Chapter XI
The German Offensive
Period 25th March, 1918, to 16th August, 1918

The long expected German offensive opened on 21st March, and although the ambitious plan of the German General Staff had not fully materialised, the British Line had been seriously thrown back, and was in imminent danger of being broken. Within a few days the names of villages and towns that New Zealanders had been so familiar with during the first Battle of the Somme, became the scene of active operations. Up to the present the New Zealand Division had only experienced offensive operations in France, and was eager to illustrate to our friend the enemy that its élan and fighting prowess were equally effective in defence, and would quickly change the defensive into offensive, Thus on the 25th March the New Zealand Division proceeded south to help check the German advance by filling in the dangerous gap between the IV Corps and the V Corps, which was supposed to extend between Hamel in the south and Puisieuxau-mont in the north, a distance of approximately three miles.

To enable the reader to follow the operation of the Battalion a locality plan has been inserted. The general idea of the Divisional scheme was to push the 2nd Brigade forward with its right flank at Hamel, swinging its left flank forward of Beaumont Hamel along the road to Hébuterne, and then to endeavour to thrust the line east of Serre in the hope of securing touch with the right flank of the IV Corps, which was thought to be in Puisieux. Both Brigades were composite, owing to the irregular arrival of the battalions from the detraining stations.

The Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company, together with a Company of the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, entrained at Cæstre on 24th March, and proceeded in page break

From the N.Z. Official War History, Vol. II]
The Upper Ancre

page break page 115the first troop train despatched by the New Zealand Division viâ Calais-Boulogne and Abbeville to three miles west of Amiens, where it was found that the railway line had been destroyed by enemy aircraft bombs. The troops detrained at 2.30 a.m. on the 25th. Mechanical transport was requisitioned, and Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company pushed on through the retreating civilian inhabitants viâ Villers-Bretonneux to Cerisy and Chipilly, on the Somme. Here Lieut.-Col. Blair found the position obscure. A regiment of Hussars retiring across the Somme could not give any connected version of how the line was held in front, save that the rearguards were falling back unbroken, according to orders, and in conformity with the flanks. Shortly after noon a motor cyclist orderly arrived from Divisional Headquarters at Pont Noyelles, with orders to fill a gap in the line up the Ancre Valley. Battalion Headquarters and Canterbury Company immediately continued their march to Ville sur Corbie. The Canterbury Company went into billets at this village, but Battalion Headquarters moved on and became established at Ribemont sur Ancre at 5 p.m.

The Auckland Company detrained at Ailly sur Somme at 2 a.m. on 25th March and "embussed" to Dernancourt, arriving there at 5 p.m. The Wellington Company detrained at Ailly sur Somme at 8 p.m. on 25th March, and at once proceeded to Dernancourt, only to be ordered to continue the journey to Hedauville, which place was reached at 3 a.m. On the 26th, Battalion Headquarters and the Canterbury and Auckland Companies had their slumbers rudely disturbed shortly after midnight by the receipt of urgent orders to proceed at once to Hedauville. By 6 a.m. on the 26th the Battalion, less the Otago Company, were concentrated in this village.

The Otago Company was the last to entrain for the Somme. By the time its turn came along there was a shortage of rolling stock, which delayed the departure of the Company for nearly a whole day; the gunners being forced to kick their heels in Cæstre in cold, drizzling weather. The Company proceeded by train to Picquigny, in the Somme Valley, where all heavy baggage was dumped. At Picquigny, information was received that a directing station for the New Zealand page 116Division had been established at Pont Noyelles, but no definite orders could be obtained. Major Inglis then decided to march to Pont Noyelles. After proceeding two or three miles, a long train of empty motor lorries coming from the direction of the line was met. Sufficient of these lorries to carry the Company's personnel, guns and S.A.A. towards Pont Noyelles were requisitioned, and the transport (under Lieut. C. V. Mark) was ordered to follow as quickly as possible.

The Company reached Noyelles during the afternoon of 26th March. The motor lorries were immediately sent back to Picquigny, and the Company was directed by Major W. L. Robinson (D.A.A.G., N.Z. Div.) to proceed at once to Hedauville. The transport made very rapid progress to Noyelles, arriving an hour later than the motor lorries. The march to Hedauville was continued after dark, and at midnight the Otago Company reported to the M.G. Battalion Headquarters.

There was little time for rest after the Battalion reached Hedauville, as the Divisional operation began soon after daylight. The Auckland Company was at once detailed to cooperate with the 1st Brigade, the Wellington Company with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, and the Canterbury Company with the 2nd Brigade.

The Auckland and Canterbury Companies moved forward with the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and were soon able to render valuable assistance, frequently coming into action against parties of enemy from ten to thirty strong with deadly effect. Two sections of the Canterbury Company formed the vanguard of the advanced guard for the New Zealand Division, being attached to the 1st Battalion 3rd (Rifle) Brigade, which Battalion had temporarily become part of the 1st Brigade. The two Canterbury sections were distributed over a frontage of nearly five miles, the left section being under the command of Lieut. R. Buchanan, and the right section under the command of Lieut. P. C. Ashby, M.C. The gunners did not have long to wait before encountering the enemy; barely had the sections passed beyond Colincamps when advancing enemy parties appeared; guns came into action from the limbers and succeeded in blocking the way. The Germans were rudely surprised to be suddenly met with machine gun fire, and lost no time in beating a hasty retreat, but not before they suffered casualties.

The advanced guard guns were withdrawn as the 2nd Brigade passed through with the Auckland Company, and returned to the Canterbury Company in the left sector with the 1st Brigade.

The handling of the sections of both Companies was excellent, the section officers keeping in close touch with the infantry, and organising covering fire from time to time to facilitate the advance.

The new Divisional front on the night of the 26th was not as planned in the operation, and the left flank rested near Colincamps, still unjoined and exposed. The new position was consolidated during the evening, and the machine guns kept busy throughout the night on the enemy positions. At 1 a.m. the Wellington Company moved forward with the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade in its advance to extend the line on the left flank.

Major Chaytor allotted No. 1 Section (under Lieut. M. Steele) to the right battalion, No. 4 Section (under Lieut. G. N. Bramley) to the left battalion, and No. 2. Section (under Lieut. E. G. Stubbs) to support both battalions in the vicinity of their junction. No. 3 Section (under Lieut. C. Hally) was left in rear of Colincamps to form a line between Sailly and Colincamps immediately the situation was clear. The three sections that advanced with the infantry were splendidly handled; the gunners frequently came into action from the limbers that accompanied them, and inflicted heavy casualties among the groups of Germans that were encountered.

The advance by the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade was rapid, and by 9 a.m. had successfully filled the dangerous gap on the Divisional northern flank, linking up with the Australians and securing the important ridge between La Signy Farm and Hébuterne. Our line now extended from a little south of Hébuterne to Hamel.

The Wellington Company took up positions that enabled it to cover the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade front and at the same time take advantage of observed enemy movement. The section officers worked their sections in conformity with the Battalions. Lieut. G. N. Bramley, with good leadership, advanced his section to the Quarries on the Divisional flank and from the position he took up was able to command the page 118whole of the ground forward of the Brigade. It was chiefly from this position that the wonderful targets described in the succeeding paragraphs were dealt with.

At 10.30 a.m. an enemy battalion was observed at 1800 yards range moving from near Hébuterne. The guns at once opened and quickly found range, playing havoc among the enemy, who scattered in all directions. About 12 noon there was a great deal of enemy movement on the new Divisional front that gave the gunners of the Wellington Company their great opportunity to demonstrate to the infantry the terrible fire power of their weapons. At one point a battalion in column of route formation was engaged by four guns at 1800 yards range, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the battalion to deploy. A little later two enemy companies in mass formation advanced against our lines. With a clear field of fire, two guns at 700 yards range poured in a murderous fire, literally mowing down the enemy. Stretcher bearers were working at this point for three hours after. The next target was two columns of enemy infantry advancing in column of route that were observed at about 1600 yards from a gun position commanded by Corp. G. H. Battersby. The two columns were gradually converging as they came over the Serre Ridge. Major Chaytor, who was with Battersby, observed the enemy columns and gave orders to withhold fire until the columns converged at 1000 yards range. The guns then opened. Probably no better target presented itself to the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps in France, and the fullest advantage was taken of it. Practically the whole force was wiped out, few reaching cover. The whole ground was until nightfall littered with dead Huns. In the early afternoon twelve enemy machine gun teams attempted to move across the open towards an old trench—presumably to establish a strong post, but were observed and engaged. Some of the gun teams were completely knocked out, some made good their escape, but the guns and equipment were dropped and left. A number of attempts were afterwards made by the Germans to recover the guns, but only ended in still more casualties. The fire discipline against the enemy machine gun teams was excellent, the gunners firing small bursts, the most effective of all direct machine gun fire. In the heat of page 119the moment there is a great temptation to keep up a continuous stream of fire, on the same principle as a fireman's hose. Short rapid bursts enable the gunner to know what he is doing, save useless expenditure of ammunition, and prevent an undue strain upon the gun that may bring about a breakage. The supply of ammunition caused a great deal of anxiety to the Company Commander, but as the day advanced Capt. C S. Geddis succeeded in getting a great many boxes of S.A.A. to a forward dump.

At 2 p.m., under cover of artillery fire, parties of the enemy advanced through old communication trenches to attempt to rush three of the Wellington Company's guns (No. 2 Section, under Lieut. E. G. Stubbs), that from their advanced position had done much damage. Fortunately "C" gun of the section was able to withdraw, the gun commander realising that the dead ground near his gun would enable it to be rushed. As he was without infantry protection he withdrew his gun about fifty yards and eluded the enemy. The commander of "A" gun stood his ground, and with marvellous coolness fired his gun as the enemy party rushed it. The party consisted of ten Huns, and in much less than ten seconds there were ten "Good Huns"; all were killed outright. "B" gun was rushed by a party of thirty. The gun commander (Corp. M. T. McGregor) also fought his gun, but unfortunately he was wounded after killing another ten Huns, and for the first time a gun of the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps fell into the hands of the enemy, but only for a few minutes; a sergeant with a party of the Ruahine Company had observed the situation; he promptly came to the rescue, and with the remainder of "C" gun team charged the enemy party, killing most of them, regained our lost gun, and captured a German light machine gun. It is unfortunate that this History cannot record the name of the gallant Ruahine sergeant who rendered such assistance to the Wellington Company.

It may be well at this juncture to briefly point out two important lessons that the last incident illustrates. First, machine gun commanders should never be in advanced positions in open warfare without an adequate infantry escort. The gun commander has the right to obtain that protection, page 120and should always exercise his right. His gun is too valuable to be exposed to the danger of capture, and by careful stalking it can be captured unless it is adequately protected by the infantry. Second, the rush method to capture a machine gun is either doomed to failure, or to cause unduly heavy casualties. Had the Germans worked round the flanks of "A" and "B" guns and bombed the teams, it is very probable that the New Zealand Machine Gun Corps would have lost two guns to the enemy, and two gun teams.

At 2.30 p.m. the enemy again attempted to attack the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade's positions, this time taking the precaution to advance in open order. The advance was observed as it came over the ridge at about 1200 yards. In a flash the Wellington guns opened, many of the enemy falling, while the remainder broke for cover. For some time after odd men were observed trying to crawl back behind the ridge.

At 4 p.m. the right battalion's left flank was forced back by the enemy, and one of the Wellington guns was ordered to withdraw. Unfortunately the whole team became casualties, but Private L. E. Spedding, although wounded, dismantled the gun before leaving it. He received five more wounds before his job was finished. The section officer later sent forward a party, who found the gun and brought it back.

In the evening the West Coast Company was forced back about 500 yards from the Hébuterne Road. A gun of the 4th Section of the Wellington Company was left exposed, and the commander was told by the infantry that his position was almost surrounded; help was offered by the infantry to assist the team to break through with the gun and so avoid capture. A hurried consultation was being held between the gunners when Corp. J. Dean of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade came up and asked the gun commander what he intended doing, at the same time stating that if the team would "stick it out," he with his party of a Lewis gun team and nearly a platoon of riflemen would do likewise; and naturally it was agreed to "stick it out." About midnight a heavy rifle fire opened about 150 yards in front of the gun position, to which the gun quickly responded. The gun commander did not know where our own troops were, the withdrawal having taken place after dark, and rather than endanger our own men he fired his gun high, page 121trusting to the deafening crackle to put the Hun to flight. The enemy steered clear of the position, and disappeared from sight and hearing.

During the early morning of 27th March Battalion Headquarters moved up to Courcelles, and Otago Company was ordered to establish a second line of machine gun defence across the Divisional front. The line was known as the Purple line, or the Divisional Reserve line, and ran from Beausart through Colincamps to the Quarries.

On this line Otago Company constructed solidly dug and carefully camouflaged emplacements for all its guns, as well as many alternative positions, to provide for any sudden change in the situation. Owing to the very extended front the Company was required to cover, the guns were sited in sub-sections with long fields of fire and the tasks of all sub-sections were carefully co-ordinated. The gun wagons and horses were distributed in positions close to their guns in readiness for any readjustment of the Company, as it was at that stage very doubtful whether the hostile advance on the flanks had been definitely stopped. The ammunition wagons were concentrated under the transport officer for all supply work and for the establishment of dumps. The Otago Company maintained their positions until relieved as later detailed.

The enemy was determined to capture a New Zealand gun, and on the 28th at 3 p.m. he succeeded, but again only for a brief period was he permitted to hold the coveted trophy. The whole gun team was surrounded, and after a short struggle the gun taken, the enemy retiring along the sap they had come up. To have the gun taken without its team was too bitter a pill, and the bombs which should have been in the position were quickly obtained. Up the sap the gunners rushed, quickly catching the enemy party, and showering it with bombs. Like all operations where the enemy is suddenly surprised, this impromptu "counter-attack" succeeded; the lost gun was recovered, and several Huns qualified for the "wooden" instead of the "Iron" Cross.

Throughout the 28th all the Companies kept busy, engaging numerous targets, but on the 29th were much quieter, owing to the enemy taking cover when within machine gun page 122range; but machine gun range has altered since the early text books were written—not that the actual range has increased, but the gunners stop at nothing less than extreme range—2700 yards.

At 11 a.m. on 29th a large working party was observed on Redan Ridge. Range finders reported the range to be 2500 yards. A section opened fire. Casualties were observed, and the whole working party scattered.

With such activity by the guns of the Companies from fixed positions, it was considered advisable to effect a change, especially as the enemy was making serious efforts to silence the guns.

During the 29th the section officers reconnoitred new positions, which were taken up during the evening.

A carefully prepared scheme was arranged for the machine guns to support the 1st Brigade's advance to capture La Signy Farm on the 30th. All guns able to do so opened at 2 p.m. as the infantry moved forward, putting up a protective barrage. Some of the forward guns were confined to selected enemy communication trenches, and others went forward with the infantry. One forward gun kept a communication trench under fire—searching up and down until the infantry came close to it, and then ceased fire. A large enemy party had apparently tried to move back along this trench, for when it was captured sixty newly dead Germans were found in it.

At one point when the infantry were held up by four German guns, one of our guns was quietly brought up, mounted in the open, and effectively silenced the four enemy guns in a few seconds. Great judgment was displayed by the gun commander in bringing his gun forward and mounting it without being observed; he took advantage of the broken ground and mounted the gun behind a small mound that almost completely obscured a sight of the gun being obtained from the front.

The attack on the 30th was successful, and the 31st saw the Division holding a well selected and defined line. Enemy movement became almost negligible—depriving the gunners of the splendid targets they had become accustomed to, and necessitating the return to indirect harassing fire.

Since leaving the Polygon Sector around Ypres at the end page 123of February the Battalion had, with the expected arrival of open warfare, devoted most of its training behind the lines towards practising direct fire over open sights and to a greater mobility by use of the gun limbers and pack saddles. It was considered that too much practice had hitherto been made of barrage fire, which is complementary only to direct fire, especially when the enemy is driven out of trenches into the open.¹ This revival of training for normal warfare was more than justified by the excellent results obtained in the following months down to the date of the Armistice. The subsequent chapters of this book will illustrate those results more fully.

Conditions began to settle down to the well-known trench warfare; positions were improved, and the Divisional front was shortened to make it a normal two brigade front.

Before proceeding, it is fitting to record what our Intelligence was able to ascertain from the enemy about the Machine Gun Battalion. A captured German officer's diary contained the following entry for 27th March:—"Crossed old front line by Croiselles ——. Our flank is in the air. Held up by cleverly concealed machine guns. Many casualties. Have to start trench warfare again as English are very strong."

The following is an extract from notes on the examination of prisoners:—"The 24th Division came into line on 27th March and launched a battalion attack. The direction of the advance was due west towards windmill north of Colincamps; the attack broke down under our (New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion) machine gun fire."

Prisoners also said that the losses in the attack were very bad, about 50 per cent, casualties appeared to have been caused.

The 1st April saw the Divisional front defined and secure. The Canterbury Company was well established on the right—Auckland Company in the centre, and Wellington Company on the left. Otago Company remained in the Divisional Re-page 124serve line, and had by this time completed the defensive positions previously referred to. Beyond carrying out a co-ordinated harassing fire programme and engaging a few targets that presented themselves, the Battalion had a very quiet time for the first four days of April. On the 4th, Battalion Headquarters moved from Courcelles and established itself at Bus-en-Artois. The transport lines were brought up much closer to the Companies, and a details camp was established at Louvencourt, comprising 33 per cent. of the personnel of the Battalion, withdrawn proportionately from the Companies in the Line. Otago Company relieved the Auckland Company in the centre, the latter Company taking over the Divisional Reserve line. During these four days the Battalion only lost two men killed and two men wounded.

The quiet period was rudely disturbed at 5 a.m. on the 5th, when the enemy opened the heaviest concentrated bombardment that the New Zealand Division experienced through-out the whole war. The extent of the bombardment was on a frontage of about three miles to a depth of three miles—shells of all calibres were used, including many gas shells. The Headquarters of the Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland Companies were hit, and several gun positions were blown up. Lieut. J. Penniket and four gunners were wounded at one position, and the gun destroyed. Immediately information of the loss of the gun was reported, Lieut. J. Black, with Sergt. Christie and two gunners, took a gun forward to replace Penniket's gun, and succeeded in getting to the position through the heavy barrage without mishap. This prompt act was rewarded later in the day, when the gun was able to perform much useful execution to the attacking Germans. At 8.30 a.m. the Wellington Company, on the left sector, caught the advancing enemy with a perfect hurricane of fire, inflicting casualties estimated at half of the total attacking force; and also harassed the remnants of the force as it retired. The guns of the Otago Company also played a conspicuous part against the enemy attack—the guns in the front line and in commanding positions in the support line delivered a heavy fire at ranges from 1800 yards to 50 yards. Particularly heavy casualties were inflicted by two guns under Lieut. A. W. Reynolds and by a captured enemy machine gun page 125under Sergt. D. Lay; the work of this n.c.o throughout the day was of the highest order. The attack was completely repulsed, at no point reaching nearer than thirty yards to our front line. The excellent rifle fire of the infantry played havoc among those who had escaped the machine gun fire. At 10 a.m. the enemy again repeated his attack, once more being caught by our machine gun fire. Two guns under Lieut. E. Goodwin had a direct field of fire to enfilade an old communication trench along which parties of the enemy advanced. These two guns were kept busy for four hours; the trench seemed to attract the enemy; every little while a fresh party would appear, but none reached our lines; the fire of Good-win's guns practically wiping out every party that made the attempt.

At 4.30 p.m. Black was rewarded for the perilous journey he had undertaken to replace Penniket's gun. A force, comprising approximately one company, made an attempt against a portion of our line. Black's gun with a slight enfilade raked the attackers, leaving seventy to eighty dead and dying in front of our line.

At this time our front line defences were protected by a large number of captured machine guns, which our gunners manned in addition to their own. About forty guns had been captured in the vicinity of La Signy Farm, and most of these were taken over by the Companies.

The best proof of the effective work of the Companies of the Battalion is obtained from the enemy. A captured officer was questioned as to the failure of the attack, and replied that the main cause was the intensity of the machine gun barrage.

Several prisoners of the 26th Würtemberg Division said that the artillery barrage did not seriously hurt the attacking troops, as it was over them, both in the assembly trench and when advancing, but the enfilade machine guns caused the many casualties that prevented the attack succeeding. A captured diary also confirmed the effectiveness of the work of our gunners. When referring to the attack of the 5th April it reads:—"At 10 a.m. we attack. Many comrades find a hero's death, others writhe in their wounds. Principally it was due to machine gun fire from the right and left flanks.

The losses are very great. Many wounded are lying in the open. Thank God, we are relieved here."

The Battalion was extremely fortunate when we consider that the whole of the four Companies was working in the intensely shelled area. Lieut. J. Penniket and twenty-five other ranks were wounded—none were killed.

The weather was very bad on the 6th, and the gunners were hampered at their positions by rain and mud. Unfortunately, Lieut. Colin Hally, M.C., was killed on this day. Hally's work had been very conspicuous at all times since his transfer to the Corps. His decoration was won in the Auckland Regiment for gallant conduct in a raid against the enemy trenches. A short while before his death he found an enemy map showing the objectives of the great offensive. The final objective, "the capture of Paris," was expected to have been completed on 1st April.

The conditions in the line remained normal throughout April, and the Battalion's casualties were small. The enemy had become very inaggressive, and in consequence our guns did not get many targets by day. They continued their night work, and also did a lot of work to the gun positions. The Divisional baths came as a great relief to the gunners, parties leaving the line daily to get bathed and refitted with clean underwear.

The Divisional front was altered on the nights of 24th and 25th April by the right sector being taken over by a brigade of the 12th Division, and the New Zealand Division taking over a brigade sector to the immediate north, which brought the Village of Hébuterne under our care. It was now decided to change the Companies of the Battalion to enable one Company to withdraw from the line and to form a Mobile Reserve at Bus-en-Artois. Canterbury Company was relieved in the right sector and took over the Divisional Reserve line. The Wellington Company relieved the 4th Australian Company in front of Hebuterne, Auckland Company maintained its position, and Otago Company moved back to form a Mobile Reserve.

On 1st May information was received that an enemy relief was taking place between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The guns of the Wellington and Auckland Companies were ordered to carry page 127out a concerted shoot during the relief, and accordingly kept all the enemy approaches under fire during the period.

On 4th May the guns of the Battalion co-operated with the artillery to assist the 1st Brigade to advance our line in front of Hébuterne, to strengthen the position. The barrage worked very smoothly, and no casualties were sustained by the gunners. The infantry reported that an enemy machine gun from near the edge of Rossignol Wood had been causing a lot of annoyance. Several gunners were told off to keep the spot under observation, and succeeded in locating the troublesome gun. A gun was pushed forward at dusk and laid on the located spot. Our attack opened at 8.30 p.m., and immediately the enemy machine gun was seen to fire, our waiting gun quickly silenced it, and so saved the infantry from its deadly enfilade fire.

On 5th May the Otago Company relieved the Canterbury Company, which then became Mobile Reserve.

The Companies were changed round during the month, to give each a turn in Mobile Reseve to rest and undergo a course of training. Conditions had returned to normal trench warfare, except perhaps for the occasional heavy enemy shelling. The health of the men remained good, and they were very keen to again have the pleasure of exacting a heavy toll upon the assaulting Huns, but the Hun had received his lesson, and the New Zealand line remained intact. On 7th June the New Zealand Division was relieved, and by 8 p.m. on the 8th the Battalion's Headquarters had been established at Bois du Warnimont. Auckland Company was at Orville, Otago Company at Château de la Haie Switch, and the Canterbury and Wellington Companies with Battalion Headquarters.

Major C. G. Hayter left the Division at this time to take over the command of the Depôt Company at Grantham. Major A. C. Finlayson took over the command of the Canterbury Company in his place.

The Division remained out of the line for three weeks, during which time the Battalion underwent a strenuous syllabus of training. The practising of the manning of battle stations was given first place in the training, so that if the enemy should penetrate our forward lines, he would be met page 128by the Division on the Divisional Reserve line that it had constructed during April and May.

One Brigade and one Machine Gun Company were always kept at this line during the Divisional training.

The Battalion was visited by Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward on 30th June. Our two statesmen were very interested in the Battalion and its guns, which they inspected carefully. Afterwards both Sir Joseph and Mr. Massey addressed the Battalion upon non-political matters, and were also photographed with it.

When the Companies of the Battalion moved back from the line, Major L. M. Inglis, M.C., was detailed for duty on General Headquarters lines of defence which were then being constructed. His work consisted of reconnoitring many miles of positions and planning schemes of machine gun defence for Divisional sectors in the Third Army Area. He also had the actual sites for the machine gun emplacements marked on the ground and prepared specifications for them and for suitable dugouts.

Practically the whole of the schemes were adopted, and the necessary work was carried out by Chinese labour units working under the directions of the Royal Engineers. Major Inglis rejoined his Company when it again returned to the line.

The 1st July brought an end to the period of rest, the Division on that day commencing to take over the sector between Hébuterne in the south and Biez Wood in the north.

The machine gun defence of the sector had been carefully arranged. Two Companies were allotted to the two Brigade sub-sectors, with one Company in support, and one Company in Divisional Reserve. In accordance with the general scheme of machine gun defence all the guns of the Companies were placed to bring down a barrage in front of our forward positions at the opening of the enemy attack, and if the attack penetrated to then form belts of fire between the successive lines. The salient near Rossignol Wood was strongly covered by twenty-one guns, placed to enfilade forward of both flanks.

The 57th Machine Gun Battalion was relieved in the sector, the whole relief being completed by midnight on the 2nd July without casualties. Otago Company took over the right sub-sector and Wellington the left, Canterbury Company page break

The Battalion Listens to Political Leaders.
Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward addressing Machine Gunners in France.

page break

The Battalion. General Richardson, Sir Joseph Ward, Mr. Massey and General Russell in the foreground.
(The Sir Joseph is holding has no ammunition in it).

page 129took over the support positions, while Auckland Company became Divisional Reserve at Couin, where Battalion Headquarters had been established.

The Companies became very active with the artillery and mortars, in preparation of the Divisional operations to improve the unsatisfactory position of the forward line. The first operation was the advancing of our line a further 500 yards east of Hébuterne on a frontage of about 1500 yards by two Battalions of the 3rd (Rifle) Brigade. Zero hour was fixed for 3 p.m., and the guns of the three Companies in the line opened with the artillery.

The machine guns were not used to supplement the barrage, but to keep all the enemy's flank trenches under fire and to harass his communications. Fire was maintained for thirty minutes, during which time 98,000 rounds were expended.

The guns were not moved at once, in consequence of the successful advance. About 9.45 p.m. word was sent to the O.C. Otago Company that the enemy appeared to be collecting in Hawk Trench for a counter-attack. Two guns were sent forward to an advanced position from which direct fire against Hawk Trench could be obtained; 4000 rounds of direct fire were delivered into the trench by these two guns, while the remainder of the Company kept on the alert in case the counter-attack should develop.

During the operation only one casualty (a gunner gassed) was sustained by the Battalion.

The 16th gave the gunners some targets, the chief being an enemy carrying party of forty men.

The 17th and 18th were marked by heavy enemy shelling, causing several casualties, among them being 2nd Lieuts. W. Thomas and H. G. Johnston, who were wounded.

An instance of the sterling fighting qualities of the machine gunners was furnished during the heavy minnenwerfer bombardment that took place on 17th July. When Lieut. E. A. Cockroft was visiting one of his subsections in Faith Trench, in front of Hébuterne, he noticed the heavy minnenwerfer bombardment directed on the locality where his other subsection was—in Sonia Avenue. Being anxious about the fate of this subsection, Cockroft went round to investigate, with his O.C, who happened to be with him. They reached Sonia page 130Trench just as the bombardment ceased, and found it completely blown in for thirty or forty yards before the gun positions were reached. They met Sergt. Sherwood, who was in charge of the subsection, going methodically about clearing up the mess around the mouth of an occupied dugout that had been blown in. The severity of the bombardment was apparent from the fact that the whole ground round the emplacements was torn up with still reeking craters. By a miracle the two emplacements were intact, although the lips of the huge bomb craters were almost touching them.

As Sherwood feared an enemy raid would accompany the bombardment, he kept both guns manned, and distributed his men to avoid casualties. He remained with his leading gun numbers (Privates Blacklock and M. A. Churton), standing to their guns, which were kept mounted and laid throughout the bombardment.

The machine guns co-operated in the operations that finally resulted in the evacuation of Rossignol Wood and the strengthening of our line. The successful advance beyond Rossignol Wood necessitated a change of the machine gun positions. Accordingly on the 30th July, after a careful reconnaissance, most of the old positions were vacated and new positions taken up nearer to the front line, in conformity with the ground won from the enemy.

July was warm and wet. In the early part of the month an epidemic of influenza broke out and accounted for much sickness, but in the last ten days of the month the virulence of the disease and number of cases rapidly diminished. Apart from the epidemic, the health of the Battalion was excellent. During July a new scheme of signal communication was inaugurated; a section of the Divisional Signal Company under 2nd Lieut. L. J. Poff became attached to the Battalion, and in a few days connected all the sections in the forward areas by 'phone to their Company Headquarters and the Companies to Battalion Headquarters.

On 1st August, Auckland and Wellington Companies were in the forward sectors, Otago Company in support, and Canterbury Company back as Divisional Mobile Reserve. Battalion Headquarters was still at Couin, and the transport was centralised at Bus, in the Couin Valley, with the Reserve page 131Company and a special reserve of twenty-eight men from each of the other Companies. Major Parks, who was in command of the transport lines and reserve personnel, had an excellent canvas camp constructed with splinter-proof banks round all tents, bivouacs and horse lines. Fortunately the bomb defences of the camp were never tested, but their necessity was shown on a number of occasions when the enemy night flying 'planes dropped bombs close enough to cause a certain amount of consternation.

A very thorough sanitary system was arranged by Lieut. J. A. Jenkins, the Battalion Medical Offices', and a vigorous campaign was conducted to clear the area of the large swarms of flies that made their appearance as soon as the camp was established. A special "fly catcher" was appointed, who by means of numerous wires covered with a sticky substance hung in the cookhouses, stores, messes and other places where flies usually collect, gradually eliminated the pest, at the rate of 30,000 to 40,000 a day.

The new Divisional canteen scheme came into operation in August, under which all stores were purchased by O.C. Divisional Canteens, and issued to units proportionately. This meant a much more liberal supply to the Battalion than had been possible before, and permitted special commodities being issued to Companies to augment the ordinary Army ration.

One of the most gratifying events in August was the excellent report made by the A.D.V.S. (Chief Divisional Veterinary Officer) upon the Battalion's transport. The report made very complimentary remarks upon the arrangement of the horse lines, the cleanliness of the animals and the general efficiency of the transport officers and men.

The Companies in the line carried out extensive firing programmes against the roads and tracks used by the enemy during the early part of August, as well as a large amount of anti-aircraft work. Aeroplane photographs, which were issued to the officers in the line at frequent intervals, disclosed the tracks and roads most used by the enemy; and determined the following night's shooting. The examinations of prisoners taken during this period generally revealed that the night firing guns had been very effective.

In the day time all the available gunners were employed page 132on the construction of gun positions and bomb and shell proof shelters. The expert advice of the Engineers and Tunnellers was sought, and several emplacements and shelters were made under their supervision. The machine gun officers afterwards supervised the construction of a number of fine gun positions, dugouts and shelters. Some of the positions were so well screened from outside observation by the use of turf that they were indistinguishable at a distance of ten yards. The construction work of the gunners in the Hébuterne sector was very favourably commented upon by the infantry battalion commanders, who had previously thought that machine gunners did very little for themselves. This impression was excusable, because the machine gunners' construction work was so thoroughly concealed that unless the battalion commander specially looked for it, he would pass it by unnoticed. Although it was possible to conceal the positions from observation, it was found very difficult to keep them secret from the enemy while day firing was carried out. The noise of the firing would give the direction of the position to the enemy, and the steam and smoke that arose in spite of the most careful precautions helped to give away the location. The Germans indicated our supposed gun emplacements with the symbol of a smoking chimney, which gave rise to the adage, "Where there's smoke there's a machine gun."

The Companies of the Battalion were changed round on 3rd August; Otago Company went up from support and relieved Wellington Company, Canterbury took Otago's place in support, and Wellington on relief became Divisional Mobile Reserve.

Otago Company was at this time temporarily commanded by Capt. L. S. Cimino. In this narrative there has been no special mention of this officer's work, owing to the fact that he had for a lengthy period filled the unromantic, if somewhat difficult task of second in command. On the few occasions that he had command of a company he displayed a great capacity for organisation and sound tactics.

By this time the American Army was almost ready to take its place alongside the Armies of France and Britain; but before it did so, its officers and men were given a final period of training with various British and French units in the line.

Towards the end of July five officers and 114 other ranks from the 313th and 317th U.S. Machine Gun Battalions joined the New Zealand Machine Gun Battalion for instruction, and on 4th August the whole of the 313th Battalion became attached to our Battalion. Otago Company (less one section) was withdrawn from the right subsector, so that each of the American Companies could have a three days' tour of duty in the forward defences. The American Company was smaller than the British, only comprising twelve guns and 160 officers and men. The American gunners adapted themselves to their new and trying duties in a most remarkable way, and soon established a warm friendship with our men.

The American Battalion Commander and his staff received their baptism of fire while making an inspection of the Divisional sector with Lieut.-Col. Blair. Every portion was visited and many explanations were given. After returning to Battalion Headquarters the party summed up their impressions with the words "most illuminating."

After the 8th August conditions in the sector began to change and a feeling manifested itself that the enemy was about to make a graceful retirement if he could. The gunners increased their activity at night against the channels of communication, hoping that if the retirement was being arranged there would be a few less Huns to take part in it

It was not, however, until about 7.30 a.m. on the 14th August that it was definitely known that the withdrawal had commenced, nor was it certain to what extent the withdrawal would be made.

The infantry patrols were at once pushed forward, covered by a section of the Canterbury Company. The whole Divisional front was moving by midday, but with the exception of two sections of the Auckland Company under Lieut G. H. Tomline, the three Companies in the line remained in their positions. Until the intention of the enemy was properly established, and our plan of action decided upon, the defence of the sector could not be weakened.

On the 16th the Canterbury Company passed from the support line through Auckland and Otago Companies, and took up positions in the newly acquired territory to cover the advanced infantry battalions. This Company was only page 134called upon once, at 5 a.m. on the morning of the 18th, when the enemy's "Sturm Truppen" attacked the 1st Otagos in the new positions in Puisieux. The Canterbury guns opened, but cannot claim the credit of destroying the "Sturm Truppen." The infantry rifles and Lewis guns quickly did the job.

It now became clear that the enemy had lost the initiative; the Allied Armies had regained it, and intended to push home the advantage, in the hope that before the winter hampered operations the tottering fabric of the once great German Armies would be finally crushed, and peace would once more spread its wings over the war-weary world.