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With the Machine Gunners in France and Palestine

Chapter IV — The Battle of the Somme, 1916 — Period 15th September, 1916, to 4th October, 1916

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Chapter IV
The Battle of the Somme, 1916
Period 15th September, 1916, to 4th October, 1916

The first Battle of the Somme opened on 1st July, 1916, when the Fourth Army assaulted the strongly defended enemy lines, in accordance with a scheme designed to relieve the enemy pressure against the French at Verdun, to prevent enemy forces being transferred to other theatres of war, and to wear down the enemy strength. The initial stages of the offensive were marked with success, except on the northern portion, where the marvellously conceived defences between Thiepval and Serre defied our boldest efforts. Steady pressure was maintained on the southern portion, gradually enabling the wedge to penetrate nearer and nearer towards Bapaume, until by the end of August it was considered that decisive results were within our reach.

Plans were quickly prepared to attain these results before the winter rains came down to hamper operations. The scheme was ambitious. It meant breaking through the enemy's last line of defence and rolling up his flank to the north-west; thus imperilling his whole line. The 15th September was fixed for the opening of the renewed offensive, which is generally referred to as the third phase of the first Battle of the Somme.

The role of the Division was to advance on a front of 1000 yards to a depth of approximately 2000 yards, and then to swing to the north-west to extend its right flank about 1000 yards beyond the Village of Flers, where it would join up with the left flank of the 41st Division. The 47th Division, attacking on our left, was to join up with our left flank. The object of this advance was to deprive the enemy first of the important High Wood Ridge, and secondly of two important trench systems—the Switch and the Flers. The Division's attack was divided into four phases: The first phase was page 39the capture and consolidation of the Switch Trench by the 2nd Brigade, which employed 2nd Auckland and 2nd Otago Battalions. The Switch Trench ran along the High Wood Ridge a short distance down the reverse slope. The second phase was the capture of enemy trenches about 800 yards beyond the Switch Trench on the downward slope, and the establishment of a new line, to be called "Brown line," by the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. The third phase was the capture and mopping up of the Flers and Flers support trenches, passing beyond them, the capture of Fort Trench and the western portion of the Village of Flers, and consolidating a new line from Abbey Road to in front of the village. The 41st Division was to capture the rest of the village, push through and continue the new line, which was to be known as the "Blue line." The 2nd and 3rd Battalions 3rd (Rifle) Brigade were employed to accomplish the work of the third phase.

The fourth phase was the swinging to the north-west from where Grove Alley crossed Abbey Road, capturing Grove Alley and establishing a new line beyond it between Abbey Road and Ligny Road, to be known as the "Red line," by 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.

The sketch plan1 will help the reader to comprehend the nature of the work undertaken by the Division on the 15th September, 1916.

The 2nd Machine Gun Company co-operated with the 2nd Brigade in the first phase of the attack, and the 3rd Machine Gun Company co-operated with the Rifle Brigade in the second, third and fourth phases.

Capt. Parks kept the guns of the 2nd Company assembled behind the original front line for quick movement after the 2nd Brigade captured its objective, as it was decided not to send any guns forward with the assaulting battalions. It seems that the decision to keep the 2nd Company unemployed during the first phase was unsound. With bold handling, the guns of 2nd Company could have been pushed ahead of Switch Line during its consolidation, and inflicted heavy casualties on the large enemy movement that was observed after the crest line had been passed.

1 See map facing page 58.

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The dispositions of the guns of the 3rd Company were:—

  • Two guns under 2nd Lieut. H. T. Morton with 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
  • Two guns under 2nd Lieut. A. H. Preston with 2nd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
  • Two guns under Lieut. C. S. Geddis with 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
  • Two guns under 2nd Lieut. H. J. Worsley with 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade.
  • Eight guns under Lieut. C. G. Hayter were held as Brigade Reserve.

The gun sections moved off with the Battalions when the anxiously awaited zero hour arrived, and the reserve guns of the 3rd Company moved up in front of Seaforth Trench—slightly to the rear of our front line. These guns were to be moved forward of Switch Trench at 7.30 a.m. to take up positions from which they could employ covering fire to assist the 2nd and 3rd Battalions in the third phase of the attack when they would be without the assistance of the creeping artillery barrage. While moving forward, the reserve guns were caught in the enemy barrage that came down between our original front line and the Switch Trench, causing heavy casualties, and one gun was blown to pieces. 2nd Lieut. K. D. Ambrose was mortally wounded at this stage, and died a short while after. This unfortunate disaster caused Lieut. Hayter to withdraw the reserve guns to Turk Lane, to reorganise the gun teams. Brigade then ordered the reserve guns to remain in Turk Lane in readiness to be taken forward in the event of the enemy counter-attacking.

When the Switch Line had been captured, Capt. Parks (2nd Company) received orders to send forward six guns to assist in its consolidation. The six guns went forward at 7 a.m., and succeeded in reaching the Switch Line with few casualties. It was decided to form three strong posts in the Switch, with two guns in each, and the gunners quickly got to work, and in a comparatively short time had their guns in position.

At 3 p.m., when the left flank was threatened by the German counter-attack, a section of four guns went forward from the reserve guns to strengthen the left flank of the page 41Switch Line. The guns from the Switch Line were actively engaged during the afternoon against many favourable targets, and were able to get observation of their fire. Although in exposed positions, these guns were excellently worked, and suffered very slight casualties.

The first objective having been taken and the guns of the 2nd Company being employed in its consolidation, the guns of the 3rd Company began their work.

2nd Lieut. Worsley moved his guns forward with the reserve platoon of the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, with very few casualties, and when the Brown line was captured took one gun forward of its left flank, where a strong post was made. This gun was able to open fire at once and inflict heavy casualties upon a large number of Germans who were falling back. It was then mounted in a defensive position in the strong post, and was not again called upon to fire that day. Worsley then went to his second gun, which he had ordered to report to Capt. W. W. Dove, commanding the Infantry Company near the centre of the line, and moved it into a position that gave it a wide field of fire. The placing of this gun was skilful, and it was able to do good work in the afternoon, when the enemy launched his counter-attack against the forward left Divisional flank.

2nd Lieut. A. H. Preston succeeded in getting his guns forward with few casualties, and quickly placed them in two strong posts forward of the Blue line. These guns were in position by 11 a.m., and immediately covered the advance of the 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. At 11.45 Preston observed long files of enemy infantry moving, and turned the fire of his guns against them. The gunners were able to observe their fire and quickly got the range; in five minutes they had completely disorganised the advancing enemy, with heavy casualties. The intensive firing had lowered the ammunition, so all spare men were employed collecting from the wounded and dead. At 2 p.m. 2nd Lieut. Morton joined Preston with one gun, just as the enemy launched his counter-attack against the 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. Preston and Morton at once brought direct enfilade fire to bear with excellent results. Morton was seriously wounded just after his gun page 42opened, so Preston took it under his command. Practically the whole of the guns of the 2nd and 3rd Companies on the forward slopes of the ridge opened fire also. The gunners were able to observe their fire, and quickly found the range. The enemy attack was completely wiped out by the artillery and machine guns. In "The History of the New Zealand Division" the author, referring to the breaking up of this counter-attack, says: "This German attack presented to the Artillery perhaps the best moving target in France—probably in the whole war." The author then goes on to state that the counter-attack was finally smashed by artillery fire. This is not wholly correct, for it was generally conceded that the splendidly controlled and delivered fire of the machine guns, both with grazing and overhead fire, very materially assisted in the complete defeat of the attcck before it reached our lines. The machine gunners were full of praise for the splendid work the Artillery performed, but justly feel entitled to some credit for the results achieved. At 3 p.m. the enemy were observed collecting in the sunken road to the left of the Divisional flank. Preston's three guns and two Lewis guns that he had taken under his command, were all trained on the road, which presented an easy enfilade target. Fire was withheld until the enemy seemed to be ready to launch his attack. At this moment the five guns opened a devastating fire; practically wiping out the massed enemy, estimated at 300 strong. Preston then received orders from the officer commanding the 2nd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade to place his guns in defensive positions, where he kept them until the following morning. These guns opened on small enemy parties several times in the latter part of the afternoon, causing casualties.

Lieut. C. S. Geddis kept his guns with the reserve company of the 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade until at the request of the O.C. Battalion he opened covering fire to help the left flank of the Battalion to advance. The Battalion was held up in front of Flers Trench by uncut wire, and heavy rifle and machine gun fire from that trench were causing serious casualties. When the flank of the Battalion was unable to proceed. Geddis decided to take one gun forward to engage the machine guns firing from Flers Trench with direct fire. Unfortunately, page 43Geddes was wounded in the thigh before he had gone far, but Corp. John Coradine carried on, and got the gun into position. It was just opening fire when it was blown up by a direct hit, and most of the gun team were wounded.

Sergt. C. V. Ciochetto, seeing what had happened, brought the other gun up, and at once opened fire on Flers Trench, not ceasing until two tanks came forward and accomplished the wonderful task of smashing the wire. These tanks metaphorically sat over Flers Trench and raked it up and down with their machine guns; the 3rd Battalion was then able to capture the trench and pass through to complete the capture and consolidation of the Blue line. Sergt. Ciochetto worked his gun with great skill, its accurate volume of fire against Flers Trench kept the enemy fire down and saved the Battalion many casualties. During the evening of the 15th September Ciochetto moved his gun forward to the Blue line in a defensive position co-ordinated with Preston's three guns.

After the reserve guns of the 3rd Company were reorganised in Turk Lane, orders were issued by Brigade to move four guns up to positions from which they could employ overhead fire to protect the flanks in the event of counterattack. Lieut. C. G. Hayter took two guns to a position forward of Brown line, from which he could protect the right flank. Hayter reached the position safely, and after digging in his guns noticed an abandoned German machine gun ahead of the position. The gun was brought in, with 7000 rounds of ammunition and mounted. Lieut. L. S. Cimino went forward with two guns to protect the left flank. Unfortunately one gun and its crew were wiped out on its way up. Cimino took up a position forward of the left flank of the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. Both Hayter's and Cimino's guns did splendid work against the enemy counter-attack in the afternoon.

The 2nd Wellington Battalion came up in the afternoon to strengthen the Rifle Brigade Battalion on the right flank, which was extended to cover the gap caused by reason of the 41st Division's heavy casualties preventing it from holding the whole of its front.

Four guns of the 2nd Company under Lieut. J. B. Mawson and 2nd Lieut. Palmes left the reserve group to assist the 2nd Wellingtons. The guns were safely taken through the heavy page 44barrage with few casualties, and were soon in position in the new line. In the evening it was decided to increase the number of guns in the front line from the 2nd Company's reserve guns. Mawson went back to the reserve group to get two guns, and then directed the teams up through Flers to a point about seventy-five yards beyond Eaucourt Abbey Road, on the left of Preston's guns. The whole of the guns in the front line were by this time co-ordinately placed.

The wisdom displayed in the placing of the front line guns was fully demonstrated the following morning at about 9 a.m., when two enemy companies assaulted the position. Mawson's six guns, together with Preston's 3rd Company guns, opened fire at point blank range, and the attack melted away. This was an excellent example of the wonderful fire power of two sections of machine guns, for while giving every credit to the excellent infantry rifle fire, it would have been impossible to have so suddenly and effectively crushed this attack without the help of the guns.

The dispositions of the Companies during the night of 15th/16th September were as follows:—

  • 3rd Company.—Five guns in Blue line; two guns in Brown line; three guns (and one German gun) forward of Brown line, laid to bring down overhead fire to protect the Division's flanks; four guns in Brigade reserve (two guns having been destroyed).
  • 2nd Company.—Six guns in Blue line; ten guns in the Switch. Capt. Parks, commanding 2nd Company, was wounded early in the morning of the 15th, and Capt. J. W. D. McKnight assumed command.

About 150,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by the two Companies during the day.

The officers with the guns took advantage during the night of the 15th/16th to replenish ammunition supplies and to adjust their guns. A new source of supply was suddenly thought of; the disabled tanks carried large quantities of well selected ammunition already belted; these tanks were raided by the gunners, and all fear of ammunition shortage was removed. Spare parts and even guns were taken from the tanks, thus enabling several of the guns that were showing the effects of the previous twelve hours strenuous work to page 45be immediately replaced without the necessity of going through the tediously formal procedure of indenting from an unsympathetic D.A.D.O.S., who often required many explanations and reports to satisfy him that a gun blown up by a direct hit had become "unserviceable through the exigencies of the service," especially if no fragments of the said "blown-up" gun accompanied the indent to prove the destruction.

The work of a private soldier (who probably became one of the best known in the Corps) on the 15th and 16th September was very praiseworthy. Private R. W. R. Graham—batman to Lieut. C. G. Hayter—after his officer's guns were in position, discovered that a number of wounded were lying out in the open. Throughout the 15th and 16th he continually brought in wounded men, and devoted himself entirely to them. He collected a wonderful supply of soup tablets and cocoa from German dugouts; with the aid of a fire which he kept burning he managed to give warm nourishment to the wounded he rescued. Many a man owes his thanks to Graham for the bit of comfort he received during the night of 15th/16th September, and in some instances his life. Graham was one of those peculiarly fearless men who was never happy unless he was doing some self-appointed task—which, even if contrary to orders, always meant "giving help where help was most needed."

The attack was again resumed on the morning of the 16th September; the 1st Brigade, which had moved up during the previous night, being detailed to carry out the Division's allotted task. The 1st Wellington Battalion attacked at 9.25 a.m. on the 16th to capture and consolidate the Red line, described, in the fourth phase of the previous day's attack. Col. Stewart in "The New Zealand Division" (page 81) has described the reason why the 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade withdrew from this line after capturing it. The 1st Wellington succeeded in accomplishing its task, assisted by the guns of the 2nd and 3rd Companies in Blue line and rear positions, delivering a heavy covering fire.

At 2 a.m. on the morning of the 16th, four guns of the 1st Company, under Lieut. E. H. T. Kibblewhite, M.C., became attached to the 1st Wellingtons. Four guns were sent to the page 461st Canterburys, and two guns to the 1st Aucklands. The remaining six guns, under Major Rose, remained in reserve with the 1st Otagos.

At 10 a.m. the reserve guns were moved forward, and suffered heavy casualties, but were able to reach the point which had been selected by Major Rose near Flers, to await the further operations that were expected to follow the attack. The army scheme on the 16th was to make a further advance in the event of the first attack succeeding, which would endeavour to break through the last enemy trench system and leave open the way to Bapaume. The remaining Battalions of the 1st Brigade and the rest of the 1st Machine Gun Company were kept in readiness to go through the 1st Wellingtons if the further advance was ordered, but the failure of the 41st Division to secure its objective prevented the further advance from eventuating at this time.

Lieut. Kibblewhite's guns that went forward with the 1st Wellingtons were busily engaged during the morning and afternoon. The gunners frequently brought fire to bear on parties of enemy infantry with deadly results.

L.-Corp. Albert Lee was moving his gun forward at about 11 a.m., when he noticed a large enemy party retreating along the Flers Road. He quickly got his No. 2 to fix the tripod, and a few moments later opened fire. He had an easy target, and exacted the full toll. This was only one of many similar episodes, and it illustrates the tremendous fire power of the machine gun—a fire that is so intense and can be brought to bear with such suddenness that one gun at a range of 200 yards will practically wipe out a close formation of twentyfive to fifty men in ten to fifteen seconds. Kibblewhite displayed great leadership, and his guns gave valuable support and help to the 1st Wellingtons. At about 2 p.m., as he was taking his guns forward, he ordered one gun into action against an enemy gun that was causing casualties to the infantry. Just as his gun opened fire he was killed by a burst of enemy machine gun fire.

The 1st Company had the misfortune on the 16th to lose its Commanding Officer, Major J. M. Rose, M.C., who was severely wounded. Early in the afternoon, Major Rose was making a personal reconnaissance close to Flers to select a page 47position for the reserve guns of the Company. A high explosive shell exploded almost alongside him, wounding him so seriously that it seemed beyond hope that he would survive.

Fortunately, Major Rose did survive, but the Corps was unable to again have the benefit of his skill and personally in the field.

Capt. R. D. Hardie now temporarily took over command of the 1st Company.

On the night of the 16th/17th September the 1st Brigade took over the Divisional front, and the 1st Company relieved the 3rd Company. The guns of the 2nd Company were withdrawn, and rejoined their Company, then in support behind Switch Trench.

The guns of the 1st Company were organised in depth, and a section of four guns came under the control of each of the three Battalion Commanders in the line, the remaining section, under Lieut. R. B. Caws, being kept as a reserve section in Fat Trench. The 3rd Company moved back on relief to form part of the Divisional Reserve, where it was able to reorganise.

During the night 16th/17th the section under Lieut. A. R. Curtis effectively dealt with an attempt by the enemy against the end of Grove Alley. One gun team was badly bombed. Private R. J. Brewer was killed, and the remainder of the team wounded. L.-Corp. C. Ogden, though seriously wounded, assisted Private Chas. Randall to keep the gun in action, and succeeded in checking the enemy advance.

When Sergt. U. J. Bartlett took over a forward position, he observed that there were some German field guns in No Man's Land near Grove Alley. He laid his gun to deal with any attempt to remove them during the night. Shortly after dark the Germans were heard in the vicinity. Bartlett opened fire at once. Next morning revealed the guns still in the same position, with a number of dead Germans lying near them.

On the morning of the 17th September, Capt. Hardie established his Company Headquarters with the reserve guns in Fat Trench, and during the day made a personal reconnaissance of all the guns of the Company, and coordinated their working. Communications were established with the Battalions and Brigade. The work of the sig-page 48nailers of the Company merits special mention. Day and night the telephone wires were cut by shell fire. As soon as a wire was cut a signaller would go off on the nerve-wracking task of repairing it; by this means the communications were kept up.

The weather broke on the 17th September, and the gunners of the 1st Company, in their improvised emplacements, which soon became sloppy quagmires, found it very difficult to keep ammunition belts and guns dry.

The gunners kept their guns in working order, in spite of the conditions, which reflected great credit on the training and instructions they had received from their officers and n.c.o.'s. The guns were employed to assist in repulsing the enemy attacks that were made on the 17th and 18th in the vicinity of the Divisional right flank.

During the night of the 18th/19th September the 2nd Company relieved the 1st Company. This relief occupied the whole night, owing to the difficulty of movement over the morass of sodden clay, accentuated by the heavy loads the gunners had to carry to get the whole of their guns, ammunition and equipment along with them.

The 1st Company on relief took the 3rd Company's place in reserve, the latter Company moving up to the intermediate area in support. The 3rd Company, while in reserve, received reinforcements, and with the guns it salved from tanks, was back to full establishment.

Captain W. I. K. Jennings, N.Z.S.C., now took command of the 1st Company. The reinforcements that awaited it on arrival in the reserve area brought the Company back to full strength.

The 2nd Company had three very trying days and nights in the forward area, manning the defensive positions and taking part in the various attacks and counter-attacks. The work of the guns on the left flank on the night of the 20th and the afternoon of the 21st was of a high order, and rendered valuable assistance to the hardly wrought and fatigued 2nd Canterbury Battalion, who had during that period performed a task that stands out as one of the greatest epics in the history of the Division in France.

The 2nd Canterburys were ordered to make a silent attack on Goose Alley, to improve our front line and to give us page break
Major J. M. Rose, M.C.

Major J. M. Rose, M.C.

Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O.

Major R. D. Hardie, D.S.O.

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Sergl. L. P. Magee, D.C.M.

Sergl. L. P. Magee, D.C.M.

Major C. G. Hayter, M.C.

Major C. G. Hayter, M.C.

page 49greater observation; the operation began at 8 p.m. Two guns under Lieut. J. B. Mawson and two guns under 2nd Lieut. A. J. M. Manson were detailed to move up behind the attacking infantry, so that after the Alley was captured the guns could strengthen its defence. Mawson moved his guns along Flers Support Trench on the right, and Manson took his guns along Flers Trench on the left. These trenches gave the gunners protection, but progress along them was practically impossible, owing to the mud. The gunners, preferring the open to the mud, scrambled out of the trenches to slip and slide along towards Goose Alley in the pitch dark, "cursing volubly." Mawson had decided, after conference with the Battalion Commander, to make a strong defensive post near the "block" in Goose Alley. The point was reached with difficulty, when it was discovered that there were no infantrymen in the Alley; the South Canterbury Company had succeeded in capturing part of it—but too far to the right. After all its officers had become casualties, and it was being bombed from both sides, it withdrew, leaving Mawson's guns quite "in the air," The gunners, however, established a strong post, which, owing to its proximity to the "block" was far from a comfortable one. Fortunately, only two or three enemy bombs reached the position, but these and a number of short shells from an English battery, which fell near the post, kept the gunners fully awake throughout the long night. The gunners worked hard to improve the post, and by morning had a fairly secure position, with a good supply of ammunition in it.

After Manson left Flers Trench, and was scrambling with his gun teams up the slope towards Goose Alley, a party of Germans was encountered. In a few seconds this party was scattered by a shower of well-directed bombs. Manson had been ordered to form a post near the junction of Flers Trench and the Alley. After some difficulty he reached the junction, and at once ordered his guns to dig in. The infantry had by this time cleared the Alley, and were working down it to the left, to join up with the Black Watch.

The enemy, however, worked back into the Alley from Flers Trench, and well down the trench itself beyond the Alley, creating the grotesque but uncomfortable position of page 50leaving the infantry and machine gunners with the enemy on both sides and in rear.

In the early morning Capt. Starnes led the brilliant attack that cleared the enemy from Flers Trench and firmly established our hold on Goose Alley.

The Alley, however, was far too valuable to the enemy to allow us to hold it unchallenged. Later in the morning he launched a determined counter-attack, which drove in our flanks. As this attack opened, Lieut. Mawson and Private McLeish were down one of the back saps collecting German ammunition to use in a machine gun that had been found in the Alley. On hearing the bombing, Mawson and McLeish looked out from the sap, and observed the enemy crowding past a breach in the parapet on the right that had been made by one of our own shells. The only weapons available were discarded German rifles, with which they tried to pick off the enemy as they passed the breach. Being unsuccessful in the attempt, Mawson hurried back to his two guns. He found one knocked out of action. The other gun was still intact, working feverishly against the enemy in the open, but practically isolated. Only two of the gun team were left—Privates Joll and Kinnimont—the latter working the gun single-handed, while the former kept the enemy on the flank off with bombs. Unfortunately, Joll received a nasty wound in the arm, leaving Kinnimont without protection. He fired his last belt before he abandoned the position, and succeeded in saving his gun. The gallant work of these two gunners held the enemy sufficiently to enable the infantry to deliver a quick counterattack, which restored the line. The heaps of German dead in front of the old gun position bore vivid testimony of the execution Kinnimont and Joll had wrought.

Manson's gunners on the left found themselves in an awkward predicament when the enemy attack was launched. Lieut. M. Steele (1st Company) had come up to Manson about half an hour previously with Sergt. A. Young and Private O'Leary to make a reconnaissance of the position, as it was intended that the 1st Company should relieve the 2nd Company that evening. The enemy bombed up towards the position, to which infantry replied pluckily and effectively until bombs ran out. The machine guns were mounted, but page 51owing to the cover the old saps gave the enemy, they were useless. Only one thing was possible—"meet the enemy with the bayonet." As there were no infantry officers in the immediate vicinity, Steele took command of the situation, passed the word along, "prepare to charge," and then, seizing a rifle and bayonet and a few clips of ammunition, was first over the top leading the charge. His football prowess stood him in good stead as he led the attack. The surprise move of the gunners was too much for the Huns, who gave an excellent demonstration of their sprinting capabilities.

The charging gunners and infantrymen then came under fire of our artillery, and were compelled to stop. Lieut. Steele now gave a display of short distance sniping, bagging fifteen Germans as they were running back. A machine gun was turned on him, but tie managed to knock out three of the team; then he ran out of ammunition, so made his way back, but was wounded before reaching Goose Alley.

When the Canterburys' counter-attack had restored the line, the machine guns became disposed along it in defensive positions, until relief next morning at 1 a.m. After relief, Manson and Mawson took their worn-out gun teams back to rest. Both these officers were recommended for honours for the exceptional ability they displayed in the handling of their guns and for their bravery and devotion to duty. Sergt. Anderson, Corp. Battison and Privates Joll and Kinnimont were all recommended for the D.C.M. for their gallant conduct and devotion to duty.

The 3rd Company relieved the 2nd Company on the night 21st/22nd September, the 2nd Company returning to the intermediate area. The 1st Company remained in reserve, pending it taking part with the 1st Brigade in the next grand attack. The work of the 3rd Company on the Divisional front proper during the next two days and nights consisted mainly in improving its positions and maintaining harassing fire behind the enemy's lines.

A number of the Company's guns, however, were moved to positions in the left Division's sector to assist the 2nd Battalion Munster Fusiliers. Two guns under Corp. H. W. Price and Corp. R. Latham were in an exposed trench during a heavy bombardment which was followed by a series of page 52counter-attacks. Price and Latham worked their guns with remarkable coolness. A number of the enemy managed to get within bombing distance along a sap. Private J. R. D. Andrews fearlessly exposing himself, got out of the trench and showered the enemy in the sap with bombs. Others followed Andrews' brave lead, which did so much towards the successful defence of the position.1

The 1st Company relieved the 3rd Company on the night 24th/25th September, preparatory to co-operating with 1st Brigade in its attack on the 25th. The 3rd Company on relief went back to the intermediate area, and the 2nd Company, for the first time since the 15th September, went back to Divisional Reserve.

The weather since the 20th had cleared, and the clay had hardened up by the 24th, which facilitated the change round. Perhaps the clay of the battlefields of the Somme was most obnoxious in the intermediate stage between slush and hardness; the stage at which it resembled and acquired the characteristics of a gluey substance which made movement a succession of vigorous "leg pulling," each pull when accomplished being accompanied by a heavy load of the substance stuck to the bottom of the lower extremities.2

The progress of the offensive, though steady, had been slow, and the final objectives set for the 15th still remained unaccomplished. The break in the weather had hampered operations and given the enemy an opportunity to reorganise after the shattering blows he had received.

The conditions following the favourable change of the weather made possible a renewal of the offensive, and on 25th September the Fourth Army and a French Army were ordered to complete and extend the objectives that should have been reached on the 15th.

The Division's front at this time was approximately along Grove Alley. Its rôle in the renewed offensive operation was to attack and establish a line from in front of Factory Corner along the high ground round to Flers Support Trench beyond

1 Andrews was killed by a stray bullet near Fleurbaix the following Christmas.

2 The writer of this History still has the tin hat he wore at the Somme, 1916. Some of this intermediate stage clay which stuck to it is still on the hat, and would require a cold chisel and hammer to remove it.

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Operations of October 26th and 30th, 1917.Bellevue, Meetcheele and Slopes North of Passchendaele. An air photograph taken on 17th October, 1917.

Operations of October 26th and 30th, 1917.
Bellevue, Meetcheele and Slopes North of Passchendaele. An air photograph taken on 17th October, 1917.

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Condition of Ground about Ravebeck, in front of Bellevue.Taken on 17th October, 1917, showing what the New Zealanders had to contend with.

Condition of Ground about Ravebeck, in front of Bellevue.
Taken on 17th October, 1917, showing what the New Zealanders had to contend with.

page 53Goose Alley, thus forming a slightly semi-circular front line, about 1500 yards in length, facing north-west. This new line was to be held in the first instance by a series of outposts which could later be joined up into a continuous line. The 1st Brigade and 1st Machine Gun Company were employed to accomplish the Division's task.

Zero hour was 12.35 p.m.; as the heavy barrage belched forth at the instant the three Battalions were over the top—1st Canterbury on the right, 1st Auckland in the centre, and 1st Otago on the left, and advancing towards the objective. The dash of the infantry was brilliant. All opposition was crushed in their stride, the objective was secured, and the new line established on "schedule time."

The machine gun scheme for the attack was to cover the advance, and after the objectives were taken to send forward guns to help in the consolidation of the new line. Two guns were sent forward with the 1st Canterburys to assist the consolidation, and four guns were kept as a reserve in Abbey Road, near Flers. The remaining ten guns were allotted the main task of covering die infantry.

Positions were prepared for four guns (under Lieut. Tingey) in Flers Trench, and for she guns (under Lieut R. B. Caws) in Grove Alley support. The guns were taken to their positions during the early hours of the morning of the 25th, and remained there until Zero hour. At Zero the guns from Flers Trench opened rapid fire and swept the Sunken Road to Factory Corner, and also searched Grove Alley. Just after Zero about fifty Germans were observed attempting to retire to Abbey Road over Grove Alley. Two guns traversed their fire accordingly, and succeeded in wiping out the party. The Grove Alley support guns concentrated on Factory Corner, and as the infantry approached, lifted their fire to form a barrage behind it. A party of twenty Germans made a dash from the Factory to the rear, and were caught in the barrage.

After the objectives had been taken the guns kept up a covering fire, while the infantry established the line of strong posts, and immediately afterwards four guns were taken forward to help in the defence of the new line.

During the afternoon of the 25th the gunners were heavily shelled, but fortunately escaped with few casualties.

page 54

The 1st Company remained in its defensive position throughout the 26th until 2.15 p.m. on the 27th, when a further operation was undertaken by the Division, which employed the 1st Brigade, 1st Machine Gun Company, 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and 1st Section of the 3rd Company. The 1st Company guns did a small amount of firing from their defensive positions during the intervening period.

The Division's objective for the attack of the 27th was the capture of the Gird Trenches, left of the Ligny-Thilloy Road, to the point where Goose Alley joined the Gird, a width of about 1000 yards; also the capture of the remainder of Goose Alley, north of Abbey Road. The capture of the objective would turn the New Zealand front into a right angled salient—the apex of which would be the junction of Goose Alley with the Gird Support.1

As on the 25th, 1st Canterbury was on the right, with one half of the Gird as its objective, 1st Auckland in the centre, with the other half of the Gird as its objective, while 1st Otago was on the left, to swing north-westwards, with Goose Alley as its objective, thereby joining with the left flank of the 1st Aucklands. 1st Wellington and two companies of the 4th Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade became Brigade Reserve, the remaining Rifle Brigade Companies and 3rd Machine Gun Company Section holding the line on the left flank of the attack.

The dispositions of the guns of the 1st Company were the same as on the 25th. The enemy seemed to have some warning of the attack, for when the bombardment preceding the attack opened, a number of enemy retired, making easy targets for the machine guns in the front line.

Two guns under Lieut. T. H. Watson were ordered to move forward with the second wave of the 1st Canterburys, with the object of reaching a position from which they could enfilade the Ligny-Thilloy Road and command the low-lying ground to the right of it. The moment after Watson had given the command to advance a high explosive shell burst alongside him. Several gunners were killed, and Watson was mortally wounded.

1 See map facing page 58.

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Sergt. Arthur Marris at once assumed command of the guns, leading them with great skill to a position beyond the right flank of the infantry. Here the guns were mounted on the forward edge of two shell holes. Scattered groups of Germans running back along the road were observed from 200 to 500 yards range. The gunners had no difficulty in finding range as they "searched" up and down the road. For nearly an hour Marris kept his guns in action without molestation, and all the time the Huns kept exposing themselves along the road, making very easy targets for the guns, one gunner saying, "It's harder to make a miss than to get a hit."

After the Canterburys had secured their objective, their forward Company Commander (Major Stitt) sent word to Marris to bring his guns forward to the new line. While the gunners were digging the new positions for the guns, Marris observed a wounded German officer lying out about fifty yards ahead. Despite the fact that he was subjected to heavy enemy machine gun fire, Marris ran out to the German, and succeeded in bringing him back to safety and captivity.

2nd Lieut. A. R. Curtis reached the front line late in the afternoon to take over the command of die section.

The other guns of the 1st Company were excellently worked, and maintained their barrage throughout the attack. When the objectives were taken the four reserve guns were sent forward to strengthen the line near the apex, at the junction of Goose Alley and the Gird Support.

The work of the 1st Company on the 25th and 27th was of a very high order, and the handling of the guns brought very warm praises from the infantry.

The effect of the barrage which covered the making of the strong points on the afternoon of the 25th was graphically described by an infantry officer. He said: "The whole ground in front of the German line was a seething mass, the ground was whipped and slashed about to a much greater extent than would have been expected, even from shrapnel."

The 2nd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade came forward in the afternoon, with one section from the 3rd Company, as an additional reserve for the 1st Brigade, but were not used.

The 2nd Company relieved the 1st Company during the night of 28th/29th September, the latter Company returning to Divisional Reserve.

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The weather had again broken, and discomfort and inconvenience were the result.

The 2nd Brigade made preparations to co-operate with an attack by the Corps on the Division's left, which would have for its objective the capture of Eaucourt L'Abbaye and the elimination of the salient on the Division's front. This attack was fixed for 1st October. The 3rd Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade and one section of the 3rd Machine Gun Company took over the right sector of the Divisional front to hold during the operation.

The guns of the 2nd Company and of the section of the 3rd Company did little firing on the 29th, owing to the foggy weather. Lieut. H. M. Preston (2nd Company) secured a good target in the early morning of the 30th, when the sudden clearing of the mist revealed an enemy party of two officers and twenty men a short distance away. Preston ordered his two guns to open at point blank range. This party was completely wiped out, except two men who succeeded in reaching dead ground.

The attack on 1st October commenced at 3.15 p.m., and was one in which the gunners of the 2nd Company had several ideal targets, that were thoroughly dealt with.

The dispositions of the guns of the 2nd Company were as follows:—

  • Six guns were kept for covering fire.
  • Four guns were allotted to 2nd Canterburys.
  • Three guns were allotted to 2nd Otagos.
  • Three guns were in reserve.

The guns that went forward with the attack were extremely fortunate. They had few casualties, and inflicted much damage to the enemy. As the guns were taken forward parties of enemy were frequently seen moving across the open. The gunners were ever on the alert and quickly brought their guns into action.

The section of guns from the 3rd Company remained with the 3rd Battalion in the right sector and co-operated with the Battalion when it made its impromptu advance on the afternoon of the 1st.

After this operation had been completed the 3rd Company lost a very gallant n.c.o.; Sergt. R. B. Coffy was killed by page 57shell fire when going round his guns in a forward position. Coffy was an old South African veteran, whose strong personality and sense of duty singled him out as one of the most trusted n.c.o.'s in the Company.

The night 1st/2nd October was one of shell and storm, the guns of the 2nd Company and of the section of the 3rd Company remained set on the S.O.S. lines, but were not called upon to fire. The 2nd October brought no change in conditions, except that the elements of nature grew worse. The 2nd Company was withdrawn from the line on the night 2nd/3rd October, and the 3rd Company took its place. This relief was perhaps the most difficult of all. Getting the guns and equipment forward to the point at which the 2nd Company's guides were waiting—a distance of 3000 yards—took over five hours; the guides were not trained guides, bat only men detailed for the duty; the barren waste of shell-holed sodden clay had no land marks, so in the darkness and storm the sections had to grope and stumble to their positions. The 3rd Company's guns finally reached their positions, and the 2nd Company's guns were taken back just before dawn on the morning of the 3rd October, thus bringing to a close their labours on the Somme.

The 3rd Company remained in the line until the morning of the 4th October, when it was relieved by the 122nd (British) Company. The front line guns remained with the British Company's guns for several hours after they had come up. After the 3rd Rifle Brigade had been relieved the enemy launched an attack against Gird Support, which the front line guns of the 3rd Company took part in repulsing. L.-Corp. C. O. Sampson acted with great gallantry in the working of his gun; all the other members of his gun team became casualties, but he continued firing the gun single handed until it was knocked out of action. Special mention of Sampson's gallant conduct was made in the 122nd Brigade Commander's report of the operation.

A heavy mist hung about during the morning of the 4th October, which enabled the transport of the 3rd Company to go up into Flers to bring back the Company's guns and equipment. In spite of the number of guns this Company had had destroyed by shell fire, it came out of the Battle of the page 58Somme with one gun above establishment, thanks to the disabled tanks.

All the Companies were now back from the line, and on the 5th and 6th of October entrained for the lower Somme Area, marching, after detraining, to the billets they occupied during the pleasant days of August, when they underwent the special training that assisted them to so conspicuously perform their part in the Battle of the Somme.

It is fitting to place on record in this narrative the excellent manner in which the transports of the Companies brought up supplies and ammunition during the operations. This work was done at night, and frequently necessitated the journey to Flers along the awful Longueval-Flers Road, a road that was constantly under fire from the enemy artillery. Those who were on this road during the first week in October can never efface from memory the ghastly spectacle it presented; the whole length of the exposed portion was littered with smashed up waggons, dead drivers and horses, the peculiar feature being that so many of the dead were nude. A new track had been made to one side of the original road; this track was piled up in the same way. Still another track had been formed. The drivers and the Transport Officers never once failed to get the supplies forward, winning the eternal gratitude of the companies in the line.

Back in the Lower Somme Area the companies were soon refreshed, equipment overhauled and replenished, and the personnel reorganised. A few days later the whole Division again went north, to take over the extreme right of the 2nd Army front.

There were many acts of individual gallantry among the officers and men of the Corps during the Somme offensive, some of which it is possible to place on record, but of many of which it is unfortunate that no particulars are now available.

Evidence of many a brave act was lost, no doubt, when its author passed to the Great Beyond; such is inevitable in war; but those acts which are on record should be given a place in history, the reader remembering always the many other acts which it is impossible to record.

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From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. III Flers and Vicinity [Copyright

From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. III Flers and Vicinity [Copyright