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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 74

Lecture II. — Religious and Scientific Bellefs

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Lecture II.

Religious and Scientific Bellefs.

All beliefs, truly religious, imply the existence of living personal God, Devoutly pious minds are apt to recieve something like a sharp heart-shock when, for the first time they hear it affirmed that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. Some of us, I suppose can remember the time when something like panic seized us when we was authoritatively assured that the great philosopher, [unclear: kd] had proved the logical invalidity and insufficiency of every one of the familiar arguments for the existence of [unclear: Gl] How awful! we said. Surely Kant must have been [unclear: I] only an Atheist, but a very fanatical and daring one. But in so feeling and thinking we were quite mistaken. One ignorance betrayed us into a quite useless expenditure of emotion. Kant was no Atheist. What he did say about the logical invalidity of the so-called Theistic [unclear: pa] amounts very much to saying and proving what all [unclear: competent] thinkers now frankly allow: to wit, that the [unclear: a] ence of God, cannot, in the strict sense of the world existence demonstrated. This concession on the first blush of it is may seem very startling to the philosophical and theological novice, but in reality it is very innocent. It is also the case that not a few religious sceptics, who like wise belong to the class of philosophical novices, have gleefully [unclear: acc]the concession that the existence of God cannot, in the strictest sense of the word, be demonstrated, and they have done so on the utterly mistaken assumption that this concession necessitates the further conclusion that the existence of God is doubtful, and that all the argumenta address page 17 in proof of His existence are void of probative value, But the negative conclusion just stated does not follow, for the very obvious reason that the existence of no objective reality can be demonstrated. As little can the truth of any ultimate or fundamental truth be demonstrated. All proof rests ultimately on assumptions or postulates, which are felt to be self-evident. The existence, for example, of an objective world, which is a necessary datum of physical science cannot be demonstrated, for confessedly the subjective idealist, who maintains that because the knowledge of an external world can only exist in a mind or ego, therein fore the world itself exists only In Thought—this subjective idealist cannot be convicted of self-contradiction. Does it follow that sane beings are really perplexed with doubts as to the existence of an external world? By no means. Though we cannot prove demonstratively that the world exists, whether we think about it or not, we are as certain about its objective reality as we can desire to be.

In point of fact, the existence of no concrete objective fact can be so demonstrated or proved is to make sceptical eavil logically impossible. The necessity which pertains to deductive or demonstrative reasoning belongs not to the premises from which the conclusion is deduced, but to the mental process by which the conclusion is evolved from this it follows that demonstrative reasoning can not prove that the conclusion reached is necessarily true. As a test it can only prove that the conclusion is as certain as the premises from which it is deduced. No behever in God need, therefore, be disturbed in the least degree when he is told that the existence of God can not be Demonstrated, for it is just as impossible to demonstrate the existence of the external world.

Let us glance at another of the prime realities with which human thought concerns itself. All of us habitually use the very familiar word "I." Philosophers for a reason freely use the Latin equivalent, ego. What, then, is this most familiar, but at the same time most mysterious thing, which we call the I—the ego, or self ? Is it a unitary substance, or is it merely a "bundle of feelings," or "a succession of mental states, hound together by an utterly page 18 inexplicable thread of memory"? It is practically impossible to doubt our personal identity, or the unity of the ego, for all knowledge implies it, and yet we cannot demonstrate this vitally important truth As a matter of fact, thinkers of note, like Hume, John Stuart Hill, and Spencer, deny that the ego is a unitary entity or real substance ! Here, too, the vast majority of human beings feel quite certain that the ego is a unity; nay more, that it is the one substance of which we have immediate knowledge. Yet they do so on grounds, or for a reason, which does not absolutely exclude the possibility of doubt, We may fairly describe our assured feeling of personal identity as an ultimate or fundamental belief, the validity of which is guaranteed by invincible faith in the essential rationality of our nature. Nay, more, our sence of personal identity is so essential that, apart from it, such all important mental functions as memory and reasoning would be absolutely impossible. If, therefore, our certainly as to the unity of the ego and the existence of an extend world rests on an evidential basis which does not exclude the possibility of doubt, may we not safely conclude that the only possible knowledge or assurance which we can have as to the existence and nature of any substantive reality necessarily includes important faith elements. Is it not all but self-evident that all knowledge of substantive reality which falls short of omniscience must, in the nature of things, contain a large faith element ?—that is, be exposed to the possibility of sceptical cavil. " this is so, how can it be reasonably maintained that religious beliefs are invalid, or essentially doubtful, simply because the evidence on which they rest does not logically preclude the passbility of doubt. Careful criticism of our knowledge of substantive reality (no matter what the sphere of that knowledge may be) reveals the incontestable fact that our conviction as to the reality of these objects, let that conviction be ever so strong, does not rest on a basis of strictly demonstrative proof. Those second and third-rate scientists who plead the indisputable certainty of current beliefs in physics and natural science, and the inherently doubtful nature of religious beliefs as a justification of their page 19 religious agnosticism, are therefore quite mistaken in supposing that there is any such distinction in the kind, and degree of certainty attainable—in the two spheres—as justifies their and-sided Agnosticism. It nothing but doubt-defying demonstration can be accepted as a rational ground of certainty, we are bound in reason to hold, not only that the existence of God is doubtful but also that the existence of an external world is questionable.

I have insisted on the fact that one of the fundamental postulates of physical science, to wit the existence of an external world, is quite as open to sceptical cavil as the evidental basis on which our belief in the existence God rests; and I have done so, not for the purpose of questioning the reasonableness of any or of all of our scientific beliefs, but by way of showing how unreasonable it is to question the validity of religious beliefs simply on the ground that they cannot be established by a process of strictly demonstrative reasoning. It must be conceded that, as matter of fact, what may be described as the accredted doctrines of science are rarely questioned, or seriously subjected to the test of criticism of the skeptical or destructive order. In this respect scientific and religious beliefs present a quite noticeable contrast, which may I think, be accounted for, altogether apart from the untenable supposition that the evidence in the one case warrants the conviction of certainty, and in the other case fails to do so. It has been pointed out, and I think justly, that there is a peculiar coerciveness, or inevitableness in those beliefs which bear on our relations to the material world. The Evolutionist more than hints that the coerciveness of these beliefs simply arises from the fact that they are the integrations or summations of an enormously extended race-experience, reaching back to the first dawning of intelligence in our brute ancestry. I do not say that this is so, but " it is so, it follows that this coerciveness only proves that the beliefs in question are not distinctively human and do not mark the highest range of insight and knowledge. There is at least this much truth this view. The religious and ethical represent page 20 the highest and most distinctively human side of our cognitive nature; or, to use the language of the evolutionist, these are the last and highest products of the evolutionary process. It can hardly be disputed that [unclear: a] variable element in our cognitive nature is not the [unclear: p] of sense perception, which furnishes the matter of which physical science is the interpretation, but our power [unclear: a] moral and religions discernment. This sufficiently [unclear: ex] how few, " any, seriously doubt those scientific doctrine which admit of sense verification, whereas many [unclear: a] sceptical in a religious sense because their power of spiritual and ethical vision and feeling are undeveloped [unclear: a] worse still, atrophied. There is yet another reason [unclear: a] apart from any difference in the cogency of the evidence religious beliefs are much more frequently doubted [unclear: a] denied than the doctrines of physical science, As [unclear: a] history proves, religious beliefs, just because they have [unclear: a] an intimate bearing on all that is deepest and highest [unclear: b] human life, call forth feelings of a far more intense [unclear: or] than any which can be excited by rival theoris [unclear: se] physical science. It is not to be wondered at that religious beliefs should arouse the most intense antagonism. The circumstance sufficiently explains how it has come to pay that scepticism has put forth all its powers in the attempt to discredit all religious belief. I venture to affirm this moral hostility to religion, and not any inheret [unclear: as] comparative weakness in the evidential basis of [unclear: it] cardinal doctrines, is the reason why the most fundaments religious, and I may add ethical beliefs are subjected remorseless criticism of the sceptical kind, whereas [unclear: phy] theories obtain easy credence though, in point of fact, the proof basis, at least in many cases, involves more [unclear: theo] difficulties, and is generally more open to criticism that the proof basis of Theism, Moreover, physical science, [unclear: of] the rational interpretation of Nature assumes that [unclear: na] is a coherent or intelligible whole, and this assumption [unclear: a] at bottom equivalent to the belief that the ultimate [unclear: a] is rational. Theism is therefore the postulate of [unclear: ta] science: that is, God is the pre-supposition of all have ledge, scientific or other. If, therefore, [unclear: theise] page 21 a doubtful creed, so are all the sciences which implicity postulate its truth.

Believing, as I do, that exaggerated ideas of the kind and degree of certainty attained in the physical sciences, as compared with the kind and degree of certainty which may justly claimed for our fundamental religions beliefs a fruitful source of unreasonable religious doubt, I need make no apology for attempting, by a criticism of some generally, accepted physical theories, to prove that, despite their universal acceptance, the evidential basis on which they rest is quite as open to sceptical criticism as that which sustains and justifies our fundamental religious beliefs. Be it observed that it is no part of my aim, either to disprove or discredit any accepted physical theory. My one object is to prove that physical theories are accepted on evidential grounds which have not even the semblance of demonstrative force, and that too, in spite of theoretical ties difficulties and incongruities greater than any which can be urged, say against the idea of God, and the arguments which are generally employed in proof of His existence. As spencer well puts it, the aim of physical science is to discover formulate "the laws of the re-distribution of and motion." Matter and motion are therefore the fundamentals realities with which physical science deals. Of motion I need only remark (1) That Du Bois-Reymond, a resulte Materialist, pronounces the impossibility of accounting for the origin of motion in the matter of which the Universe is composed." one of the three barriers which physical science must for ever fail to overleap. (2) That many of the foremost physicists are of opinion that the only possible explanation of the origin of motion is the will power of the absolute personality; or, in other words, the will power of God. Matter, too, which the unreflecting imagine that they know so well, presents ever so many thought difficulties to those who seriously attempt to answer the question, What is matter ? And these difficulties are precisely of the kind which play a conspicuous part in the argumentation of religious sceptics.

Professor Tate, in his treatise on the "Properties of, Matter," gives thirty-four definitions of matter, all of which page 22 are confessedly either unsatisfactory or doubtful [unclear: The] difficulty which attaches to our conception of matter may put "thus : Is matter a something distinct from [unclear: as] qualities? or is it a mere roosting place and vehicle for those energies apart from which it could never be known to us ? Remove from any material substance all its known properties, and what is left, as far as our thought is one concerned? We are forced to answer nothing. Is matter then a fictitious unity which we ascribe to a permanes group of energies? or, as John Stuart Mill puts it, Matter only—" the permanent possibility of sensation?" I case fess that I have long felt disposed to regard matter, not [unclear: a] the mere seat and vehicle of energy, but as energy itself Substantive being, as I am disposed to regard it, is [unclear: ca] energy. This seems to be the conclusion towards [unclear: u] the best scientific thought is moving. Faraday took the view of matter. Lord Kelvin thus expresses himself in a article on the Kinetic theory of matter. "The now [unclear: w] known Kinetic theory of gases." says he, " is a step so important that it is scarcely possible to help anticipation in idea the arrival at a complete theory of matter in what all its properties will be seen to be merely attributes a motion." But then, is the possibility of massless motion that is, of motion in which nothing moves or is more conceivable? How, too, can we bring this theory of [unclear: ma] the into harmony with the fact that inertia is one of the essential properties of matter ? If, then, every concept of matter heretofore formed involves insuperable those difficulties, ought we to regard the reality of matter [unclear: a] as more than doubtful ? This certainly is what we [unclear: w] do did we follow the example of the religious sceptic, of contends that there is no God, because the conception God as personal, infinite, self-existent, and the creator the world, involves thought in difficulties of the kind insisted on by such thinkers as Hamilton, Mansal, as Spencer, As far as matter is concerned, we are the seriously tempted to doubt its reality, merely because it do not possess that complete and logically coherent [unclear: hi] ledge of it which is only possible for omniscence. [unclear: wi] should we act on a different principle in any other [unclear: sphe] page 23 Is it reasonable to suppose that God, the ultimate reality, comprehensible than matter? " the though-difficulties inseparable from all knowledge which is finite and partial do not, in and by themselves, constitute a valid foe doubting the reality of matter, where is the reasonableness of holding that analagous difficulties justify a the essentially higher spheres of religion and ethics.

Let us now turn to some of the most important and accepted and widely theories in physics. Foremost among these theories is that known as "the conservation of energy." This theory is practically regarded as one of the axioms of science. Physicists unhesitatingly assume that no energy is or can be lost. It may, and does, disappear in one form, but its exact quantitative equivalent turns up in so some othershape. Molar is transformed into molecular motion, and vice cersa. Light, heat, electricity, chemical affinity, and magnetism are but forms that protean tiling called energy. The history of the physical universe is but a history of the orderly trans-formations of energy. But how can it be proved that energy is a fixed quantity—that is a indestructible? Actual tent, so far as it is available, does support this doctrine, but, in the very nature of things, experiment and sense-perception cannot reach the universal and necessary, The doctrine is universally, and with good reason, held to be proven, but the proof is by no means of the strictly demonstrative order. Reason, presuming on the order, unity, and essential rationality of nature, leaps to the conclustion that energy, as far as the present order is concerned, is indestructible. The presence of a large faith element in this and such like physical theories does not disturb the physicist, though it is just possible that he may be reasonable enough to object to the evidence adduced in of some religious belief, because, forsooth, it falls short of demonstration, and contains assumptions of the very kind which are freely used in scientific investigations. Nor do we call in question the validity of the doctrine of the conservation of energy, because thought may find it difficult, if not impossible to show how it harmonises with page 24 other and equally well established scientific theories. [unclear: a] of these grave difficulties arises out of the fact that the conservation of energy doctrine pre-supposes an [unclear: infi] system, at least infinite space occupied throughout by the mysterious thing called other. But then in such infinite system the energy, say of our solar system, in due time be practically lost by dissipation in [unclear: int] space—just as confessedly the energy of the physics universe must, in course of time be reduced to a practice nullity, by issuing in a state of universal balance. The I believe, is a thought difficulty which has [unclear: hereto] proved insuperable, and yet physicists, rightly enough decline to reject this theory, the truth of which must be assumed in any rational doctrine of end It is unreasonable to suppose that man, whose knowledge is so very partial, can so unify all his beliefs that the shall obviously form a logically coherent whole. As [unclear: a] shall see in the sequel, the conservation of energy doctrine conflicts, or at least seems to conflict, with a widley accepted form of the atomic theory. And this is another indication of the truth of the principle that inability to reach the focal point, where apparently as flicting aspects of truth would be seen to meet as harmonise, does not warrant us in rejecting either of the seemingly antagonistic aspects of reality, provided each supported by adequate evidence.

Let us take another physical theory for the [unclear: pur] of showing how large and liberal our power of belief when not restricted by moral bias. We enter the region of the truly wonderful in modern physical science why we consider the properties of that mysterious and [unclear: in] ceivable something called æther. All, or almost of physicists believe in the existence of this universal square filling something called either, though it is utterly [unclear: fc] the range of sense perception; as much so as spirit [unclear: it] But the wonder does not end here. Properties most ascribed to this either, which are without parallel in [unclear: a] of the forms of matter of which we have sense experience Nor is the assumption of this rather gratuitous. It is rational inference necessitated by the wave theory of [unclear: lip] page 25 There must be some luminiferos medium which conveys the wave-motion of light through the inter-stellar spaces, with a velocity, say, of 188,000 miles per second, that is—speaking roughly—about one million times more swiftly than sound travels, This, according to the accepted theory of wave transmission, necessitates the conclusion that were the density of either equal to that of the atmosphere its elasticity, or power of resisting compression, must be a of million times greater than our atmosphere. This abundantly Young, Jevons, and others in describing æther as an " adamantine solid." To meet the requirements of the undulatory theory of light, it must be assumed that æether is many hundreds of times more incompressible than steel. Nor is this all. Sir John Herschel has calculated "that the pressure of æther per square inch must he about seventeen billions of pounds." a But as a matter of fact, this æther must be inconceivably less dense than our atmosphere, for it offers no recognizable-resistance to the motion of planets and those tenuous bodies called comets. Can it be believed, in ht of our sense experience, that this æther at once so unspeakably tenuous and so inconceivably elastic or incompressible. Some, like Lord Kelvin, are disposed to regard this æther as the prothyle or primitive something out of which his vortex ring atoms are supposed to be evolved, or rather created, and if so then æther is a perfect, that is, an incompressible or infinitely elastic and frictionless fluid. Nevertheless, the heavenly bodies move in, or rather through it, with as little resistance as they were moving through a perfect vacuum. Physicists, for the most part, seriously believe in this astoundingly strange æther, and that simply because it is a rational inference, practically necessitated by the wave theory of light. Theologians as such have no quarrel with this theory. On the contrary they regard it as a striking and instructive example of how physicists accept the most startling conclusions on the ground of an inference purely rational, for, observe, it is utterly impossible to bring æther be range of sense perception. Not sense, but the speculative reason sees æther. Observe further the exis- page 26 tence of this æther, like that of the atoms of chemical science, only admits of rational, as distinguished from sense verification. Just imagine what would happen were this tether theory an item of religious belief. How the critical sceptic would exult in the manifest absurdity believing of that an unperceivable something, with properties so contradictory, or at least seemingly so contradictory could possibly exist. Of course, " nothing can be supposed to exist which cannot be imaged in thought, and verified by sense perfection, then tether must be dismissed as one of the superstitions of a too speculative science.

The law of gravitation is confessedly one of the most important and best established of the generalisstions of physical science. It may surprise some of you to hear that the theory of gravitation confessedly involves some quite inconceivable suppositions—(1) the force of gravity acts instantaneously between the most distant parts of the solar system. Even Laplace did not hesitate to say that "" the action of gravity is propagated in time, its velocity must be at least fifty million times greater than that of light." Arago disclares that its action is instantaneous, (2) "Gravity is a force which appears to act between bodies through a vacuous space;" but all authorities from Sir Isaac Newton to Du Bois-Reymond and Tate pronounce such action as inconceivable, absurd, and impossible, I have said enough to prove that gravity is in the last degree mysterious and inconceivable. C J early conceivability is not recognised as a test of truth in physical science. In the name of all that is reasonable why should it be used to test the legacy of our conception of God—the ultimate reality?

Among accepted physical theories none is more widley embraced or more highly valued as a working hypothese than the Atomic theory. I may add that no part of phyical science is more fascinating for first rate physicists, like Clerk Maxwell and Lord Kelvin, than the theory of atomos " you wish to get some idea of how fascinating their subject is for Lord Kelvin, you may consult his paper on "The Size of Atoms," in vol. i. of his " paper Lectures," &c. The result which he has reached as to the [unclear: si] page 27 of atoms is so interesting in itself, and so generally received, that I feel sure you will pardon me for giving it to you in his own words: "Imagine." saya he," a globe of water or glass, as large as a football, to be magnified up to the size of the earth, each constituent molecule being magnified in the same proportion. The magnified structure would be more coarse-grained than a heap of small shot, but probably less coarse-grained than a heap of footballs."

Only the chemical expert can have an adequate impression of the growingly important part which Atomic theory plays in chemical science. But what are atoms? Here the difficulties of scientific theory come into view. I shall not vex you with the speculations of first-rate chemists like Crookes, and philosophers like Spencer, who contend that the elements or atoms of laboratory theory are simply stable groupings of the primordial atom. Even physicits like Balfour, Stewart, and Tate describe the atom of laboratory-theory in these terms: "To our minds it bra no less false to pronounce eternal that aggregation we call the atom." than it would be to pronounce eternal that aggregation we call the sun." Let us assume that the atom is an indivisible entity, for such the primordial atom must be assumed to be. " this is so, then it seems to follow that atoms are infinitely rigid, and, as a matter of fact, first-rate physicists contend that this conclusion is, in itself The conclusion is, in itself, striking enough, but, unfortunately, it is not reconcilable with the accepted Kinetic theory of gases or the conservation of energy doctrine. Both of these theories demand infinite elasticity in the atoms, and elasticity seems to be inconsistent with rigidity implied by indivisibility. That the ultimate of mass or the primordial atoms must be regarded as infinitely elastic is recognised by all physicists who accept the "Kinetic theory of gases" and the conservation of energy doctrine. "We are forbidden (says Lord Kelvin) by the modern theory of the conservation of energy to assume inelasticity or anything short of perfect elasticity of the ultimate molecules." The famous vortex-ring theory of atoms propounded by Lord Kelvin avoids, and was intended to avoid, the difficulty presented by the theory page 28 of infinitely rigid and inelastic atoms, but then it is itself as Maxwell points out) be pet by the seemingly insuperable difficulty that vortex-ring atoms would lack inertia, and inertia is held to be one of the essential properties of matter. Are we, then, to reject the Atomic theory, say, on such grounds as these : 1st. Atoms are, and for us must ever remain invisible and intangible, 2nd. The logical understanding cannot bring Atomic theory into obvious harmony with other accepted physical theories, Ought we, for these and like reasons, to reject the Atomic theory? By no means. And why not? Because physicists, like wise men who accept the consequences of their partial and essentially finite knowledge, refuse to accept conceivability, manifest logical congruity with al1 accepted doctrine and verification by sense perception, as the atoms conditions of reasonable belief; or, to put it otherwise, as the tests of truth. Manifestly, modem science, by in daring rationalising of the data of sense experience, has gone far beyond the limits of the knowable as defined by consistent Positivists. Physical science, by a fearless application of the interpreting principle of reason, has to a large extent become meta physical science-Where, then is the reasonableness of that class of physicist., mostly, as have said, belonging to the second and third rank who reject all religious beliefs on grounds, or for reasons which would lead to the utter rejection of all that is grandest in physical science? The wise theologian freely grants that his view of God and the world does not by any mean amount to absolutey that is doubt-defying, knowledge. He confesses also that there are gaps and logical incoherence in his creed. Just because it is the creed of a fining intelligence, it is not a rounded, harmonious whole, but rather a cluster of isolated points of light which shine like solitary stars on the dark bosom of the Infinite.

Why is it that all scientists do not recognise that the creed of Science is marked by precisely the same evidence of mental limitation ? In a very able book, "The Concepts of Modem Physics," by Stalio, you will find abundance of evidence to satisfy you that the creed of the physicist is very far from being a harmonious, logical page 29 unity. Let me again say that I do not in the least wish to depreciate physical science. My only desire is to make it trident that those physicists and naturalists who take up a negative attitude to religion, on the ground that physical theories are criticism proof and religious beliefs essentially doubtful, are utterly mistaken in their conception of the kind and degree of certainty attainable in both spheres. There is simply no absolute certainty outside the abstractions of Mathematics and formal Logic. In this view of the matter, and in the light of the manifest difficulties and logical incongruities of the creed of Science, 'it surely is highly unreasonable to deny the legitimacy of religious beliefs on the ground that their evidential basis does not make sceptical cavils impossible. If this canon of criticism is rational in its application to religious beliefs, is quite as rational as applied to all other spheres of knowledge; and if it be impartially applied as a test of the validity of all knowledge, then the result can only be universal Agnosticism. The arrogant and extremely un-critical Gnosticism of the scientific creed of certain physicists and naturalists largely if not fully explains their religious Agnosticism. The enormous credulity of the scientist, who thinks he can give a rational—that is, reasoned—account of the evolutionary process, and of the order of the universe by simply assuming that force is persistent, while at the same time he finds the Theistic doctrine beset by all kinds of difficulties and incredibilities, is surely an amazing instance of irrational inconsistency. If anything is certain, it is certain that those ambitious schemes of mechanical evolution which claim to account for the order and rationality of nature apart from the action of ordering intelligence are unproved in the ordinary sense of the word. Spencer's evolutionary philosophy is, as far as I know, accepted by no first-rate thinker. Even Fiske, who, next to Spencer, is perhaps the most distinguished exponent of the evolution philosophy, has declared himself in favour of a teleological or Theistic interpretation of the order of the Universe, and of course has most emphatically rejected naturalism. The much page 30 less ambitious speculation called Darwinism cannot even claim to be proved.

In Romanes' posthumous volume—" Darwin, and After Darwin "—you will find a lucid account, by one of the ablest of Darwinians, of how the disciples of Darwin have broken up into three conflicting schools. In the face of all this, what can be said of the certainty which is supposed to be the exclusive prerogative of scientific as distinguished from religious beliefs? The certainty of which some scientists of the religiously Agnostic class boast is surely a moral product, and not the result of a truly rational process. The hypothesis of spontaneous generation has no support in experience, and yet Huxley and Tyndal accepted it, because it is a necessary inference from the larger hypothesis of mechanical evolution. Is there any religious belief so manifestly open to the charge of setting aside the teaching of positive experience out of deference to an inference from a confessedly unproved speculation ? Those physicists and naturalists are therefore, I contend vastly unreasonable who maintain that religious beliefs are essentially doubtful, because the evidential basis on which they rest does not warrant absolute certainty. There is not one single fact or theory in physical science of which absolute certainty can be predicated, nevertheless physicists are not afflicted with sceptical doubts; nor is there any ground in reason why those who cherish religious beliefs should be troubled simply because their creed, like the creed of science, is open to sceptical cavil.