be proved would be that the natural law was unknown—not that the law varied or failed. But having erroneously asserted the deviation of the law, the Bishop then produces the application of his argument. "If," he says, "I say that a dead man can come to life again, Science affirms that it is unlikely." I say that Science affirms that if a man comes to life again he has not been dead at all. The Bishop says that it would be an exception to the natural law, like the expansion of freezing water. He is plainly wrong. The revival of a man apparently dead proves that he was not really dead at all, and the expansion of freezing water is no exception to the law, because it *always* does the *same thing at the same temperature*. No instance to the contrary can be produced. His argument therefore falls to the ground, and so does his assertion that it is an unreasoning assumption that what commonly happens will always happen. It is not an unreasoning assumption, because all reasoning is based upon the conclusion (not assumption)—the *conclusion verified by accumulated experience*, that the laws or processes of Nature are not only uniform but *necessary*.

The Bishop says, "Philosophy is sometimes hardy enough to deny not only that a dead man can come to life again, but that there can be any life beyond this, any God, or any Spirit. But then," he says, "philosophy is only speculation : it does not know." Now against this I protest. Philosophy is the love of wisdom; the love of strict

reasoning from exact knowledge. *Metaphysic* is *speculation*. The possibility of God, or of a life after death, may be imagined in metaphysic, or speculation, or theology; but Philosophy and Science are at one in judging not only that speculations of the kind are beneath their notice, but that they are contrary to the consistent witness of experience. The essential meaning of the word "God" is—a being competent and willing to interfere with the course of Nature. Philosophy and Science are based upon the certainty (from experience) that interference with the course of Nature is impossible. If such interference were possible, Science and Philosophy would be impossible. This endeavor to confuse philosophy with speculation and metaphysic was but another shake of the metaphysical bottle; and after it naturally follows the next assertion, that "a miracle may have occurred." Then the Bishop says "whether it has or not will depend on the evidence produced. All that Science can say is this : the evidence must be strong and ample. Let us take the alleged resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ as an example. You say that the ordinary rule in his case was not followed. Well, says Science, I cannot deny the possibility of that; only as it contradicts ordinary experience—as it opposes our natural assumption that what ordinarily follows always follows,—you must be prepared to give me good evidence of the fact." Now, in the first place, I deny that Science can admit the possibility of the truth of the assertion that a miracle ever took place. Hume destroyed this argument. He said, "No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior. When any one says that a dead man was restored to life, I immediately consider whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and, according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle." This reasoning of Hume's cannot be refuted. We have the testimony of all mankind (including that of the asserters of the miracle) as to the course of Nature, and that a dead man is incapable of rising to life. The miracle is alleged as contrary to this rule and course of Nature, which is, therefore, admitted in the premises. The evidence in favor of it is, consequently, necessarily less than that against it, and the particular miracle must be rejected in favor of the universal consistency of Nature. But what about the *evidence* in the instance chosen by the Bishop? he says that Science says, "you must show me that the occasion of it was worthy, that the evidence of it is adequate, and that the predicted consequences of it have followed." "Well I believe," says the Bishop, "that we are in a position to do all these things. First, the occasion of the alleged fact was worthy." And the worthiness of the occasion, the Bishop alleges, consisted in the fact that Christ rose to take away human sin—and took it away. Now, taking sin to mean—as evidently meant by the Bishop—man's proneness to evil-doing, it is an obvious fact that Christ's rising did not take it away. The human race is just as sinful, or prone to do evil, as ever, and the Bishop's occupation would be gone if it were not so. It is his particular vocation to help people now to do what he says Christ did for good and for all 1,800 years ago. I, of course, hold that sin is simply a priestly fiction, and has no reality. For the word "sin" implies that all man's evil-doing is an offence against God; whereas all his good or evil-doing concerns his fellow-men only. But the Bishop cannot deny the reality of sin, for he lives by it; and that being so, his position is contradictory when he says that Christ abolished it or took it away. But, secondly, he says,—"Is there sufficient evidence that the miracle occurred?" He says we have the evidence of eyewitnesses who were truthful, sincere, and perfectly competent. Now it is well known that there were no witnesses whatever of the alleged fact (according to the Scriptures) except the Roman guards, who are said, in the Gospels, to have stated that the disciples came by night and stole him away. There were no other witnesses. The further accounts of what occurred, that we possess, are not only incredible but contradictory, and no one knows who wrote them. The whole story is utterly irreconcilable with the complete silence on the subject of all contemporary writers. Philo-Judæus, Josephus, Nicolaus of Damascus, and Justus of Tiberias, all wrote minutely on all such subjects, and their absolute silence cannot be explained or ignored. The Bishop relies on Paul, and says that his admitted Epistles to the Corinthians and Galatians prove that he enjoyed the personal friendship of Peter, James, and John; whereas those Epistles prove rather his consistent animosity to them. The Bishop says that St. Paul affirms that he and all the apostles, and even 500 brethren at once, saw the Lord after his resurrection. Now, if Paul in one place says that he himself saw Jesus, he plainly says in another that what he saw was only a *vision*; and, in any case, it was AFTER—not only the resurrection but the *ascension also*. His statements of the circumstances were evidently made at random, and were contradictory. His assertion as to the 500 brethren is inconsistent with another statement that there were then only 120 brethren altogether, and it is therefore wholly unreliable, if he really made it at all.

Thus none of the disciples even profess to have seen the resurrection at all; but if they had seen it they would have been interested, and therefore doubtful, witnesses. They were admittedly ignorant people, selected for their unreasoning faith; and Paul was not one of them. We have no direct or authentic evidence of the existence of Paul, and he cannot have been the prominent person that he is represented to have been, or

contemporary writers would have mentioned him, which they do not. We know absolutely nothing of the first 300 years of Christianity. We have to rely for all early particulars entirely upon Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, who was a man admitted to be utterly unreliable and unscrupulous, weak, and superstitious. The Fathers of his time were like himself, and nothing that came through their hands can properly be regarded as trustworthy. No one accuses them of wishing to deceive more than they were themselves deceived; but we know that they did not think it wrong to deceive and lie in such a cause. The best ecclesiastical historians admit this. But, besides this, there is before them a blank of nearly 300 years, respecting which we have no intelligence whatever but theirs; and the complete silence of all Pagan authors as to the existence of the Church, or of Paul, or of the Apostles, as the prominent persons that they are in the New Testament, and by the Fathers represented to have been, cannot be ignored or controverted. The Jewish authors I have named were able men, who were just the persons to give full particulars had they known them. The Pagan authors were men of character and ability, and mentioned everything of the sort that came to their knowledge. Yet they never once allude to the wonderful things which are said to have happened in their time, nor to the persons who, according to Eusebius, were remarkable prominent characters. The existence of those persons, as such, is therefore an incredible anomaly. The extremely judicial and careful analysis of these authorities, and of the facts that they profess to describe, made by Judge John Lumisden Strange, is well worth the perusal of any one who wishes to learn the truth on the subject.

See his "Sources and Development of Christianity,"—and "What is Christianity?"

The Bishop seems to think that the fact that the religion of these men is, in his estimation, the purest and most spiritual the world ever knew (which is entirely matter of opinion) is an argument for their veracity. I think as much *may* be, and *is*, said for Mormonism and Mahoinetanism, and far more for Buddhism. I am willing to admit that the intentions of the founders of Christianity were good. They did not really intend to deceive people any more than they wished to be themselves deceived, but they were admittedly and certainly not very particular. Their religion was totally different from the Bishop's—far less pure and spiritual than his; and they thought it quite right to use deceit and fraud to forward their religion. And how can we be surprised at that when we find now an able, clever, brilliantly intelligent man like Bishop Moorhouse deliberately disposing of the question of the value of evidence in the manner I have described. The strength of his foregone conclusion is more evident than even his ingenuity in arguing in its favour. He alleges not only that Jesus abolished sin—which the Bishop himself and every one else knows that he did not, — but that also he brought immortality to light—which every one sees that he was just as far from doing. There were, long before, many similar stories, in and out of the Bible, of men recalled from the grave by miracles, and of others ascending to heaven by like means. Then how did Jesus bring anything to light respecting it, whether he himself rose from the grave or not? It was no new thing, and he added nothing whatever to the evidence for it. If, after a proper public inquest held, he had called all the chief priests and Pilate and his officers together, and had before their faces risen to Heaven in broad daylight, there could then at least have been little room to doubt or dispute. But there was no attempt to provide witnesses of any kind, far less impartial or competent ones, and no evidence of any kind was provided for more than 200 years. What knowledge, then, have we of the alleged resurrection of Christ comparable to that which we have of the transit of Venus in 1874, or of that one which is infallibly coming in 1882? For, though that is yet to come to pass, we know it *must* come, because we understand the principles which make it certain; and we ought to know, on the same principles, that the resurrection of Christ cannot have taken place. For these principles are identical in Nature with that by which $2 + 2 = 4$, which the whole power of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost could not make 5, nor even 3!

Bishop Moorhouse is not an ignorant man. He knows probably a good deal more than I do. But he is, unfortunately, a Bishop, and cannot move or think out of the orbit of a Bishop. He has not had, as I have, the immense advantage of 20 years of real free discussion. What is the consequence? Before he attempted to state the proposition he wished to prove, he devoted half his lecture to a deliberate attempt to invalidate and discredit all the real practical knowledge to which human nature has attained, and to reduce it to what he called *states of consciousness!!!* which are among the most equivocal and deceptive of all phenomena known to us! In any case he should be aware that, on his own principles, both the alleged fact of the resurrection of Christ and his belief in it can be no more than states of consciousness, and therefore (possibly) a dream, a vision, a fiction! But he omitted to mention *that*.

You will observe that the whole point of this paper is to exhibit and insist upon the superior value and reality of practical exact knowledge of real objects as verified by observation and experiment, in contrast to the so-called knowledge of metaphysicians and theologians, which they deny is knowledge of objects, but allege is that of states of consciousness only, which are unsusceptible of quantification or verification. States of consciousness are *means* not *objects* of knowledge. If Professor Huxley and others make the mistake of adopting the metaphysical theory, they but play into the hands of the professional depredators of Science in the interests of ignorance and superstition. I trust that I have made myself understood; that I have given sufficient

reasons for judging that the metaphysical theory of knowledge of states of consciousness only is inadmissible by rational men, and that real verified human knowledge of external objects is that by which we travel by rail, converse by telegraph, manufacture watches, *and, centuries beforehand, foretell eclipses and transits accurately to seconds of time*, in utter unconsciousness of the states of consciousness by means of which we know them. Science relates not to states of consciousness, but to objects themselves, and therefore only is it reliable and certain for all practical purposes.

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Science and Theology, an Essay. A REPRINT, DEDICATED BY Hokor, to the Rev. A. M. Henderson, And the Early Closing Association.

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Dedication.

To the Rev. A. M. Henderson and the Early Closing Association.

IT seems to be generally accepted that the relations between Science and Theology should form the staple of most of the Lectures given on behalf of the Early Closing Association; but those Lectures unfortunately, are deprived of most of their point, for want of the simultaneous presentation of the views with which they are in antagonism. It, therefore, seems desirable to rescue them from the imminent charge of fighting against shadows. This is a defect which is doubtless inseparable from the one-sided discussion which is characteristic of the ordinary lecture hall and the pulpit, where the views contested are stated, if at all, solely by an opponent. Human nature seems scarcely competent to do this with impartiality and perfect fairness; refutation being the object, the easiest way to accomplish it is naturally and unconsciously adopted. As Dr. Boyd says—"you have merely to state your opponent's "views so as to make them rank nonsense, and then it is comparatively easy to show that they are rank nonsense." But truth thus suffers from want of salience in the error with which it should contrast.

I observe some rather puzzling passages in the address of the talented lecturer on "History;" several apparent defects indeed, some elucidation of which is probably desired by others as well as myself. For these reasons I venture to offer to the consideration of the Rev. A. M. Henderson and of the Early Closing Association, a revised reprint of a colonial production on the subject of "Science and Theology," the reasoning in which I have never been able satisfactorily to refute, and which does not appear to me to have been met by Mr. Henderson; and I take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded of indicating points in Mr. Henderson's address of which explanation seems most required.

Though I desire to confine these remarks mainly to that part of the lecture in which an attack is made upon those views of the Philosophy of History, which are becoming so prevalent among the most distinguished disciples of modern Science, and which are notoriously spreading elsewhere in duo proportion to the more general application of scientific method in the investigation of nature; still I do not feel justified in passing over his ninth page in which he scouts the idea that the supernatural is impossible. He says (page 9, line 20.2)—"It is on all hands admitted that the "sacred Scriptures *assume* the existence of the supernatural; "nay, even base *all* their claims to acceptance upon it." If this be really true, it seems to follow clearly, that there can no longer remain a shred of rational basis for belief either in the sacred Scriptures or in the Supernatural! Yet those are Mr. Henderson's words ! According to them the solo basis for belief in the Scriptures or in the Supernatural (which *may* be regarded as his whole stock-in-trade), is nothing but a mere assumption! One which itself implies the absence of corroborative evidence, and which is directly opposed by the testimony of modern science ! Mr. H. himself says—line 41-2—"No believer in the supernatural has ever "said it was to be seen in the natural!" But the rationalistic opinion is based upon evidence to be seen everywhere in nature, and is applied to nothing beyond. It simply asserts the unreasonableness of gratuitously assuming the existence of a supernatural *in* the natural, where it is confessedly "not to be seen;" the charges therefore of *absurdity* and *impudence* are surely inapplicable Those who simply ask for reasonable evidence in favour of a bare assumption which they are required to adopt, seem scarcely deserving of such hard terms; while those who use them can hardly be justified in doing so, while compelled to admit that they have no proofs whatever to offer; whether they recognise the force of those producible on the other side, or not.

Mr. Henderson next ridicules his old skipper for saying that he had not seen certain phenomena in places where it was asserted that they had sometimes been seen by others; and for therefore in some instances disbelieving their existence; and Mr. Henderson regards that statement as equivalent to an assertion by the skipper that the phenomena *could not have been*, because he (the skipper) had not seen them, though Mr. Henderson does not say that the old skipper actually said so. Is Mr. Henderson really incapable of recognising

the important distinction between the two statements? From his own account of the matter his cautious old skipper seems to have understood what he was saying far better than Mr. Henderson, who might have learned from him a useful lesson in logic. Mr. Henderson can probably say he never before *saw* the arguments in the following reprint against a belief in the supernatural, and yet not be chargeable with having denied their existence or their truth.

At page 21 Mr Henderson generously comes to the rescue of the doctrine of free will, from an "atrocious contradiction to the universal conviction of man." If this conviction of man be, as Mr. H. states, *universal*, is any rescue required? And does Mr. H. speak truth in calling this conviction of man *universal*, if he knows that Luther, Hobbes, Edwards, Locke, Collins, Hartloy, Priestley, Buckle, Mill, Spencer, Bain, &c., express the opposite? Does the fact that Mr. H. comes to the rescue, prove that he feels that the conviction is *universal*? Or was this merely a rhetorical flourish? In any case I decline to borrow the terms "absurdity" and "impudence," to characterise the passage.

In the next paragraph Mr. Henderson quotes from Mr. Mansel a singularly weak passage, in which it is attempted to be shown that statistical averages are not results of natural laws. Mr. Mansel says, "A natural law is valid for a class of objects, only because "and in so far as it is valid for each individual of that class; the "law of gravitation, for instance, is exhibited in a single apple as "much as in an orchard; and is concluded in the latter from being "observed in the former. But the uniformity represented by "statistical averages is one which is observed in masses only, and "not in individuals." I will adopt Mr. Mansel's illustration, and see if the law is less applicable to men than to apples. In accordance with the law of gravitation a single apple falls to the ground if sufficiently unattached to the tree and nothing intervene; and so under the same conditions will all the apples in the orchard. The law of averages expresses, under conditions, how many apples will fall with a wind of given strength in a given time. In accordance with the law of human action, a man will commit suicide if he be sufficiently unattached to life and if opportunity serve. The law of averages expresses, under conditions, how many men will commit suicide under misfortunes of given severity in a given time, and we can foretell the number of suicides as accurately as that of fallen apples. Is it not clear that the laws of motion and of average are equally applicable to both? Mr. Mansel and Mr. Henderson both overlook the fact that, in defiance of statistics, they determine the application of the laws of motion and of average by their own foregone conclusion that they are inoperative on man, instead of simply considering whether the logic of facts is not equally applicable to both men and apples. It was never asserted that, of a certain number of men *under the same conditions*, a few will commit suicide while the others will not;—any more than that of an orchard full of apples, equally firmly attached to the trees, a few will fall and the others continue fast. It was never asserted that a few happy fortunate men out of ten thousand must commit suicide; but that in large masses of men of all conditions, a few are sometimes so miserable and dissatisfied, that the ordinary attachments of life are weakened so much, that a small additional temptation will suffice to make them leave it. The law of averages merely expresses this proportion, and just as the apple with the weakest attachment to the tree *must* fall with a sufficiently strong wind—so the man most friendless, moneyless, and hopeless, *inevitably chooses* the fate most consonant with his circumstances and frame of mind.

See Professor Tyndall's brilliant refutation of Motley's Hampton Lecture on "Miracles" reprinted in Melbourne by a Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge, and in the Fortnightly Review, 1st June, 1867 as to the necessity or all causation.

Mr. Mansel continues "and hence the law, if law it be, which such averages "indicate, is one which offers no bar to the exercise of individual "freedom, exercised, as all human power must be, *within certain "limits"!* Within certain limits !!! Yes! within certain limits! Why in these three words lie all the pith and marrow of the argument. A stone is as free "within certain limits," and so is a steam engine or a watch. But the movements of the watch and steam engine are as evidently determined by the *motive* power of each, limited by the texture, form, and disposition of their parts, as is the repose of the stone itself. So are those of a bull-dog—a far more complex being than either; a being too that, Mr H. can scarcely deny, exhibits more will and determination than the average of men, though he does not attribute to it moral responsibility, of which again he makes will and determination the basis.

But turning to page 22, where Mr. Henderson says that "Mr." Buckle was evidently blind to the fact that, as consciousness, "properly understood, is that knowledge which the mind has of "itself—as thinking, feeling, or willing—he was destroying the "possibility of all knowledge by denying the validity of its testimony." I simply challenge the statement that Mr. Buckle ever denied the validity of all knowledge, or the possible validity of much of its testimony. But he showed most incontrovertibly that man's knowledge and the testimony of his consciousness cannot possess absolute certainty and infallibility; and that the greatest certainty to which he can attain must be achieved by careful comparison of the evidence furnished in all times and places, and the cautious adoption of that which, on the whole, seems most consistent with itself and past experience. Though the Pope may not be infallible, it does not therefore follow, that he may not think accurately on a few points on

which he may agree with Mr. Henderson. This illustration may avail further, and suggest that as the (Ecumenical Council, to give authority to its dictum, has yet to prove its own infallibility; so Mr. Henderson, even if he be infallible, would find some difficulty in demonstrating the fact upon his own authority. His Lecture on "History" has certainly not tended to prove it.

Mr. Henderson says (page 22) that on the subject of volition, the deliverance of his consciousness is diametrically opposed to that of the late Mr. Buckle. Evidently, therefore, one of them must be or have been, in Mr. H's. words, "the dupe of his own deceptive consciousness." Of course, that of Mr. Henderson may be assumed to be genuine. But then, if that of Mr. Buckle—a man at least worthy to be selected as the most eminent victim of Mr. H.'s scathing criticism—if Mr. Buckle's consciousness was so radically fallacious, what guarantee or hope can any ordinary man have of the certainty or accuracy of his own? By admitting the possible duplicity of Mr. Buckle's consciousness, has not Mr. Henderson utterly annihilated his own argument for the infallibility of human consciousness generally? If my consciousness should un-fortunately err with Mr. Buckle's, what am I to think? If Mr. Henderson's consciousness be infallible, I should rejoice to follow it. But if Mr. Henderson's consciousness asserts mine to be in-fallible, am I not bound to follow my own?

Mr. Henderson says in his next paragraph, with happy innocence of definition, that his volitions are his own, with power to choose the alternative. Might it not be replied, that if that were the case—if the act of volition has no antecedent determining cause—there can be no reason to expect that the future will be like the past—causation must be altogether a myth—science and knowledge impossible—and experience inapplicable and worthless? But the unsophisticated consciousness of all men (including Mr. Henderson), rejects such a fatal theory; which, however, it may be nominally held, is practically denied by all men in their every act. Their instinctive faith or rather *certainty* in inviolable causation is too strong, and is so rapidly expanding into a recognised principle, that the theoretical objections of those whose conduct invariably contradicts their assertions must eventually pass into desuetude and contempt. The simple fact that those who advance them endeavor to influence others, proves that they instinctively recognise that the volitions of men are liable to be *caused* by the physical acts of writing and speaking. In fact, education, business, and social life, consist mainly of endeavors to supply to others, motives which we feel will induce them to act as we desire. Allowing, for the sake of argument, that there could be any sense or meaning in the statement that "all volition is conditioned on motive "though not determined by it;" (though to my poor consciousness this seems too like an attempt to gain shelter in sophisticated obscurity) it should, at least, be susceptible of clearer explanation. If Mr. Henderson allege a relation between motive and volition as cause and effect, he yields the point taken by Mr. Buckle. If not—ho has failed to show any cause for an act of volition; which, therefore, being so far as shown, an uncaused phenomenon, necessarily comes into the category of chance, which Mr. Henderson elsewhere repudiates. When Mr. Henderson says that volition is not apart from motive, but is conditioned on it—if he means that they are concomitant or concurrent causes, he gains nothing; for it is then plainly incumbent upon him, if he would consistently repudiate a doctrine of chance, to indicate the causes of the motive as well as of the volition. If he assert the efficient causation of volition without equally efficient antecedent causation, whether in motive or otherwise, he not only by implication contradicts himself when he repudiates a doctrine of chance, but he also explicitly contradicts the scientific experience of those who have ascertained and proved that for every act there is an equivalent molecular change, corresponding to the expenditure of efferent nervous force, for which there is invariably an adequate measurable cause in afferent stimulation. To put this more concisely—Every event must have cause. If the cause of volition be not in motive, it must be elsewhere, and should be shown before the causation of motives is denied. But to imagine that the exigencies of the argument are met by saying that volition is conditioned on motive though not determined by it, or that that is equivalent to the indication of the link of causation which universal experience and consciousness demand, is merely *se payer des mots*.

Once more,—as to the power to choose between alternatives. To suppose any fact, whether of choice or otherwise, to have occurred differently, clearly involves (to my consciousness) that its causes *must* have been different also:—their causes also again—and so on throughout the preceding eternity. From this it follows, that nothing could ever have happened, or can happen, otherwise than as it did, or does. Either this is infallibly true, or else experience can furnish no certainty or even a balance of probabilities as to the consequences of events, and must, therefore, be as worthless as knowledge is impossible. Every intelligent act, however, is based upon the invincible conviction of the uniformity and inviolability of causation, and experience consistently justifies this confidence.

It also appears (to my consciousness) that any consistent conception of *freedom* or *liberty* necessarily involves absence of restraint—of *obligation*; and that *obligation*—rather than its antithesis *freedom*—is an essential constituent in *moral responsibility*, with which freedom and liberty are, therefore, essentially incompatible. Let us formulate this however.

Moral responsibility involves restraint and obligation.

Liberty and Freedom are incompatible with restraint and obligation.

Therefore

Liberty and Freedom are incompatible with moral responsibility.

It may profit those to whom the collocation of terms is novel, to ponder the foregoing syllogism, and observe that its integrity demands solely that the word *obligation* be denuded of no other meaning than is absolutely surreptitious, and antagonistic to its strictest etymological signification. I think the term should be rescued from the equivocal misapplication to which it has been subjected. On this important point the deliverance of Mr. Henderson is not as direct and explicit as might be wished.

The cases selected by Mr. Henderson as those to which the words "ought" and "ought not" are inapplicable are those of a tree and a stone. But a bull dog evinces fully as much "will" and "determination" as any man; and, in fact, typifies anyone who exhibits both in an eminent degree. Would Mr. Henderson apply "ought" and "ought not" equally to dogs as to men in so far as they exhibit such qualities? And why not, if will and determination are with him the bases of moral responsibility?

I am conscious of entirely sympathising with the most eloquent indignation against impersonal bigotry and intolerance. At the same time I consciously excuse and pity those who exhibit them. I repudiate even the supposititious right claimed by Mr. Henderson to blame them. But self-interest and altruism (not comitism) concur in forbidding that we should permit the self-cancelled claims of any individual thief, murderer, or intolerant persecutor, to weigh with us against the peace and security of their otherwise probable victims in the future, or of the victims of those who might be encouraged by their immunity to follow their example. Am I wrong in asking the learned lecturer whether, if lawyers were to demand the release of prisoners on the grounds given by him (at the top of page 28 in his lecture), the "certain condition of society" *provided for in the premisses* (in page 22), would not be thereby materially altered and changed? So much so that, to *my consciousness*, it seems that it would have been more accurate if Mr. Henderson had said next—"I cannot," instead of "I need not say that such are "the legitimate conclusions of the doctrines taught by this much "lauded writer."

In the next paragraph the lecturer is scarcely sufficiently explicit for *my consciousness*. He does not show *horn* the theory of free will—of a cause acting without any anterior cause or mover—differs from a doctrine of chance, susceptible of accurate description in nearly identical terms. This fallacy, however, has already been sufficiently pointed out.

Mr Henderson says (p. 26, line 12) that he takes "the liberty" of converting Mr. Mill's admissions into an argument for that "which he rejects. *All sound philosophers*" (!) he proceeds, "have regarded the action of the human will as a true instance of "an efficient cause—indeed *the only instance directly known to "us*; and they have regarded it as the analogue of a higher will "conceived as the cause of the universe itself. The argument is "very plain. We see changes produced in our own system by our "own volitions; and seeing analogous changes occurring around "us, we naturally trace them to an analogous cause." Really Mr. Henderson seems to have been so intent upon picking a hole in Mr. Mill's argument, that he quite overlooked that he was rending his own into shreds and tatters. What can this mean, but that we should infer a cause—analogue to that which Mr. H. discerns within ourselves—volition—in every object in which we observe analogous changes! nay, in the universe! (line 41). Thus either every change in surrounding objects is caused by an intrinsic will or volition in—and identified with each object;—or else,—if these analogous changes are to be referred—not to a local volition analogous to our own, residing or arising in every such object, but—to a higher will conceived as the cause of the universe itself;—what possible reason can we have, if there is any analogy at all in the matter, for refusing to refer the changes occurring in ourselves to the same cause as that which produces the changes around us? Mr. Henderson here places himself in the dilemma exposed by the author of the following essay. He either commits himself to the Pantheistic doctrine by which the volitions of men are—as exclusively as any movement in the universe—the action of Deity; (thus annihilating free will as completely as Mr. Buckle could desire, and transferring at the same time all responsibility for every action to God alone)—or else he ignores Deity completely—makes everything happen by intrinsic volition in each moving object—denies causation—and has nothing to substitute for it but blind chance! And all this comes by complete misconception of the point of Mr. Mill's argument. Mr. Mill speaks of volition as an efficient cause, not as a premiss of his own, but as a supposititious one granted solely for the sake of argument (vol. 1, p. 398, l. 18-22), and he shows conclusively that *even if* volition *mere* an efficient cause, we should have *even then* no right whatever to attribute analogous efficient causation to every movement around us (as Mr. Henderson would assume when rising to "the assertion "of will as a universal efficient cause"), but should restrict it to those movements which are strictly analogous. Mr. Mill points out how unwarrantable—even from their own premisses—is the demand made upon him by such as Mr. Henderson, "to infer that volition "causes everything, for no reason except that it causes one particu- "lar thing; although that one phenomenon, far from being a typo "of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its laws bearing "scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon, "whether of inorganic or organic nature." (Vol. 1, p. 399.) And Mr. Henderson admits that this is so (page 26, line 13-4),

when he says "that the action of the human will as a true instance of an "efficient cause—is "indeed *the only instance directly known "to us.*" Clearly, then, Mr. Mill's position is impregnable, although he reasons only from an illegitimate assumption of his opponents to show them that their logic is as defective as their premisses.

But after quoting from Mr. Mill's second volume to the effect that induction by simple enumeration is a valid process in arriving at the generalisation of universal causation from the uncontradicted and best known facts of experience—but not from arbitrary and disputed assumptions of efficient causation in what is confessed to be "the only instance directly known to us;" Mr. Henderson proceeds thus—"Now this is precisely the thing we do in arguing "upward to a First cause. We notice a fact, that certain changes "take place in our own frame from the exercise of our own will, and "*Mr. Mills admits that this is so.*"!!! Where does Mr. Mill admit this? Let the quotation be given, which it is not by Mr. Henderson; though the page he quotes (898, vol. 1.) contains an exactly contrary conclusion. The only concession I can find is distinctly made (page 898, lines 18-22) merely for the sake of argument to give added force to the refutation, but which Mr. Henderson appears to have misconstrued into an unconditional admission. But Mr. Mill does not admit anything of the kind; and it should be sufficiently obvious from what I have said, that Mr. Henderson's process of arguing upwards to a First Cause is directly opposed to that by which we arrive at the generalisation of the universality of causation; and that it inevitably conducts into solecisms which should be as abhorrent to piety, as they are repugnant to reason. So much for Mr. Mill's supposed admission, and Mr. Henderson's argument, by which he was to have convicted Mr. Mill of the inconsistency in which he has plunged himself.

Mr. Henderson seems to be as unfortunate in dealing with Spencer, Taine, &c., as with Buckle and Mill. On the fundamental point at issue he expressly yields the argument to them (lines 24-5, page 25), by saying, "and we agree with them that when they do know "all, they can predict;" a statement identical in effect with that for which (at Mr. Henderson's page 20, lines 83-5), Buckle's 18th page is the object of derisive censure; and at page 27, I find a paragraph devoted to assertions that the wills of Abraham, Cyrus, Paul, and Cromwell were influenced and moulded, determined and caused by God to suit his purposes. Their wills evidently could not have been free when so influenced; or, if they were free, God could not have foreseen the alternatives that they would choose; the theories of freedom and foreknowledge being absolutely incompatible. (See Jonathan Edwards's demonstration to that effect.)

I have now only to express my admiration of the method by which close and terse argument is rendered entirely superfluous by the simple asseveration that "the creed of thoughtful men" finds its expression, not in the writings of Hobbes, Locke, Collins, Edwards, Voltaire, Priestly, Buckle, Mill, Spencer, Bain, &c., so much as in the mouth of a Melbourne preacher, of whom the trait freshest in my recollection, is that the Early Closing Association has found the way to convert him. At his lecture, no doubt, not only his great dead and absent living antagonists were mute, but his present dissentient auditors were likewise silent from conventional courtesy, even when the round assertion was made that "all "sound philosophers" have held the lecturer's opinions. It is of trifling importance how many or how great men may have held the opposite—because, of course, they must have been "unsound philosophers."—Q.E.D.

Before concluding my remarks I wish distinctly to disclaim any intention whatever of *blaming* Mr. Henderson for misrepresenting the views of Buckle and others. He had, doubtless, no more intention of doing so than of stultifying himself, as I have shown he has done. One cause of his mistakes I have already indicated in the vicious system of one-sided discussion incidental to his un- fortunate vocation, and probably I have sufficiently explained that whatever he has spoken or written, has been evoked—not by any undetermined volition arising without cause in Anketell Matthew Henderson as a *Great First Cause* thereof (what a very modest theory!) but has been simply the necessary result of a concatenation of circumstances, of which he has been privileged to be unconsciously the instrument. This is, doubtless, humbling—particularly to one who has been misled into believing himself the voluble exponent of the ideas of Deity, or rather (I beg pardon), of *his own volition!* I now merely wish to point out the superior charity of those necessitarian principles which admit of the benignant exposure, and even sometimes of the merciless punishment, of grave error, without imputing wilful turpitude to its perpetrator; and to contrast them with those by which a mistake cannot be discovered without attributing voluntary perversity and sin to a poor organism, in which the effects of particular circumstances upon its individual constitution could not otherwise be converted into expression. The one system producing only sanctified conceit, intolerance, hatred, and all uncharitableness; the other, true humility, brotherly kindness, and aspirations after all possible knowledge and good of humanity.

Finally—as it is a common device to refuse to reply to unanswerable arguments, on the ground that anonymity is used merely to screen the writer from the consequences of making personal attacks, I have to point out that such reasons do not apply in this case. I attack opinions, not men, and have expressly exempted Mr. Henderson from all blame. It, therefore, concerns the interests neither of Mr. Henderson nor of anyone else to notice me personally. Let my opinions be refuted and I shall be delighted to change them, and recant them as publicly as I express them. It seems to me also that those who set themselves to defend the authenticity of

writings so peculiarly anonymous as the Bible, should be the very last to depreciate and contemn anonymous writings as such.

Trusting that the following essay may prove the means of prolonging attention to "this sublime theme," and of promoting a correct consciousness with respect to it, I commend it to the attention of the Rev. A. M. Henderson and of the Early Closing Association.

Hokor.

Science and Theology.

Rule 1. we are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.

Rule 2. Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.

Rule 3. The qualities of bodies which admit neither of intention nor of remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experience, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.

Rule 4. In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.—Isaac Newton's Principles of Natural Philosophy. Book 3.

An interesting discussion took place some time ago in the columns of the Melbourne papers, on "Science and Sermons but it soon lost all the point and vigour with which it commenced; which was attributable to the fact, that the real points of radical opposition were not stated with sufficient sharpness, and the question narrowed to some specific issue. If we can succeed in exposing the true basis of antagonism, surely we may more reasonably hope for a practical useful result, from what can scarcely have tended then but to create mistrust, if not alarm.

In the first place, the relegation of the argument to times so ancient and conditions so exceptional as to be entirely removed from observation and verification, renders the disproof of bold assertion and of plausible theory alike impossible, and deprives the question also of more than a very superficial interest. A few words, however, upon that view of the subject may serve as a useful introduction to something more relevant.

What can it matter to us *now* how many thousands or millions of years have elapsed since man first walked or talked? Whether it was six thousand or six thousand millions of years, it is in either case the facts of *to-day* that are superlatively important to us *now*. Being indisputably in possession now of our present organisms, powers, privileges, and responsibilities, what is it to us whether the Valley of the Dead Sea thousands of years ago was covered with twenty-five thousand feet of water or none at all? However that might be, the present facts remain the same. Whatever affects our present conduct and prospects is alone of actual pressing interest to us. How futile also to devote our time to the investigation of the primeval *origin* of matter—which, for all we know, never had a beginning—when we certainly have it substantially before us now, and can try every available means to analyse it, and test its destructibility and creatability at our leisure. Grant that all possible tests cannot produce a demonstration, we *can* have no stronger evidence or test than those which actual experience supplies, and which constitute amply sufficient reasons for not only our opinions, but even our actions. Upon facts all our knowledge is based.

To talk of reasonableness or probability with respect to events said to have occurred in an age when it is assumed that miracles were current, seems to us to be equivalent to a surrender of the whole argument. When the geologist points to a gigantic stratum, consisting, apparently, of incalculable multitudes of cretaceous fossils, which he reckons took thousands of centuries to accumulate; how, without impugning the theory of miraculous power, can his inferences from natural experience be received as of any weight compared with the statements of a record which authoritatively affirms that all strata were supernaturally produced? Was it not quite as practicable for Omnipotence to create the rock at once by fiat, with the *appearance* of having been slowly deposited in conjunction with fossiliferous remains through, countless ages, as to create the inorganic constituents of the rock and the cretacea, etc., separately, to be afterwards deposited together? Was it not fully as competent to the Almighty to cause supernatural rain from heaven during forty days and forty nights to cover the whole earth with water above the tops of the highest mountains, as the Scriptures simply tell us was the case, as to anthropomorphically *manage* it by a sudden subsidence of the east coast of the Mediterranean Sea, as has been repeatedly suggested? Whoever thus substitutes natural causes for the supernatural action of the Creator, yields entirely the broadest distinction made by any one between the two theories of causation, and does evident violence to the sacred text; the essential character of which is professedly miraculous. The man of

science who accepts such a compromise is as inconsistent as he who offers it. Each, out of deference to the other, yields, not a portion, but the whole of his own principle. Compromise is suicidal. For, in acknowledging any efficacy in his antagonist's principle of causation, he admits that so far his own has none. And if so far, why not altogether? For if one principle he at all adequate to the production of the effect, to suppose the second must be superfluous and unphilosophical. It is clear that the supernatural cause must be amply adequate to every effect if valid at all; but the supposition of natural causes in lieu, or in addition, at once implies its inadequacy in the instance in which they are supposed; and the man of science may well retort that the admission of the intrinsic efficacy of natural causes to any extent should be held to render their adequacy to the production of every phenomenon more than probable; because their efficacy should not have been admitted, if that of the supernatural cause could have been maintained as indisputable or reasonable.

We are fully aware that this argument suffers much in its application to such events as the creation and the deluge. The lapse of ages introduces many elements of uncertainty, such as the imperfection and paucity of the evidence, the changes in the signification of words, and the elasticity of the processes of interpretation adopted with regard to the Scriptures. We, therefore, desire to lay no stress upon this application of our principle, and have only dwelt upon it so far that we might not appear to neglect what has been already said on the subject; to point out the hopelessness of any practical result from investigations into the events of such distant times; and also to prepare the way for the following adaptation of the same principle to facts within our personal observation.

The question as to the nature or philosophy of causation, can, fortunately, be applied to current practical phenomena with immeasurably greater advantage and force. One of the most direct and obtrusive points of antagonism is that raised by Professor Tyndall in his article "On the Constitution of the Universe," in No. XIV. of the *Fortnightly Review*.

"A miracle is strictly defined as an invasion of the law of the conservation of energy. To create or annihilate matter would be deemed on all hands a miracle; the creation or annihilation of energy would be equally a miracle to those who understand the principle of conservation. Hence arises the scepticism of scientific men when called upon to join in national prayer for changes in the economy of nature. Those who devise such prayers admit that the age of miracles is past, and in the same breath they petition for the performance of miracles. They ask for fair weather and for rain, but they do not ask that water may flow uphill; while the man of science clearly sees that the granting of the one petition would be just as much an infringement of the law of conservation as the granting of the other. Holding this law to be permanent, he prays for neither."—*Fortnightly Review*., No. XIV., p. 144.

He there showed that to pray for, and praying for, to expect or suppose possible, any objective results different from those which would otherwise have occurred, is essentially unscientific, and puts the "intellect to shame;" that prayer, to be efficacious, can be so only by a miracle, though it is conceded that the age for miracles is past; in fact, the dispute is substantially the same as that respecting creation.

But a little careful attention and reasoning show that theories of natural and of supernatural causation mutually and essentially exclude each other. For the supposition of intrinsic efficacy in either, makes the introduction of the other unnecessary, and, therefore, unphilosophical. To suppose both is, therefore, inadmissible. In fact, the admission of the second amounts to a declaration of the inadequacy of the first to observed results. Nay, to any results. For whichever is held equal to the greater or more difficult results, must obviously be held equal to the lesser and more simple, and should, therefore, be preferred for both. Compromise is here again only self-destructive. For to suppose natural causes as dependent upon, or acting only by virtue of a supernatural cause operating through, or behind them, is obviously to suppose really nothing but the action of the supernatural cause itself. And to suppose their independence or intrinsic efficacy to any extent, is to admit and establish the radical distinction and antagonism between natural and supernatural force, and, as shown above, to declare the latter superfluous and inadmissible. Truth must be on one side or the other; not on both, or neither.

Again, natural causes are clearly perfectly adequate to the production of all natural effects; and the supposition of a supernatural cause should be, therefore, wholly superfluous for any other than supernatural effects. But while the law of conservation involves the eternity and constant total quantity of both matter and force, on the other side it is conceded that the age of overt miracles is past; and natural and supernatural causation cannot be supposed to co-operate in any proportions in the production of the same effects, for natural forces are accurately measurable in some instances, and are then found exactly commensurate with the observed effects; thus, of course, excluding the supposition of any additional force, supernatural or otherwise. If it be said that we only call the supernatural force by the name of natural force, because of the natural forms in which, and by means of which, it is manifested, what is this but the identification of one with the other? The supernatural force, if any, must be the only really operative one; any of the natural objects which it moves being no more than as a tool in the hand of a man; and the supernaturalist is clearly bound, in logical consistency, to

maintain his theory of supernatural causation intact, if at all. The supernatural cause must be universally, particularly, and solely active, to the exclusion of all efficacy in any natural cause whatsoever; any admission of operative natural causation being entirely fatal to the supernatural theory. We shall soon see the logical consequences involved in this established position.

Though thus the argument appears to be concentrated on the single point of the nature of causation, it may be readily apprehended how much more is involved in it. For upon the decision hangs not only the efficacy of prayer, but also the whole theory of a special, or of any Providence. All is involved in the question of the nature of causation.

All possible theories of causation may be exhaustively classified as follows:

1st. God, as Force operating solely, continually and universally, in eternal necessarily existent matter (Pantheism).

2nd. God, as creator of matter, and as Providence or Force, operating therein solely, continually, and universally (Pantheistic).

3d. God, as creator of matter, and of Force active therein, but not interfering with the operation of that Force after its creation (Creatorial).

4th. God, as creator of matter, and of force active therein, and continually governing and guiding that force after its creation (Creatorial and Providential.)

5th. God, as Providence guiding Force, that Force consisting of necessary intrinsic properties of eternal uncreated matter (Anthropomorphic).

6th. Eternal Matter: and Force, or the intrinsic active properties of matter (Scientific and Causational).

In the first class, the Deity being supposed the only operator, man, like everything else, must act, perhaps blindly, but in any case compulsorily. In God all action, and therefore all responsibility are at once centered. Religion is impossible, for prayer and adoration are thus *the action of their object*; man, like anything else, being merely used as a tool or instrument, conscious by sensation of his acts, but utterly unconscious of their true cause.

The second is essentially the same as the first, the single new feature of the creation of matter directly involving, of course, more entire responsibility for all its intractability. But the first supposition involves that matter had originally no intrinsic properties whatever, and, consequently, no intractability. If, however, to lessen the responsibility for evil, the intractability of matter be still imagined, omnipotence is at once sacrificed, and the theory is so far anthropomorphic. But to suppose matter as existent without properties is clearly not only eminently unscientific, but absurd.

The third is merely a nominal concession to the undeniability of the intrinsically sequential character of the operation of natural forces. If God created matter and force, and left them to themselves, the result must be to us the same in effect as if they were uncreated, and acted by intrinsic necessity. For past and present cosmical facts are, and are supposed, the same. Only in the one case an origin by fiat is imagined; in the other, evolution from all eternity. But although a continuous guiding Providence is thus abandoned, still, entire responsibility in the Creator is maintained, whether the creation be supposed to have been accomplished in ignorance, or with knowledge, of all possible consequences.

The fourth is like the third, but it involves a virtual denial that miracles are less common now than ever before; all action being supernatural and none natural, all is miraculous; or more accurately speaking, no action was ever more miraculous at any one period than at any other. The responsibility for all action whatever, cosmical or human, is, if anything, even more directly fixed upon the creator in this than in the preceding theory. Yet this is unquestionably the most popular hypothesis.

The fifth is a further concession to the inchoate idea of the eternity of matter, and the intrinsic nature of its properties and laws. It reduces the Deity to much the same position as a magnified man. Matter and Force are to him at best only partially tractable, and it is impossible to say how much or how little. Science, or the knowledge of nature, is constantly taking from the exceptional and arbitrary, to add to the uniform and necessary, and the application of this process is extending so rapidly as to threaten to become speedily universal.

The sixth is simply Nature as expounded by Science. In this theory, Deity has simply hitherto held, but with questionable utility, the place of x , the sign representative of the unknown quantity in an algebraic equation, pending the solution of the great problem by Science. When this is known the sign may be discarded. Matter is judged, upon the evidence of all experience, to be eternal, and constant in quantity; uncreatable and indestructible. Force is the activity of the intrinsic properties of matter itself, being like matter constant in total quantity, though infinitely variable in its forms of manifestation; so that, when expended in one, it is always to be traced in another, into which it is diverted in the process.

Though we have enumerated six theories of causation, it is clear that the first and sixth are really the antithetic alternatives, of which the others are but nominal, untenable compromises, logically inconsistent and

impossible; and a theory of causation can scarcely be proposed which may not legitimately be classed under one of these six beads, and therefore resolved, by consistent analysis and reasoning, into the first or last.

So far this statement of the case appears impregnable, together with that of the inevitable and startling consequence; not only that *all* causation *must* be due to one of two sources, either natural or supernatural, but that either alternative is irreconcilable with and excludes the other. There remains absolutely no logical alternative between on the one hand a Pantheism which, by identifying Deity with the intrinsic properties of matter, makes it, as the sole mover, exclusively responsible for every accident, offence, and crime perpetrated in our world—a conclusion at which consistent piety must stand aghast—and on the other an inviolable universal causation; which, utterly blind to and regardless of particular consequences, makes every isolated circumstance the necessary and absolute product of the conditions under which it may be evolved. To what does this commit the man of science? To our theory of causation expressed in the law of the conservation and persistence of Force, so lucidly propounded by Professor Tyndall in the paper before mentioned. That law, it appears, cannot be held consistently with a belief in the efficacy of prayer, or even in a special Providence. It involves the *necessity* of *all* causation, and that every event is the inevitable result of its concatenated antecedents.

See articles by Professor Tyndall in the *Fortnightly Review* for 1st of December, 1865, and 1st of June, 1867, in which this is amply proved.

It involves that the nature of the causation of human actions is essentially identical in kind with that by which two and two make four, which Omnipotence cannot be supposed competent to alter. Still, man's actions are his own; and *their consequences prove to him every hour his ineluctable responsibility*.

The man of science finds that the operation of natural causes is strictly in conformity with mathematical and physical laws, and, therefore, may philosophically be deemed as undeviating and non-contingent as mathematical and physical processes. Obedience to such laws is simply "movement in the direction of least resistance." Were a single case to occur in which the observed movement was not in the direction of least resistance, or not in accordance with, but in opposition to, mathematical or physical necessity, there would then be ground for inferring the operation of a supernatural cause, and relinquishing all idea of any efficacy in natural forces. But no such anomaly has yet appeared; and until such an instance occurs, the man of science feels not only justified in rejecting such an unphilosophical supposition, but *compelled* to reject it.

Above all, is this argument applicable to the solar system, the optic organ, the apiarian cell, &c., &c., the commonly cited examples of supernatural action. In each of these it is found that the phenomena conform strictly to mathematical laws, by which we learn to comprehend them; if we are not rather conducted *to* those laws *by* them. And it would be strange indeed if the substantial manifestations of those mathematical principles were to be less certain and inevitable in fulfilment, than the abstract processes themselves; which are but the signs of the material things, and of their actual relations. Is it possible that any even supernatural power should be competent to change the course of the phenomena, without producing a corresponding aberration of the mathematical laws which merely express them; by which we ascertain and understand them; and which may be called simply the description of them as physical facts?

Applied to the phenomena of organic continuity; the wonder should not be that hens breed chickens, dogs puppies, sheep lambs, and men children; or that the same food eaten by sheep should form mutton, by pigs pork, and by oxen beef; but the wonder would be if the results were different. Thus, a cow has never been known to produce a cat, nor a hen a monkey; nor does, *nor can*, the grass eaten and digested by a horse, produce the same results as if eaten by a sheep or a kangaroo. Yet there is scarcely less evident continuity or persistence of force in these instances than in the necessary persistent identity of any physical object. *We are not surprised* that what was a stone yesterday should continue to be a stone to-day and to-morrow, instead of becoming a tree, or a living organism, &c., from hour to hour; and, as experience convinces us that the identity of any substance or object must persist or endure in time and space until adequate physical causes produce the dissolution of the arrangement of its parts; and as, in accordance with the first Newtonian law of motion, a body impelled in any direction in space, must continue its course in that direction until some external force deflect, retard, or accelerate its motion; so it seems that any *kind* of motion, including assimilation and reproduction, must, in like manner, persist or continue in time, until adequate causes compel its cessation, or conversion into some other form of force. The pabulum appropriated by organisms, thus undergoes changes determined by the special media of assimilation. By the tremendous solvent powers of the digestive apparatus, it is perfectly disintegrated and chemically decomposed, until it loses all the special characteristics by which it was before distinguished. Thus prepared to receive those which alone it is in a position to acquire, nothing whatever appears to be necessary to identify it with the substance of the organism itself into which it may have been introduced, but rapid and constant circulation through every part and corner of the structure, whence it is subsequently expelled when effete by peripheral excretion. But such a stringent process appears to be indispensable to effect any rapid change in the outward constitution of substance, the actual chemical bases of

which remain constant in quantity throughout. Different results from those which Ave observe are simply impossible, and would be motion in the direction of greater resistance. We cannot really believe that even supernatural power could effect different results; and Ave necessarily and instinctively attribute absolute efficacy and continuity to natural causes, which we are convinced and feel, produce the effects we observe. And our confidence is never deceived.

What, however, is the position of the super naturalist? When once it is recognised and understood that he cannot consistently admit the efficacy of any natural causes, but must regard them, if he recognise them at all, as mere supposititious puppets in the hand of an over-ruling Providence; then nature and man must be supposed alike irresistibly subjected to a power of which they form but passive instruments—irresponsible machines. And if man's natural organic functions, such as digestion, and his involuntary animal action, including sensation, require the intervention of a supernatural force, surely it cannot be reasonably contended that his intellectual operations, thought, speech, and reason, require a less supernatural or potent cause.

Is not man thus, by the supernatural theory, deprived of action? and all his movements made simply the involuntary expression or effect of incomprehensible, untraceable, supernatural energy? Can anything be more demoralising than such blind, helpless, fatalistic Pantheism? The scientific theory admits of the action of rational man as a responsible

What a striking and suggestive analogy there is in the meaning of the words *responsible* and *reflex!*

natural force; but by the supernatural theory his acts are not his own, but those of an arbitrary, irresistible, supernatural power, softening or hardening whom he will. And if it be alleged that the age of miracles is past, as is conceded to experience; if the former supernatural is now merged in natural causation; if a Providence is really as obsolete as miracles by the reduction of its action to what cannot be distinguished from undeviating, inexorable, physical necessity; what then remains of Deity to venerate or adore? Are all our hallowed traditions—all our religious proclivities to be subjugated and annihilated by a blind, inevitable causation? On the other hand are not *all* knowledge, *all* experience, and *all* science, absolutely based not only upon the uniformity, but also upon the *necessity* of causation

See *Fortnightly Review* already quoted.

? For that uniformity there must surely be a reason, a cause; and a single departure from the absolute uniformity of the results of given conditions, would, if we could believe it, falsify the knowledge and destroy the experience until then accumulated. Were it possible, or could we suspect, that, as regards the uniformity of causation, the future will not, nay *must* not be as the past, both experience and knowledge must inevitably be worthless—in short, impossible.

To the scientific man do these considerations make life less sweet, health less delightful, love less pure, the world less beautiful, knowledge less invaluable, morality less indispensable, or truth less true? Can they alter reality in the world or in himself? And if not, is it nothing to find his reasoning at last consistent with facts and with itself? Has the theologian this consolation in abiding by his traditional faith? May he also love this beautiful world which smiles so benignantly upon him? Can he touch what he regards as pitch and not be defiled?

Can he reap the benefit of the achievements of science in chemistry, mechanics, physics, and in all the wealth of worldly comfort and civilisation, remembering at the same time that he "cannot serve God and mammon?" Can he live in ease by forbidden usury, travel by steam on land or water, enjoy the worldly pleasure and worldly advantage resulting from the cultivation of scientific knowledge and literature; can he attain to worldly wealth, social honour, and domestic felicity, and lay the flattering unction to his soul, that he shall never hear, "Woe to you! for you have received your consolation?"

For him, is consistency possible?

Should he not feel absolute despair rather than hope of that ultimate bliss, for which, according to his own principles, he must repudiate and despise the worldly blessings so exuberantly evolved around him? To secure it he knows that his principles require him to be more meritorious than all or nearly all his neighbours—for many are called but few chosen—yet those same principles bind him to repudiate all merit! Humility being an indispensable qualification, he should know that any confidence which he may feel in his salvation, must itself be entirely fatal to his pretensions. Thus should he be indeed of all men most miserable! In Christian theology it is asserted that the salvation of the vicious is achieved solely and righteously by the sufferings of the virtuous and innocent! Is not this to proclaim immunity to vice, and punishment to virtue? An inversion of the plainest moral principles! a theory of immorality! To hold the doctrine of the forgiveness of sin, and yet that a just and benevolent deity rather than forego or abate one jot of the penalty, exacts it, rather than from none, from the wrong and an innocent person, instead of from the guilty one, is obviously not only contradictory but impious. Yet it is not found to be absurd.

But even this contradiction is not more glaring and suicidal than another which has more direct relevance to our argument, and lies besides at the basis of all theology; namely, the assertion that because every event *must*

have a cause, therefore there must have been a beginning and a *first cause of all*. For on the self-same principle the asserted beginning *must* have had a cause, that cause a prior one, and that again a prior, *ad infinitum*. To suppose a *first* cause, without an *antecedent eternal precession of causes*, is evidently to violate the principle and destroy the basis of the supposition itself.

We have stated this double dilemma as accurately as we can, doubtless with a strong and irresistible leaning in the same direction to which believers in science notoriously tend. The lovers, however distantly, of knowledge, must perforce follow where the leading pioneers have cleared the way. We have endeavoured to confine our statement to one principle, certainly a comprehensive one; the nature of causation. Patient analysis and strict logic form ample means for dissipating all the mystery in which traditional authority and sophistical equivocation have enveloped the subject. The essential difference between metaphysical mental gymnastics and consistent reasoning is maximised in the results.

We believe that we have herein—imperfectly, perhaps, but truly—represented the real positions of the contending parties, and the alternatives their systems offer, with reasons

That perhaps another,
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
A forlorn, [bewildered] brother,
Seeing may take heart again.

Let such a one remember that the absoluteness of causation is the essence of experience, which is itself the basis of knowledge; while consistency is the best available test of human reasoning. That "art is long and time is fleeting;" and, lastly, this: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave, whither thou goest." Ecclesiastes ix., 10.

R. Bell, Printer, 97 Little Collins Street East, Melbourne.

The Person, Character, and Teaching, of Jesus.

PRINTED BY REQUEST] [PRICE 6D.

A lay Sermon read to the Sunday Free Discussion Society. Turn Verein Hall, Melbourne, October 6, 1872. John vii, 24. JUDGE!—not according to the appearance,—but judge-righteous judgment!

MY main object in this paper, is to review the *teaching* of Jesus, and to form a more accurate estimate than I have lately heard expressed of its worth in the past and present; but I have thought it right to include his *person* and *character* in my theme to protect myself from that misconception which is otherwise almost certain to arise. For in all questions connected with religion, the sympathies of men are so powerfully engaged, that the criticism of a *doctrine* is frequently regarded as a personal attack upon the *character* of him who promulgated it, if not upon that of anyone who may undertake its defence. I think also that erroneous impressions prevail as to the means we possess for judging the person and character of Jesus; and therefore that a few minutes may be profitably devoted to the consideration of those two points.

Now of the PERSON of Jesus, we of course know nothing *directly*; and our *indirect* information about him is as doubtful as it is scanty. The inevitable tendency of modern criticism is to throw doubt upon the personality of *all* those typical characters which tradition has handed down to us as the founders of human improvement. It was like the uprooting of an old affection to learn that Homer and Æsop were imaginary characters; and if the personality of Jesus has no greater title to historic reality, the arrival at that conviction must certainly cost a pang, for which nothing could compensate but the accompanying certainty of an approximation to reasonable probability, if not to demonstrable truth.

The evidence preponderates in my opinion *against* the reality of the existence of Jesus. It is most remarkable that a person of his asserted pretensions and views should himself have written —*nothing!* Not a word—to preclude the otherwise certain misconception and distortion of his precepts; to say nothing of his objects and personal character. This would certainly be quite intelligible on *one* supposition which has strong support in the Gospels; namely, that his regards were limited exclusively to *his own generation*, in which he plainly said that he expected that the heavens and the earth would pass away. But *this*—is to impute to him an *ignorance* wholly inconsistent with his asserted character, if not altogether fatal to it. Not only did Jesus himself write nothing, but nothing was written about him for such a long time after the date assigned to him, as to preclude direct disproof of any statement respecting him—however absurd; for inherent improbability or

incongruity with contemporary history cannot amount to more than moral disproof. Of improbabilities—nay impossibilities—the story is full, but to those who are as full of faith, even such mountains are easily moveable. But when in addition—the utter silence is remembered of contemporary historians who made it their business to report every analogous circumstance; it should be evident that the constant adjurations throughout the Gospels to exercise faith,—not only met a perceived want in even that credulous age, but also indicated a consciousness even then, that the evidence was not in itself probable or credible to those, who could not possibly then discern that faith is an intellectual vice, instead of a virtue.

But it may be said Socrates also wrote nothing, yet his existence is not doubtful. True, but *first*, he made no such pretensions as did Jesus; secondly, we have otherwise the best authority of that age for believing in his real existence; and thirdly there is nothing improbable in his story. History had made its appearance in the world, and if any history of that age is credible at all, those of Greece and Rome are *the most* so. There can be no comparison between the testimony of the cultivated Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, and that of the obscure and in fact—unknown writers of the Gospels; although the death of Socrates took place 400 years before Christ, when Xenophon was about 54 years of age, Plato 30; Aristotle being born 15 years later.

But of the existence of Jesus no mention whatever is made by the contemporary writers of Greece and Rome, or of the world; which proves that it could not have had any *prominent publicity at the time*, if any reality at all. The fact that he is not alluded to in the writings of Philo Judæus, who was born about the same time as Jesus's asserted birth, and lived to old age in which he wrote extensively upon Jewish philosophy and religion; or in those of Josephus,

See Gibbon, vol. ii, p. 90 (Bohn's edition), and Taylor's Diegesis, p.p. 363-4 & 385-9, for evidence of the forgery of the passage in which Jesus is named.

who was born near the time of Jesus's supposed death, and wrote the history of the Jewish people and of his own time,—is ample evidence against the truth of the Gospels, even if their testimony presented a general aspect of probability instead of fable. But we have no such particulars of the Evangelists at all—as we have of the disciples of Socrates; and we know that their names were altogether arbitrarily attached to their putative writings, to give them what cannot but be a spurious authenticity, by some of the fathers; who, from their own statements, besides being grossly incompetent witnesses and judges, did not scruple to deceive, lie, and forge, whatever seemed to suit their purposes.

See Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History and Middleton's Free Enquiry.

The Gospels themselves, the dates of which are thus mere guesswork, are known to have been selected by the same incompetent fraudulent old fathers from scores of others scarcely more incredible. In addition to this we have the positive testimony of several of them that the Scriptures were to be understood allegorically. Some say that Jesus—if he really lived—was not really crucified at all, but that Simon the Cyrenian was substituted for him. Some gravely contended that he was but a phantom. It appears that this was a not uncommon opinion; some saying that a portion, others that the whole of the Gospels, was not to be understood literally. But more important still is the witness of the Gospels themselves. They make Jesus speak distinctly of subsequent events,—and even of some—AS PAST,—which did not occur until long after his reputed death! One glaring instance is at verse 35 of the xxiii chapter of Matthew, where he speaks of the death of Zacharias the son of Barachias *as past*; although according to Josephus it did not happen until about the year 70.

"The story in Josephus, of Jesus the son of Ananus, (see Wars vi, v, 3) is evidently the basis of much of that of Jesus of Nazareth. The similarity of their vaticinations (compare Mat. xxiii is very striking. The 35th verse of the xxiii ch. of Mat. affords overwhelming proof that it was written long (say at least 20 years) after the destruction of Jerusalem, Zacharias, the son of Barachias, being killed in the temple 34 years after the reputed date of the crucifixion (Josephus, Wars iv, v. 4); and sufficient time must be allowed for the confusion of dates to arise. The cunning reference in the popular editions of Josephus to 2 Chron. xxiv, 21, will not satisfy the demands of the citation. For "from righteous Abel to Zacharias "is evidently meant to include the complete series from the first to the last notorious case of murder—and the passage in Chron. refers to a time 900 years before Jesus. The prophet Zeehariah, who has also been suggested as the person referred to, and the manner of whose death has not been recorded, and was therefore not notorious, lived about 600 years before. The Zacharias of Chronicles also was the son of Jehoiada not Barachias; the prophet Zechariah was the son of Berechiah. (Zech i, 1)."

This fact suggests the possible identity of the Jesus of Scripture with a Jesus son of Ananus, of whom Josephus speaks as prophesying the destruction of Jerusalem just before the event; and that it was when his character was invested with the divine or supernatural nimbus that his appearance was *ante dated* nearly half a century in order to set criticism at defiance. This was of course easy in an age and country, where there were no newspapers or records, which in any case would have had to prove a negative. The date of the story had only to be carried back beyond the memory of those addressed, to be secure from refutation. This theory concurs with the probably real conditions of the case, which are totally at variance with the received Gospel story. The date

assigned to Jesus is altogether incompatible with that, but agrees perfectly with the theory which identifies him with Jesus son of Ananus, as the mere nucleus round which the stories of Christna and others, picked up probably by Paul in Arabia, and modified by the prevalent Neoplatonism, afterwards gathered. Of these we know that that of the slaughter of the innocents, and that of the taxing of the world are wholly incredible and mere inventions as applied to Jesus.

Paul's curious visit to Arabia, as mentioned by himself, is as incongruous with the rest of his story, as the fact,—that many of the leading incidents in the history of Jesus, are mere plagiarisms from the far older history of the Indian Christna—is fatal to the originality and historic truth of the Gospels. That Paul's epoch is also ante dated, and that his otherwise unintelligible visit to Arabia—much more probably ensued upon the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, concurs much better than the received chronology—with Lucian's supposed account of Paul, as, "a bald longnosed Galilean, who had been taken up to the third heaven and had there heard unspeakable words," and whom he had actually-seen; for Lucian was born *in the second century*, writing and dying *near the end of it*. And even without these materials for a re-adjustment of dates, there would remain to be accounted for, the long period of time between all these asserted events, and the date of the first authentic Christian writing, and respecting which no explanation whatever can be given on the orthodox hypothesis.

These conclusions must of course more or less affect our estimate of the character of Jesus. The son of Ananus was evidently no better than a lunatic, whose vaticinations related to nothing beyond the evidently impending destruction of the city and nationality of the Jews. But the *character* of the Jesus of the Gospels—imaginary or not—is another matter. As portrayed, impartial criticism must recognise in him a mild enthusiast, whose ideas of virtue and of philosophy were equally a caricature. But we judge of character mainly by actions, and those attributed to Jesus leave *his* open to considerable question. The most remarkable thing reported of him is, that he went about ostensibly practising thaumaturgy and curing diseases; for the expressed purpose, less of labouring for the good of others, than *to prove the truth of his doctrines!* (John x, 37 8) Than which nothing could be more absurd. If Dr. Tracy were to appeal to his clever cures, as proof of the accuracy of his theological opinions, we should simply laugh at him; because, there is no congruity or relation between the two things; the one can no more be proved by the other, than any theology will enable a man without medical knowledge to cure diseases; and the *pretension* to cure anything so, proves something very different,—the folly or the roguery of the *pretender*. Yet such was the *sole object* of the miracles of Jesus! Also much suspicion is thrown upon those miracles, by the plain statement that their success depended, not so much upon his ability, as on the credulity of the spectators. (Mat. xiii, 58. Mark vi, 5-6.) "And he did not many mighty works there, *because of THEIR UNBELIEF!*"—The very reason why he pretended to do them, and should have done them if he could! "And *he COULD there do no mighty work*, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk and healed them. And he *marvelled* because of their unbelief." He,—who "knew what was in man,"—the manufacturer of man, marvelled! For what purpose did he profess to work miracles but to cure unbelief? yet when the occasion served, and demanded it, he *could not* do so! Jesus's statement (Mark ix, 22) that "all things are possible to them that believe," is obviously untrue, for a mistake would then be impossible.

Further than this there is really little or nothing by which we can judge of his moral character. He admittedly lived the life of a vagrant, apparently helping himself—or directing his disciples to help him—to other people's corn (Mat. xii, 1. Mark ii, 23) and donkeys, (Mat. xxi, 2. John xii, 14,) and giving evasive answers to plain questions. He never was in a position of trust and responsibility, and we have not very encouraging means of judging how he would have acted if he had been in one. His asserted meekness was certainly not proved when he scourged the people out of the temple, an incident in itself devoid of all semblance of probability. (Mat. xxi, 12. Mark xi, 15.) His judgment appears to have been worse than indifferent in more than one instance; not so much perhaps in the fact that he expected very different results in that generation—for the wisest of men are often deceived,—as in that he selected the greatest rogue for his treasurer in the person of Judas. It may also be thought that he might well have taken care that the records of his life and teaching might come to us in such an authentic manner and reasonable form, that they would not have been open to such very grave suspicion; to say no more. The grotesquely ascetic character of his doctrines is in perfect keeping with the fact that it is recorded of him that he wept and groaned, while it is not hinted that he ever laughed or even smiled.

On the other side, what can be said? His devotion to his visionary purpose is, I fear, the best. He was sacrificed at last (accepting the story as credible) not with that confidence, enthusiasm and endurance which alone can give the halo of glory to the martyr, but in misery and despair! He begged that the cup *might, if possible*, pass from him! Not with the conscious joy of rectitude, but *sweating drops of blood!* He *implied* that he *believed*—whether he did or not—that his *God had forsaken him in his last agony*. *Could* this have been without a conviction that his life was an error, and his devotion a mistake? A pitiable case indeed! Let us thank common sense and straightforward criticism, that it is probably altogether fictitious. Pray observe that I regret as much as any one, that most of his good must be interred with his bones, and that the evil that men cause

comes after them. I insinuate nothing against him but what the Gospels have said; and for *that*, I do not blame *him*. I devoutly thank my philosophy that while pitying him as a deluded fanatic, and deploring the enormous evils which the teaching attributed to him has brought upon humanity, I can honor him for his good attempted, pity him for his misfortunes, and entirely exonerate him from all evil intentions. From the essential stand point of all religion—freewill—so much charity would be a simple impossibility. If man had a power of initiating action or motion as freewill implies;—if under the same conditions it were possible for him to act otherwise than as he does, there would then be room for blame to Jesus. With me, I rejoice to say, there is none. But religion can see no error without calling it *sin*. It assumes that faults are voluntary, intentional, and of choice, and calls the ignorant victim of inherited passion, vicious education, and stringent circumstance, *wicked*, *perverse*, and *damnably*! Blind to the inevitable fact, that, according to its own principles, *if sin can be*, it *must originate* with the *originator*! That if man is bad, God—if there be one—made him so! It has no right to deny this, and then assert that God is the author and giver of virtue, of which it *thus robs man*. It cannot be charitable any more than consistent. Its pretensions to consistency would be absurd, if they were not repudiated; but its claims to be charitable are impudently false.

But in any case the necessitarian sees that all such visionaries are the victims of exalted imagination, as well as of external circumstance, and that the intentions of all are equally blameless. Rather, perhaps, that intention enters but nominally, or faintly if at all, into the causation of action. For man's intentions are—like his acts—necessary products of his constitution and circumstances, over which he has no control, and which he cannot select. Thus, and thus only, is charity possible. And *therefore*, "let us not condemn one another any more; but judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling block or an occasion to fall in his brother's way." (Rom. xiv, 13).

Poor Jesus! deluded visionary! Thanks be to common sense and growing knowledge, your story is happily altogether incredible!

But the *teaching*—whosoever it is—is here! and I wish to examine it impartially and truly. For it is a stumbling block in the way of many. I shall lay little stress on particular texts, which may be shewn to be *contradicted*, or as piety would say *explained*, by others. I shall not touch now upon the implied communism, nor on the toleration of the adulteress. Nor on the doctrine of *faith*, which deserves a separate paper. But I shall deal with leading admitted doctrines only; and shall quote, if at all, merely for general purposes of illustration.

The first thing to be done, is to distinguish what was peculiar in Jesus's teaching, from what he merely repeated; from what was taught hundreds of years before, by Confucius, Zoroaster, &c. Thus the doctrine of immortality was older than Moses, and was notoriously held by the Pharisees in Jesus's time. The common statement then that Jesus brought immortality to light, can only be made in wild contempt for veracity and fact. And for the golden rule,—"*Do not to others what ye would not that others should do to you*,"—Jesus deserves no more credit than any other man that quotes it with approval; but it must not be overlooked that in repeating it he spoilt it by putting it in the positive form—"Do to others as ye would that others should do to you." And the good of this maxim is very much exaggerated; for it is not of universal social application, and strict conformity to it would produce serious evil. If judges, constables and jailers were to do to our criminals as they would be done by, crime would have no check, and society would collapse.

This brings me to the next thing, which is to point out, that what Jesus repeated, he invariably exaggerated and caricatured. He could not inculcate that aggression and retaliation are evil, (because provoking strife, and therefore opposed to self interest as much as to morality,) without a caricature, and saying, that if struck on one cheek you should offer the other to be treated likewise. And, "whoever shall take your cloak, give to him your coat also. If any one compel you to go with him a mile, go with him twain." Such teaching is absurd; and in practice would be destructive of true morality, and of society also. So is "resist not evil;" and "love your enemies," which is not only impracticable but wrong. Act towards your enemies so as to convert them into friends if you can, and no one will admire the wisdom and propriety of such conduct more than I. But to *love* them, is not more difficult than immoral.

And here I shall venture to lay down a canon, which I think is a decided advance upon any teaching of Jesus. I am satisfied that one great cause of the prevalence not only of immorality but of the vague and unfruitful ideas on the subject of ethics generally,—is the want of such a canon. But it is in diametrical opposition to the general teaching of Jesus. I hold that nothing would so much conduce to the improvement of morals generally both public and private as the fulfilment of such a rule as the following. I say that man individually and collectively should *never let slip any opportunity of pronouncing in the most emphatic manner possible, the broad distinction between good and evil, virtue and vice*; so far as he has attained to it. Love your enemies? Not at all. *Hate* them not, however evil they may be. For if they *are* evil, they did not make themselves. But *mark your dis-approval of evil conduct wherever you may find it*. I say not, "judge not, lest ye be judged," but, **JUDGE, inviting judgment**; as we do here. **RESIST EVIL**; ay! and to the death!

But according to Jesus, you should make no distinction whatever between your friends and your enemies,

the just and the unjust. You are not to judge, but to love and bless, your enemies; do good to, and pray for, them! (Mat. v, 44-5) And what else in the name of common sense are you to do to your friends? You are thus told by Jesus, to ignore the distinction between, and suppress your own judgment of, good and evil, virtue and vice; Why? "That ye may be the children of your father which is in Heaven, *for* HE maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good; and sendeth rain on the just, and on the unjust," without any distinction whatever!!! Is not this either rank *blasphemy*; or else, a *complete refutation of the idea of God*? And this is not the only place where God is said to be *no respecter of persons*.

But though it is hard to find any doctrine originally taught by Jesus, there *is* one, which he has particularly appropriated; namely, the Forgiveness of Sins; and this I propose to shew, is both *false* and *pernicious*. And it is directly obnoxious to the rule I have laid down. For it places the good and bad upon a level, and is therefore execrably immoral. If we look round on nature or on human society, we find that evil, or error,—ay! unconscious error too,—is NEVER FORGIVEN. The evil consequences of evil acts are as inevitable as recurring day and night; and must be so until the acts themselves can be undone. And mark! it is solely *because* this is so—because we find that *fire* ALWAYS burns, that we keep our fingers out of it. And it is only because such ignorant notions, produced by such false teaching, prevail on the subject of morality, that we are less certain of the effects of vice, than of those of fire. The obvious result has been that men believe (as they have been taught) that they *may* touch pitch and *not* be defiled! They have been led to think that they may safely err, because repentance and forgiveness avert the natural consequences of error. The vile sale of indulgences was but the natural and proper fruit of such confusion of the principles of virtue and vice; and men for 1800 years have literally—upon this false promise of the Forgiveness of Sins,—SOLD THEMSELVES *to work iniquity before the Lord!!!*

If men were similarly taught that fire does not burn, they would soon learn the truth by experience of the directly obvious effects. But though more complex and therefore obscure, the effects of vice and crime are not less certain; and *therefore*, though they *have* been taught this falsehood for 18 centuries, most men have been acute enough to see their interest in being *really* moral, and dispensing with that forgiveness of sins, which puts others, bound hand and foot, into the power of the priest. But even yet many cannot discern it. They think a man *may* lie or steal with impunity, if only *not found out*. Not so. *Nature's retribution is always of the most appropriate kind. Those who so mis-use their judgment DESTROY IT.* Falsehood invariably causes the destruction more or less of the capacity to distinguish between good and evil, wise and foolish; and we frequently see this remarkably proved by the *silly* manner in which, after a career of deception, men of good original abilities, at last commit themselves and come to grief. But if they do *not* do this evidently to their fellows, the personal deterioration and degradation is all the greater, and all the more inevitable, *because* it is unconscious in operation and in effect, and demands intellectual foresight to avoid. I suspect that a much more direct connection than could possibly be perceived at once, will yet be traced between lunacy and falsehood.

See corroborative remarks in Maudsley's Physiology and Pathology of the Mind. pp. 210-1.

That natural retribution in complex cases, though absolutely certain, is difficult to discern at first, is no disproof. That is quite in accordance with the method of nature in the development of intellect. To apprehend this truth demands the complete exercise of the logical faculty, involving a bold deduction, and extended verification by inductions of great complexity. But the establishment of this as a fundamental moral truth, is worthy of the perfection of intellectual effort. Discoveries of greatest value have always been most difficult of achievement. But though as yet intellectually so hard to discern, this is instinctively, and generally admitted and affirmed in all such popular axioms as, "*Honesty is the best policy!*" Honesty is the best policy. This is truer than all the Gospels. If it were *not*, morality would be a wild chimera, instead of a *growing fact*.

I must however turn, before I conclude, to Jesus's summary of the whole law.—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." (Mat. xxii, 37-9.) This is as obnoxious to my canon as the rest. Love your neighbours, good, bad, and indifferent, all alike! And if their virtues and vices are not really theirs, but the capricious gift of God, I don't see why you *shouldn't*. But if the qualities which distinguish them, *are* their essential characteristics in accordance with which they *cannot but act*; I say, mark as plainly as possible upon every occasion, *your judgment* of their good or evil conduct, and so far do *your* part to educate posterity. *Judge, and be judged.* In complex and obscure cases, investigate, compare, discuss, and *judge* to the stretch of your capacity, *every phase of human conduct*; APPROVE the GOOD, and CONDEMN the BAD. On philosophical,—though not on religious,—principles, you may do this, and love the lovely to your heart's content: and without hating even your *evil* neighbour. You may *hate* his *evil conduct* and if you like, the evil circumstances which produce it. But *he*, like *yourself*, is as good as his constitution and circumstances admit; and if he be so mischievous as to produce much evil or *even insecurity* to society, (which has preferent claims upon you exactly in proportion to its greater numbers) *hesitate not*, in your position as a member of society, to judge him, to stay him, to exterminate him, if necessary. But *not* in the *spirit of religion*.

Judgment should be without love, and without hate, but not without discernment—blind. *After judgment, love the worthy*; but not the unworthy, who should be indifferent to you. But let *worth* and *worth alone*, determine your judgment and your love. One great blot upon the Decalogue is the fifth command, to honor your parents *irrespective of desert*, and for no reason but the personal relation to yourself! nothing could be more vilely immoral or subversive of the radical distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice. *Do NOT* then love your neighbours—or parents—*indiscriminately*. *Honor what is honorable*. Love *what is lovely*; BUT *condemn what is evil*, and *abhor what is vile*, as you would hate and shun your own destruction.

But love *God* FIRST, says Jesus. Is God the better for your love ? No! Is man ? Yes, largely. Then, I say, love man, that is, the *worthy* man, first. Cannot God take care of himself ? If not, how can he take care of you ? *Morality is*—the manners of men *towards each other*. To love any other being (except woman) *more*, must therefore be immoral and evil. It is this *putting God first*, that is the *evil essence of religion*. Hark to the man after God's own heart—David, (see Psalm cxxxix, 21, 2) "Do not I HATE them, O Lord, that hate thee ? And am not I grieved with those that rise up against thee ? Yea, *I hate them* with PERFECT HATRED. I count *them* MINE enemies." What a diabolical utterance! Thus it is that the love of God, is, and always has been, the PERFECT HATRED of *humanity*! When a man's *imaginative egotism* is once projected and exalted into the idea of a God and leads him to fancy that he can possibly owe a higher duty, than to his neighbour and himself, there is no length to which his pious enthusiasm will not carry him, to effect any purpose which he may be so unfortunate as to be persuaded is the will of his God! Let history tell how he has endeavored to emulate his fictitious divine fiend, in inventing horrid tortures for his unfortunate neighbour, whom he has deliberately sacrificed with holy joy, for a sweet smelling savour in the nostrils of the demon Jehovah! Could anything be more immoral ? Yet Jesus taught all this *in effect*, when he said *love God first*. Yet we can freely forgive him, for he knew not what he did !

To conclude, what did Jesus teach that had not been taught before ? NOTHING ! The golden rule, which he spoilt, was better taught by Confucius and Zoroaster, and probably by thousands before them. So was the forgiveness of injuries as well as of sins. Even the precepts—to *resist not evil*, and to *love enemies*, did not originate with *him*, though he may have given more prominence to them, or exaggerated them more, than his predecessors. *Why then*, if he taught nothing new that was good, or good that was new, is he preferred to them, and falsely invested with particular credit, for repeating what others had said ? Simply because his painful though impossible story, his unmerited wrongs, and miserable fate, have invested his memory with a melting pathos, which appeals directly and powerfully to human sympathy; which while it captivates the affections, *deceives the judgment*. Men are moved, aye, and to tears, far more readily by *reading fiction* than by *witnessing fact*. This is why men are utterly blinded to the otherwise obvious and vital defects of Jesus's teaching, and actually adore *him*, for what they would contemn another. And until men and women better appreciate and utilise their precious faculty of reason, and recognise their duty and interest in exercising it unreservedly upon every subject that comes before them, to distinguish and emphasize the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, their very virtues will always be liable to run them headlong into vice, *and their GOOD will be EVIL*. And again I say unto you,—JUDGE !—not according to the appearance, but *judge righteous judgment!*

Hokor.

H. THOMAS. PRINTER. 75 LITTLE COLLINS STREET WEST, MELBOURNE.

Tough Morsels of Theology.

By Iconoclastes.

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Some Attributes of God.

IN 1860, the writer of the following fragments was induced to visit a hall occasionally on Sunday evenings, when Mr. S——, an immersed Christian, lectured, and invited discussion on various points in theology, advertising each subject in the papers of the preceding day. As on more than ten minutes on each evening was allowed by Mr. S—— for the remarks of any visitor, the writer put what he had to say in writing on two or three occasions, in order to condense and emphasize it as much as possible.

The subject advertised for Sunday, the 25th November, 1866, was "Some Attributes of God," when the following remarks were read by their author, in the ten minutes accorded to him:—

You will find it thus written in the 45th chapter of Isaiah, and in the 7th verse:—" I form the light, and create darkness : I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things." Also, in the 3rd chapter of Amos, and in 6th verse—"Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord bath not done it?"

I propose to apply to these texts and the Christian notions of God an axiom of my own, by which I test

every proposition, theological or other, wise. I find it simple and invaluable, and think its truth can scarcely be questioned by any reasonable person. It is this—

Of the terms of a contradiction one must necessarily be false; and any proposition which involves a contradiction must as certainly be false also.

The Christian God is asserted to be completely omniscient, omnipotent, and good; in fact, no intelligent man can now recognise as God any being who is not all that those words mean. Yet Christians and believers in the Bible hold that this God creates millions of men, who he knows beforehand must inevitably be tortured for ever in hell, without any hope of relief to them, or of good result to anyone.

I ask, Are such creations good acts?

Was the creation of Satan, in full view of the awful evil consequences, a good act?

Could Satan himself commit a worse?

As there may be a few irregular Christians here, who do not assert a real hell or devil, I put the same question to them thus:—The infliction, or permission, of the gratuitous pain, daily, of millions of harmless animals, and of thousands of innocent babies, racked with colic and excruciating diseases,—burnt alive, &c. I, and doubtless most of you, have *seen* and heard pure innocent babies, after living for weeks, at last die, shrieking with agony. *Is this good?* Is there an ignorant, hardened criminal in this Melbourne gaol who would deliberately inflict such useless pain on such innocent, helpless beings if he could possibly avoid it? I know no man so bad. *Is God worse?* Does he want the *mill*, or the *power*, to prevent this *cruel, motiveless torture*? Is the *omnipotent unable* to take a poor baby out of the world without *hurting* it so *pain-fully*, so *wantonly*, so *unrelentingly*? Or—does divine loving-kindness watch with *holy joy* the convulsive pangs of those *innocent, tender, quivering* little limbs? Are these his tender mercies?

What blasphemy!

Plutarch said, "I would rather they should say, 'there was no such man as Plutarch,' than that 'he was cruel and unjust.' "

There is a common sense of right in every man which, in spite of Bibles and rotten systems of religion, admires Plutarch's saying, and revolts at what is involved, necessarily, in any conception of the Christian God.

This Christian God, according to St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans (ix. 18), *loved Jacob*, and *hated Esau!* What follows? It being maintained that WE are to regulate *our conduct*, not by what *our best reason judges* to be *right and good*, but *so as to please the same being* that *loved a despicable villain* like *Jacob*, and that *hated Esau*, almost the only man shewn in the Bible as capable of frankly forgiving his worst enemy when he had him in his power! *Hated Esau!* of whom no wrong is recorded! Is Jacob to be our pattern? Is this morality? Is it *right*? Are we really, if we would earn a blessing, bound to imitate (and we *are* if we receive this story as *divine*) one who deliberately swindled and robbed his famishing brother, cheated and lied to his dying father, and actually presumed to dictate terms (Genesis xxviii. 20, 21, 22) and such terms! bread, raiment, safe conduct—to his God, as those only on which he would recognise him! Jacob and his God were worthy of each other.

To earn the love of the Christian God we must cheat and lie; to deserve his hate, we have only to forgive our enemies!

Of course, we all know that *elsewhere* the precept is laid down, "*love your enemies!*" But we are expressly told that *Jacob* GOT the blessing, and that *Esau* did NOT; and such facts—IF FACTS—have more weight than fifty precepts. Also, the contradiction of one text by another only destroys the authority or credit of both, but cannot lessen the iniquity of either.

In any case, it is only proved too clearly that sanction for the grossest immorality, quite as much as for the contrary, is afforded by the Bible; which fully accounts for the fact that the history of Christianity is one long tale of intolerance, of blood, of torture, fire and stake.

Christians! or Theists! if you insist upon, or cannot help, constructing a colossal phantom of omnipotence and omniscience, a *personal God*, out of nothing but your own imagination and credulous fear, at least remember that it is absolutely impossible to divest it of direct responsibility for *all* the wanton *pain, evil*, and *crime* in the universe. If you *mill*, in the face of all experience, imagine a *first cause* of *everything*, that *first cause* of *ALL* *must* be *THEREFORE* the *real cause*, and if omniscient, the malevolent cause of *all evil* and *crime*.

It is a mere subterfuge, as miserable as futile, to endeavor to divide this omnipotent, omniscient personality into two—a God and a Devil. They *must be one and the same*. The supposition that God created the Devil is as impious as absurd, for you cannot deny Satan any attribute of God. You say God advisedly and premeditatedly made pain and sin, though *being omnipotent*, he *needed not to do it*, to accomplish any of his purposes. And you say the Devil's acts produce pain and sin, and that *that* is wrong in *him*, *solely because* HE *NEEDS not* to do it. What difference is there? None whatever, *morally*. But Christianity makes Satan superior. In omniscience, omnipresence, and, as we have seen, *morally*, he is at least equal to God, but vastly superior in power. He constantly and *successfully thwarts God!* gets a thousand to God's one, terribly anxious as God is for all! The

devil is, then, the real Christian God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are subordinate persons in Christian theology. This explains the anomalies in the story of the fall of man in Eden, where the solemn assertion of God that Adam should surely die the same day that he disobeyed was proved false by the event, while the serpent is said to have spoken the truth; and where also the evil being is made the one who led man to the knowledge of good and evil, and the good being the one that wanted to keep him from it! These contradictions can be evaded by equivocation only. This accounts, likewise, for the apparent discrepancy between 2 Samuel xxiv. t, and 1 Chronicles xxi. 1, where "the Lord" and "Satan" are used as convertible terms; also the God-and-devil-confounding system of sacrificial worship. What benevolent creator could enjoy or permit such wanton destruction of his creatures, over whom all his *tender mercies* extend? The horrid idea of hell naturally grew out of such an atrocious system. What *tender mercies* are over those condemned to, and created for, eternal agony? As Mr. Barlow says—"Are they not his creatures? If everlasting torments are the result of tender mercies, I should very much like to know what would be the result of deadly hatred?"

Some persons have been so rash as to suggest that *evil* is used by God for the purpose of producing greater good!—that he does evil that good may come! But what says St. Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, iii. 8, of those who slanderously affirmed that mere men like him said, "Let us do evil that good may come?"

"Whose damnation is just!"

And what fate can be too severe for those who blasphemously affirm it of the God they profess to adore?

What contradictions can be plainer than these? what more blasphemous against natural intelligence and truth—still more against our best criteria of virtue?

Of the terms of a contradiction one must necessarily be false, and any proposition involving a contradiction must as certainly be false also.

Moral Grandeur of Christianity.

THE subject advertised by Mr. S for discussion, on the 9th of December, 1866, was the "Moral Grandeur of Christianity." In the ten minutes allowed him the author of these fragments read the following:—

My stumbling-block to-night is a most important and vital one—it is the immoral tendency of Christianity.

Christianity tends to destroy man's interest in temporal and social improvement, by teaching him to sacrifice the real and tangible objects of action to the unsubstantial and visionary; by attracting his desires and diverting his efforts towards a distant and hypothetical world,

Col. iii. 2

instead of the practical one in which he finds himself, in which he feels, nevertheless, compelled to act, and to act against his Christian principles—to hate the world, all worldly advantage, and worldly wisdom, as being entirely antagonistic to his heavenly interest.

Christianity teaches that he should take no thought for the morrow, but let the morrow take thought for the things of itself

Mat. vi. 3d.

—a principle obviously fatal to all personal and social well-being, and all proper sense of the value of time.

It teaches that, in order to become a disciple of Jesus, a man must actually *hate* all that should be nearest and dearest to him, yea, and his own life also.

Luke xiv. 26

Fortunately, natural instinct and wordly policy compel him, on the contrary, to feel his best interest in fulfilling his duties to his fellow creatures and himself, in flatly contradicting his verbal creed by his daily and hourly acts. Yet Christians perceive not their inconsistency!

Christianity teaches that whatever crimes a man may commit he can wipe out all by *repenting afterwards!* instead of teaching that, in accordance with the established principle that every event is the inevitable result of its antecedents, every evil act brings necessarily its own retribution, and that its evil consequences can by no possibility be averted from the perpetrator.

Christianity teaches that, irrespective of individual merit, which it counts as *nil*, God will save whom he will, and damn whom he will,

Rom. ix. 18.; Eph. i. 4, 5.

and made his free selection before any men were born! that he *loved Jacob*, and *hated Esau!*

Rom. ix. 13

which is explained in Genesis by describing *Esau* as almost the only Bible character capable of frankly forgiving his worst enemy, and *Jacob* as a vile cheat and liar, who deliberately swindled his famishing and open-hearted brother, impudently deceived his dying father, for the purpose of doing his brother a mortal injury, and imposed faculties of their infants by thus impressing upon them the duty of lying to themselves in

the face of all experience, at an age when they are incapable of resisting or perceiving the moral poison thus instilled into them. Thus is falsehood deliberately inculcated by Christians upon their babies! and why? Transparently because they *feel* that contradictory absurdities cannot be accepted as true by cultivated minds accustomed to judge. Do they not thus tacitly, but clearly, acknowledge the weakness of their cause, when they dare not wait till it can be understood, to establish it like any *truth!*

All Christian virtue is, in any case, the result of a bribe—heaven, or done under the rod—hell. What a mean contrast to the noble principle (superior to any in the Bible) that virtue should be, and is, its own sole and ample reward!

Finally, Christianity calls that *true worldly wisdom* which produces the discoveries of science, which would elevate and improve the human race individually, socially, physically, intellectually, and morally, *worthless, foolish, enmity to God!*

1 Cor. i., ii., iii.; Ja, iv. 4

while Atheism makes its *summum bonum* to consist in the development and perfection of that very wisdom! How is this? Which is most moral?

I will now ask Mr. S—and others here, to consider for a minute what would be the probable results were all churches, priests, Bibles, and the ideas of God and the devil banished at once from the universe? Would fear of disease, of death, of social contempt and punishment, lines, imprisonment, and the gallows be one whit less efficacious *than now* in restraining the bad from injuring their neighbours? and would the respect, esteem, and love of society, and the obvious advantages of virtuous, upright conduct, be *legs powerful* incentives to the practice of the purest morality?

We cannot imagine it.

But if, on the other hand, all government and human laws were abolished, if there were no courts, no magistrates, no police, and all the doors of our penal establishments and gaols were thrown wide open, what would be the result? Who can doubt that our lives and property would not be worth a penny piece? We feel and know that all the priests and Bibles in the world would not have the smallest effect upon bad men, if there were no human laws and social penalties to restrain them. Robbery, rapine, and murder would soon reduce the world to a social chaos. I appeal to your consciences and common sense whether you are not satisfied of this. Then which system of the two is the true operative basis of our morality?

All sciences are based upon experience, and the nature of the objects to which they relate. There never can be any science of morals adapted to the wants of men, that is not founded in like manner upon human nature as developed and known by experience. We know that wise men who understand their own true interest require no heavens and no hells to make them moral and virtuous. We see, also, every day that bad men, ignorant of their best worldly advantage, can only be made harmless by the terrors of good laws well administered. They care not for God—they never think of him, or heaven, or hell, *when temptation arises*, though taught the whole fictitious system from their cradles. *What, then, is the use of religious systems if the good do not require, and the bad do not regard them?*—None whatever. But inasmuch as they are made the deceptive rule of conduct, to supersede and to withdraw attention from the only real efficacious basis of morality, they are absolutely and incalculably mischievous and destructive of virtue. This is shewn in the history of Christianity—"By their fruits ye shall know them." From what motive beside a religious one did men ever insanely and cruelly burn one another alive by hundreds of thousands? what beside religion has ever caused such bitter persecutions, wars, hatred, and all uncharitableness? "By their fruits ye shall know them."

Are not such fruits the natural consequences of such hateful, diabolical enunciations as the following?—

Mat. x. 21, 84-86—"And the brother shall deliver up the brother to death, and the father the child : and the children shall rise up against their parents, and cause them to be put to death. . . Think not that I am come to send peace on earth : I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law. And a man's foes shall be they of his own household." Also Luke xii. 51-58—" Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division : For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three. The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother in law against her daughter in law, and the daughter in law against her mother in law." Luke xiv. 26—"If any man come to me, and *hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple!*"

Can the atrocity and immorality of such sentiments and precepts be exceeded by anything in history? Scarcely even by the pious cruelty and holy vindictiveness with which they have been too literally carried into execution by Christians! "For *every tree is known by its fruits.*"

DIVES AND LAZARUS.

THE above subject was advertised for discussion on the 24th of March, 1867, and evoked the following remarks [Luke xvi. 19-31]:—

The parable of Dives and Lazarus is one upon which much stress has been laid, as furnishing more precise particulars than ordinary as to the post mortem conditions of men;—as shewing not only that men will be rewarded, or the reverse, according to their deeds, but that they will possess organised bodies susceptible of the same feelings and functions as on earth. They see and converse at a distance, besides feeling the burning of thirst as well as of fire.

It may certainly be said, that considering the semi-savage life led by Abraham in a country almost deprived of water, his bosom would most probably be well seasoned to both dirt and vermin, and would form but an indifferent and unattractive paradise unless to persons of such habits as those of Lazarus. Still as the customs of the Jews in the days of Jesus, were probably but little improved from what they were when their leprous tribe was expelled from Egypt, their ideas of a paradise would be likely to be incomplete without those two adjuncts.

I wish however to call attention to what I consider much more remarkable features in the parable. The first is, the characters of the persons. It is a salient fact that Dives is nowhere said to have been either good or bad. His morality we are left to infer from data which appear to be not inadequate. In the first place Lazarus was left at *his* gate. Now it is wholly contrary to experience and probability to suppose that this selection was made without reason. It is not at the gates of the penurious or the hardhearted that the poor and miserable ask to be laid, but rather at those of the most compassionate and generous. Nor is there a hint throughout, that the latter was not the character of Dives. It is not stated that Lazarus did not receive, not only the crumbs, but also a fair share of the bounty of Dives; and the circumstance that he was not taken elsewhere to seek more liberal benefactors makes it still more probable. Again, when Dives was informed that relief for himself was impossible, his thoughts with ready affectionate solicitude fled to those dear ones whom he left on earth. Forgetful of his own sufferings, his thought is only for his five brethren, and he begs that Lazarus may be sent at least to warn them to avoid a similar fate. Everything in fact is calculated to convey the impression that Dives was exceptionally virtuous and charitable, rather than the reverse.

On the other hand there is not a word to lead us to believe that Lazarus was virtuous, but rather the contrary. We hear not a word of *his adding his* request to that of Dives to be permitted to relieve his sufferings or to warn his brethren—not a word of sympathy, commiseration or gratitude. Though comfortably esconced in Abraham's bosom, he had not a thought to bestow upon the pitiable case of him whose gratuitous charity he had once been glad to implore, and accept.

But if there seems reason to suspect from negative evidence, that the change in their relative positions was not due to the difference between their moral characters, the positive proof of this is furnished by Abraham himself. In the 25th verse the mystery is explained without the slightest disguise. Dives was tormented, *not because* he was uncharitable, but because he was rich; and Lazarus was comforted *not because* he was virtuous, but *because* he was poor—he had received his evil things. And for corroboration of this view we are not restricted to this parable. The New Testament teems with texts to the same effect. The sermon on the mount promises heaven and happiness—*not* to the virtuous, but to the miserable.

Luke vi. 20

"Blessed are ye poor (not ye virtuous and charitable), for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are ye that weep, for ye shall laugh. But woe unto you that are rich (irrespective of virtue) *for ye have received your consolation.*"

The whole story is calculated to convey the impression, that physical compensation was to be made, wholly irrespective of moral conduct. And the natural consequences of these principles appears in Acts ii. 40-5, where it is reported that they that believed had all things common. They sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men. Again, in Acts iv. 32, "Neither said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. Hence we see that the true key to the whole is simply *communism*, and communism of the lowest type, the object being to take from the rich and transfer to the poor; which was always the principle of the Christian Church until it has succeeded in reversing its relative position. *Then*, however, history relates that, until its power was broken by the dissemination of knowledge and the progress of material civilisation, the Christian Church practised the very opposite rule of taking from the poor to increase their own excessive hoards. And by the text they were justified! But what awful blasphemy is involved in the deliberate attribution to an omnipotent God of Justice, that men are to be blessed or punished irrespective of their moral character! Well might Solomon exclaim, "Give me *neither poverty nor riches!*" if a slight tendency towards either must be compensated by an excessive and everlasting reverse! Altogether a more

immoral lesson was never taught, nor the distinction between virtue and vice, good and evil, more carefully ignored and annihilated.

There is, however, one other striking and instructive passage in this parable; one which exhibits such a gigantic stultification and absurdity, as to damn for ever the pretensions of the record to respect or credibility; still more to the character of inspiration. See the 31st verse—"And he said unto him, *If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead*" And this is put into the mouth of Jesus! One who, according to the Gospels, *specially came to rise from the dead for the particular purpose of convincing those who would not hear Moses and the prophets*, is here made *deliberately to assert the utter futility* of such a mission! If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead! The force of stultification and self-contradiction can no further go.

The Immortality of the Soul

ON another occasion, the date of which was not preserved, the advertised subject was the immortality of the soul, and evoked the following:—

The indisputable fact that in the writings attributed to Moses the doctrine of a future life for man is consistently ignored, has been more than once dwelt upon here; and it appeared to me to be spoken of as a surprising anomaly for which an explanation could not readily be found, and as evidence of the inferiority of Moses' dispensation, rather than as I am disposed to view it;—as stamping Moses as one of the shrewdest and most clear-sighted observers that ever existed. If an explanation was offered, it escaped my attention, perhaps from its appearing to me altogether inadequate.

Moses, as we were reminded, could not by any possibility have been ignorant of the doctrine of a future state which was propounded by, and perfectly familiar to, the Egyptians; *for Moses was learned in all the learning* of the Egyptians. The celebrated Bishop Warburton beside others is said to have exhausted the resources of learning in demonstrating the fact, as nearly as it admits of demonstration.

Now I think that the only consistent and reasonable explanation is this. Moses, having numerous opportunities of viewing and considering men and manners in various countries, and being peculiarly observant and reflective, felt that this doctrine of a future state possessed not the smallest power to affect the practical conduct of men—to make them better or to keep them from crime. He saw that men were incapable of being influenced by any other than direct proximate and physical causes; that, though they theoretically held and taught the doctrine of post mortem rewards and punishments, experience proved daily, that if it affected the conduct of any one, it certainly did not that of those who needed control; i.e. *criminals*; that the only effect produced on the otherwise harmless was to make them superstitious and uncharitable; that mundane punishments had far more real terrors than any imaginary hell,—and that the immediate urgent temptations of vanity, lust, cupidity, and revenge, entirely eclipsed the attractions of any hypothetical heaven.

Moses plainly perceiving this, wisely substituted temporal and immediate, for distant and fictitious rewards and punishments; and had he only consistently carried out his principle to its legitimate conclusions, he might have had the glory of laying a substantial foundation for a universal morality. Unfortunately however, he failed to perceive also that the visible presence of a magistrate or constable was incalculably more efficacious in preventing crime than the intangible notion of a never present God; that a human executioner was beyond computation more terrible than any pretended avenging angel; and that it was ridiculous to proclaim arbitrary laws as divine, which could be and were always violated more constantly and with greater impunity than those of man. He failed to see that virtue inevitably reaps its natural reward, and crime its appropriate punishment and degradation. In fact it is only modern aggregated experience that has taught us that no system of morality can be efficacious, that is based upon gratuitous assumptions, instead of experience and statistics. Unhappily, therefore, Moses only perpetuated the superstitious *unnatural* idea of a *supernatural* God, and a science of morality was indefinitely postponed. All honour however to Moses, for his one step in the right direction. His successors have neglected and suppressed his truth, and have only adopted his error; namely the subordination of experimental truth, to a prejudice in favor of a hypothetical system. Had he been as we all now ought to be, careful never presumptuously to assert without evidence, what the wisest of even our barbarous ancestors doubted;—had he regarded physical facts and experience, as more reliable data than superstitious traditions and imaginary existences, he would have found unnecessary in morality what Laplace found entirely superfluous in astronomy; and have seen that any true science of morality must be based solely on the nature of man and the physical conditions under which he exists.

The scientific facts,—that every event is the necessary consequence of its antecedents;—that in the universe *force* is unchangeable in quantity, and like matter can neither be created nor destroyed; but is constantly transferred from one form to another;—that no force of any kind can be exhibited or transmitted, that

is not derived;—that moral power is but the indirect operation of physical force;—and that all attraction and repulsion, whether moral or physical, necessarily act inversely as the square of the distance, whether in time or space;—must, as soon as they are popularly recognised as certain, which is now merely a question of time, cause a complete revolution in moral systems. The silly because contradictory doctrines of original sin, freewill, and life after death, will then be entirely exploded, and moral responsibility will be defined and enforced as amenability to punishment at the hands of nature and society only. The factitious human ideas of blame and sin, those unique sources of hatred and all uncharitableness, will be abolished with the mythical devil and all his works. When imagination is subordinated as it should be to reason—when contradictions are consistently rejected as absurd, and consequently the *super-natural* is relinquished as *un-natural* and *impossible in nature*;— then it will be perceived that man has been blindly inventing instruments of torture for himself, by substituting the visionary for the practical, the distant for the present, the dreams of fancy for the facts of experience. When antiquated ignorance shall have succumbed to progressive science, when this beautiful pregnant world shall engross the admiration and the love which have hitherto been squandered on the barbarous past and an imaginary future, when man shall have learned to perform that duty to himself and to his neighbour, which formerly he literally sacrificed to the phantasms of his terrified imagination, then shall be realised that happiness and virtue which has hitherto been only faintly shadowed forth in incoherent visions; as in the Elysium of the Pagans, the Millennium of the Christians, the Paradise of the Mahometans, and the Utopias of isolated philosophers.

The particular theory which I now propose to notice, is that Christ *first* brought *immortality to light*, that man naturally is not immortal, and that but for Christ, death would still be really death.

This theory has been advanced and advocated by the celebrated Dr. H. T. Dodwell, Bishop Courtenay, and many others.

Now setting aside for a moment the fact that nothing at all has really been *brought to light* on the subject, (for we are notoriously as much *in the dark* about it as ever), how could it have *first* been brought to light *by Christ*, if the Egyptians, and in fact, according to this theory, "*all policied nations*," had always been cognisant of it *before his time*? And if granting for the sake of argument merely that Christ *did first* introduce it; then the Egyptians and others actually held and taught it, when there was really nothing of the kind; and it is therefore clear that the most plausible argument for a belief in a future life, is thereby proved conclusively to be fallacious; namely, the general hope, opinion, and consent of men; for if they hoped and believed it, as supposed, when it was really false, and in the face of facts; the general hope, belief, and consent of men cannot constitute a valid argument for it under any circumstances, and for a reasonable ground for this belief dependence must be placed on other arguments.

Some may say that they rely on Scripture to prove that *Christ overcame death*. But I call the gospels to witness that *Christ died!* that therefore *death overcame him* most unequivocally. If it be said that Christ rose from the dead, he at best scarcely retrieved his former relative position; but I maintain that we have not the evidence of a *single disinterested* or indeed of *any* witness to the fact; that the accounts of the *interested* (so-called) witnesses contradict each other flatly in important particulars, and it should be evident from *them* to an impartial critic, that the disciples' opinion that they saw him afterwards was entirely an afterthought. For example, the two who went to Emmaus with a third person with whom they walked and talked much,—*said* that they never imagined that he was Jesus until the moment when *they lost sight of him*, and verification became impossible! They even acknowledge to *persuading* each other afterwards that it was Jesus.

But the most astounding assertion that Christ thus achieved a similar resurrection for all men, should need no refutation. For not a single man or woman has since that time given the smallest color to it by likewise rising; all lie in their graves as dead, as silent, as motionless and as *soulless* as they did for centuries before Christ died if he ever lived. Death's universal empire is as incontestible as ever.

Christ in the Sepulchre.

OUR subject to-night (5th May, 1867), is "Christ in the Sepulchre," and particularly the credibility of the stories in the various gospels of the circumstances connected with his being there.

Now from the distance of time—the absolute silence of all contemporary history—and the fact that Christians claim that all things extraordinary or improbable are easily accounted for by the theory of almighty power exerted in miracles, many things which a reasonable impartial man must consider impossible and absurd, cannot be disproved, simply for want of any evidence. The common-sense view that improbable tales which contradict all our experience, ought not to be accepted on mere assertion—although it may be conclusive to the unbiassed critic—cannot be expected to have its proper weight with persons who postulate the possibility of miracles, and for whose insatiable credulity no absurdity is too gigantic—who are determined that if their faith

cannot really remove mountains, as promised them by Jesus Christ, no mountain, however huge, of logical inconsistency shall for a moment stand in their way. But there is one way of conclusively testing improbable stories, and in most cases of convicting them, if false, accordingly. If they are obnoxious to my criterion, their condemnation cannot be evaded. Both the terms of a simple positive contradiction cannot possibly be true; one must be absolutely false. Even if the pious Christian fathers,—when they burned all the books against their religion, that they found and that they could not answer, had had the sense to burn those attributed to Mark, Luke, and John, still Matthew's gospel itself without them contains ample materials to prove itself utterly unworthy of credit or respect—that many of the statements it contains are absolutely false.

For above reasons I shall do no more than allude to the absurdity of introducing a cock to crow to Peter at a time when the Jewish law forbade that any cocks should remain in Jerusalem—similar in kind to that of two devils entering into 2000 swine in a country where pork was not eaten, and consequently it was absurd to suppose that anyone could or would keep them. The more relevant fact that though the penalty was no less than death for violating the Sabbath, Joseph of Arimathea took Jesus's body and put it in the sepulchre *after the even* which formed the commencement of the Sabbath *was come*:—and the chief priests, though such ultra-ritualists, made the sepulchre sure, sealed the stone and set the watch, *upon the Sabbath*—for such a violation of which the penalty was death—though these things are utterly incredible and preposterous, still I admit that neither is absolutely impossible, and the contrary cannot be proved. I must however call attention to the manner in which Mat. xxvii. 62, transparently evades saying that it was the Sabbath. "Now the next day, *that followed the day of the preparation*," the chief priests went to Pilate to ask for the watch.—Why not say distinctly "the Sabbath," as it was? The writer or interpolator of these verses assuredly was no Jew; nor was he honest.

I however intend to rely solely upon absolute flat contradictions, simply because Mr. S——himself clearly acknowledged the principle that both terms of a contradiction cannot be true—in admitting that there must be an error in 2 Chron. xxi., xxii., where Ahaziah is twice stated to have been two years older than his father. I reminded him of his inconsistency—I pointed out that he was playing fast and loose with the infallible word of his God and also with his own principles—that there is no greater miracle in a man being two years older than his father than in three and one being the same—feeding 5000 men with five loaves and two fishes—or rising from the dead. Mr. S——then proved that he had really no faith whatever—not even as a grain of mustard seed—to move his mountain; and the consequence is, he is now bound in common consistency, to acknowledge the equal impossibility of reconciling the following directly opposed statements:—

Matthew, Mark, and Luke place the last supper and the passover on Thursday.—John says the last supper was on Friday—the passover on the Sabbath, Saturday.

It is repeatedly stated that Jesus said he would rise again *after three days*.—But Matthew [xii. 40,] makes Christ himself say clearly, "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, so shall the Son of man be *three days and three nights* in the heart of the earth."

Yet this same Matthew [xxvii. 57], says that *the even was come* before Joseph came to beg the body. It was *already the Sabbath*—which began at *sunset on Friday*; and *ended*—when? Observe—this supposed Jew—Matthew—here shows his complete ignorance of the most popular of Jewish customs. He was actually ignorant that the Sabbath terminated at sunset on Saturday, for he says, "In the *end of the Sabbath, as it began to damn toward* the first day of the week," (thus clearly reckoning the Sabbath as ending at sunrise on Sunday!) the resurrection was complete, and still more so therefore was the clear contradiction. For thus the Sabbath was *not yet over*; and by Matthew's reckoning he had therefore *not been ONE CLEAR DAY* in the sepulchre! by the Jewish computation he was there only *ONE DAY and part of another!* and by ours he was there no more than *ONE DAY and TWO NIGHTS!* The solemn assertion therefore of Jesus per Matthew that he would be there *THREE DAYS AND THREE NIGHTS* is proved absolutely false by Matthew himself!!!

In Mat. xxviii. 10, and Mark xiv. 28, xvi. 7, the disciples are told to go to Galilee where they shall see Jesus.—But according to Luke xxiv. 49, and Acts i. 4, they were told to tarry at Jerusalem until endued with power from on high—*Jesus then leads them to Bethany and ascends*.

Mat. xxvii. 32, Mark xv. 21, and Luke xxiii. 20, make Simon a Cyrenian carry the cross. John xix. 17, specially says *that Jesus carried it himself*.

Luke xxiii. 43, states that Jesus said to the thief—"TO-DAY shalt thou be *with me in Paradise*."

John xx. 17, has "Jesus saith" (the *second day* after) "*touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my Father!*" But, entirely inconsistent with this injunction *not to touch him*, Matthew xxviii. 9, says—"And they came and *held him by the feet* and worshipped him!" The second passage being utterly stultified by the first and third. Mat. xxvii. 44, and Mark xv. 82, state that both thieves *reviled Jesus*. Luke says *one did and that the other did not*. [John xviii. 81]. The Jews therefore said unto Pilate, "It is *not lawful* for us to put *anyone to death*. Yet in Acts vii. 58, 9, there is no difficulty whatever *made about putting Stephen to death*."

Mat. xxviii. 8, 5, states that Judas returned the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and went and hanged himself, and (v. 7) that the *priests* purchased the potters' field *with them*. But Acts i. 18, says that *Judas*

himself bought the field *with the reward of iniquity*—and falling headlong he burst asunder in the midst, and all his bowels gushed out!

In suggesting that Judas may have managed to hang himself after such a singular catastrophe I come to the assistance of Mr. S——; because for the sake of his own consistency, I do not desire to hear him admit an error in the book which cannot err. For that would prove that his faith is nil—no greater than mine! it wholly fails him as soon as put to the test.—He says he goes by the book. Let him do so—I hope to hear him flatly deny that there is any inconsistency or impossibility whatever either in these texts, or in those that state that Ahaziah was two years older than his father. There is only the same objection to that, that there is to the others, or to any miracles;—that they are simply impossible. But yet, if all things are possible with God—if he be really omnipotent—that of course goes for nothing. It would give him no more trouble to make a man two years older than his father, than to keep a man three days alive in a fish's belly, to turn water into wine, or to rise from the dead. But if Mr. S——admits that the Holy Spirit made a mistake respecting Ahaziah's age, Judas's death, or Jesus's solemn assertion, neither his book nor his faith are entitled to any credit whatever—both are utterly worthless and absurd. Still I confess after helping Mr. S——to the explanation that Judas might have hung himself after all his bowels gushed out, I see no way of getting over the statements that both he and the chief priests bought the field with the same money, the reward of iniquity, which is specially asserted. That could scarcely be even if it were supposable that he bought it, or afterwards stole the money from them, for the reward of iniquity would then have been in the potter's hands, not in his.

Luke xxiv. makes the ascension take place apparently on the day of resurrection, after appearances at the sepulchre, going to Emmaus—in Jerusalem—and leading the' disciples to Bethany.

Acts i. 8, makes him seen for forty days by the disciples—1 Corinthians xv. G, by 500 brethren at once. John relates appearances at Jerusalem—one after eight days—and at the Sea of Tiberias—but he specially states the last appearance he mentions to be the third, (xxi. 14.)

Mark xvi. details the reappearances as three,—Mat. xxviii. 1-17, says that an angel (not Jesus) appeared at the sepulchre to the women only; who were directed to tell his disciples to go to Galilee to meet *him, which he says they did*.

Now I have limited myself to a few contradictions in matters of fact, because they admit of no differences of opinion, as must be the case with matters of doctrine, or a relation of circumstances which are merely inexplicable, improbable, or apparently impossible.—It may be said that *any schoolboy* might furnish an explanation of them.

This had been said by one of the speakers.

—That reminds me of a retort I once received thirty years since from an aboriginal Australian lad to whom I said, when he shewed me something he had done, that a child could do that. "Yes," he said to me, "a child can do that, but you can't," which I found to be true. And it has been found that neither schoolboys nor scholars have ever been able to give any truthful color to these things, or any explanation of them, except one.—That the whole story is a fabrication, whether from good or bad motives. Experience has proved that the human mind, when credulity is regarded as a theological virtue instead of an intellectual vice, when degraded by superstition, or when only too prone to dwell upon its own imaginations and visions, generally religious, though sometimes not; the human mind I say, knows no limit to its own extravagancies, though still ready enough to distinguish those of others.

If it was the fact that the world was at first in a perfectly civilised condition and that its progress was continually towards savagery—there would be some reason in feeling and exhibiting the greatest respect for the opinions of our remote predecessors, and in endeavoring to stay the rapid descent into the gulph of barbarism, by mutual appeals to emulate the wisdom and virtues of our primitive ancestors.—But we know to the contrary! we know that improvement has been inversely as the square of the distance in past time. We know that if our physical progress has been great, that our moral advancement has been infinitely more marvellous. We know from the writings of the holy fathers of the church and early Christian writers, that they thought it virtuous to encourage pious frauds,—that they thought there was no harm in lying. Falsehood for the good of their superstition was as a sweet smelling savour in the nostrils of their anthropomorphical Deity, and thus they came to erect into a virtue the credulous faith necessary to believe their grotesque fables. In short they were woefully ignorant, and therefore extravagantly superstitious.—If the first germs of a purer morality occasionally shewed themselves, they were not and could not be comprehended in an age so ignorant and barbarous. But that the Anglo-Saxon race, with some pretensions to scientific knowledge, should still in this nineteenth century, respect and adopt the besotted and self-contradictory dreams and absurdities of one of the most degraded tribes that earth ever produced, does seem the very depth of debasement. What blind infatuation! to base our moral and religious system on that of a people whose savage ancestors were, according to their own records, peculiarly tainted with the vilest of all crimes.—Their very patriarchs, princes and patterns were principally noted for lying, cheating, adultery, robbery, murder, and above all *human sacrifice*.—Even to this day the

memory of Abraham is actually peculiarly revered for his villainous readiness to sacrifice his own son to his diabolical superstition! It has been suggested that the story may be interpreted differently—that Abraham revolted against, and tried to abolish the abominable practice of child sacrifice among his Syrian neighbours. But if so, the Jews were too stupid to understand it thus; and Christians have only made the matter infinitely worse, by impiously asserting that their god is actually guilty of the same crime!

Free Agency.

THE subject advertised by Mr. S—to be discussed on Sunday, the 21st of June, 1868, was Free Agency; and the writer hereof, having undertaken on the previous Sunday evening to show the absolute incompatibility of Free Agency with Moral Responsibility, read nearly the following words; almost double the usual time having been accorded to him for the purpose, by a stretch of courtesy on the part of Mr. S—and the meeting:—

"For *it is God* which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure. [Phil. ii. 18]:—

A more emphatic and distinct contradiction than is expressed in this verse, of the whole theory of freewill, can scarcely be conveyed by words. The real responsibility for all human acts good and bad, is here clearly laid upon God. For if it be attempted to evade this conclusion by alleging that the words were addressed to a class or number of persons limited in number and exceptional in virtue;—it is still as obvious that it is thereby implied that others, wanting in that virtue, were so solely for want of the requisite operation of God in them in their original construction if not after. But as Paul, with ordinary theological inconsistency, flatly contradicts here the basis of the Christian and every other religion, and as he constantly furnishes authorities for various Christian sects mutually to refute and condemn each other, I shall turn to the logical aspect of the matter, and be satisfied with showing the radical inconsistency and absurdity of the freewill doctrine in itself.

I believe that to Mr. Buckle belongs the credit of having first indicated the intimate relationship that subsists between the doctrine of freewill, and the superficial notion of chance; and between the doctrine of predestination, and the empirical conviction of the necessary sequence of natural phenomena. Freewill is simply chance personified; and predestination is the personification and deification of causation. Chance and freewill both imply that some events are not the necessary results of their antecedents; that is that they are uncaused. This is of course utterly irreconcilable with the indisputable axiom that *every thing must* have a cause. Fatalism and predestination on the contrary, both imply that some future event, no matter how presumed or inferred, *must happen*, whatever may be done to prevent or avert it. This also clearly involves a glaring absurdity; namely, that the present is determined, not by the past, but by the future; the antecedent by its consequent; which is equivalent to reversing the relations of cause and effect as completely as the dogma of freewill ignores or denies them.

The necessitarian doctrine, on the other hand, assumes no more than facts prove,—that under like conditions, like effects must follow; and that under any given conditions, alternatives are really impossible. It is as absolutely impossible under any given conditions that any other result *can* follow than that which actually *does* follow, as that *both* of two incompatible results can follow.

For as Hobbes has well proved, *any sufficient* cause *must* be also a *necessary* cause. "I hold that to be a *sufficient* cause, to which nothing is wanting to the producing of the *effect*. The same also is a *necessary* cause. For if it be possible that a *sufficient* cause shall not bring forth the *effect*, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the *cause* was *not sufficient*; but if it be impossible that a *sufficient* cause should not produce the *effect*, then is a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause, for that is said to produce an effect *necessarily* that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest that whatsoever is produced, is produced *necessarily*; for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also, *voluntary* actions are necessitated. Lastly, that ordinary *definition* of a *free agent*, namely, *that a free agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it*, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be *sufficient*, that is to say *necessary*, and yet the *effect* shall not follow."—Hobbes' Works, vol. iv., p. 274.

The necessitarian holds that the future results of present conditions, though necessitated, can only be inferred, in so far as those conditions resemble others previously experienced. Under new conditions, therefore, we cannot predict the results; and the supposed perfect foreknowledge of God which is not pretended to have been acquired by experience, has therefore no cause—no basis, and is merely something magical, and naturally impossible. Were it however real and absolutely certain, the course of *events* must obviously be so too; all man's actions and thoughts must necessarily be pre-determined also, and man of course could not be responsible for either. Any attempt to hold him responsible would be the depth of injustice. I am to shew that responsibility is as impossible under the freewill theory as under that of predestination.

To enable you to look at the question from a new standpoint, I will ask each of you to imagine himself for once in the position of a creator. This should give every advantage to the theological position, for as a creator you would be likely to exact more than as a creature you might like to concede. But there is also a natural diffidence or reserve experienced in judging of the relations of creatures to a creator when viewed from the standing of the former, which fetters, intimidates, and therefore incapacitates the reason more or less, for impartial judgment. We shall for every reason I think make a fairer estimate of those relations by regarding the subject from the supposed creator's level, or any other rather than from the more common one of the creature. But my arguments against freewill are as strong and valid with respect to any possible creator, and even viewed from the creature's standpoint. It is mere evasion to say we are not, and cannot place ourselves, in a position to judge of our Creator. In *one* important sense, certainly, we cannot, and do not. If the creator were producible, together with proof that we are his creatures, we should have something tangible to go upon and criticise, though there might then be really some presumption in doing so. But as it is we have absolutely nothing beyond *human ideas* of a creator and creations to deal with; and *human ideas*, are of all things, the most eligible and profitable for human criticism. For thus knowledge is best gained and corrected. It cannot be shewn that we have anything more—any farther basis for the argument—than human ideas; my argument is, in fact, a challenge for the production of anything farther; because, failing its production, the mere assertion upon no other evidence of a creator and a creation, is entirely gratuitous, baseless, and therefore in contempt of veracity.

Well, suppose you have created your creature and endowed him with perfect freewill. Then in whatever circumstances you place your free creature,—on what principle of justice can you possibly *blame* him for acting in *any conceivable* manner? *The freedom you give him is his entire justification.* DESTROY THAT FREEDOM by ever so slight a tendency or inducement one way or another,—by precept, by command, by promise of reward or threat of punishment,—and however slight the influence so produced, it *must necessarily* operate and determine, in the absence, as supposed at first, of any counteracting tendency or power. For any power of resisting such influence must have a cause, which by the freedom from predisposition you conferred, you precluded from arising in himself. Every motive tends to determine. Freedom is the absence of determining motive; and therefore every motive, influencing or resisting, *must destroy freedom.* And every motive, influencing or resisting, must have a cause; and any obstacle to the operation of a good influence sufficient to prevent its dominance, must be a prior, stronger evil tendency; which must result either from a defect in the original constitution or in the materials of which it was formed. But in neither case can the defect be chargeable upon the creature, by any principle of justice; but obviously upon the ignorance, incompetence, or deliberate intention of yourself as creator, in selecting or manipulating your materials. Clearly as creator, you must be responsible for any original tendency in your creature towards good, or towards evil; as well as for the circumstances in which you place him, and also for any susceptibility in him to be influenced by them. If you give him an evil constitution and associations, you can easily predict a corresponding result. Make him good, and he cannot become bad; unless subjected to subsequent influences so bad as to overpower his goodness.

Observe,—that as regards your responsibility, it makes no difference whether you are an omniscient creator or not. If . you are, you are of course the absolute sole cause of the results whatever they may be. But if not, and you in ignorance of possible consequences, take upon yourself to create creatures, you are no less the sole cause of, and therefore quite as much responsible for, all the evil that may ensue.

Now as regards man. He is susceptible to innumerable influences, from, and *even before* his birth, as to which he has no control, or option whatever, but which absolutely determine his. fate. And observe—that any one of these influences **MUST DESTROY** his freedom; for each, when present, **MUST** infallibly sway him entirely, unless counteracted by a stronger one, whencesoever derived.

It has been, and may be contended, that man's freedom consists in the power of choosing by which of two equal influences he shall be swayed. Allow them to be equal; and if he then choose either, he must do so without any reason, or motive, or cause. If there be a reason, or cause in himself at all, it constitutes necessarily a predisposition, which was excluded by the premisses. But *suppose* such a power of choice to exist;—is it good or bad? Surely that must depend wholly on the badness or goodness of the being in which it exists; for power is but a latent quality, the activity of which constitutes the being in which it exists, good or bad, according to the results. If this power be indifferent, it can neither be good nor bad; therefore not moral, and responsibility is impossible. If responsibility is, or can be obligatory, freedom from obligation of whatever kind, must be irresponsibility. A *free will* then *means simply an irresponsible will*, and *freedom, is essentially, irresponsibility.* But say that the man or his will determines his choice to good or bad. If he be free, surely he is free to choose one as much as the other, and *his freedom is his full justification.* If not free, surely it must then be because he is *subject* to some influence either good or bad; but in either case he is only the *subject*; for anything which excites or influences him to act destroys his freedom. To call a man *free*, is then simply to call him—not only neither good nor bad, i.e. meritorious or the contrary—but *incapable of being either, until he lose that freedom.* But we feel and know that *men are really and intrinsically good or bad*—moral beings in

fact; but they are and can be such, in so far only as they are freely susceptible to good or bad influences, and as they are not free to select them.

What does the strikingly pregnant word CHARACTER mean? If not the *inherent moral constitution of a man which determines the quality of his actions, and in conformity with which he necessarily acts in a way absolutely incompatible with the supposition that he is free to act otherwise*? The word character has absolutely no meaning or significance whatever, under any other theory. How could we ever distinguish, and what essential difference would there be, between a good and a bad man, if either were free to be the other? Free, not only to *do as he liked*, but to *like to do* good or bad acts, indiscriminately or by chance, or otherwise than as his natural constitution may determine? What is education, business, daily life, argument, but discerning the motives or influences which move other men, and furnishing fresh ones to induce them to act as we desire? And what is our desire? Can we *choose* our desires? If we could, action would be superfluous. Can we choose not to thirst, when dry? Not to hunger when fasting? Can we, by *choosing*, be rich or learned, when we are the contrary? Who would not be both, if *choosing* would do it? And who would not cease to desire, what when unattainable, makes the heart sick to yearn for,—*if he could*? Can we *by choice* or *at will*, NOT desire to be rich or wise, when we are satisfied of the solid advantages of riches and wisdom? Can we *by choice*, be careless of the good opinion of others, and of the advantages of upright conduct, when experience has proved to us their superlative value? Then what *merit* is there in being virtuous? Can a poor wretch, ignorant of those advantages, *choose* to be so wise as to see what his experience never plainly taught him—that honesty is the best policy, and that lying and cheating are a most self-destructive policy? Then how can we justly *blame* him for dishonesty? Can Mr. S—*at will* believe in Atheism? He may say that he can, *if he likes*. But *can he like*, at will? No more than I can believe in the Bible, which I long tried hard to do. Can either of us, *at will*, *believe* or *like*, otherwise than as we *do* believe and like? We can do whatever is within our power, IF WE LIKE and WILL; but we have clearly NO CHOICE whatever as to WHAT *we shall will or like*. Allow the strongest and most universal of reasons to exist—and *no one can believe what appears to him, to be untrue, or disbelieve that which appears true*. Were Mr. S—to get £10,000 a year for it, he could not believe that I am now standing on my head, nor for ten times that amount can I believe that any proposition which is self-contradictory can be true; or that to evade or shelve the difficulty by calling it a *mystery*, is not a miserable evasion, and a cowardly abdication of reason, in fact the rankest infidelity! For CONSISTENCY is the only means attainable among men whereby they may be saved—from falsehood and error; and nothing can be more radically inconsistent and contradictory than the dogma of freewill, or the best human conception of a Deity. But plainly it would be simply iniquitous to punish or to hold responsible any man for his belief; which must depend upon the amount and nature of the evidence, and the *natural capacity* for apprehending it, which no one has within his choice; and therefore no one can deserve the slightest credit or discredit, praise or blame, for believing or disbelieving anything whatever.

But morality means manners, not belief; and moral responsibility therefore relates to actions solely, and not opinions. Man is obviously not responsible for the amount of knowledge he possesses, which is the basis of his opinions; for notoriously *every man would if he could, know everything*. He may take greater or less pains to get knowledge according to the natural strength or weakness of his desire for it, (which he cannot choose); he may apply it to good or to bad purposes, according to the goodness or badness of his natural constitution, and of his education and experience; but nothing is more certain than that he would, *if he could, know everything*. Man is also morally responsible exactly in proportion to his knowledge, and physically responsible to the extent of his power of action, and of his liability to the consequences of his acts. But his responsibility extends no farther. Were he a free agent, as far as words have any meaning, he could not be responsible at all;—for his acts being on that theory *uncaused*, or the result of chance, reward and punishment could have no useful, uniform, or certain effect upon him; and responsibility, if nominally supposed, could not be enforced, and therefore could not practically exist. But though reward and punishment on the theory of freewill, are absolutely useless and absurd, on that of necessity their efficacy must be both proper and necessary; and greater or less according to circumstances. Every event being the necessary result of its antecedents, reward and punishment MUST affect future events, as part of their antecedents. But if man were free, and his acts not necessary consequences of their antecedents, reward and punishment would no longer be such, as they would bear no relation to their antecedents or consequences; and for this reason while men believe in freewill, they are and must be deprived of the benefit of much of the salutary effect which reward and punishment would otherwise produce.

Whence then arose this senseless doctrine? Apparently it was an invention of pious intolerance, in order to, provide a reason for hating and persecuting people of a different opinion. Blame is simply the imputation of wickedness, and the expression of hatred and all uncharitableness, for it proceeds upon the gratuitous supposition that under the same conditions we *can* act otherwise than as we do; but it is entirely inapplicable on the necessitarian principle. Men's actions being necessary effects of causes which they cannot select, all blame and hate are improper, unjust, and pernicious. But the inconsistency, and therefore absurdity of the doctrine of

freewill is obvious, as soon as it is perceived to be identical with that of chance; for with as good reason might a man blame a pair of dice, as his neighbour, for acts produced by an illimitable chain of occult causes. But no one is so foolish as to suppose that the sides of dice turn up without adequate causes, though we may be unable to trace the links of the chain; and the causes of man's acts are just so much more difficult to trace, as he is a more complex being than a die. Load the die—weight one side, no matter which, more than the other, and you give a tendency which makes it necessarily preponderate like a motive in a man, and you can foretell the result, as you can a man's act; but only by destroying the so-called freedom of each: which is obviously only imaginary and assumed for convenience in both cases. But theologians arbitrarily isolate man from nature, and gratuitously assert that he is the sole initial cause of his acts; endeavouring by this specious but contradictory device to relieve their imaginary creator from the imputation of causing the evil done by man, whom they still call the work of his hands. They are too blinded by piety and habit to see, that if God be omniscient as they assert, he *must have foreknown* the evil to be produced by his handiwork; and thus consciously caused it, though being omnipotent, he of course needed not to do so to accomplish any of his purposes. Their own success in governing man is ample proof that through man's ignorance and credulity he is easily influenced to suit their purposes, and that his asserted freedom is wholly powerless to resist.

They have however only removed the difficulty, if at all, a single step; for if it be possible that man's acts are caused by himself, and not by antecedent circumstances entirely beyond his control, most assuredly *he* is not caused by himself, and (theologians insist, when it seems to suit them, that he was made by God; thus completing the chain of causation and responsibility, which they fancy they can break by merely disconnecting parts of the same proposition. They have thus gratuitously invented an unhappy pretext for introducing into the world all that intolerant hatred, which has deluged it with more spitefulness and blood than any other cause ever did. But on the principle, of the necessity of human actions, all hatred and uncharitable imputation of wickedness would be abolished. No room would be left for them, for each man being simply a medium for the transmission of communicated force, no one would be blameable. Punishments would still be necessary, and more useful; more effective, because better understood, introducing fresh circumstances to influence men for good; teaching practically to offenders the evil consequences of bad acts; deterring hesitating possible criminals from a career of vice; and protecting the good from the depredations of the bad; in the same way that nature, *which never blames*, never fails to punish for any disregard of her penalties.

Mr. S——often asserts with the Bible that God is a free being, and at other times, on the same authority, that he is not. He says that it is *impossible* for God to lie, or sin. If so—if he be *incapable* of evil, he deserves no credit, and cannot be called virtuous, for doing good. If he were necessarily and uniformly good, though he could not be called free, we should at least know what to expect from him, and what to do to please him. But the assertion of God's freedom is equivalent, as in the case of man, to a denial that he is a moral being, or capable of good or evil—that we can even guess what he might do or require at any moment. Thus, however derogatory to, or irreconcilable with the idea of a God some persons may deem the necessitarian system, the freewill theory is certainly as much, or more so, and destructive of it altogether. For if God be *free*, his acts must be uncaused, and it must be exactly an equal chance whether any act of his be good or bad. The utter irreconcilability of the doctrine of freewill in man, with that of fore-knowledge in God is so obvious in itself, and has been demonstrated so clearly by Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Dr. Priestley, that it is unnecessary for me to do more here than refer those who fail to recognise it, to those writers.

From some confusion of ideas, or inattention to the subject, necessitarian principles are too commonly regarded as equivalent to fatalism. But they are really as distinct from fatalism as from freewill and chance, which are nearly synonymous. The necessitarian recognises the inevitable operation of every cause or force. The fatalist denies or ignores that of all but those which predominate in his diseased imagination. The necessitarian confesses his ignorance of the future result, but ceases not to endeavor to modify it, confident in the certain effect, more or less, of every attempt to do so. The fatalist on the contrary assumes an imagined future result to be as absolutely certain as the past, while ignorant that the slightest effort of himself or others to effect it, must be followed by necessary, though while future, unknown consequences. Thus while activity is the product of necessitarian principles, apathy or paralysis is the essential condition of the fatalist. The necessitarian finds by experience that like causes are always followed by like effects: that a consequent can have no causal influence over its antecedent; in fact, that causes are antecedent, and effects consequent. The fatalist asserts that the present is governed by the future—the antecedent by the consequent—the cause by the effect; which carried one step farther means that effects cause their causes, and that causes are consequences of their effects! Let not then my necessitarian doctrine be confounded with such a ridiculous absurdity, to which it is so entirely antagonistic. I may here say that it should be clear that pre-destination, or even only fore-knowledge on the part of God, is and can be nothing more nor less than blind fatalism personified; for both essentially imply that a merely assumed future event must inevitably take place, whatever be done to prevent it; the direct effect of the personification of fatalism as God, being to make it the conscious, and therefore

malevolent author of all evil. The blasphemy thus essentially involved in Christian dogmas is commensurate with their inconsistency.

But I think that a little attentive study of physiology furnishes the most concentrated practical proof of the impossibility of freewill. It has been demonstrated by experiment that for every nerve of so-called voluntary motion, there is a distinct corresponding nerve of sensation; and these nerves of sensation form the sufficient media by which motor nerves are brought into a state of activity. External impressions thus form perfectly adequate causes of all nervous action; and to suppose that what is called man's *will* creates nervous force exclusive of that produced through his nerves of sensation, is to suppose two adequate causes of the same effect; than which nothing could be more absurd.

Addenda.

The only plausible objections made to the foregoing were that I had omitted to consider, firstly, man in his twofold nature : and secondly contingent events; cases in which it was contended that man's will was really free.

As to man's twofold nature, I think those who gratuitously assert it should prove it to be a fact, before they quote it as proving anything else. Such a doctrine would be as destructive of moral responsibility as pre-destination or freewill. Responsibility essentially depends upon the absolute unity and singleness of the subject. Paul certainly, but in appearance inadvertently, let fall an expression (Rom. vii. 19, 20) by which he might seem to countenance such an opinion. "The evil which I would not that I do. Now if I do that I would not, *it is no more I that do it*, but sin that dwelleth in me." But what is this but an overt, not to say impudent attempt to evade all responsibility entirely? He lays the blame not on himself, but, on sin; and he says in the 28th verse, that no one can deliver *him* from this sin but Jesus Christ. Sin, however was obviously nothing but the quality, real or supposed, of his act; and if for that he was not responsible, who else could be so, unless either Jesus in not delivering him from sin (as he says he only could), or God—who he says in my text works in us *both to will and to do* of his good pleasure? Paul constantly got into this dilemma, and seemed to fancy that he could get out of it by simply avoiding the consideration of both the horns of it at once. In any view the passage is nonsense. But a man who in any *court of JUSTICE* should plead that an offence with which he might be charged was due to his "second nature," would be treated as a rogue rather than a fool, and very properly too. Such a method of trifling with the basis of moral responsibility would be too dangerous to society to be tolerated for a moment in any practical matter; and never was considered admissible except in theology and in metaphysics, which Hobbes has well described as that wherein a man may contradict himself without perceiving it. Those who assume a dual nature in man can scarcely appreciate or perceive the pernicious consequences, any more than they do the gross inconsistency into which the exigencies of a defective argument betray them.

As to *contingent events*, it should be clear that those two words are improperly connected. *Events* cannot be contingent in themselves, and are only said to be so, in relation to our ignorance of their causes, in the future or the past. A future event can only be said to be contingent upon one or other of two doubtful, because unknown, alternatives. If we are ignorant of certain causes, it is not wonderful that we should not foreknow the effects, which are to us therefore, and therefore only, contingent. If all antecedent conditions are known, contingency is excluded. To adduce contingency as an argument for freewill is merely to beg the question; for both are equally antagonistic to the absolute uniformity with which effects follow causes, without which experience and knowledge would be impossible.

A common and at first sight plausible argument against the adoption of the necessitarian, or any theory of the will different from the popular one, is that necessitarians and libertarians both sow in order to reap, and send for a doctor when sick; and that as both thus *act* alike, the particular theoretical principle upon which they act can be of no essential importance. And this is true as regards acts which regard *self* only, for which natural instinct is generally an ample guide irrespective of speculative principles. But in our *social* conduct when we judge others by our experience and knowledge epitomised in principles, the case is altogether different. For evidently the libertarian's principles compel him to blame (which is equivalent to hate) those who offend or differ from him; whereas the necessitarian acquits, and simply desires to instruct and furnish superior motives to those whose conduct he disapproves.—Thus it is obvious that their social conduct will be essentially different, and that the one will be intolerant, and therefore immoral, while the other will or should be tolerant and therefore moral. The question thus, instead of being, as it is too commonly supposed, one of mere theoretical speculation, becomes one of universal and the very highest practical importance, and cannot be too earnestly investigated or too widely discussed.

It may be desirable to explain that I have used the word *blame* as imputing *voluntary badness*, and the word *praise*, *voluntary goodness*, as they are never applied except to supposed free agents. The imputation of

voluntary goodness or badness, is, of course, baseless on the necessitarian theory. Hobbes certainly says, that to praise a thing is only to say it is good. But he thus deprives the word of its special import; which is, not only that the object of it is good, but that *he is so, because* with the same antecedents *he might have been bad*, had he not chosen to be otherwise.

Hobbes seems to have overlooked that praise and blame are not appropriated but to imagined free agents; for horses, tables and chairs are called good or bad, but are neither praised nor blamed, their goodness in the admitted absence of freewill being allowed to be intrinsic and necessary.

Man's self conceit

In the *Fortnightly Review*, for 1st August, 1868, Professor Bain traces the notion of freewill to *pride*, a slightly less offensive name for the same thing.

alone seems to furnish him with the idea that he is worthy or meritorious, and those who differ from him the contrary.

Blame and praise have been defended as being useful motives to form men's wills; but they merely minister to his self-conceit,—create uncharitableness,—and are based as I think I have shewn, on essentially false pretences, which alone should secure their condemnation. Praise is injurious as reproducing the self-conceit from which it arose, and as causing contempt of others; blame is worse, as creating hatred and all uncharitableness. Let us be content with being if we can, good, without claiming merit for it. This is a description of humility which I conceive to be incomparably more genuine and even really æsthetic, than the Christian vanity disguised under the name, which not only indirectly repudiates goodness, unless meretriciously adorned with the imaginary quality of merit, but actually also exacts undeserved and over-payment in a fictitious heaven. The imaginary right to merit and such reward is only secured by consigning others to the contrary. But what good man except a Christian would not cheerfully relinquish all claim to merit, while reserving the privilege of doing good? and to a heaven, the idea of which supposes a hell for nearly all his neighbours? Let those who exclaim that to deny the reality of merit and demerit, desert and sin, is degrading to humanity; pause when they reflect that it is their theory alone which constitutes man, the only animal in the known universe guilty of voluntary crime. This should surely teach his spurious pride humility.

Original Sin.

ANOTHER Sunday evening the subject was "Original Sin," which gave occasion to some remarks such as the following:—

Respecting original sin, Mr. S——has rightly informed us that the originator of anything, is he who gives beginning to it, or is the source whence it proceeds. This being so, reference to the Scriptures will furnish us with a clear solution of this stumbling block. Isaiah says, "I make peace and CREATE EVIL; I THE LORD do all these things," It is thus impossible to avoid the conclusion, according to the Bible as well as Mr. S——, that the Lord alone is the cause, creator, and originator of sin. Both of them thus establish the Lord as the only *original sinner*; and if the Bible be God's word, the Lord is plainly convicted out of his own mouth, as being the *sole original arch sinner*. The intervention of man, or even the devil, can be no more than instrumental and secondary; for both are asserted by the same authority to have been created by God, who is indeed positively asserted to have made all things. He is said to have deliberately made both man and devil, with *full fore-knowledge of all the evil consequences which must ensue!* He cannot plead the excuse,—that man certainly has if not the devil,—of ignorance; for he created (THEY SAY) the devil, man, and sin, with *full and complete knowledge of all the evil consequences!* If *he so foreknew* it—it follows that *they* could not act otherwise. For he could not possibly foreknow, what it was possible might never happen. From this there is no escape. By asserting an omniscient creator of all things, full and entire responsibility for all evil is unavoidably fixed upon, and imputed to him; man and devil are made mere instruments and puppets, and deprived of all responsibility whatever! What pernicious nonsense! Yet these are not only the legitimate, but the necessary consequences of the consistent application of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity!

The basis of the absurd doctrine of original sin, is confessedly the childish story related in Genesis of Adam and Eve in Eden. But a critical examination of that story should convince any unbiassed person that it was written for entirely opposite purposes, *by a worshipper of the SERPENT*. Possibly by Moses, but perhaps not. It is wholly absurd as related, but less so if regarded as an imperfect version of the legend of Prometheus. Observe—that it was the SERPENT that desired to confer upon man the inestimable boon of the knowledge of good and evil; and that it was the LORD (*or* EVIL DEMON) who wanted to keep it from him! The SERPENT succeeded—the LORD failed. It was the SERPENT who truly foretold that the result would be to place man comparatively in the position of a god—knowing good and evil.

Acknowledged by the Lord himself!—Gen. iii. 22.

It was the LORD who falsely predicted that man would surely die on the day he ate the apple.

Nothing can be more absurd and immoral than the climax of the story, namely—the punishment of Adam and Eve. For as it is expressly stated that they only *acquired* a knowledge of good and evil *by* eating the apple, they could not possibly have erred consciously in eating it. They must therefore have been necessarily innocent, and unjustly punished. It is a principal feature in the story that they had no such knowledge, till they ate the fruit. They therefore, obviously, could not know any good or evil in obeying or disobeying, or in anything else. In fact every thinking man must know that such knowledge can only be acquired by experience and comparison of both, and that he can judge of the quality of any action solely by its results.

Is it not clear that this fable was stolen by the stupid Jews,—entirely misunderstood by them, and mis-appropriated to wholly foreign and opposite purposes? Or that it was "borrowed" by Moses, and ignorantly distorted afterwards? For we should remember that Moses is said to have made in the wilderness, a brazen *Serpent* for the Jews to fall down and worship; and previously that Moses' rod (or god) took the form of a *Serpent* which swallowed or overcame those of the Egyptian magicians. But the circumstance that the benevolent *Serpent*, like Prometheus, was cursed for conferring a benefit on man suggests, if it does not prove, that the story was of extra Jewish origin; but stupidly misconceived—and stultified, and spoilt in the process of un-naturalization. There could be scarcely stronger proof of the dull incapacity of the Jews to appreciate or comprehend any relations of right and wrong—of good or bad—than the way in which in this story, they made their god guilty and convict himself of gratuitous malevolence, falsehood, and injustice; and imputed at the same time truthfulness and benevolence to their own conception of an evil being, whom they made to suffer for the good he did to man!

Obtuse however as were the Jews, Christians are as bad, and worse. They out-Herod Herod. The Jews began by sacrificing innocent animals to appease their cruel demon god, Jehovah, in important cases slaughtering human beings to placate his wrath; but it was reserved for Christians to impute to a god of justice and of love, the stupid inversion of all notions of right and wrong; by which the wicked are to be put on a level with the virtuous, on condition that the punishment that they deserve, shall be suffered—not by them—nor by himself for making them so sinful, but—by the best and most virtuous of beings,—his own innocent son! If anything could be worse than the original sin of the creation of evil, it must be this. For observe the pernicious consequences of this principle. It obviously becomes the interest of men to be among the wicked, and to have an innocent person sacrificed in their stead! To be virtuous would be to provoke similar treatment to that experienced by Jesus. For what else can be expected of a being who crucified his own innocent son, because he was angry with bad men, for whose bad conduct he was himself, as their creator, solely responsible? What more natural than to expect, that if he should take a fancy to redeem some devil from hell—he would require the blood and sufferings of another virtuous man as the necessary ransom? We can only judge of the future, by the past.

But Common sense itself teaches us that the idea of sin, original or otherwise, is absurd. For evil deeds invariably cause their own retribution, as virtue brings its own reward. Consequently no one would sin, or rather do evil, but from a defect of knowledge; and obviously every man would, *if he could*, know everything. Errors therefore must in every case be errors of judgment, not intentional. If our most definite and invincible notion of cause and effect be really true, as we cannot but deem it, it should be of universal application; and if so, it should be clear that man cannot possibly act otherwise than as his original constitution impels, and as circumstances (including knowledge) admit. How many drunkards would give anything for the *power* to refrain from drink? Who would not be rich, healthy, learned, and virtuous, *if he could*? Knowledge of what is good, of what constitutes one's own real true interest, is the one thing needful,—to create the desire for it; the essential preliminary to the endeavor to secure it. Therefore that knowledge is what every man should above all things strive to get, to give, and to extend.

Moral Responsibility.

By MR. H. K. RUSDEN. [Read before the Royal Society, 24th February, 1868.]

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY,

I think it will not, and cannot, be contested that the current morality is lamentably imperfect; and that an alarming proportion of society being immoral, it follows that sufficient reasons for being moral are either unknown or do not exist. The fact that some persons are moral affords ground, however, for believing that such reasons are to be found; and if it be possible to discover and disseminate them, so as to augment the number of the moral and diminish that of the immoral, I think that time could not be better spent than in endeavouring to render such a service to humanity. Trusting that this is possible, let us, as an essential preliminary, examine the subject of moral responsibility.

In dealing with moral subjects, great obscurity arises from the arbitrary addition to those qualities of human actions which constitute them physically good or bad, of a totally different and transcendental class of qualities, in conformity with the hypothesis of merit and demerit. The reality of the distinction upon which that hypothesis is based, has been repeatedly and gravely questioned; and therefore it should not be too rashly assumed. A presumption against it is at least suggested by its mysterious nature. But, avoiding the adoption of any premisses which might be disputed, we may safely postulate that the distinction between pleasure and pain, or physical good and physical evil, is more clear, certain, and indisputable, than that which imputes merit or demerit to an intelligent agent. The former is discerned readily and clearly by children and savages, long before they acquire the slightest glimmering of the latter. Many, indeed, never arrive at the conception of merit and demerit; which proves that it is certainly not original and universal, like that of pleasure and pain. Without assuming, as might be contended, that this alone is fatal to the more subtle theory, and desiring to take for granted no more than would be conceded by those who uphold it most strenuously, I propose first to examine the most currently propounded bases for it; and, if still necessary, to search then for some more definite and consistent principle as a guide to a feasible and universal morality. We surely cannot adopt a course better calculated to attain this end; and, if we fail to do so, then, I say, that though we may not have proved the popular theories to be merely factitious, still the probability of their reality will be so far lessened; and, if we arrive at any more substantial and effective principle, then the importance and essential value of the system of merit and demerit,—praise and blame,—will have been sufficiently disproved.

To begin with our terms. The term moral is derived from the Latin (*mos, moris, moralis*), for manners, customs; and it is often used in a similar sense among us. It remains to be seen whether every practical purpose would not be better served by using it thus only. Moral philosophy is defined as the study of social duties. Moral responsibility implies, beside *moral obligation*,—which I would interpret as the reason why a man acts well rather than ill, because an *obligation*, to be real, should *oblige*,—that he is answerable to some *authority* for doing one or the other. But it seems to me that the day is past when any authority could be quoted as a universal guide for conduct. The idea is wholly repugnant to the tendencies of modern thought, which entirely claims, if it cannot secure, for man, exemption from control by any power in the constitution of which he has no voice. Even under the most despotic monarchies of Europe, the principle of no taxation, and even no legislation, without representation, is asserted by all who dare to speak their minds.

But to whom or to what, and in what manner can man be . responsible or answerable for his acts ? Some will say to God. But the existence of immorality proves that God does not interpose to prevent it, which is the very thing that we require; and all who recognise and appreciate the absolutely sequential operation of natural forces upon man, as inevitably as upon any other object in the universe, and the proof of this afforded by statistics; must see, that, as physical and social influences are all that are certainly discernible as affecting or necessary to account for the conduct of man, and are fully adequate causes of all such effects, the gratuitous introduction of doubtful occult forces can be productive only of complication and difficulty. In any case, upon thousands who admit a divine authority it is notoriously practically inoperative; and it is necessarily so upon all who know nothing of, or disown it. It has thus to give way to the agent whom it should govern, and the man proves superior to his authority. And as tints no authority, even though divine, is adequately operative upon those for whose control it is most required, the principle, as affecting morality, must be dismissed as inefficacious and invalid; for what we want, and what is indispensable, is a principle of universal, not of partial application or force.

But the moral efficacy upon conduct of the theory of a future state of rewards and punishments forms another essential part of the *religious sanction*, as it has been called; and has been so commonly deemed indispensable as a basis of moral government, that it demands careful consideration, notwithstanding that it involves that of the authority of a Deity—which, as regards the prevention of immorality, we have already been obliged to relinquish. Let us therefore here, for the sake of argument, admit the authority of a Deity as the only one competent to effect a *post mortem* rectification of mundane conditions, and examine whether this doctrine, which includes the whole relevant part of the religious sanction, combines the indispensable conditions of consistency with itself and universal efficacy upon men.

When we consider that any theory which demands a state of future existence, as necessary to provide an opportunity of satisfying or completing justice in the administration of this life, actually and essentially involves the rash, not to say impious assumption of injustice in the Divine government *here.*; and also, in addition, of a radical change to an entirely opposite treatment *hereafter.*; we cannot but acknowledge that a theory of morality which should require such a basis, would be subversive not only of itself, but also of a belief in two of the most important attributes of the Deity—justice and unchangeableness.

To hold *that God does or permits evil that good may come*, seems to me the very essence of blasphemy; for to assert that he *cannot* effect all good without .any evil, amounts to a denial of his omniscience or omnipotence; and to say that he *will not*, is even worse; being a positive imputation of malevolence. And if in man such

conduct can only be excused by stupid ignorance, its culpability should augment in proportion to knowledge. Inconsistency thus seems inherent in the theory.

Still, to secure a universal basis for moral principles is an object of so much importance, that *certain efficacy* might atone even for such inconsistency as I have just exposed, and would lead me to suspect an error in the argument; which, however, would be proportionately strengthened should the contrary appear. I will therefore consider the *effects* of the theory of a future life upon present morality.

It seems proper to remember that all the evidence for the probability of this theory, is purely traditional, and derived from a comparatively barbarous ignorant age; and we know that opinions, even among its advocates, have always been divided as to its possible reality and conditions.

It seems clear that any theory at variance with experience, and of which all verification and tangible proof is so indefinitely postponed, can at best have no more than a doubtful influence even upon the speculative and curious, and cannot be supposed to govern the impulsive busy mass. The motives to conduct afforded by any such considerations must necessarily be weak in exact proportion to their distance and uncertainty, as compared with present, pressing, felt wants. We all know that force acts inversely as the square of the distance. So the distance or frequency of the sittings of courts of justice, determines in miles or in hours the amount of their moral effect. Altogether the whole subject of *post mortem*, conditions is necessarily so obscure, that as regards motives to conduct, it can furnish none to compete in vividness and strength with present, potent temptations, and immediate urgent necessities, which obliterate all distant and merely supposititious considerations. Whenever the two classes of motives compete, those which are least distant and most certain, are inevitably victorious. If we find that facts corroborate this opinion, the inefficacy upon conduct of the theory of a future life will be substantially established, and my argument of the inconsistency of the doctrine practically confirmed.

It is surely incontestable that there is a proportion, and probably everywhere about the same, of men of every religion and in every country, who are really good, and another of those who are bad; the one class comprising those whose conduct forms the criterion of the local moral code; and the other, those who fall below and violate it. The precise relative proportions of the two classes are immaterial to my argument, but their existence is indubitable. A part, and a part only, of those who are good, inevitably profess the local religion whatever it be; for those well inclined, unless unusually critical, eagerly adopt the reasons currently taught for acting well, and naturally accept them as valid and true. But though the conduct of a few may give some plausibility to the notion that their theoretical principles cause their pure practice, the indisputable facts—that religions are as antagonistic as they are various; that men are good or bad, though of any or no religion; that large numbers are, equally with the best, exposed to religious influences without becoming moral; and that the most pious men have been betrayed into vindictive and cruel intolerance by their religious principles and feelings,—prove that virtue is caused not by religion, but rather by individual intelligence and temperament, developed by cultivation and modified by those natural conditions of climate, diet, and scenery, or what Mr. Buckle calls "aspects of nature," which determine the general characteristics of nations and their local moral customs. These, again, are of course affected by changes in their social relations and their advances towards civilization. And it seems to me a grievous libel upon those whom we instinctively revere and love for their inherent virtues (as well as an outrage upon common sense) to say that they are by nature and inclination abominably sinful; and that their good qualities are not really theirs, but are wholly attributable either to a theoretical system current where they happened to be born, or to the overruling influence of a capricious Deity, impiously asserted to soften or harden whom he will.

Moral rules have sometimes been advantageously formulated by teachers of religion, who were compelled to adopt and incorporate them with their dogmas, to which they could otherwise never have hoped to secure a listener. For no theory of immorality would be tolerated among men. Every religionist devoutly fancies that it is his religion which makes him good, and is surprised that others can be good on any other principles; indeed, he is often inclined to deny the fact, and to regard their virtue as mainly spurious; whereas, in truth, his own virtue is owing to his superior organisation and to the natural morality with which he has associated his religion, and which alone renders it acceptable. As a proof of this we find that whenever the religion has been pushed into predominance, morality has been to the same extent sacrificed; real moral ties have been subordinated to supposed supernatural duty, and violated to such an extent as to produce among rude nations, even the immolation, not only of enemies by their conquerors, but of children by their parents; and in partially civilised times and countries, the results have been those fearful reciprocal persecutions and wholesale massacres which constituted far more pernicious evils than any pestilence or famine; inasmuch as in addition to the cruel destruction of innocent thousands by deaths often devised as the most painful, the bitterest hatred and rancour were excited and aggravated to an extreme to which no other known cause has ever proved adequate. Such effects can only be considered as distinctly antagonistic to all genuine morality. The radical difference and even opposition thus shown to exist between the religious and moral sanctions, teaches us that their aims and

functions should be entirely dissociated; that their connection is illegitimate, and their offspring therefore an abortion or a monstrosity.

It may still be said, however, that man is responsible to society; and this might hold while his acts affect society, and he not only acknowledges but bows to its authority. But society takes no cognizance of many of his acts, and very imperfectly prevents what it knows and disapproves. And who can deny his right to throw off its authority when he has the power? It is because he actually *does* this whenever he lists, failing to perceive that his highest interests are best served by yielding to the restrictions which society imposes on each for the benefit of all, that we are driven to seek a more universal and effective basis for morality. The fact that any mere authority *can* be contravened with impunity, is fatal to the efficacy and validity of the principle in any shape or form.

To what then can man be responsible? and in what consists his obligation to virtuous conduct? Let us analyse his position and the facts. When man is tempted to commit a social offence, or any act whatever, and regards solely his object or himself, he experiences no check but what is imposed by direct physical obstacles; which however are often wanting, and the act is forthwith completed. If, however, he abstain, it is in every case either from mere habit, which avails nothing in unusual circumstances, or from *a consideration of the probable direct or indirect consequences of the act*

"First I conceive that when it cometh into a man's mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to *deliberate*, the doing it or abstaining *necessarily* follows the *present* thought of the *good* or *evil* consequence to himself."—Hobbes's Works, vol. iv., p. 272.

This I think must be evident. Animals act without reasoning—man can reason, and thus is in a position to become a moral being; but he cannot be perfectly moral unless he not only reasons, but reasons accurately, and also acts accordingly. If the consequences would apparently be evil to himself, so much more evil than the immediate or prospective good as to compensate for any difference of distance—if the general balance of probable results be evil, or *appear evil to him*—he will, nay, he must, forego the lesser for the sake of the greater good, and avoid the preponderant evil.

If it be said that some men act for the good of others to their own manifest injury, I reply that they do so solely because it pleases them best. Their own pleasure is far greater in contemplating the distribution of good among others, than in the limited inferior pleasure of sense. They *feel* that it is more blessed to give than to receive. The indirect or moral intellectual pleasure is superior *for them* in degree and in kind, in extent and in duration, to any direct and merely sensuous one; but both are physical results of reflex nervous action, and unless a mind is nearly as narrow as a beast's, it can not be satisfied with mere direct temporary enjoyment. An organism with a brain bearing a large proportion to the rest of its nervous system, cannot be satisfied with gratifications which arise or locate in the subordinate parts of that system. Where the convolutions of the brain are large and numerous, they imperatively demand, and in a healthy system, reproduce the activity which first developed them; and it is only in nervous systems, whose function is fitted for little more than to support life, that what may be called organic pleasures can adequately satisfy their demands.

Doubtless much, and very much, depends upon the accuracy of man's apprehension of the probable good and evil consequences of his acts. If this be so, then to the precise extent to which a man is alive to, and justly appreciates the consequences of his actions, he should invariably choose the greater good or lesser evil; which accordingly we find to be the case around us.

As the value of this principle rests upon the inseparability of any act from its consequences (which is now an acknowledged scientific fact as regards all events whatever), it follows that the indispensable condition of universality of application is perfectly fulfilled. The other condition necessary to its complete efficiency—knowledge, and sagacity in the apprehension of consequences—experience unfortunately proves to be too often unfulfilled; were it otherwise we should not have to search for a rule of conduct. But the fact that men with knowledge and sagacity most seldom err, while those without such qualities constantly do so, is a strong argument for the validity of my principle; while the rapid and wide extension of knowledge, and the daily-increasing appreciation of it, afford solid ground for hope that it will eventually be universally recognised. That the necessary consequences of every act are morally or indirectly appropriate, requires to be known and thoroughly understood; indeed, in comparison with the due apprehension of this fact all other knowledge is futile and worthless.

For the whole of his conduct man thus is evidently not responsible to any authority, but strictly amenable to physical consequences; and the degree of his comprehension of them is the measure of his obligation. Responsibility is a phrase scarcely appropriate in such a connection, although sufficiently intelligible. Responsibility then, or amenability to natural consequences, is co-extensive with the power of action, and ignorance of them does not exempt from infallible retribution. Obligation is measurable by the extent of apprehension of those consequences; and social penalties partially remedy ignorance of them by adding more perceptible unmistakable penalties to those natural ones which are generally overlooked. With society,

ignorance of social penalties is seldom, though too often, admitted as a ground of exemption; but with inexorable nature ignorance is never admitted as an excuse. Society, however, thus indirectly remedies ignorance of *natural* consequences, by teaching offenders the knowledge of them, which they evidently want. Man is exactly recompensed by natural consequences, for observing or violating the laws which experience dictates as necessary to preserve his life, health, and general well-being; and liable to social consequences for observing or violating those prescribed by the society in which he lives. This social responsibility is only rendered necessary by the deficiency of his comprehension of physical consequences, by his general ignorance of natural effects; and thus partially makes up the difference between his obligation and his responsibility. In nature he is irresistibly impelled to maintain his existence and health if possible; he is provided more or less adequately with means; and he is with perfect measure rewarded for wise attention, or punished for disregard, to natural laws by the natural consequences of his acts, and *by them alone*. There is no fact better established than that attention to, or neglect of, diet, temperance, or hygiene, is followed by peculiarly appropriate consequences; as also that in cases of constitutional defect, where wise conduct is unavailing to secure the usual reward, so many are traceable to the ignorance or carelessness of ancestors, as to justify the conclusion that the principle holds good with the race when it seems to fail with the individual; and though on any principle of merit and demerit this could not be excused or justified by any expedient, there is really nothing whatever which detracts from the perfection of the course of nature. Where the error has been carried to an extreme, death ensues, sometimes without the extension of the evil to posterity. When it is possible that in posterity the ill effects might be counteracted by greater knowledge, the opportunity is afforded; but when persistently neglected, injury to the race is prevented by the extinction more or less rapid of the family, which should form a salutary warning to other individuals of the race. And such examples would always produce their visible good results were such effects readily traceable to their causes. But that they are not is the most powerful stimulus to their study; and when physiology is properly and generally understood, a key will be held, fitted to the solution and remedy of most of such difficulties. But this want of knowledge is also in fulfilment of another law as vast and significant as any, and of immense importance in every science. Without the urgent want there could be no vigorous action. There is no motion, physical or moral, but under the necessitation of the aggregate of its antecedents; and from man's most stringent needs always arise his most effective energies. The more a spring is bent the stronger is its rebound. The politico-economical law of demand and supply pervades all sciences, and forms only one of the innumerable bonds which knit them together into one harmonious whole.

I have dwelt upon hereditary evil for an illustration, as being one of the most complex but pregnant problems of all, and therefore the better test of a principle; and I only wish that I had time to do it justice. Viewed socially, the same apparently anomalous facts furnish society with a reason, which it could not otherwise learn, for discouraging in individuals, acts which would ultimately tend to injure the race.

But simpler instances are far more obvious and common. For the same principle extends as far as the meaning of the word moral—to all man's manners, customs, and acts. Fire is destructive of his bodily tissues. The first experiment convinces him of it, and if he be wise he will not even try a second. If he fight with his neighbours, he is hurt; and suffers, though he conquer. Peace therefore is moral, and war is immoral; but as man, when ignorant, acts from impulse and habit and not from principle, war is still only too frequent. If he break the laws of his nation, society avenges itself upon him for the offence; but I wish to draw a distinction here between the offence against society—which it seems to me consists in the breach of its laws—and the offence against the natural rights of any individual, both being included in the same act. It strikes me that man's responsibility, or certain amenability, to natural consequences, should be distinguished from his responsibility or liability to social consequences, though the act be one and the same. The natural consequences of any act are in themselves amply retributive, which in many cases is not recognised; the fact being lost sight of behind the more plainly perceptible penalties inflicted by society for the infringement of its laws alone. Take the case of a liar. Society punishes merely false oaths, which impair its judicial administration. The general contempt, avoidance, and other detrimental results of having the reputation of a liar, are *natural*, not *social* consequences; for they spring from the spontaneous, self-defensive action of individuals, not from the organised action of the social body. But natural evil consequences are inevitable for the slightest infraction of truth, and are eventually far more severe, indeed all the greater in proportion to its apparent success; to the extent to which the lie is believed. For when a man utters a falsehood, and is thus led to regard it as advantageous to him, he doubly misrepresents and inverts facts to himself, and acquires a fatal misconception as to the relative value of truth and falsehood; his judgment becomes distorted; every repetition of the offence against himself and nature increases the perversion of facts; he soon loses all power of representing things correctly to himself, or of judging accurately of the probable effects of his words or acts; unless extraordinary circumstances forcibly impress upon him the true cause of his insidious error, his mental degeneration becomes complete; and whatever may have been his original intellectual capacity, he is nearly sure to become inextricably lost in a maze of difficulty and ruin. But in any case the mental deterioration forms the severest retribution, and none the

less, but rather the more so, that it is so insensible. Nothing is more ordinary than for persons of even superior abilities, if they once engage in a course of falsehood and deception, entirely as it were to lose their head, and to commit themselves at last in a manner absolutely childish and unworthy of their natural capacity, and utterly inexplicable in any other manner with which I am acquainted. If I name as an instance, Dixon, of the Oriental Bank, the example may have more force than my argument. That Dixon acquired his position in that institution is proof that he at first earned and deserved confidence; and his capacity for judging wisely and rightly must have been vastly superior at the beginning, than at the end of his career, when he not only was guilty of the most puerile and profitless duplicity, but appeared also altogether incapable of perceiving either his dishonesty or his folly. But even when falsehoods are told with what are deemed the best intentions, it is almost always perceptibly the case that beside the unconscious but inevitable mental injury, the purposed object also is defeated, and it becomes apparent after all that truth would have answered best. And it is clear that even cleverness and sagacity cannot avail to enable a man to discern when a lie would be advantageous to him; for he views things from a deceptive stand-point, and it would be wonderful indeed if even the severest logic were to deduce from erroneous premisses anything but false conclusions.

We can all bear witness to the appropriate ways in which various vices *produce* their own proper and significant penalties. Intemperance, debauchery, lying, idleness, dishonesty, selfishness, ignorance, all not only meet with, but clearly *cause* more exactly appropriate punishments than any with which society visits those offences of which it takes cognizance. I think that the fact that such habits are indirectly though surely recompensed by their own necessary consequences, constitutes them moral offences, and that it is only when they are publicly injurious to others, that they become offences against, and are punishable by society. But whether such bad habits culminate or not in open social offences, they infallibly bring their own natural retribution of physical and mental deterioration; and the ever-increasing but unfelt difficulty of recovering from or staying that deterioration, is its most dangerous and fatal feature. The degrading results of confirmed drunkenness or gambling need only to be mentioned. How frequently do we see degraded ruffians, who for years have never felt a higher sentiment than brutal self-interest, at last committing openly, even such acts as murder, although directly contrary to their false views of that self-interest which is their professed rule of conduct. And when it then becomes the interest and therefore the duty of society to remove or destroy a criminal, it must also be the criminal's best interest to be so disposed of. His degeneration, though unconscious, accelerates so rapidly and becomes so irremediable, that every step only plunges him deeper and deeper into vice and into misery.

How delightful to remember that equally appropriate rewards are the inevitable results of temperance, probity, industry, benevolence, and knowledge ! How true it is that honesty is the best policy, and that virtue is really its own reward! How true it is that these rewards are strictly though indirectly physical, arising from reflex social action; and are therefore called moral!

Some persons profess to be shocked at the idea of recommending men to be honest or moral from motives of policy; of making virtue a question of mere self-interest. I should not demur to this high-flown æsthetic sentiment being adopted as a rule of conduct by those who recognise its force, provided it were found effective. But notoriously, it is not only inoperative upon, but beyond the conception of all but a very few; indeed those who uphold it are not always as observant of it as their professedly selfish neighbours. But what we want is, a principle of universal application; one which has, if possible, more weight with those of evil tendencies and habits than with those of good. Any other is absolutely worthless; for it is the immoral, and not the moral, who require a motive, and an incentive to alter their conduct. I am convinced, however, that it is only in speculative argument that the idea is entertained at all; that it never affected the conduct of anyone when more powerful reasons did not support it,—sufficient to outweigh entirely all temptation to the contrary;—but men like to hug themselves upon the *nobleness*, rather than the truth of the motives they can find for their own actions, and to assume a virtue though they have it not.

It may be said that it is not proved that fully adequate rewards and punishments are natural inevitable consequences of all human acts. Granted; it is not proved. Neither is it proved that the action of gravity is universal. Still the practical universality of the force of gravity is so certain as to be accepted as a safe assumption; nay, a valid principle; and a historical comparison of the two cases will show no material difference in the probable reliability in each. The validity of the principle that every event is the necessary result of its antecedents, physical and moral, and must also cause as necessarily its consequences (which must also be its appropriate moral consequences), is substantially enunciated in such notorious maxims as "Everything must have a cause;" "Honesty is the best policy," &c. This principle is the basis of all experience and knowledge, and its truth is proved by their mere existence. Curiously enough, it is only beginning to be appreciated, Mr. Buckle being, I think, its first consistent expounder. It was practically admitted in conduct (the only true test of opinion) long before it was distinctly affirmed, but it has always been theoretically contested on the ground of apparent exceptions. But gravity was known as a principle long before Newton showed that it

was apparently of universal application. The supposed exceptions exhibited in the perturbations of the planets were subsequently recognised, but did not make wise men despair of the principle. They had confidence in it, and worked it out, until they demonstrated that the apparent exceptions were really exemplifications and proofs of the immutable law.

I will now attempt to view historically the origin and progress of both the genuine and the fictitious ideas of moral responsibility and obligation.

In a primitive state of existence, man's wants are so few that it is generally long before he arrives at the conception of the exclusive right to property. But it naturally arises when what he acquires costs him labour, and as he becomes civilised, and his wants and possessions increase, so does the notion of the right to property acquire strength with exercise

Since writing the text I have been fortunate enough to meet with strong corroboration of my theory, in a work by an author classed by Buckle, as, "by far the ablest traveller who has published observations on European "Society." Hist, of Civil, vol. i. p. 239. "In this nation of small pro- "prietors the sense of honour is more developed, and more generally diffused, "than in the countries feudally constituted. Loss of honour has been from "the earliest times, a specific effective punishment in the criminal law of "Norway, standing next in degree to loss of life. The possession of "property naturally diffuses through all classes the self-respect, regard "for character and public opinion, circumspection of conduct, and considera- "tion for others, which flow from or are connected with the possession of "property, and render these influential on the morals, manners, and mode "of thinking of the whole body of the people." S. Laing's "Residence in "Norway, 1834-6." Part I., p. 152. Traveller's Library, Longmans, 1851.

But it is long before he learns to add to it what it evidently had not at first; the idea of demerit in anyone who deprives him of what he claims, who infringes on his right to the proceeds of his labour. As this idea is unknown among savages and young children, or any but an organised society, and commences about the period when society first becomes established by mutual agreement upon rules of association, or at the age of comprehension of the advantages of co-operation and reciprocal security, it seems probable at least, that these two circumstances have some causal connection. The ideas of merit and demerit appear to me to have arisen from the reciprocal demand for and supply of sympathy and support by social allies, to resist aggression and co-operate in labour; superadded to the simple sympathy and antipathy of an earlier developement, and exaggerated by the unfortunate predominance of feeling over reason. There is no antipathy in the feeling with which an animal is pursued for the purposes of food; but it is strong in the chase of dangerous beasts of prey, and is proportioned to their power to harm. Still this is but antipathy, and there is nothing more in the wars of savages and the squabbles of young children, who cannot be said to have attained to a social condition. Even civilised people who readily recognise and deprecate breaches of moral right, *inter se*, exterminate savages and appropriate their possessions, without considering the principle infringed, or feeling more than simple antipathy at most. They *first attribute blame* to such savages, for *conscious breaches of their moral code*, as they do to children when they likewise become familiarized with, and appear to comprehend their conventional notions of social rights and duties. On the other hand, praise is awarded by them for the readiness with which some children and savages comprehend and conform to such notions of moral right and mutual service, and thence also the corresponding idea of moral responsibility and obligation.

But it is after men have begun to experience the security and the power afforded by occasional and prolonged reciprocal assistance and co-operation in labour and defence; and when they begin to agree upon rules and conditions upon which such benefits shall be mutually given and received; that their sympathy and antipathy extend beyond themselves and those things in which the investment of their own labour has created a personal interest; and they come to regard aggression or depredation committed against their social body, or against any individual, or light, or law, or custom of it, as an indirect or moral injury to themselves. An individual, in calling upon his neighbours to resist or prevent an aggression upon himself or any of them, from within or from without their social body, naturally represents the offender as a proper object of antipathy and hate, and claims protection and united action against him, from their sympathy and sense of mutual interest.

Here then, I believe, was the origin of the idea of *indirect*, or *moral obligation*; and the first germ in connection with it of that sentiment which subsequently developed into the system of praise and blame, merit and demerit, which I propose to trace a little further. The idea of moral *responsibility*, I think, belongs to, and must have originated in, a different and ruder form of civil society—that of the paternal government, chieftainship, or monarchy; which is the developement of the principle of authority, and perfectly adapted to the government of children. The mutual dependence and reliance generated by the operation of the democratic principle, experience teaches us are far more appropriate and favourable to the equal conditions, the capacities, the activity, and the prosperity of adults, national as well as individual.

That this view is correct—that the notion of merit and demerit, desert for praise and blame—is compounded of, first, the feeling of the right to property, acquired from the consciousness of having expended

labour for it; secondly, the sense of mutual advantage and reciprocal dependence, ensuing from combination, first casual and temporary, afterwards permanent, and resulting at last in social security and collective power; thirdly the sympathy and antipathy which, by the force of habit, men readily learn to transfer beyond the immediate to the most indirect perceptible causes of pleasure and pain; and lastly, the gradual exaltation of the whole into a transcendental region of sentiment in proportion to the development of what is called the æsthetic faculty. This account of the concrete idea is strikingly corroborated by the fact that in the history of the world, the development of the moral sentiment originated almost entirely among democracies or republics, where the sense of mutual dependence, confidence, and security, was the leading principle of action and thought; and was far more slowly and imperfectly introduced into despotic monarchies, where that of dependence upon authority took its place. The moral effect of social co-operative unity was strikingly exemplified in the republics of Greece and Rome, where it may be said to have attained a morbid growth; for so intensified by the æsthetic element was their moral sentiment of patriotism and individual virtue, that in deference to it they not only freely sacrificed their private interests and their lives, but they frequently, on principle, involved their own adored countries, as well as those of their adversaries, in the miseries of war and devastation. Contrast with their conduct the debased condition of the eastern monarchies, where, though civilization had an earlier beginning, the moral development, not only then but almost ever since, has notoriously exhibited altogether inferior results.

I have characterised the exalted and generally admired patriotic sentiment of the Greeks and Romans as morbid, because the evil results proved it to be, in such an extreme, pernicious; though doubtless it was necessary as a link in the chain of events, and for the enlightenment of the human mind to the advantages of mutual confidence and combination. Of the two, the Roman sentiment was the most practical and least æsthetic; and the stern vigour of their morality, of which Regulus afforded a significant example, had throughout Europe a powerful effect, which long outlived their political fabric. To its enervation, first by the influence of the more æsthetic Greek development, and to its subsequent rapid degeneration under the principle of authority which supervened with the emperors, do I attribute its complete suppression, until the revival of trade and commerce, and the consequent reappearance of the republican spirit after the long night of the dark ages. For nearly a thousand years did that enthusiasm, which lost its direction and object on the severance of the old republican bonds of mutual interest and united power, unfortunately find nothing with which to ally itself, but the religious sentiment; and thus formed with it the most appalling scourge with which human nature has ever been afflicted—fanaticism. Engrossed exclusively by imaginary visions of supernatural duties, and therefore bereft of data by which to check and regulate their exaggerated exaltation, all scientific knowledge and habits having entirely disappeared before pious asceticism and intolerance, men seem to have found the chief vent for their sympathies and antipathies in injuring and torturing not only others but themselves. In the previous democratic period, when dialectics and culture rapidly developed the minds of men, they not only acquired an enthusiastic activity, but first learned to subordinate their own interest and happiness to those of others. Still this development was morbid and exaggerated; for the general interest of the human race is as much injured by a narrow, greedy patriotism, which seeks its own aggrandizement at the expense of other nations, as the real interest of the individual is damaged by the notion that it can be really served by depredations upon others. But the subsequent age of religious frenzy was infinitely worse. Men were wholly possessed by an insane superstition, in which they preserved no features of their former progress but that energy and self-subordination which then misdirected them into the wildest excesses; and there appear to have been few of any intellectual activity, whose pious rage could be satisfied with less than either enduring the pangs of martyrdom themselves, or of inflicting them on others, for the glory of God. At last, fortunately, the paroxysm spent itself. Population had gradually multiplied so much that in many places men were driven by their increasing wants to agriculture and to trade. These necessarily restored the sense of mutual dependence, confidence, and reliance. The republican spirit revived. The Reformation then for ever burst the bonds of authority, to which the human mind can never again be submitted; for the invention of printing has secured the permanent advance and wider dissemination of knowledge for the future. The sympathies and antipathies of men are now being gradually brought under the government of reason, after the chastening of a salutary though dreadful experience; while the superiority of the ratio of the increase of population, to that of the means of subsistence, secures the maintenance of an abundant and sustained energy. We have, at last, arrived at an age of unfettered criticism; at a day of judgment. But fearful evidence of the severity of the ordeal through which the human intellect has passed is still everywhere perceptible, and it still exhibits symptoms of the panic by which it was lately transported. The fancied belief in a super-natural *in nature*,—in a transcendental moral faculty, in a theory of more than moral duty,—and above all, in a hypothetical future; still too much distracts the attention of men from their present practical physical requirements, leads them to depreciate and neglect their advantages; and opposes, though with daily decreasing power, the irresistible progress of that scientific knowledge, in which alone the prosperity, happiness, and true virtue of the human race, are to be sought and found.

But throughout this hasty sketch of the genesis of the idea of moral responsibility and obligation, there is nothing to indicate the existence, or to demand the importation of any more mysterious principle than physical advantage and conventional convenience; the cause and explanation of current theories being, that in the matured social system, the causes of mental phenomena are much more complex, indirect, and therefore obscure; and at the same time the inchoate sentiment becomes more refined and defined, than in a very primitive condition of society. This seems to have led men insensibly to regard all indirect consequences of an act, as if inhering in the act itself; and it is called moral or immoral, when its *general tendency* only can be discerned as it were by habit; its physical consequences becoming too complicated and numerous to be easily traced. A moral man is of course one who customarily does moral acts, or such as are calculated to produce generally good effects; an immoral man is one who habitually commits acts of an evil tendency, according to the moral standard of the society in which each lives. It is corroborative of this view, that morality is as variable as the conditions of climate and of civilisation. Hospitality is incomplete in Lapland and elsewhere, without the concession of conjugal privileges in favour of a guest. In Ladak, &c., it is moral for a woman to have several brothers for her husbands in one house; and in Fiji and Melanesia, it is a moral duty to bury parents alive. All these customs are practised under a moral obligation. Among our own ancestors within three centuries, it was meritorious to burn one's neighbour alive if of a different religious opinion. A pious bishop thanked God that he had been enabled to burn alive after torturing seven hundred in a single year, and he died in the odour of sanctity. None of us, probably, would envy him his state of mind; still it must not be overlooked that that would be one of virtuous self-complacency, and the reverse of that of any man who should do so in our times. "When *his* piety was most fervent, his acts were what *we* deem most atrocious. But as beyond dispute he acted conscientiously, we cannot blame him; his knowledge being the measure of his obligation. And his case is only one among thousands. Calvin in the same manner, in a religious paroxysm, burnt Servetus alive on a tire of green faggots, and was thus most criminal when most pious. But the only difference between them and us is, that we have acquired more knowledge of physical science, and consequently of the nature and social relations of man; while their rule of conduct was simply their religious duty, as deduced from the Bible. If it be said that they mis-interpreted it, that is only one proof among thousands, that interpretations of any such standard are and must be as various as men; and a demonstration of the inefficacy of any mysterious and therefore supposititious principle.

Altogether it seems clear that such notions as desert for praise and blame, and merit and demerit, are the results of the force of imagination and idealistic habits, upon a groundwork of ancient conventional customs; and that they are purely arbitrary and factitious. For all proves that standards of morality vary with degrees of latitude and the lapse of time; and that he who conforms to, or violates, or endeavours to improve the local current standard, whatever it may be, must as necessarily experience the exactly proportioned and appropriate consequences, as the planets must fulfil their cycles in accordance with the law of gravity.

I have now endeavoured to establish consistent and practical moral principles upon patent facts, and the invariable relation between causes and effects which it is impossible to infringe, instead of upon a mysterious fiction, which is directly violated daily by whosoever lists; to prove that it is only a superficial and erroneous observation which leads to the supposition of any injustice in the mundane distribution of pains and pleasures;—a fundamental error, which, while it forms the motive for imagining endless methods of compensation, can never explain or remove, or more than evade the anomaly, that the injustice so assumed must be the deliberate act of the Deity; and I trust that I have succeeded in showing that we are justified in attributing absolute infallibility to the rule that every effect of every cause must be the most perfectly appropriate, morally as well as physically; and also that careful examination will transform even apparently vitiating exceptions into irrefragable proofs of its validity.

I have contended that one condition only is still wanting to man, to enable him to perfect his morality; and that is, full knowledge of the natural consequences and of the causes of his acts. I have pointed out also that his morality is always proportioned to such knowledge. The obvious lesson, therefore, which I deduce from the whole is that, to extend and disseminate knowledge (and most of all among the ignorant and vicious) as widely and completely as lies in our utmost means and power, is not only our best policy and highest virtue, but our most sacred and imperative duty.

These principles may be formulated thus:—

1st.—That every event, physical or moral, is the necessary result of its antecedents.

Hobbes has I think conclusively shown that *any sufficient* cause, must be also a *necessary* cause. "I hold that to be a *sufficient* cause, to which "nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the *effect*. The "same is also a *necessary* cause. For if it be possible that a *sufficient* cause "shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was "needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not *sufficient*; but if "it be impossible that a *sufficient* cause should not produce the *effect*, then "to a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause, for that is said to produce an effect "*necessarily* that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that what-

"soever is produced, is produced *necessarily*; for whatsoever is produced "hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and "therefore also *voluntary* actions are necessitated.

"Lastly, that ordinary *definition* of a *free agent*, namely, that a free agent "*is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce "the effect, can nevertheless not produce it*, implies a contradiction, and is "nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be *sufficient*, that "is to say, *necessary*, and yet the *effect* shall not follow." Hobbes's Works, vol. iv., pp. 274, 275. I cannot but consider that the succinct wisdom of these weighty words is unsurpassed, and their scope must be startling to whoever will ponder them as they deserve.

2nd.—That moral power is simply indirect physical force. 3rd.—That the highest interest of the individual and that of society, cannot really conflict, but are absolutely identical in every instance.

4th.—That man's knowledge is the measure of his obligation to virtue, and of his prospect of reward; while his responsibility or certain amenability to the necessary and appropriate consequences of his acts, is coextensive with his power of action; and

5th.—That virtue is therefore really its own sole and ample reward.

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The Bishop of Melbourne's Theory of Education.

SIR,

In the current general Election it is right that the question of Education should occupy a paramount position, and that whatever misconceptions surround it should be investigated and discussed with all possible discrimination and care. I wish through your intervention to point out a most important and extraordinary fallacy which seems to be almost universally prevalent; for it pervades every line of the letter lately addressed to the *Argus* by the Bishop of Melbourne, and is entirely overlooked by all his critics both favorable and adverse. It is broadly stated in the beginning of his letter as the basis of his theory.

His lordship corrects the Honorable the Chief Secretary thus:—" What I said was, 'education "' without religion I will not say is altogether in-"jurious, but it may be said to be dangerous. It "' is our duty to combine religious education with "' secular instruction.' And again, 'All would "' agree that mere instruction without moral "' training is, to say the least of it, a very imper-"feet education; and every Christian man would "' feel that moral training must be based upon "'religious education. An individual may be a "' moral man without religion, but no community "' can be a moral community without religion.' "

Now I think, and confidently assert, that education is most valuable in so far as it is moral; that is, calculated to improve in the highest degree the manners of men as social beings. For morals means manners. But religion and religious instruction are a totally different thing. The latter are to improve and perfect man's relations with his God; the former, his relations with society. As the ends are widely different, so are the means distinct; and the more "the question is examined, the more does the distinction appear obvious and radical. If we take the Scriptures as authoritative, we shall discover that no religious progress can be made without special divine influence; man is wholly powerless himself to secure that influence of the spirit which "bloweth where it listeth." I believe it to be a growing opinion, that legislative—if not all human interference with religious development, is but a presumptuous and futile—nay, profane—attempt to usurp the divine function; and I think that this opinion, has so far a foundation in fact, as it expresses the complete inadequacy of human powers and institutions to achieve spiritual progress. But it is on all hands conceded that moral training for social conduct is a legitimate field for legislative action, though opinions are divided as to the manner in Which it should be applied. And the reason of this uncertainty is just what I wish to show.

Notwithstanding the general agreement as to the fitness of legislation to promote social morality, we have been so accustomed to hear our spiritual teachers claim, unopposed, both fields of operation as their own peculiar province, that it is now difficult to realise the fact of their real and marked separation. I may, however, succeed in placing the matter in such a new light that the distinction should become plain to everyone who reads these words. Let us imagine, for the nonce, all human institutions for the maintenance of morality at once and completely abolished—our laws, courts, magistrates, police, gaols, and penal establishments suddenly annihilated.—What would result? Would all the elaborate machinery and strenuous efforts of our religious establishments prove of the slightest efficacy in restraining the immorally disposed from indulging their

propensities at the expense of their neighbours? Would our property or our lives be safe for a single day? No—not for an hour. But now let us put the converse proposition. Suppose on the contrary, our human moral government intact, but our religious institutions suddenly and entirely obliterated;—that every priest, bible, church and religious idea were to vanish from the earth. Will anyone contend for a moment that our social moral machinery for the repression of crime would be in the least degree less efficacious than before in protecting our lives and property? I am satisfied that very few would contest the point for a moment. In fact, the existence and maintenance of social checks upon immorality, prove the general practical disbelief in the efficacy of any others—even though divine. I think these considerations ample to prove the wide distinction between morals and religion,—a distinction too often entirely ignored. They prove that morality is based—not upon religion—but upon man's social nature and necessities; and the vagueness and want of precision of current moral teaching, naturally arise from the fact that objects and means so totally dissimilar, are thus improperly confused and confounded together. In fact, it would not be difficult to show that this same confusion of ideas has too frequently produced direct antagonism—if indeed that be not the normal and necessary condition. Had sound moral knowledge had the place of religious enthusiasm in the cases of the judges of Socrates and Jesus, the world would at least have been saved from the commission of atrocious crime, if it might not eventually have benefitted more: and in that of Calvin,—his fame would not have been tarnished by the murder, in a paroxysm of piety, of the innocent Servetus. But that very religious fervour which formerly prompted our ancestors to incrementate each other for being conscientious—to subordinate real and natural, to imaginary supernatural duty—is precisely that which now interposes the principal obstacle to the establishment here of an effective moral (or secular) system of education.

I beg leave, however, solemnly to warn my fellow-colonists that our population is formed of such heterogeneous materials, and the rising generation has so largely wanted good moral examples and associations, that the danger hereafter to social order is imminent, and it is, I believe, of far greater importance than is generally imagined, to establish here without delay, an extensive system of compulsory education of a superior description at *any cost* whatever. My own opinion is that our educational system should be sedulously extended and remodelled, until we are thus enabled to lessen our expenditure on police and gaols. For prevention is better than cure.

The confusion of ideas as to the different means and objects of morality and of religion is Curiously exemplified in the passage which I quoted from the letter of his lordship. First he asserts that education without religion may be called dangerous, (though he omits to explain how,) and that it is our duty to combine religious education with secular instruction. Next, he says (what I endorse) that mere instruction without moral training is an imperfect education. Then he says plainly, (as if the sequence of the sentences proved a logical sequence!) that moral training must be based upon religious education, which I think I have sufficiently disproved. But lastly, he expresses a genuine paradox, in which the fallacy of his argument is concentrated. He says (truly enough) an individual may be a moral man without religion; but, he adds, a community cannot be a moral community without religion. I ask—if any man in a community can be moral without religion (as he admits), why may not every man in the community be moral also? and if all the men in a community are moral (as the Bishop cannot with his premisses consistently deny), how can such a community be other than moral? The long standing and persistence of that confusion of ideas which I have endeavored to expose, could alone have induced a man like his lordship to write such nonsense.

I have alluded to the *nature* as well as the scope of the education which I think it is urgently necessary to establish, meaning that it should comprehend the "moral training" which his lordship admits to be necessary to perfect education; and this demands some exposition. The suppression of the broad distinction between moral and religious needs and objects is so general, that I grieve to say that I know of no school in Melbourne much superior to the streets for acquiring moral training. People are left to acquire it as best they can, and too many learn it for the first time in the Police Court when fined 40s. and taken away. But all too late. No other of our public institutions, so far as I am aware, is calculated to impart the important moral knowledge why we should not lie, steal, cheat, or murder. From the common school to the University, the knowledge that is imparted may confer power for good—or for evil; but the most important knowledge—*how to use it*, is only taught too late at the Police Court and the gaol. I do not forget that this is assumed to be partly taught to children as religious instruction; but the lesson for that very reason fails to produce conviction or practical result; the true reasons why immoral acts should be avoided, being unconsciously suppressed or subordinated to fictitious ones. The causes and effects of human actions constitute the materials of the most important moral knowledge that can be learned; yet it is not attempted to be taught, unless, as I have said, so confused and falsified, that it cannot possibly be understood. I know also that this knowledge is so imperfectly apprehended, that the teachers would have to learn it first, for that which they possess is of a totally different description. So much greater is the necessity for an immediate reform. Without this knowledge—what are the chances that the orator will not prove a liar, the locksmith a burglar, the penman a forger, and the chemist a poisoner?

I bid my fellow-colonists to look to it. I believe that I have herein indicated the main fallacies in connection with the subject of public education, which confuse and mislead the popular judgment and paralyze rational legislation; and having done what I conceive to be my social duty in this respect, I have the honor to remain, Sir, yours respectfully,

HOKOR.

Melbourne,

4th February, 1871.

decorative feature

R. BELL, PRINTER, 07 LITTLE COLLINS STREET EAST.

The Bishop's Easter Sermon.

TO THE LORD BISHOP OF MELBOURNE.

(Per favor of the Editor of the *Harbinger of Light*)

MR LORD,—Your lordship's proved readiness to follow the example of your divine master in meeting enquirers—"both hearing them, and asking them questions," has gained you golden opinions among those who love the truth, and feel that it is best attained by the exposure of error in free discussion. The ill-natured rumour that you were *unable* to reply to Mr. Marcus Clarke's letter to you in the *Melbourne Review*, I disregard. Your lordship was doubtless anxious to rejoin to a reply which you had invited by answering Mr. Clarke's article on "Civilisation without Delusion," in the *Victorian Review*, and it may be presumed that you were only prevented from maintaining your position and credit, by the perverse meanness and narrowmindedness that suppressed a letter, which certainly demanded refutation far more than the article to which you had responded. By the courtesy of the editor of this paper, I am permitted to offer to your lordship an opportunity—perhaps as good as that of which you were so unfortunately and unjustly defrauded, of going about your master's business.

The reprint of your Easter sermon, has just reached me. Your lordship, has I hear put "Sceptic" to silence on the subject. If I venture to offer a few remarks upon it, and to hope for your lordships notice of them, it is because I am no sceptic, but the opposite of a sceptic. A sceptic, as your lordship is aware is a *doubter*, and so far as he has any definite opinions, he is no sceptic. If I have definite opinions and no doubts on some subjects which I have considered, I am still quite prepared to modify them as definitely and decidedly upon being furnished with adequate reasons. I am always ready to check and correct the little I do know.

Your lordship's text is "And if Christ be not raised your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins." An anomaly here strikes me my lord. Is not your vocation the saving of sinners ? But if Christ really rose to save sinners, is not your occupation gone ? Sinners are either saved or not saved by Christ. If the sinners have still to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, and if it is your function to help them to do so, they cannot be already saved by Christ. If they are already saved by him, they, and you can have no saving to do. At present I have no doubt about the practical contradiction herein involved, but I await your lordship's solution of the difficulty.

Your lordship says on your first page that Sceptics allege that we cannot be sure that we have apostolic testimony to the resurrection, or that the Saviour was seen after his burial. My clear impression is that we have rational ground for being sure that there is no valid apostolic testimony on the subject. Your lordship must know that the titles of the gospels advisedly state that they are not *written by*, but *according to* certain apostles; that they are supposed to be based upon prior documents; and that the prefixing of apostles' names to them, was entirely arbitrary and subsequent. In fact the sole testimony available is that of certain *fathers* in the next three centuries; and of those fathers we have ample testimony (see Dr. Conyers Middleton's "Free enquiry into the miraculous powers, &c.") as to their folly, credulity, and disregard of truth. Your lordship appears indeed, to recognise the lack of authenticity of the gospels, when in your first page, you desert them, and rely upon St. Paul. Now my lord, did St. Paul ever see the risen Saviour at all ? I admit that he says in general terms in Cor. xv, 8. that "Last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time." But this was after—not only the resurrection, but the *ascension* also, and therefore was not properly seeing him at all as the others are supposed to have seen him. And if we take St Paul's particular specific account, given repeatedly in the Acts of the Apostles, of what really happened, he saw *nothing but a light*, and thought he heard a voice which he did not

know as that of Jesus, for he had to ask "Who art thou Lord?" By his own account he saw no more, being struck blind on the spot. What guarantee then had *he*, that the answerer was really Jesus?—none. There was nothing but a vision, as St. Paul himself calls it, (Acts, xxvi, 19) and a vision implies something subjective, not objective. Then to say that he saw the risen Saviour, is inadmissible. His incidental assertion in Cor. xv, 8, is evidently a mere rhetorical expression, inconsistent with the date, and his own repeated particular statements on different occasions, as preserved in the Acts of the Apostles. Then to build anything upon the fact that St Paul "knew Peter, James, and John," seems fallacious in the extreme; St Paul strenuously disclaims having received anything from them, (Gal. i 16-7.,) apparently met them only to quarrel with them, (See "Not Paul but Jesus,") speaks disrespectfully and with animosity of them (Gal i, 7, 8, 9, also ch. ii,) and repudiates all connection with them. Yet your lordship appears to accept St Paul's incidental assertion that they had seen the risen Saviour, as irrefragable proof of the fact, though we have seen that his general assertion that he himself had seen him was contradicted by himself, and was therefore and otherwise inadmissible. St Paul's writings prove him to have been exceedingly rash and unprecise in statement. His round assertion that 500 brethren at once saw the risen Jesus, (see your lordship's repeated mention of it—page 5.) has no support from those who profess to relate the circumstances. Your lordship eagerly accepts his assertion that *others* believed that they *had* seen such an extraordinary and inexplicable phenomenon as a person risen from the dead, when his own statement regarding his own conversion are (as given by the inspired recorder of the Acts of the Apostles) so conflicting and so contradictory, (see "Not Paul but Jesus," conversion table.)

Your lordship conceives (page 6) that there was "no possibility of mistake when a supernatural being takes a long walk with two men, converses with them copiously by the way upon the prophecies of the Jewish scriptures, goes in with them to their dwelling, and then vanishes away." Is your lordship warranted in entirely ignoring the plain statement in the record that they did not recognise their familiar teacher and master in all that time: and only imagined that it was he when he suddenly left them, and when verification was impossible? What sort of evidence is this to us?

Yet even all this is beside the point. What is required is evidence of the resurrection itself, not of what happened afterwards. Your lordship's whole sermon is an implicit recognition of the importance of the facts, and of the connection of those facts with us by means of the evidence of them. What evidence then have we? Authentic statements of independent unbiassed witnesses? The very opposite. The only alleged spectators—the disinterested guard—who must have believed what they saw, are said (by interested persons who were not present) to have made, for money, a false statement respecting it. There were no other spectators. A few persons whose statements, with perhaps one doubtful exception, have not come to us, arrived at the sepulchre *after all was over*; but had they been present, they were too interested and partial to be eligible witnesses. The statements about them and what they saw are contradictory, and they are said to have thought that the person whom they saw was someone else.

But your lordship ignores some important facts to which I invite your attention. It was quite possible to have convincing proof (to persons on the spot at the time, if not to us.) of the resurrection; the initial steps of it are said to have been actually taken; but the failure to complete it, seems fatal to the credibility of the story. Independent, unbiassed, disinterested witnesses were available and ready. A large stone had been rolled over the mouth of the sepulchre, the seal of the chief priests was upon it, and a Roman guard kept watch. So says the inspired record. If then, at the expiration of the appointed three days and three nights, Pontius Pilate, his officers and soldiers, independent and disinterested,—and the chief priests—biassed rather against than in favor of the resurrection, had been summoned to be eyewitnesses of the event;—if the seal had been broken by the chief priests, the report of the guard duly made to Pilate, the stone rolled away, the stiff and decomposing body, minutely examined and identified, and if *then* the resurrection had unmistakably taken place before the astonished gaze of such unexceptionable witnesses,—what room for doubt, dispute, cavil, or suspicion would there have been? And would not the honesty and veracity of the divine record have been triumphantly vindicated, at least to those living at the time and place? And what difficulty was there in the way of such desirable verification?

But what was admittedly the result? After all the preliminary precautions had been duly taken, what happened? *Long before the time appointed by Jesus himself, the seal was broken in the night, the stone rolled away, and the corpse removed!!!* Was not the failure implicitly yielded? the fiasco complete? The "lame and impotent conclusion," is only aggravated by the attempted explanation. If the Roman guards had really beheld what it is stated that they saw, would they not have reported the truth at once to their own officers and governor? But having as stated gone to the chief priests instead, is it probable or credible that they would have taken from them money to report a lie to criminate themselves, and secure their own severe punishment? *What but the truth could exonerate and save them?* Would any guards have been so stupid as to falsely state that they slept, and state also what happened while they were asleep?

Further the chief priests are stated to have *believed* the report of the guards !!! but to have acted as if they

disbelieved it ! If they *believed*, in what respect were they not converted christians? But if they believed the guard, would they not have done the very reverse of what they are reported to have done ? Would they not have been baptised at once ? And if they *believed not*, would they not at once have reported the guard to the governor as lying conspirators ? Is not every item and circumstance of the story irreconcilably inconsistent with others ? Wholly improbable and incredible ? Let me remind you my lord that these considerations affect the value of the evidence to persons living at the time and place, not to those separated from the events by thousands of miles, and years; to whom in comparison it would be valueless, even if it had been perfectly satisfactory to those on the spot at the time.

From the difficulties of materialism, as you call them my lord, you will not find me shrink. You ray lord, as a believer in the bible, can scarcely refuse belief in hereditary transmission of moral qualities (see John viii 41, & 44.) I demur to the term *automatic*, which involves a solecism. "No body can originate motion in itself"—is a fundamental law of motion. The cause of all motion is external. To hold and make men responsible for their acts, I hold to be right and proper, though I concur with you at page 8, that that being so, to blame or punish them, is unjust and irrational. But to prevent their injuring society is a moral duty and is dictated by wisdom. *That we can do*, and yet repudiate the idea of punishment. Let us inflict no pain on wrong-doers, but seclude or *narcotise* them. You say "We *must* blame and punish." That I hold to be adding evil to evil, and experience proves that no anticipated good results. You say "we feel and know that we are free; that we can chose to do right, and ought to be punished when we do wrong." St Paul differs from you (Rom. vii, 15, 20.) All men desire good, to be good, and to do good; and if they do not and are not, it is from error or in-capacity. Surely it is the reverse of charity to insinuate the contrary. But, in common with many of the greatest and best of men, I feel and know that I am *not* free, and that all our choosing is determined by heredity education, and circumstance, and the bible, particularly, your favourite, St Paul, is on my side again. "*For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.*" (Phil, ii, 13) But I decline to (with St Paul) lay the responsibility upon God, who, he says *predestinated* us to good or evil before our birth. (Rom. viii & ix) I could of course multiply quotations to the same effect but I think the above from St Paul should answer purpose with your lordship.

I venture to deprecate the style of your lordship's adjuration to your congregation (pages 8 & 9). You do not attempt to lead your hearers to judge coolly, resonably, and conscientiously, according to the evidence before them; you do not appear to recognise that *faith* is not demanded or required, except for incredible or doubtful statements, and that our supreme responsibility is for the earnest and conscientious *use* rather than *suppression* of the discrimination and judgment with which we find ourselves endowed. On the contrary, you appeal to your auditors' æsthetic imagination, urge them to ignore every principle of evidence and science, and demanding blind admiration of an impossible hyper moral character, you conclude your sublime exhortation by asking.—" Say if you can keep yourselves back from the centurion's confession, *verily this was the Son of God!*"

My lord, allow me to remind you of another passage which you appear to have overlooked, though equally authenticated in the same record, and which, to unbiassed minds has a clearer aspect of probability, while it suggests the very antithesis of such enthusiastic exaltation. "About the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, *Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani ?*" That is to say, "*My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me ?*" I ask you my lord, what should a man of unsophisticated common sense and human feeling gather from that despairing cry of mortal agony ? What but a forced confession that the sufferer's eyes were at last opened; that he felt that his life was an error, his mission a delusion, and his death the dissipation of his faith, his aspirations, and worse than all—of his fortitude? My lord, My lord, how many thousands of pious christians suffer practically the like foretaste of your promised hell, when on their death beds, they in similar agony vent their parting breath in such despairing exclamations as "*My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me ?*"

These agonies are the natural effects of such irreconcilable contradictions, anomalies, and mysteries upon anxious, sensitive, and candid minds, which are driven by them to bewilderment and despair, sometimes to insanity or suicide.

Think my lord, how much you may contribute to such agonies by such sermons!

I am my lord with great respect your lordship's fellow-labourer in the cause of truth.

Anti S(c)eptic.

Melbourne,

April, 22nd. 1880.

Royal Society Of Victoria The Week. By H. K. Rusden.

VERTICAL, SECTION OF The Great Pyramid of Jeezeh.

Plate I. (From PIAZZI SMYTH'S "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid.")

VERTICAL SECTION OF King's Chamber AND Ante Chamber, SHOWING (1) THE COFFER, CONTAINING 71,250 CUBIC INCHES, AND THE CUBIC GRANITE BLOCK (2) CONTAINING 17,812-5. ENGLISH QUARTER, 17,745,536.

Plate II. Rough Sketch of Plato XI. in PIAZZI SMYTH'S work, "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid."

THE GREAT PYRAMID OF JEEZEH

A C HEIGHT OF PYRAMID.

D B DIAMETER OF PYRAMID— 365*242 PYRAMID CUBITS.

E F G H BASE OF PYRAMID.

A B C D DIAMETRICAL VERTICAL SECTION.

A E C J DIAGONAL VERTICAL SECTION.

AC is to twice DB as #, or as 1 is to 3.14159, or as the diameter is to the circumference of a circle.

And A D B, the right section of the Pyramid, is to EFGH, the area of the base, as #, or as 1 is to 3.14159, or as the diameter to the circumference of a circle.

And AC, the height, is the radius of a circle equal in circumference to the external lines of the square base.

Thus actually squaring the circle as accurately as possible.

See PIAZZI SMYTH'S "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid."

The Week.

BY H. K. RUSDEN.

[Read 21st December, 1874.]

Circumstances have lately led me to investigate the subject of The Week, so far as the limited time and opportunities at my disposal permitted, and as a result I have a proposal to make, involving I conceive an improvement, equally important, desirable, and practicable. Before however explaining it in detail, it will be proper to glance at the natural history of the present conventional institution.

Materials for this investigation I have found to be meagre and scattered. I think, however, that there exist sufficient data to justify the decisive conclusion that the septenary cycle comes to us from the remotest antiquity; that is—from a period altogether prehistoric. The wide distribution of the week over Southern and Northern Asia, and also in Northern Europe, long before our era, is, I believe, unquestionable. This in itself would have little significance, were it not for a curious point of resemblance, which is unaccountable on any other theory than that of a common origin. It is very remarkable that the Scandinavians, the Chaldæans, the Persians, and the Hindoos, have always named the days from the planets, and in the same very peculiar order; peculiar in its curious variation from their relative astronomical order—real or supposed. The true order would be of course Sunday, Wednesday, Friday, Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday; after the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Moon, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. The Ptolemaic order would be Monday, Wednesday, Friday, Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday. The deviation of all weeks from both these arrangements is identical and universal, and should therefore be ascribed to a common source. Friday is the day held sacred by the Mahometans since the 6th century, and by the Hindoos for many thousands of years. Saturday is the Sabbath of

the Jews, who were therefore supposed, according to Plutarch

Symposia 5. Other points of resemblance between the Jewish and other mythologies are too striking for mere coincidence. Abraham corresponds with Brahma as well as with Saturn, Samson with Hercules, Jephtha's daughter with Iphigenia, &c., &c.

, to be worshippers of Saturn. Sunday is held sacred to rest or recreation wherever the Christian religion prevails, and has been so since the 3rd century; and as most nations have worshipped the sun, it has probably been the most generally observed in ancient times.

Though the septenary cycle has been used by most branches of the Aryan family, it seems singularly to have been unknown to the Greeks, and to the Romans and ancient Etruscans; who used respectively cycles of eight and ten days; the two former until about the 2nd century after our era

See Adams' *Roman Antiquities*, pp. 84 and 331.

But though the dominion of the Romans in Britain lasted till the 5th century, it is evident that our ancestors did not acquire the week from them, but had obtained it previously from Scandinavia, as is partly proved by our present names of the days, which belong to the old Scandinavian mythology. Indeed it seems not quite clear whence the Romans acquired it. They did not get it with their amended calendar from Egypt in Caesar's time, and it seems that they *could* have got it from the north as easily as from the east; for the Saxons and Kelts and other northern peoples had it long before their contact with the Romans.

Kees' *Cyclopaedia* (week) and *English Cyclopaedia*.

Dio Cassius

History of Rome, vol. xxxvii. See Sir G. C. Lewis, *Astronomy of Ancients*, p. 301.

reports that the Romans derived it shortly before his time (born 155) from the Egyptians, who he says named the days from the seven planets—or bodies then known—of our solar system. But the Egyptians are positively asserted

Humboldt's *Cosmos*, vol. iv. p. 412, quoting Lepsius in a note.

to have more anciently used a cycle of ten—not seven—days; and if they thus only acquired the week so lately from the east, the probabilities of the Romans having obtained it from the north are increased. The Egyptians had not even any original astronomy of their own, as Sir G. C. Lewis shews in his *Astronomy of the Ancients*, chap. v., nor were the Chaldæans—from whom they appear to have acquired what they possessed—the inventors or discoverers of it; nor were they the first to misapply it to purposes of astrology, or to name the days from the planets. Humboldt confidently says that shortly before our era, the Egyptians had not named the days from the planets, the signs of which were then perhaps only recently known to them. But Humboldt does not apparently consider, and perhaps could scarcely have been in possession of the ethnological and philological evidence, which modern research has revealed, of the great antiquity of a comparatively perfect civilisation and astronomy elsewhere, of which the relics only were found in India and Chaldæa. He, however, mentions that the Peruvians had a nine day cycle, with a day of rest in each; and that the Aztecs used weeks of five days, which they named from deities, one of whom, Wodan, was the counterpart of the Scandinavian Woden, from whom our Wednesday is named. The Indian Wednesday, Budhavaram, is thought to be derived from the same original as ours.

Mr. Proctor shows

Saturn and his System, (appendix on Chaldæan Astronomy).

that none of these peoples had any original astronomy, any more than the Egyptians; and I find elsewhere Bailly's *Histoire de l'Astronomie*.

that they reckoned eclipses, &c., by rules, of the origin and basis of which they had no knowledge. But Mr. Proctor shows also that all their old astronomical records present indications of having been derived from a far superior but extinct civilisation, of which no historical vestige remains, but which must have had its seat in a much more northern latitude. He says, that the length of the winter and summer days given in the oldest Brahminical and Persian records—the oldest Babylonian star risings obtained by Ptolemy—and the measurement of the earth adopted by ancient astronomers, all correspond to a latitude of about 45° north. Finally he adduces reasons—from old Chaldæan representations, which he reproduces, of Venus, Jupiter, and Saturn, as Mylitta, Bel, and Nisroch or Asshur; and from the fact of a plano-convex rock crystal lens having been discovered by Layard at Nimroud—for believing that these ancient astronomers probably possessed telescopic appliances of sufficient perfection to enable them to discern the crescent form of Venus, the satellites of Jupiter, and perhaps even the ring of Saturn.

From Sir Wm. Drummond's

Sir Wm. Drummond died in 1828. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society, and British Ambassador at the Two Sicilies and at Constantinople. He wrote a *Review of the Government of Sparta and Athens*, *Herculanensia*, *Odin*, *Origines*, *ædipus Judaicus*, and this work on the *Zodiacs*.

work on the *Zodiacs* I am compelled to quote—though through an admittedly reliable channel—at second

hand (which I regret, as I thereby lose the references to his authorities which he always gives).

See Godfrey Higgins' *Keltic Druids*, p. 50, and Do Morgan's *Budget of Paradoxes*, p. 164. He says; "The fact however is certain, that at some remote period there were mathematicians and astronomers who knew that the sun is in the centre of the planetary system, and that the earth—itsself a planet—revolves round the central fire; who calculated, or like ourselves attempted to calculate, the return of comets, and who knew that these bodies move in elliptical orbits, immensely elongated, having the sun in one of their foci; who indicated the number of the solar years contained in the great cycle, by multiplying a period (variously called in the Zend, the Sanscrit, and the Chinese *ven, van, and phen*) of 180 years by another period of 144 years; who reckoned the sun's distance from the earth at 800,000,000 of Olympic stadia" (=91,931,818 miles at 606¾ feet to the stadium), "and who must therefore have taken the parallax of that luminary by a method, not only much more perfect than that said to be invented by Hipparchus, but little inferior in exactness to that now in use among the moderns" (much *more* exact, as it now appears, for Sir W. D. knew nothing of the late corrections of the estimated distance in question, which he only knew as 95 millions of miles); "who could scarcely have made a mere guess when they fixed the moon's distance from its primary planet at 59 semi-diameters of the earth; who had measured the circumference of our globe with so much exactness that their calculation only differed by a few feet from that made by our modern mathematicians; who held that the moon and other planets were worlds like our own, and that the moon was diversified by mountains, and valleys, and seas; who asserted that there was yet a planet which revolved round the sun beyond the orbit of Saturn, who reckoned the planets to be 16 in number, and who reckoned the length of the tropical year within three minutes of the true time; nor indeed were they wrong at all, if a tradition mentioned by Plutarch be correct."—*Drummond on the Zodiacs*, p. 36.

With respect to the extent to which the Copernican or Pythagorean system was received about the time of our era, it will suffice to refer to St. Augustin (*De Civitate Dei*, lib. 16, ch. 9, vol. vii. Paris 1685) and Lactantius (*Institutiones Divince*, lib. 3, ch. 24, vol. i. Deux Ponts 1786), who both found the doctrine so prevalent as to require their special and too successful opposition and condemnation.

See Patrice Larroque's *Examen Critique des Doctrines de la Religion Chretienne*, 4th ed. Paris, 1870. Vol. ii. p. 68. See also *Supernatural Religion*, p. 87, Australian Edition.

I believe that M. Bailly

Maire de Paris, Garde honoraire des tableaux du Roi. L'un des quarante de l'Academie Royal des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, de celle des Sciences, et de l'Institut de Bologne, des Academies de Stockholm, de Harlem et de Padoue, et de la Soeiété des Antiquitfis de Cassel.

the historian of astronomy, is the author of the specific hypothesis of an antediluvian highly civilised people, who, as he says, "brought the sciences to perfection; a people who in the great enterprise of discovering the exact measurement of the earth, dwelt under the 49th degree of latitude." He is often quoted without specific references, and his works in our Public Library are without that indispensable feature in the eyes of inquirers—a good index. The cycles were special subjects of investigation with Bailly. He held that the week was certainly antediluvian, concluding that it was impossible that the seven days composing it could have been dedicated to the same planets in Egypt, India, and Chaldæa, in identical order in these and in many other places beside, unless it had been derived from some older common source. As regards the prehistoric high civilisation his position seems impregnable. But his theory that it was destroyed or scattered by the traditionary flood seems irreconcilable with facts. In the first place the date assigned to Noah's flood, 1655 B.C., is not nearly so old as the Chinese and the Brahminical eras, which also imply a much older separate civilisation; and as Bailly remarks, they evidently exhibit the *debris* rather than the *elements* of science. But if the careful labours of Piazzzi Smyth at the Great Pyramid have not been altogether thrown away and misrepresented too, the construction of that most ancient of monuments alone bears ample and irrefragable testimony to the existence—when it was designed—of astronomical and mathematical science,

See Plates I., II., and III., pp. 27 and 28. I take Professor Smyth's best attested facts, but do not accept his theories.

far excelling any which obtained for thousands of subsequent years, but which must have been entirely obsolete and forgotten before the other pyramids in its vicinity were built; probably about 4,000 years ago. The Great Pyramid should thus be clearly antediluvian.

It seems also above all improbable that any flood should destroy so entirely all relics of a civilisation established—not on a low level—but on the elevated lands of high Asia. It seems to me that subsequent experience of the decadence of other civilisations gives a better key to the obliteration of that, which—I think with M. Bailly—certainly existed over fifty centuries ago to the north of Bokhara and Samarcand. We have every reason to believe that the esoteric system of the monopoly of knowledge by a small number of persons, prevailed in the greatest exaggeration in the most distant times. The vitality of the principle—which, though exploded in theory and in conscious practice, has still in a modified form its advocates—is a guarantee of its

antiquity. I believe that that monopoly of knowledge and thence of wealth, necessarily produced an antagonism of classes, which, in the inevitable ultimate collision between them, resulted in the annihilation of the instructed few by the exasperated ignorant many; and that this same cause has always been the main factor in the evanescence and destruction of past civilisations. This is in any case a most important problem, which has met with wonderful neglect. But is it not absolutely accordant with the allegorical Oriental habit, and the esoteric system too, to understand this great deluge as an irresistible flood of barbarism and ignorance overwhelming all extant human wisdom? Have not such deluges been too frequent within historical time? Can the old legend be thus explained in a form in which—in strict accordance with the spirit of the record—the misrepresentation of natural catastrophes as possible manifestations of divine anger, is transformed into important historical admonition? I think so. I think—passing over many equally significant instances, such as the Egyptian, Persian, Tyrian, Greek, and Roman extinct glories, to one within our more immediate knowledge,—that the French revolution, which was essentially an outcome of a like antagonism of classes, similarly produced, and capable of entirely overwhelming a less distributed civilisation, was merely history repeating itself for perhaps the thousandth time; and that the only security *we* possess for the stability of *our* civilisation, lies in the wider and wider dissemination of knowledge, which prevents its destruction in social cataclysms, and also tends to lessen the antagonism of classes.

From this primeval high civilisation, antecedent to that deluge, we derive I think, besides this significant lesson, the weekly cycle, the Great Pyramid, the Sanscrit language, the Zodiacal signs and constellations, if not the symbols of both—the still extant esoteric system of Freemasonry—Chaldæan and Indian astronomy—the Aryan race and civilising instinct—and in fact the germs of civilisation generally. It may be said that the invention of the week belongs to a very early period and rude condition in the history of Astronomy; being probably but a subdivision of the lunar cycle. Doubtless so it is. But that marks some progress made, especially as I think the week was a subdivision of the sidereal revolution of the moon in 27-32166 days, not of the synodical one of 29-53059 days; which is the more obviously observable cycle, though not approximately divisible by four; and which forms the apparent basis of the Julian and other months of 30 and 31 days. The Kelts, I find, had not only the seven-day week but twelve months also;

See Toland's History of the Druids.

and I have met with a statement

Bailly's *Histoire de l'Astronomie Ancienne*, p. 324.

with regard to astronomy, to the effect that Rudbeck calculated from the displacement of a festival recorded as being anciently fixed at 20 days from the winter solstice, that the Swedes 2,300 years B.C. knew the right number of days in the year, though they had not provided the intercalation necessary to compensate for the fractional excess. Nevertheless, the coincident order of the Scandinavian days, and the Aryan roots in the Keltic languages, prove their indebtedness to the same stock as the Indian and Chaldæan civilisations. For further instance, it can scarcely be a mere coincidence that the British measure of capacity—the *quarter*—that of which it is a quarter having otherwise completely eluded research, corresponds closely with the cubic measure of which the standard is extant in the antechamber of the Great Pyramid, and which is an *exact* QUARTER of the contents of the great coffer or sarcophagus in the King's Chamber.

See Plate II. p. 27.

Professor Piazzi Smyth considers that he has identified many other interesting items of our inheritance in the Great Pyramid.

I have alluded to the curious order in which the days of the week succeed each other, which is found consistently the same wherever the weekly cycle is known, and which does not correspond at all to the real or supposed astronomical order of the planets after which the days are named. Dio Cassius says that the order of the days had relation, 1st, to the musical intervals; or 2nd, to the astrological allotment of the planets to the hours of the day; or 3rd, to their distribution among the signs of the Zodiac. It is a curious fact, that the astrological appropriation of the hours of the day, as well *as* of the days themselves, to the seven bodies of our then known solar system—as being peculiarly under their influence—should furnish the method of connection between the universal order of the days, and the order of the planets in the Ptolemaic solar system. For the astrological order was of ancient date in Ptolemy's time, and his solar system was therefore scarcely his, but was based upon that of the Astrologers. In the absence of any other known or probable basis for the connection of the order of the week days with that of the planets, I conceive that it had its origin in the pernicious esoteric system, by which everything was rendered enigmatical and obscure to all but the initiated.

I am not aware of any particular probable site of the high civilisation thus inferred by Bailly, Drummond, and Proctor, as the common source of its various posthumous offshoots in different directions. According to Mr. Proctor, it should be five degrees farther north than Samarcand (39°5G), and it seems to me that the most moderate guess at its date must be at least 6,000 years ago, and that it is probably much further back. Bunsen Brande's *Dictionary* (Aryan).

reckons the immigration of the Aryans into India at from 80 to 100 centuries B.C., and Laplace mentions two epochs, 2,000 and 15,000 years ago, at which the significance of the signs of the Zodiac in the position of the heavens was so marked as to suggest their introduction then. He says

Laplace's *Système du Monde*, p. 316.

—referring to the greater period—"Capricorn, or the constellation of the Goat, appears to be more properly placed at the highest than at the lowest point of the sun's course." I know not whether he included in his scheme the fact of Canopus (in Arabic the *south* star) having actually been about that time a south pole star,

Dupuis' *Origines des tons les Cultes*, vol. iii. p. 426.

or that the Samaritan Pentateuch commences with the words, "In the beginning the GOAT (Azima) created the heaven and the earth,"

lb. vol. v. p. 67.

which is neither absurd nor unintelligible if read—"When the Zodiacal signs were first distributed, Capricornus held the dominant position indicated by Laplace." These are merely coincidences with Dupuis' great work, which I remarked on reading Laplace's statement. Laplace had doubtless far more substantial reasons for his opinion. It is, perhaps, right to mention that Laplace respectfully differs from Bailly as to the antiquity of astronomy; but with all deference to his weighty authority, I cannot but think that the philological evidence discovered since his time, more than outweighs his objections.

The suicidal esoteric system seems to have subsisted in this primeval civilisation in the most exclusive form, and to have effectually prevented the spread and survival of more than mere fragments of the knowledge upon which it was based. But I believe that ethnology and philology both point to the same approximate site for the original home of the Aryan family and speech. The patriarchs of the Brahmin race seem to have been those who survived the collapse of their ancestors' civilisation, and are admitted to have brought with them to India (but how long afterwards must be mere matter of conjecture), amongst the relics of their former state, the Sanscrit language, the weekly cycle, and a half-understood or forgotten astronomy; together with the most radical distinctions of classes known.

I think it reasonable to suppose, that if the Brahmins exhibit signs of the most direct derivation from the primeval civilised race, they were probably the immediate survivors of the social convulsion, which is supposed to have almost annihilated the antecedent civilisation. The customs (and among them notably the week) which appear to be due to the same source, and which still survive among the descendants of the Kelts and Scandinavians, I should judge to have spread westward long before the extinction of the civilisation which gave them birth. Those which survive in China were probably received thence at even an earlier date. The Chinese appear to me to exhibit the *rudiments* rather than the *débris* of an astronomical science, and never to have advanced beyond them, though they have always made and recorded observations. The authors of the Chinese calendar may have emigrated from, or only had communication with, the Aryan patriarchs, after the division of the year into months of the length of the sidereal lunar revolution, the division of which by four gives the ordinary weekly cycle. For although it is generally stated, mainly I believe on the authority of Freret

See *Encyclopædia Britannica*, *art. Chronology*.

in the last century, that the Chinese have a cycle of ten days instead of seven, and though Laplace ascribes to them a cycle of 60 days, as well as 60 years, still on referring to Sir John Davis' work (an unimpeachable authority I believe) on the Chinese, I find (vol. ii. p. 73) that he, after admitting points of resemblance between the astronomical systems of India and China, indirectly shows that the Chinese have at least an equivalent of a septenary cycle. He says "the Chinese reckon *five* planets, to the exclusion of the sun and moon, but they give the names of one of their twenty-eight lunar mansions" (into which their Zodiac is divided) "successively to each day of the year in a perpetual rotation, without regard to the moon's changes; so that the same four out of the twenty-eight invariably fall on our Sundays, and constitute as it were, perpetual Sunday letters. A native Chinese first remarked this odd fact to the author, and on examination it proved perfectly correct." This coincidence appears to me to arise from the simple fact that their cycle is a multiple, and therefore a full equivalent of ours; and as they make no intercalations of less than a full month of 28 days, the coincidence is perpetual. Though the Chinese thus have not a perfect septenary cycle, still their system without doubt, regarding other coincidences, originated—though at a very distant date—from the same source as ours, with which it synchronises so well. Laplace says the seven day week was known to them from the most remote periods. Their monthly cycle, and their sixty year cycle, are probably as old as their era, or 45 centuries, if not as old as Fo Hi, or 52 centuries past.

See *Meadows' The Chinese and their Rebellious*, p. 329.

There is certainly no geographical or chronological improbability in the derivation of the Chinese calendar from the locality indicated, and I think that the division of the 28 days cycle—based doubtless on the sidereal lunar period in preference to the synodical period—is strongly suggestive of a common origin with the seven day week, after the more accurate determination of the moon's revolution.

Not only, however, is the great antiquity of the weekly cycle sufficiently and conclusively established, but its wide expansion over the world, even to islands of the southern oceans, argues a far more ancient origin than that to which it has been commonly referred. If, as modern criticism claims to have shown, the Hebrew Scriptures were not compiled before the time of Ezra, or Hilkiah, or Samuel at farthest

See Home's Introduction, and Sir Isaac Newton's Observations on Daniel.

(that is the 5th, the 7th, or the 11th century B.C.), the Sabbath (and the Jews had no specific names for the other days of the week

Humboldt's Cosmos, vol. iv. p. 413. English Cyclopædia and Horne's Introduction.

), which is not mentioned from the 40th to the 15th century B.C., was actually not instituted—even for the Jews—according to their own records, until at least 15 centuries (and probably many more) after the septenary cycle was in use by the Chaldeans, the Hindoos, and probably the Scandinavians and Chinese. But even supposing for the nonce that Moses himself really had instituted the Jewish Sabbath, *his* reputed date is only the 16th century B.C., while Fo Hi's in China was the 33rd; the Kali Yug in India was the 31st; the Scandinavian was the 23rd; and Egyptian records, according to Bunsen, extend back to the 35th, when the astronomy from which their eras were all derived was forgotten and lost. It has always been a standing difficulty—why, if the Sabbath was, as such, instituted at the supposed creation—or 40 centuries B.C., its observance should never have been inculcated even on the Jews for more than 20 centuries after. The accommodative principle upon which the recorded six days of creation have been expanded into as many geological periods, only magnifies this difficulty indefinitely.

This rough sketch of the materials for forming an opinion respecting the age and origin of the week, is far from exhaustive, or even satisfactory in itself; being based necessarily upon anything but original authorities. But it is, I think, amply sufficient for my purpose, which is simply to show that though doubtless Sunday was always as sacred for us in Europe as Friday is for a Hindoo or a Mahometan, or Saturday for a Jew; yet there is evidently nothing intrinsic in the day itself, or in the septenary cycle, or in the origin of either, to determine their perpetuation otherwise than as they concur with human convenience. But if there were other grounds for preserving either intact, still after the numerous changes and alterations of calendars by every people, the identification of any particular day must now be purely arbitrary, and the real original seventh day it must now be a matter of impossibility to distinguish.

I find that it is a disputed point when the Hebrew calendar was formed. It has been referred by some to our year 500, by others to 325, by others 300, while some contend for an older origin. (*English Cyclopædia*, art. Calendar.) I am willing to concede a possibly much greater antiquity for it than is even claimed, and I offer the following as a rational solution—in strict accordance with the known style of esoteric Oriental tradition—of a part of Genesis (ch. 5), which has hitherto defied reconciliation with experience or probability. I think it not unlikely that the exceptional longevity attributed to the antediluvian patriarchs, and which Professor Owen has concluded to have been physiologically impossible, may really be a symbolical record of the numerous attempts to discover the true length of the annual cycle; and that Enoch the *perfect* man who was *taken* and accepted by God, and who lived just *three hundred and sixty-five* years, represents the epoch when that was discovered to be the true number of days in the year, and the calendar was thenceforward upon that basis taken and accepted as perfect. I am of course aware that the record refers to no specific date, and that it was promulgated and perhaps written after the 10th Century, B.C.

No objection therefore on that ground can be valid against a further alteration of the day or week, provided that preponderating reasons can be adduced on other grounds in favour of it. In fact, the only way possible now, to make sure of sometimes hitting on the right original seventh day, if any, is to alter the cycle to another number of days, which would of course make the new Sunday, or Sabbath, or day of rest, occasionally coincide with the original one.

I now come to the proposition—the making of which is the object of this paper. This is, to shorten the week from seven to five days, as the Romans formerly found it convenient to reduce theirs from eight to seven. I am satisfied from a variety of reasons that the present week is too long. I think that people work much harder now than they did when the septenary cycle was first instituted, and that six days of such continuous hard work to one of rest is too much. This is proved by the innovations made upon the Saturday, which is now neither one thing nor the other. It is admitted that it is no business day; that for business purposes it is practically worthless. People attend at their offices as a mere matter of form, though as a business day they allow that it is a delusion and a mockery. But as a holiday it is worse than a delusion; it is a snare. It is no holiday. For no one worth noticing gets it all, and very many—particularly those who most require it—never get it at all. It is clear that the eight hours movement is of very partial benefit, and the fact that numerous classes are entirely and hopelessly excluded from it, makes it extremely desirable to devise some method of affording them equivalent advantages. I cannot see that this can be done, unless by a change like that which I propose. In any case, the only thing that the half-Saturday does plainly and completely, is this; it furnishes ample proof that the week is felt by every

one to be too long.

Now the lunar synodic cycle is twenty-nine days and a little over a half. A weekly cycle therefore of six days, or five days, would synchronise with the lunar cycle much more nearly than any division of twenty-eight could possibly do; if it were any object to conform to a lunar period at all. I recommend the quinary rather than the sexenary cycle. It would concur better with the denary scale now in use in notation and computation; it would leave no odd day over in an ordinary year; and I believe it would better proportion hard labour to rest. If any man works his best for four full days continuously, I think that he will be quite ready, and that it will be good for him, to rest on the fifth. This is all that would really be necessary, except the rigorous preservation of the fifth day as a day of rest from labour; and of intellectual cultivation, for which one day in five would be little enough, though infinitely better than any evening after a hard day's work.

But the proposed change would not be nearly such a startling innovation as it might at first sight appear. By having a complete universal holiday, on one day in five, instead of one day and a half (but the half-day neither universal nor complete) in seven, there would be really a difference of but one seventieth. That is, there would be in seventy days—at four working days and one rest day to the week—fourteen complete days of rest; and at five and a half working days and one and a half rest days to the week, fifteen days of rest. My plan would thus subtract just one-seventieth of rest from those who get more than they require, but would secure to those who really want it the real equivalent of the half day which *now* they cannot get.

But the advantages of making the months of a uniform length of thirty days or six weeks each, leaving an odd week, and in leap year also an odd day, for an annual festival to welcome the new year, are so very clear and great, as to induce me to include this amendment also in my proposal. I think it would be a great convenience and advantage to be able to know at once the day of the week by that of the month; or the day of the month by that of the week. Commercially and privately, the vast simplification of all calculations of interest, wages, &c., by making all the months of a uniform length, would prove of immense advantage. Indeed, at present, in the calculation of interest, the great inconveniences of reckoning by the week or month, are so obvious, as to lead to their abandonment altogether; and interest tables are always constructed for the number of days alone, which has then to be adapted in each case to the actual period required. The constantly recurring complex computations rendered inevitable by the weeks and months being non-coterminous, and the months being of various lengths, involve an enormous amount of unnecessary labour, which my proposal would entirely obviate.

I will offer one or two simple illustrations of the advantages of the change. Say—on what day of the week will fall the 3rd of next September or October, or the 23rd of those months? It would take some time under present arrangements to ascertain this simple information, without an almanac; and even with one the easiest plan would be to refer to it for each required day separately. By my plan you would know at once, without reference or calculation, that the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th, 23rd, and 28th of every month must always fall on the 3rd day of the week, and the like would be as easily known of every other day of the week or month. Say—next, to what does five shillings a week for nine months amount? or for one month? You cannot give it at all, until the month or months are specified, and then the amount will vary for other nine months, or another month. Whereas by my system of having six weeks in each month, you would know at once that five shillings a week is thirty shillings a month, and adding one week to the twelve months it is £18 5s. a year. The enormous saving in trouble, time, and labour, which would thus constantly accrue, must be obvious. Nearly all the ordinary every day calculations of wages, &c., would be saved entirely, and after the first year almanacs would be almost superfluous.

I think it would furnish also a very good opportunity for discarding the present old pagan names of our days, by substituting others for them, such as "Oneday," "Twoday," "Threeday," "Fourday," for the current heathen names of the week days, and some appropriate distinctive name instead of Sunday, which has of course been a complete misnomer ever since the worship of the sun on that day was abolished. "*Redday*" would too readily suggest idleness as the proper use of it, and ignore the fact that the best mental rest is variation rather than cessation of occupation. I think that "*Goodday*" would best express the intended value and right use of it. I also think that the odd intercalatory day every fourth year should be a "*goodday*" added at the end of the year.

Such an alteration would interfere with the calendar no further than as it would prove a convenience. All dates, historical, legal, or commercial; all anniversaries and calendrical epochs, are fixed by the day of the year or month, not of the week, and therefore would not be affected. In fixing the date of Easter-day, it would give two-sevenths more precision. It would, in fact, greatly facilitate every computation in which portions of a year, month, or week, were factors. Indeed it is difficult to see whom or what it would affect otherwise than advantageously. The proportion of weekly to daily wages would adjust itself at once. To those engaged in ordinary necessary labour on Sundays now, it could, of course, make no difference; while to those engaged in the special ministrations and exercises which are regarded as peculiarly appropriate to the Sunday, it would afford additional opportunities, in the twenty-one more Sundays, or total of seventy-three in the year, of

performing duties for which time is all too short, and must appear to those who sincerely delight in them still shorter. From this class, therefore, I count upon the strongest support.

I contemplate one possible effect with much complacency. If our Jewish brethren would also adopt my suggestion, on account of what I cannot but regard as its manifest advantages, how gratifying it would be to know that they were enjoying their holiday at the same time as ourselves. I protest that I never meet a Jew going to or returning from his synagogue on Saturday, without feeling a strong impulse to apologise for doing my secular business upon his Sabbath, while he is debarred from doing his upon our Sunday. The present one-sided distinction always strikes me painfully as a relic of ancient illiberality and alienation of feeling, which should surely now be obsolete, and I cannot but think that the adoption of a common day of rest would tend much to promote the social feeling to which it is so desirable that there should be no exception. The fact that these excellent fellow-citizens have hitherto had practically only five working days a week to our six, is demonstrative proof that six working days in seven are not indispensable. Four working days in five are obviously a larger proportion by 3-35ths, than five in seven. But should the sect to which I allude decline to adopt the quinary week which I propose, were *we* to do so, there would still occur on every seventh Goodday and fifth Sabbath, a synchronism of practice which would surely promote a sympathy of feeling. The prospect of the attainment of such objects is surely a strong ground of recommendation of my scheme.

I propose thus simply to have a week of five days, instead of seven. This would give exactly 73 complete weeks in a common year, and one day over in leap year. I also recommend the allotment of an equal number (30) of days, or six weeks, to each month, leaving over one festival week, say at the new year, with an extra "Goodday" added every leap year. I presume that an act of the Legislature would be necessary to give effect to the proposal, but public opinion must, of course, precede legislative action. I have thought it better to make the suggestion first to this Society, in order that it may be at once subjected to the skilled criticism of those competent to say whether any inconvenience could possibly result in connection with the calendar, so that objections on that score, which is really of primary importance, might be disposed of once one way or the other. When no rational objection can be discovered to a proposal of this kind, it is not unusual to allege that, however desirable it may be in theory, it would nevertheless be bad in practice, or that it would be *impracticable*

For the refutation of this "Fallacy of Confusion," see Bentham's *Book of Fallacies*, ch. 9.

Such an argument of course yields entirely the question of expediency, but is itself obviously no better than the opposite simple assertion; and if reasons be on the other hand advanced to show that similar innovations have formerly been successfully made, it stands refuted until at least the experiment be tried. But in this case far more difficult innovations, even involving an alteration of the calendar, have at different times been made with perfect success by Julius Cæsar, Pope Gregory XIII, and others. But more, the week itself was actually altered by the Romans, Greeks, and many other peoples; and, in fact, as there is no record of any attempt to alter the week having ever failed, the allegation of impracticability is so far proved to be utterly baseless. The probability is that there would be no difficulty whatever.

I think the perfect practicability, as well as the many and manifest advantages of this scheme, would be apparent on the printing of the first almanac in conformity with it. But the greatest of its benefits could not possibly be appreciated until after it should have been earned into practical execution. I mean the great relief to those who really labour hardest and who cannot now secure opportunities for self-improvement.

Doubtless some people can congratulate themselves upon having rest and leisure enough. Some, there is shrewd reason to suspect, have too much of both. My proposal accommodates even them, by reducing their superfluous leisure by one-seventieth. But it is not made expressly in their interest. I make it in the interest of those who, by the force of circumstances, have too little; who not only labour hard on five days and a half in every week, but cannot secure time for self-improvement on the other half of the Saturday which their more fortunate neighbours have and do not appreciate, and which they are never likely also to get, unless it be guaranteed to them by making it as inviolable as Sunday itself.

I append a table showing the names of the days of the week in ten different languages, and three diagrams from Piazzzi Smyth's *Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid*, giving sufficient proofs of the science displayed in the construction of that ancient monument.

Names of the Days of the Week in

Based upon Arago's *Pop. Astronomy*, vol. ii. p. 727.

Melbourne: Stillwell and Knight, Printers, Collins Street East.

The Treatment of Criminals in Relation to Science.

An Essay READ BEFORE THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF VICTORIA, MELBOURNE, ON MONDAY,, 11TH NOVEMBER 1872.

By H. K. Rusden. Melbourne: GEORGE ROBERTSON, 69 ELIZABETH STREET. 1872.

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The Treatment of Criminals in Relation to Science.

BY H. K. RUSDEN.

[Read before the Royal Society of Victoria, 11th November, 1872.]

THE proper method of disposing of criminals is a subject upon which there appeal's to be as great a diversity of opinion, as any with which I am acquainted. If the best plan has ever been proposed, it would seem to have found small favour; for I know of none—whether practised or not—which is not widely and loudly condemned, not excepting even those most in vogue. Some persons still advocate flogging and hanging; others exclaim at such expedients with horror, as being not only wrong, but brutal, and also ineffective as deterrents. Some, with Mr. Carlyle, would swiftly sweep from the universe the Devil's regiments of the line. Others find more joy in trying—however ineffectually—to bring one sinner to repentance, than in giving countenance and assistance to thousands of other men who need everything *but* repentance. Some are for doing more or less than *justice* to the criminals; some few to their victims—past and future; some few regard the claims of society; but in what justice to any of them consists scarcely two persons agree. I believe that this variety of opinion arises from want of clear perception of the nature of crime and of criminals, and of the relations of society to both. Most of those who are best acquainted with the subject—agree,—that there is a large and more or less distinct class of persons, who by birth, education, habit, and therefore inclination, subsist entirely—or mainly—by crime; by systematically preying upon their neighbour's property, generally with small care whether their neighbour's lives become involved in its acquisition. It appears that though occasional accessions from without are received by this class, they are actually trifling in number, and comparatively easy to deal with; it does not seem that the ranks of crime would thus be permanently augmented, but for the association with the criminal class which the adoption of such a career necessarily involves. On these points the evidence of experts is consistent, as a rule;

See F. Hill "On Crime." M. D. Hill "On the Eepression of Crime." Dr. J. Brace Thomson's "Psychology of Criminals," in the Journal of Mental Science, Oct. 1870. Quarterly Review "The Police of London," July 1870, &c.

but one of the leading psychologists of the day traces all such cases of apparent aberration from a moral type, either to hereditary taint or physical lesion.

Dr. Maudsley's address before the Psychological Section of the British Medical Association, *Lancet*, August 10th, 1872. In justice to myself, I must state that with the single exception of the above allusion, any coincidence between my paper and Dr. Maudsley's invaluable address, is purely accidental. This paper was prepared for the meeting of the Royal Society of Victoria on the 14th October, and Dr. Maudsley's address was not received in Melbourne until the following mail.

The broad assertion frequently made, that members of the criminal class can readily be recognised at a glance by an acute officer, is scarcely eligible as a basis of action. A very remarkable statement, however, made by one of the highest authorities on the subject, is worthy of the gravest attention. Mr. Fredk. Hill (for many years Inspector of Prisons in England and Scotland), in his valuable work on "Crime," gives as the result of his long experience and statistical knowledge (p. 55), that "nothing has been more clearly "shown than that crime is to a considerable extent "hereditary." And he further says (p. 56), "If all the "criminals in the present generation could be collected and "placed in confinement—the young to be cured, and the old "to pass the remainder of their days under control, the next "generation would probably contain but few thieves." And he continues, "One of the most serious evils perhaps of the "system of short confinements is, that it allows the "perpetuation of a race of criminals. So long as a man is in "prison, he cannot at any rate become the father of future "offenders; and as the greatest number of crimes is com-"mitted at that age at which the passions are most violent, "this consideration is a further and important reason for "long and unbroken periods of confinement." Report for 1836, p. 23. A most important statement, which Mr. Hill proceeds to corroborate with statistical proof. But even Mr. Hill scarcely appears adequately to recognise the entire scope and significance of the evidence he adduces to support it. He shows that the actual number of criminals bears to the number of crimes constantly committed a very much smaller proportion than is commonly supposed; that the large majority of offences is committed by criminals who have been imprisoned and released; that thousands of crimes are committed by one criminal, and that the loss to the community by his depredations amounts to many thousands of pounds. And this is not only probable, but inevitable, if his theory is correct. If there *is* a large number of persons whose profession is crime, it *must* be of almost constant commission; and as is otherwise probable, the crimes unreported and perhaps unsuspected, bear a large proportion to those detected or even known. A single party of Manchester pickpockets

is estimated to have cost England more than £26,000 (p. 59).

Mr. Hill speaks of the imprisonment for life of all our criminals at once, as very desirable, though scarcely practicable; and appears to regard the state of public opinion as a more insuperable difficulty than even the cost of their arrest and maintenance. The first obstacle must, I think, give way, if it be only plainly and often enough shown that the balance of results would be clearly and largely good. And if a criminal cost much more in plunder, surveillance, detection, conviction, and occasional imprisonment, than he would in detention for life; the latter course must clearly be the most economical. The diminished expense for detections and convictions in the future should not be omitted from the calculation. And even if ten times the present expenditure were found to be necessary for gaols at first, a large economy would thus inevitably result; while far more important objects would also be attained; namely, the increased security to society of life and property; the fewer accessions to the criminal class from evil example and association; and the certain check to the propagation of criminal children. This, as the most perfect of all preventives, is an object of such transcendent importance, as should counterbalance many weighty objections, did such exist. But prevention has always been subordinated to cure, and to cure of the most imperfect and impossible description; instead of being adopted as *itself* the most perfect cure of all.

But it seems more than doubtful whether any extra expense would be involved for gaols—even at first. "No unreformed inmates of a prison," says Mr. M. D. Hill (*Repression of Crime*, p. 465), "however extravagant "its expenditure, cost the community so much as they "would do—if at large. This fact has been so often "proved that I must be allowed to assume it as un-"deniable." It has been estimated that a criminal at large costs three or four times as much as when perpetually imprisoned.

See p. 502, quotation from *Weekly Dispatch*, 14th October, 1855.

But even if the cost should be found to increase a little, that little would inevitably soon decrease; and before I conclude, I shall propose an expedient by which the cost—and every other real disadvantage—would be reduced to a minimum, while incalculable benefits would demonstrably result to the community, both physically and morally.

The broad proposition—that *no convicted criminal should ever be released*, is one which can scarcely be expected to gain ready acceptance on its first proposal; though I look upon its ultimate adoption as certain. The wisest and most beneficent suggestions have always met with strenuous opposition at first, and have never been cordially adopted, until the objectors discovered that the ends they *themselves* had most at heart, were actually being best effected in spite of their opposition. Man, however, never learns anything—except under compulsion. Few will contest that of all economic subjects, this is one—the solution of which is of the first importance, or that it has yet to be found; and fewer still will fail to recognise that the moral aspects of the question are more important still.

The present state of things is notoriously unsatisfactory, but the full extent of the mischief produced can scarcely be apprehended, for it is of daily increasing proportions. A worse than foreign enemy is maintained by us in our midst, and favoured with every advantage that our civilisation can furnish. We endow the criminal—known or unknown—with every protection from the ministers of the law which is accorded to the honest citizen, and actually assume that he has not done what we know he has done, until a certain method of proof has been fulfilled; and any loophole that a clever lawyer can find, is made effectual to save him from the legal consequences. But if—by force of circumstances, a conviction follow, the consequences tend rather to confirm him in his evil career, and perfect him in his profession. He lives as before, at the cost of his honest neighbours, with medical and every other attendance free; the most select of the society he prizes most, and no more work than is exactly calculated to keep him in health. He is far better fed, housed, and cared for, than many honest labourers;

See *Argus* (supplement), 16th October, 1872, as regards the prison dietary scale in America. Also, *Mayhew's London Labour and London Poor*, (to which I have lost an important reference) as regards the Dietary Scale in England. Also at Munich, and Valencia, see *Repression of Crime*, pp. 552 and 556, &c.

and he not only knows it, but proves by returning to it as soon as possible, that he appreciates it. But this is not all. Exactly in proportion to his reward for his crime, is the . discouragement to the honest labourer, who cannot but be made too well aware of the difference in their fortunes on every fresh liberation of the protected idler, to whose support he knows he has to contribute ! The only wonder is that crime is not more general than it is.

I would define a *criminal* as one whose acts are *habitually* predatory, and in contravention of the laws which protect property and person. If a criminal act were shown to be incongruous with the character and previous habits of the perpetrator, I would not call him a criminal; but if his criminal act were shown to accord with his habits and disposition, I would at once class him as a criminal upon his first conviction. A second conviction should be taken as decisive—as to criminal habit and disposition under any circumstances. One criminal act may not *prove* a habit or disposition; but its recurrence *is* proof of a liability which *must* augment

with repetition. A habit is only a more advanced stage of the same course. But habits are formed and confirmed under ordinary conditions of life; and there can hardly be a more glaring or mischievous fallacy than the supposition, that conduct produced by the discipline, and exhibited within the precincts of a gaol, will probably be maintained under opposite conditions outside it, and in the face of habits which were the outcome of previous longer life, and which are stronger in proportion. "Can the "Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots ? Then "may ye also do good, that are *accustomed* to do evil." (Jer. xiii. 23.) Experience and statistics combine to prove the strict truth of this wise saying, and that it is impossible to make good citizens out of confirmed bad ones. In fact, they must be TRANSFORMED physically, before moral reform can be possible. Every tree is known by its fruits, and good deeds should no more be expected from bad men, than grapes from thorns, or tenderness from tigers. Vice to the vicious, and crime to the criminal, are as natural as heredity, habit, and association can make them; and if their subjects are temporarily susceptible *under certain conditions* to corrective influences, they are inevitably more so to the predeterminations of inheritance and habit, when the conditions are renewed under which they were originally developed. Every individual is as much an example of the PERSISTENCE OF FORCE, as is any other object in the universe. The force of habit is as certain and necessary as that of gravity. And this is admittedly a fact, proved by the statistics of crime, so far as they have been investigated. In Dr. J. Bruce Thomson's article on the "Psychology of Criminals" in the Journal of Mental Science (Oct. 1870, p. 343), he says : "They seem not amenable to moral treat-ment. All the appliances of chaplains and teachers, with all "the discipline of prison legislation, are not known to turn "any from the error of their ways. The criminal goes out "of and into prison many times, and the hopeless imbecile "is not reformed if a professional criminal. Such are set "at large, after short sentences, to my seeming, with as "much judgment as guided the Knight of La Mancha, "when he in his morbid philanthropy set at liberty the "wild galley slaves going to punishment. I have asked "all the principal governors of [gaols in] Scotland, if "they can point to a converted thief, but *they never "knew an habitual thief, man or woman, who became "honest and industrious.* A distinguished writer, who has, "as he says, looked more criminals in the face than any man in "Scotland, and has well studied their characteristics, says—"as to reforming old thieves—find me the man who has made "an honest working man out of an old thief, and I'd next set "him about turning old foxes into housedogs. The feat is "impossible." Mr. M. D. Hill, in his work already quoted, gives ample reasons for entirely distrusting the so-called statistics of *reformed* criminals, (pp. 589—594.) In fact, reliable statistics on the subject are impossible; for no test applied to a criminal when under gaol discipline, is of any value as regards his conduct when beyond it;

Lord Stanley, on the 12th Jan., 1857, said : "Moreover, the men who were the best behaved in prison, were often the worst behaved out of prison—and for this reason, that they were the men who were most susceptible to any influences whether good or bad, which were brought to bear upon them. The man who was docile to good influences, was apt to show himself equally docile when placed in contact with his old companions." See *Repression of Crime*, pp. 631-2. See also pp. 563, 586 to 594, 615-6, 655-8, 693, &c. &c. I quote Lord Stanley as a man who did not speak without being well informed on the subject, as well as because he has given the reason convincingly.

and the conditions of test imply a surveillance, more or less equivalent to that discipline. But the statistics of reconvictions *are* reliable, as far as they go; and experience, so far as certain, agrees with the theory that criminals *cannot* really reform, and that therefore they *never do*. In fact, if a man guilty of crime were by any possibility to become a worthy member of society, that would only prove that he was never really a criminal; that is, that his criminal act was not habitual or characteristic. But supposing it possible that a small per centage of genuine criminals *could* reform without relapse. Should the very doubtful chance of the reform of one criminal weigh for a moment against the imminent risk, not only of *his* not really reforming, but also of his influencing for evil—not one, but many—hitherto innocent members of society, to become criminal like himself ?

But even were all this otherwise, or doubtful,—society is no more called upon to show consideration or tenderness to criminals, or to try—to its own prejudice—to change their nature, than it is bound to tame every tiger, or civilize every serpent. As Mr. F. Hill remarks, the "humanity of the "English law is in fact, inhumanity both to society, and to "the criminal himself." Doubtless it may be plausibly urged that a criminal is but the product of circumstances, with the determination of which he has actually less to do than society itself; and therefore that the JUSTICE which Mr. Carlyle invokes upon him, would *really exempt him from punishment altogether*. But though the premiss is certainly true, the conclusion is absolutely false. Though society may be spoken of as a kind of personality—in so far as it has a power of acting, its personality is constantly changing, and it certainly is *not to blame* for the shortcomings of its previous personalities in past epochs. It *can* do no more than act for the best in *present* circumstances; and cannot do so better than by marking in the most practical and emphatic manner possible, the full breadth of the radical distinction between good and evil—right and wrong—so far as it has attained—so slowly and painfully—to the knowledge of it. All other kinds of

knowledge are surely worthless in comparison; but the value of this is practically depreciated and ignored by every man who fails to pronounce and establish it to the full extent to which he has the opportunity. This is a duty—which, it appears to me, is fully as incumbent upon society, as upon the individual, if not more so. Yet this is where both the individual and society constantly fail, and hence I believe, the slow progress which morality really makes.

One of the most surprising things in connection with the subject is, the small practical sympathy shown for the *victims* of criminals. To judge by the sympathy commonly exhibited, we might imagine that men in general regard the probability of their becoming *criminals themselves*, as much greater, than that of their being made the *victims* of criminals. Although punishment is administered to the criminal far too much in the spirit of revenge, from a sense of "*wild justice*," as Bacon calls it, and is arbitrarily measured by some idea of impossible quantitative proportion to the turpitude of the offence—instead of simply by the probabilities of its repetition—the "*wild justice*" is very rarely extended to the unfortunate victim. How rarely is compensation afforded to the victim of robbery or personal violence of any kind! The criminal—once caught—appears to exhaust public attention and sympathy. Would not public funds be more *justly* appropriated to pensioning the victim of a brutal rape, than in maintaining her ravisher in ease and idleness? Though not prepared to advocate state compensation to the victims of the depredations or violence of criminals generally, I believe it would be difficult to disprove the JUSTICE of such a proposal; as crime takes place solely by the failure of society to maintain the sufferers in that security, which is surely the tacit condition of good behaviour. Why do not those who talk so much of *justice*, seek to apply it here? But they do not. And I do not,—but why? Because utility is the only rational basis of human action. And while the criminal classes remain at large, they would manage to get the bulk of the compensation as well as the plunder. Futile attempts at imperfect justice have always resulted not only in injustice, but also in enormously evil consequences, which weigh far more heavily on the worthy than on the unworthy members of society. It is therefore incumbent on society—and it is also expedient for it—to recognise the claims of prospective victims; rather than as at present, to its own and their detriment, to devote its whole attention and expenditure to the amelioration of the condition of the criminal.

Theoretical principles of nearly every form corroborate the view, that consideration for the criminal should be subordinated to the interest of society. Whether we adopt the admirable saying of Buckle, that the perfection of government is the maximum of security with the minimum of interference; or Bentham's criterion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number; or the more widely acknowledged authority, which may be said to lay down that it is expedient that one man should die for the people; we are equally warranted in coming to the same conclusion, that a criminal—a proved criminal—should never again have the opportunity of injuring a worthy member of society. For that one possible victim to the mischievous propensities of the criminal, is obviously entitled to more consideration and protection than the criminal himself; besides which, though one person *may* by a bare possibility be the *sole* victim; not only is that rarely the case, but the *security* of *all* is jeopardised and infringed.

Mr. Carlyle, however, enounces a remarkable theory. He asserts that JUSTICE should be executed upon the two-legged human wolf as a palpable messenger of Satan. But his view of *justice* extends no further than the act for which he invokes revenge! But has not the "merely ill-situated pitiable man" a claim, and a prior one to be avenged? For his urgent temptation, his unconsciously acquired evil habits, his worse associations and worst ignorance, his undesired birth in degradation, his inheritance of iniquity and passion? Why should *he*, rather than Mr. Carlyle—have been born to vice and its hopeless uncompensated consequences, in conditions which would have equally shapen in iniquity his scornful contemners? Surely *justice* should regard causes as well as effects, and withhold both hate and blame from those who, with different antecedents, would have been different men?

But the rectification of antecedents is an impossibility, and Society should therefore relinquish the vain chimera of *justice*, the opportunity for which has irrevocably past; and should devote its whole attention to the modification of consequences, so as, out of the present possibilities, to evolve the greatest future good. Is not a weighty obligation laid upon its all to do so, in virtue of those superior conditions which we so undeservedly enjoy, and which have made us what we are? Is it *justice* to hate and revenge, in conditions which *justice* would actually exchange? Should we not rather exercise our unearned prerogative of position with scrupulous care, as those to whom the future of the human race is temporarily entrusted, to produce the best possible conditions for our successors? When Mr. Carlyle claims, as a child of God, a right—and asserts it to be his duty to put an end to those whom he styles "palpable messengers of Satan,"—does the old adage occur to him, that it is a wise child that knows its own father? Like causes produce like effects. Would not the same causes which made one—a palpable messenger of Satan—have done the same for the supposed child of God, and *vice versa*? If not, can there be any ground for belief in causation at all? And if divine paternity made the difference, where is the *justice* of the distinction made? It is excluded. *Justice* then forms no valid ground for the punishment of any criminal whatsoever. *Justice* is an impossibility without a reversal of the past. The idea

of *punishment* also, should therefore be discarded; particularly as it is *per se* a mere barbarity devoid of good result (unless as a feeble deterrent to others), and essentially unjust in principle. We can at best only so act in the present, as to educe good and avoid evil in the future.

Another very important consideration should lead us to the same conclusion at which I have arrived on other grounds,—that *a criminal should never be released*. It is characteristic of the criminal classes, that they are both unscrupulous and improvident, and set at nought the restrictions which society imposes upon the numerical increase of morally-disposed persons. An enormous impediment to the moral progress of the people would be at once removed, were convicted criminals never liberated to propagate their evil kind; the honest poor would be so far relieved from competition—at an immense disadvantage—with others who scruple not to avail *themselves* of means of subsistence from which honesty excludes; a part more or less—of the burden of foundling and reformatory asylums would be saved to society; the proportion of uneducated—or rather miseducated—children would be largely reduced; and the first direct step probably in the history of the world would have been taken to improve, or rather to stay the deterioration of the race of human beings. For it must be obvious that if those below the general average of morality and intelligence multiply—as we know they do—far more rapidly and promiscuously than those above it, the tendency *must be* to lower the general average. And that tendency is enormously enhanced by the consequently increased competition, against which the honest poor have to contend in living, and in educating their children. And the highest authorities agree, not only that the majority of criminals are the children of criminals, but also that the large majority of the children of criminals become criminals themselves. And this is only what might naturally be expected by those who believe in cause and effect. It is inevitable—by that law of the persistence of force, which is as much the explanation of habit as the cause of heredity. And for all these reasons a criminal *by habit* should never be released under any circumstances.

The increased security to Society generally,—the rescue from injury and depredation of those who would otherwise be victims,—the banishment from society of constant evil examples,—the prevention of the production of a large number of evil children; these are advantages which are obvious, and can scarcely be over-estimated. The disadvantages appear to be all embraced in the one item of the cost of maintenance. But it seems doubtful whether that would not actually be reduced, even if all convicted criminals were incarcerated for life. I have already quoted the weighty opinion of the Recorder of Birmingham to that effect, and it is obviously true of those prisons in America and elsewhere, which are (said to be) self-supporting. But it must not be forgotten that it is precisely in such institutions that the life conditions of the criminal are made entirely superior to those of the honest labourer with whom he is made to compete, and whom, in a place like England, he thus helps to starve. Prison labour, if made remunerative, is thus doubly objectionable, and the cost of maintenance should be considered irrespective of the results of the prisoner's labour. But even then the increase of criminals by example and propagation would be checked, and the total number of criminals would therefore certainly diminish. The cost of police, now mainly engaged in watching and re-catching released criminals, might be safely reduced, so as probably to more than compensate for any extra expense in gaols.

And as regards the criminals themselves, the most plausible objection appears to me to be, that perpetual imprisonment would operate too much as a premium to crime, if they were to be maintained in conditions (as at present) vastly superior to those of the honest labourer. For this cruel and pernicious anomaly, a remedy should then be found, and I have one to propose. The maudlin nonsense that we hear about the loss of precious liberty is altogether out of place, and would be unworthy of a moment's consideration, but that there ARE morbid sentimentalists who constantly repeat it. But liberty is prized by the *active* and *industrious*, *not* by the *idle* and *lazy*. The simple incontestible fact that our thieves and forgers, as a rule, repeat their offences as soon as they regain their liberty, proves that they really appreciate their comfortable quarters, their gratuitous medical and other attendance, their food and exercise carefully regulated to maintain them in perfect health; and above all, the consciousness that their life in clover is at the expense of the honest labourer and taxpayer. Deprivation of liberty would be a punishment to an active mind and body, to a person to whom work is pleasure, and to whom debt, dependence, degradation, and depredation are equally repugnant. But criminals prove by their acts that they prefer gaol-life to freedom (M. D. Hill, p. 523-4); for they regularly adopt, as soon as liberated, the very means which experience has taught them are the most certain to secure their return to it. The only plausible argument to the contrary is, that attempts *are* sometimes made to escape. But these are notoriously rare exceptions, and arise from a love, less of liberty than of license, and hatred of social restraint rather than desire for free action; and these attempts to escape, admittedly prove extra intractability and impatience of social obligation. No attempts are made to escape from Munich or Valencia prisons.

Though perpetual imprisonment would prevent convicted criminals from contaminating Society, and propagating criminals, after their conviction, it is still open to grave objections. For the honest starving poor who contribute to their support should not be so mistaught that crime will entitle them to State maintenance and solve all their difficulties; and if criminals were made by their labour to pay for their keep, they would so far

compete with honest labour, which would thus be placed at a disadvantage, though entitled to preference for any employment or expenditure. It therefore remains to be shown that there is a sure means both of preventing an increase of the expense of maintaining criminals and of avoiding, at the same time, the slightest appearance of offering to *them or to others* the premium to commit crime, which are the defects of the system of perpetual imprisonment. If, in attaining perfectly these ends, my proposal can be proved to present also the means of acquiring knowledge of the most important character, unattainable otherwise, and which would confer unprecedented benefits upon the human race generally, it is difficult to see what more could reasonably be desired. Nevertheless, I undertake to fulfil all these conditions, and also leave no room for the common complaint of competition with honest labour. More than this, my expedient has already been tried on a small scale, and with perfect success.

Sir G. C. Lewis says, that "by vivisection, important physiological facts have been established. Some of the ancient physicians of the Dogmatic sect were permitted by the kings to open the living bodies of convicted criminals, a practice which was defended against the objections of the Empiric sect, upon the ground that it is reasonable for a few criminals to suffer for the benefit of many innocent men. In modern times, likewise, the practice of inoculating criminals with the matter of the plague, for the purpose of throwing light upon contagion, has been recommended if not practised; and it appears that the French Government used in the 16th Century, to furnish annually to the physicians of Montpellier a living criminal for dissection." Sir G. C. Lewis takes this statement at second hand, and throws some doubt upon it, by adding in a note, that he has been unable to verify it by reference to the original author. See Sir G. C. Lewis' *Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, vol. i., pp. 162-3.

It is well-known that much modern knowledge has been acquired by experiments on the living subject, and could not have been otherwise attained. And it appears that they have been much more freely practised in Germany and France than in England.

In the English Cyclopædia, under the head of "Inoculation," it is stated that that preventive of a deadly disease was very slowly adopted in England, after its introduction from Turkey in 1721, by Lady Mary Wortley Montague, "and it was not until after it had been practised on six "criminals (whose liberty was promised to them if they "recovered, which they fortunately [!] did) that it was "generally received." My proposal is, to adopt this expedient and apply it generally; not, of course, to inoculate our criminals with small-pox, still less to liberate them afterwards; but to utilise as subjects for physiological, medical, and surgical experiment, *all our criminals without exception*. They should be divided into, say three classes; of which the first might be simply made subjects of experiments in diet, or in the trial of the effects of drugs of such a character as to produce the least inconvenience or pain, and extending over long or short periods. The second class might be used for experiments of a more critical or important character—if, indeed, any experiments involving such results as the improved health, longevity, and morals of the human race should be called other than important. The last class should be reserved for experiments in which life might be risked or taken. But the "welfare of society in the advancement of medical and physiological knowledge should always form the prime consideration, and every other should be entirely subordinated to the scientific perfection of the experiments. No unnecessary pain should be inflicted; in fact, it would be generally indispensable to avoid it by means of anaesthetics. But even without their use, I confidently appeal to competent physiologists to say whether a capital surgical operation, in sound tissues, causes nearly as much actual pain as one ordinary gaol flogging;—a mere revengeful barbarity—which is barren of all good results that would not be far better and more amply attained by my proposal. Judges and juries would have solely and simply to determine the class to which any particular criminal should be assigned; and a felon of the deepest dye might thus be privileged to become the means of conferring unequalled benefits upon the human race. In the selection of subjects, I should, however, be inclined to allow the skilled experimenters as much latitude as the exigencies of science might demand or suggest, if subjects of experiment were required for any particular purpose. Every organ and function of the human body might thus be brought under direct observation and scientific experiment far more completely and advantageously than in the case of Alexis St. Martin.

See "Will the Coming Man Drink Wine ?"—*Atlantic Monthly Magazine*, 1868.

All the objections to my proposal that I have been able to foresee are, the apparent inhumanity involved in its execution, and the alleged defect of moral right to put it in practice. For if there could be any question as to the deterrent effects of the plan, or the transcendent importance of instituting experiments upon the living human subject, I think those points may be best examined when I consider the advantages to be attained.

And first as to the inhumanity. I not only deny, but report the charge. The fact is, that Mr. Hill's remark, already quoted, that humanity to criminals is inhumanity to society, is strictly applicable to the case; and the real difference between my position and that of my possible opponents is, that I prefer to exhibit my sympathy and humanity towards the unfortunate Mary Egans, Sullivans, Grahams, and Eltons, &c.; towards the innocent victims, than towards their criminal ravishers and murderers. I feel that as a member of Society which distinctly

owed the protection and security, which it failed to afford to those helpless women in their dreadful need, I am bound to acquit myself of the responsibility which I certainly share, and this paper is my contribution to that end. If I have opponents, let them recognise that they are not only defenders of such villains as Sanders, Branch, Elton, Ritson, and Weechurch, &c., but their rewarders, and the accessories before the fact of the like crimes and outrages, if not participators in them, in the future.

But I extend *my* sympathy and humanity to millions besides the victims of robbery, murder, and rape. Millions of innocent sufferers from excruciating diseases of every description will have good hopes of release from their pangs by means of the rapid increase (which the proposed system is calculated to produce) in medical knowledge, which has hitherto languished under disabilities almost equivalent to prohibition. I can even discern a possible solution of the gigantic evil of poverty, which afflicts so heavily a large proportion of our fellow creatures, and dooms their progeny to inevitable ignorance, and probably to crime. Are we to show no humanity to these innocent victims of our social errors, but exhaust it upon those who, by their own act, have cancelled their title to consideration. And is it even a wrong to *them*, to make them, or rather to confer on them the privilege of being, against their wishes, of inestimable use to the Society they have wronged? The special aims of my proposition are to expand and exalt human sympathy, and to concentrate it upon the most legitimate objects.

The *right* of Society to act generally for the decided benefit of its aggregate body, is ordinarily admitted to be beyond question. As regards the taking of life, the *right*, I think, has been more rarely questioned, than the *policy* of Society in doing so, and thereby conducing indirectly to the acquittal of the guilty. The *last* is of course not a defect of the *law*, but of its *administration*; and the general diffusion of knowledge seems its only legitimate cure. The abstract right to take life is a transcendental point, which should be dealt with on its own grounds. The possession of the *power* may be logically maintained to constitute the *right*. *Power* indisputably vindicates *natural* right in every other case beside that of man; and in human action it does the same where no injury is inflicted elsewhere. The question then becomes; Is it right that to benefit society, an evil should be inflicted by it upon an individual? This is conceded freely when that evil amounts to no more than a small fine, or a temporary deprivation of liberty; and now the question is narrowed to one of proportion. Now the estimate of the value of a human life is altogether arbitrary, and if anyone likes to assert that *per se* it is so precious that nothing can be put in competition with it, we can only oppose our opinion to his. But should he condescend to reason on the subject, weighty arguments may be adduced to the contrary. The fact that thousands risk and sacrifice their own lives for the most trivial of objects may prove no more than their opinion, but opinions are as good on that side as the other. It may also be said that human life, like everything else, where very redundant, *must* have a smaller value. But waiving that, death being the inevitable lot of all, what is taken is an uncertain number of years or days of life. The value of these years or days may be estimated in two ways; the good work done, or the pleasure experienced. The first of these would be amply satisfied by my proposition, which, I contend, provides for unsurpassable good to the human race. And as to the pleasure of the individual, *that* has an ample off-set in the pleasure taken from others; in the direct injury to some, and the lessened security of all. The consideration of the evil lives into which many are led by the greater prospect of impunity, should I think bear preponderant weight. But I have already given ample reasons why the interest of one unworthy, or even worthy, member of society should be subordinated to the interest of its aggregate body and posterity.

But as regards the *right* or *justice* of taking the life of a criminal; I may safely assume that my transcendental objector must grant that, for reasons already given, it is absolutely impossible for any human being to ascertain in what *justice* would consist, or to estimate only approximately the due weight to be allowed for inheritance of evil disposition, education, and provocation. But his premises are also understood to involve that in the next world perfect justice can and will be meted out to him. *Therefore*, the surest way to act justly to a criminal, is to leave the account of justice to be equitably balanced there, and despatch him with all convenient speed to where that consummation is to be achieved. On these principles—consistently applied—to inflict any punishment, as such, *but death*, is to incur the risk of committing an injustice; and to despatch a criminal forthwith, is the surest way to avoid inflicting an excess of evil. But as any defect of justice is to be so speedily rectified elsewhere, it becomes a minor question, if any, whether the evil we inflict, for the purpose of effecting a great good, be in excess or defect of justice; and we need feel no compunction or hesitation on the subject, if we simply fulfil upon the criminal, our own plain duty to society and posterity; confident that our criminal will infallibly receive the exact balance of good or evil which may be his due, as soon as we shall have done so. It is evident further that on the same principle we need not fear error on the side of severity in *doubtful* cases; but may confidently act for the good of society, even at the otherwise possible risk of sacrificing an innocent person. And we should thus abolish an admittedly most prolific source of the miscarriage of justice, and of the encouragement of crime; and at once explode that really stupid saying, that it is better that ten guilty should escape, than that one innocent should suffer. The fact is, that death being inevitable, the suffering is

altogether assumed, being far less than that endured by the majority of honest men who die in their beds; and that it is clearly better for society and morality, that ten innocent persons should suffer, if only *apparently* guilty, than that one guilty one should escape. For the execution of a supposed guilty person—though innocent—should deter others as much as if he were really guilty, and is therefore good for society; while to let one guilty man escape is to teach possible impunity and immorality to all. To those who demur to this conclusion, I will merely propose a comparison of the popular penal system, which, as I have represented it, implies that it is good that many innocent should suffer for the benefit of one guilty,—with a fundamental principle of the popular religion, which implies that it is good that one innocent should suffer for the benefit of many guilty,—and with my conclusion that it is good that one guilty should suffer for the benefit of many innocent; and I challenge a candid and thoughtful decision.

These reasons are of course superfluous for those who recognise the clear right of society to dispose of criminals with sole regard to its own purification and good; and in fact for all but those to whose objections they specially apply. But it is necessary to meet, by anticipation, every objection which it seems likely will be made.

The first advantage arising from my proposal, is, that it is *eminently*, nay, *pre-eminently calculated to operate as a deterrent*. If those who are *least likely themselves* ever to become *subjects* to it, view my plan with horror—which I am prepared to believe—how much more will those do so who are the special objects of it? From my own knowledge of the criminal class, I suspect that this horror is likely to be enormously exaggerated. But I think the prospect of being made really and specially useful to society, would appal the worst of them quite as much.

Secondly. By never releasing a convict, which is a part of my proposal, the *reproduction* of criminals, either by *association* and *example*, or by *direct propagation*, *would be prevented*. This is, I think, no more than the plain duty of Society towards its as yet uncontaminated but weak members. But the non-production of evil children—not so much for their own sakes (though that good should not be overlooked) as for the general improvement of the race and the security of the great body of society—is a good which can scarcely be over-estimated, and is beyond calculation, extending as it would into the remotest future.

Thirdly. These objects, important as they are, scarcely, if at all, surpass the incalculable benefits which would accrue to the human race by the great, and perhaps, first impetus to medical and physiological knowledge which would be the direct result. The present condition of medical knowledge is notoriously miserably deficient, and it is no compliment to the profession to say that people outside it know less. It has been, I think, an entirely mistaken policy of the profession, how much so ever forced upon it by circumstances, to shelter its own ignorance behind a technical terminology, and otherwise to maintain the monopoly of its poor apology for knowledge. By keeping patients, and thousands who otherwise *would* be patients, in such outer darkness, I believe that it has narrowed its own sphere of observation and research to the smallest limits, and deprived itself of much of that knowledge which is its greatest want. Had it not always as a body persisted in this suicidal course, originally adopted, doubtless, solely in self-defence, it might not have suffered as it has under prohibitions and disabilities which from time immemorial have been legally and conventionally imposed upon its education. Had legislators and others been aware that their own comfort, health, and longevity lost enormously by the professional ignorance of medicine and physiology, they would, perhaps, have discerned the absurdity and self-destruction involved in making it penal for a doctor to have a human body in his possession for purposes of experiment, while also making it penal that he should not understand his business. Yet such was, I believe, the case till within the last 40 years.

See English Cyclopædia, Art. Anatomy.

Did men ever yet obtain real systematic knowledge otherwise than by experiment? Yet doctors are, and always have been, specially debarred from that best means of learning their business, and of benefitting the world; and it has only been by stealth, at considerable personal risk, and by circumventing the laws and Society itself, that some indomitable earnest workers have learned the very little that is known. The existence of homoeopathy in the face of allopathy demonstrates that the fundamental principles of medicine are in doubt and uncertainty, to say nothing of the thousand points of detail, upon which opinions are divided. The notorious fact, also, that leading allopathists of Melbourne actually practice, by means of spiritual mediums and clairvoyants, is a sad proof of the insufficiency of ordinary means of diagnosis and methods of treatment. It is, I think, impossible to estimate the nevertheless certain prospective benefits, or to exaggerate the value to humanity of the scientific experiments which I propose—whether for acquiring accurate knowledge of the more obscure functions of the human body, the perfecting of capital surgical operations, the discovery, testing, and utilization of drugs of every description, or the solution of various most important physiological problems. Several of the most eminent members of the medical profession here fully endorse my views on this point. The popular mind will probably best recognise the importance of the proposal, in considering the instance that I have quoted in which it has already been practised in England. Inoculation was the first check to the then

appalling ravages of small-pox, and prepared the way for the discovery of vaccination, which has since super-seded it. The historical fact that the popular mind was at once convinced and satisfied by the experiment in that case is my ground of encouragement in reviving the proposal after a dormancy of 150 years, and advocating its wide extension. It is to me a guarantee that my recommendation will yet commend itself to the common sense of the people, and that it has only to be fairly tried once, to ensure its ultimate and permanent adoption throughout the world.

It is almost amusing to think how very foolishly Society defeats its own purposes in its conduct towards the medical profession. It lays down that *doctors shall not experiment*. If any ordinary person suspected for a moment that his medical attendant was *experimenting* upon HIM, he would never see his face again. With what difficulty has the comparatively worthless privilege of obtaining a dead body for dissection, to learn scarcely anything beyond mere anatomy, been wrung from the stupid prejudices and superstitions of the people? How can the living expect to benefit by experiments, unless upon the living? It should surely be obvious that to learn with certainty the effects of drugs upon the living body, experiments with them upon the living body are indispensable. But that would be too shocking! And what is the result? That every one of US who employs a doctor to attend himself, his wife, or his child, actually furnishes a subject, and *too often a victim*, of ignorant, blind, and uninformative experiment in his own person or that of one of his family! Instead of enabling certain knowledge to be acquired as I suggest, by careful and conclusive experiment upon persons who *voluntarily* (when they know it as the legal penalty of crime) offer themselves for it! For a doctor cannot experiment profitably upon his ordinary patients, because he cannot be sure that the conditions he prescribes are carried into effect; he generally has reason to suspect that they are not. Even in a hospital (his only school at present) experiments must be strictly limited to the demands of the cases before him, and are so slightly more profitable than ordinary practice, that almost the sole advantage is, that he *can* have some certainty as to the conditions under which they are made. But in practice, because we stupidly prohibit perfect experiments upon persons who are good for nothing else, we *actually subject ourselves* to experiments of an *imperfect, unprofitable, and even dangerous* description!

Although experiments upon animals may have been useful, they are well known to be wholly inadequate to secure reliable knowledge of the susceptibilities of the human subject. In fact, it is fortunate that this *is* known. For as it is now certain that doses of various drugs, which would kill a man, are perfectly innocuous to many animals, it would obviously be dangerous and foolish to rely upon any experiments, but those made upon the human subject. There can be no doubt that innumerable and perhaps valuable lives have been sacrificed for want of them. The value of true experiments for the purpose of understanding the nature of epidemics and checking their progress is so obvious, that as I have said, resort has already been had to them; but unfortunately with a halting doubt that it was right to do so, instead of with full confidence in it as the wisest measure that ever was adopted. But I confidently appeal to the profession to testify to the inestimable value of such experiments.

A fourth advantage is the enormous reduction of cost in the final disposal of criminals which would obviously result; as all the worst criminals would be utilised for experiments, involving so much risk or certainty of death, as would speedily reduce their numbers. I believe that the present cost of disposing of criminals would be reduced far more than fifty per cent, and that the supply of subjects for experiment would soon fall far short of the demand.

It has occurred to me that it may be thought that I have neglected or overlooked the question of Reform of Criminals, but I *have* touched upon it; and I admit that, just after reading the accounts of the noble institutions for that purpose at Munich, Valencia, &c., any proposition in which they are entirely ignored must appear cruel and unjust. But the fact is, that greater cruelty and flagrant wrong are unintentionally done by those very institutions; and not to persons who deserve evil at our hands, but to innocent strugglers who are entitled to protection from contamination and encouragement in virtue. The honest poor have in the first place a preferential claim to the expenditure itself. They have another, *not* to be exposed to the competition of prison labour. They have also a claim *not* to be taught that crime is rewarded with large expenditure, good food, lodging, and attendance, with freedom from care; while struggling poverty meets not only with anxiety, misery, and starvation; but with demonstration that by depredation and violence they may reverse their evil condition. It is as if you gave to the burglar the wages due to your honest servant, and informed your servant that he and his family *must want*, because what was *his due* might be the means of reforming the burglar, adding that he should follow the burglar's example. But, as I have said, the estimates of reformation have been proved to be altogether fallacious; and it is a demonstrated fact that those who appear, when under control, the most reformed, are, when beyond it, often the worst offenders. But whether you release them or not, while you thus spend thousands upon thieves and felons,—men, women, and children are literally worked to starvation in the next street, and *die* of want and disease, *because* they do not rob and murder! But even all this is nothing to the cruel wrong involved in the immoral lesson thus deliberately taught, that vice meets with the reward of virtue, and

virtue with what should be that of vice.

I believe I have now shown that the ideas of justice and punishment should both be discarded as futile and worse than useless in dealing with this question; and that reformation is, if not impossible, at least rare and incapable of timely test or proof; that the permanent incarceration of criminals would be a far better protection to society, present and future, than the current penal system; that it must necessarily tend to reduce crime to a minimum; that the cost would probably be much less than might be supposed; and that it would even furnish the means of effecting a direct and certain moral improvement in the human race. And I trust that I have also shown that the utilisation of criminals for scientific experiments would reduce the cost of perpetual incarceration of all criminals to a smaller amount than any other plan without exception; that it would operate as the most powerful of all deterrents from crime, and thus obviate the principal objection to all self-supporting or life imprisonments; that it would give an impetus to medical science which must speedily have a beneficent effect upon the health, comfort, longevity, and, still better, the morals of mankind; that it satisfies every want, extinguishes every anomaly, and solves every difficulty in the great problem of the disposal of criminals; and finally, that the charge of inhumanity recoils at once upon those who raise that objection, as their sympathies should be with—not the criminal—but his innocent victim.

STILLWELL AND KNIGHT, PRINTERS, MELBOURNE.

Essay on Suicide. By H. K. R.

READ BEFORE THE ECLECTIC ASSOCIATION OF MELBOURNE.

Melbourne: PRINTED BY ROBERT BELL, 97 LITTLE COLLINS STREET EAST.

Suicide.

IN this paper I propose to consider, not so much suicide itself, as the judgment of it, and of those who commit it, which is commonly formed; and how far that judgment is logical and true. To do this it will be necessary to consider suicide itself to a certain extent, as the object of that judgment. But suicide itself can possess but slight interest for those who are not tempted to commit it; which I trust will always be our own case. For it is certain that no one ever committed or was tempted to commit suicide, unless under circumstances of acute painfulness, or in a state of morbid excitation almost equivalent. But we judge our neighbours every minute in the day, and almost mechanically. That is, we condemn or approve without subjecting every decision to the rigid scrutiny of reason; but our ordinary hasty judgments are unconsciously determined in accordance with principles arrived at when we *do* trouble ourselves to consider particular cases carefully. Of so much the more importance is it then to do so correctly. It is my own impression that there is no point on which the popular judgment is more fallacious and less digested than on that of suicide and its victims; and I think that the fallacy which underlies the matter commonly misleads men in such a multiplicity of other instances, but is so much more susceptible of clear exposure in this than in *them*, that time and attention bestowed upon the careful consideration of this topic maybe attended with particularly beneficial results.

Let us begin at the beginning: what is the cause not only of suicide, but of all men's acts? Indisputably pleasure and pain; and of these pain is chief. For pleasurable conditions are often enhanced by passivity, but pain is urgent and will not be denied;—action is imperative. All man's natural exterior covering is more or less delicately sensitive to impressions, which produce sensations painful or pleasant, and thus constitute his motives to action. It is indeed difficult to conceive how without a sensation he could acquire a motive to action at all. In fact, he has no other way of receiving impulses to action. By his sensations only does he learn what is hurtful, and what is beneficial to his system. How else could he know that fire burns, or that blows bruise? or what is good or bad for food or life? Why do we like people of what we call *good feeling*, but because we feel and know that those feelings produce corresponding actions?

But not only do we thus recognise what is good or bad for us, but we thus, and thus only learn how to act. Having thus been taught what is painful and pleasurable, we thus, and thus only learn how to reproduce the pleasure, and how to elude the pain. This is our only warranty for any action. Why do we eat or drink? we feel the sensation of hunger or thirst; we distinguish by experience the appropriate aliment; we seize it, and call it good if it answer to our anticipations. And "To enjoy is to obey," says Pope.

If cold, we light a fire; if too hot, we seek the shade. In every case the pleasure realised or the pain avoided, is not only the *reason* of the act, but its *justification*. Existence is itself almost unexceptionally a pleasure, and to the same extent how tenacious are we of existence! How inestimable a good it is regarded, may be judged from the amount of pain which it will outweigh.

But in some rare instances we find that these infallible monitors, our sensations, advertise us that existence (the balance of pain over pleasure being overwhelming) is an evil, and non-existence a good; and if we act then, otherwise than in accordance with our feelings and convictions, do we not do violence to our nature? What do I

say? Is it *possible* for us to act otherwise than as our sensations indicate to us the best course to avoid the pain and secure the pleasure? Certainly not. It is *not competent* for us to act otherwise than as our nature prompts and impels. And if there be any truth or significance in the principle that "*to enjoy is to obey*" it must be applicable to all cases; and when our enjoyment is to be found only in non-existence, our obedience must inevitably be involved in it also. Indeed, if anything more so:—for our existence is to a great extent involuntary; and the term obedience is indisputably more applicable to a voluntary than an involuntary act, whether the object be the maintenance or the destruction of our life.

The same argument has been well applied by Rousseau to the theological aspect of the question; and as the principal objections to suicide are generally advanced on theological grounds, I may not pass them over.

First then, there is no prohibition of suicide from Genesis to Revelations. Was this because it was a *sore subject* with the author? Pliny says that there is one invaluable privilege which man has, but God has not; that of terminating his own existence. I think if any being should hate his life, it should be the creator of a hell, and of evil. If he hates it, and cannot get rid of it, how awful is his punishment! The Bible however docs not forbid suicide. "Thou shalt not kill" was evidently intended to prohibit encroachment on the rights of others; the taking from them their existence, their highest good. And when the destruction of another is considered a good for the social body, both nature and law not only justify, but command it.

But it is said, we have no right—it is a crime—to quit the post assigned us by Providence. On exactly the same principle we can have no right, and it should be equally a crime, to leave the country or the spot where we were born, or where we find ourselves at any time. We have no justification for doing so, but the very one I at first adduced:—that our sensations and experience lead us to deem it best for us to do so. To say that Providence placed us here, is only a mysterious and irrelevant way of saying "*we are here*;" as we say "God knows," when we merely mean "*me don't know*." And those who say so will surely not demur to say that our sensations are equally bestowed by Providence. Then as Providence notifies to us the propriety of our going or staying, solely through the sensations by which alone we can discover it—when we are similarly convinced that non-existence is preferable to existence—on what ground can it be maintained that suicide is not the will of Providence? In fact, if Providence governs all, the success of a suicide proves decisively that his act was as much the dispensation of Providence ad his any other act, or his death by lightning. But, as Rousseau points out, if Providence sends you a plague or a famine, or any ordinary death, you resist the dispensation with all your force, and elude it if you can. The suicide has the evidence of the like senses that it is the apparent wish of Providence that he should cease to exist; but *he* possesses the superior merit of obedience. Rousseau also shows how unreasonable it is to accuse the suicide of a desire to withdraw himself from a post of duty and from the governance of God. For on the theory of a God and a future life is it not impossible for him to do so? He simply steps into another post, as much or more under the government of God; by many supposed to involve greater, instead of less capacity and scope, and therefore more responsibility. What is death on this theory? Merely passing from one room to another—from a scene where circumstances indicate, in the only way in which we can receive such an intimation, that we are no longer required, to another to which we appear to be invited, and where therefore we may confidently hope to be enabled to act with better effect. If Providence gives us an appetite and food, and we consider that that justifies our using both,—if when Providence causes the sun to heat our heads we consider ourselves justified in interposing an umbrella to stop the inconvenience,—or if we scruple not but hasten to sacrifice a gangrenous limb for the sake of preserving the life we value more:—why, when life becomes painful, should we not recognise it as an intimation to move to a more favorable field of exertion, and why hesitate to use the means which a careful Providence has placed within our reach?

It is however, obvious that suicides are caused by the overwhelming pressure of circumstances, and the imagined impossibility of coping with or improving them. In every case dissatisfaction with existence is the reason for the act; and if it were in the conscious power of the unfortunate victim to make his existence agreeable, or tolerable otherwise, we may safely assume that that alternative would be preferred. Knowing as we do, and feeling the almost inexhaustible power and elasticity of the love of life, it is difficult if not impossible to realise the appalling load of hopeless despair which must oppress and excruciate the sensibilities of a sane suicide, before that energy by which alone the human race is maintained and continued, can in him find no employment so tolerable as its own destruction. How all the sweets and delights of life, which make the love of it so strong in all animated nature, must be converted into gall and wormwood! Is there anything so calculated to arouse the liveliest pity, the most compassionate sympathy? For who can assure himself against similar conditions?

Yet human *ill nature* has stigmatised the act as a voluntary crime of the deepest dye! It has been imagined not only to. blacken the memory of the unfortunate victim himself, but also, by an excess of illogical stupidity, to injure the fame of those relatives who would have done all in their power to prevent it! This happily: has not been general. Thus to impute turpitude to unfortunate, .misery, is pre-eminently a blot on Anglo-Saxon institutions. To. the disgrace of England be it said that she was among the last of the: nations of Europe to relax

the savage severity of the laws on this point. Suicide has not been the subject of legislation in France or in most other states for nearly a century. How is it that in England such a stultification should have been maintained until 1824? For there, till then, it was actually attempted with impotent spite to punish the poor victim after he was dead, by burying him at a cross road with a stake driven through his body; but malice, not being satiated by that, was vented upon his *sorrowing relatives* by confiscating his property!

Surely it must be obvious that punishments of *unsuccessful* suicides can have but one tendency:—that of making them more careful to avoid failure on the next occasion. It is self-evident that nothing could be more fatuously absurd than to endeavor to punish abortive suicidal attempts. It is like telling a prisoner that if he escape, you will punish him for doing so, *if you don't catch him!* In every way the conventional judgment in such cases seems to be diametrically opposed to the most fundamental principles of humanity and common sense.

What can be the cause of all this unreason, contradiction, and cruel illiberality? It seems to me that it is entirely attributable to that abominable *spirit of intolerance* which will not permit our neighbours to act, speak, or think otherwise than as *we* approve. For that intolerant spirit it appears to me that Christianity, that essentially intolerant religion, is mainly responsible. But this should not be carelessly stated without reasons given, for intolerance is not overtly taught by Christianity. The true cause of Christian intolerance seems clearly chargeable to *monotheism*. For when people cheerfully allowed their neighbours to have various gods of their own, there was no ground for intolerance of their religions. But when once a man feels bound to assert that his god, and therefore his religion, is the only true one, and that he and his god are *jealous* of all others, intolerance obviously becomes the main-spring of his conduct, so far as he is pious. This is corroborated by the fact that the other monotheistic religions, the Jewish and the Mahometan, are as intolerant as the Christian.

Religion is notoriously a common cause of insanity, as well as of suicide. The reason is plain. Instead of learning from experience and reason that his happiness depends solely on the practice of virtue—which consists in understanding and utilising to his utmost the circumstances in which he is placed, and resolutely appropriating knowledge and its advantages wherever he may find them—man is too early taught to distrust and repudiate his most valuable faculties and important privileges, and to rely for guidance and strength upon an imaginary power, which of course fails him entirely whenever it is put to the test. If favorably circumstanced, or blessed with a naturally resolute temperament, he may get through life without a very serious mishap; but too often under less fortunate conditions, repeated failure confirms his fatal distrust of himself, produces despair; and he is driven and tossed like a rudderless ship upon the waves of life, and is ultimately lost in the storms of insanity or the whirlpool of self-destruction.

In what is England behind the foremost nations of Europe? Is it in energy, intelligence, or wealth? No. But *she is pious*. Though her national institutions are free, in conventional opinion the bulk of her people are slaves. The personal and social freedom of action of individuals doubtless leads them to criticise their neighbours, and to repel interference with their own opinions and prejudices; but it is their intolerant religion, based upon the absurd notion of the freedom of the will, which leads them to condemn as intentionally immoral, what is simply produced by the pressure of inflexible circumstances.

It is surely contrary to English, or any principles of justice, to condemn any man unheard. Could we only hear and realise the history of a poor suicide, could we know and understand *all* the cruel circumstances which inevitably caused his act, I imagine that nothing further would be necessary to induce us to retract our condemnation; particularly when we reflect how little our own circumstances are within our choice. When once the causes of all human action are discerned to be *necessary* in their operation, no room is left for blame. It is inapplicable. For it essentially implies that error is *not necessary*, but is avoidable under identical antecedent conditions.

We naturally and instinctively *hate* death; and if we hate and recoil from misery less, it is simply because it is generally the lesser evil. But surely the unfortunate, unwilling victim of misery—aggravated to such a degree of torture that even hateful death appeals comparatively a blessing—should be the object rather of sympathy and compassion than of blame. It should require no further argument to prove that to blame or to hate a poor suicide involves a total misconception and confusion of ideas.

The only plausible argument for endeavoring to discourage, or even deprecating suicide, seems to me to be, that were it to become prevalent population would decrease; and the race must become extinct if the practice were to become general. But apprehensions on this score are utterly idle and baseless. The natural inevitable law of demand and supply amply guarantees us against such a contingency. Suicides have never been common except where population was condensed, and misery great—where life, being redundant, possessed a smaller value, and was comparatively at a discount. It is unknown in sparsely peopled countries, while in China, Japan and India, and in large crowded cities, it is, I believe, prevalent in proportion more or less to the density and pressure of population. Other causes are of course operative. Intemperance I find causes (at Geneva for instance) one twelfth of recorded suicides. By far the greater number are attributed to disease. I presume that in

most of *these* cases death is known to be inevitably near, when I think suicide, to avoid pain, is wise, rather than otherwise. The suicide of the Jews at York (said to have been 500 in number) in the reign of Richard the First, was in my opinion clearly an act of wisdom. For I imagine that the alternative would have been inevitably worse. It was *usual* then for *Christians* to *commence* intercourse with Jews under such circumstances, by drawing their teeth—not with chloroform or ether spray, not with skill or tenderness, but probably with a hammer and a cold chisel—the object being to *give*, not to relieve the toothache. This instance alone proves unanswerably that circumstances *can* justify suicide; and in my mind in *every case*, the *circumstances which cause, must therefore justify, suicide, or any other act*. The *consequences* alone of any act determine its goodness or badness. By men, of course, the consequences can only be divined from appearances. The wise foresee them best, but are frequently mistaken. All have to accept them, foreseen or not. It is clear, however, that *every man endeavors* to foresee them as accurately as possible, whatever object he may have in view. To offer arguments for or against suicide to anyone not driven by exceptional circumstances to contemplate its execution, seems utterly idle; and entirely presumptuous to those who are. For to have any weight, arguments must have special reference to the particular case; and even *then*, they can have no efficacy comparable to that of whatever distracts the mind from the subject; for all depends upon the state of mind of the man himself, which if he could, he would scarcely communicate. This is a conclusive reason why no other man is, or can be, competent to condemn the act, even as an error of judgment; for that state of mind can only be *guessed at* by others, *even by* the results.

As in the debate I was accused of advocating suicide, I would say that if asked whether I advocate or deprecate it, I reply "Never be miserable if you can help it, still less commit suicide but I think it just as idle and impertinent to urge upon the miserable, as upon the happy, any arguments for or against it.

My only object in considering this subject was to seize a favorable opportunity of deprecating that pernicious spirit of intolerance which leads men to presume to judge and blame their neighbours; causes hatred and all uncharitableness; intimidates and fetters thus the human mind; and is the greatest obstacle to its development and improvement. For *activity* is the one thing needful, even when erroneously applied. We learn most from our errors. New truths scarcely strike us, unless they explain and teach the remedy for former faults. Even the greatest and most fatal errors, involving the destruction of those who commit them, are of more inestimable value to others who are active-minded enough to profit by them, than perhaps even their own. Mental activity should be promoted and encouraged to the utmost. Happy those who are so constituted and circumstanced that their activity is always in the best direction! Let us pity and be grateful to those who are less fortunate; by whose errors we profit; who are sacrificed to the general good. If they deserve no credit, because their sacrifice was involuntary, they are clearly not proper objects of blame for missing the mark which we, by better fortune, may have hit. Inactivity is the only thing really to be deprecated; for by inactivity no good can accrue to anyone.

And let us remember always that charity and reason are thus *at last* in harmony. It marks an important step in the history of the progress of the human mind, when it is discerned that charity and blame (or condemnation of others) are essentially incompatible. There is no place or ground for uncharitableness with those who have once comprehensively grasped the idea of causation; who apprehend that men's actions, being necessitated, must be blameless; that activity is virtue, and that reason is its highest form.

R. Bell, Steam Printer, 97 Little Collins Street East, Melbourne.

Selection: Natural and Artificial. A Lecture Delivered in the Wangaratta Athen Æum, By Mr. H. K. Rusden,

Late Secretary to the Royal Society of Victoria,

On Monday, October 26th, 1874.

Beechworth Richard Warren, Printer THE OVENS AND MURRAY ADVERTISER GENERAL PRINTING OFFICES, FORD AND CAMP STREETS. MDCCCLXXIV.

Lecture.

"Are [man] and nature thus at strife,
That nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life;
That I considering everywhere

Her secret meaning in her deeds,
And finding that of fifty seeds
She often brings but one to bear."

TENNYSON'S *In Memoriam*, LIV,

"This surely means that she intends—
Though fifty times we fail to find
The hidden meaning of her mind—
The next time to reveal her ends."

New Song.

It is now nearly thirty years since I was at Wangaratta, and it is with but few of its inhabitants that I can pretend to any acquaintance. I will not presume to say whether they know more or less of me than I of them. But some explanation may be due to you of my appearance here, because I am really no lecturer. I never delivered a *bona fide* lecture in my life, and I possess no special knowledge to warrant my presuming to instruct others. But I *have* something to say in sober earnest, in calling attention to conditions of present society, which strike me as being of grave importance, and at the same time generally overlooked. I shall propose remedies for evils, the existence of which," I conceive, has only to be indicated to be admitted; and if my proposals do not meet with your approval, I shall still be satisfied if I succeed in awakening interest in topics fitly described in the saying—what is everyone's business is nobody's business. I may be the nobody—but the business is not only yours, but emphatically everybody's. That it is transcendently important is even less my reason for venturing to ask your attention to it than that it is so generally disregarded. There are many far more competent than I am to treat of such matters, and if they would only teach, I would gladly listen and learn. Their silence, however, renders it my duty to speak.

I hope to be able to say what I have to say in less time than a lecture usually occupies. If you should not like my paper, its shortness will, therefore, be at least one redeeming point in it. But I do not think you can like it, unless you do more than hear it. It will be necessary for you to recognise the great importance of the subject, and the need of some remedial action; as well as to weigh and judge my suggestions to that end. I should therefore be much gratified if some discussion were to follow my paper; in fact I, never read one except upon that condition. I should consider it an act of colossal presumption to stand here to propound my own views without inviting question, criticism, and reply upon the spot; and I am convinced that no lecture, not even an exposition of physical fact or scientific method, can have a tithe of the value or benefit to any auditory, unless questions be raised and answered on the spot upon obscure points—to remove misunderstanding, not only of what has been said, but what may be supposed to have been implied or involved. Let me also plead for my own advantage. I wish to correct my own views; which I have never failed to do, more or less, by a discussion on a paper of my own. If it should turn out—which I do not expect—that we agree in everything, it would, perhaps, be very agreeable; but I am satisfied that much more benefit would accrue to us all by the discovery and comparison of *differences*, and the *selection* of resultant accordances—reciprocal ratiocination, in fact. It is thus in discussion of ideas—as in the struggle of species for existence—that *natural selection* and competition ensure the *survival of the fittest*.

Another reason for mentioning that I have never lectured except when the subject was to be debated on the spot, is, that I may have acquired a somewhat dogmatic style of expression, which among strangers may appear to require apology; I therefore make mine at once, though for my part I prefer a dogmatic tone. A man who has opinions of his own—pronounced opinions—is entitled to any hearing he can get, and society is fully entitled to hear them, be they good or bad. If good, to select them at once for their intrinsic value; if bad, that they may be refuted and extirpated as soon as possible; and that either may be done to the best advantage, it is best that they be exposed in the most frank and unmistakable language that speech affords. Dogmatism, when it consists in plain speaking simply, is, I think, a virtue. It becomes a vice only when offence is taken, or impatience betrayed at equally free criticism, and the expression of diverse views.

It is now many years since Darwin first unfolded the great principle of Natural Selection. I say unfolded, not discovered. For Darwin only told us what we mainly knew before. Everybody knew before that in a race the swiftest as a rule win; that the weak have to give way to the strong; that, as a rule, qualities are transmitted hereditarily; and that, in certain circumstances, species of plants, insects, or animals, flourish at the expense of others less fitted to encounter them. This, experience and observation had amply proved. What then was there

peculiar in Darwin's teaching? How is it that, if he told us mere details beyond what we ourselves did know, there can have been any contention respecting it, or any opposition to his doctrine? Simply this—that he put it in a scientific form, and showed that what all had observed in isolated instances, is true universally and without exception. This is what constitutes the difference between scientific knowledge and knowledge falsely so called. Science is simply knowledge reduced to rule. Doubtless knowledge has been reduced to rule for thousands of years, and the rules, even now, it is constantly found necessary to supersede and change. For the first rules were necessarily crude and tentative generalisations; and the progress of science has since mainly consisted of the gradual elimination of supposed exceptional cases, and the consequent qualification or alteration of the rules. In ancient times no durable classification *could* be established, for observations were too limited, and there were no adequate records of others to make system possible, and therefore the old records of observations—such as those of Hippocrates, Aristotle, Hipparchus, and Pliny—have hitherto proved of far greater value than the theoretical works of systematizers like Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, or even Aristotle himself. This was so, in spite of the fact that the intellectual capacity of many of those ancient philosophers was—as I cannot but imagine—superior to that of any that have arisen since. Duly considering the previous state of science, I venture to doubt whether the intellectual equals of Euclid and Aristotle have since appeared. The subsequent progress of science has transparently been due far less to the transcendent genius of individuals like Newton, Cuvier, &c., than to the careful, patient labor of almost unknown men, who, not even dreaming of the ultimate particular value of their observations, were so thoroughly possessed by the *genuine scientific spirit of confidence in general principles*, that they allowed no single important observation, made within their knowledge, to pass unrecorded. Professor Huxley thus expounds the same idea in his lecture on the "Physical Basis of Life":—"Anyone who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has in all ages, meant, and now, more than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." He asks "what is the difference between the conception of life as the product of a certain disposition of material molecules, and the old notion of an Archæus, governing and directing blind matter within each living body, except this—that here as elsewhere, *matter and law* have devoured spirit and spontaneity? And as surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of *matter and law* until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action." The selection of rules for understanding the various relations of matter and law, is now determined upon a really scientific basis; namely, upon that of the widest range of exact observations, and the greatest possible multiplication of instances. This is why Darwin is unanswerable. He affirms nothing which he does not support—not only by a multitude of his own observations of unrivalled minuteness, but also by an enormous mass of the observations of others; and he patiently weaves the whole into a web of proof that is absolutely impregnable.

But the age produced Darwin. Had Darwin appeared before humanity had arrived at a condition in which appreciation of general principles was possible, his doctrine would not have met with wide acceptance. Darwin did not create—though he has helped to confirm—the capacity to recognise and admit general principles. It had "grewed" like Topsy. Darwin took advantage of it and fed it, but he only partially satisfied the demand. The present age will produce hosts of Darwins who will meet with due and increasing appreciation. Everyone has insensibly imbibed, more or less, of this spirit of confidence in general principles, or Darwin would not be appreciated as he is. This spirit now permeates all society, and no one is exempt from its absorbing influence; no—not even Darwin's most strenuous and bitter opponents. For I do not forget that Darwin meets with detraction and opposition. That was to be expected. The intellects of men are as various as their conditions, and many seem to have been born but to struggle impotently against the current which sweeps them away. Huxley says of them, "The consciousness of this great truth weighs like a nightmare, I believe, upon many of the best minds of these days. They watch what they conceive to be the progress of materialism, in such fear and powerless anger as a savage feels, when, during an eclipse, the great shadow creeps over the face of the sun. The advancing tide of matter threatens to drown their souls; the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom; they are alarmed lest man's moral nature be debased by the increase of his wisdom." The great shadow will soon pass, and their fear and alarm prove but idle superstition. They *must* await the return of light, whether patiently or not, and they, or their successors, will at last discern that man's moral nature has only passed through a necessary phase of the process of evolution, and that in so far as they have vainly endeavored to obstruct its free exercise and development, so far they have wasted their own energies and demonstrated the futility of their opposition. Have we not already learned to perceive how fact extinguishes fable? and that the imputation to our innocent parents—as faults—of the errors by which alone the knowledge of good and evil could be achieved for us, is but a relic of the primitive ignorance which was inseparable from their condition? The inexhaustible fruit of the allegorical tree of paradise is ever before *us*, and in the interest of our children and our grandchildren it is demanded of us that we *pluck all within our reach*; and defraud them not of any of

their inheritance in the ever-ripening harvest. Thus—I rather invert the tenor of the old story of Eden, but surely we have now arrived at a stage of moral perception where we cannot hesitate to decide that our highest ideal of goodness *could not* prohibit the knowledge of good and evil to man; or impute sin to those who, wanting that knowledge, *could not* know—and certainly could not do—better than seize upon it; we feel that the spirit of truth could not foretell a result which did not follow;

Gen. ii., 17.

we now know also that it could not be any representative of evil that helped man to that invaluable and indispensable knowledge, and that accurately foretold the absolute truth respecting the results.

Gen. iii., 4 5, 22.

Could man ever have become a moral being? without the knowledge of good and evil? It cannot be but that the characters or their acts in the old fable are entirely transposed,

Note.—This interpretation accords best with the rational view that the *Serpent* was recognised as the superior benevolent deity when the story was first written, and that that story was subsequently embellished or distorted to suit after innovations. The Bible plainly tells us that the Jews *worshipped* the *Serpent* (which was the emblem of cunning as well as eternity) from Moses' time (Numbers xxx., 9.) till H. Sekiab's. (2 Kings, xviii., 4.) Would a good being malevolently prohibit the knowledge of good and evil; impotently curse man and the serpent, and long after send deadly serpents among the people? No! The success, the truthfulness (Gen., iii., 4 5, and iv., 22.) and beneficence of the Serpent of Gene-is justify this conclusion; the defeat, the falsehood, (Gen., ii. 17) and the malevolence attributed to the Deity, forbid the contrary ordinary, but impious interpretation.

my enquiry may yet throw some light upon the reason.

Darwin, however, has conclusively explained the universality of the law of natural selection just as Newton expounded the law of gravitation. I do not propose to dwell upon the doctrine of *natural selection*, further than may be desirable for exhibiting in relief or contrast the distinctive characteristics of *artificial selection*. For this purpose a short statement of the former is necessary.

1st. Variation of progeny from the parental type is a certain rule without any exception whatever. Whether in a state of nature or of civilization, no progeny is the exact copy of the parent, nor are any two off-pring of the same parents exactly alike. Hence, necessary—though minute—variation. The duplication of parentage, and the diversity of their characteristics, ensure this certain perpetual variation, which is the broad basis of the doctrine of natural selection; and as this variation, however slight, occurs in every generation, the ultimate amount of it must be simply a question of time, of which past eternity furnishes half an infinity. The question thus becomes simply one of arithmetic. As one is to infinity so is the variation of one child from its parent to the aggregate variations or differences in the whole organic kingdom.

2nd. All species are enormously prolific, far beyond their necessities for perpetuation, though throughout Nature one kind of organism preys upon another, and in fact many kinds form the staple sustenance of others. The proportion of seeds which germinate is almost infinitely small; of those which do germinate, a vast proportion never attain maturity; while enormous quantities exist but to be devoured. Yet the production is more than ample. Natural selection simply determines which individuals among these enormous masses of beings or plants are best fitted to survive and which to be obliterated; and by such plain processes as these. The swiftest and most agile escape pursuit; the slowest are exterminated. The strongest secure the most and best food; the most hardy atone survive privation, and beget offspring like themselves. It is plain also that when any species increases largely in number, its means of sustenance must become less in proportion. In the consequent competition for a share, the weakest are starved out, and the species is continued by those only which are the strongest and best suited to survive. By this the species is benefited in competition with others, and this constitutes Natural Selection. In fact variation is so universally the rule, that the wonder would rather be that species are so persistent, *but*—that like can produce like; and that also, in spite of constant divergence, there is also a constant tendency towards mediocrity and the original type.

For as every offspring proceeds from two parents slightly differing from each other, the tendency of their conjunction is to produce a mean in all points of difference, and to exaggerate only those of mutual resemblance. Such of those points of resemblance of two parents as are exaggerated beyond the typical average, and conduce to the greater prosperity and multiplication of the specks,—become more exaggerated in their posterity and tend in time to form varieties, of which, however, those only survive; to the existence, of which surrounding conditions are most favorable. The general tendency to a mean is of course calculated to perpetuate the species intact, provided surrounding conditions remain unaltered (which they never do) or favorable. Thus notwithstanding constant slight variations of individual progeny, the tendency is still towards persistence, of the normal type, and hence Natural Selection can produce distinct varieties of species, *solely* in very protracted periods of time. The doctrine of Natural Selection requires therefore again, nothing but the application of the simplest principles of arithmetic to the most extensively verified facts. As the one acorn—which out of all that

fall from an oak in a season, fructifies and becomes a tree,—is to the millions which perish, so is a successful, naturally selected variation to the millions exterminated by inherent inferiority or unfavorable conditions. If the whole theory of *evolution* is *also* involved in these established premises, it behoves those whom it offends to accept it or show cause for their opposition. It seems to me that they might as well dispute that they *themselves* have passed—like every other organism—through all the gradations of form and growth between a simple cell and a human moral being.

The practice by man of artificial selection adds experimental demonstration to historical and arithmetical proof, and hastens the results enormously—by restricting propagation to parents—selected as exhibiting the same desired points of resemblance, and preventing reversion of their progeny to the original type, by discarding in successive generations all those individuals who do not inherit them in sufficient exaggeration, and also by maintaining such general surrounding conditions as favor the development of the selected variation. But the actual process of variation cannot be hastened. The moment this is attempted, sterility or hybridity prevents too sudden a variation. The development, in time, of each individual organism passes through stages microcosmically representative of the slow gradual changes through which the race has come through cosmical ages, exhibiting a brief epitome of its past history; and how could two distinct histories be represented by one individual? Only—as we see it—by a collapse. Mr Darwin says, "on my theory *unity of type is explained by unity of descent.*" (Nat. Sel. p. 247.)

I am less concerned, however, to defend or expound the theory of natural selection, than to make an application of it to human sociology. Natural selection has done its work, for probably many millions of years, in human development. Races have been produced, have flourished, and been exterminated. There is, however, strong reason for believing that some races have in pre-historic intervals; attained to a civilisation very much superior to subsequent conditions of society, if not in some respects even to our own; and we know that in historic time the progress of civilisation has been intermittent. We know that the intellectual condition of Europe in the middle ages was for inferior to that under the Roman Empire, and to that of Greece, in the days of Pericles and Plato; and that the builders of the great pyramid must have possessed some scientific knowledge, at least equal, perhaps superior to our own. If the Chinese have not retrograded much, they certainly have not advanced, while in India decadence is but too apparent. Its architecture is a thing of the past, and its astronomy is not only almost forgotten, but presents indications of belonging to a higher latitude, where it is now altogether unknown. We know little of the great mound-builders and copperworkers of North America, and of the early civilised people of Mexico, beyond the fact that they gave way before inferior races. The disinterred cities of the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates bear as heavy witness to the complete annihilation of their ancient civilisations as that which history furnishes in the case of Europe, where the millenium, which succeeded the advent of Christianity, may be fairly described as the age of social monstrosity and intellectual abortion. No phoenix arose from the ashes of former glories. In each case selection seemed to favor savagery, ignorance, and stupidity; and if brutal wars had not tended to maintain some physical efficiency, the productions of the dark ages would seem to have been unmitigatedly evil. To the Moors we probably owe the materials of after progress. If something more substantial seems now to have been retrieved, that is, apparently, due to the vast accumulation rather of materials and data than of the knowledge of their use; to the almost accidental discovery of one little material advantage here and another there; each infinitesimal inventor adding his puny quota, and merely assisting to prepare and dispose things for the little further contributions of his successors, who added their mites to the aggregation of knowledge and its results, while really only struggling for their own existence. And it is plain that the greatest existing means towards ultimate general progress consist in the material facilities for recording all the minute steps in discovery, so as to make them at once the common property of the race, that no progress now made may be lost. The first great step, of course, was the invention of writing; but from what we now know, we may rest satisfied that ages intervened between many first attempts, and before any such thing as an alphabet was even thought of. The invention of printing, which has consolidated and established knowledge, was not altogether a sudden leap, though the results accumulated rapidly. The perpetuation of an idea by a physical record saves everyone the task of re-discovering for himself all that has been previously learned, and the general dissemination of the power of deciphering the records, now prevents the loss, from lack of means, of any inventive power to spread its little achievements. If one loses an opportunity, another takes it, and many a one loses by slowness what another, incapable of inventing, takes by mere quickness. Knowledge is thus now the property of the race, and the individual is almost suppressed. It is the work of nature, "So careful of the race she seems, so careless of the single life." It is as if she had work to perform and used individual men merely as instruments, and those as if of the smallest value too. One Babbage's difference engine, not only does more intellectual difficult work in an hour than an expert computer could in a month, but does it with a certainty, an ease, and still more, a guarantee against error which no human calculator could possibly give or possess. One steam engine is worth several hundreds of laborers, and is far more reliable.

So nature now may be regarded as discouraging war, not from care for men, but because it checks civilisation and wastes energy. Men are of no consequence in the march of progress, and almost as many valuable (or valueless) workers are drowned in rotten ships, killed by factory explosions, smothered in mines, starved by poverty, emasculated by wealth, or exterminated by special disease, as were formerly wasted in *national murder*. Death itself proves that men are not the peculiar care of nature. She discards effete material of human kind like any other, and substitutes more effective tools in utter indifference provided that her unceasing work be done.

Is not this the universal law? Nature everywhere teems with life, the function of its possessor being—to subsist upon, or become the food of others. One kind is preyed upon by another, that other forms only sustenance for a third, and that third for a fourth. Animals and birds prey upon each other and upon whatever else is adapted to their digestion. Insects feed upon plants—upon each other—and upon us—and Dr Hooker has just shown the motives, as he says, of some plants that deliberately decoy, seize, devour, and digest, insects in return, and are fully as capable as man of discriminating and selecting appropriate aliment.

See Dr Hooker's address "On Carnivorous Plants" before the British Association at Belfast, 21st August, 1874.

Man preys upon more than all the rest; but it is really in self-defence, or rather instinctively, in him as in all beings. Existence depends upon it. For ages his wild struggle was with the beasts of the forest, his fellow-men among the number. In civilisation, where he has so far mastered other objects, the struggle is mainly with mankind. The pressure of human population is the great antagonist, and a man's foes are emphatically they of his own household, more than ever at the very time that he has learnt the complete identity of his own interest with theirs. This is the problem of the age. To put the ultimate case: a man's children are so necessary to him that he actually creates them, yet for them he has to struggle harder and more painfully than for himself. All his social relations involve the same difficulty in greater or less degrees. It may be unfelt by those whose means are proportioned to their liabilities, but I believe that a large majority are in a very different position. Thousands in Europe, and particularly in England, are now daily overcome in the struggle. The solution of this difficulty lies rather in the anticipation of artificial selection than in its exercise, and is, therefore, hot in-directly connected with my subject. But the remedy happens to be the same as one which I propose for other difficulties—namely, the general spread of knowledge particularly of physiology, and the complete abolition of monopolies and restrictions upon its universal study.

I have mentioned, as the most conclusive demonstration of the doctrine of natural (election, the fact that it has been put to experimental proof by man in artificial selection. Those who have actually and systematically tried the experiment are surely the best witnesses; "and they," says Mr Darwin (Nat. Sel., p. 82), "habitually speak of an animal's organisation as something quite plastic, which they can model almost as they please." They hold that the agriculturist (p. 83) is, by natural selection, enabled "not only to modify the character of his flock, but to change it altogether. It is the magicians wand, by means of which he may summon into life whatever form and mould he pleases.." Sir J. Sebright said of pigeons, he "would produce any given feather in three years, but it would take him six years to obtain head and beak." Mr Darwin adduces an argument of an undeniably practical kind, when he says (ib.), "What English breeders have actually effected, is proved by the enormous prices given for animals with a good pedigree; and these have been exported to almost every quarter of the world."

For precision's sake, I will just restate here the principle of artificial selection as I apprehend it. If a breeder desire to perpetuate any particular bodily or mental characteristic, he selects two parents exhibiting that characteristic; and if they both possess it in any degree above the ordinary *average*—below the maximum perhaps—of their kind, that characteristic will infallibly appear in some offspring in an exaggerated degree. Of these he then selects those which exhibit it most prominently to propagate his variation, and discards the others. It suffices in subsequent crosses to select a fresh parent with an average degree of the same characteristic, but of course the effect will be largely increased and accelerated by the Selection of parents possessing the maximum development of the special, desired characteristic. This is, of course, in strict accordance with the arithmetical principle, that things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and that if unequals be added to equals, the whole will be unequal, &c. I may add a common observation with regard to mankind that corroborates what I before stated, to the effect that in reproduction by pairs, there is always a tendency to a mean—that mean being of course a variation—in the progeny. That is, that in general, opposites attract one another; and we are often amused at seeing what appear at the first glance incongruous, but are really natural, associations of tall with short, dark with fair, fibrous with lymphatic, clever with foolish, medium with medium, and good with bad. Thus the mean is preserved even more closely than it would be by unions without any such directly compensating tendency. The color of half-castes is an ample illustration of the tendency towards a mean; and Frederick the Great's success in producing tall guardsmen sufficiently proves variation, and the general amenity of human kind to the law of selection artificially applied.

The question I now raise is this. Does natural selection operate, as it otherwise universally does to the advantage of species, in furthering man's civilisation—his moral and intellectual improvement? I have already shewn that his progress in civilisation is at least unequal, intermittent, and even sometimes retrogressive. Is this from a failure of the principle of natural selection? Does it arise entirely or in part from its misapplication by man in the form of injudicious artificial selection? or—civilisation being the unique work of man, extra and additional to Nature—does its maintenance demand, as special an adaptation of Nature's method of natural selection—artificial selection? And is the failure a result of man's inexperience in its application, or in his neglect to apply it to his own case? And why does he neglect this? Mr Darwin admits that a single clear case of the production, by natural selection, of a modification in any degree injurious to its possessor, would be fatal to his theory; extinction being the alternative ("Wallace's Natural Selection," p. 834; "Darwin's Origin of Species," chap. iv. and vi). And I am confident that this is true, and further that any apparent failure of selection to produce unalloyed benefit in the development of man is solely due to man's interference with that law—in artificial misapplication of it to his particular case. The result of man's artificial selection in the case of plants, birds, and animals, have proved a decided and brilliant success. The horses, the cattle, the sheep, the dogs, the rabbits, the fowls, the pigeons, the canaries, the plants of every description—produced by artificial selection, and the extent to which such of their qualities as are useful to man, have been expanded, and undesired ones suppressed—*by careful selection*, amply prove to my mind that the defect is *not* in any radical inadequacy of human intellect to discover the means proper to secure its own social and intellectual improvement, but *is* simply in the failure to apply to that object the same principles which have proved so strikingly efficacious when directed to the modification—for his own advantage—of other organised beings. My object therefore is to point out how this occurs, and how it may be remedied. The means I propose are certain and simple, and I am satisfied that their adoption will be a mere question of time.

It is an important but much neglected question, whether modern civilisation exhibits signs of stability as compared with more ancient ones which proved evanescent? The condition of greatest prosperity of an organism, is that in which it exhibits the most thorough adaptability by natural selection to its surrounding conditions. Those conditions are ever changing, and immobility or intractability in accommodating itself to those changes, means—that a point in its history has arrived at which natural selection is no longer competent to modify it so as to bring it into appropriate relations with its natural conditions; and that it is therefore on the road to extinction. It may be as well for me to repeat, here that I think that civilisation—being artificial—requires artificial selection to perpetuate it, and that the cause of the failure of various civilisations was the neglect of man to apply to his own case what he found to succeed so well in that of animals. We can only account in this way for the evident relapses, into semi-savage conditions, from those of apparently flourishing civilisation, that have constantly taken place in various parts of the world in post times. Now one of the most striking features in modern civilisation is its apparent viability. Inferior races vanish before the wealth accumulating, and machinery employing European, as the light of the stars is extinguished by that of the sun. It presents no immediate signs of approaching extinction. At the same time its mobility seems scarcely equal to the demands of its rapidly changing conditions. It seems to owe its vigour mainly to its unprecedented employment of material, tools, and machinery by which its working power is so enormously multiplied; to the fact that the invention of printing has secured the means of establishing permanently every achievement of man, whether of discovery or invention; and to the more general spread of education, which has to a much greater extent than formerly, brought those means of permanent record within the reach of every discoverer and inventor. Nevertheless the refractory constituents of our society not only impede the general march of civilisation, but they themselves live very hard, or die very hard, in the struggle.

The persistence of type is too strong for the tendency to variation. In artificial selection, which we well know requires the conduct of an expert, man has proved that he can materially assist nature by availing himself of the tendency to variation, which is his source of profit. In the production of useful varieties of plants and animals, he has reached in many instances the natural boundary to immediate variation—hybridity; but has ascertained that, as in his own personal growth he absolutely represents infinitely greater changes of ancestral structure, which it probably took millions of millions of years to accomplish, so it is impossible for him to dispense with the necessary element of time, or to lead the capacity for variation to encroach upon the limit imposed by inheritance and the persistence of type. In his social and moral development, however, he has as yet met with no such abrupt check to variation. In fact civilisation has as yet had *no* persistent type. Its late renovation has not extended over more than four or five centuries; a period which—judging by previous developments, is of itself wholly inadequate to secure it against relapse. This being the case, our civilisation cannot be regarded as securely and permanently established, and it is evidently desirable to learn the causes of former collapses of civilisation, to enable us to avoid similar catastrophes in future.

I have come to the conclusion that the evanescence of former civilisations was due to two main inherent causes, irrespective of foreign aggression, which I think was of less importance. The principal one I think was

the *monopoly of knowledge*, relics of which still exist among us, though mainly in the form of conventional restrictions upon its acquisition.

The other I think was the neglect to apply artificial selection to the human family, the natural and persistent tendency being to select the savage varieties only.

We know that the small numbers in Egypt, Chaldea, &c., for instance, who anciently possessed knowledge—guarded it as jealously as they cultivated it vigorously. They not only kept the masses ignorant, but taught them, not what was true, but only such things as they thought would make them docile, and subservient to their masters. They feared to trust the people with knowledge. It was, they thought, too precious, and so *they lost it themselves*. The monopolists were then, and always must be a comparatively small number, and when any circumstances led the ignorant masses to try and feel their physical strength—they used it,—knowing no better; knowing only that they had been vilely deceived and the victims of tyranny, they were unlikely to show mercy to those who had withheld from them *the knowledge of good and evil*. Is not the prohibition of that knowledge in Eden an apt illustration of my point? Was not the story evidently written to deter simpletons from aspiring to break the monopoly? Does not the serpent typify a useful renegade from the monopolist's ranks? Is not the story of Prometheus a humanised edition of the same allegory? Are there not actually to-day advocates for prohibitions and restrictions upon knowledge? We know that allegory and parable were the staple form of popular instruction. When it was desired to inculcate, in the style of Æsop's fables, the changes of the seasons, the priests did so by teaching mythical stories of deified animals or heroes, who had been translated into constellations. Hence, the twelve signs of the Zodiac, into which it was found convenient to divide the annual revolution of the heavens, represent the twelve labors of Hercules, and those of Samson, the sons of Jacob, Tribes of Israel,

See Sir W. Drummond's *Ædipus Judaicus*.

&c. The adventurers of Isis and Osiris, of Mithra, Bacchus, Adonis, Atys, &c., who were all born with the New Year, and died and rose again at the vernal equinox, are relics of the devices by which the pernicious monopoly of knowledge was maintained by the mistaken protectors of it to their own destruction. The people having been taught these fables to guide them to seed time and harvest, but still more to intimidate them with oracles and miracles, sometimes rose in their numerical might and annihilated their oppressors. That might, however, was merely physical, and could not free them from the tyranny of the superstition which enthralled them, and which they therefore only perpetuated; which also is now far from extinct. I am satisfied that similar circumstances have had much, if not everything, to do with every extinction or check to the progress of civilisation; and no more remarkable instance of it than the great French revolution has ever occurred. The antagonism of classes which grew till it culminated in that revolution, and which is a salient feature of the system, is slowly increasing day by day in England, and must eventually produce a revolution there, unless means be taken to give the working class the knowledge which they want. From the destruction, with the civilisation, of its records, history cannot furnish us with particulars of all such revolutions, so that its silence is an indisproof, and the esoteric system is not yet extinct. The use of dead languages till recently, the superfluous use now of technical terms, priestly systems, freemasonry, and the subjection of women, are living relics of the evil system. The spread of education, and still more the popularisation of science, independent thinking, and unrestricted discussion, are the great antidotes to the evil of the monopoly of knowledge.

The neglect to apply artificial selection to the human family I have named as another and the most important cause of the vicissitudes of civilisation. Natural selection makes fine savages, but therefore, by debasing the intellectual type, tends to retard civilisation. Man's civilisation is essentially *his own work*; and unless he practise selection, the modifications of his structure, favorable to the development of civilisation can never be effected. Plato and Aristotle were fully alive to the necessity of such selection, and wisely provided for its enforcement in their "Republic" and "Politics" respectively. The reasons for the failure in practice of Plato's "Republic" are not precisely known, but in any case it was not a failure of artificial selection *in practice*, but a failure—for any reasons—to *put it in practice*. The wider distinction now between the civilised man and the savage makes artificial selection more than ever indispensable, as without it, in spite of the great advantage of the more general education of the people, their status in civilisation rather retrogrades than otherwise. Their education certainly increases their *power* to contribute to the general civilisation, but quite as much also to retard it. If the poor are rendered more efficient workers, the pressure of poverty upon a large proportion of them is much greater, and it is doubtful whether their moral condition is not therefore worse. I say doubtful—but contact with civilisation multiplies ideas and promotes intelligence, without which there could be no morality. There can be no doubt whatever that the demoralising conditions to which the poor are constantly exposed, produce a generally deteriorating effect.

One great cause of this, which was unknown, I believe, to the ancients, is *morbid sensibility*, and consists in the undue subordination of the intellect to un-reflective feelings. Reason is dethroned, and sentimentality usurps its place. This error is demonstrable, because it can be shown that a more expanded view of the

consequences proves that the sympathetic sensibilities—if under the direction of the intellect—would realise a *far larger and purer satisfaction*. The wealthy classes are not exempt from the evil effects, but the poor are as usual the principal victims. To such an extent has this morbid sentimentality been carried in the last hundred years, that I think that all the advantage of the spread of education has been more than negated. It has in any case been much restricted. It is not that the good and the bad are placed indifferently upon a level, when natural selection might maintain an average. Far from it. Our legal systems and conventional customs combine to select the worst specimens to perpetuate the race. Any exceptional success of superior specimens is effected by natural selection through individual vigor. But these are, I think, indisputably far below the average *in number*; so much below it as scarcely to affect the average, even if no extra protection were afforded to those below it. The main characteristics, which I think it is desirable to develop and improve, are health, vigor, self-respect, prudence, truthfulness, honesty, moral or social feeling, and intellect. But our penal administration and conventional habits both tend to protect and exaggerate the very opposite, and to encourage the consequent degeneration of posterity.

As regards health, the follies are as glaring as interminable. We lay embargoes upon progress in medical science, by prohibiting experiments upon the only suitable objects, and on the other hand the chief results accomplished are the prolongation of the agonies of death, and the preservation of those afflicted with radical defects, and dire diseases, to inoculate others while they live, and transmit them to posterity when they die. Thus shortsighted sympathy for one, results in cruelty and misery to many.

As regards prudence, self-respect, and vigor, our so-called charitable institutions offer premiums to the imprudent and the helpless, and preserve their evil qualities to posterity at the expense of the industrious and prudent, who are thereby more or less deterred from perpetuating their better qualities. Thus charity to inferior and degenerate individuals, is needlessly suffered to ensue in uncharitableness, and injury to our posterity and our race. Let the objects of charity be supported in the greatest comfort that those who sympathise most with them desire—in clover if they like. But are we right to suffer them to crowd the world with their inferior type, and double the severity of the struggle for existence, of the posterity of their superiors? Is this not a crime?

Next, as regards truthfulness, honesty, and moral feeling. The most flagrant errors of sentiment are shown in our treatment of our perjurers, forgers, thieves, outragers of persons, and murderers. But I need not test your patience now by dilating much on this, which is the strongest part of my position, and involves the most direct and disastrous effects upon the human race. I have already specially exhibited these evils in a discourse "On the Treatment of Criminals in Relation to Science," which is in your library, and to which I beg to refer. To give connection to my present argument, I will quote from it two or three passages:

Treatment of Criminals in Relation to Science. By H. K. Rusden. Melbourne, 1872, Geo. Robertson, p.p. 12-13.

—
"The present state of things is notoriously unsatisfactory, but the full extent of the mischief produced can scarcely be apprehended, for it is of daily increasing proportions. A worse than foreign enemy is maintained by us in our midst, and favored with every advantage that our civilisation can furnish. We endow the criminal—known or unknown—with every protection from the ministers of the law, which is accorded to the honest citizen, and actually assume that he has not done what we know he has done, until a certain complex method of proof has been fulfilled; and any loophole that a clever lawyer can find, is made effectual to save him from the legal consequences. But if, by force of circumstances, a conviction follow, the consequences tend rather to confirm him in his evil career, and perfect him in his profession. He lives, as before, at the cost of his honest neighbors, with medical, and every other attendance free; the most select of the society he prizes most; and no more work than is exactly calculated to keep him in health. He is far better fed, housed, and cared for, than many honest laborers; and he not only knows it, but proves, by returning to it as soon as possible, that he appreciates it. But this is not all. Exactly in proportion to his *reward for his crime*, is the discouragement to the honest laborer, who cannot but be made too well aware of the difference in their fortunes, on every fresh liberation of the protected idler, to whose support he knows he has to contribute! The only wonder is that crime is not more general than it is." These are the demoralising influences to which I before alluded. "It is characteristic of the criminal classes, that they are both unscrupulous, and improvident, and set at nought the restrictions which society imposes upon the numerical increase of morally disposed persons. An enormous impediment to the moral progress of the people would be at once removed, were convicted criminals never liberated to propagate their evil kind; the honest poor would be so far relieved from competition—at an immense disadvantage—with such as scruple not to avail themselves of means of subsistence from which honesty excludes; a part—more or less—of the burden of foundling and reformatory asylum* would be saved to society; the proportion of uneducated—or rather miseducated—children would be largely reduced; and the first direct step probably in the history of the world would have been taken to improve, or rather stay the deterioration of, the race of human beings. For it must be obvious that if those below the general average of

morality and intelligence multiply—as we know they do—far more rapidly and promiscuously than those above it, the tendency *must be* to lower the general average. And that tendency is enormously enhanced by the consequently increased competition, against which the honest poor have to contend in living, and in educating their children. The highest authorities agree, not only that the majority of criminals are the children of criminals, but that the large majority of the children of criminals become criminals themselves. And this is only what might naturally be expected by those who believe in cause and effect. It is inevitable, by that law of the persistence of force, which is as much the explanation of habit as the cause of heredity. And for all these reasons, a criminal *by habit* should never be released under any circumstances." I now further say that I consider his release a crime against our children, and the human race. At page 24, I concluded by saying that "the permanent incarceration of all criminals would be a far better protection to society in every way than the current penal system; that it would tend to reduce crime to a minimum; that the cost would be much less than might be supposed, if not less than the present expenditure;" (and experts assert that criminals cost society far more when at large than in confinement;) "and that by preventing the indiscriminate propagation of, and general contamination by criminals, a direct and certain moral improvement in the human race would be effected. But I have pointed out that a fatal objection to perpetual imprisonment, and all reformatory institutions, lies in the fact that they offer a premium to the criminal and lazy, and mislead the honest poor that crime would solve all their difficulties and secure them State support. My last proposition to utilise criminals generally for scientific experiments entirely overstates this objection to, while enhancing the advantages of my first. It would offer stronger deterrents; it would reduce the cost; it would be more extensively and discriminatively humane, and wisely admonitory and it would besides secure, by the inevitable impulse to medical knowledge, incalculably beneficial effects upon the health, longevity, and morals, of the human race."

Finally, as regards intellect. The gradations between crime and lunacy are held by experts to be quite indistinguishable, and I am clearly of opinion that criminals and lunatics should receive indiscriminate treatment. We cannot—by any process—discern the particular motives of any individual; we know absolutely nothing of the strength of his temptation, or of his power of resistance. But we certainly know—as far as we can learn anything on the subject, that the acts of a criminal, as much as those of a lunatic, are the outcome of the history of his ancestry as much as of himself, and that every act of man, sane or insane, philosopher or thief, is in the last resort, simply a necessary process of adjustment of an organism to its environment.

To use Mr Spencer's phrase quoted by Professor Tyndall in his late address to the British Association, 19th September, 1874.

Thus the idea of punishment is as inappropriate to the case of the criminal as to that of the lunatic. But, when we are conscious that it lies in our power to condemn our posterity to contamination, and moral putrefaction, or to save them from those evil conditions, I think that to sacrifice such objects to the *tender cultivation* of beings without intelligence or moral sense, is simply *both lunatic and criminal*. Our treatment of lunatics is such that it often suggests to me the applicability of the household phrase, "A fellow feeling makes us wondrous kind" But there is kindness and kindness. Kindness is good, if well bestowed. Kindness to one, involving unkindness to many, yields a large balance of unkindness, which is bad; and kindness to an object incapable of appreciating or feeling it, and involving unkindness and deadly injury to our children's children, is not only unkindness, but a crime. Must we not be half-lunatic ourselves to be blind to this? Ought not a person, once lunatic or criminal, and therefore with increased liability to become so again, to be precluded from opportunities of perpetuating his variety, and deteriorating posterity? Can we not discern our direct responsibility in the case? People shut their eyes to the fact that a human being without intelligence or moral sense, is not a human being at all—he hath no pre-eminence above a beast. I do not protest against the enormously greater and insanely extravagant expenditure upon lunatics or criminals, than is ever devoted to help struggling honesty and virtue. I protest against the moral and intellectual destruction of our children's children, and plead the cause of those who cannot plead their own.

Artificial selection may be considered in relation to individual action, or to state action. As regards individual action there can be little hope that it will be attempted, until familiarity with physiological and social science shall have conferred a larger grasp of general principles and a more expanded social feeling—than is now but rarely possible. But I have no fear of any deficiency in these respects ultimately, when the intellect shall have been sufficiently developed and restored to its due supremacy; when also the pernicious exaggeration of senseless sentimentality shall have subsided. For that we must wait. There can, however, be no possible doubt that the advantages to society, as well as to individuals, would be incalculable, if special modifications of mental and physical excellence could be handed down for many generations, without admixture of irrelevant tendencies. The family that first adopts and maintains the practice must soon eclipse its neighbors. As the cultivated English racehorse excels the American mustang, or the Timor pony, so, were we to practise individual artificial selection, would our mathematicians, engineers, doctors, financiers, and laborers excel all others, till they follow suit. A consummation devoutly to be wished, but not soon to be expected.

But artificial selection by the State is not only perfectly practicable now, but it is imperatively demanded for the security and preservation of society. It is not so much a question of improvement, as of prevention of rapid and disastrous deterioration. If we wait until the general spread of knowledge and individual confidence in general principles enable every one to see the necessity for it, the type will inevitably have degenerated enormously, and so much lost ground will have to be recovered.

I have myself perfect confidence that our civilisation *will* endure, that much ground *will not* be lost. Artificial selection is sure—at no very distant date—to be practised by the individual as well as by the State. No criminal or lunatic inheritances will then pollute posterity, and medical science will enjoy many more advantages than it ever entered into my imagination to conceive. But before that prosperous time arrives, conventional monopolies of all kinds must disappear, and the whole structure of moral science must be erected upon physiology as its basis. Happy he who contributes in ever so humble a degree to expedite this consummation.

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Sin.

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An Essay read before the Sunday Free Discussion Society by HOKOR, on Sunday, the 23rd of April, 1871, at the Masonic Hall, Lonsdale Street, Melbourne.

A mos iii. 4. Shall there be evil in a city and the Lord hath not done it."

I SELECTED "*Sin*" for the subject of my paper, in the strong conviction that the word expresses an idea, which, while fraught with incalculable evils to humanity, is nevertheless absolutely devoid of real meaning; directly at variance with all those notions of right and wrong which constitute man's most precious achievement by patient study of nature and himself; and therefore more plainly contradictory and absurd, than some other theological fallacies, quite as worthy of being refuted and destroyed.

In enquiries of this nature, the common objection is, that the subject of them being beyond the sphere of the operation of his senses, man is not competent to enter upon them at all; but should humbly and reverently accept any modicum of information respecting them which may be afforded by those, who—while assuming the function of leaders of the blind, are unable to produce the slightest evidence that their vision is one whit superior to that of their neighbours. But I wish to impress upon you as forcibly as possible, that though certain facts may be designated "*Sin*," that designation is purely arbitrary; and together with the co-relative idea of God—is—as an idea, a *human idea*, as properly the object of human criticism, as any other idea which the human mind is capable of forming. For human ideas are of all things the fittest for man to analyse and dissect. Ideas are the materials of his reasoning and of his knowledge. It is solely by rigorously and carefully scrutinising his ideas of all kinds, and testing their greater or less exact correspondence with facts, that he can either reason profitably, or acquire valuable knowledge. Ideas are the products in the mind of man, of the operation of external objects—through his senses—upon his sensorium; and the fact that his knowledge is in exact proportion to the degree to which he exercises the natural function of digesting them, is sufficient proof that it is his right and his duty to exercise it to the fullest possible extent. Every natural phenomenon is admittedly a legitimate object of investigation; how much more the workings of his own imagination with impressions made upon him by those natural objects!

Sin is defined as a voluntary or conscious offence against God; the ideas of both God and Sin being alike—products in the imagination of man, of complex impressions by external objects upon his organs of sensation. It is beside my present purpose to enter upon the question of the reality of God, or of any object corresponding to the complex idea. I shall merely observe that it is generally admitted, that if there be any such object, it is not of such a nature as to produce impressions upon our organs of sensation; and that the idea is therefore necessarily of the nature of an inference from other ideas derived in the first instance from materials furnished by our senses. It seems also not irrelevant to remark—that as there is scarcely a people in the world, however rude and savage, to whom the idea of God is unknown, that idea obviously cannot be the result of high civilisation or cultivated intelligence; but rather of ignorance, and inexperience in reasoning. In corroboration of this we find, that if the very lowest savages of all, have like monkeys, so far as we can judge, no ideas of any kind respecting a god; the rejection of such ideas as puerile and illusory is no where so common as among those persons who most habitually and systematically subject their ideas to the most searching analysis, and conform them most rigidly to the most certain facts. An extended acquaintance with and exclusive study of those natural objects in their most intimate, or most expanded relations, have proverbially a *tendency* to lead men to discard such ideas; and though many able students of nature still entertain them, it is confessedly by way of inference,

and not from observation of any object corresponding to the idea.

Sin—however—being defined;—a voluntary offence against God;—it follows—if the idea of God be,—as many now suppose, a figment of of the imagination,—that that of sin can have no more substantial basis Upon the premisses of the atheist therefore, this is the inevitable conclusion. But as in our discussions the idea of God is generally admitted without question, I shall proceed to other phases of the argument. If I find that the principles of the Theist or Christian, consistently applied, conduct to the same conclusion, so much the more confidence may safely be placed in it as practically certain.

All who hold the theory of a God or Creator,—assert—as his necessary characteristics, his *omniscience*, *omnipotence*, and *goodness*. Assuming these,—we come face to face with the surprising anomaly that though God enables man to learn with more or less certainty how to secure physical good, and avoid physical evil,—he has left him absolutely without means of discovering when or how he transgresses any law—other than those *natural* ones—for attention to which, pleasure constitutes his reward; and neglect—or even ignorance of which, surely causes pain. *These laws he cannot transgress*. If he could reap the pleasure—or avoid the pain, *without using the natural means*—THEN *he could transgress them*. For instance—drinking to excess is not violating the laws of nature. It can only be done by fulfilling them. If man could drink or otherwise abuse his person, without incurring the natural penalties for so doing—*then* he could violate the laws of nature; but not otherwise. The pain he suffers, and the pleasure he enjoys, are alike the fulfilment of, and proof of obedience to, the law. To say, that man violates the law of God, is to reverse their relative positions. If God *be omnipotent*, his law *cannot* be infringed. To suppose the contrary would be to deprive him of the characteristics of a God, and degrade him below the level of a man. And observe—man learns natural laws solely by observing their effects upon himself and other objects, and his conduct is determined as they affect him with pleasure or pain. And neither the laws,—nor the objects in which they operate, are to blame or the reverse, if he experience either. For in either case, he is furnished with sensation, memory, and reason, to guide his conduct in the future, to enable him to utilise such objects, and to convert even the evil into good.

Now this being so, with what reason can God be supposed to suffer any offence, injury, or wrong at the hand of man, when man's every act and its consequence is in fulfilment of his law? The pain which man suffers is the natural fruit of error—of ignorance,—and is his means—his *only* means—of knowledge. Its natural function and use being thus amply explained, the supposition of a further supernatural consequence is entirely gratuitous and impertinent; the doctrine of sin has no basis as regards man. But as we have assumed a God, we should regard sin as it affects him. If man *CAN sin*,—and afflict God,—inflict injury, offence, and wrong upon him, does he not do so, (as we have seen he *must*) by *obedience* to laws *which he cannot transgress*? By ignorant erroneous obedience perhaps, but still obedience. By acting as his nature fits him to act. And the assumption of a God, involves, that he is the author and foreknowing constructor of that nature. Man has neither power—choice—nor option, as to *his own* nature. There is no man here present, however self-sufficient, who would not—*if he could*, alter and improve his nature. As I said, *God is asserted, to have made, FORE-KNOWINGLY, that nature—with its capacity for sin; nay—with a tendency and predisposition to sin; original sin*. And being by the assumption, *omnipotent*—not tied like man by circumstance, or blinded by ignorance,—it follows that the sin is God's creation, and his alone! If sin then be possible at all—it *must* be God's and his only! From this there is absolutely no escape. If God be the creator and author of ALL, He *must* be the author and creator of sin—*if sin can be*. And the deliberate conscious author too.

Many of man's works would be perfect if he could obtain his materials, of the degree of perfection which he diligently seeks all over this globe; and if he also could adapt them as perfectly as he aspires to do. But the universal responsibility of God is culminated in the specific allegation that he *creates his materials at will*, and that his wisdom and power in using them are infinite. Then—to create beings—while possessing certain knowledge that they *WILL*—not to say *must*—sin,—is obviously to assume the moral responsibility for that sin; in the strict accepted meaning of the terms. And I assert this to be Christian doctrine, and quote one unexceptionable authority. "Thou couldest have no power at all against me" said Jesus to Pilate, "*except it were given thee from above. Therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin*" (John xix, II.) I cannot state my argument more explicitly. He says—Judas's sin was *GREATER*, than Pilate's. Why? Because he was the prior conscious cause. But *who gave Judas the power FROM ABOVE* without which he could have had *none at all against him? a further prior conscious cause—God. Therefore HE had the GREATEST sin!* If you pass from Pilate to Judas at all, accumulating the moral responsibility and augmenting the sin,—you are *BOUND* to pass from Judas—to the original fountain of *his* power, which according to Jesus—was derived—and derivable—solely from above! Paul furnishes many similar texts I shall quote but one. (1 Cor. III, 6—7.) "I have planted, Apollos "watered; but God gave the increase. So then neither is he that "planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the "increase." He clearly holds God to be the cause;—responsible;—and deserving the praise if any, and of course—the blame if any.

Man errs from ignorance or folly; and invariably (as is even asserted by all) in opposition to his own real

interest.

Thus were self-sacrifice or self-mortification really virtue, man would be most virtuous when most vicious. But it is involved in Christian principles and doctrines (not in *mine* remember) that God deliberately and consciously created man—sin—and *Satan too*, with *full foreknowledge of all the awful evil consequences!* How my mind revolts from such horrid blasphemy! How profoundly I pity the infatuated dupes of such degrading superstition! Is it possible that earnest, anxious, intelligent beings can actually hug to their hearts such pernicious nonsense, as a holy mystery? Yes. I once did so most trustingly. What a relief—what new life—what boundless happiness at last to discover—that the unlimited exercise of his intellectual faculties by man—so far from being criminal, is as much a duty as it is a privilege! to learn that sin is simply an invention of priestcraft to bind the human intellect in fetters of adamant;—and that the sole possible method of committing blasphemy,—is—to assert a God!

But I shall remark on other texts. The other three gospels (Mat. XII, 31-2; Mark III 29; Luke XII, 2) say that all *sin* shall be forgiven to men—except sin against the Holy Ghost; which being unpardonable, is the only one worth consideration. Now Peter (2 Peter I, 21) says, that "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;"—and in 1 Kings xxii. 23, and Ezekiel xiv. 9, it is unequivocally stated that God put a lying spirit into the mouth of prophets! Could anything be more blasphemous? Could anyone speak against the Holy Ghost more explicitly than these authors of the books of Kings and Ezekiel, *whom the Holy Ghost moved to speak?* Is any theory involving such glaring contradictions worthy of the slightest respect? Can anything be more destructive of faith? Yet want of faith is made the *sin par excellence* in several places. John (xvi. 10) makes Jesus say the Holy Ghost will convince the world of sin because they believed not on him, (Jesus); and Paul says (Rom. xiv. 28) "Whatsoever is not of *faith* is sin." Surely I need not produce arguments to prove that faith is an intellectual vice, and that belief is wholly involuntary. Whoever doubts or disputes it—should see, that it is *demonstrated by his very inability to believe it*. Can any one of you believe that I am now advocating Christianity? not if you were to get £20,000 a year for it.

In Romans (iv. 15) Paul says "The law worketh wrath; for where "no law is, there is no transgression." And John says in his 1st Epistle "Sin is the transgression of the law." (1 John iii. 4.) Of course it must be obvious from what has preceded, that the LAWGIVER was the *cause* of the sin, and therefore responsible for it, morally. It is gratifying to note one Bible definition of sin, which indicates some insight into the principles of right and wrong, and which is diametrically opposed to the others which I have quoted. (James iv. 17.) "Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him "it is sin." Here is not a word about the Holy Ghost, nor even of an offence against God. It makes the standard of right and wrong—the man's internal conviction; and sin,—an act in opposition to conviction. A noble saying, and worthy of all acceptation. But God and the Holy Ghost are wholly superfluous to this definition, which is all the better for their absence. In fact in this text the word "*Sin*" evidently means "*crime*," a totally different thing; relating to Society, not to God.

The story of the origin of sin in Eden, though absurd, is worth referring to. I wish to point out, that it was absolutely impossible that Adam or Eve *could sin*, BEFORE they possessed any knowledge of good or evil, which knowledge they are specially said to have only acquired *by* or *after* eating the fruit. *Without such knowledge*—they obviously could not (according to the definition) *voluntarily* or *consciously* sin But the old legend is simply that of Prometheus, distorted and inverted. The Serpent, the emblem of wisdom, procured for man the incomparable boon of the knowledge of good and evil; and earned the usual theological curse for his pains. None but the spirit of evil would try to keep that knowledge from man. This moral fact alone should prove the accuracy of my view, that the characters are stupidly transposed in the story of Eden. According to that story the Serpent deserved to be worshipped, and the Lord to be execrated. But two other features in it leave no room for doubt. First—the benevolent Serpent entirely succeeded, while the Omnipotent God completely failed. Second—the Lord is made to assert falsely that the man would surely die on the day he ate the fruit; while the serpent foretells the accurate truth in saying that; he should not die, but be as a God knowing good and evil, (Gen. iii. 5) which is also admitted to be the truth by the Lord himself (iii. 22) when he says "Behold the man *is become as one of us to know* "good and evil." It is plain that the author of this version of the story grossly misunderstood or perverted the legend; or else—that he intended to write a biting satire upon the theological spirit represented by "the Lord," and to illustrate the difficult though certain ultimate success,—in spite of the impotent anathemas of priests,—of that irresistible human intelligence which is slowly but surely civilising the world, and silently undermining the monstrous fabric of superstition.

Yet that old fable forms the whole basis of the infernal doctrine of *original sin*, which therefore needs no further refutation at my hands.

Some people are yet to be found so insane as to argue, that as the doctrine of sin exists, there must be some basis for it in truth. But that argument is of course as good for astrology, the philosopher's stone, witchcraft, ghosts, and the cure by the powder of sympathy. There is in truth a basis for it, though not a basis in truth. I have watched how, among the savages of Australia, a cunning rogue can abuse the credulity of the simple;

make them believe that he can work miracles while alive, and harm to his probable murderers after his death. The horrid riddle is thus easily solved. What I have observed in primitive man in our own age, was surely true of primitive man a few thousand years ago. But of all the engines ever employed by the cunning and unscrupulous to arouse the fears,—paralyse the intellect,—and cow the spirit of the ignorant masses.—none can compare with the diabolical doctrine of sin. The priest's prosperity and power depend upon his success in *convincing man of sin*. Get a man, innocent or guilty, to stand self-convicted before you, and you have him at your own price. Make him believe himself naturally vile and incapable of good, and you have prepared him for the commission of any imaginable crime. We all know how easily the really guilty are intimidated and so plunged further into crime. The fictitious guilt of the virtuous and weak is infinitely more useful to the priest, for their conscientiousness aids to rivet their fetters and to subjugate their reason. Hence the invention of original sin,—the capital of the priest,—the apology of the persecutor,—the antithesis of charity,—the paralysis of intellect—and the most demoralising of all outrages upon common sense. It is a refinement upon the simpler doctrine, and better fitted to appal and quell the minds of the innocent babies to whom it is barbarously taught before they are capable of judging of its falsehood. Were it a reasonable theory in itself, it would be best understood and accepted at a reasoning age; and were it true, experience would certainly suggest and confirm it. To teach it there- fore to infants, as is now done, is a tacit admission of its falsity. This is also the reason of the objection of churches to scientific knowledge and free discussion. It is instinctively felt that to tolerate either would be suicidal. It seems impossible to overrate the pernicious effects of the doctrine of sin. Human sacrifice (a consequence of it) was a trifle compared to it. For human sacrifice was rarely applied to the destruction of valuable intellects; but when it was, it produced a revulsion of feeling which more than compensated for the loss. But the sense of sin is destructive specially of intellect, rendering mischievous or unfruitful some of the noblest minds that ever existed. Its persistence to the present time proves its speciousness and its power. But activity of intellect and free discussion must eventually effect its extirpation, and an institution like this is one of its deadliest enemies.

Common sense teaches us that the idea of sin, original or otherwise, is absurd. For evil deeds infallibly cause their own retribution, as virtue brings its own reward. Consequently no one would sin, or rather do evil, but from a defect of knowledge; and obviously every man would, *if he could*, know everything. Errors therefore must in every case, be errors of judgment only, and not intentional. If our most definite and invincible notion of cause and effect be really true, as *we cannot but deem it*, it should be of universal application; and hence it should be clear that man cannot possibly act otherwise than as his original constitution impels,—and as circumstances, (including knowledge) admit. How many drunkards would give the world for the *power* to refrain from drink? Who would not be rich—healthy—learned—and virtuous, *if he could*? Knowledge of what is good, of what constitutes one's own real true interest, is the one thing needful—to create the desire for it; the essential preliminary; to the endeavor to secure it. Therefore that knowledge is what every man should above all things strive to get, to give, and to extend.

Hokor.

R. Bell, Printer, 97 Little Collins Street East, Melbourne.

Free Discussion, in the Bendigo Evening News.

A SPIRITED controversy has lately taken, place in the columns of the *Bendigo Evening News*, upon certain lectures delivered at Sandhurst, by the Rev. James Nish, in reply to Mr. G. C. Leech, the popular lay preacher of Universalism at Castlemaine. The discussion brought interpellations into the field from various parts of Victoria. Some pungent criticisms upon the Rev. James Nish's lectures came from the pen of a "A Distant Reader," and evoked among other rejoinders, one from "Fairplay," to which "Another Distant Reader," replied from Melbourne. The two letters last indicated are now re-printed by request of several persons; some of whom desire, while others challenge, refutation of the views so freely and suggestively expressed by "Another Distant Reader," in the conviction that free discussion is the best if not the only way to eliminate truth.

BENDIGO EVENING NEWS, 18TH AUGUST, 1870.

To the Editor.

SIR,—I observed by "Distant Reader's" last communication through your columns, that he is quite prepared

to answer or explain any question announced by him in previous letters in connection with the Rev. James Nish's lectures. The Rev. gentleman in concluding one of his lectures, stated "that the Bible must have been "written by good men or angels, or by bad men or devils; "if not by those, then it must have been written by the "inspiration of God."

Another question I would ask "Distant Reader" to explain, which Mr. Nish dwelt largely upon,— "The Origin of Evil." How has sin come into the world, if not in the way the Bible represents it? Evil does exist in the world—how has it been created? "Will "Distant Reader" inform me where he gets his ideas of God from, if not from the Bible? If "Distant Reader" will answer these questions he will oblige,

Yours, Fairplay.

18th August, 1870.

BENDIGO EVENING NEWS, 23RD. AUGUST, 1870. A Few Words in Answer to Fairplay.

To the Editor.

SIR—I see by your paper that a correspondent, signing himself "Fairplay," wants answers from some "Distant "Reader" to three questions, which should, I think, puzzle the most distant Reader you have; for I believe that the wisest men at our antipodes have never been able to give generally satisfactory replies to them. However, with your permission, I have a word or two to say in answer to him.

And as to the first question,— "Fairplay" only repeats a confused assertion of Mr. Nish's respecting the authorship of the Bible, and omits to ask his own question about it. We are left to guess it, as Daniel had to guess as well as to interpret Nebuchadnezzar's dream. Is thy servant a Daniel that he should do this thing? Was such a demand ever made by anyone beside Nebuchadnezzar, unless perhaps Pharaoh, when he demanded bricks without furnishing straw? Possibly "Fairplay" may think clay would have answered for the bricks; and if clay and spittle can make the blind to see, I'll first spit in my fist of mortal clay, and let us see what we shall see.

Let us take Mr. Nish's positive assertion for our straw, with which to make our bricks, and see whether it be worth a straw, in default of "Fairplay's" unstated question. "The Bible *must* have been written by good men or angels, or by bad men or devils; if not by those, then it *must* have been written by the inspiration of God." So this exhausts the category of possibilities! Dr. Bromby said in his late lecture (page 15, lines 34-5) that "instinct is nothing else than a direct inspiration from the Almighty." If this be so, then why may not the Bible have been written by Balaam's ass? or any other ass? But Mr. Nish is certainly not Dr. Bromby. Dismissing the idea that the Bible could have been written by devils or angels, as I never heard it proposed by anyone but Mr. Nish, and I scarcely think he did it seriously; and assuming Mr. Nish's last alternative to be correct that the Bible was written by inspiration of God; does Mr. Nish, or will "Fairplay" maintain, that it was not then effected by the intervention of men, good, bad, or indifferent? I think not; for God would scarcely put the names of men to books that he had written himself; and I presume that Mr. Nish will hardly charge him with such degrading forgery. Well—if then the Bible must be confessed to have been written by men, what ground is there for saying that the inspiration of God had any hand in it? We know that this device has been hit upon by every hierophant from Moses to Mormon—from the Sybils to Joe Smith—by every one in fact, who wished to give to his own sayings a higher authority than his own, to command the attention, which otherwise he could not expect, of men like himself. Who says the book of Mormon was written by inspiration of God, but the human writer of it, and those upon whom he imposed? Can it be affirmed that the inspiration of God ever did, or can speak to man otherwise than through a man? (unless Balaam's ass?) And what possible evidence can we therefore have that the inspiration of God so speaks at all, unless the bare assertion of the man himself, and those who believe in him? I let "Fairplay" have these suggestions instead of answers, as he asked no question. Let my suggestions then have *fairplay*—and I think the answer will not be far to seek.

The second question concerns "the Origin of evil," and, "how has Sin come into the world, if not in the way "the Bible represents it? Evil "does exist in the world"—how has it been created?" But the Bible gives entirely different accounts of it. (See Isaiah XLV. 7.) "I "make peace, and *create evil*; 7, the *Lord do all* these "things." Here is plainly the origin of evil; and is not Sin evil? Genesis says Sin came by a snake persuading a woman to eat an apple. If the woman was deluded she was a sufferer—not sinner. And the Snake—well—if the snake was evil—*who made it*, with *knowledge that it would delude the woman*? Was not Isaiah right, if Genesis be true? and who thus is the originator of Sin, and, therefore the Sole Sinner? Will it be [*unclear*: assorted (without) authority) that it was not a snake, but the Devil? Well—*who made the Devil—deliberately—with full knowledge of all the awful evil consequences*? Who was thus the creator—consciously—of the first and

greatest evil—and was, therefore, the *first and greatest sinner* ? I stand by Isaiah !

The third question is, where did "Distant Reader," get his "ideas of God from, if not from the Bible ?" Where did the first human writer of the Bible get his ? Not from the Bible, which he had not yet begun to write. And if his conceptions of God were superior to those of "Distant "Reader," of what worth are the Christian experience and literature, accumulated through eighteen subsequent centuries ? But what *were* his notions of God ? That he tried—and ineffectually—to keep from man the knowledge of good and evil, (GEN. II III.) That he put a *lying spirit* in the mouths of prophets, (I KINGS, XXII 23, EZEKIEL XIV. 9.) That he called himself the friend, and approved the conduct of Abraham; who told vile, cowardly, deliberate lies, for which the punishment was visited on innocent persons with their households, (GEN. XX. 2.) That he hated Esau,—(ROMANS IX, 13.) one of the noblest characters mentioned in the Old Testament, and loved and blessed Jacob ! Who deliberately swindled and robbed his famishing and open-hearted brother, (GEN. XXV, and XXVII) cheated and lied to his dying father, (XXVII) and dictated impious terms to his God, as those only on which he would recognise him, (GEN. XXVIII, 20, 4.) That for an error of Saul—long dead—he inflicted three years of famine on the land of Israel, and would not be entreated for the land, till *seven innocent men had been sacrificed to him* ! (II SAMUEL XXI, 9, 14.) The God of "Fairplay" is, I devoutly trust, an entirely different God from that of the Bible!

I think I have already trespassed sufficiently upon your patience, and that it is unnecessary at present to expand further my replies to "Fairplay's" questions. I am, Sir, yours obediently,

Another Distant Reader.

Melbourne,

22nd Agust, 1870

For Private Circulation only.

Miracles and Special Providences, By Professor Tyndall.

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Miracles and Special Providences.

It is ray privilege to enjoy the friendship of a number of religious men, with whom I converse frankly upon theological subjects, expressing without disguise the notions and opinions I entertain regarding their tenets, and hearing in return these notions and opinions subjected to criticism. I find them liberal and loving men, patient in hearing, tolerant in reply, who know how to reconcile the duties of courtesy with the earnestness of debate. From one of these, nearly a year ago, I received a note, recommending strongly to my attention the volume of "Bampton Lectures" for 1865, in which the question of miracles is treated by Mr. Mozley. Previous to receiving this note, I had in part made the acquaintance of that work, through the able and elaborate review of it which appeared in the *Times*. The combined effect of the letter and review was to make the book the companion of my summer tour among the Alps. There, during the wet and snowy days which were only too prevalent last year, and during the days of rest interpolated between days of toil, I made myself more thoroughly conversant with Mr. Mozley's volume. I found it clear and strong—an intellectual tonic, as bracing and pleasant to my mind as the keen air of the mountains was to my body. From time to time I jotted down my thoughts regarding it, intending afterwards, if time permitted, to work them up into a coherent whole. Other duties, however, interfere with the carrying out of this intention, and what I wrote last summer I now publish, not hoping within any reasonable time to be able to render my defence of scientific method more complete.

Mr. Mozley refers at the outset of his task to the movement against miracles which of late years has taken place, and which determined his choice of a subject. He acquits modern science of having had any great share in the production of this movement. The objection against miracles, he says, docs not arise from any minute knowledge of the laws of nature, but simply because they are opposed to that plain and obvious order of nature which everybody sees. The movement against miracles is, he thinks, to be ascribed to the greater earnestness and penetration of the present age. Formerly miracles were accepted without question, because without reflection; but the exercise of what Mr. Mozley calls the historic imagination is a feature of our time. Men are now accustomed to place before themselves vivid images of the past, and when in that past a miracle rises to view, they halt before the astounding occurrence, and realising it with the same clearness as if it were now passing before their eyes, they ask themselves, "Can this have taken place?" In some instances the effort to

answer this question has led to a disbelief in miracles, in others to a strengthening of belief. The end and aim of Mr. Mozley's lectures is to show that the strengthening of belief is the logical result which ought to follow the examination of the facts.

Attempts have been made by religious men to bring the Scripture miracles within the scope of the order of nature, but all such attempts are rejected by Mr. Mozley as utterly futile and wide of the mark. Regarding miracles as a necessary accompaniment of a revelation, their evidential value in his eyes depends entirely upon their deviation from the order of nature. Thus deviating, they suggest and illustrate to him a power higher than nature, a "personal will;" and they commend the person in whom this power is vested as a messenger from on high. "Without these credentials such a messenger would have no right to demand belief, even though his assertions regarding his divine mission were backed by a holy life. Nor is it by miracles alone that the order of nature is, or may be, disturbed. The material universe is also the arena of "special providences." Under these two heads Mr. Mozley distributes the total preternatural. One form of the preternatural may shade into the other, as one colour passes into another in the rainbow; but while the line which divides the specially providential from the miraculous cannot be sharply drawn, their distinction broadly expressed is this, that while a special providence can only excite surmise more or less probable, it is "the nature of a miracle to give proof, as distinguished from mere surmise of divine design."

Mr. Mozley adduces various illustrations of what he regards to be special providences as distinguished from miracles. "The death of Arius," he says, "was not miraculous, because the coincidence of the death of a heresiarch taking place when it was peculiarly advantageous to the orthodox faith. . . as not such as to compel the inference of extraordinary Divine agency; but it was a special providence, because it carried a reasonable appearance of it. The miracle of the Thundering Legion was a special providence, but not a miracle for the same reason, because the coincidence of an instantaneous fall of rain in answer to prayer carried some appearance, but not proof, of preternatural agency." The eminent lecturer's remarks on this head bring to my recollection certain narratives published in Methodist magazines, under the title, if I remember aright, "The Providence of God asserted," and which I used to read with avidity when a boy. In these chapters the most extraordinary and exciting escapes from peril were recounted and ascribed to prayer, while equally wonderful instances of calamity were adduced as illustrations of Divine retribution. In such magazines, or elsewhere, I found recorded the case of the celebrated Samuel Hick, which, as it illustrates a whole class of special providences, approaching in conclusiveness to miracles, is worthy of mention here. It is related of this holy man—and I, for one, have no doubt of his holiness—that flour was lacking to make the sacramental bread. Grain was present, and a windmill was present, but there was no wind to grind the corn. "With faith, undoubting Samuel Hick prayed to the Lord of the winds: the sails turned, the corn was ground, after which the wind ceased. According to the canon of the Bampton Lecturer, this, though carrying a strong appearance of an immediate exertion of Divine energy, lacks by a hair's breadth the quality of a miracle. For the wind *might* have arisen, and *might* have ceased, in the ordinary course of nature. Hence the occurrence did not "compel the inference of extraordinary Divine agency." In like manner Mr. Mozley considers that the "appearance of the cross to Constantino was a miracle, or a special providence, according to which account of it we adopt. As only a meteoric appearance in the shape of a cross it gave some token of preternatural agency, but not full evidence."

In the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, in one of which these lines are written, and still more among the pious Tyrolese, the mountains are dotted with shrines, containing offerings of all kinds, in acknowledgment of special mercies—legs, feet, arms and hands, of gold, silver, brass, and wood, according as worldly possessions enabled the grateful heart to express its indebtedness. Most of these offerings are made to the Virgin Mary. They are recognitions of "special providences," wrought through the instrumentality of the Mother of God. Mr. Mozley's belief, that of the Methodist chronicler, and that of the Tyrolese peasant, are substantially the same. Each of them assumes that nature, instead of flowing ever onward in the uninterrupted rhythm of cause and effect, is mediately ruled by the free human will. As regards *direct* action upon natural phenomena, man's will is confessedly powerless, but it is the trigger which, by its own free action, liberates the Divine power. In this sense, and to this extent, man, of course, commands nature. Did the existence of this belief depend solely upon the material benefits derived from it, it could not, in my opinion, last a decade. As a purely objective fact we should very soon see that the distribution of natural phenomena is unaffected by the merits or the demerits of man; that the law of gravitation crushes the simple worshippers of Ottery St. Mary, while singing their hymns, just as surely as if they were engaged in a midnight brawl. The hold of this belief upon the human mind is due to the inner warmth, force, and elevation with which it is commonly associated. It is plain, however, that these feelings may exist under the most various forms. They are not limited to Church of England Protestantism—they are not even limited to Christianity. Though less refined, they are certainly not less strong, in the heart of the Methodists and the Tyrolese than in the heart of Mr. Mozley. Indeed, those feelings belong to the primal powers of man's religious nature. A "sceptic" may have them. They find vent in the battle-cry of the Moslem. They take hue and form in the hunting-grounds of the red Indian; and raise all of them, as they raise

the Christian, upon a wave of victory, above the terrors of the grave.

The character, then, of a miracle, as distinguished from a special providence, is that the former furnishes *proof*, while in the case of the latter we have only surmise. Dissolve the element of doubt, and the alleged fact passes from the one class of the preternatural into the other. In other words, if a special providence could be *proved* to be a special providence, it would cease to be a special providence and become a miracle. There is not the least cloudiness about Mr. Mozley's meaning here. A special providence is a doubtful miracle. Why, then, not use the correct phraseology? The term employed conveys no negative suggestion, whereas the negation of certainty is the peculiar characteristic of the thing intended to be expressed. There is an apparent unwillingness on the part of Mr. Mozley to call a special providence what his own definition makes it to be. Instead of speaking of it as a doubtful miracle he calls it "an invisible miracle." He speaks of the point of contact of supernatural power with the chain of causation being so high up as to be wholly, or in part, out of sight, whereas the essence of a special providence is the uncertainty whether there is any contact at all, either high or low. By the use of an incorrect term, however, a grave danger is avoided. For the idea of doubt, if kept systematically before the mind, would soon be fatal to the special providence as a means of edification. The term employed, on the contrary, invites and encourages the trust which is necessary to supplement the evidence.

This inner trust, though at first rejected by Mr. Mozley in favor of external proof, is subsequently called upon to do momentous duty with regard to miracles. Whenever the evidence of the miraculous seems incommensurate with the fact which it has to establish, or rather when the fact is so amazing that hardly any evidence is sufficient to establish it, Mr. Mozley invokes "the affections." They must urge the reason to accept the conclusion from which unaided it recoils. The affections and emotions are eminently the court of appeal in matters of real religion, which is an affair of the heart, but they are not, I submit, the court in which to weigh allegations regarding the credibility of physical facts. These must be judged by the dry light of the intellect alone, appeals to the affections being reserved for cases where moral elevation, and not historic conviction, is the aim. It is, moreover, because the result, in the case under consideration, is deemed desirable, that the affections are called upon to back it. If undesirable, they would, with equal right, be called upon to act the other way. Even to the disciplined scientific mind this would be a dangerous doctrine. A favourite theory—the desire to establish or avoid a certain result—can warp even such a mind so as to destroy its power of estimating facts. I have known men to work for years under a fascination of this kind, unable to extricate themselves from its fatal influence. They had certain data, but not, as it happened, enough. By a process exactly analogous to that invoked by Mr. Mozley they supplemented the data, and from that hour blinded their intellects to the perception of adverse phenomena which might have led them to the truth. If, then, to the disciplined scientific mind, this incongruous mixture of proof and trust be fraught with danger, what must it be to the indiscriminate audience which Mr. Mozley addresses? In calling upon this agency he acts the part of Frankenstein. It is the monster thus evoked that Ave see stalking abroad, in the so-called spiritualistic phenomena of the present day. Again, I say, where the aim is to elevate the mind, to quicken the moral sense, to kindle the fire of religion in the soul, let the affections by all means be invoked) but they must not be permitted to colour our reports, or to influence our acceptance of reports of occurrences in external nature. Testimony as to natural facts is usually worthless when wrapped in this atmosphere of the affections, the most earnest subjective truth being rendered by them perfectly compatible with the most astounding objective error.

There are questions in judging of which the affections or sympathies are often our best guides, the estimation of moral goodness being one of these. But at this precise point, where they are really of use, Mr. Mozley excludes the affections, and demands a miracle as a certificate of character. He will not accept any other evidence of the perfect goodness of Christ. "No outward life or conduct," he says, "however irreproachable, could prove His perfect sinlessness, because goodness depends upon the inward motive, and the perfection of the inward motive is not proved by the outward act." But surely the miracle is an outward act, and to pass from it to the inner motive imposes a greater strain upon logic than that involved in our ordinary methods of estimating men. There is, at least, moral congruity between the outward goodness and the inner life, but there is no such congruity between the miracle and the life within. The test of moral goodness laid down by Mr. Mozley is not the test of John, who says, "He that doeth righteousness is righteous;" nor is it the test of Jesus—"By their fruits shall ye know them; do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" But it is the test of another: "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." For my own part, I prefer the attitude of Fichte to that of Mr. Mozley. "The Jesus of John," says this noble and mighty thinker, "knows no other God than the true God, in whom we all are, and live, and may be blessed, and out of whom there is only Death and Nothingness." And he appeals, and rightly appeals, in support of this truth, not to reasoning, but to the inward practical sense of truth in man, not even knowing any other proof than this inward testimony, "If any man will do the will of Him who sent me, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

Accepting Mr. Mozley's test, with which alone I am now dealing, it is evident that, in the demonstration of

moral goodness, the *quantity* of the miraculous comes into play. Had Christ, for example, limited himself to the conversion of water into wine, He would have fallen short of the performance of Jannes and Jambres, for it is a smaller thing to convert one liquid into another, than to convert a dead rod into a living serpent. But Jannes and Jambres, we are informed, were not good. Hence, if Mr. Mozley's test be a true one, a point must exist, on the one side of which miraculous power demonstrates goodness, while on the other side it does not. How is this "point of contrary flexure" to be determined? It must lie somewhere between the magicians and Moses, for within this space the power passed from the diabolical to the Divine. But how to mark the point of passage—how, out of a purely *quantitative* difference in the visible manifestation of power we are to infer a total inversion of quality—it is extremely difficult to see. Moses, we are informed, produced a large reptile, Jannes and Jambres produced a small one. I do not possess the intellectual faculty which would enable me to infer from those data either the goodness of the one or the badness of the other; and in the highest recorded manifestations of the miraculous I am equally at a loss. Let us not play fast and loose with the miraculous; either it is a demonstration of goodness in all cases or in none. If Mr. Mozley accepts Christ's goodness as transcendent, because he did such works as no other man did, he ought, logically speaking, to accept the works of those who, in His name, had cast out devils, as demonstrating a proportionate goodness on their part. But people of this class are consigned to everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels. The zeal of Mr. Mozley for miracles threatens, I think, to eat his religion up. The truly religious soul needs no such proof of the goodness of Christ. The words addressed to Matthew at the receipt of custom required no miracle to produce obedience. It was by no stroke of the miraculous that Jesus caused those sent to seize him to go backward and fall to the ground. It was the sublime and holy effluence from within, which needed no prodigy to commend it to the wonder and the worship even of his foes.

As regards the function of miracles in the founding of a religion, Mr. Mozley institutes a comparison between the religion of Christ and that of Mahomet, and he derides the latter as "irrational" because it does not profess to adduce miracles in proof of its supernatural origin. But the religion of Mahomet, notwithstanding this drawback, has thriven in the world, and at one time it held sway over larger populations than Christianity itself. The spread and influence of Christianity are, however, brought forward by Mr. Mozley as "a permanent, enormous, and incalculable practical result" of Christian miracles; and he actually makes use of this result to strengthen his plea for the miraculous. His logical warrant for this proceeding is by no means clear. It is the method of science, when a phenomenon presents itself, to the production of which several elements may contribute, to exclude them one by one, so as to arrive at length at the truly effective cause. Heat, for example, is associated with the phenomenon; we exclude heat, but the phenomenon remains: hence, heat is not its cause. Magnetism is associated with the phenomenon; we exclude magnetism, but the phenomenon remains: hence, magnetism is not its cause. Thus, also, when we seek the cause of the diffusion of a religion—whether it be due to miracles, or to the spiritual force of its founders—we exclude the miracles, and, finding the result unchanged, we infer that miracles are not the effective cause. This important experiment Mahometanism has made for us. It has lived and spread without miracles; and to assert, in the face of this fact, that Christianity has spread *because* of miracles, is not more opposed to the spirit of science than to the common sense of mankind.

The incongruity of inferring moral goodness from miraculous power has been dwelt upon above; in another particular also the strain put upon miracles by Mr. Mozley is, I think, more than they can bear. In consistency with his principles, it is difficult to see how he is to draw from the miracles of Christ any certain conclusion as to his Divine nature. He dwells very forcibly on what he calls "the argument from experience," in the demolition of which he takes evident pleasure. He destroys the argument, and repeats it for the mere purpose of again and again knocking the breath out of it. Experience, he urges, can only deal with the past; and the moment we attempt to project experience a hair's-breadth beyond the point it has at any moment reached, we are condemned by reason. It appears to me that when he infers from Christ's miracles a Divine and altogether superhuman energy, Mr. Mozley places himself precisely under this condemnation. For what is his logical ground for concluding that the miracles of the Few Testament illustrate Divine power? May they not be the result of expanded human power? A miracle he defines as something impossible to man. But how does he know that the miracles of the New Testament are impossible to man? Seek as he may he has absolutely no reason to adduce save this,—that man has never hitherto accomplished such things. But does the fact that man *has* never raised the dead prove that he *can* never raise the dead? "Assuredly not," must be Mr. Mozley's reply; "for this would be pushing experience beyond the limit it has now reached,—which I pronounce unlawful." Then a period *may* come when man will be able to raise the dead.

He has of late produced numberless organic substances which were long deemed impossible save to vital action.

If this be conceded—and I do not see how Mr. Mozley can avoid the concession it destroys the *necessity* of inferring Christ's divinity from his miracles. He, it may be contended, antedated the humanity of the future; as a mighty tidal wave leaves high upon the beach a mark which by-and-by becomes the general level of the ocean.

be to give one or two examples of the mode in which men of science apply the unintelligent impulse with which Mr. Mozley credits them, and which shall illustrate the surreptitious method by which they climb from the region of facts to that of laws.

It was known before the sixteenth century that when the end of an open tube is dipped into water, on drawing an air-tight piston up the tube the water follows the piston, and this fact had been turned to account in the construction of the common pump. The effect was explained at the time by the maxim, "Nature abhors a vacuum." It was not known that there was any limit to the height to which the water would ascend, until, on one occasion, the gardeners of Florence, while attempting to raise the water a very great elevation, found that the column ceased at a height of thirty-two feet. Beyond this all the skill of the pump-maker could not get it to rise. The fact was brought under the notice of Galileo, and he, soured by a world which had not treated his science over kindly, twitted the philosophy of the time by remarking that nature evidently abhorred a vacuum only to a height of thirty-two feet. But Galileo did not solve the problem. It was taken up by his pupil Torricelli, who pondered it, and while he did so various thoughts regarding it arose in his mind. It occurred to him that the water might be forced up in the tube by a pressure applied to the surface of the water external to the tube. But where, under the actual circumstances, was such a pressure to be found? After much reflection, it flashed upon Torricelli that the atmosphere might possibly exert the pressure; that the impalpable air might possess weight, and that a column of water thirty-two feet high might be of the exact weight necessary to hold the pressure of the atmosphere in equilibrium. There is much in this process of pondering and its results which it is impossible to analyse. It is by a kind of inspiration that we rise from the wise and sedulous contemplation of facts to the principles on which they depend. The mind is, as it were, a photographic plate, which is gradually cleansed by the effort to think rightly, and which when so cleansed, and not before, receives impressions from the light of truth. This passage from facts to principles is called induction, which in its highest form is inspiration; but, to make it sure, the inward sight must be shown to be in accordance with outward fact. To prove or disprove the induction, we must resort to deduction and experiment. Torricelli reasoned thus—If a column of water thirty-two feet high holds the pressure of the atmosphere in equilibrium, a shorter column of a heavier liquid ought to do the same. Now, mercury is thirteen times heavier than water; hence, if my induction be correct, the atmosphere ought to be able to sustain only thirty inches of mercury. Here, then, is a deduction which can be immediately submitted to experiment. Torricelli took a glass tube a yard or so in length, closed at one end and open at the other, and filling it with mercury, he stopped the open end with his thumb, and inverted it in a basin filled with the liquid metal. One can imagine the feeling with which Torricelli removed his thumb, and the delight he experienced when he found that his thought had forestalled a fact never before revealed to human eyes. The column sank, but ceased to sink at a height of thirty inches, leaving the Torricellian vacuum overhead. From that hour the theory of the pump was established. The celebrated Pascal followed Torricelli with a still further deduction. He reasoned thus—If the mercurial column be supported by the atmosphere, the higher we ascend in the air the lower the column ought to sink, for the less will be the weight of the air overhead. He ascended the Puy de Dome, carrying with him a barometric column, and found that as he ascended the column sank, and that as he descended the column rose. And thus Pascal verified the result of Torricelli.

Between that time and the present, millions of experiments have been made upon this subject. Every village pump is an apparatus for such experiments. In thousands of instances, moreover, pumps have refused to work; but on examination it has infallibly been found that the well was dry, that the pump required priming, or that some other defect in the apparatus accounted for the anomalous action. In every case of the kind the skill of the pump-maker has been found to be the true remedy. In no case has the pressure of the atmosphere ceased; constancy, as regards the lifting of pump-water, has been hitherto the demonstrated rule of nature. So also as regards Pascal's experiment. His experience has been the universal experience ever since. Men have climbed mountains, and gone up in balloons; but no deviation from Pascal's result has ever been observed. Barometers, like pumps, have refused to act, but instead of indicating any suspension of the operations of nature, or any interference on the part of its Author with atmospheric pressure, examination has in every instance fixed the anomaly upon the instruments themselves.

Let us now briefly consider the case of Newton. Before his time men had occupied themselves with the problem of the solar system. Kepler had deduced, from a vast mass of observations, the general expressions of planetary motion known as "Kepler's Laws." It had been observed that a magnet attracts iron; and by one of those flashes of inspiration which reveal to the human mind the vast in the minute, it occurred to Kepler, that the force by which bodies fall to the earth might also be an attraction. Newton pondered all these things. He had a great power of pondering. He could look into the darkest subject until it became entirely luminous. How this light arises we cannot explain; but, as a matter of fact, it does arise. Let me remark here, that this power of pondering facts is one with which the ancients could be but imperfectly acquainted. They found the exercise of the pure imagination too pleasant to expend much time in gathering and brooding over facts. Hence it is that

when those whose education has been derived from the ancients speak of "the Reason of man," they are apt to omit from their conception of reason one of its greatest powers. Well, Newton slowly marshalled his thoughts, or rather they came to him while he "intended his mind," rising one after another like a series of intellectual births out of chaos. He made this idea of attraction his own. But to apply the idea to the solar system, it was necessary to know the magnitude of the attraction and the law of its variation with the distance. His conceptions first of all passed from the action of the earth as a whole, to that of its constituent particles, the integration of which composes the whole. And persistent thought brought more and more clearly out the final divination that every particle of matter attracts every other particle by a force which varies in the inverse proportion of the square of the distance between the particles. This is Newton's celebrated law of inverse squares. Here we have the flower and outcome of his induction; and how to verify it, or to disprove it, was the next question. The first step of Newton in this direction was to prove, mathematically, that if this law of attraction be the true one; if the earth be constituted of particles which obey this law; then the action of a sphere equal to the earth in size, on a body outside of it, would be the same as that exerted if the whole mass of the sphere were contracted to a point at its centre. Practically speaking, then, the centre of the earth is the point from which distances must be measured to bodies attracted by the earth. This was the first-fruit of his deduction.

From experiments executed before his time, Newton knew the amount of the earth's attraction at the earth's surface, or at a distance of 4,000 miles from its centre. His object now was to measure the attraction at a greater distance, and thus to determine the law of its diminution. But how was he to find a body at a greater distance? He had no balloon, and even if he had, he knew that any height which he could attain would be too small to enable him to solve his problem. What did he do? He fixed his thought upon the moon;—a body at a distance of 240,000 miles, or sixty times the earth's radius from the earth's centre. He virtually weighed the moon, and found that weight to be 1/3600th of what it would be at the earth's surface. This is exactly what his theory required. I will not dwell here upon the pause of Newton after his first calculations, or speak of his self-denial in withholding them because they did not quite agree with the observations then at his command. Newton's action in this matter is the normal action of the scientific mind. If it were otherwise—if scientific men were not accustomed to demand verification—if they were satisfied with the imperfect while the perfect is attainable, their science, instead of being, as it is, a fortress of adamant, would be a house of clay, ill-fitted to bear the buffetings of the theologic storms to which from time to time it is exposed.

Thus we see that Newton, like Torricelli, first pondered his facts, illuminated them with persistent thought, and finally divined the character of the force of gravitation. But having thus travelled inward to the principle, he had to reverse his steps, carry the principle outward, and justify it by demonstrating its fitness to external nature. This he did, as we have seen, by determining the attraction of the moon. And here, in passing, I will notice a point which is worthy of a moment's attention. Kepler had deduced his laws from observation. As far back as those observations extended, the planetary motions had obeyed these laws; and neither Kepler nor Newton entertained a doubt as to their continuing to obey them. Year after year, as the ages rolled, they believed that those laws would continue to illustrate themselves in the heavens. But this was not sufficient. The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere registration of sequence in nature. The further question intrudes itself with resistless might: whence comes the sequence? What is it that binds the consequent with its antecedent in nature? The truly scientific intellect never can attain rest until it reaches the *forces* by which the observed succession is produced. It was thus with Torricelli; it was thus with Newton; it is thus preeminently with the real scientific man of to-day. In common with the most ignorant, he shares the belief that spring will succeed winter, that summer will succeed spring, that autumn will succeed summer, and that winter will succeed autumn. But he knows still further—and this knowledge is essential to his intellectual repose—that this succession, besides being permanent, is, under the circumstances, *necessary*; that the gravitating force exerted between the sun, and a revolving sphere with an axis inclined to the plane of its orbit, *must* produce the observed succession of the seasons. Not until this relation between forces and phenomena has been established is the law of reason rendered concentric with the law of nature, and not until this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in peace.

The expectation of likeness, then, in the procession of phenomena is not that on which the scientific mind founds its belief in the order of nature. If the force be *permanent* the phenomena are *necessary*, whether they resemble or do not resemble anything that has gone before. Hence, in judging of the order of nature, our inquiries eventually relate to the permanence of force. From Galileo to Newton, from Newton to our own time, eager eyes have been scanning the heavens, and clear heads have been pondering the phenomena of the solar system. The same eyes and minds have been also observing, experimenting, and reflecting on the action of gravity at the surface of the earth. Nothing has occurred to indicate that the operation of the law has for a moment been suspended; nothing has ever intimated that nature has been crossed by spontaneous action, or that a state of things at any time existed which could not be rigorously deduced from the preceding state. Given the distribution of matter and the forces in operation in the time of Galileo, the competent mathematician of that

day could predict what is now occurring in our own. We calculate eclipses before they have occurred and find them true to the second. We determine the dates of those that have occurred in the early times of history and find calculation and history at peace. Anomalies and perturbations in the planets have been over and over again observed, but these, instead of demonstrating any inconstancy on the part of natural law, have invariably been reduced to consequences of that law. Instead of referring the perturbations of Uranus to any interference on the part of the Author of Nature with the law of gravitation, the question which the astronomer proposed to himself was "how, in accordance with this law, can the perturbation be produced?" Guided by a principle, he was enabled to fix the point of space in which, if a mass of matter were placed, the observed perturbations would follow. We know the result. The practical astronomer turned his telescope towards the region which the intellect of the theoretic astronomer had already explored, and the planet now named Neptune was found in its predicted place. A very respectable outcome, it will be admitted, of an impulse which "rests upon no rational grounds, and can be traced to no rational principle;" which possesses "no intellectual character;" which "philosophy has uprooted from "the ground of reason," and fixed in that "large irrational department" discovered for it, by Mr. Mozley, in the hitherto unexplored wildernesses of the human mind.

The proper function of the inductive principle, or the belief in the order of nature, says Mr. Mozley, is "to act as a practical basis for the affairs of life, and the carrying on of human society." But what, it may be asked, has the planet Neptune, or the belt of Jupiter, or the whiteness about the poles of Mars, to do with the affairs of society? How is society affected by the fact that the sun's atmosphere contains sodium, or that the nebula of Orion contains hydrogen gas? Nineteen-twentieths of the force employed in the exercise of the inductive principle, which, reiterates Mr. Mozley, is "purely practical," have been expended upon subjects as unpractical as these. What practical interest has society in the fact that the spots on the sun have a decennial period, and that when a magnet is closely watched for half a century, it is found to perform small motions which synchronise with the appearance and disappearance of the solar spots? And yet there are men who would deem a life of intellectual toil amply rewarded by reaching, at its close, the solution of these infinitesimal motions. The discovery of the inductive principle is founded in man's desire to know—a desire arising from his position among phenomena which are reducible to order by his intellect. The material universe is the complement of the intellect, and without the study of its laws reason would never have awoke to its higher forms of self-consciousness at all. It is the non-ego, through and by which the ego is endowed with self-discernment. We hold it to be an exercise of reason to explore the meaning of a universe to which we stand in this relation, and the work we have accomplished is the proper commentary on the methods we have pursued. Judge the tree by its fruits. Before these methods were adopted the human mind lay barren in the presence of Nature. For thousands of years witchcraft, and magic, and miracles, and special providences, and Mr. Mozley's "distinctive reason of man," had the world to them-selves. They made worse than nothing of it—*worse* I say, because they let and hindered those who might have made something of it. Hence it is that during a single lifetime of this era of "unintelligent impulse," the progress in natural knowledge is all but infinite as compared with that of the centuries during which magic, miracles, and special providences harried the reason of man.

Still the believers in magic and miracles of a couple of centuries ago had all the strength of Mr. Mozley's present logic on their side. They had done for themselves what he rejoices in having so effectually done for us—cleared the ground of the belief in the order of nature, and declared magic and miracles to be matters for ordinary evidence to decide. "The principle of miracles" thus "befriended" had free scope, and we know the result. Lacking that rock-barrier of natural knowledge which we, laymen of England, now possess, and which breaks to pieces the logical pick and shovel of the theologian, keen jurists and cultivated men were hurried on to deeds, the bare recital of which makes the blood run cold. Skilled in all the rules of evidence, and versed in all the arts of cross examination, these men, nevertheless, went systematically astray, and committed the deadliest wrongs against humanity. And why? Because they could not put nature into the witness box, and question her; of her voiceless "testimony" they knew nothing. In all cases between man and man, their judgement was not to be relied on; but in all cases between man and nature they were blind leaders of the blind.

Mr. Mozley concedes that it would be no great result for miracles to be accepted by the ignorant and superstitious, "because it is easy to satisfy those who do not inquire." But he does consider it "a great result" that they have been accepted by the *educated*. In what sense educated? Like those statesmen, jurists, and church dignitaries whose education was unable to save them from the frightful errors glanced at above? Not even in this sense; for the great mass of Mr. Mozley's educated people had no legal training, and were absolutely defenceless against delusions which could set that training at nought. Like nine-tenths of our clergy at the present day, they had an intimate knowledge of the literature of Greece, Rome, and Judea; but as regards a knowledge of nature, which is here the one thing needful, they were "noble savages," and nothing more. In the case of miracles, then, it behoves us to understand the weight of the negative, before we assign a value to the positive; to comprehend the protest of nature before we attempt to measure, with it, the assertions of men. We have only to open our eyes to see what honest, and even intellectual, men and women are capable of in the way

of evidence in this nineteenth century of the Christian era, and in latitude fifty-two degrees north. The experience thus gained ought, I imagine, to influence our opinion regarding the testimony of people inhabiting a sunnier clime, with a richer imagination, and without a particle of that restraint which the discoveries of physical science have imposed upon mankind. To the theologian, with his wonderful theories of the "order of nature," I would in conclusion say, Keep to the region—not, however, exclusively *yours*—which is popularly known as the human heart: the region, I am willing to confess, of man's greatest nobleness and most sublime achievements. Cultivate this, if it be in you to do so; and it *may* be in you; for love and manhood are better than science, and they may render you three times less unworthy than many of those who possess ten times your natural knowledge. But, unless you come to her as a learner, keep away from physical nature. Here, in all frankness I would declare, that at present you are ill-informed, self-deluded, and likely to delude others. Farewell!"

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