The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Personal Volume
Appendix No. 8
Appendix No. 8.
But neither the New Zealand nor the Canadian laws can be so construed as to warrant a claim by the Upper Chambers of eithor Parliament to "equal rights in matters of aid and supply to those which are enjoyed and exercised by the Commons' Houso of Parliament of the United Kingdom;" for such a claim, if insisted upon, would, to a great extent, derogate from and diminish the constitutional rights of the representative Chamber." (Pp. 476-7.)
.... justifies the claim of the Imperial House of Commons (and, by parity of reasoning, of all representative Chambers framed after the model of that House) to a page 97 general control over public revenue and expenditure—a control which has been authoritatively defined in the following words: "All aids and supplies, and aids to his Majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the Commons; and it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords." This parliamentary principle, moreover, has been generally, if not universally, admitted in all self-governing British colonies by the adoption in both Legislative Chambers of Standing Orders which refer to the rules, forms, usages, and practices of the Imperial Parliament as the guide to each House in cases unprovided for by local regulations.
(1.) | We are of opinion that, independently of "The Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865," the Legislative Council was not constitutionally justified in amending "The Payments to Provinces Bill, 1871," by striking out the disputed clause 28. We think the Bill was a money Bill, and such a Bill as the House of Commons in this country would not have allowed to be amended by the House of Lords; and that the limitation proposed to be placed by the Legislative Council on Bills of aid or supply is too narrow, and would not be recognized by the House of Commons in England. |
(2.) | We are of opinion that "the Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1865," does not confer on the Legislative Council any larger powers in this respect than it would otherwise have possessed. We think that this Act was not intended to affect, and did not affect, the legislative powers of either House of the Legislature in New Zealand. |
(3.) | We think that the claims of the House of Representatives contained in the message to the Legislative Council are well founded, subject, of course, to the limitation that the Legislative Council have a perfect right to reject any Bill passed by the House of Representatives having for its object to vary the management or appropriation of money prescribed by an Act of the previous session. (Pp. 478-9.) |
This opinion is a direct and unimpeachable settlement of the point at issue. . . . The relative rights of both Houses in matters of aid and supply must be determined in every British colony by the ascertained rules of British constitutional practice. The local Acts upon the subject must be construed in conformity with that practice wherever the Imperial policy is the accepted guide. A claim on the part of a colonial Upper Chamber to the possession of equal rights with the Assembly to amend a money Bill would be inconsistent with the ancient and undeniable control which page 98 is exorcised by the Imperial House of Commons over nil financial measures. It is therefore impossible to concede to an Upper Chamber the right of amending a money Bill upon the mere authority of a local statute, when such Act admits of being construed in accordance with the well-understood laws and usages of the Imperial Parliament.
On the 3rd of July, 1678, the Commons resolved, "That all aids and supplies and aids to His Majesty in Parliament are the solo gift of the Commons; and all Bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the Commons; and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the Commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such Bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords."
It is upon this latter resolution that all proceedings between the two Houses, in matters of supply, are now founded. The principle is acquiesced in by the Lords; and, except in cases where it is difficult to determine whether a matter be strictly one of supply or not, no serious difference can well arise the Lords rarely attempt to make any but verbal alterations, in which the sense or intention is not affected.
On the 30th July, 1867, it was very clearly put by Earl Grey and Viscount Eversley that the right of the Lords to omit a clause which they were unable to amend, relating to a separate subject, was equivalent to their right to reject a Bill which they could not amend without an infraction of the privileges of the Commons.
No doubt the other House might raise a question of privilege on their part; hut with that their Lordships had nothing to do. If their Lordships rejected this clause they would interfere in the question of the incidence of taxation; but their Lordships were not the judges of the privileges of the other House or what they would do in such a case.
That is, as I understand it, the Lords had the indisputable right to reject the clause as they might reject a money Bill, but subject to encountering the resistance of the Commons on the score of the violation of their privileges. I have now 'given my opinion frankly, and I have only to say that, if the House of Representatives were to waive its privileges in this instance, I cannot see how it can refuse to waive them in all others whenever the Legislative Council chooses to encroach upon the special functions of this House in regard to money Bills.