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With the Machine Gunners in France and Palestine

Preface

page 15

Preface

In writing this historical record of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, I have had the two-fold task of tracing the operations of the Corps in France and in Sinai and Palestine. A General History of the New Zealand Forces in these campaigns has already been written and published. I have endeavoured in this account to follow the chronology of the General Histories, but to supplement them by giving in greater detail the part the Corps took in the many operations of the campaigns. The narrative is divided into two parts; the first deals with the work of the Machine Gun Companies that served the New Zealand Division in France, and the second deals with the work of the Machine Gun Squadron that served the Anzac Mounted Division in Sinai and Palestine.

Before entering upon the task of describing the exploits of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps, it is perhaps advisable to briefly refer to the Corps' principal weapon, and the organisation of the units that handled it, because it is assumed that some readers will be without this technical knowledge.

It is not an exaggeration to state that the machine gun was the weapon that played the most conspicuous part in the Great War; to it must be allotted the premier place among the death-dealing instruments of modern warfare.

For many years the scientists endeavoured to design a weapon with an automatic action, so that in the hands of one man it could do the work of many men with rifles. A number of weapons were introduced—the American Gatling Gun with ten barrels, and the French Mitrailleuse with twenty-five barrels; but they were found awkward, cumbersome and ineffective.

In 1883, however, Sir Hiram Maxim invented the true automatic gun, which has since borne his name. Although the modern machine gun is a very different weapon to the original, the principle on which it works is exactly the same, namely, the utilisation of the recoil caused by each discharge to extract the empty cartridge from and reload and fire the page 16gun. The maximum rate of fire is now 700 rounds a minute, which exceeds that of fifty expert riflemen.

The machine gun was used in the South African War and the many minor campaigns in which, during the twenty years that preceded the Great War, the British forces were engaged.

The potentialities of the gun were not fully appreciated, nor were its tactical uses properly studied and developed, until after the outbreak of the Great War. The reason of this omission on the part of the British General Staff is probably explained by the fact that the gun had so often failed in critical moments, and was looked upon as unreliable. The fault did not lie with the gun itself, but with the gunners, who had not been sufficiently trained to master the mechanism of such a delicate piece of machinery.

The Germans, however, before the war had realised the potentialities of the gun, and had made great progress in the development of its uses. Their gunners were specially selected and trained men, organised into companies. The company comprising six guns was an easily handled unit, and the whole of its personnel were experts on the gun.

On the other hand, the British Army left its machine guns in sections, divided up among and forming part of the battalions of infantry and regiments of cavalry. A section comprised two guns under a subaltern; there was only one section to a battalion or a regiment. Working as part of a battalion or a regiment the section had very little scope.

The British General Staff realised during the first year of the war that the superiority of the Germans in the number of machine guns and in the tactical handling of them had caused increased casualties to the Allied forces, and had hampered their offensive and defensive operations.

It then set to work to take away that superiority. The task was at once facilitated by the introduction of the Light Vickers gun towards the end of 1915. Prior to this the Maxim had been used; a gun that had reached a state of mechanical reliability in the hands of a thoroughly trained gunner, but had two very serious disadvantages, the weight, and the difficulty of speedily remedying stoppages caused by mechanical defects. The Light Vickers was only half the weight of the Maxim; its mechanism could be mastered by a gunner in a page 17comparatively short time, and was easily capable of adjustment and replacement. Many of the breakdowns that would have required the Maxim to be returned to ordnance for repair could be remedied by the gunner himself in a few minutes.

The first step to gain superiority over the Germans was the establishment of a suitable formation, as it was realised that the study and development of the gun and its tactics could not be efficiently carried out if the section remained merely an infinitesimal unit in a battalion or regiment. The solution was found in the creation of the Machine Gun Corps, comprising companies for service with infantry and squadrons for service with cavalry.

The Company and the Squadron became self-contained units, and were placed on the same footing as a battalion or a regiment

At first three, and later four, companies were allotted to an infantry division, and the same number of squadrons to a cavalry or mounted division, which meant each brigade had a whole company or squadron, and the divisional commander was left with one in reserve. As a general rule the same company or squadron was always attached to a brigade, but for special operations the machine guns were frequently worked independently.

The creation of the Corps was a success from the commencement; the self-contained units were highly mobile, and could without difficulty or delay be moved about to conform with the tactical situation. Officers and men quickly accustomed themselves to the new formation; co-ordinate training brought about a marvellous development, while a fine esprit de corps, the greatest essential in the attainment of military efficiency, spread among all ranks.

It is interesting to note the difference between the old order and the new; under the old order a division of infantry had twenty-four machine guns, divided up in pairs, among the twelve battalions; it was difficult to co-ordinate their working; even when they were brigaded the lack of a permanent administration impaired efficiency. Under the new order the division had sixty-four machine guns, divided among four companies, each company was self-contained and independently mobile, concentrated and well co-ordinated work became practicable; page 18the gunners felt they were part and parcel of the great machine, and not the rag-tail of a battalion; the divisional and brigade commanders were able to take full advantage of every gun at their disposal.

Early in 1918 a further alteration was made in the organisation of the Corps by the establishment of the machine gun battalion, to comprise the four companies of a division, with an independent headquarters. It was considered that the battalion formation would aid the administrative work, and would also facilitate closer co-ordination in the tactical handling of the guns. Although the battalion formation remained until the end of the war and was fully tested, there is not a consensus of opinion among the most experienced machine gun officers that it was an unqualified success.

After the creation of the Corps was decided upon towards the end of 1915, the General Staff's next step towards gaining superiority over the Germans was the extension of machine gun training. A central depot was established at Grantham, England, through which all reinforcements to the companies in France had to pass; General Headquarters Schools were established in the war zones for the purpose of instruction and experiment. A wing was established at Grantham in July, 1916, for training the reinforcements for the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps. Lieut. H. W. Shackleford commanded the wing until Capt. R. D. Hardie took it over in October, 1916. The splendidly trained reinforcements from Grantham that were sent to our companies in France evidenced the excellent training that was carried out in the New Zealand wing. An extension of machine gun training began in the New Zealand training camps in November, 1915, when a special instructional staff under Lieut. L. Potter, N.Z.S.C, was appointed to train recruits in machine gun work. Lieut. Potter was succeeded by Major E. G. Fraser, a South African veteran, who had made a close study of the machine gun before the war, and who had been seriously wounded on Gallipoli. The excellent breaking in that many of the reinforcements received from Major Fraser greatly facilitated the work at Grantham, and enabled the men to be sent on to France more quickly.

The New Zealand forces before the war had been extremely fortunate in having three of the ablest machine gun instructors page 19in the British Army to assist is the training of the machine gun sections: Majors P. B. Henderson, J. M. Rose and J. A. Wallingford. These officers demonstrated on Gallipoli that not only were they able instructors, but were equally able fighters. The wonderful achievements of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps in the Great War are in no small measure due to the work and example of these three officers.

The units of the Corps took their places in the Divisions to which they had been allotted in the early spring of 1916. When the machine gunners were in the battalions and regiments nobody took any notice of them; now they had their individuality stamped upon them by a new badge, that at a short distance resembled the crossed swords of a general. The battalions did not take kindly to the companies to begin with; they looked down upon them in much the same way as the older boys of a school look down upon the unfortunate new boy at the beginning of a term.

Brigadiers and battalion commanders were apt to brush aside the views of the youthful company commander nervously expressed at a brigadiers' conference; but then the Corps was only in its infancy, and had yet to prove itself. The German gunners had to be beaten it their own game.

Gradually the gunners did prove themselves; they put their guns to all kinds of uses; the companies in France, unable to observe the well-entrenched enemy, harassed his communications by night as well as by day; the gunner showed the infantryman that his gun could do the same work as the artillery. Then, as efficiency increased, the machine gun was used to supplement the creeping barrage, also to cover advanced posts with indirect overhead fire, falling barely a hundred yards ahead. At first the infantry objected to the guns firing over them; they did not realise that it could be done with safety; even battalion commanders complained. Soon, however, they not only got used to it, but learned to welcome the sound of the familiar crackle immediately an S.O.S. signal was sent up.

The British machine gun, its uses and its tactics developed wonderfully, and completely overshadowed the German machine guns from June, 1917, until the end of the war. The object of the General Staff was fully achieved.

page 20

The writing of this book has been to me a pleasant undertaking. With the return to the rush and bustle of civilian life, the great events through which we passed are apt to become mere episodes. An historical account, compiled from official records, will help us to retrace our steps, and will keep before us the incidents and friendships of those eventful years.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the writer was not one who served throughout the whole period of the war, also that his knowledge is confined to the work of the companies in France, and does not extend to the work of the squadrons in Sinai and Palestine. If the members of the squadrons feel that their portion of the book does not fully deal with the splendid part they played in the campaign in the Holy Land, they will be good enough to remember that the history is based on official records, and that during the war, commanding officers looked upon the forwarding in each month of "The War Diary" as an unnecessary nuisance. I must concede, however, to the squadron commanders that their War Diaries were excellently kept; I cannot concede the same to all the company commanders, or even to the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion Headquarters.

It is to be hoped that the account which I have compiled will be complete, and will show and illustrate the way in which the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps worked from its inception to attain efficiency, and how it used that efficiency, if only in a small degree, to contribute to the Final Victory that should mean so much to mankind and civilisation.

I feel under a deep debt of gratitude to the many officers and men who have assisted me in my task. Lieut.-Col. D. B. Blair, D.S.O., M.C., Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O., Major J. M. Rose, M.C., and Major L. M. Inglis, M.C., have taken a very keen interest in the progress of the history, and have supplied me with much valuable information. Lieut.-Col. Blair not only assisted in the correction of the facts, but also eliminated a large proportion of my grammatical and spelling errors.

Major L. C. Chaytor, M.C., Major R. P. Harper, D.S.O., M.C., D.C.M., Major A. C. Hinman, and Lieut. E. H. Picot, page 21M.C., have all been kind enough to peruse my manuscript to help eradicate errors of fact.

The officers is charge of Historical War Records and Base Records (Major L. C. Forgie and Captain V. G. Jervis) have been most courteous, and have promptly responded to the many requests I have made upon them.

Lieut.-Col. C. Guy Powles, C.M.G., D.S.O., the author of the excellently written The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine," very kindly made representations to the Honourable the Minister of Defence on my behalf, to allow me to reproduce maps contained in the Official History. This consent was willingly given. Without the aid of both Lieut.-Col. Powles' and Lieut.-Col. Stewart's histories my task would have been much heavier.

I wish also to express my thanks to Mr. P. N. Cubitt, of the Department of Agriculture, for the assistance he rendered me in compiling the appendices, and to Miss C Taylor, of my office staff, who undertook the typing of three copies of manuscript to enable as many senior officers as possible to peruse and criticise before publication.

J. H. Luxford.

"Croydon,"
Remuera, Auckland, N.Z.
4th October, 1922.