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New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18

[preamble]

page 161

For many months, indeed, since the late autumn of 1916, preparations for the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had been proceeding steadily and unobtrusively, but in March they were fast reaching such dimensions that concealment was impossible; thenceforward they were pushed on with the utmost rapidity, and with all the resources at command. The railways which served the area had had to be extended, new roads constructed, and provision made for an adequate supply of water, which had to be brought forward by pipe lines from the Kemmel Hills or from sterilising barges on the River Lys. It was a huge constructive scheme, demanding much exhaustive and informed thought, and careful elaboration of multitudinous detail, and to its masterful handling throughout was due the complete success that attended it. The difficulties always attendant upon an enterprise of such magnitude were increased by the fact that the enemy's positions completely overlooked the British lines, and much of the area in rear. To deprive him of this direct observation over practically the whole of the Ypres salient was one of the objectives of this attack, and of the subsequent prolonged struggles, which began at the end of July, for the ridges further north. The launching of the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had been fixed for a date early in June, and fully two months before that date all the countryside behind the forward positions was alive with the countless activities which must always precede such an offensive.

On March 15th the Division relieved the 36th Division on the left in the sector from St. Yves Avenue to the Wulverghem- Wytschaete Road, and handed over its sector to the 3rd Australian Division. The artillery relief was conducted on the 16th and 17th of the month. The 1st Brigade went in on the left to the positions vacated by the 153rd Brigade R.F.A., and the 3rd Brigade relieved the 173rd Brigade, R.F.A., and became page 162right brigade. The 13th Battery remained in its old position with four guns, placing the remaining two guns in the position vacated by the 12th Battery. The 4th Battery, which went into the small square wood behind the group of buildings known as the "piggeries," left a section in its old position in the Bois de Boulogne, behind Hyde Park Corner. Batteries quickly settled down and registered their new zones; little offensive shooting being done meanwhile.

Since the beginning of March hostile artillery fire had been on the increase; several battery positions had been engaged, and some ammunition had been destroyed; while on the 8th, the enemy guns had been very active all day, and had destroyed Rutter's Lodge used by the 12th Battery as an observation post. After the Division had settled down in its new sector, this activity increased, and several raiding parties were launched by the enemy in an effort to secure identification. At 3.55 a.m. on March 23rd, the right group fired in response to an S.O.S. call; after heavily shelling the front line the enemy put down a box barrage and raided, but was driven back without obtaining identification. The following morning two enemy parties raided the line on the left goup sector, but both were driven off.

At the beginning of April work was commenced on the construction of battery positions to accommodate the mass of artillery which was to support the attack, and in the laying down of the network of tramways and light railways which were to serve the area for its supplies of ammunition and stores of all descriptions. Forward dumps were established for the provision of material required in construction work, and large working parties, generally a battalion or more in strength, were engaged on the burying of a cable running forward to a control station in rear of the trenches. This cable was buried to a good depth, and proved a tremendous improvement on the old system of ground wires, which could never be properly maintained in the heat of a bombardment. On April 1st the 3rd Brigade was entrusted with the building of ten battery positions. The infantry assisted by providing working parties, and a dump was formed and material issued to the batteries as it was required. page 163These magnum opus positions, as they were styled, had all to be carefully camouflaged, even before work was commenced, so that not the slightest indication of their presence might be observed by the enemy. Usually the site chosen was covered from end to end by great strips of green camouflage netting, and the men toiled under cover of this. Units of the Divisional Artillery constructed twenty-five battery positions on and near Hill 63 and in Ploegsteert Wood, the work being supervised by Major Glendining and Major C. McGilp.

In pursuance of the policy of resting the Division by units, the Artillery Brigades were withdrawn from the line in turn for a period of two weeks, which were spent in training and recreation in the Lumbres area, near St. Omer. By April 6th the 1st Brigade batteries had withdrawn to their waggon lines on relief by the 112th Brigade, R.F.A., and on the 9th the Brigade left on the march to the Lumbres-Tilques area for its period of rest. On the 6th, at midnight, the Division contracted its right, and the front was narrowed down to that on which it was to attack on the 7th of June, and following on the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade the right group, less the 12th Battery (which was temporarily under the tactical command of the C.R.A., 3rd Australian Division), extended its zone to embrace the whole divisional front. During this time one battery of the 112th Brigade was attached to the group. On the 19th and 20th the 3rd Brigade was relieved by the 110th Brigade, R.F.A., and marched out for the rest area on the 22nd. The 110th Brigade was relieved by the 1st Brigade on its return from Lumbres on the 24th. The 3rd Brigade returned from Lumbres on May 7th, but did not go into action until four days later; during this interval the Brigade supplied a daily working party one hundred strong for work on the magnum opus positions.

While out of the line batteries carried out a certain amount of training, but a good deal of time was devoted to sport in the way of football competitions, sports meetings, and cross-country races. The men benefited very much by the spell; but in the 1st Brigade the horses returned in rather poor condition, due to the cold weather which had been experienced and the work during training. No interruption in the works in progress had page 164been suffered by the process of spelling the brigades, and once they had returned and settled down again, work went on with renewed energy. Such intense activity in forward areas, the construction of new roads and tramlines, and the growing volume of traffic had all been observed by the enemy from his coign of vantage on the ridge, and his artillery began to display an aggressiveness which was doubtless increased by the heavy shellings to which his own defences were being subjected in growing measure. Battery positions came in for a fair share of this hostile activity, and all through the night of May 5th, until four o'clock of the following morning, the rear areas along the whole front were heavily shelled. Several casualties were suffered at the waggon lines, and a number of horses were killed. At 3.30 a.m. a heavy bombardment was opened up on the front line, followed a little later by S.O.S. rockets along the whole front. All batteries immediately opened fire on the S.O.S. lines, and continued shooting until 4.7 a.m., when reports were received from the liaison officers, and fire was concentrated on the front of the left battalion. An enemy raiding party, which had been observed in No Man's Land, was driven off, and at 4.25 a.m. "All clear" was reported and batteries ceased fire.

On May 13th, the Divisional Artillery Horse Show was held near Westhof Farm; the condition of the teams and vehicles entered in the show was in all respects excellent, and reflected the greatest credit on the drivers, to whose zeal and labour such creditable results were due. The 7th Battery received the cup awarded for the best Battery Transport, and a number of prizes were secured by the sections of the Divisional Ammunition Column.

As the month progressed every day was marked by the most intense activity on the part of the British artillery, heavy and field, and by a corresponding increase in the enemy's retaliatory fire and counter-battery work. Wire cutting was carried out each day on the particular zones allotted to each Brigade, and targets at night included enemy tramways and roads, and places which had been shelled by the heavy artillery during the day; this latter practice was adopted in order to hamper repair work which might be attempted under cover of darkness. In order to secure the greatest degree of perfection in the elaborate and page 165carefully schemed barrage which was to cover the advance there was frequent practice in the firing of creeping barrages, and the imperfections noticeable at the outset, especially in the timing of the lifts, gradually disappeared. The enemy gunners retaliated by shelling the roads and selected areas, and by a great deal of counter-battery work. In reply to a practice barrage carried out on May 25th, Gas Trench and the general neighbourhood of Hill 63 were heavily shelled with 10.5 and 15cm. howitzers. The same areas were shelled on the night of the 26th, and back areas were swept with fire for several hours. We suffered a good many casualties by these bombardments, the progress of work was often seriously hindered, and dumps of ammunition, some of them containing thousands of rounds for the field guns, were blown up; but these were checks not unforeseen that in no way stayed the momentum of events.

Brigadier-General Johnston had moved his headquarters from Steenwerck to Westhof Farm on April 30th, and on the 22nd and 23rd of May forward concentration areas which had been established for all units of the N.Z.F.A. were occupied. The object of these concentration areas was to have the headquarters of each brigade, the limbers, firing battery, and first-line waggons of each battery, and the sections of the D.A.C. grouped forward in a manner that would provide for better tactical and administrative control in the coming advance. Spare horses and men and transport were left at the rear waggon lines.

On the last day in May most of the batteries spent some time cleaning up uncut wire in their zones, and by the end of the day all the wire within wire-cutting range in group zones was reported cut. From 6 a.m. this day onwards fire was maintained continuously, day and night, on all roads, bridges, communication trenches, light railway junctions, and transport halting places on the front. Thus there was no road or approach by which the enemy could transport stores or ammunition, or bring up reliefs for his weary and harassed infantry without being subject to this incessant and destructive fire. What mental and physical agony this meant when prolonged for over a week may readily be conjectured. The enemy guns were very active during the night of June 1, Hyde Park Corner, where there was always page 166much traffic, being persistently shelled. A practice barrage with 75 per cent. of the guns only, was fired on June 2nd, and the same night the German positions in front of Messines were liberally gas-shelled. The weather continued bright and warm, and practice barrages were fired again on the 3rd and 5th. On the 3rd enemy planes were active low down over battery positions and Ploegsteert Wood was heavily shelled; but on the 5th hostile fire was particularly severe and effective. The positions of three batteries of the 311th Brigade, R.F.A., which were attached to "G" Group, were shelled practically all day. About 1,300 rounds of ammunition were destroyed, and the position was almost burnt out. The personnel were withdrawn, but returned at 3 p.m. to take part in the corps practice barrage. Two minutes after this practice barrage started the men of one battery had to evacuate the position, owing to the danger from burning ammunition dumps in rear. All the rations and stores were destroyed, and the exploding ammunition put no fewer than five guns out of action. On the following day "G" Group did not fire as the positions, several of which were very exposed, were still being shelled at intervals, and it was not desired to give them completely away before the attack.

From June 1st the daily expenditure of ammunition had been 150 rounds per gun and howitzer, and this expenditure continued right up to the day of attack. Prior to the assault there was to be no intense bombardment and no departure from what had been for some time the normal and customary procedure in the daily and nightly attention given to the enemy. It was a critical moment in the consummation of the scheme—the hour preceding its tumultuous birth—and anything that might give the vigilant German mind any idea of the hour of the attack was to be rigorously avoided. "It is essential," said the order on the subject, "that there should be no increase or slackening in the rate of fire before zero hour, and that everything should appear normal." Such was the density of the smoke and dust resulting from the ceaseless shelling of the enemy front that the whole countryside was completely hidden from aerial observation. A cessation of fire was in consequence ordered for fifteen minutes each day, to allow aeroplane photographs to be taken.

page 167

The assault on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge was entrusted to the 2nd Army, commanded by General Sir Herbert Plumer, and the front selected for the attack extended from opposite St. Yves to Mt. Sorrell inclusive, a distance of between nine and ten miles. The final objective was the Oostaverne line, running between these two points, and the greatest depth to which it was planned the advance should penetrate was about two miles and a half The frontage allotted to the 2nd Anzac Corps, in which were the 3rd Australian, New Zealand, and 25th Divisions from right to left, extended from St. Yves to the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and the objectives included the capture of the enemy's guns to the north-east of Messines and towards Oostaverne. For the Corps the attack was divided into two phases. In the first phase it was to attack and capture the Black line, which extended across the rear of Messines, involving of course the taking of Messines by the New Zealand Division in the centre. In the second phase the Corps was to capture the Green or Oostaverne line, which, on the front of the New Zealand Division, was about twelve hundred yards beyond the Black line. The three Divisions in line—3rd Australian, New Zealand, and 25th—were to carry out the first phase, and the second phase was entrusted to the 3rd and 4th Australian Divisions, the latter of which was to pass through the New Zealand and 25th Divisions, and capture the portion of the Green line opposite their front. In the New Zealand Division the 2nd Infantry Brigade, on the left, and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade attacked side by side.

The projected operation had previously been thoroughly rehearsed by all the attacking troops on a large scale, exact model of the Messines area; and before June 7th arrived every man was perfectly familiar with the part his unit was to. play in the battle. The signal for the attack was to be the explosion of a number of heavily-charged mines, which had been prepared during many months of unremitting and dangerous labour. Along the original Second Army front there was a total of twenty-four mines, which had involved the driving of eight thousand yards of galleries. Of this total four mines were outside the front of the attack, and one had been destroyed by the enemy. The remaining nineteen mines, charged with overpage 168one million pounds of powerful explosive were to be exploded under the enemy's positions at zero hour.

From first to last the operation in every detail, from the most important to the very minor, was thought out and planned with the most exacting care and, as far as was humanly possible every phase was carried out with clock-work precision. In the scheming of the barrage which preceded the infantry in their advance along the whole Army front no spot which might possibly prove an obstacle to the advance was left untouched. On the front of the New Zealand Division the barrage travelled a depth of less than two thousand yards in just over twenty lifts; so it may literally be said to have swept along in front of the advancing troops. A feature of the barrage in its earlier stages was the active presence of 144 machine guns along the Corps front, 56 of them being on the front of the Division. In addition to heavy guns and howitzers, one hundred and fourteen 18-prs. and thirty-six 4.5in. howitzers covered the Divisional front of 1,500 yards. The 18-prs. were divided into three groups; and there was one group of 4.5in. howitzers. "F" Group consisted of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th Batteries of the 1st Brigade, and A, B. and C Batteries of the 242nd Brigade R.F.A. The three 18-pr. batteries of the 3rd Brigade, the 11th, 12th, and 13th, were grouped with one battery of the 38th Brigade, and three batteries of the 311th Brigade R.F.A.

The system of grouping batteries did not generally affect administration to any extent, while it rendered the tactical handling of the artillery much simpler. Nearly all 18-pr. batteries were used on the creeping barrage, while the howitzer group was allotted special tasks. The standing barrage was generally a heavy gun barrage, although it also included 18-prs., and was laid well back, with the object of frustrating any attempt to bring up reinforcements as well as to keep down the fire of enemy riflemen and machine-gunners.

The last synchronisation of watches before zero hour took place at 9.30 p.m. on the June 6th. During the night the enemy threw over a great quantity of gas shell, chiefly lachry-matory on to Hill 63 and the vicinity. The shelling of battery positions which continued all day was also kept up during the page break
A Good Example of a Barrage Map The lines between the Divisional Boundaries show the successive "lifts" of the barrage as it moves forward in front of the advancing infantry. The "Blue Line." "Black Line," etc., indicate the Various objectives.

A Good Example of a Barrage Map The lines between the Divisional Boundaries show the successive "lifts" of the barrage as it moves forward in front of the advancing infantry. The "Blue Line." "Black Line," etc., indicate the Various objectives.

page break page 169night and until 3 a.m.—ten minutes before zero hour. Those last ten minutes passed slowly for everyone, for the infantry awaiting the signal to advance, for the gunners standing ready by their guns, and for those who waited to press the buttons that would explode the mines under the German positions. Four minutes before zero hour a machine gun section opened its barrage prematurely, and then at exactly ten minutes past three the earth quivered and shook as the nineteen mines with their millions of pounds of explosives went up, and at once the barrage came down through the clouds of debris and dust So dense were these clouds that until the attacking troops, preceded by the barrage, had passed beyond Messines Ridge, nothing could be seen from the observation posts. By 5 a.m., the New Zealand Infantry had captured Messines little opposition having been encountered in the enemy front line trenches.

The barrage was completely effective, and so successful in its purpose of opening a way for the attackers as to extort the highest praise from the infantry commanders. In order to make it as weighty and destructive as possible at the outset of the attack, all 18-prs. employed on the creeping and standing barrages kept one hundred per cent. of their guns firing for three-quarters of an hour after zero. At the expiration of that time every opportunity was taken of briefly resting the guns; but, meanwhile, those guns still in action substantially increased their rate of fire and swept in order that there should be no weakening of the barrage.

After capturing Messines the infantry pushed on, and finally reached the Black line, which was their obejctive for the time being. At this juncture troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade took up the task of establishing this line and the "Black Dotted Line" a little further down the eastern slopes of the ridge; these positions were to serve as the "jumping-off" place for the 4th Australian Division in its attack on the Oostaverne Line, the final objective. Following in the wake of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, the 1st Brigade troops had established themselves on the Black Line at 5.20 a.m. Stubborn resistance had been encountered at many points, and some light field guns, several machine guns, and many prisoners page 170had been captured. At 8.40 a.m., after a pause of about three hours, the infantry moved forward again, and reached the limit of their advance. The artillery barrage was kept up in front of this line till a few minutes before ten o'clock, when it gradually slackened off and ceased. Shortly after 1 p.m. enemy troops were observed from several points to be massing for a counter-attack, and as they advanced from the vicinity of the Oostaverne Line they were preceded by a heavy barrage. The movement appeared to be general along the whole Divisional front, and the artillery barrage was promptly called for, and stopped the attack before it had time to develop.

The 4th Australian Division's attack on the Oostaverne Line was postponed for two hours, the "new zero" being 3.10 p.m. The final objective was reached about a quarter to four, after which a protective barrage was maintained for a further twenty minutes, and then all batteries reduced their fire to a very slow rate. As soon as word was received that the Oostaverne Line had been taken S.O.S. zones were allotted to each battery by group commanders, and all stood by ready to open fire upon the first sign of a counter-attack. Several S.O.S. calls were received during the early part of the evening, and all were promptly responded to, but it is doubtful if any real need existed for this vast expenditure of ammunition. At 9 p.m. "G" Group received a message from the group forward observing officer with one of the Australian Battalions that the line had been pushed back about three or four hundred yards; but Artillery Headquarters ordered the group to fire on the original S.O.S. line. A second message received by group at 9.20 p.m. stated that the Black Dotted Line was being held by the infantry, but Divisional Artillery Headquarters again ruled that fire should be kept outside the Green Line, as no definite information could be gained on the subject. Incidents of this description were of fairly frequent occurrence during the hours following a battle when communications were severely disorganised, and responsible officers were often obliged to make the most momentous decisions on the most meagre and uncertain information. Whatever doubt existed overnight had vanished by the morning, when the Australians were consolidated on their furthest assigned objectives.

page 171

On all other parts of the front the advance had been equally successful, and when time was gained to tally up the prisoners they were found to number over seven thousand; while in material the enemy had lost 67 guns, 94 trench mortars, and 294 machine guns.

During the first phase of the attack the field batteries were practically free from hostile fire. This was not an unusual experience, as it was frequently found that at the outset of an attack the enemy concentrated the heaviest weight of his artillery on barrage work, in his effort to stop the advancing infantry. In this instance, however, there were two other factors at work which undoubtedly had an effect on the situation. The first was that hostile batteries must have suffered heavily from the neutralising fire of our counter-battery guns; and the other was that a number of batteries on the front attacked were withdrawn to the rear. All the indications pointed to the fact that the enemy expected the attack to be pushed further than it actually was. The first hostile fire came from a flank, from the direction of Deulemont and Warneton, at about 9 a.m., principally directed against batteries on Hill 63, where one dump of about 3,000 rounds of ammunition was destroyed, and against Messines.

Groups experienced the usual difficulty in getting accurate and immediate information regarding the trend of events, but considering the difficulties of maintaining communication under such circumstances, much valuable information was received during the day from observing officers who had gone forward with the attacking infantry. Owing to the difficulty of main-taining communication by wire, these observers sent in many of their messages by runner or by carrier pigeon, by both of which methods, of course, messages were, unfortunately, subject to considerable delay.

Elaborate arrangements had, of course, to be made for supplying the enormous quantities of ammunition consumed by the massed batteries for days before and during the attack. It was a big undertaking, on the success of which great issues depended, and the fact that the system of supply never failed at any single point is the highest tribute that can be paid to the organising ability and range of vision displayed in itspage 172conception and control. The Divisional Ammunition Column, command of which had passed to Lieut-Colonel N. S. Falla about the end of March, had to supervise the delivery of ammunition to the twenty-five field batteries supporting the Division to the extent of 7,800 rounds per 18-pr. battery, and 6,600 rounds per howitzer battery prior to the attack. The most interesting feature of the system was the manner in which mechanical transport superseded the usual horse-drawn, limbered, and G.S. waggons. The ammunition came in by two broad gauge lines, one running to near Romarin, and the other to Kennabek. From these termini light railway lines ran up the Douve Valley and Ploegsteert Flat to forward dumps, and wooden spurs ran off to the different battery positions. It had originally been intended to use wooden rails in the construction of the light railway lines also, but later it was decided to use 9lb., and then 20lb., and even 40lb. rails.

All the construction work was done by Canadian and South African units, assisted by the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, which maintained the system after its completion. It was late in the day when the lines were handed over for traffic, and it was imperative that the ammunition should commence to pour in without delay; there was little traction, however, and there were anxious moments when some mishap or breakdown threatened to dislocate the whole service. At one stage, the whole supply was dependent on the working of one petrol light line engine, and with the attack little more than twenty-four hours off another of these engines stopped, owing to a defect in a small but vital part and an officer of the D.A.C. had a midnight gallop to have it repaired. Nor did matters always run smoothly on the broad gauge; one night the second train to arrive failed to stop at the terminus, and ten trucks of ammunition went over the end of the line into a swamp. On occasions, also, enemy aircraft bombed the trains at Bailleul. But despite these mischances, and the destruction of a great quantity of ammunition by hostile shelling after it had been brought forward, supplies were always more than adequate. Between noon of May 31st and noon of June 7th the 18-pr. batteries expended 126,200 rounds, and the 4.5in. howitzers page 17333,700 rounds; up till noon on June 9th there was expended a further total of 76,000 rounds, of which over 63,000 were fired by the 18-pra.

This method of supply relieved battery transport of a big burden, and meant the saving of a great many horses and mules. A certain number of mules were used for haulage on the lines, and for hauling the ammunition up Hill 63. But the activities of the Divisional Ammunition Column did not end with the feeding of the field batteries; it handled a large proportion of the ammunition for the 6in. howitzers, took up small arm ammunition and bombs by mule-packs as far forward as it was possible to go, and then handed them over to the infantry, and night after night carted wire and stakes and material of all descriptions to within a few hundred yards of the front line.

The three medium trench mortar batteries and the one heavy battery did more than their share of shooting during the weeks preceding the attack; working under conditions of unusual difficulty they carried out a surprisingly big programme of shooting; and the thoroughness with which they dealt with dug-outs, strong points, and other features in the enemy's forward trench system, in addition to cutting great quantities of wire, marked a distinct development in their offensive use. The enemy retaliated strongly with artillery fire, and the mortar batteries were often forced to obtain covering fire from their own field batteries; on occasions, also, they fired under cover of a bombardment from the field guns. Enormous quantities of ammunition were fired away during the fortnight immediately preceding the attack, and the distinction of having achieved the "record" shoot was not lightly regarded by the mortar men themselves. On May 24th, three batteries of medium mortars fired a total of no less than 1,265 rounds; but this was eclipsed a few days later, when three batteries got through a total of 1,950 rounds. The trench mortars fired up to the opening of the attack, and then withdrew to Pont Nieppe.

There was little change in the situation on the 8th of June; throughout the day Messines and the ridge were bombarded by enemy guns from the direction of Warneton; but as Messines was not occupied by the infantry the effects of this shelling were page 174not so serious. Several S.O.S. calls were received during the afternoon and finally, at approximately 8.30 p.m., a barrage was called for and kept up till about 10 p.m. It was subsequently ascertained that no counter-attack had been delivered. At 9 a.m. on the 9th, the 4th Australian Division assumed command of the front held in advance of the New Zealand Division, which then went into Corps Reserve. At 5 p.m. command of the New Zealand Artillery passed to the C.R.A., 4th Australian Division; Brigadier-General Johnston went to Bailleul, where he remained until the 13th, when he moved to Steenwerck, and again assumed command of the Divisional Artillery. On this day there was an unfortunate and most unusual occurrence, Captain Primmer, New Zealand Veterinary Corps, having been killed by lightning at the Mobile Waggon Line, and seven other ranks injured.

Considerable changes were made in the composition of the groups immediately after the attack. After the capture of the Black Line the 38th Australian Brigade joined "G" Group, and at 4.15 p.m. A., B., and C. Batteries of the 311th Brigade left the group for another command. On the 9th, "F" Group lost the batteries of the 242nd Brigade but next day was joined by the 15th (howitzer) Battery from "H." Group. Batteries of both groups moved forward by the 12th June to positions below Messines, near the Wulverghem-Messines Road, and the mobile waggon lines were moved forward to fresh quarters east of Neuve Eglise.