Sir William Martin to the Hon. the Native Minister.

I have the honour to report to you that the notes I undertook to prepare on the best mode of working the Native Lands Act are now completed and in print. Some copies are forwarded by to-day's mail; the residue will be sent by the next. In these notes I have endeavoured to set forth the several parts of the system to be pursued in their ordinary relation to one another, confining myself to questions of a political kind. Therefore I have contented myself with pointing out that, for the success of this undertaking, we require first of all a state of rest and peace, without inquiring how rest and peace are to be attained. But knowing your desire to bring the Act into operation, and considering the benefits which may be expected to accrue to both races from its success, I have been led to reflect seriously on the way in which the pacification of the country may be effected.

I now beg leave to offer for your consideration a few words on this point as a sort of postscript to the notes, praying that the paramount importance of the subject may be my excuse. It is my conviction that the course of proceeding devised in 1863 is not the best for the purpose. We ought not to be surprised if it be found that measures, adopted in a season of excitement and panic, do not approve themselves now, after a fuller consideration and a longer experience.

The necessities which press upon us at this time are the following: It is necessary to quiet the minds of the Natives, many of whom, in different parts of the country, apprehend that the part they have taken may expose them some day to serious consequences, and therefore seem to have no interest in the restoration of peace. Also, it is necessary to get rid of the grievous burdens which must continue to be borne by ourselves so long as we are holding possession of land by mere force, and many of the former occupants are sitting by, saying (as it was expressed at Hangatiki) "neither Yea nor Nay" to our doings. Further, it is necessary that the attempt of the Natives to set up a separate and independent Government for themselves be seen to have failed so signally as to leave no temptation to repeat the experiment.

Now, Sir, to my mind, the only direct and sure mode of reaching all these results is by the way of an open and express cession of land, accompanied on our part by an amnesty large enough to include at any rate all persons who have committed no offence against us beyond that of bearing arms in the war. A piece of territory being once so ceded, no hope or thought of recovering possession of it at some future time will be entertained by the hostile Natives. By the abandonment of a delusive hope their own minds will be so far set at rest. Thenceforward our possession will be undisturbed, and a great and continued outlay, which we must otherwise incur, will become unnecessary. As to the Maori King and the hostile tribes, the most manifest proof of failure will be such a cession. To have to retire before the large force which we have had in the field against them may not be regarded by themselves or other tribes as a complete defeat; but to be constrained to cede land in the centre of the King's territory, and publicly to cut themselves off from all hope of recovering it, would be an undeniable proof of defeat and failure. I remember how strongly the need of such an amnesty (or murunga hara, as they call it) was felt, and how the subject was discussed in Waikato, after the cessation of the former hostilities. There is ground for hope that a like feeling may be taken advantage of for granting the land, and that, through the intervention of friendly chiefs, a settlement such as I have here suggested may be brought about for the real interests of all.