Passchendaele.

Plans were now being prepared which were again to bring the New Zealand Division into the Ypres Offensive, following immediately upon the attack to be launched on October 9th. Orders were issued to the 2nd Infantry Brigade to hold itself in readiness to take over the line held by the right Brigade of the 49th Division, and for transport and advance and reconnoitring parties to be ready to move to the Brandhoek area, and thence to "Y" Camp, near Saint Jean. Prior to moving off a large number of officers proceeded to Poperinghe to inspect a model of the Passchendaele position which was to be concerned in the forthcoming attack. The Regiment followed its advance parties in motor-lorries, and reached the allotted point about midday. At 5 p.m. the 2nd Battalion assembled fully equipped, and moved forward to take over the sector held by the 148th Brigade on the right half of the Divisional front. The new sector extended from Peter Pan in the north to the Ravebeek in the south, and was approximately 2,000 yards due west of Passchendaele. Relief was completed by 2 a.m. on the 11th, and Battalion Headquarters and the Regimental Aid Post were established at Waterloo Farm. The 1st Battalion had left "Y" Camp an hour later, and during the night of the 10th took up positions in rear of the 2nd Battalion. Command of the new sector passed from the 49th Division to the New Zealand Division at 10 a.m. on the 11th.

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The dispositions of the troops of the 2nd Infantry Brigade on the completion of reliefs were as follows:—The 2nd Battalion of Otago Regiment in the front line, with rear troops on the line Boethoek-Boetleer; the 1st Battalion of Otago next in rear on the line Delva Farm-Schuler Farm; the 1st Battalion of Canterbury on the line Capricorn Keep-Pommern Castle; the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury in the old German front and support line, south of the Wieltje Road. At 3 p.m. on the 11th a conference of Commanding Officers was held at the Capitol (advanced Brigade Battle Headquarters) in regard to the impending attack.

The success achieved in the British attack on October 4th against the enemy strongholds on the line of the ridge east of Zonnebeke had marked a definite stage in the operations entered upon. A line had been established along the main ridge for a distance of 9,000 yards from the starting point near Mount Sorrel. The breaking of the weather and the consequent difficulties of movement made it doubtful, however, whether the remainder of the programme could be accomplished before the winter finally set in. The state of the ground, as a result of the continued heavy weather and persistent shelling, was daily becoming worse, and was to prove a terrible handicap in regard to both our preparations and the attack itself. Nevertheless, the Ypres Offensive was persisted in. On the morning of October 9th the British renewed the assault on a front of over six miles, from a point east of Zonnebeke to the junction with the French north-west of Langemarck. On the left the French prolonged the area of battle to a point opposite Draaibank, and on the right of the British main attack minor operations were undertaken east and south-east of Polygone Wood. Only a measure of success was achieved, and at many points the losses were severe. Arrangements were immediately made for a renewal of the offensive on October 12th. On this occasion the attack was launched between the Ypres-Roulers railway and Houthulst Forest. It progressed along the spurs and higher ground, but the valleys of the streams which ran westward from the main ridge, and which were overlooked by formidable enemy defences, proved impassable. It was in this operation that the Regiment was to become tragically involved.

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page 209

The obscurity which temporarily prevailed as a result of the unsatisfactory issue in the attack launched on October 9th, and the absence of any definite information on the situation until 3 p.m. on the following day, afforded New Zealand Divisional Headquarters but limited time in which to decide on the tape-line for the attack of the 12th; for the drafting and issuing of orders; for the commanders concerned to make the necessary vital preparations, and for artillery barrage tables to be formulated. There were other stupendous difficulties which the brevity of the warning seriously accentuated.

In accordance with orders issued on the evening of October 10th the offensive was to be renewed on the morning of the 12th by the Second Army (which embraced the New Zealand Division), together with the Fifth Army on our left. Attended by the measure of success which was hoped for, the operation was to place us in complete possession of the Passchendaele Ridge and the village of Passchendaele itself. The New Zealand Division, which had on its right the 3rd Australian Division, and on its left the 9th Division of the Fifth Army, was to attack with two Brigades disposed side by side, the 2nd Infantry Brigade being on the right and the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade on the left, with the 4th Infantry Brigade in Divisional reserve. The direction of the attack was north-easterly, and the width of the 2nd Brigade front approximately 750 yards. The right of the Brigade boundary, commencing at its base, followed the course of the Ravebeek, the western edge of Graf Wood, and the northern outskirts of Passchendaele village; the left boundary extended from Peter Pan (exclusive to the Brigade) in practically a straight line north-east to the Passchendaele-Westroosebeke Road about 250 yards beyond the Vindictive Cross Roads. The Brigade was to attack on a one battalion frontage in depth in the following order:—(a) 2nd Battalion of Otago; (b) 1st Battalion of Otago; (c) 1st Battalion of Canterbury, with one company of the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury attached. The three objectives to be captured and consolidated were allotted in that order. Within the Brigade boundaries, the first of these, known as the Red Line, extended from the Ravebeek on the right across the Bellevue Spur to the left; the second, known as the Blue Line, was approximately 1,000 yards in advance of page 210 the first objective; the third and final objective comprised the Green Dotted and Green Lines. The first of the two final lines was approximately 1,000 yards in advance of the Blue Line, and extended from the northern outskirts of Passchendaele village, at a point near the Westroosebeke Road, in the direction of Venture Farm on the left; the second followed a parallel course about 250 yards ahead.

At zero hour the 2nd Battalion of Otago, the leading assaulting formation, was to move forward to the attack on a three-company frontage; the 1st Battalion of Otago, in similar order, was to leap-frog the leading troops on the Red Line, followed by the 1st Battalion of Canterbury on a two-company frontage. When the 1st Battalion of Otago had reached the second or Blue Line, Canterbury was to push forward to the final objective. The 2nd Battalion of Canterbury (less one company detached) constituted the Brigade reserve, and was to follow in the wake of and if necessary assist the two Battalions of Otago. Provision was also made for sending forward 12 machine guns to assist in consolidating the final objective. Prepared and issued almost on the eve of the attack, these were the dispositions of the troops of the 2nd Brigade for an operation which, as a review of the situation will disclose, was already foredoomed to failure.

When the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment proceeded to take over the line from the Ravebeek to Peter Pan on the night of the 10th, a desperate state of affairs revealed itself. The whole countryside, under the continuous rain and heavy shelling, was rapidly approaching the state of a deep morass through which the relieving troops blindly floundered in the darkness of night until they reached the position which was only nominally a front fine. There was overwhelming and gruesome evidence of the disastrous results of the British attack launched on the 9th. To say nothing of the dead, scores of men, wounded and near to death, still lay out over the country, unattended and without protection from the weather. The 148th Brigade, so heavy were its losses, had apparently found it impossible to cope with the task of clearing the wounded. At Waterloo Farm the congestion was such that many of the wounded were still lying above ground and in the open, and frequently enemy shells burst among or near them and put an end to their miseries. There page 211 were probably 200 stretcher cases lying over the area, and it was doubtful if any of them had been fed until our troops provided them with rations on the morning of the 11th. The urgent necessity of clearing these wounded and the large number of stretcher cases at Waterloo Farm, and elsewhere, was pointed out to Brigade by Lieut.-Colonel Smith (Commanding the 2nd Battalion of Otago), in view of possible congestion on the 12th, and at the same time it was strongly advised that a large number of stretcher relays be held in readiness in connection with our own impending attack. This, serious enough in itself, reveals only one phase of the situation.

The enemy defences along the slopes and high ground of Bellevue Spur, which struck westward from the main Passchen-daele Ridge, had not suffered materially from the attack delivered on October 9th. Rather was the enemy strengthened in his belief as to their impregnability. The seriousness of the position which confronted Otago on taking over the line overlooked by Bellevue Spur was disclosed, or rather confirmed, by an exhaustive reconnaissance made during the night of the 10th and the early morning of the 11th by that redoubtable fellow, Sergt. Travis. No Man's Land was a mass of shell-holes three parts filled with water, and scattered among them were broken wire entanglements. Overlooking this waste, and commanding approximately 1,000 yards of the valley and the country as far back almost as Korek, were many concrete "pill-boxes," or block-houses, hemmed in by wire. At least six of these were discovered along the front of the Battalion sector, four in front of 8th Company, and two in front of 14th Company. Parties of the enemy, numbering from 12 to 20, could be seen going towards two of the block-houses in front of our lines, suggesting that some of the garrison sheltered or slept in them by day and by night took up position in groups to form the front line. The enemy, who overlooked our lines from a gradually sloping spur, was distant only 100 to 150 yards from our forward posts, and the volume of machine gun and rifle fire at night would indicate that his positions were strongly held. The block-houses which the reconnaissance disclosed were still intact; the belts of wire which surrounded them still uncut. The information obtained was despatched to Brigade by Lieut.-Colonel Smith at 5.30 on the morning of the 11th, and page 212 a request made that the fire of our heavy artillery should at once be brought to bear on them. Nothing followed; and so a further urgent request was made in the afternoon. After a lengthy period of time the heavy artillery opened out on the Bellevue Spur, but only briefly, and the damage done was negligible. This fatal remissness will be referred to later. At intervals throughout the day small parties of the enemy could be seen moving about in the village of Passchendaele, all dressed in fighting order. Under the Red Cross flag German wounded were being carried from "pill-boxes" opposite our front, there being six men to each stretcher, a grim forecast of events in our own line, where the ground was in an even worse state. At 4 p.m. a further report had been forwarded from the 2nd Battalion to Brigade Headquarters in reference to the condition of the Ravebeek, No Man's Land, and the enemy's wire and block-houses.

It is now necessary to turn to the artillery side of preparations for the attack, and the difficulties which beset them. The New Zealand Field Artillery arrived in the Ypres zone during the latter part of September, when the whole of the area taken over at St. Julien was found to be water-logged and in a general condition of wreckage. Positions and communications called for the expenditure of unceasing labour to bring them to anything like the required condition. The Divisional Artillery took part in the attack delivered on October 4th, and when the Infantry were relieved continued in line. Orders were then issued for a readjustment of artillery groups, but in attempting to move forward many of the guns were stranded. Weather and traffic had made the one road forward to Gravenstafel, torn as it already was by shelling, practically impassable. Ammunition supply could be maintained only by pack-mules, and stranded guns were hauled off the road and got into action where they were. The Divisional Artillery joined in the unsuccessful attack launched on October 9th, supporting the 49th Division. An endeavour was then made to move some of the guns to positions near Winnipeg-Kansas cross-roads, but was attended by only partial success. The roads were submerged in mud and strewn with the wreckage of transport and the mutilated bodies of men and horses, the result of the shelling of the previous night. These were some of the desperate conditions page 213 against which the Artillery had to contend. The result was that only a proportion of the guns were in position for the attack fixed for the 12th, and those that were got up in face of stupendous difficulties sank down to their axles immediately they commenced to fire, or before it. Adequate support from the artillery, so vital to the assaulting infantry, was in consequence not forthcoming.

The day preceding the attack was extremely, almost ominously, quiet. The great belts of enemy wire ahead were apparent to the most casual observer. At 3 p.m. final orders and instructions for the operation were issued by Brigade. In order to ensure that the leading waves should start in correct alignment and at a safe margin of distance from the creeping barrage, it was arranged to tape a line running from the Ravebeek on the right, where the Australian Division joined up, to Peter Pan on the left; all posts in advance of that line to be withdrawn a distance of 50 yards a quarter of an hour before zero. The laying out of this tape line was commenced by Major McCrae and 2nd-Lieut. Halliwell at 11 p.m. on the 11th, and completed about 4 a.m. on the 12th. Owing to the impassability of the Ravebeek, which ran at the foot of the Bellevue Spur, and the impracticability of effecting a crossing by the temporary duck-board bridge in reasonable time during daylight, this had to be done over-night; and three Battalions were thus assembled across an area which was approximately only 100 yards in depth, creating serious, though unavoidable, congestion. Actual assembly for the attack commenced early on the evening of the 11th, and was continued throughout the night, every unit being in position before daybreak on the 12th. In view of the state of the ground, it was decided that the three machine gun sections of the No. 2 Machine Gun Company, which were to be employed for purposes of assisting consolidation on the completion of the attack, should move up as far as possible during daylight on the 11th in order to reserve the strength of the crews for the following day. Accordingly, they moved forward and dug in on a line between Boethoek and Wimbledon. At 9 p.m. they pushed still further ahead with their 12 guns, the Otago section digging in about 400 yards in advance of Waterloo. Two light trench mortars of the No. 2 Trench Mortar Battery, detailed to support the attack, moved up on page 214 the afternoon of the 11th and assembled in shell-holes on the western slopes of Abraham Heights. Two other trench mortars which had succeeded in obtaining only 33 rounds were blown up by shell fire half an hour before zero, and had to be withdrawn. The night prior to the attack was fine at the outset, but during the early hours of the morning a heavy drizzle set in. The enemy was obviously jumpy during the hours of darkness, and used many flares.

The dispositions of the 2nd Battalion of Otago, which comprised the leading wave, across the Brigade frontage of approximately 750 yards, were as follows:—10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Major W. W. Turner, on the right; 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Lieut. G. B. Knight, in the centre; 14th (South Otago) Company, commanded by Lieut. J. O. Webber, on the left; 4th (Otago) Company, commanded by Captain H. S. Sanson, in support. Two companies of the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury were attached as a reserve of strength. The 1st Battalion of Otago, with one company of the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury attached, had previously moved up to the line Otto Farm-Gravenstafel Road, and at dusk on the evening of the 11th advanced to positions within 100 yards of the Ravebeek. Its dispositions were then as follows:—4th (Otago) Company, commanded by Captain G. H. Allan, on the right; 8th (Southland) Company, commanded by Captain R. H. Nicholson, in the centre; 10th (North Otago) Company, commanded by Captain S. C. Greer, on the left; 14th (South Otago) Company, commanded by Captain C. H. Molloy, in Battalion reserve.

The assaulting waves of infantry were to move forward to the attack behind the protection of artillery barrages, and normally, exclusive of heavy guns and heavy and medium howitzers, the operation would have been supported by 144 18-pounders, and 48 4.5in. howitzers. The difficulties of complying with the demands of the prepared programme of artillery co-operation were so great that there could not be ensured even the efficient support of anything approaching that number of guns—probably less than half.

The Headquarters of all four Battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade were established at Waterloo Farm an hour before zero, but owing to the severing of connections by page 215 shelling through-communication to Brigade Battle-Headquarters at the Capitol was not obtained until about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 12th. For various reasons the preparatory signalling arrangements were anything but complete.

Throughout the night of the 11th-12th the enemy frequently shelled the Division on our right, using many gas-shells. The conditions affecting our infantry, about to attack in the morning, were the worst possible. The task of getting into positions of assembly, in face of darkness and over ground that was sodden and yielding and literally torn with shell-holes, and then lying over night in what was for the most part a morass, combined with a certain knowledge of the great difficulties of the task ahead, presaged a bad start for an attack at daybreak.