New Zealand in the World
5 — Decline of Independence
5
Decline of Independence
In 1887 the crucial problem of naval defence brought out the difference between the New Zealand and the Australian points of view. That difference was fundamental, and was accentuated as Australia (particularly after federation) pressed for a navy of her own. Admiralty experts pointed out in vain that separate navies would be less efficient and more costly than a single fleet under central control. Australian national dignity would no longer permit her to pay tribute to another country; and that political argument, once formulated, was unanswerable. The Admiralty accepted it just before the Great War with a fair grace—but with a reminder to the Empire as a whole that fighting efficiency had been sacrificed to colonial sentiment; and New Zealand's conduct was held up in contrast as an example to self-governing colonies.
* Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 122, pp. 507 ff.
Actually, when the test came in 1914, the practical difference between the two arrangements was nil, for the day before war was declared Australia offered her new navy unconditionally to the Admiralty. But the difference in principle was great: New Zealand had deliberately accepted the Admiralty view almost in its entirety at a time when Australia made the principle of naval independence a point of pride for her developing sense of nationhood. Indeed, New Zealand's loyalty to the British view of naval defence was part of her general reaction against that nationhood, and marked the extent to which the two Dominions had drifted apart by the eve of the Great War.
* Appendices to Journals of House of Representatives, 1886, A-1, p. 14.
From the first New Zealand set the conception of imperial federation against that of a regional arrangement with Australia; if she were to surrender anything of her independence, it should be in order to become an effective part of a great world power. As opposed to mere regionalism, her statesmen even looked forward to a reunion of all the English-speaking peoples, and in 1885 they actually invited the Queen to organise a conference in London or Washington to consider such a project. With such ideas in the minds of her leaders, and with the under- page 83lying conviction that (to use Vogel's phrase) 'the benefits that would follow imperial federation are as certain as those of colonial federation are doubtful', New Zealand argued an unpopular cause in imperial affairs during the last twenty-five years before the Great War. During those years Canada, and to a less extent Australia, fought for colonial autonomy, and the Empire as a whole stumbled towards a new ideal: that of permanent alliance between virtually independent nations which (in the mystic phrase) were 'equal in status though not in stature'. New Zealand shared modestly in this process; but at the same time she, alone among self-governing Dominions, pressed the case for a much closer political bond than that represented by periodical imperial conferences. At the Imperial Conference of 1897, for example, the vast majority of delegates thought that the then existing political relations within the Empire were satisfactory. The time might come, they allowed, for colonists to be given 'a voice in the direction and control of those questions of Imperial interest in which they are concerned equally with the Mother-country'. But they were in no hurry, and feared that if they were allowed a voice in their own foreign affairs, there might be money to pay. As against this resolution, Seddon formed the more vocal half of a minority of two. He deplored that nothing had been done 'to more firmly secure the political ties between the United Kingdom and the colonies'; and he denied page 84that improved ties would mean colonial subsidies towards imperial expenses. At the next conference (1902) Seddon himself, and in 1907 his successor, Sir Joseph Ward, urged different plans for tightening imperial bonds; and finally, in 1911 Ward presented an elaborate plan for an Imperial Defence Parliament (or Council) in a speech which (it has been suggested) was the longest ever made at an Imperial Conference.* These proceedings, taken in conjunction with New Zealand's comparative docility in naval matters, earned for this Dominion an outstanding reputation for imperial enthusiasm which was refreshing to English statesmen jaded by the independent spirit of Canada and Australia.
* Keith, Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, Vol. 2, p. 247.
These arguments were typical of New Zealand's approach to the problem of imperial relations. They had in fact been anticipated almost word for word page 86in the parliamentary debate of 1883,* and in the writings of Vogel and Stout. They were also typical in that they were clear in general intention, but were not embodied in a workable system. Such concrete details as they contained were probably due primarily to the Round Table movement, and certainly did not represent the considered opinion of New Zealand statesmanship, let alone the New Zealand electorate. In fact, Ward placed before the Conference a vehement wish that something should be done rather than a well thought-out scheme of how to do it, and in doing so he expressed the general Dominion point of view more accurately than is suggested by the volume of criticism hurled at him then and since. Though he spoke the language of imperial federation and the rest spoke that of Dominion nationalism, they all had the same grievance at heart and the same vaguely conceived remedy in mind.
* Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 44, p. 243.
Sir Joseph Ward at the Imperial Conference, 1911
New Zealand's championship of imperial federation which flamed up in 1911 was, then, not a mere surrender of judgment to British leadership. It was historically connected with a crusade to win for her some real influence in imperial affairs: and the same can be said of certain other acts of policy which were rightly hailed as proof of New Zealand's loyalty to the mother country. It is true, for example, of the whole episode of Seddonian imperialism. There can be no doubt of the spontaneous will of New Zealand as a whole to help Britain in the Boer War. Seddon, however, was clearly conscious that in leading the colony to war at Britain's side he was helping to earn page 88the right to a 'direct part in the government of a federated Empire'; and, taking up Macaulay's famous remark, he said that in the legendary future 'the New Zealander will be advising in council, not croaking on London Bridge' as he surveyed the ruins of the Empire's capital.* Seddon himself, for that matter, was eager to advise Britain (or anyone else) forthwith, without awaiting the formalities of imperial federation; and the conferences of 1897 and 1902 gave him a ready-made public platform in Britain, South Africa, and Australia. To all he gave broad hints on social reconstruction, based on the idea that they might well copy New Zealand; but to the mother country in particular he gave impressive counsel on general policy.
* Harrop, My New Zealand, p. 201, and in Cambridge History of British Empire, Vol. vii, Part ii, p. 219.
The results were disappointing. Chamberlain, it is true, launched a powerful campaign in Britain for 'tariff reform'. But the idea of free trade was deeply rooted in the British mind, which felt that the solid benefit of cheap food was not to be lightly risked, even in order to please such forceful colonials as Seddon. As he complained, therefore, there was much talk about imperial consolidation, but little action in the directions he desired. Nor were Englishmen much more responsive to his practical gestures. New Zealand's tariff of 1903 gave a substantial preference to Britain; shortly afterwards commercial agreements were negotiated with Australia and South Africa, and Canada and New Zealand granted each other a tariff preference. According to New Zealand spokesmen these changes together made up an impressive contribution towards an imperial tariff system: and the only thing really lacking was British co-operation. But Britain made no move. Apart from the free-trade principles of her Liberal Government the fact was that Seddon's preferences had only a small effect on page 90trade. As Asquith, speaking for Britain, gently reminded Ward in 1907, they only affected one-fifth of Britain's exports to New Zealand. Moreover, duties against British goods had not been lowered; an additional burden had been imposed on foreigners, but the British exporter faced the same barriers as before. In short Seddon's arguments for imperial preference were weakened by the fact that his own application of them illustrated the difficulties rather than the possibilities of genuine imperial customs co-operation. The suggestion which pleased Mr Chamberlain and British manufacturers was that of a Zollverein, or free trade within the Empire, which would knock down Dominion barriers against British trade. The Dominions, however, were determined to keep those barriers high against British manufacturers.* What interested them was the suggestion that the British market for their food and raw materials should be protected by taxing foreign imports: a suggestion naturally distasteful to manufacturers who wanted cheap materials and to politicians whose constituents clamoured for 'a free breakfast-table'. Between these contradictory points of view the field for an imperial customs system was narrow indeed.
* Though it should be noted that, as compared with Australia and Canada, New Zealand was and remained a low-tariff country.
Mr Chamberlain answered this outburst with tact. He recognised 'the legitimate disappointment of New Zealand in regard to the settlement of Samoa, and the loyalty with which it has been accepted by the colony', and, as to islands asked for by Seddon, he hinted that the time might come when 'the great self-governing colonies' might be allowed to relieve Great Britain of a burdensome responsibility. The only practical result, however, was the annexation to New Zealand of the Cook Islands and Niue (1901). Fiji remained page 92a Crown colony, in spite of an energetic agitation for federation with New Zealand in 1900-1, when Seddon and the Governor of Fiji waged a wordy battle across the waters of the Pacific; Tonga became a British protectorate, not administered by New Zealand; and thus was Seddon frustrated. The Auckland islands (1863), the Kermadecs (1887) and the Cook islands formed a meagre empire compared with the visions of Grey, Vogel, and Seddon himself. Towards the end of his life Seddon wrote in some bitterness of the way in which British muddlement and folly had frustrated New Zealand's sensible ambitions. Samoa had gone, though all had been prepared in 1885 for New Zealand's annexation, and 'the steamer was there tearing at her hawsers' when Downing Street's veto arrived. The Sandwich islands had gone to the United States, and the Philippines also were American. New Caledonia had gone, and the New Hebrides were apparently going. 'These losses were incalculable,' he wrote, 'and it was a pity that such statesmen [as had allowed them] should ever have been entrusted with the destinies of Great Britain.'*
* Drummond, Life and Work of Richard John Seddon, pp. 324-6.