Salient. An Organ of Student Opinion at Victoria College, Wellington, N.Z. Vol. 1, No. 21 October 5, 1938
Farewell to Arms
Farewell to Arms
War has been averted. The world breathes again. Mr. Chamberlain has become a terrific figure. Our natural feelings of thankfulness and relief should not prevent us. However, from examining calmly just what the whole crisis means. Incidentally, if you keep your old "Salients," look again at the article on British foreign policy on page 2 of No. 16. It might help.
In the first place. Hitler has been given what he wanted. That much seems clear. The "shock tactics" with which the world is now becoming familiar have succeeded once again, and one more capitulation has been made by the democracies under the menace of force.
If the elaborate Czech fortifications are in the ceded territory (and from a study of maps it looks as if they are) the most serious military obstacle to the Nazi drive to the East has been removed without the loss of a man and without firing a shot. The effect of this in Germany will no doubt be to strengthen Hitler's prestige, and to encourage further aggression.
It is extremely problematical whether the Fuhrer ever Intended to use force for other than show purposes, for no matter how well forged a weapon the German army may be, German national economy is in a precarious condition. As Nazi General was Fritsch recently remarked. "You may be able to end up a war on ration cards, but you can't start one on them." It may well be doubted whether the alternative to Hitler's demands really was war, nevertheless the bluff succeeded.
The effect on the French Popular Front may be disastrous. French strategic dependance on Britain was never more clearly shown than it was during the Czech crisis, when M. Daladier. leader pro tem. of the Popular Front, a man whose political philosophy differs widely from that of Mr. Chamberlain, was obliged to toe the line, and to run all over Europe after the British Premier, signing away his only reliable European ally in the process. It would not be at all surprising if after the failure of Non-Intervention in Spain, the French Coalition failed to survive this surrender to Fascism. Should such be the case, it would mean the end of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and the isolation of both those countries, thus rendering each more vulnerable to a Nazi attack.
Two points remain for consideration: the four-power talks and the prospects for the future.
With regard to the four-power talks, the absentees were almost as remarkable as the invited guests. "Deserted by all the States of Europe" the Czechs undoubtedly were, and decisions taken were taken without them and against them. If ever a nation could claim the unique experience of having its own head brought to it on a plate, that nation is the Czechs.
And then there was the other empty chair—Russia. This is easier to explain. Russian statesmen have a habit of speaking in plain terms. This has often been somewhat embarrassing to statesmen who like their diplomacy subtle. Plain speaking at the present time would have been awkward. Further. Russia must at all costs be isolated. How else can she be attacked?
The outlook at the moment is one of intense relief, combined with deep misgiving for the future. Every step he makes brings Mr. Chamberlain closer to the point at which he will be able to say to anyone who disagrees with his policy. "Either you must follow us in agreeing to the Fascist domination of Europe (which no doubt would ultimately include domination of Britain) or you must demand war." As Fascist power grows unchecked, both in armaments and in the occupation of strategic positions in Europe that alternative begins to become more significant. The point that he is actually aiming at no doubt is to be able to name as warmongers anyone who refuses to become an ally of Fascism.—A.H.S.