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Chapter IV. How the Guns Were Starved.

From the earliest hours of the Gallipoli campaign it needed no master of strategy to divine that one of the most fatal weaknesses of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force lay in its shortage in guns, especially howitzers, and in shells. This weakness in a potent and indispensable arm detrimentally affected the fortunes of the army at every stage and in every phase; and the appalling casualty lists were undoubtedly swelled by reason of the necessarily inadequate artillery preparations for infantry assaults against strongly fortified and naturally formidable positions, and across broken and difficult country, the like of which was unknown in France or Flanders. The New Zealand batteries which landed on the Peninsula successfully overcame obstacles which might well have been considered insurmountable. They dragged their guns up the precipitous hillsides, and fought them for months under the direct gaze of an enemy more liberally supplied with both guns and shells. But despite their skill and devotion they were handicapped and at times almost crippled by a factor beyond their control—the shortage of shells.

In chronicling the part played by the New Zealand Field Artillery in the Gallipoli campaign it is unnecessary and inadvisable to attempt to deal with the events leading up to the inception of this "immortal gamble," to analyse the causes of its failure, or to speculate on the far-reaching consequences that success would have had on the general course of the war. But the artillery were so directly affected by certain of the shortcomings under which the Expedition suffered, that no history would be complete without some reference to them.

From the outset the War Office seemed to display a tragic lack of understanding of the magnitude of the undertaking to which the country was about to commit itself in the Gallipoli Expedition. The Army was but ill-equipped with guns, many page 56of them out-of-date, and the ammunition supply "was not calculated on the basis of a prolonged occupation of Gallipoli." So the War Office informed Sir Ian Hamilton early in May. Maps were scarce, and those that were available were old and inaccurate. None of them was reliable. The idea of despatching an army to Gallipoli was conceived in an atmosphere of irresolution and doubt, was regarded with "hesitating reluctance" in many official circles at Home, and was bitterly opposed by generals on the Western Front. Launched under these discouraging auspices the Expedition from first to last was regarded as a "side show" for which almost anything was good enough. Even as late as June Sir Ian Hamilton, in endeavouring to persuade the War Office to increase his supplies of ammunition, pointed out that he had only the artillery of two divisions for the infantry of five, which fact vitiated all comparisons based on expenditure per gun, as the guns at Gallipoli had to do twice the work of those in Flanders. Both the colonial divisions at Anzac were armed with 18prs., but at Cape Helles the 29th Division was the only division in possession of these modern weapons. The Royal Naval Division had no guns at all! The 15prs. with which the 42nd Division was armed, were obsolete and worn. On one occasion when the force at Helles was in the greatest straits for 15pr. ammunition, a good many hundred rounds arrived, but on being landed were found to be suitable only for the Royal Horse Artillery guns in Egypt, of which, however, there was none on the Peninsula.

In contrast to this pitiful weakness the French troops which landed at the southern end of the Peninsula were well equipped with guns and howitzers, and were always well supplied with ammunition, so that they became the envy, as well as the admiration, of the British gunners. On occasions the French generously lent some of their batteries to the British in order to help them in their preparations for an assault. In the attack at Helles on the 12th and 13th July the French placed some thirty or forty guns and howitzers under British command; and' on account of the shortage of British ammunition the French guns undertook the whole of the preliminary artillery preparation for the assault.

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Situated far distant from the source to which he must look for the supplies of men and munitions, which were vital for the successful prosecution of the campaign, and almost for the very existence of his army, Sir Ian Hamilton could present his pleas or press his demands only in the comparative brevity of a cable, or by the slow process of a despatch. In neither way was he likely to carry conviction to the War Office against the arguments and influence of those who were opposed to any diversion of strength from the main issue on the Western Front, insisting that not a man nor a gun could be spared from France. Yet what incalculable consequences might have followed from the diversion to Gallipoli of some very small proportion of the forces that were expended in the indecisive battles fought by the British and French on the Western Front in 1915! Had the original British forces on Gallipoli not been literally starved in guns and shells there are reasonable grounds for the belief that their efforts might have been crowned with success, and the Dardanelles opened and made secure for the passage of the Fleet. At any rate it is certain that the losses in killed and wounded would have been very considerably less, and those of the enemy incomparably greater. The British armies in France and Flanders suffered severely from the shortage of guns and shells throughout the whole of 1915, but surely no other troops had ever to advance against such strong positions with less artillery support than was afforded the infantry of Anzac and Helles.

The messages which passed between the Commander-in-Chief of the Dardanelles Army and Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, afford illuminating evidence of Sir Ian Hamilton's urgent and almost incessant, but for the most part fruitless, appeals for more guns for his army, and of his endeavours to quicken the sluggish and uncertain flow of ammunition supplies. After having very early in the campaign described the ammunition question as acute, Sir Ian Hamilton placed the position with much fullness before the Secretary of State, and pointed out that a liberal supply of ammunition, especially H.E., would enormously reduce the loss of life. Only three aeroplanes were available, and trouble page 58was being experienced from the enemy's heavy guns, which could not be located, and were doing a lot of damage. Significantly enough, a few days later the ammunition allowance at Anzac was reduced to two rounds per gun per day. About the middle of June the War Office reported that it was impossible to send out more ammunition than was being sent. Four days later the Commander-in-Chief cabled pointing out to the Secretary of State that the Turkish trenches were deep and narrow, and the howitzer was the only effective weapon for dealing with them, and succinctly summed up the position regarding the need for munitions in the following terms:—"We realise for our part the necessity in matter of ammunition and guns it is no good crying for the moon, and for your part you must recognise that until howitzers and ammunition arrive it is no good crying for the Crescent."

But the War Office, apparently convinced that the needs of the far-distant campaign must not be permitted to interfere with the paramount claims of the cause near at hand, remained unmoved by all appeals and every demand. For the great battle of August, inexperiencd troops were sent to reinforce the Gallipoli army—to meet an enemy whom Sir Ian Hamilton had already described to the War Office "as a very formidable foe, and individually better fighting men than the Germans"—and any increase in the rate of ammunition supplies was insignificant. During the tremendous fighting in August the 18pr. ammunition sent out averaged only eleven rounds per gun per day.

The total artillery strength at Anzac by May 17th was just under forty guns and howitzers, included in which were the twelve guns of the Indian Mountain Artillery, and the two 6in. howitzers which had just been landed. Both these howitzers were old, and badly equipped with stores; and as only 150 rounds of ammunition were sent with each piece their usefulness was rather limited. In June Anzac asked G.H.Q. for more of these howitzers, but there was only one available, and there was no ammunition. In their attack on May 29th, the Turks had a numerical superiority in guns of about two to one, and as they were mostly well-concealed and page 59liberally supplied with ammunition, they were able to make the most of their advantage. Throughout June and July the garrison was subjected day by day to galling and destructive fire from the Turkish guns, the most active of which it was impossible to locate without aeroplanes, or to silence without howitzers and shells. Throughout this trying period the shore guns of the Army Corps fired with any freedom only on those few crucial occasions of attack or counter-attack which were regarded as epochal in the monotonous succession of summer days.

Every effort was being made at this juncture to build up a store of ammunition for the big operations which were being planned for the month of August, but notwithstanding that this meant submitting to hostile fire without retaliation, the situation was accepted in the cheerful, self-sacrificing spirit that was characteristic of Anzac. Battery commanders managed to achieve surprising results with the small number of rounds that were made available from time to time. The guns of the 4th Howitzer Battery were constantly in request for breaking up enemy works and strong points, and engaging targets that lay in "dead" ground for the flat-trajectory 18prs. On June 12th one of the 4th Battery guns at the foot of Howitzer Gully was taken up to Plugge's Plateau, near the 2nd Battery position, thus giving it a more effective range for engaging distant targets. More particularly on the right flank there were always plenty of tempting targets out of range of the shore artillery, and for a considerable time the Commander of the Australian Field Artillery had made urgent representations for two 4.7in. naval guns with which to engage them. It was not, however, until July 11th that one very old and much-worn gun arrived, and was placed in position on the right flank, firing its first round on July 26th. As it was frequently out of action its usefulness was very limited.

The Turks no doubt experienced difficulties and anxieties about their own ammunition supplies, but never at any period was there anything to indicate that they were in the same sore straits as the Army Corps at Anzac, or the British Forces at Helles. On July 10th, indeed, a memorandum was issued by G.H.Q., stating that news had been received to the effect that page 60a secret order had been issued four days previously by the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, enjoining economy in regard to ammunition. A General Staff memorandum issued at the same time stated that it had been learned from a source believed to be "absolutely reliable," that for the next three weeks the situation of the Turks on Gallipoli Peninsula would be most critical unless munitions of war were allowed to pass freely through Roumania. At the end of that period it was believed Turkey would be in a position to manufacture her own munitions. But however critical the position may have been for the Turk, his guns were persistently active throughout July; and in addition to periodical bombardments of the trench systems, he freely shelled the "inner circle" and the Headquarters' area, making work on the beach and piers dangerous and costly.

The expected arrival of two more batteries from New Zealand, the 5th Battery of 18prs. and the 6th Howitzer Battery, made necessary some reorganisation in the composition of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery at the end of this month. In an order published on July 26th, the details of this reorganisation were set forth. In place of the existing Brigade of four batteries, two Brigades were created, each consisting of three Batteries. Major F. Symon, 1st Battery, and Major F. B. Sykes, 2nd Battery, were promoted Lieut.-Colonels, and given command respectively of the 1st and 2nd Brigades. Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Johnston, commanding N.Z. Divisional Artillery, was promoted Colonel. The composition of the Brigades was as follows:—

1st Brigade:—1st Battery—Major C. McGilp; 3rd Battery—Major I. T. Standish; 6th (How.) Battery—Captain G. E. Daniell; 1st Brigade Amm. Column—Captain A. E. Horwood.

2nd Brigade:—2nd Battery—Major F. G. Hume; 4th (How.) Battery—Major N. S. Falla; 5th Battery—Major G. J. Beattie; 2nd Brigade Amm. Column—Captain T. Farr.

The Divisional Ammunition Column, an attached British unit, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Cochrane, D.S.O. The 3rd Battery was of course at Cape Helles, and the Brigade Ammunition Column in Egypt.