Salient. Victoria University Student Newspaper. Volume 33, No. 2 4 March 1970
...or not lose by much
... or not lose by much
In the following article David Butcher, President of the Labour Club and Labour Party candidate for Hawkes Bay in the Election last year, discusses the future of the Party.
"You won't win next Saturday but you'll win in April" was a fairly typical comment from people attuned to the political climate as I stumped Hawke's Bay Electorate putting forward the Labour viewpoint. It illustrates the two major features of the election from the electorate scene: the pessimism of the Labour Party's supporters during the election run up and the marginal nature of a contest in which particular results could change at a very late stage. The electorate was particularly sensitive to local issues and personalities.
The unsuccessful result, from the Labour view, leads one to ask what now? Will Labour dilute still further the remaining principles it promotes and hope to sneak into power under a different name? Will it shed its progressive elements and become a conservative party of functionaries and old faithfuls? Or will it become a radical party embracing a wider spectrum of socialist ideas, more tolerant of diversity? Will it fight back into office — leading a crusade for social equality, justice and an equality of power?
To the idealists and radicals, young and not so young, who comprise the progressive element within the Labour Party a choice like this is no choice at all. Labour must fight back with principles restated and policies renewed. "Labour a crusade or nothing" is still true, even if the source (Harold Wilson — frequently) is unquotable! There were signs in 1969 that even if the spirit of 1935 was not attained, enthusiasm and a sense of urgency did prevail at the centre. After several false starts the Parliamentarians have elected a leader who can see objectives for the Party other than "to elect competent men and women to Parliament and Local Authorities," (as the Party's Constitution and Rules puts it) and defend the institutions of 1938 from erosion.
Even so the years 1966-69 were wasted years for the Labour Party. Reform was frustrated at the 1967 Conference and the Party tried, once again, to use the old tools to do a new job in the 1969 Election. Although they performed better, polished and sharpened, than they did when badly blunted three years ago, the need for more modern tools is urgent. A member of the Party's New Zealand Executive is said to have claimed that "there must be hidden strength somewhere. How else could we get so many votes with such poor organisation?" If the British Labour Party of the mid-fifties was in the "Penny-farthing Age," then its fraternal New Zealand Party organisationally is barely coming out of the stone age! An ill-directed attempt to change this state of affairs at the 1967 Conference was thrown out in what possibly was the last reactionary success of the really old, old guard. This rejection of change left the Party little more sophisticated than it had been in 1922 in its approach to electioneering and policy formation.
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Sports Officer Ian Stockwell
As a direct result of the Lee Labour Party of 1943, the Labour Party's organisation divides power from responsibility and efficiency from both. At the local level too many competing organisations have formal responsibility for the same tasks and none has the resources to fulfil them adequately. The only link between the centre and the regions is the powerless Divisional Area Officer. This places further work on the already inadequate Head Office through which all information and communication must be channelled.
Whether intentionally or not, certain conventions and procedures prevent any issue being discussed fully at the Party's supreme governing body, the Annual Conference. No meaningful attempt at political education for new members can be made because such facilities simply do not exist. The result is that the Party organisation remains a moribund structure for three years except for the three weeks of the General Elections. Otherwise the organisation has only a creaking fund-raising function. It also means that Party organisations in areas remote from the principal centres rapidly decay simply for the lack of interesting activities.
Despite deficiencies of organisation, the quality and quantity of the 1969 Campaign publicity, publications and broadcasts was far better than has been achieved in previous elections. Even from the biased viewpoint of a candidate, it was clear that a tremendous impact had been made, especially on the young, by the projection of a more adventurous and dynamic image. It was no coincidence that Bill Rowling, Vice-President of the Party and number three Parliamentarian, was in command of the Publicity Committee. This may, however, have been the reason why a lack of flexibility left little new for the last week of the campaign. No party with the same man campaigning for it, organising its publicity, on its Policy Committee, on its Executive (and organising his own electorate) and with minimal logistic backing, can expect maximum efficiency in all departments at the same time, even if the person is, like Rowling, highly competent.
Not only in presentation but also in content the 1969 Policy was a vast improvement on 1966. Education, health and housing were excellent policies and several areas of policy such as immigration, fisheries, arts and — somewhat less enthusiastically — law and order were new or considerably revamped. This resulted from Mr Kirk's reorganisation of Caucus into specialised committees for research and organisation of parliamentary material. It enabled better use to be made of the Party's ill-constructed Policy Committee. The superficial industrial relations policy, the timid social security policy and the vagueness of the economic proposals can be traced to the excessive work load of the Chairman of the first two committees and to an atmosphere of confusion on the third.
This confusion on economics is probably a result of the ill-defined ideological position of a party to which economics has always been a fundamental tenet of ideology. Ideology and dogma can be a great drawback to a party when it strangles original thought — as, for instance, happened through the attachment of the western socialist parties to Stalinism during the thirties. This attachment was a natural reaction by basically working class parties to the establishment of a working class state, but ideology itself is necessary for a party which considers itself to have any sort of mission. The gradual evaporation of Labour's originally vague ideology and the appearance of another apparently radical ideology in the form of Social Credit may have been responsible as much as anything for the slump in Labour popularity in 1966.
For anybody who is only interested in the survival of the Labour Party as an institution, the most cheerful feature of 1969 must have been the decline of Social Credit. For those expecting substantial gains for this Party, Social Credit's crushing defeat can be seen only as a reaction against the inept use of the opportunities he has had by Mr Cracknell. Such opportunities seem unlikely to recur especially if Labour's organisation is revamped in the near future. However the religious fanaticism of Social Credit supporters (noted by Brian Edwards) will keep Social Credit alive for a long time and, should New Zealand ever again be faced by economic collapse of 1930 proportions, this Party will almost certainly form the basis of an extreme right wing front. Labour cannot afford to be complacent and, in the absence of a thorough shake up, the tub-thumping O'Brien could lead a
Social Credit revival by making a deal with the more pragmatic section of the Party on the issue of leadership.
For the future of reform within the Labour party — and also for progress in policy formation and election prospects — the most promising feature of the campaign was the personal success of Norm Kirk. Although, in theory, the Leader of the Parliamentary party has far less power in the Labour Party than does his National opposite number, the effect of a strong leader in Parliament permeates the rest of the organisation. Throughout the campaign one factor alone dominated the minds of supporters and detractors alike and that was the impact the Labour Leader had made. In Hawke's Bay, I constantly met supporters of all Parties who told me how much they had enjoyed the Compass debate or Kirk's Campaign opener. Backed by the good publicity campaign, relatively unknown figures such as Stan Whitehead and Sir Basil Arthur came over with sincerity and effect. This success only serves to underline what could have been achieved had the Labour Party had an election machine to back for a three year campaign the not inconsiderable ability of candidates and the quality of both policies and ideals.
It would be wrong to say that within the Labour party there is any gulf between 'Left' and 'Right'. As organised groupings these do not exist. Differences of viewpoint of course remain but are muffled by poor organisation and an obsolete constitution. In 1970, the Labour Party will have a chance to reconsider both. Upon Norman Kirk will fall, to a great extent, the responsibility for providing support for those in branches and unions who will be pressing for overdue reform. The measure of success achieved will determine the future of the Labour movement as an organised political force in New Zealand society.