Defensive Alliances

with foreign powers as would tend to preserve the peace of the world. For a long time her statesmen have pursued a policy of splendid isolation, but the time for that seems to have gone by. Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 indicates the termination of the policy of isolation, and renders it more probable that British statesmen will see the advisability of maintaining the cohesion and solidarity of the Empire by forming other and stronger alliances on similar lines.

The objects of this Treaty, as set out in the preamble, are:—

(a)	The consolidation and maintenance of the General Peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.
(b)	The preservation of the commercial interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese page 15 Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities foe the commerce and industries of all nations in China,
(c)	The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contacting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia, and of India, and the defence of their special interests in these regions.

The articles of the treaty specify how the carrying out of these objects may be achieved, and under what conditions the one Power may, when necessary, come to the armed assistance of the other.

It should not be difficult for Great Britain and Japan to arrange a defensive alliance with the United States of America on somewhat similar lines. Such a treaty might well deal with the propection of the commerce and sea-trade of the three countries, and the general preservation of peace at sea. All three nations are isolated sea-powers to whom the internal complications of Europe are not of [unclear: treme] importance. In alliance, they would be too strong for any possible naval combination that could be formed against them. They would then have supreme control of the sea, without the slightest possibility of having that supremacy wrested from them. Great Britain, with her stronger navy, would be the dominant partner of the alliance, and would, therefore, as at present, still maintain her sea-sovereignty.

America should be the natural ally of Great Britain and her colonies. The two nations are practically one in blood and speech. Combined they represent a white population of nearly 150,000,000, of [unclear: dred] aims and interests. Their resources are almost unlimited; their power of expansion almost equally so. Their common aim is the preservation of the peace of the world.

Japan, too, should come into the alliance. There is no practical reason why she should not. The little pin-prick of colour feeling, that is temporarily irritating the people of Japan and America, will soon disappear, and will not be likely to retard the solution of the great problem of the preservation of the general peace. Japan would be an almost necessary factor of the alliance, in order to balance in the East the preponderance of Britain and America in the West. It would be of the utmost importance to the colonies of Australasia, and the other British possessions in the Pacific, that Japan should be a member of the suggested alliance. Indeed, it is greatly to be desired, in the interests of Australasia, that Japan, with her 50 millions of population, and her great and growing military and naval strength, and her comparative nearness to the Pacific colonies of the Empire, should remain a friendly power in alliance with Great Britain.

Great Britain, America, and Japan, as we have stated, are isolated sea-powers, whose common interests are, first, the preservation of peace at sea, and, second, the continuance of the general peace of the world. Neither of them has much interest in the frictional differences that may arise between any of the countries of Europe in regard to their page 16 European territories, except is so far as the establishment of the military and territorial predominance in Europe of any one Power, such as Germany, might prejudicially affect their own interests from naval or military point of view.

The chief obstacle in the way of the formation of a triple alliance between the Powers mentioned, will be found to be in the unwillingness of American statesmen to depart from the traditionary implications of the Monroe doctrine. But an alliance, such as the one suggested, need not in the slightest degree interfere with the principle underlying Monroism. It would rather strengthen the doctrine, than otherwise, and give it additional international weight and importance. If the main objects of the alliance were the preservation of the existing rights of each member, and there was a joint determination to resist any attempts on the part of any other nation to encroach upon these rights, then, the combined navies of the three Powers would be a guarantee of a prolonged and perhaps a general peace.

Already some leading Americans advocate the establishment of a defensive union between Great Britain and America; and no doubt, if the attempt were strenuously made, it might soon become an accomplished fact.

An Anglo American-Japanese alliance, or defence purposes would tend to secure a long, if not a permanent peace. The longer the general peace of the world is maintained, the more does trade and commerce increase and prosper; the kindlier is the feeling engendered amongst the people of the world; and the more will militarism languish and tend to die away. National prosperity, the world's progress, depends on the preservation of the peace of the world. Militarism feeds on war, and without war would die of inanation. While war is possible, however, armaments must be kept up as a guarantee of peace and justice. As a guarantee, too, of the preservation of her Empire, Great Britain must maintain her sea supremacy; and the most feasible method by which she can do this, is, as we have pointed out, for each part of the Empire to contribute, in proportion to its means, to a general scheme of naval defence; and, secondly, the Empire, to enter into a defensive alliance with such combined Powers as America and Japan.