Battle of St. Quentin.

It is necessary to briefly review the situation which obtained on the Western Front at the beginning of 1918. Russia had ceased to exist as an active belligerent Power on the side of the Allies, and the transfer of German and Austrian Divisions from the Russian to the Western Theatre of War had already commenced. This gave the enemy a definite numerical superiority. The American Army to come was in a mere stage of development. Consequent upon these events, the British Army set itself a policy of defence; but there were certain considerations which tended to limit this defensive policy. In January, 1918, after protracted deliberations, the British relieved the French of about 28 miles of front, and with this extension to the right the British Army was holding a front which stretched over a distance of approximately 125 miles. The exhausting operations conducted at the close of 1917 had seriously drained the strength of the Army, and when the German blow fell in March, 1918, it would seem that the British Army was still deficient of the necessary reserve of strength.

Certain it was that the enemy was about to launch a formidable offensive. Frequent air reconnaissances indicated that communications by road and rail were being extended, and that great ammunition and supply dumps were being established in rear of the whole enemy front from Flanders to the Oise. In his Despatch covering events of that period, Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies, stated that on the 19th March his Intelligence Department reported that the final stages of the enemy's preparations for an offensive on the Arras-St. Quentin front were approaching completion, and that from information obtained it was probable the actual attack would be launched on March 20th page 273 or 21st. "On our side," he added, "our dispositions were as complete as the time and troops available could make them."

The Armies holding the front affected were the Fifth and the Third. The front of the Fifth Army, at that stage commanded by General Sir H. Gough, extended from the junction with the French, just south of Barisis, to north of Gouzeaucourt, a distance of about 42 miles. The Third Army, under the command of General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng, held a front of approximately 27 miles, from north of Gouzeaucourt, to south of Gavrelle.

The great German Offensive was launched on March 21st on a front of about 54 miles; and on March 28th extended northwards until from La Fere to beyond Gavrelle about 63 miles of our original front were involved. According to estimates, a total of 73 German divisions were engaged against the Third and Fifth Armies and the right of the First Army, and were opposed in the first instance by 22 British infantry divisions in line, with 12 infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions in close reserve. Additional reserves were hurriedly collected from other parts of the front, once the enemy's intentions became known. Before the end of March a further eight British divisions had been brought south and committed to the battle, and by April 9th an additional four divisions had arrived.

The opening of the German attack was signalled at 5 o'clock on the morning of March 21st by a bombardment of terrible intensity with gas and high explosive shells from guns of all calibres directed along the front and back areas of the Fifth and Third Armies from the Oise to the Scarpe River. Heavy bombardments on other parts of the Western Front broke out simultaneously. Shortly after 9 o'clock the infantry assault had been launched along the whole of the selected front. Following upon this terrific artillery preparation, and under cover of a dense fog, great masses of German infantry swept forward to the attack, completely overwhelmed the British foremost defences and advanced field guns, and by midday had reached the first line of battle positions on almost the whole front of the attack. The most desperate resistance was unavailing against this avalanche. Attack followed upon attack, and a break-page 274through by the enemy at one point imperilled the position and compelled a withdrawal at another. The offensive was renewed with equal determination on the 22nd, and despite heavy losses inflicted on the enemy at short range, the British had again to give ground under the weight of the onslaught. By the evening of the second day of the battle, the enemy had penetrated to the third zone of defence at several points. The whole of the resources at the command of the Fifth Army had already been committed to the fight, and a withdrawal to the bridgeheads east of the Somme was inevitable.

On the morning of the 23rd the Fifth Army Commander, in order to avoid almost certain defeat by committing his exhausted divisions to an engagement with fresh and vastly superior numbers, decided to continue the withdrawal to the west bank of the Somme. Retractions were also necessary on the front of the Third Army; and at the junction of the two Armies the position became critical. One result of these retirements was that divisions and brigades lost touch, and with the enemy, now flushed with success, maintaining an incessant pressure, the rearward movement continued. The days of the 24th and 25th were equally disastrous. On the 24th the III. Corps (the right Corps of the Fifth Army) passed under the command of the French Third Army, and French troops were coming rapidly to its assistance. On the 25th the situation over the front of the Third Army had improved, and there were hopes that the enemy would be stopped north of the Somme and the line of the Ancre held. South of the Somme there was more cause for anxiety. The troops had reached a state of almost complete exhaustion; and it was not to be wondered at that serious demoralisation and disorganisation had set in.

On the night of the 25th orders were given that in the event of the enemy continuing his attacks in strength, the divisions affected should fall back to the approximate line Le Quesnoy-Rosieres-Proyart, and the Fifth Army link up with the right of the Third Army at Bray. The enemy did resume his assaults on the morning of the 26th, south-westwards and westwards from Nesle, also about Hattencourt, in the neighbourhood of the St. Quentin-Amiens Road, and at Herbecourt. The withdrawal accordingly commenced and page 275 the new line was taken up. North of the Somme the situation was becoming more settled, although a dangerous gap existed between the V. and IV. Corps of the Third Army, over the area between Hamel and Puisieux. It was into this gap that the New Zealand Division, which had travelled by rail and forced march from the north, was thrown, definitely arresting the enemy's advance about Colincamps and Beaumont Hamel, and then quickly hurling him back from the high ground which gave him observation far to our rear. It was on the 26th of March that General Foch assumed supreme command of the Allied Forces on the Western Front.

On the 27th, again attacking in great strength against the greater part of the Fifth Army front and against the French, the enemy continued to gain ground. An unfortunate retirement to beyond the Bray-sur-Somme-Albert line on the previous day precipitated a withdrawal further south, and the great railway junction of Amiens, towards which the German wedge had been driven to a depth of over 40 miles from the starting point, became imperilled. At the close of the day of the 27th the approximate line held at this point was the defence of Amiens. On the 28th the enemy renewed his attacks with great violence, notably from Puisieux to north-east of Arras, which represented an extension of the original front so far as the northern flank was concerned. While gaining ground at many points, the Germans failed to achieve the dramatic successes of the preceding days. The great force was expending itself, and the resistance was becoming more durable. Two further efforts, the first on April 4th, south of the Somme, and the second on April 5th, north of the Somme, were no more successful. The stupendous Battle of St. Quentin was at an end.

Ordered South.

On March 21st the New Zealand Division, then in XXII. Corps reserve, received orders to be prepared to move south as G.H.Q. Reserve. On the 23rd orders were issued for the Division to commence entraining at Hopoutre, Godewaers-velde, Caestre, and Cassel, to detrain at St. Pol, Frevent, and Petit Houvin, and then to concentrate in the Third Army page 276 area at Le Cauroy, 12 miles east of Arras, and to come under the command of the XVII. Corps. Early on the morning of the 22nd the Regiment left Moulle, and returned in motor lorries to its former areas, the 1st Battalion to Caestre, and the 2nd Battalion to Hondeghem. Shortages in ammunition and equipment were at once made up, and final preparations completed for the move. On the 24th the original movement order was cancelled and the Division was diverted to the Fifth Army area. This involved detraining at Corbie, Edge-hill, and Mericourt, and concentrating in the Bray area, under the command of the VII. Corps, but still in G.H.Q. Reserve. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major J. Hargest, M.C., entrained with first line transport at Caestre at 11 p.m. on the 24th; the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieut. Colonel D. Colquhoun, D.S.O., after marching from Hondeghem, entrained at the same point by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th. Departure was made immediately entraining was completed.

The fluctuations of battle and the ever-changing situation necessitated fresh orders, and at 1 a.m. on the 25th the detraining stations were altered to Hangest, Ally, and St. Rock, in consequence of the railway to Amiens being damaged; and the concentration area to Mericourt l'Abbe, Morlancourt, and Dernancourt. Packs and blankets were to be left at or near the detraining stations under a guard; ammunition was to be brought up to 220 rounds per man; and that for Lewis and Vickers guns up to the maximum carrying capacity of the limber teams. The Regiment detrained at Hangest after a cramped and cold journey of 16 hours. The 1st Battalion formed up on the road, and after marching as far as Picquigny all surplus gear was dumped. The Battalion moved forward again in battle order of dress in the direction of Amiens, and when darkness set in, halted and slept in abandoned motor-lorries drawn up on the roadside. The 2nd Battalion, also in fighting order, moved out of Hangest at 8 p.m., and bivouacked for the night near Brielly, with the sky for a covering.

At a late hour on the night of the 25th further orders were received that the Division was to march by the Hedauville-Mailly Maillet-Puisieux Road, and fill the gap between Hamel and Puisieux-au-Mont, the Division to come under the IV. Corps of the Third Army. Orders were accordingly page 277 at once issued to direct all troops and transport of the Division to Hedauville, which was to be the new concentration area.

The Regiment was on the move again early on the morning of the 26th, and before midday passed through the outskirts of Amiens, headed by its Regimental Bands. The sweeping and destructive nature of the German advance and the startling depths to which it had penetrated, had some time since become tragically evident. Throughout the previous night there had been a constant stream of motor-lorries and ambulances speeding westward with refugees and wounded men; and on this day the roads were choked with the swell of guns and transport, the stragglers of broken regiments, peasants with their primitive wagons conveying a few cherished effects and their sobbing women; others, old men and women and children, struggling woefully along on foot, anon glancing back in terror at their burning homes and the smashing of high-explosive and incendiary shells among the ruins—a human stream driven to none knew where by the fury and the ruthlessness of war.

The 1st Battalion, continuing its march through Pont-Noyelles and Franvillers, reached the area of Hedauville at 8 p.m., and awaiting battle instructions, bivouacked in the open without covering through a bitterly cold night. The Battalion had accomplished the gallant performance of a 27 miles forced march without a single man falling out, which must stand as a record for the Division. The 2nd Battalion, after reaching Pont-Noyelles, completed the journey to Hedauville by motor lorries, and was also compelled to pass the greater part of the night lying in the open fields. At 11.30 p.m. orders were received to be in readiness to move at 1 a.m. on the 27th.

New Zealand Divisional Headquarters had opened at Hedauville at 1.30 a.m. on the 26th. At 2 a.m. a conference was held and a plan for an attack on Serre decided upon.

The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Brigade was to move at 8 a.m., and take up an outpost position on the Englebelmer-Auchonvillers Ridge, and secure the right flank of the main advance of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, which were to bridge the gap between the left of the 12th Division at Hamel and the right of the 62nd Division at Puisieux-au-page 278Mont. The objective of the 2nd Brigade extended from Hamel, inclusive, where touch was to be gained with the 12th Division, northwards through "Y" Ravine to a point about 1,000 yards north-east of Beaumont-Hamel, That of the 1st Brigade was firstly a prolongation of that line due north for a distance of 1,000 yards; and secondly a line extending from in rear of the first line north-west to Serre where it was to be further extended to get into touch with the 62nd Division at Puisieux-au-Mont. In the event of the enemy being met in greatly superior numbers, his advance was to be checked, and the Brigades concerned were to manoeuvre so as to gain and hold the line Colincamps-Hebuterne. To assist in this movement the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade was to be prepared to occupy a line in continuation of that held by its 1st Battalion on the Englebelmer Auchonvillers Ridge. The definitely affirmed principle on which these operations were based was that whatever the development of the enemy offensive, the New Zealand Division was to set itself as an impassable barrier to the German onslaught. How valiantly and with what splendid determination it gave effect to that principle will be realised in the course of the succeeding passages.

At 8.30 a.m. the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Brigade moved forward from Hedauville, and at 10 a.m. reported Englebelmer and Auchonvillers to be occupied by various British troops. An hour later contact was made with the enemy 500 yards east of Auchonvillers, where German patrols were engaged and driven in. The left flank of the advanced guard encountered the enemy in considerable strength at the sunken road south of the Sugar Factory; and although the right and centre platoons of the left outpost company succeeded in establishing posts after slight opposition, fighting continued on the left. At 11.45 a.m. the left platoon became hotly engaged with superior numbers of the enemy, some 300 of whom had taken up a position extending from Euston Corner on the left, past the Sugar Factory, to Kilometre Lane on the right, with additional troops advancing along the Serre Road. The villages of Martinsart and Mesnil were found to be occupied by troops of the 12th Division; while troops of the 17th Division held the Auchonvillers-Hamel Road near the latter village.

By 12 noon on the 26th five infantry battalions and two machine gun companies had assembled at Hedauville. The motor-lorry arrangements had proved inadequate throughout; and as with the 1st Battalion of Otago, several units had to march the whole distance from the detraining station. The result was that the concentration of the Division was greatly impeded; and units had to be sent into action irrespective of the Brigade to which they belonged. At 12 noon the 2nd Brigade, less two battalions, followed by the 1st Brigade, less three battalions, and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, moved forward from Hedauville through Mailly Maillet, and proceeded to put into execution the plan of attack above referred to.

Further enemy penetrations necessitated slight alterations in the original plans; but the attack was not launched on the left until 4.30 p.m. Fourteen whippet tanks, which had reached the vicinity of Colincamps on the previous night, successfully operated on this flank. On the right the attack reached its objective, but on the left it was held up by heavy machine gun fire from the ridge overlooking Colin-camps. There was also a gap between the left flank and the right of the 4th Australian Brigade, which on the evening of the 26th had been ordered to fill the breach between Colincamps and Hebuterne to the north. A total of 50 prisoners and 16 machine guns were captured during the operation; our casualties amounted to 150, of which the majority were walking cases. The night was spent in consolidating the ground gained and in maintaining touch with the enemy.

By 6.30 p.m. on the 26th further battalions of the Division had arrived at Hedauville after stiff marching. Orders were now given for troops to move at 1 a.m. on the 27th, to close the gap along the Sugar Factory-Hebuterne Road, and connect with the Australians, attached to the 62nd Division, at Hebuterne. Accordingly, at one o'clock on the morning of the 27th the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, less three battalions, with the 2nd Battalions of Otago and Wellington, and one Machine Gun Company, moved out from Hedauville, Otago troops leading. This force proceeded through Mailly Maillet to Colincamps, where the 2nd Battalion of Otago Regiment put out a screen covering the eastern side of Colin-page 280camps and the remainder of the Brigade. At dawn the 2nd Battalion of Wellington on the right and the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade on the left moved forward to close the breach referred to between the 1st New Zealand Infantry Brigade at about Euston Corner and the 4th Australian Brigade at Hebuterne.

Opposition from enemy machine guns was immediately met with; though there was no shell fire. On the left the advance was rapidly pushed home, the objective reached at 6.30 a.m., and touch gained with the Australians on the outskirts of Hebuterne. On the right, however, heavy machine gun fire was again met with from the ridge in front of La Signy Farm and overlooking Colincamps; but the centre being unable to advance further, dug in on a line 300 yards west of the Sugar Factory-Hebuterne Road. In the course of these operations 42 prisoners were captured. During the day the enemy delivered four successive attacks against the line at various points. Three of these were effectively driven off, though not without difficulty; and the fourth, the last of the day, necessitated a slight retraction immediately north of Euston Corner. There was considerable movement of hostile troops across the Divisional front; and it being fully expected, that the enemy would renew his attacks in the morning, orders were issued for preparations to meet such a contingency.

On the afternoon of the 27th four 18-pounder batteries and one 4.5in. howitzer battery of the New Zealand Divisional Artillery had arrived in the area, and after concentrating at Hedauville moved into position near Mailly Maillet.

The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment, having effected its purpose in the attack launched on the morning of the 27th was during the evening withdrawn from the front of Colincamps, and occupied the newly-constructed Purple Line in rear in a series of posts, with Battalion Headquarters in the orchard near Courcelles.

Holding the Line.

On the morning of the same day the 1st Battalion of the Regiment moved forward from its point of bivouac near Hedauville, through Mailly Maillet, and took up a line in page break

Lieut. Colonel James Hargest, D.S.O., M.C., (d.), [f.]

page break

Lewis Gunners of the Regiment in Support Position near Mailly Maillet.
N.Z. Official Photograph.

page break page 281 relief of the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, extending along the ridge in front of Englebelmer and Mailly Maillet, and along the east and north-east of Auchonvillers, representing a total frontage of approximately 3,000 yards. These positions were maintained over the 28th, when the enemy artillery, apparently searching for our batteries which had now taken up positions in the villages in rear, became much more pronounced in its activity. It was during this shelling of Colincamps that the Headquarters of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were destroyed, and Brigadier-General Fulton and Major R. G. Purdy were killed and others of the Staff wounded.

Minor attacks were made during the day by the left Brigade in line of the Division; the main success achieved being the capture of the Quarries, immediately south of Hebuterne, a position which commanded a field of fire in a south-easterly direction for a distance of about 3,000 yards. At all points of the line tested the enemy was found to be holding it in strength; and considerable movement was reported to be still taking place across the Divisional front. The weather, hitherto fine, now showed indications of breaking; and in view of the fact that great coats and blankets had been dumped during the forced march from the north, the prospect was not very cheerful.

On the morning of March 29th orders were issued to the 1st Battalion of the Regiment to relieve the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury in the front line of the left sub-sector of the 2nd Brigade. Relief commenced at 9 p.m., and was completed by one o'clock the following morning. The position taken over extended north and south, with Auchonvillers in the immediate rear and the site of the village of Beaumont-Hamel to the front. The trenches comprised those of the old British front line before the Somme Offensive of 1916, which though in a moderate state of repair when first taken over, reached a deplorable condition when the weather broke. The front line and communication trenches then fell in badly, and drainage was difficult or impossible. Sentries stood at their posts for two and sometimes four hours during the night thigh-deep in mud and water, and when relieved, indifferent to all else but sleep, crawled exhausted into filthy, shallow holes scooped out of the slime of the parapet. With the exception of one or two dug-outs which were in a dangerous page 282state of collapse, the system contained no shelters. Wrapped in an old bag or blanket or dead German's ground-sheet, unshaven, and caked with mud and filth, men lumbered heavily along the trenches by night or lay huddled in these holes in the ground, more resembling beasts than human beings. The written impressions of a French correspondent during a visit by night to a front line trench fairly describe the conditions obtaining in this unwholesome place. "A sinuous ditch bottomed with mud, and foul with human refuse. There are holes in its sides from which as you lean over there comes a foul breath. Misty, shadowy things are emerging from these side caverns, and moving about in shapeless bulk like bears that shamble and growl. They are the squad." With the substitution of the word platoon for squad, the description stands.

So passed several days, with no change in the outlook, except with the rum issue in the early morning, when for a space of five or ten minutes more optimism, more pugnacity, and more grim humour were exhibited than in the whole of the preceding 24 hours. The ration carrying parties, drawn from the support platoons, soon found it impossible to struggle along the communication trenches, and finally took a course over the open. The trenches on the enemy's side were obviously in the same terrible state; and for a time it seemed as if a mutual understanding existed on the point that ration parties would not be fired upon from either side, until this limited form of armistice was abruptly terminated when a German carrying some sheets of iron attempted to avail himself of the same privilege, and was shot by one of our sentries.

At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th a minor operation was carried out by troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade, one Battalion of the 3rd Brigade co-operating, with a view to improving the line and gaining better observation. The objective aimed at was the line of the hedge from near the Serre Road on the right to a point about 1,000 yards to the left, which was also the line of the ridge overlooking La Signy Farm. The flanking Battalions were to conform to the movement. The main attack met with instant success; and it was only over a short stretch on the left that the enemy held his ground behind heavy machine (gun fire. This pocket page 283 was cleared on the following morning, and the new front, affording good observation over a wide stretch of country, was consolidated. The captures in this highly successful operation were 290 prisoners, five light minenwerfer guns, and the extraordinary total of 110 machine guns. Over 200 enemy dead were counted on the front attacked. Our casualties amounted to 43 killed and 100 wounded. The presence of such a surprising number of machine guns over the front attacked served to indicate one of the phases of the tactics employed by the enemy during his offensive; which was to push forward machine guns with great boldness to successive commanding points, and under cover of their sustained fire, allow the infantry to filter through and encircle their objective. The attack on the 30th was delivered behind a protective barrage, and almost immediately our artillery had opened fire considerable numbers of the enemy left their trenches and scampered over the face of the ridge in rear of their line. These were engaged by Lewis gun and rifle fire from Otago's sector, and there was little doubt that many casualties were inflicted. At 6.15 p.m. the enemy opened a heavy bombardment over our sector, evidently in retaliation for the 1st Brigade's success.

At this stage there were several changes in commands. On the 28th Lieut.-Colonel D. Colquhoun, D.S.O., proceeded to the United Kingdom on duty, prior to leaving for New Zealand. On the 30th Major W. G. A. Bishop, M.C., left the 1st Battalion to take over command of the 2nd Battalion. Captain R. Fraser assumed command of 8th Company, vice Major Bishop; Captain J. P. Hewat was wounded and evacuated, and command of 10th Company fell to Captain D. J. Walls. Major Hargest, commanding the 1st Battalion of Otago, was a few days later granted the temporary rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

Our artillery was now becoming more firmly established along the Divisional front, and as the difficulties, at first very acute, of obtaining adequate supplies of ammunition were overcome, hostile movement was subjected to harassing fire. On the other hand the enemy was undoubtedly utilising captured British guns as well as the great ammunition dumps that had been left in his possession; immediate and unpleasant proof being afforded of the effectiveness of our own artillery page 284weapons. Some of these abandoned guns could still be observed on the ridge in front, repeated efforts by the enemy to get them away to a less prominent position being ultimately successful.

On April 1st, the last day of the Battalion's tour, a daring daylight incursion into the enemy's lines was carried out by Major Hargest and Corporal R. Marshall, of 8th Company. This patrol proceeded out from the left of 8th Company's sector, and worked its way for a distance of 300 yards along a communication trench leading to the enemy's lines. A number of other communication trenches were successfully reconnoitred, until a block was reached. Here an enemy sentry was caught unawares and shot. The patrol then moved a considerable distance further ahead, and finally returned safely to our lines after having accomplished a daring and useful reconnaissance of the enemy's area.

On being relieved by night by the 2nd Battalion of Canterbury, Otago moved out of this area of mud and filth to support positions in front of Auchonvillers, Englebelmer, and Mailly Maillet, previously occupied. The extreme darkness of the night, the heavy going, and the unfamiliar country, made the relief an arduous operation, and daylight had broken before some of the companies had settled down. Under such conditions the carrying out of a relief was more to be dreaded than the actual garrisoning of the line. During the strenuous tour just completed, the 1st Battalion sustained casualties to the number of two killed and 34 wounded.

Throughout this period the 2nd Battalion had been contending with the same difficulties of mud and movement, and enemy activity. On March 29th it moved from the Purple Line and relieved the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Brigade as reserve to the 2nd Brigade, the companies being disposed in bivouacs in rear of Englebelmer. On the night of the 30th the Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of Canterbury in the front line between "Y" Ravine and Hamel, on the extreme right of the Divisional sector. The conditions there were no better than those experienced by the 1st Battalion. The trenches were deplorably muddy, there was an almost entire absence of shelters; and owing to the great length of front held the posts were very scattered, even with the four companies in line and one platoon of each in close support. page 285 The enemy frequently harassed the garrison with trench mortar fire; and although the tour was comparatively brief, it was by no means free of hardships. On the night of April 3rd, when the reorganising of the Divisional front on a two-brigade frontage was commenced and part of the northern extremity near Hebuterne was taken over by the 4th Australian Brigade, the Battalion was relieved and moved back to positions at Englebelmer, There was a considerable increase in enemy artillery activity on April 4th. The village of Englebelmer was consistently shelled, and companies were forced under stress of casualties to quit some of their bivouacs. This was but a prelude to much more furious events.

The Enemy Held.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of April 5th the enemy commenced an artillery bombardment which must rank as one of the heaviest and most sustained the Regiment ever experienced. It extended along the whole Divisional front; and from guns of all calibres shells were poured down over the forward, support and rear positions as far back as Bus-Ies-Artois and Bertrancourt, almost without interruption from early morning until the late afternoon. It furiously searched every known and likely forward position, and in the back areas batteries and villages and roadways were pounded by guns of the heaviest calibres. Its extraordinary depth and intensity indicated an attempt by the enemy to renew the progress which had been so abruptly stayed a few days previously. It was not long before these attacks developed. At 8.15 a.m. reports were received from the 3rd Brigade that the enemy was attacking from the right of the Serre Road to the left boundary south of the Quarries. The attack was beaten off; but when renewed at 10 a.m. the enemy succeeded in capturing a short length of trench east of La Signy Farm, and the Farm itself, the small garrison of three sections of Rifle Brigade troops who comprised this advanced post being overwhelmed. At no other point did the enemy make any progress, and he suffered very severely from our artillery and machine gun fire, his casualties being estimated at 500 killed. Prisoners captured on the front of the left Brigade stated that their ultimate objective was Colincamps, also that many page 286 new batteries had been brought up for the attack. At 2 p.m. an attack was made against the right of the Divisional sector, but similarly failed, the only party of Germans who reached our line being taken prisoners. Under cover of this sustained bombardment attacks were launched by the enemy during the day along the whole Army front; but nowhere did he achieve more than very local successes. This may be said to have signalled the termination of the great German drive in the Battle of St. Quentin.

The positions occupied by the Regiment in support had to weather the storm of this extraordinary and relentless artillery bombardment, and a large number of casualties were sustained among both officers and men. During the afternoon an enemy two-seater aeroplane was brought down by Lewis gun fire directed from one of the posts occupied by 4th Company of the 1st Battalion, and the pilot and observer made prisoners. Rain commenced to fall late in the afternoon, after which the situation became comparatively quiet.

On April 6th the 1st Battalion of the Regiment received orders to return to the front line and take over the sector previously occupied. As the relief was about to commence, the S.O.S. signal appeared on the left and was repeated along the line. All movement in respect of reliefs was delayed for one hour. No infantry attacks developed, although there was a considerable amount of shelling. In consequence of a misunderstanding some of the relieving troops did not reach the line until a late hour on the following morning. Heavy rain fell almost continuously throughout the night, and the approaches and trenches were in an even worse state than formerly. The tour lasted until the 10th, and during that time the weather was exceedingly stormy, and the conditions under which the garrison maintained the line indescribably bad and exhausting. There were periodical bursts of shelling over our front and support lines, but on the whole not much damage was done. Our own artillery displayed considerable activity over the same period, directing sudden bursts of fire to the enemy's forward and back areas. On the night of the 10th the Battalion was relieved by Canterbury and returned to its old positions of support in front of Auchonvillers, Englebelmer, and Mailly Maillet.

The 2nd Battalion of the Regiment took over its former front line sector, from "Y" Ravine to Hamel, on the night of the 7th. Enemy activity on the 8th was confined to trench mortar fire, but on the following day, between 10 a.m. and 12 noon, the front and support lines were heavily bombarded with high explosive and 77 mm. shells, and during the afternoon low-flying aeroplanes patrolled the system apparently with the object of determining the damage done. Finer weather and improved observation on the 10th disclosed considerable movement of enemy troops and transport over the back areas, suggesting that a relief was in progress. On the night of the 13th the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, and after a long and exhausting journey, at 3 o'clock on the following morning reached its bivouac area in rear of Beaussart and south of Bertrancourt. On the 13th the 1st Battalion moved back to the Purple Line, where it occupied a series of posts extending from Sailly-au-Bois in the north to Courcelles in the south.

The period of exceptional activities in which the Regiment had been engaged as a result of the startling German advance was now at an end. The general situation on the Divisional front had become more settled; and the decisive check which the enemy received on April 5th when he attempted to renew his advance after a terrific artillery preparation, was gradually followed by conditions approaching those of trench-to-trench warfare. The new positions taken up had of course to be established, and new defensive lines constructed in the rear; but as far as the front line defences were concerned the continued broken weather and the consequent deplorable state of the trenches made anything in that direction impossible. The period of rest and training completed in the areas of Caestre and Hondeghem had enabled the Regiment to resist some of the worst conditions of warfare in a remarkable manner, following upon its forced march from the north. Continuous standing in water-logged trenches threatened a serious state of trench feet; but the number of such cases evacuated was actually comparatively few. Casualties from enemy action were, however, heavy, as indicated by the fact that between March 27th and April 5th the total incurred by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment was 11 killed page 288 and 59 wounded, while the 1st Battalion suffered to an even greater extent. The penetration by the enemy to such a great depth over the fronts of two Armies naturally created serious dislocation of the main lines of supply, and the service had to be maintained under the very greatest difficulties. Any shortages of rations experienced by the Regiment, at least over the first several days of the period under review, were met when in support by drawing upon the poultry and vegetables, to say nothing of the contents of the well-stocked wine cellars, left behind by the civilian population in its flight; and oft-times the menu was one of chicken and champagne, topped off with some of the finest liqueurs,—surely great fare under such conditions.

During the period from March 24th to April 14th the New Zealand Division captured a total of 430 prisoners, 127 machine guns, and five trench mortars. The Division's casualties amounted to: Killed—29 officers and 482 other ranks; wounded—97 officers and 1,748 other ranks. This high total affords some indication of the severity of the period.

The Division received the congratulations of the Commander of the IV. Corps for its "courage and endurance." In a communication dated March 28th, General Harper expressed his confidence that the troops of the Division would continue to hold the line against all attacks, and that confidence was not misplaced. For the operations subsequently carried out the Division received the congratulations of the Commander of the Second Army (in which it was formerly incorporated), General Godley (Commanding the XXII. Corps), and General Monash (Commanding the 4th Australian Division).

The Regiment remained but a short time in reserve, but during that period every opportunity was availed of to restore lost vitality. Baths were improvised by the 1st Battalion at Sailly-au-Bois, and by the 2nd Battalion at Bertrancourt; the luxury of a hot tub after five weeks of filth and weariness being something to be remembered. Equipment and clothing were cleaned and repaired, and all possible rest afforded. The new lines of defence constructed along the rear of the Divisional front were reconnoitred by officers and n.c.o.'s, and every opportunity taken to become familiar with the country. Throughout the 15th considerable enemy page break

Brig.-General R. Young, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., (d.), [f.]

page 289 movement was observed at points fronting the Divisional sector, while from the 37th Division on our left similar activity was reported. Special precautions were adopted in view of a possible attack; and on the morning of the 16th our artillery-directed heavy fire over the areas where the enemy concentration had been observed. About this time several officers of the 14th Division of the French Army arrived and effected a reconnaissance of the Purple Line; and at a later date a considerable force of French troops, embracing some of the crack Regiments of that Army, arrived in the area in rear.