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The Spike: or, Victoria University College Review, June 1916

Editorial

Editorial.

"With such agents as Christian truth and intellectual culture at work, the possibilities of the future are indeed infinite; but till man becomes a very different being from what he is, the only guarantees against unjust aggression, I fear, must continue to be authoritative mediation in the instance, and armed intervention in the second."

Professor James Lorimer.

editorial

If there is one question more than another, which is coming into prominence to-day, if there is one question more than another, which, though there is the uneasy feeling that the time is not yet ripe for its discussion, is yet drawing more and more attention to itself, and which, at the conclusion of the present world-devastating conflict, must be food for the thought of all seasoning people—that is the question of the disarmament of the great powers. Much has been written on this topic in the past: before the commencement of the war one could not open the smallest and least important publication without coming into contact with a contribution on the subject: discussion is already rife as to the part which disarmament must play in the page 10 great peace councils which will ensue after the war in the great democracy of the United States of America disarmament is, and has been for months past, the one topic, upon which leaders of American thought have not ceased to dilate. When President Woodrow Wilson said that "there was such a thing as being too proud to fight." The expressed not, as has been so often represented to us, the feeling and ill-considered convictions of a few, but the conclusions of a very large number of his countrymen. When Mr. H. G. Wells rushed into print in his "War That Will End War" and expressed the passionate belief that this war would end all wars, that this war must see the end of the hideous race for armaments, that disarmament must be the fruit of the present conflict, one inevitably realised that Mr. wells was the mouthpiece of a considerable section of his countrymen, that his views were probably not local or personal, but, in a greater or less degree, general. It is therefore well worth while to take up for discussion the subject of disarmament.

We are labouring under no fond delusion that we are going to throw a flood of new light upon the subject; in point of fact we are not going to advance an argument in favour of disarmament or in favour of the increase of armaments, but we aspire impersonally, impersonally, impartially, and without bias, to discuss those factors which have a bearing upon the whole question. "What we want," says Matthew Arnold," is a free play of thought upon our routine notions, spontaneity of consciousness, sweetness and light." Our notions as to disarmament are essentially of a routine order. Hence the need for a free play of thought upon those notions.

In those essays of Matthew Arnold, from which we have already quoted, and from which we shall continue freely to quote, the author speaks of Hellenism and Hebraism. "The governing idea of Hellenism, he says, is spontaneity of consciousness; that of Hebraism, strictness of conscience." Hellenistic, man's moral activities and impulses; and after tracing the origin of Hellenism to the Greek ideal of the perfect conscience, he proceeds to show how at different periods in the life of the individual the Hellenistic and the Hebraistic influences are predominant. page 11 Further than this, he shows that all through the history of each nation, the national activities, whether in literary, social, or religious direction, have been determined by the nature of the influence—Hellenistic or Hebraistic—for the time being predominant within the particular nation. It is of paramount importance for us to remember that these two influences have been present at the same time in at least one period of English history—the one, a main stream running through the national thought and life; the other, a tributary stream, crossing the current of the main one, deflecting its course. This is just what occurred after the Renascence. Hellenism, dammed for hundreds of years by the Hebraistic influence of Christianity, had burst its confining bonds, and was sweeping in a grand stream over Europe. But a side stream entered the main river, checking its course, hindering its onward sweep. This cross current is most commonly known as Puritanism. And the unhappy result has been that since the 17th Century, in England, the Hellenistic and the Hebraistic influences have been mutually active, and each has proved a check upon the progress of the other. "For more than two hundred years the main stream of man's advance has moved towards knowing himself and the world, seeing things as they are, spontaneity of consciousness; the main impulse of a great part, and that the strongest part, of our nation has been towards strictness of conscience. They have made the secondary the principal at the wrong moment, and the principal they have at the wrong moment treated as secondary. This contravention always must produce, a certain confusion and false movement, of which we are now beginning to feel, in almost every direction, the inconvenience. In all directions our habitual causes of action seem to be losing efficaciousness, credit, and control, both with others and even with ourselves."

Now it seems to us that the subject of disarmament is one, as to which there has been in England much "confusion and false movement." It seems to us that before the war. British prestige was surely on the decline, owing to the enervating changes in Britain's foreign policy caused by the domination influence upon Liberalism of the Puritanical section of the British electorate. As we have said, we desire to view subject impartially, but in so page 12 doing, our conclusions have led us into a position very far removed from that of the advocated of disarmament.

In order to dispose of the first cause of confusion, which arises, we must first dispose of the question—is the popular demand for disarmament to-day the product of the Hellenistic or of the Hebraistic element in England life? It seems sufficiently clear that the answer must be—the demand for disarmament is almost entirely attributable to the Hebraistic element in England. We do not propose to go into this preliminary point at length, but there are several good reasons, which justify the conclusion to which we have come. In the first place it is noteworthy that the demand in England for disarmament has become most pronounced during the last decade, in which the Liberal party has held the reins of office; and we fancy that most people are agreed that the main support of the Liberal parts in England is the faction, which, for want of a better name, we have termed the Puritanical. If we were to carry our inquiries back so far as the South African War, we should find that that war most bitterly opposed in England by the Quaker cum cocoa cum Puritan press (of which the paper edited by Mr. A. G. Gardiner is a typical example) upon the ground that any further extension of British territory was inimical to the interests of the country. We suggest that the excellent result of that war, not only for England, but also for South Africa itself and for the Empire, become more and more noticeable as the present terrible conflict progresses. Nevertheless the little Englanders, whose attitude over the South African War proved them to be egregiously in the wrong, upon the conclusion of that war and ever since have not ceased to direct their energies into a still more dangerous channel—the advocacy of disarmament. An instance of the lengths, to which this party would go in the interests of peace at any price occurred in the columns of a typical cocoa paper, which, two days before England declared war in Germany, came out with the naked and shameless statement—"Truth to tell, the causes which precipitated the present European conflict, are not worth the bones of a British soldier." And we have the latest declaration of the champion of the cocoa press—Mr. A. G. Gardiner—that it were better to lose the war than resort to conscription. We do not wish to labour the point further. It is the puritan element in England page 13 that has been most prominent in the demand for disarmament, and it is the Puritan element that has been all-powerful in the councils of the Liberal party. We think that the point for which we are contending will not be seriously questioned. And that being so, it remains for us to consider what Hellenism would have to say upon the subject. That is to say, we must take into consideration all those factors, which suggest themselves as having a bearing upon the subject of disarmament. Let us allow our thought to play freely over those factors, and see whether we cannot arrive at some rule approximating to the "firm intelligible law of things."

The first factor, which we wish to consider is the moral views of civilized states upon war. The present European conflict has thrown into full relief the fact that there exists in almost every civilized nation to-day a national ideal of the morality of war, a national ideal, and that that ideal is not necessarily common to all civilised nations. In the United States of America the national ideal is undoubtedly peace: we might almost say—"peace, at any price." The attitude of Mr. Bryan—that nothing could justify the United States in entering into the war—is unquestionably indorsed by large number of his countrymen. Even if it were not, there is ample evidence to justify us in suggesting that the American view is that war should be resorted to by a nation only as a final and inevitable weapon of redress. What degree of immorality the United States of America would consider a casus belli it is difficult to say. It is clear that the Americans do not regard a direct insult from another nation as good ground for war. It is clear that they do not regard the murder of American citizens by a foreign nation as sufficient ground: and, according to Mr. Roosevelt, it is clear that Americans are not prepared to resort to war in defence of a treaty, to the maintenance and support of which they have pledged themselves. Nevertheless was must assume that there is some supreme act of immorality, which Americans would deem sufficient to justly them in dirtying their hands with the vulgar business of war. This then we take to be the national sentiment of the United States in regard to war. The difficulty that we have found in defining the attitude of the United Stated in relation to war is not met with when we turn our attention to European states. England has page 14 in defence of her citizens, in defence of treaty rights, in defence of oppressed people. The same may be said of France. Italy entered the war for many reasons, at least one being that she desired to recover her lost provinces. Serbia was prepared to sacrifice everything, except her nationality. But rather than surrender that, she fought. Germany fought to gain her "place in the sun." Her dream of a Teutonic world-empire also dazzled Austria. Russia pleaded the necessity of defending Serb Slav nationality. Japan came in in pursuance of treaty arrangements. Thus we see that, with the doubtful excepting of the United States of America, the idea is prevalent in every civilized states, in every one of the great powers to-day that recourse to war is always justifiable upon the occurrence of certain undefined, but nevertheless very definite, events. It is obvious that this attitude of civilised states towards war has a very important bearing upon the problem of disarmament. While any one state alone is prepared to resort to war as a result of any real or fancied grievance, no state that has faith in its national ideals and in its destiny could dare to enter upon a scheme of disarmament. Thus we see that the indispensable preliminary condition to disarmament must be the profound and real conviction throughout the world, that warfare is an immoral and unsound method of setting a dispute. In other words, progress towards disarmament is conditioned by our morality. Every moral advance that we make, brings disarmament nearer. Our conclusion and international morality disarmament is out of the question, but that progress towards disarmament will naturally result from progress in morality.

The second factor, which we take up for discussion, is the presence in the world to-day of peoples uncivilised, only partly civilised, or of a civilisation different from and irreconcilable with European civilisation. Imagine the position in Africa before the outbreak of the war. Here in a vast continent, with but few settlements of Europeans, were large numbers of uncivilised tribes, whose inherited instinct was war, whose moral creed might be summed up in the phrase enunciated by the German Chancellor—"Might is right." Among these races peace was maintained, right was enforced, as in such cases it must always be enforced— page 15 made it clear many times that she is prepared to go to war by the sword, we have suggested Africa as an instance of a country inhabited very largely by uncivilised peoples. A consideration of the internal state of such a country seems to us to reveal at once a great stumbling-block in the path of those. Who call for disarmament. As the "Round Table" has wisely pointed out, the position of Great Britain in regard to her remark holds good in respect of all European states, that have colonial possessions inhabited by uncivilised people. The trust is a sacred one—the teaching the barbarian "sweeter manners, purer laws," the gradual amelioration of his condition, an amelioration not only physical, but spiritual and moral. Any European state that refrained from performing such a duty would be adjudged infamous at the bar of the world. But, and this is the point, in such a primitive condition of society, the controlling authority must always have available armed force for the enforcement of peace, for the prevention of war. For instance Britain, for many years past, has had to maintain garrisons on the North Western frontiers of India to check predatory raids by border tribes, and revolts by disaffected tribes. Unless Britain is to depart from India, frankly leaving the maintenance of peace, and the development of the people to the inhabitants themselves, she must continue to maintain a comparatively large forced in India until such time as the condition of Indian peoples, and of peoples contiguous to India, is such as to render warfare impossible. That is to say, we have come to the same conclusion as we earlier came to, namely that the uncivilised must become civilised, and his views be such as to cause him to regard war as immoral and wrongful, before it would be practical and wise to indulge in disarmament. So that we are thrown back upon our former conclusion—that disarmament is conditioned by the culture and morality of the people. And we think that the same conclusion must be come to, if we consider the effect upon our problem of the existence of peoples civilised, but of a civilisation different from ours. For instance, we in New Zealand can never blind our eyes to the fact of the menace to our civilisation by Asiatic peoples. How can we seriously advocate disarmament in New Zealand with the knowledge that not far off is a people, whose moral code is page 16 certainly not marked by any strongly determined pacific tendency, whose present territory has proved too small for its people, whose eye has already been cast upon Australasia as a suitable sphere for colonisation, and whose moral, political, and social ideals form a marked contrast with the moral, political, and social ideals of the free democracies of Australia and New Zealand ?

The next two factors, which we take up for discussion are closely allied to that one, which we have just discussed, and they call for consideration in conjunction with it. Let us state them as being firstly, the existence of habitable, but uninhabited spaces of territory, and secondly the fact that some nations to-day, which evince the greatest prosperity and are remarkable for the virility of their peoples, are penned up in territorial limits, which prevent that expansion for which they obviously seem destined. The two facts uppermost in our mind are the vast expanse of country known as the Northern Territory of Australia, and the rapid growth of the population of Japan, combined with Japan's material prosperity, her lack of colonies, wherein to "dump" her surplus population, and her absurdly narrow territorial limits. It is perhaps this aspect of the question, which appeals most strongly to us colonials, we cannot, and it is only right that we should not forget, that in Australia and New Zealand there are great tracts of country, which are primarily suitable for settlement, but which are now lying idle. The Australian is well aware of this fact, and long ago made up his mind as to the policy, he is going to adopt in regard to the Northern Territory. Now the population of Japan is increasing at such a rate that that country is compelled to look outside her territorial limiters for space, to which to transplant her citizens. There is no reason to suppose that Japan is governed in her foreign relations by pacific principles. She has already had a sharp clash with the United States of America over the question of Japanese settlement in California, and there is good reason to believe that war was only averted with the very greatest difficulty. Were we to embark upon any scheme of disarmament, we should be compelled in a few years either to admit the Asiatic races freely, or to go to war in a state of hopeless inefficiency against a nation splendidly equipped, and prepared for war. This is perhaps the most potent argument page 17 against disarmament. But the interesting questing nevertheless remains whether we should exclude any of the Asiatic races from the Colonies, if their cultural attainments and moral views were uniform with ours. As we understand it, the objection to the immigration of the Japanese and Chinese is due to the fact that their form of civilisation is different from ours, and in many instances must be regarded as revolutionary from our standpoint. The danger is that those features of civilisation, which we most cherish, may become destroyed, if brought into contact with another form of civilisation. But were the moral outlook, and the culture of Japan, for instance, exclusion of the Japanese? We can see none. So that it would seem that the objection to the immigration of the Japanese is based upon the fact that there is a lack of uniformity, of unanimity, between their moral and cultural attainments, and ours. But were these difficulties removed, a very great and valid objection to disarmament would be removed. Here again then we are brought to the same conclusion as we earlier then we are brought to the same conclusion as we earlier came to, namely that progress towards disarmament is conditioned by the moral code of the nations. But there is a marked distinction to be noted. Our earlier conclusion was that there must be progress in morality before disarmament can become possible, but here we see that there must be not only progress but uniformity. The Japanese may have advanced further than we have. We have no standard by which we may judge whether they have or not. But we do know that their moral code is not uniform with ours, and that while that lack of uniformity remains, we cannot seriously consider disarmament.

We have left ourselves but brief space, in which to mention the two last factors, that we propose to discuss—Socialism, and the improvement of the instruments of warfare due to the progress of scientific discovery. The importance of the Socialistic movement is not likely to be underestimated to-day. The only voice raised in Germany against the present war was that of the Socialists. To a less extent the Socialist made himself felt in England and in France. Rightly considered, in the future, the influence of Socialism will undoubtedly be used against war, and, in the interest of disarmament. But whatever may be the influence of Socialism in the future, the present war page 18 has revealed the fact that in France, to a great extent in England, and to a great extent in Germany, the claims of nationality at the present time weigh more with the Socialist than the claims of Socialism. The fact must also be remembered, that in one of these three countries, an neither as an international force has Socialism attained yet to sufficient strength to enforce disarmament. Two things must therefore take place, before Socialism become convinced that the claims of nationality are subordinate to the claims of Socialism, and secondly, the growth of Socialism must be such as to cause Socialism to become sufficiently powerful to enforce a decree of disarmament among the nations, and to prevent recourse to war to settle international disputes. Now before these two conditions taken place not only in national, but in international morality. And it may be that the mortal disarmament can be realized, may occur in the form of a change, rather than an advance—that change being to a Socialistic state of society. Upon this point we prefer to call ourselves agnostics. We do not propose to take up the role of prophet. In any case our conclusion remains the same, and is practically unmodified—that there must be a change in the moral views that are now current before it would be safe to experiment upon a scheme of disarmament.

The last factor, which we have mentioned is, in our view, not important, but we include it for the sake of completeness. It is sometimes contended that warfare must very soon cease, because instruments of destruction are becoming so improved that it will be a practical possibility for one nation completely to destroy another. It seems to us that nations will continue to wage war, no matter how destructive weapons may become, just so long as such nations continue to believe in the justifiableness of war. If a nation given up warfare as a means of securing redress, or of enforcing right, it will be not because that nation has become appalled by the destructive nature of the machines of war, but because the destructive nature of the machines of war have emphasized the horrors of war, and proved its immorality.

page 19

We set out to investigate the factors, which have a bearing upon the problem of disarmament, and to endeavour to arrive at a conclusion which would approximate as nearly to the truth as possible. "The uppermost idea with Hellenism, says Matthew Arnold, is to see things as they really are." This is what we have endeavored, however inadequately, to do. Consider from whatever point one will, it seems to us that the question of war and peace will always be determined by the moral factor. When the moral views of all nations are the same, when those views are definitely pacific, when the cultural attainments of all people are equal and uniform—then, and not till then, will disarmament become possible.