II: Dispositions of New Zealand Force

In spite of some preliminary uncertainties² General Weston seems to have felt himself definitely in command on 26 April. So far as he knew, moreover, the troops then being evacuated from Greece were in transit only and would eventually be replaced by fresh troops from Egypt, presumably 6 British Division.³

Till shipping was available for the onward move of the evacuated troops it was obvious that he must not only make the best provision he could for their reception but also utilise them to help make good the gaps in the defence; for, with Greece in enemy hands, invasion was already a threat and might soon become something more. As soon, therefore, as Brigadier James Hargest,⁴ commander of 5 NZ Brigade, visited Creforce HQ on 26 April he was given the task of defending the Maleme sector. And on the afternoon of that day an order was issued designed to knit the new arrivals into the whole scheme of defence.⁵

The details of this order were to be modified by the arrival of further troops and by the later change in command; but it is interesting in so far as it reflects the situation as seen by Weston at this time and because it embodies an outline appreciation of vulnerable points which did not alter.

The order states that the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East had decided Crete was vital to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and was to be held at all costs; that the Greek Government also favoured defence and intended to co-operate; and that Maleme, Suda Bay, and Heraklion were essential to the defence, while the retention of Retimo was at least desirable. Airborne attack was clearly envisaged as the most likely—hence the importance of the airfields—but seaborne invasion was possible also. Middle East HQ intended itself to use the airfields as much as possible; but air support would be limited till evacuation from Greece was complete and the air force reorganised.

While these orders were being prepared and issued the New Zealand troops already on the island were being organised under Hargest's command. He formed a headquarters staff, delegated command of his brigade to Lieutenant-Colonel Falconer (CO 23 Battalion),¹ received his verbal orders from Creforce, made a reconnaissance as far as Maleme, and decided his dispositions. The units under his command were sorted out and issued with rations and blankets; those units which had left equipment at Suda returned to collect it, only to find that some of it had already disappeared and that the scepticism of those who refused to part with their hard-kept weapons had been bitterly justified;² medical arrangements were put in train, a party of about fifty New Zealand nurses from Greece carrying on their work at 7 General Hospital while New Zealand MOs and their ADMS arranged for an MDS³ to be opened up by HQ Company, 6 Field Ambulance.

These arrangements inevitably took up the whole of 26 April and it was not till the following day that the troops were able to move into their sectors. According to Operational Instruction No. 5 they were to go to the Platanias area, take it over from 1 Welch, and develop it as soon as possible from a living into a defensive area. Accordingly, by 9 a.m. 27 April advanced parties were reporting in, and by the end of the day all units were in position, with Brigade HQ established at Platanias and NZ Force HQ at Ay Marina. The four battalions (21, 22, 23, and 28) faced west with orders to ‘deny the advance of enemy landing parties from the west’.⁴

Administrative arrangements went forward, meanwhile. A supply dump was arranged for at Ay Marina and HQ NZASC moved into the olive groves near the village; 5 Field Ambulance also moved to Ay Marina and set up an MDS; 6 Field Ambulance continued to operate its MDS at the Perivolia camp and set up another at the junction of the Canea-Galatas road.

On 28 April, while 4 Brigade was still making its way towards Crete, 5 Brigade continued the reshuffle occasioned by the move of 22 Battalion to Maleme. This complete, the brigade settled down to tackle its defensive tasks, a pattern of training was swiftly devised, and the hard skeleton of discipline and organisation once again asserted itself.

A notable feature in this process was the reorganisation of the ASC and artillery. Since the former was without transport for its normal role it had to be diverted to the primary task of the soldier. And so the 1100-odd men not employed on ASC duties had been formed into infantry companies under Major McGuire² by 28 April and given sectors in the Ay Marina area to defend against paratroops. The artillerymen had similar readjustments to make: by 28 April there were assembled round Ay Marina about two-thirds of 4 and 5 Field Regiments, about 80 men and officers of 6 Field Regiment, 90 of 7 Anti-Tank Regiment, and almost the whole of HQ New Zealand Divisional Artillery and 1 Survey Troop.³ None of the regimental commanders had landed on Crete and most of those trained in administration had gone with them to Egypt. But the most grievous deficiency was in guns. All of them had had to be left behind in Greece, though much of the portable equipment had been brought off.⁴ But the men remained, and now began the process of organising them into infantry companies which was to culminate in the formation of Oakes Force some days later.⁵