Thoughts on Ultimate Problems
A Synoptic Statement of Two Theodicies
Mr. Frankland's Speculations
sole driving force of the cosmic process
The sole driving force of the cosmic process is the cosmic craving to product joy.
the sole factor which makes the future follow from the past—the sole factor which determines the relation of the "next" to the "immediately preceding") is logical implication, i.e.
the logical possibility of drawing conclusions
. What appear to us1
as the relations of "before" and "after," are really the logical
relations in the constituents of an all-inclusive Personal Intellect which is behind
Time. The logical relations between the components of His mind, are constitutive
of Time. Hence the perfect uniformity of causation in Nature, and the inexorableness of natural law.
This preceded all phenomena; underlies all phenomena.
Such is the "driving force" of the Cosmos if by driving force be meant that which connects
successive moments of the cosmic
existence. The "connection" is, fundamentally, a logical
one. It is the connection between premiss and conclusion. But if by "driving force" is meant the totality of original premisses
—then "joy" is a part of the driving force, and "craving" (in the abstract) is another part of it. The "craving to produce joy" is already something composite, however slight its complexity. Still, being so small and immediate a remove from absolute simplicity, it must (on the theory that chronology is divine logic) have existed almost from the beginning, and it has doubtless pervaded the whole inorganic world (to say nothing of the world of life), though perhaps not as exclusively as Mr. Weeks' theodicy requires.
At first it was blind; by reaching forth for satisfaction it became more and more intelligent; even as in the animal from the lowest type to the highest, the reaching forth for satisfaction produces intelligence. For the law of psychology is first cravings then effort then intelligence.
Quite correct, except that—in the most abstract and rudimentary sense
—"intelligence" must have existed from the beginning, because the mere mutual relation
of two or more mental states (and nothing except mental states and their relations can ever have existed) constitutes
"intelligence" of this most abstract and rudimentary type.
The cosmic craving is necessarily benevolent, because only through the benevolent will could it satisfy itself: God cannot enjoy except in the enjoyment of sentient being.
This is quite true of the "cosmic craving to produce joy"
But there are other
kinds of "cosmic craving," however nearly universal (through automatic selection as a very stable and conservative channel of intellec-
tion in a world of low intelligence but with myriads of subordinate egos embosomed within the Universal Ego) the craving to produce joy may be in the living
world below man
. We do not know that it is as neatly universal in the inorganic world : and we do
know that it is not nearly as universal in the human
world, where high intelligence gives the (dialectically suggested) diabolical an extensive opportunity for exercise without early automatic elimination, An Ivan the Terrible, for example, is possible in the human but would be impossible in the sub-human world.
Pain is the non-success of the cosmic craving to create joy, and is the result of a primitive mis-action of that craving while it was still unintelligent.
Pain is something more positive
than this. It is related to "joy" as minus one
is related to plus one—not
is related to plus one. It is the dialectically suggested opposite
of joy. That mere fact (its logical relation to joy) is enough to bring it into existence at the beginning of the cosmic process, before high-grade Intelligence had arisen, and it will require benevolent high-grade Intelligence to eliminate it—especially as malevolent
high-grade Intelligence has been (dialectically) generated in the meanwhile and pari passu
with the benevolent high-grade Intelligence, and is, from its nature, striving for the continuance and intensification of pain. Until the genesis of the human race, the level of intelligence was too low to permit of the tragic to a degree that offset the general preponderance
of joy as secured by automatic selection, and creation might rightly on the whole be pronounced to be "very good," But soon after the genesis of a mammal that, by language and consequent sociality, was entitled to be called "human" this was no longer the case. Although the evidence available goes to show that at first the new talking animal was truly "social" (many surviving primitive folk being, as Spencer has pointed out, more so than any "civilised" race), the increase of intelligence among the individuals
composing the new species soon suggested opportunities for the strong to exploit1
the weak to an extent that was impossible among sub-human animals (where a violent death is usually the worst2
fate in store for the weak at the hands of the strong, and starvation at the hands of nature), while—unfashionable as it is in this age to maintain it—the "inversive" half of the cosmic
intelligence possessed in the human brain an instrument enabling it to initiate even darker tragedies which, from the nature of the case, are necessarily without a parallel in the sub-human world.
Still, in spite of the positive nature of pain, and the positive nature of much of its causation, there is
a great deal of it that is "the result of a primitive mis-action of that craving while it was still unintelligent," When, in a recent catastrophe, it was asked, "Where was God?" the true1
answer would have read, "Undergoing the logical unfoldment of the original experiences of His being." All events that happen are the thoughts
of God, but not all events are the result of His will
, and some events are not the result of any
will. Thus, though the "craving to produce joy" is a
"primum movens" (not the only
one, however), very
much of its "primitive" action is liable to be a "mis-action" permitting the
occurrence of that which is the opposite of "joy."
The present drift in the physics of the minute is to-ward stating the atom as an arrangement of particles of electricity—so to speak—thug resolving back the whole phenomena of the universe into a single physical force.
Yes: and it is something more than a "drift." The possibility of explaining "mass" (the fundamental property of matter) as a function of "electric charge," is apparently so absolute and the reverse interpretation so impossible, that we may take it that probably both ordinary gross matter and also æther, will be banished (in the name of the principle of "parcimony," which forbids the needless multiplication of hypothetical entities) from the universe as
having any existence distinct from "electro charge." This "electric charge" is, how ever, apparently not a single
physical entity but an alternative between two opposite
some things, called respectively "positive" and "negative" electricity, though the evidence seems to show that these adjectives might more appropriately have been transposed (so much is this the case that those physicists who still hope to rehabilitate the old Franklin theory of a single electrical "fluid" would unhesitatingly affirm that a redundancy
of the single fluid constituted a so-called "negative" charge, and vice versa)
. In any case, the relation between the two opposite electricities is not an equi
lateral or interchangeable relation (lite that be tween north and south, or between "clock-wise "and" counterclockwise" rotation), but a uni
lateral or non-reversible relation like that1
between past and future, between
up and down, or between positively and negatively curved space. Its resemblance to the relation between the last named is so close, that I venture the surmise (which harmonises with a hint thrown out long ago by the late Professor Clifford) that the same principle of parcimony which threatens to banish matter and aether in favour of electricity, will yet banish matter, æther, and electricity, in favour of space
, the varied and changing geometries of which will be found adequate to account for all the phenomena of the material world. I further venture, also in harmony with a hint of Clifford's, to surmise that these geometries of physical space wilt be found not to be truly "continuous," but to be merely the varied and changing "tactical" arrangements of a discrete
manifold consisting of a finite number of indivisible units (true "atoms" in the etymological sense). "Parcimony" will thus be further satisfied, for the notion of extension (at present considered ultimate) will by this simplification be subsumed under the truly ultimate notion of relative position
. The above simplification would reduce all physical facts to facts of nextness or contiguity between indivisible units. They would be analogous to the facts of nextness or contiguity subsisting between the minutest of our simultaneously experienced visual sensations. It is well known that there are minima visibilia;
and the visual sensations corresponding to these,
constitute a discrete manifold having a [unclear: finite]
number of elements. Moreover it is one belonging to the category of those manifold which, in my "Theory of Discrete Mani folds," I have called "nets," i.e.
manifolds in which the return to a starting point is always possible without the retracing of steps. This property also characterises the physical cosmos. The duplication of that property in our "visual field," and in that alone of our simultaneous sense-experiences is what makes vision the only one of our senses that is adapted to give rough immediate information as to the structure of the cosmos without the necessity of patient
I take it this single physical farce is the phenomenal side of a single mental force, and that in this last we have the cause and source of the entire cosmic process.
exploration (such as would be necessary to a race of the blind). The physical cosmos must of course be the phenomenal side1
of some complex of mental experiences of the Universal Self. We may legitimately infer that this complex is, at all events in the mathematical relation of its parts
, imperfectly mirrored in the simultaneous visual sensations of a human being or other seeing animal, and it may therefore be called—in something more than a merely metaphorical sense—the Divine Vision
. The structure of the material world is what God sees
it to be. The experience of the Universal Ego, in this act of what, for want of a better
word, we here call "vision," may be qualitatively
from the colour sensations experienced, in vision, by a human
or animal ego; but in respect of the mathematical arrangement of its parts
, the divivision is mirrored (though only roughly [unclear: a]
inadequately) in the human vision. [unclear: A]
it is in this sense that Berkeley was [unclear: n]
quite right in denying to the so-[unclear: call]
"primary" qualities of matter an [unclear: existe]
outside our minds, though of course he [unclear: will]
quite right to deny the existence of [unclear: the]
or any other "qualities" outside all [unclear: mini]
The mental experiences of the Universal [unclear: Eg]
at any one moment of Time, form a [unclear: matg]
; matically connected whole, in which [unclear: o]
simultaneous mental experiences are [unclear: e]
cessively small parts whereof our [unclear: visua]
experiences most nearly mirror the [unclear: whole]
—not perhaps in respect of quality
, [unclear: but]
certainly in respect of arrangement
). [unclear: The]
mathematical connections of God's [unclear: simul]
taneous mental experiences (or, at all events, of that portion of which the physical cosmos is the phenomenal side) are what constitute Space
. But the mental experiences of God through all Time
, form a logically
connected whole, and it is the logical connections of His mental experiences which are constitutive of Time
. It is these logical connections, therefore, that constitute the "cosmic process": and, when we speak of the "cause and source" of the "entire cosmic process" we may mean either (a) this divine logic
, which connects the successive moments of existence, or (b) the multiplicity of original premisses—all the simple undecom-
posable "qualities" plus all the simple undecomposable "relations" between them—from which the Universal Reason starts. Only in sense (a)
can it be said that a "single mental force" 13 the "cause and source of the entire cosmic process."
What meaning can the term' mental force have? I can see but one possible meaning for this term; it is that which is expressed in various phases by the words 'craving,' desire,' purpose," 'will.'
No. If by "mental force" you mean mental antecedent
, then any mental state (and not merely "craving" "desire," "purpose," or "will") is a mental force; while, if by mental force you mean that which connects
antecedent and consequent, then only
divine logic is a mental force. Only
the universal Reason
propels the cosmos, and that is why rational creatures embedded within it can draw valid inferences respecting it—argue legitimately from the known to the unknown. Only by assuming the cosmos to be ultimately reasonable
(not, indeed, in its original premisses, which are alogical1
but in its principle of sequence
or causation), can we avoid being stalled in universal scepticism.2
I take it then that the single homogeneous reality which existed from all eternity, before process began, was, to use the lowest term, craving. The immediate question is—craving for what?
"Reality" is not homogeneous, though it has a principle of unity in that its parts are related within a single Self, i.e.
exist as the mental experiences of that Self But there is irreducible qualitative diversity among these parts, nor could the perfectly homogeneous ever by any conceivable dislectical or credible physical process have given rise to the heterogeneous. The total number of irreducible "kinds" or [unclear: unde]
composable "qualities," though finite, [unclear: ha]
from the beginning been at least
as large [unclear: a]
it is now : for, while original "kinds" may conceivably be eliminated by dialectical negation, no fundamentally new "kind" can possibly be introduced by a process which essentially consists in quantitative
involution and rearrangement. No fundamentally
or "quality" : but among the quantitative changes which the Time-process permits, blending
is not as impossible one, and it is capable of giving rise to "kinds" which might be mistaken
by an ego of limited experience for fundamental or irreducible ones. The so-called "secondary" colour sensations show that the process has been actual: and an ego which experienced "purple" but had never experienced "red" or "blue," would probably regard purple as a primary sensation. Yet, as introspection assures us that its quality stands between
the qualities of "red" and "blue," it follows that it is quantitatively related
to "red" and "blue": for "betweenness" is one of the most fundamental of all the quantitative relations, as a perusal of Professor Hilbert's "Foundations of Geometry" will make evident. Hence it can be dialectically generated from the premisses "red" and "blue." And let it not be said that "blue" can be dialectically generated in the same way from "purple" and "green." Introspection does not see purple and green in blue, though it sees blue and red in purple Moreover "reality" not only is, and always has been, heterogeneous; but it has not "existed from eternity." If the chronological process is, in its nature, a logical
one, it must root back in first premisses; and that means an absolute beginning of all mental history, or—on the phenomenal side—an absolute beginning to the cosmos.
The three great terms of the cosmic series are:- first, mineral; second, vegetable; third, animal. And it is reasonable to suppose that the mental movement—the craving which is the cause of this series—is in the line of the series itself; that it is a craving toward that which characterises the Latest term of the series.
As already indicated, the "series" is not caused entirely by any single "craving," nor even entirely by "cravings" in their
totality. It is "caused," in one sense, by all the undecomposable feelings or "kinds" which happen to exist; and, in another sense, by the Universal Reason or Logic which unfolds the implications or possibilities of multiplication or other quantitative relationships that can exist among these "kinds." But the test proposed by Mr. Weeks would be a valid one for determining not
the nature of an imagined single cause, but the nature of the strongest
or most central
among the plurality of causes that have been at work, and the application of this test, as indicated in my paper on "Atheism, Theism, and Pantheism," establishes joy [unclear: a]
the strongest and most central of the perfectly simple causes, and the joy-giving
impulse as the strongest and most central [unclear: of]
those causes which are second in order [unclear: of]
What then characterises the latest term of the series, i.e. sentient life? We can picture the universe of sentient life as a continuous stream made up of an immense number of separate threads of sensation : each little thread has its beginning winds in among the others, and ends. But the current is continuous; something the way that a rope while continuous itself, is composed of short, individual threads. Now lot us imagine that we could take a cross section of this entire current, As we looked at the cross section we should see an immense number of little disks, these representing the individual threads of Sensation—of lives. Let us suppose that red is the colour which represents joy, and black: the colour which represents extreme pain. Then we should find an incalculable preponderance of red and rosy disks, with comparatively speaking a very few of black or grey disks scattered among them. I take it therefore that the net result of the cosmic process to the present moment is an immense volume of agreeable sensation, mixed, however, with threads of pain.
The kingdom of animal life can certainly be pictured just as Mr. Weeks here says—as "a continuous stream made up of an immense number of separate threads of sensation." But it is too dogmatic to affirm that each thread "ends," however profound may be the change in the character and constitution of the "thread" that synchronises with the dissolution of that corresponding structure in the phenomenal world which we call the physical organism. The "threads" of personal identity have not, necessarily, what mathematicians call [unclear: a]
strict "one to one correspondence" with the individual animal organisms our senses cognise in the phenomenal world. Evidently there is at least a high degree of correspondence between the intellectual grade
of the mental experiences of a given "self" and the degree of complexity
of "structure" that manifests the said "self" in the phenomenal world. But the bare possibility of such a thing as thought-transference carries with it the possibility of soul
-transference and shows that we need proof before confidently affirming that a "self" is dependent on any one particular
individual "structure." So far as there is evidence, it points in the opposite direction—at any rate in respect of some human beings. For the same reason, although each of the "threads" must undoubtedly have had a beginning, that beginning may have been long anterior to the beginning of the particular organic structure with which we associate it. We must not suppose that the total number of individual "selves" that have existed in the noumenal world is necessarily identical with the total number of individual organisms that have existed in the animal kingdom. Such a numerical identification may err both by excess and by defect—excess in certain directions, and defect in others. The same selves may appear over and over again in successive generations of organisms; and, on the other hand, many selves may animate a given
organism besides the one which comes to the front as director of the molar external relations of that organism—as the [unclear: organism']
secretary of state for foreign affairs, so to speak. As a counter effect, again, to this it is possible—especially in the case of the highest and most gregarious animals, viz., human beings—that the same "self" may have a foothold in, i
. be a partial [unclear: noumenal]
counterpart of, more than one [unclear: simultaneously] existing
organism. If a "self" survives the physical death of its primary organism, something of this kind (which amounts to little more than telepathy) is probable, because it is an unlikely supposition that "soul-transference" should be limited to the moment of death, though the statistics of phantasms of the dying show even this extreme supposition to be less arbitrary than would at first sight seem to be the case.
I conclude, therefore, that the primal pre-cosmic craving is the craving to produce agreeable sensation, to create joy, a craving immensely successful though not as yet wholly successful.
The "craving to produce agreeable sensation, to create joy," is the strongest
and most central
one in that multiplicity of primal pre-cosmic cravings and other undecomposable mental experiences, the inter-action of which has constituted and still constitutes the world-process. Revelation—superhuman in the sense of proceeding from a section of "extra-liminal" brain activity which is, in some respects at least, superior
to the ordinary intra
-liminal activity of which alone each of us is conscious
—decisively affirms the ultimate triumph, complete and
eternal, of this most central craving. The whole stream of Hebrew prophecy (through which—perhaps on account of some organic peculiarity in the Semitic race—the Highest "Extra-liminal" has most easily been able to communicate itself to the intra-liminal), from the earliest dawn of the righteousness-religion to the incarnation of the Supreme Himself and His apocalyptic utterances at the close of the Jewish national existence, has as its main current the prognostication of an endless state of perfect joy. Apart from revelation, a hope of this ultimate triumph of good may be based on the fact that, probably for some logical
reason at present uncomprehended by us, no self is ever apparently capable of "craving" pain for itself
as a sole1
ultimate end, while the corresponding power to crave joy for self alone is only too evident. As a result of this a perfect organisation of the powers of evil becomes impossible, whereas a corresponding organisation of the powers of good involves no logical impossibility. On the contrary, if the Hebrew revelation can be trusted, the nucleus of an organisation of the powers of good (the "kingdom of heaven")—perfect as far as it goes—already exists
in the "extra-liminal" activities of the human race, and has for eighteen hundred years been going forth "conquering and to
conquer." Now the struggle for the [unclear: empine]
of the world is essentially a rivalry in excellence of organisation
. And although the powers of evil are susceptible of an amazingly high degree of organisation, perfection
in that regard is precluded by the fact that, from the nature of the case, an element of discord must remain.1
And, meanwhile, however fierce the rival "cravings" may be, assuredly the "craving to produce joy" is the only one which ought to be supreme. It is the sole craving that is placed on the throne of the universe by the divine conscience and by the human conscience as far as it is educated by the divine. All other cravings that are compatible with it must be its servants, and all that contradict it must be destroyed. Not as a suppliant for favour, suggesting an optional "counsel of perfection," but as a sovereign
, backed by the whole force of conscience and of God, the "craving to produce joy" addresses the concourse of emotions—commanding
, not beseeching
obedience, and threatening all the ultimately
recalcitrant (be it cruelty, be it mere selfishness, or be it asceticism), whether emotions or the selves harbouring them, whether the sinners or the sins, with "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of His power."
And now as to the extent to which the "craving to produce agreeable sensation" has been "immensely, though not as yet wholly successful" in the Past. We have seen that this craving is the sole monarch of the universe de jure
("neither shall there be any more pain "—Rev. xxi. 4—is one of the last proclamations of the Eternal through the prophets of His chosen Hebrew race). Let us see how far it has been monarch of the universe de facto
. In the sub-human organic world it would certainly seem to have preponderating power, though that world is still "groaning and travailing, waiting for the redemption of the sons of God." As both the introspective and the interrogative methods fail us, it is difficult to assess the pleasures and pains of living creatures below the human plane, while as regards the hedonic value of the inorganic world we are still more entirely in the dark. The guess of Buddha with his promise of "lifeless, timeless bliss," when the "dew-drop slips into the shining sea" may be paired off against the at least equally logical forecast of Mr. Mallock's angel of Objective
Truth ("The Veil of the Temple," page 426 that—
"I shall become the painless pain,
The soundless sound, as deaf and dumb,
The whole creation strives in vain
To sing the song that will not come.
Till, maimed and wingless, burnt and blind,
I am made one with God and feel
The tumult of the mindless mind
Torn on its own eternal wheel."
Still, in spite of these uncertainties inherent in the blur of sub-human psychology, the circumstances of the sub-human living world (with its countless multitude of selves subjected to an eternal automatic competition but with as yet no1 intelligence emerging adequate to the deliberate exploitation of the weak) would seem to afford a fair guarantee for the marked preponderance of joy. And this is the impression produced also by a direct observation of the facts.
With the advent of the human race, all this is changed. With the building up of a certain level of intelligence, the hedonic fate of weaker selves comes to be largely at the mercy of the deliberate choice
of stronger selves. Without impugning determinism as a metaphysical doctrine
, we must obviously, for practical purposes
, admit the truth of the old-fashioned view that with intelligence
sufficient for the deliberate choice between alternatives clearly contemplated, sin
entered into the world, and—with sin—a degree and amount of misery altogether unparalleled in the earlier course of evolution. Hence the Hebrew story says truly that the fruit of the tree of knowledge was fraught with disaster—disaster to the weak, who are preyed on by the strong (in an altogether more tragic way than is possible at a lower psychic level), and disaster to the strong, who prey on each other. And the orthodox view of human history is justified in so far as it postulates an ethical Fall
, from which a process of spiritual Redemption
is needed. The ethical course has not been continuously upward
, but—aside from the saving influence of the Redeemer—largely downward
and precisely as a result of the almost continuously upward movement of human intelligence and civilisation
. If the orthodox view, in all its crudity, stands in need, as it does, of qualification, that qualification cannot be supplied by the shallow evolutionary optimism, born of Caucasian conceit and insolence but by no means endorsed by the chief prophets1
which rejects the story of the Fall because its own superciliousness ignores the [unclear: ethica]
beauty of primitive communism. It [unclear: mus]
be supplied by the Marxist or "economic" interpretation of history. This latter, with-out denying the substantial1
truth of the orthodox chart of ethical history, [unclear: chain]
down the succession of ethical and [unclear: hedoric]
moments to the iron bar of economic [unclear: pio]
gress. The Garden of Eden remains as the terminus a quo
, and the New Jerusalem as the terminus ad quem
, and Christ remains as "the Way" from one to the other : but the spiritual is seen to be chained to the rigid economic needs of man instead of floating free as the orthodox have supposed.2
At the same time, the materialistic fatalism of Marxian economics can be carried too far, and often is unduly accentuated by Marxian thinkers, who sometimes almost speak as if human volition were both impotent and unnecessary. Had the inherent altruism of the earliest men been sufficient, the temptation to oppress the weak would have been resisted in spite of an intellectual and industrial development that rendered such oppression physically possible : and unless both the altruism and
the wisdom of the downtrodden are adequate in the crises that are to come, no amount of industrial consolidation will change economic oligarchy into the socialist millennium. Nor would the proletariat ever have had a chance of establishing the latter, had not the partial righteousness struggling upward under the earlier bourgeois régime endowed them with political rights that may be used, and are already1
to some extent being used, as levers for economic betterment. Thus, in spite of the substantial2
soundness of "revolutionary class-conscious" Marxism, it still remains true, as ever, that Altruism, i.e.
Saivation from Sin (to use the phraseology of John H. Noyes), is the sine quâ non
of universal happiness. Confucius spoke with approximate though not with entire truth when he said: "If at any time harmony reigns over humanity as it ought to reign, evil will no longer have any power over mankind. Physical evils are only the consequence of moral evil, of the hatred and injustice which always separate human beings." Physical evils are not indeed exclusively due to moral evil, but the entire abolition of moral evil is the necessary and sufficient condition for the ultimate removal of physical evil. There is no measure that may be required for the removal of any physical evil, which the
human race will not be willing and eventual able (if not so already) to undertake, only the volition
of all its members is [unclear: abs]
lately righteous. But the volition of [unclear: a]
its members is not likely to become [unclear: righteou]
until economic conditions have been [unclear: im]
proved. This is no vicious circle: for [unclear: t]
certain measure of altruistic volition already exists in the human race and is probably now increasing, and the (prospective) quantum thus available may turn out adequate, in conjunction with the mechanical improvements in production, to socialise the economic condition of humanity and so permit the universal
spread of moral goodness.
The special triumph of God (i.e. of the cosmic craving towards joy) is in the bringing forth through the cosmic process of brings who, like Himself, are consciously and intelligently devoted to making others joyous—perhaps even conscious co-work-era with Him in making the cosmic process clearer and clearer of the evil element.
The present writer is in absolute agreement with this proposition of Mr. Weeks' theodicy.
God will certainly keep such beings alive with Himself for ever, if that achievement be possible under the conditions which the preceding part of the cosmic process has set up.
This I agree with, but I should add that we have learnt from Christ that the achievement is
now possible ("Christ brought life and immortality to light"). If Christ came late in Time (and Napoleon the First used
to say that this was the chief difficulty in the way of believing Christianity), it may be because God was not till then in a position to announce the possibility of the achievement and to issue His conditional guarantee,1
even though He was then able to make the latter at least partially retrospective (see the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews on the glorious destiny in store for pre-Christian servants of God).
I suppose that at the very beginning of the cosmic process an element was introduced, without foresight of all its effects, which is the primal cause of all the pains and evil that have existed and must yet exist.
Now what I contend is that this "element" is precisely pain itself
as a qualitatively indecomposable entity (the logical germ of the malevolent or "inversive," as T. L. Harris calls it—the evil power meant by such terms as "the Devil" and "Satan"), and I quite agree that it was "introduced without foresight
of all its effects." I should Bay without foresight of any
of its effects, but simply by dialectical necessity
, on the principle that every qualitatively undecomposable entity irresistibly suggests its own opposite. If we know (as we do) of some qualitatively undecomposable entities that have no opposites within our knowledge, e.g
. a salty taste, we may depend upon it that such opposites have
existed, but have
in some way been eliminated (at all even in our part of the universe), even as [unclear: w]
may hope that pain will some day be [unclear: elim]
nated from all
parts of the universe. [unclear: The]
can be," nothing (qualitatively) new [unclear: und]
the sun," as all
fundamental "kinds" [unclear: mu]
have existed in the first or second [unclear: insta]
of Time : but some old "kinds" may [unclear: di]
appear. Thus there is no ontological [unclear: in]
possibility in the realisation of the [unclear: glorio]
prophecy, "There shall be no more death neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall [unclear: the]
be any more pain : for the former [unclear: thing] are passed away
" (Rev. xxi. 4).