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New Zealand Artillery in the Field, 1914-18

Hill 60

Hill 60.

After the failure of the attack on the Ridge Sir Ian Hamilton cabled to the War Office, pointing out the sadly weakened condition of his Divisions, and urging that large reinforcements must be sent at once if the campaign was to be brought to a rapid and successful conclusion. The answer to these requests effectually dispelled all hopes of a resumption of offensive operations on a scale that would be likely to produce any decisive results. Reinforcements could not be sent. Forced to make the best of a bad situation, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to strengthen his forces at Suvla Bay as far as lay in his power, and to make an attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe—known at Anzac as the "W" Hills. The possession of these page 87hills would not only command the valleys running up to the two villages of Biyuk Anafarta and Kuchuk Anafarta, but would permit freer communication between Anzac and Suvla. To assist the 9th Corps in this operation troops from Anzac were to attack Hill 60.

The attack was fixed for the 21st of August, and the artillery support was to be rendered by the following guns:—2nd, 3rd, and 4th (How.) N.Z.F.A., "Daniell's" Battery (two Australian guns), three 5in. howitzer batteries of the 69th Brigade, one 18pr. battery at Lala Baba (Suvla Bay), certain of the mountain guns, and naval guns. It had been intended that the guns at the disposal of Colonel Johnstone should give their support solely to General Cox's attack on Hill 60, and all the preparations were made to this end; but almost at the last moment these dispositions were upset by an order for a general bombardment of the Turkish trenches in front of the 9th Corps. Accordingly, at the eleventh hour the whole programme of artillery support had to be revised in order that for the first phase of the action support might be given to the 9th Corps alone. This seriously interfered with the preparation of the ground over which the Colonial and other units of General Cox's force were to advance, and instead of the bombardment commencing at 2.15 p.m., it did not begin until 2.45 p.m., when fire was switched from the 9th Corps' front.

From 3.30 p.m., when the infantry assault commenced, the 18pr. batteries were engaged on any target which presented itself. They made good shooting on enemy reinforcements advancing at Anafarta, and got particularly good results on various targets in the direction of Kabak Kuyu, Susak Kuyu, and the northern slopes of Kaiajik Aghala. Meanwhile the howitzers of the 4th Battery were bombarding enemy trenches on Kaiajik Aghala, where their shooting was accurate and effective, prisoners captured later reporting that this shelling caused heavy casualties. The attack fell short of success, the enemy rifle and machine-gun fire at some points being so intense that it was impossible for the attackers to make headway. On the left the Indian troops succeeded in gaining the page 88well at Kabak Kuyu, but on Hill 60 the two hundred yards of trench line seized and held by the New Zealand Mounted Riflemen represented the sole gains. At the request of General Cox a steady rate of fire was kept up by the 4th Battery's howitzers during the night on the front occupied by General Russell's troops, in order to hinder any attempts at an assembly of enemy troops for the purposes of counter-attack. During the day of August 22nd the 4th Battery kept up this bombardment, and did excellent work in limiting the activities of the Turks, who were endeavouring further to entrench. On the lower northern slopes of the hill, where the enemy was in strength and strongly entrenched, they were subjected to a steady fire, which drove them into the gullies beyond observation. Hoping to clear this portion of the front, and acting on artillery advice, General Russell asked for the co-operation of the 9th Corps artillery, as it was thought that with the assistance of their enfilade fire this piece of ground could be denied to the enemy altogether. This assistance, however, was not forthcoming, the reason given for the refusal being that observation was difficult, and that the results to be expected were not thought to justify the expenditure of ammunition.

Late on the afternoon of the 21st one of the guns in "Daniell's" Battery was completely destroyed by a shell which burst in the bore, fortunately without wounding any of the crew. The gun, which had been borrowed from the Australians, was replaced by one from the 2nd Battery. On the evening of August 26th the right section of the 3rd Battery moved its guns to a new position on the north-western slopes of Damakjelik Bair. At the close of the month the whole battery was established in a position on the edge of the beach about a mile north of No. 3 Outpost.

In the interval which ensued before the second and final attack was made on Hill 60 on August 27th, the Hill was kept under fairly constant fire, especially during the hours of darkness. So frequently were requests for night-firing received from the infantry that the daily allowance of ammunition, which had again been reduced to five rounds per howitzer page 89and ten rounds per gun, was almost entirely accounted for in this manner. The attack on the 27th, which was made at 5 p.m. by a force consisting of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, Australian Infantry, and Connaught Rangers, was preceded by an hour's heavy bombardment, over 500 high explosive shells being poured into the limited area on the front of assault. The batteries in action were the 4th (How.) Battery, and B., C, and D. Batteries, 69th (How.) Brigade. Field and naval guns assisted by shelling the flanks and rear areas. The bombardment inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, whose trenches were found heaped with their own dead; but still the attackers were met with a heavy fire from machine-guns and field batteries. The attack achieved a very fair measure of success, only the troops on the right being held up by machinegun fire from a trench, the existence of which had not been suspected. Initial gains were slightly enlarged on succeeding days; but substantially the line remained unaltered from this on to the close of the campaign.