Desert1On a Stronger Ground [unclear: than] Adultery.

Of such cause, there can be no [unclear: doubt] disertion, when it is wilful, [unclear: deliberate,] long continued (say for three years), is [unclear: o] the most unmistakeble; another [unclear: is] habitual cruelty and neglect, These [unclear: two] by their very nature indicate the total [unclear: ab] of the essentials of true wedlock [unclear: according] any rational conception of it. As [unclear: Lucky] "Anyone who can look at the subject [unclear: th] other than ecclesiastical spectacles [unclear: mus] that long-continued disartion is really [unclear: a] complete rupture of the marriage [unclear: bond] even infidelity itself." In Scotland, as [unclear: I] before mentioned, desrtion has been [unclear: recog] page 5 [unclear: a] ground of divorce ever since the Reformation, probably on the authority of the Protestant [unclear: view] of the teaching of St. Paul lodeed, in all Pretestant countries, with the exception of England and some of her colonis, and, I think, one of the American States, deaertion is so regarded The objection commonly raised to desetion being made a ground—that it would enable parties bent upon obtaining a divorce to attain their object by arrangement—is surely the very [unclear: spotheosis] of fallacy and absurdity. It is [unclear: surely] very far-fetched suggestion that parties [unclear: intent] obtaining a separation as speedily [unclear: as] possible would adopt a method requiring [unclear: there] years for the attainment of their object, when a single act of adultery, or even conduct sufficient to justify an inference of the composition of adultery, would serve the purpose so much better. And yet, apart from [unclear: Sxipture] and ecclesiastical cousiderations, [unclear: this] almost the only kind of argument [unclear: usually] employed. The suggestion often [unclear: made], that the period of desertion should be [unclear: extend] to seven years, is not only cruel in the [unclear: extreme], but it ignores the nature of the quality [unclear: in] human nature which lies at the vary reached on Friday morning. I learn from [unclear: foundation] of marriage. Another objection, and the most irrational of all, is that it if desertion were recognised as a ground of dissolution the number of divores would be enormously increased. This objection [unclear: emanates] from the purely theoligical view that the sanctity of marriage is derived from the [unclear: mere] ceremonial rite; but according to the view I am urging affection is the internal form and [unclear: ul] of marriage, and where that is wanting the conjugal relation is a mere empty huak. When husband has deserted his wif i for, say, three years, and left his children unprovided for, the marriage bond is already dissolved, and divorce is merely a recognition of the fact, To speak of the sanctity of marriage in such circumtances is simply to use the words without a meaning-it is a cruel mockery. The [unclear: anutity] of marriage is not impaired by divorce but by the impurity and inhumanity that lead to it. At gold is purified by the rejection of the alloy, so the sanctity of marriage is strengthened and not impaired when grosa misconduct on one side enables the sufferer to escape from a bond which it is a misuse of terms to describe any longer as holy. To speak of marriage as a sacrament in such cases is an [unclear: outrage] alike on religion and common sence; it were truer, indeed, to speak of the [unclear: sacrament] of divorce.

We have thus arrived at the principle that the marriage bond is dissoluble, not merely nor mainly on the ground of [unclear: adultery] of either party but is [unclear: dissotuble] "for any fault sufficiently grave of any kind, and, what is still more important on the ground of any quality or characteristic icin either party which, without being a fault in either, makes happiness impossible."