476
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

1. As soon as the Japanese surrender has been accepted by their Governments, the Allies will be faced with many tasks resulting from the Japanese capitulation. We trust that we may rely on your assistance in these, and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable. The proposals set out below are to be regarded as replacing the suggestion for a British Commonwealth force dealt with in my telegram of 31 July¹ and in connected subsequent telegrams.

2. The tasks confronting us are:

3. Subject to your agreement, we suggest that plans shall be made on the following assumptions on policy:

May we have your very early agreement in principle to these suggestions?

4. Orders have been given to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia,¹ and the Commander-in-Chief British Pacific Fleet,² to make plans for the following operations:

5. We are asking the Australian authorities to arrange for accepting the surrender of all Japanese troops in Borneo and in the territory east thereof. We should welcome the association of Royal New Zealand Air Force squadrons in this operation and, if you agree, I suggest that you communicate with the Australian Government direct on this point. We have undertaken to make some assault and merchant shipping available to this area.

6. We hope that you will agree to the continued attachment of the New Zealand ships to the British Pacific Fleet.

7. In view of the time factor, we are informing the United States Chiefs of Staff of the proposals in paragraphs 3 and 4 above and inviting their comments.

477
General Freyberg (London) to the Prime Minister

I have been advised of the proposal for a New Zealand brigade group in the British Commonwealth Occupational Force for Japan.

It seems clear that the Commonwealth Force will be required to embark for Japan as early as possible. Assuming your agreement to the project, it would seem that the New Zealand brigade group could be formed from personnel who are already overseas in the Mediterranean area. Alternatively, you might consider sending it direct from New Zealand. In the event of your decision to send it from the Mediterranean, presumably you would take men who have been the shortest time overseas. Numerically, the 14th and 15th Reinforcements would be sufficient. There would, however, be certain difficulties to be overcome with officers, NCOs and specialists. Our own problems in organising a brigade group at short notice are such that early notice of your decision in this matter would be most helpful.

478
The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom¹

Your telegram of 13 August [No. 476].

New Zealand participation in the British Commonwealth Force for the occupation of Japan is still under consideration by the New Zealand Government, and inquiries are now being made as to the possibility of obtaining sufficient men for a brigade group on a volunteer basis from men now with the 2nd New Zealand Division in Italy.

2. It is agreed that one New Zealand squadron should be made available for the tactical air force contingent referred to in paragraph 3 (c) of your telegram under reference.

3. While we are agreed to the association of Royal New Zealand Air Force squadrons with the Australian force which is to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops in Borneo and the territory to the east thereof, and will make two squadrons available for this purpose, we assume that this mission will be of short duration, and that it will be possible for these two New Zealand squadrons to be relieved and returned to New Zealand when the surrender of Borneo and contiguous territories is completed.

4. We agree to the continued attachment of New Zealand ships to the British Pacific Fleet.

479
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg (London)

Your telegram of 16 August [No. 477].

War Cabinet have considered the request from the United Kingdom Government that a New Zealand brigade group should be made available with other British Commonwealth forces to take part in the occupation of Japan. While agreeing in principle, it is felt that before coming to a final decision your advice should be sought as to whether or not it would be possible to obtain a properly balanced brigade group of 5000 all ranks from volunteers drawn from the single men at present in the Middle East in the 11th to 15th Reinforcements.

It is also proposed, in the event of such a volunteer force being made available, that the strength of the brigade group should be ‘turned over’ in a period of twelve months by providing from New Zealand on a volunteer basis at quarterly intervals replacement drafts of 1250 men, and that the men in the force with the longest service should be returned to New Zealand first. Future replacements would not be effected under a period of six months. I would be grateful for your earliest comments.

480
General Freyberg (London) to the Prime Minister

Your telegram of 21 August.

The total number of single men in the 11th to 15th Reinforcements now in the Mediterranean area is only 7500. I am not hopeful of getting 5000 all ranks as volunteers for service in Japan from this number. Further, we would not get the correct proportion of officers, NCOs or specialists to form a balanced brigade group. In the circumstances I do not feel that a voluntary system will succeed. I do not wish to call for volunteers unless you so direct, because should we fail, as I feel we should, it would prevent the subsequent detailing of these men as an ordinary military duty. As an alternative plan, I feel there will be no difficulty or hardship should we detail 5000 single men from the 11th to 15th Reinforcements under the conditions set out in your telegram of 21 August. Even so, I feel that certain officers and key personnel outside the 11th to 15th Reinforcements will have to remain until replacements from New Zealand are made available. If you decide to provide the force from our resources in the Mediterranean page 514 area, I feel that such a course is the only solution to the problem. I realise the reliefs suggested in your telegram will have to be accelerated unless the men are called upon to remain a few months after their present engagement for military service has been completed.¹ I have consulted [Brigadiers] Stevens² and Gentry,³ who is at present administering command of the Division, and the above also represents their opinion.

481
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg (London)

Thank you for your telegram of 22 August. Would it be possible to obtain the requisite number of volunteers from all categories of men in the 11th to 15th Reinforcements?

482
General Freyberg (London) to the Prime Minister

Reference your telegram of 23 August. While I personally would prefer a voluntary scheme, if the force is to be found from men overseas, I feel that such a course would produce a relatively low number of men. This has been a long war and there is a general war-weariness and desire to get home and make a fresh start. I feel, and in this I am supported by all my brigadiers, that should an occupational force be required from New Zealand troops overseas, the only sure way is for its personnel to be detailed from among the last-joined reinforcements, as indicated in my telegram of 22 August [No. 480]. An early decision in this [matter] would greatly assist us here.

483
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand¹

Your telegram of 21 August [No. 478].

We are grateful for your agreement to make available one Royal New Zealand Air Force squadron for the Tactical Air Force contingent and [for the advice] that your ships may continue their attachment to the British Pacific Fleet. We also note that you are making inquiries as to the possibility of obtaining sufficient volunteers from men of the 2nd New Zealand Division for a brigade group for the occupational forces in Japan.

2. Your paragraph 3. We have already informed the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, that as soon as he is in a position to spare the necessary forces and shipping, it is our intention to instruct him to take over by stages from Australia their initial responsibilities in the South-West Pacific area, other than Papua and Australian mandated territories. This arrangement should, subject to unforeseen circumstances, provide relief for your squadrons in Borneo as soon as the first priority occupation tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, have been completed.

484
General Freyberg (London) to the Prime Minister
[Extract]

… ² With regard to the minimum number of men necessary to form one brigade group, I assume that we should conform to the order of battle of the standard operational brigade group with which we are familiar, plus Brigade Army Service Corps company, Brigade Workshops, and sections of Ciphers, Field Security, Provost, Field Hygiene, Ordnance Field Park and Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit. We should require, in addition, Force units, including a small General Hospital and a welfare [service]. Preliminary calculations give a brigade group of 4320, plus Force units 850, total 5170. This figure excludes reinforcements in the theatre: in round numbers, 5000.

485
The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom¹

My telegram of 21 August [No. 478] and yours of 13 August [No. 476].

After further consideration of the question of New Zealand's participation with other British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan, the New Zealand Government agree to the provision of one brigade group.

It is proposed that this force should be made available for a period of six months' service in Japan and that its subsequent withdrawal or replacement would be subject to review before the expiration of that period. The brigade group will be obtained from single men of later reinforcements of the 2nd NZEF now in the Mediterranean area.

486
The Prime Minister of New Zealand to General Freyberg (London)

As indicated in my telegram of 29 August, the Government have agreed to provide one brigade group for the British Commonwealth force for a period of six months. It is further agreed that the strength of this force should be 5000 all ranks, and that it should be a properly balanced brigade group with the necessary administrative and welfare services.

In the circumstances it is considered that the men required to fill the establishment should be drawn from the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. The Government also consider that suitable volunteers should be accepted from all categories of men outside the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements.

It is at present proposed that the term of service in Japan should be six months, but if it is decided to retain a New Zealand force there for any greater length of time, volunteers will be sent from New Zealand for the purpose of reliefs.

487
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg (London)

Reference my telegram of 30 August.

Owing to the great reluctance of the Government party to agree to the compulsory direction of men for the brigade group from Europe to Japan, I am compelled to ask you to give consideration again to the possibility of attaining 5000 volunteers for Japan in suitable units from all forces under your command, the period of service to be six months. The relief would be from volunteers in New Zealand, of whom 2500 could be trained in New Zealand during three months and be ready to leave New Zealand at the end of that period, if shipping would be available, for the purpose of replacing half the brigade group. Owing to the attitude of a very large minority of the Government party and the consequent great difficulties, I must ask you to explore every possibility of obtaining sufficient suitable volunteers, and would like you again to give the fullest consideration to the matter before a final decision is made either to direct compulsorily or to give instructions to call for volunteers. In the meantime until the matter is further considered and you receive final instructions, please do not take any action on my telegram [No. 486] sent earlier.

488
General Freyberg (London) to the Prime Minister

I have received your telegram [No. 487] and realise the difficulties. All necessary and possible arrangements for shipping and movement and organisation of the brigade group have been made. I must now inform the War Office that no final decision has been taken about the brigade group, and I will go back to Italy on Sunday and cable you after discreet consultation with selected officers. I feel that the shorter term of service in the Far East will be more acceptable, but I am not hopeful that any voluntary system will meet with the necessary support. I will cable you as soon as possible next week.

489
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Your telegram of 29 August [No. 485].

We are very glad to learn that New Zealand can provide a brigade group to take part in the occupation of Japan.

We have been considering the position in the light of Australian Government telegrams Nos. 240 and 245,¹ and while appreciating Australian wishes in the matter, we still feel strongly that the best interests of us all would be served if a joint Commonwealth force for service in Japan could be arranged.

I am therefore sending to the Prime Minister of Australia a message, of which the text is being repeated to you in my immediately following telegram,² expressing the hope that Australia will agree to the constitution of a single British Commonwealth contingent, to be under an Australian officer as Commander-in-Chief of the whole force.

I hope very much that this suggestion will commend itself to you.

490
General Freyberg (Italy) to the Prime Minister

Reference your telegram of 31 August [No. 487].

I am now back in Italy with the Division and have seen the nine senior officers of the force, including Brigadier Parkinson³ from page 519 Egypt, where we still have 3000 of the 15th Reinforcements. We have examined the suggested policy of providing the occupational force by voluntary enlistment from the whole of the 2nd NZEF overseas. We have all approached the problem with the greatest desire to make a voluntary force possible. I have spoken individually with these nine officers and have put the best possible case for a voluntary force to them.

My approach has been that with the shortage of shipping at least 9000 of the latest-joined reinforcements will not get back to New Zealand until March or April. These men will therefore remain where they are for at least another six months in the knowledge that there will be little to do to keep up their interest. If they volunteer they will join the occupational force for Japan, which will concentrate in Italy as soon as possible and, providing the Americans agree to receive the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan at that time, will move to Japan early in November, arriving there before the end of the year. Under the terms of the scheme they would be back in New Zealand about the end of July 1946, having seen in all probability Singapore and Manila, as well as Japan itself.

Although none of the officers feel that they can with confidence give a definite figure, they all agree that we should not get the required number of volunteers. Their estimates run from 750 to 2500 in the extreme cases, with the consensus of opinion less than 1500.

I also discussed the problem with a selected group of officers at the War Office, asking them what they would expect to get from a British force of equivalent size and in similar circumstances. They felt that they might get 1000 volunteers. Field Marshal Alexander and his Chief of Staff, General Morgan,¹ also gave a figure of about 1000. My own opinion is that we might get 1500—which falls far short of the required 5000 for a brigade group. Further, I feel it would not be possible to get the correct grades or numbers of specialist personnel to enable a balanced fighting force to be formed. In reference to your request, I therefore feel, after giving the matter all possible consideration, that a voluntary system from the present 2nd NZEF overseas would not succeed.

I must point out that the fact that the Australian and United States forces are being raised on a voluntary basis does not appear to be analogous with our own case. The Australian Imperial Force is already in the Pacific. The United States troops are to have ninety days' home leave before going to Japan. The two British brigades are already in India and have been fighting the Japanese. We should be the only page 520 force which would move direct from the European theatre to the Pacific.

I would suggest as a possibility that the British Government, for the purpose of maintaining the Commonwealth aspect of the force, might consider accepting from us a smaller garrison force capable of carrying out guard duties but not capable of working as an operational brigade group. Such a force of three battalions plus rearward services could be formed from 4000 men. Should this proposal be acceptable, these 4000 could be detailed from the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. Officers and certain additional specialists would have to be detailed from outside these reinforcement categories. As the bulk of the men so detailed have seen little fighting they could not logically have any grievance.

I know from certain definite pointers that opinion here has altered to a marked degree since VJ Day. All entitled officers and men who volunteered to stay on at Base for the duration of the war against Japan have withdrawn their applications to remain and now wish to proceed home at the earliest date. VJ Day meant far less to our men than will the day they leave here for New Zealand. This general desire of everyone to get home and re-established into their new life is most pronounced.

The United Kingdom leave scheme is being kept in mind as a means of relieving the boredom which is bound to follow a long wait in the present surroundings. Such leave, however, could not be given to the men who will leave by the vessel promised for October, nor to those for the occupational brigade. The announcement of the scheme is therefore not being made in the meantime.

At present the tone of the Force both in Italy and Egypt is all that is desired, but a considerable prolongation of the present state of waiting is bound to have its effect. As you know, there has already been trouble with the Canadians at Aldershot and with the South Africans in Cairo.

There is little more we can do here at the moment. There should not be any trouble if we are able in the near future to give the men a detailed statement of the New Zealand Government's policy. Although I do appreciate the difficult position in which Cabinet is placed, I am told that such a statement of policy is generally expected by all ranks now that I have returned from England.

491
The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs¹

My telegram of 29 August [No. 485].

Advice has now been received from General Freyberg that it will not be possible to obtain a sufficient number from the 2nd New Zealand Division on a volunteer basis for the purpose of providing a brigade group for service in Japan. We are thus faced with the alternatives of exercising compulsion, which we are most reluctant to do at this stage, or of endeavouring to obtain a sufficient number of volunteers largely from New Zealand, supplemented by others from the Division.

The matter clearly calls for an immediate decision and I should like to take the opportunity tomorrow of discussing the whole question with the Government party and, if possible, of reaching a definite conclusion on the course to follow. Before I raise the matter I wish to know whether or not the United States have actually been advised of the proposed British Commonwealth force and, if so, whether they have signified their agreement to this form of participation in the occupation of Japan. As you will appreciate, we do not wish, in view of the difficulties already confronting us, to go ahead with our arrangements if the proposal to send a British Commonwealth force should not prove acceptable.

492
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New Zealand

Your telegram of 7 September on the proposed British Commonwealth Occupation Force for Japan.

The proposal was mentioned by our Joint Staff Mission in Washington to the United States Chiefs of Staff on the instructions described in my telegram of 13 August [No. 476], and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied that they accepted in principle the participation of British ground forces in the occupation of Japan, and that details of size and composition would be a matter for later determination. page 522 Accordingly, we are making our own plans on the basis that there will be participation by British Commonwealth ground forces, whether by separate forces, as proposed by Australia, or by a joint force to which, as you will have seen from my telegram to Australia of 31 August,¹ we hope the Australian Government will agree. We greatly hope that we may count on New Zealand participation in either case.

493
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg

Your telegram of 5 September [No. 490].

I am most grateful for your endeavours in connection with the formation of a brigade group for Japan on the basis of volunteers. The difficulties are appreciated. I have had an opportunity of discussing the matter with members of the Government party, and I am now negotiating with the Leader of the Opposition party on the basis of New Zealand participation in the manner suggested in your telegram under reference, namely a force of three battalions plus rearward services, composed of single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. I am doing my best to reach an agreed decision as soon as possible. The position has been rendered more difficult in the meantime by the announcement over the BBC this morning, in a despatch from Rome, that 5000 single men from the 2nd Division will be called upon to volunteer for garrison duty in the Pacific.²

494
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg

I regret to inform you that a decision is not yet possible. The Opposition did not agree that the force should be raised by compulsion. I hope that further discussions after the weekend will enable the Government to reach a satisfactory settlement.

The Leader of the Opposition is laying stress on the statement contained in your telegram of 5 September [No. 490] that the Australian page 523 and United States forces are being raised on a voluntary basis, and the fact that United States troops are to have ninety days' home leave before going to Japan. I would be grateful for elucidation of these points, which are being checked here also.

495
General Freyberg to the Prime Minister

Your telegram of 14 September.

1. As far as United States and Australian forces are concerned, we depend upon broadcast statements and reports in Stars and Stripes and British newspapers for our news, much of which may be inaccurate, and it causes considerable confusion. Based on such reports, our understanding of the long-term policy for the occupation of Japan is that immediate occupational forces of the kind referred to in my following paragraph are to be replaced by forces enlisted voluntarily in the United States and Australia. In the case of the Americans such volunteers, if they are already serving in an overseas theatre, are to receive a period of home leave in the United States before going to Japan. The paragraph in my previous cable [No. 490] was meant to relate only to the raising of a voluntary force, and I did not consider, therefore, that our call for a voluntary force from the New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas would meet with much success without similar leave in New Zealand.

2. With regard to the employment of Australian, American, and British troops for the immediate occupation of Japan, the point that is evident is that these troops were actually being employed in operations against the Japanese or were deployed in the Far Eastern operational area at the time of the Japanese surrender. In carrying out their immediate occupational duties in Japan they are doing no more than the New Zealand Division did in Trieste and the British are still doing in Austria. As we are not called on to do garrison duties in Europe, I see no reason why our short-service personnel, who have seen little or no fighting, should not be used as a temporary garrison force in Japan.

496
The Prime Minister to General Freyberg

Your telegram of 18 September.¹

My own statement regarding New Zealand's participation in the occupation force and the initial composition of the brigade group may be delayed for a few more days pending agreement of the United Kingdom and Australian Governments on broad questions of formation and command of the British Commonwealth Force.

There is no objection meanwhile to you making your own statement as amended and I had assumed that you would have done this.

For your own personal and confidential information, Cabinet are agreed that the force should comprise single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements. It seems clear that it would not be possible to organise the force in time on any other basis.

497
The Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs²

New Zealand's participation in the occupation of Japan was today the subject of a statement by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. P. Fraser.

‘In referring to the Press Association cable regarding General Freyberg's statement to the men of the 2nd NZEF, Mr Fraser said the actual text of General Freyberg's remarks had been conveyed to the New Zealand Government and approved in advance of publication. These were as follows:

“The question of finding a small New Zealand Force to assist in the garrison of Japan is still under consideration and subject to negotiations by the British and United States Governments regarding the forces required for the occupation of Japan. I can only tell you that eventually it will be found from New Zealand by voluntary enlistment. This will take time and it is possible that a small force about 4000 strong will be found from the 2nd NZEF in Italy to carry out six months' occupational duties in Japan. They would then be relieved by the voluntary force from New Zealand. If it is decided to send a force from the 2nd NZEF to Japan it would probably page 525 be found from single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements and from certain officers and specialists to be detailed by name. These men would concentrate and organise in Italy and would leave here by ship in November or December. After the voyage east the force would stay six months in Japan and return to New Zealand about July 1946. I will give you detailed news of this project as soon as negotiations between the two Governments are concluded.”

‘I should add,’ said Mr Fraser, ‘that these negotiations are still taking place and, moreover, the British Commonwealth countries concerned are also discussing questions relating to the formation of a British Commonwealth Force.

‘I had intended making a statement in Parliament as soon as I had received confirmation that arrangements had been completed. I can only say at this stage that if a British Commonwealth Force is to go to Japan then New Zealand will be represented.

‘In view of the press cable messages received this morning it is necessary that I should now release the following statement which I had intended to make to Parliament:

“When Parliament discussed at the beginning of August the formation of a New Zealand force for service in the Pacific it was decided to send a two-brigade Division to fight against the Japanese. Before that decision could be implemented, and when it became clear that Japan intended to surrender, Mr Attlee, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, consulted me regarding the substitution of this combat force by a British Commonwealth Force to take part in the occupation of Japan.

“The new proposal envisaged a land force composed of brigade groups from various countries of the British Commonwealth, together with a tactical Air Force contingent. The New Zealand Government agreed at once that a New Zealand squadron could be made available for the tactical Air Force; they agreed also to the continued attachment of New Zealand ships to the British Pacific Fleet and they undertook to give consideration to the proposal that a New Zealand brigade group should participate in the proposed British Commonwealth land force.

“I feel sure,” said Mr Fraser, “that the people of New Zealand will agree that this opportunity of proving our unity and solidarity with the Mother Country, and of sharing in the responsibilities of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, should be accepted by the provision of a brigade group as requested by the United Kingdom Government.

“The Government made the fullest inquiries as to the practicability of obtaining from the Division on a voluntary basis a properly page 526 balanced brigade group with its essential technical units, but the advice received from General Freyberg and from the Chiefs of Staff in New Zealand is that it will not be possible to organise a brigade group on a voluntary basis to be ready in time to form part of the British Commonwealth occupation force entering Japan. It has therefore been decided that a brigade group shall be made available for six months' service in Japan from the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements of the 2nd NZEF who have seen little or no actual fighting. The men who have already served with the 3rd Division in the Pacific, both married and single, will not be included. It will also be necessary for certain officers, NCOs and other key personnel to be drawn from other units of the 2nd NZEF for the Occupation Force.

“It is proposed that the personnel of this brigade group shall be relieved at the end of six months by men from New Zealand. The relief force will be obtained from volunteers, for whom a call will be made at an early date to enable training to be completed and such relief force to be despatched in sufficient time to take over from the brigade group in Japan.

“Despite the repeated efforts of the Government to obtain the highest possible priority in shipping, there appears to be little prospect so far of obtaining transports to bring the men of the later reinforcements back to New Zealand before March or April next. The consequent delay in the return of the single men of the 13th, 14th and 15th Reinforcements occasioned by their going to Japan now should, therefore, not result in their being away from New Zealand for more than an additional two or three months.

“It will be generally agreed that New Zealand should undertake this duty, not only because it is in our interests as a Pacific country to do so but also because, in common with the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, we have been invited by the United Kingdom Government to participate. Indeed Mr Attlee said in his original message, ‘We trust that we may rely on your assistance and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable.’

“It will be generally agreed also that our only enemy in the Pacific is Japan and that her surrender does not of itself ensure freedom from future Japanese aggression. To render this impossible it is necessary to disarm Japan, to dismantle her war industries and, as far as possible, to eradicate the spirit of Japanese militarism.

“The Allied Powers have set themselves in the Potsdam Declaration, in the Armistice terms and in various declarations of policy to implement this policy, which is endorsed by the New Zealand Government.

“It is clearly our duty,” said Mr Fraser, “to undertake our share of the responsibility for the enforcement of the peace, to the achievement of which our war effort has made a notable contribution. If, moreover, the peace settlement with Japan should fail, New Zealand may well be one of the first countries to suffer. Having regard to our resources and the part we have played throughout the war, the Government proposes to limit our commitment for a land force to an initial period of six months. Any extension beyond that period will depend upon the response which is made to the call for volunteers to provide the necessary reliefs.”’

498
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister of Australia¹

Reference Australian Government's telegram of 21 September.²

We are most gratified that you have agreed with our suggestion for a joint Commonwealth force for the occupation of Japan.

2. We agree with the proposals in your telegram. We should like, however, to be sure that our interpretation of the machinery proposed in your paragraph 6 (v), (vi) and (vii) is correct.³ In framing our reply we have been very glad to have the benefit of Dr Evatt's advice.

3. We envisage an organisation similar to that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which worked so well between ourselves and the Americans. This would mean that our members of the joint organisation would be representatives only and would normally consult the British Chiefs of Staff in London before giving their agreement on the questions under consideration. Thus the joint organisation would be, in effect, the combined United Kingdom—Australian Chiefs of Staff, the instructions to the Commander-in-Chief being issued through the Australian Chiefs of Staff. Reference to Governments would therefore be made by the respective Chiefs of Staff to their Governments rather than through the Australian Defence Department, as might be inferred from your paragraph 6 (vii). Inter-governmental discussions, when necessary, would then take place through normal channels as you propose.

4. We suggest that the title ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff’ may lead to considerable confusion with the American Chiefs of Staff, who are also known by that name. We suggest as an alternative, ‘Chiefs of Staff in Australia’.

5. The British Chiefs of Staff will be communicating with the Australian Chiefs of Staff on detailed questions of organisation and command of the force. When these details are agreed, no doubt you will approach the American Government with our joint proposal.

6. For New Zealand: Please despatch your agreement or comments on the above direct to Australia, repeating to us.

7. We are communicating separately with India.

499
The Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs¹

Your telegram of 1 October.

The New Zealand Government wish to express their satisfaction that arrangements have been concluded for the formation of a British Commonwealth Force for service in Japan under Australian command. They trust that immediate steps will be taken to conclude discussions with the United States authorities and that a public statement will be issued at the earliest possible date.

2. So far as the control organisation is concerned, the New Zealand Government are prepared to accept the procedure proposed in paragraph 6 of the Commonwealth telegram to you of 21 September,² subject of course to any modification as may be agreed upon in the light of your telegram under reference.

3. The New Zealand Government would wish, in view of their contribution to the occupation forces, to arrange that representatives of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff are associated with the organisation it is suggested might be known as the ‘Chiefs of Staff in Australia’. They hope that this will prove acceptable to both the United Kingdom and Commonwealth Governments. It is at present proposed that there would be two representatives of the Chiefs of Staff, one from the Army and the other from the Air Force. These would represent the views of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and function as an integral part of the planning and controlling organisation on the Service level for the occupation force.

500
The Prime Minister of Australia to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs¹
[Extract]

My immediately preceding cablegram.² Following is the text of the proposed announcement:³

‘1. As a result of discussion between members of the British Commonwealth, proposals for a joint British Commonwealth force to participate in the occupation of Japan were agreed upon and conveyed to the United States Government by the Australian Government, acting on behalf of the British Commonwealth Governments concerned.

‘2. Following recent representations in Washington by the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr H. V. Evatt, the United States Government have now formally accepted the participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan. Arrangements are now well advanced for the force to proceed on the following basis.

‘3. The force is drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand⁴ and India. The Commander-in-Chief of the force is Lieutenant-General J. Northcott, CB, MVO,⁵ of the Australian Military Forces. His headquarters is fully integrated with representatives drawn from each service and from each Commonwealth country contributing to the force….

‘4. The force comprises:

‘8. The British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) will form part of the occupation forces in Japan under the supreme command of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)…. Lieutenant-General Northcott as Commander-in-Chief BCOF is entirely responsible for the maintenance and administration of the British Commonwealth Force as a whole. He has direct access to General MacArthur on matters of major policy affecting operational commitments of forces. On policy and administrative matters affecting the force the Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the British Commonwealth Governments concerned through a British Commonwealth organisation set up in Melbourne and known as the ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia’. Their instructions to the Commander-in-Chief BCOF will be issued by the Australian Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia (JCOSA) comprise the Australian Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Chiefs of Staff in the United Kingdom and New Zealand¹ and of the Commander-in-Chief in India. This organisation is fully associated with the Australian joint service machinery. The Commander-in-Chief BCOF has the right of direct communication with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia on administrative matters affecting the force. On matters of Governmental concern affecting the policy and operations of BCOF he will communicate through JCOSA to the Australian Government, who act as the representative of the other Commonwealth Governments concerned.

‘9. The BCOF will be initially located in the Hiroshima Prefecture, including the cities of Kure and Fukuyama. It will be responsible for the demilitarisation and disposal of Japanese installations and armaments and for exercising military control of the area, but not for its military Government, which remains the responsibility of United States agencies….

‘11. The British Commonwealth Force may be withdrawn wholly or in part by agreement between the United States Government and the Commonwealth Governments concerned or upon six months' notice by either party. It has also been agreed that progressive reductions in the strength of the force will be made from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions which may be made in the strength of the United States occupation forces in Japan….²