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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 74

Lecture I. — Religious Certainty

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Lecture I.

Religious Certainty.

The subject of the Lectures which I propose to deliver in this place is "Religious Certainty." I have chosen the phrase "religious certainty," rather than the phrase "religious certitude" because, according to the best usage, certitude is descriptive of a mental state, whereas certainty is a "quality of propositions." R is certain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that distinctively religious and. Christian beliefs are cherished by multitudes of men with something like absolute assurance of their truth, but it does not by any means necessarily follow that these beliefs are justified by evidence at once sufficient and valid. In other words, certitude may be predicated of the state of mind of him whose belief is a mere superstition, whereas certainty can only be affirmed of well-grounded or verified convictions. The phrase " religious certainty " therefore implies, and is mint to imply, that it is possible to reach well-grounded conviction in matters religious. The main object of this course of Lectures is to vindicate the reasonableness of religious belief by reference to the laws and grounds of legitimate credence. That the object proposed is, in the last degree, important does not need to be proved to those who have heart enough, and insight enough, to feel and see that questions of supreme interest and importance for humanity are such as these :—What is our origin and destiny? and—How do we stand related to the person or thing which we must hold to be the ultimate reality?

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In the earliest and pre-critical stage of human thoughts men did not trouble themselves with such subjects as the logic of religious or, indeed, of any other kind of belief. Yield iug to the impulse so characteristic of the childhood of the individual and the race, they gave free scope to the faith instinct, and, with scarcely a suspicion of possible [unclear: erre] freely interpreted the universe in terms of spirit Reason and history alike prove that in the development of human thought unquestioning belief is the precursor of critical doubt. Or to put the matter in a slightly different from-belief is primary, essential, and abiding, whereas doubts is secondary and transitional. I am not aware that any report able thinker, or school of thinkers, even pretenda [unclear: d] the fact that unquestioning religious belief of some sort is marked feature of the earliest stage of human hid history Whatever may be the significance of the fact, it is [unclear: a] certain that spontaneous thought interprets the University terms of spirit or personality. The presumption, of course is that spontaneous thought implicitly regards personal as an essential attribute of the ultimate reality, or the first cause. Even Positivists, who plume themselves on their superiority to all manner of credulities, emphasise the [unclear: a] that the first stage of human history is the theological case

In passing let me remark that this admitted [unclear: a] the fact, namely, that instinctive religions belief was the first creed of humanity—is pregnant with momen[unclear: a] important inferences for those who firmly believe in [unclear: a] essential rationality of human thought and the essenial intelligibility of the visible Universe, which it essays interpret. But, as far as the civilised world is concerned the age of instinctive, or uncritical, faith has passed, [unclear: a] to return. It is worse than futile tomouni over a vannished past. He who believes in God must, at the same [unclear: a] believe that the evolutionary process of human history means progress as well as change. Indeed it is all the self-evident that the passage from the easy belief of the childhood of the race (associated as that belief was [unclear: ae] much over-belief) to the more sturdy intelligence of your manhood could hardly fail to create a critical temper, [unclear: a] to pass over into an arrogantly unreasonable [unclear: sceptions] page 5 When old beliefs are discredited by grooving knowledge and the testing of experience, it is both reasonable and inevitable that the desire should arise to test or verify all kinds of beliefs, and more especially those beliefs which we feel to be supremely important and interesting. As it seems to me, the civilised world is presently engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of sitting and testing its fundamental beliefs; the God-intened issue of this process being the elimination of error, and the elevation of our beliefs to a higher and more stable plane of intelligence. The peculiar difficulty attendant upon this delicate process arises from this : that, whereas pure instinct is (in a broad sense) unerring, the process of reasoning and philosophising is peculiarly apt to betray us into the most extravagant errors. The history of philosophy is throughout a standing proof of the astounding errors into which those are betrayed who propose to eliminate all faith elements from their creed, and elaborate a strictly-reasoned theory of the Universe. More particularly are those ambitious systems of philosophy-respectively named Pan-Egoism, Pantheism, and Pan-Materalism, an outrage on the most sacred, deep-seated inevitable convictions of humanity.

The danger incident to the critical stage arises from this, that all great mental reactions do, as a matter of fact, issue in extremeness. When the reign of instinctive credence with its associated over-belief comes to an end, extreme spirits set up some criterion, or test of belief or truth, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that certainty is utterly, and in all things, unattainable. This sceptical, temper though in itself unreasonable and hurtful in a high degree to those who cherish it, nevertheless serves an important end in furthering the progress of thought. Scepticism is the Nemesis of erroneous belief. Its function resembles that of the innumerable army of microbes which resolves all dead and dying organic matter into its in-organic constituents, and thereby prepares the way for fresh organic reconstructions. In the world of thought, primitive beliefs are subjected to the solvent of a keen, remorseless criticism which questions everything, and page 6 obliges well-grounded faiths to justify themselves by [unclear: a] appeal to evidence. It is only fair to allow that may erroneous beliefs have vanished under the action of the sceptical solvent. May we not also say that well-grounds beliefs of the instinctive order have also been constrain by this same sceptical spirit to place themselves on a [unclear: m] stable, because more obviously rational, basis.

It cannot be denied that, as compared with the [unclear: s] called ages of faith, our own age is in an eminent degree critical, and even sceptical in the ordinary sense of the word The customary, which—as I may have occasion hereafter prove—is an important element in every stable civilisation—the customary is no longer regarded as an authority not to be questioned. On the contrary, the more rash [unclear: i] ignorant spirits of the new time are disposed to regad the customary as the antiquated and the effete, These Anarchists in the realm of thought do not, to be [unclear: a] represent the average critical spirit of our time; but these very extravagance serves to make palpable the general [unclear: a] of the prevailing mental tendency. Nowhere has the sceptical spirit made its power more seriously felt than is the religious, ethical, and philosophical spheres, The beliefs which lie at the root of our religious and ethlic life are peculiarly apt to be shaken by the kind of arguments urged by the sceptical critic. Hence the necessity for a thorough vindication of our fundamental religious and ethical beliefs has in recent time made itself deeply felt. For a time men may [unclear: a] a keen delight in the negative work of destruction but human nature in duo time asserts itself in an [unclear: irr] demand for reliable answers to these question. On where human duty and destiny turn. As a rational and men being, man instinctively yearns for the light which general and justifies certainty. To delight in doubt, in the [unclear: a] of wishing to rest in it, is both unnatural and [unclear: ud] Of course, there are those who delight in the darkness of sceptical doubt, because the light which works conviction imposes inconvenient restraints of one kind or another but this perverse spirit can only be the ruling element in society doomed to destruction. The critical and [unclear: sceptical] page 7 stage, in the nature of things, is only transitional and preparatory the last and reconstructive stage of human thought. The searching analysis, which has disintegrated and shaken so many venerable beliefs, simply prepares the way higher, truer, and more stable synthesis. The things that can be shaken must pasa away that the moveable and eternal may be made manifest. As far as I can judge, symptoms are by no means wanting of the fact that the age of earnest reconstruction has dawned. Even aowed Agnostics are now ashamed of that old fanatical scepticism which could see no soul of truth and goodness in the old religious and ethical beliefs, but regarded one and all of them as the product of imposture, or imbecility, or a combination of both. Nor is this all. Some of the most notable recent products of thought—outside the sphere of theology proper—are avowed and most strenuous attempts to give a rational or reasoned vidication of these fundamental religious and ethical beliefs which constitute the very basis of religion and, morality. I shall only notice two such notable attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of those faith elements which lie at the root of our religious life and thought.

The entire philosophy of Lotze has for one of its con-seious aims the rational vindication of the catholic religious and ethical beliefs of humanity. Fully to explain how or by what method he proposes to accomplish this end would invole an exposition of his system of philosophy. Suffice, it to say that his theory of knowledge assigns to thought, or the logical understanding; a much humbler function than is generally ascribed to it; whereas he attributes to what he calls feeling, or, as some would rather say, reason or intuition, a cognitive value utterly ignored by those who believe only in the purely intellectual methods of physical science. In passing I may notice that Lotze's estimate of the value and function of reasoning is strikingly accordant with that of Romanes, who thus ex-presses himself in his notable posthumous work " Thoughts on Religion": "But I now clearly perceive two well-nigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first was science in merely syllogistic conclusions. . ." page 8 A few lines further on he confesses how mistaken he was in not "considering how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of his earlier argument is to God Himself, as " His existence were a merely physical problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his other and higher [unclear: fd]tits." In Germany the indirect theological influence of Lotze has been very marked. In a very real sense he the philosopher of the Ritchlian school, which also made feeling—that is, such a sense or feeling of value. As evoked by the contemplation of moral worth—the basis certainty in matters religious. In our own country, [unclear: t] Lotze's influence is evidenced, not only by the translation of his more important works, but also by the fact the thinkers of repute, such as Professor Jones, have publisher elaborate critical expositions of his system.

The work of the Honourable Arthur Balfour, entiled. "The Foundations of Belief," is even more exclusively [unclear: a] anything which Lotze has written an attempt to justify the reasonableness of our fundamental religious and ethical he liefs, I do not know whether or not Balfour has been [unclear: a] sciously influenced by Lotze, but to me, at least, both the spirit and method of his book are strongly suggestive of Lotze. Naturally, Balfour's book, both by reason of marked ability, and because it reveals the thoughts of as sponsible politician of high culture, has excited deep [unclear: intd] and provoked much criticism. Like Lotze, he has set [unclear: him] to prove that the accepted postulates and theories of physical science present difficulties and [unclear: incoka] of the very kind which sceptics urge as a reason for setting aside religious and ethical beliefs. He [unclear: a] indeed been accused of using an essentially eceptical philosophy for the purpose of inducing the kind of [unclear: di] which blindly seeks refuge from paralysing doubt in the unverified affirmations of some external authority [unclear: I] accusation I take tobe very unjust, for it seems to me religious beliefs can only be effectively vindicated by [unclear: ing], as Balfour has attempted to do, that the kind sceptical criticism, which, by some, is supposed to be to all religious and ethical belief is equally effective [unclear: were] page 9 impartially brought to bear on the most widely-accepted theories in physical science, Multitudes imagine that the basis of certainty in the physical sciences cannot be questioned by the most astute scepticism, and on the strength of this imaginary fact they contend that all religious beliefs ought to be set aside as unproved, because, forsooth, scepticism always has been and always will be possible in the religious sphere, But " it is a fact that absolute certainty of the kind which makes scepticism utterly impossible is unattainable in every sphere of knowledge concerned with fact, is it not in the highest degree desirable that this fact should be known and insisted on? If "these theoretical difficulties and inconceivabilities of the kind which make scepticism possible are discoverable to a greater or less extent in every sphere of knowledge, is it not unreasonable to make theoretical difficulties, and the possibility of doubt, a bar to belief in the religious and ethical sphere. The possibility of demonstrating any fact or first principle by a process which absolutely excludes all faith elements, is a sheer fiction, In truth, the only parts of human knowledge which practically compel universal accepance are rational principles and the bare facts of self-consciousness. The legitimate inference from the established fact that our knowledge, in all spheres, is partial incoherent, and therefore exposed to sceptical eavil, is not that all things are doubtful, but that it is absurd, or at least irrational to demand in any sphere of knowledge in kind of evidence and logical consistency which excludes, the possibility of speculative doubt. A good deal of the argument urged against those beliefs which are distinctively religious simply amounts to the quite indisputable assertion that these beliefs are not, and cannot be proved by argument so absolutely demonstrative that doubt is simply impossible. Every competent thinker will, I presume, freely grant that the existence of God cannot, in the strict sense of the word, be demonstrated. But what of that? The existence of an external world, and, of course, the existence of our fellowmen, is just as incapable of rigid demonstration. Even the reality of knowledge cannot be demonstrated, and yet its possibility and reality must be page 10 assumed even by the sceptic who most irrationally denies its validity, Absolute certainty is exclusively the possession of the omniscient. " we men insist on doubt-defying demonstration as the condition of belief—we are bound in consistency to doubt the reality of everything with one solitary exception, and that the paltry fact of bare self-consciousness. In subsequent Lectures I hope to make good the above assertion by reference to accepted scientific theories.

It will, I think, prepare the way for the more positive treatment of our subject " I direct your attention to some of the more prominent causes of religious scepticism. It is clear that hindrances to belief can only be effectively dealt with when they are known. Of course, it is quite impossible within our limits to notice everything in the stream of thought-tendency which makes for the un-settling of religious belief. Only the more prominent and influential of these influences can he glanced at Some of these particularly concern the Christian Church, for it cannot he denied that those errors, practical and theoretical which in times past obtained a foothold in the Church, have helped to swell the tide of unbelief. Detected error and superstition, more particularly hi matters religious, strongly tend to generate unbelief. For intelligible reasons which I need not pause to explain, religious associations strongly tend to claim absolute infallibility for the creed which they profess. The Church of Rome frankly maintains not only that her official creed, known as the Symbola Romano, is infallible, but also that the ex cathedra deliverances of her Popes carry with them the same infallible authority. This is a most perilous claim doomed to produce in the future a gigantic intellection revolt. The detection of the slightest error in a creed which claims absolute infallibility utterly destroy is pretensions as an infallible authority, and tempts those who detect any such flaws to reject the entire creed, even though it may contain much precious truth. To take a small matter by way of illustration. In the decrees of the Council of Trent, it is set down that the said holy Synd " ordains and declares that the said old and Vulgate edition page 11 which, by the lengthened usage of so many ages, has been Approved of in the Church, be in "public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions, held as authentic; and that no one in to dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatever." Now, apart from any question as to the test of the Vulgate, no candid scholar can believe that the Vulgate or any other version is an absolutely correct translation of the original. The Protestant Churches formally disclaim infallible authority for their creeds; but it is not to be denied that Protestant theologians have not un frequently defended every doctrine in the creed of their Church with an air of dogmatic assurance only to be justified on the assumption of its proved infallibility. In a world where, development, or, " you will, progress, is the law of every tiling finite, this infallibilist tone not only provokes scepticism, but in a sense justifies it. We who live in this critical and sceptical age are assuredly suffering from the sins of some of our fathers. What I venture to call the Gnostic pretensions of some of the theologians in the scholastic period of Protestantism is, I think, partly responsible for Agnosticism. It hardly needs to be proved that pretentious dogmatism calls forth sceptical protests, and modern Agnosticism rightly understood is just such a protest evoked by the excessive dogmatism both of theologians and philosophers. To claim an amount and kind of certainty in matters religious not justified by the available evidence, is a sin again at truth sure to be avenged by the Nemesis of Scepticism.

The moral scandals with which Churches and professing Christians are more or less chargeable is another source of religious doubt. Reasonable Christians cannot object feo the application of the fruit test. No religious creed which, being honestly accepted, tends on the whole to produce results which are ethically bad can be held to be true. If "anything is certain, it" is certain that truth is the handmaid of goodness. Any belief, or body of beliefs, the proper tendency of which is to foster immorality must be false. Unfortunately, the history of the Church, and the lives of certain professing Christians, furnish the religious sceptic with too many plausible pretexts for page 12 denouncing religion as the parent of ever so many evils, such as obscurantism, bigotry, Jesuitism, intolerance, persecution, hypocrisy, and so forth. To be sure the religious sceptic applies the ethical test wrongy for he identifies the wheat with the tares—genuine religious with its perversions. The fact, however, that the religious sceptic makes so much of the moral scandals of religious life and history, points unmistakeably to the all-imports truth that the ultimate ground of Christian belief is the vision of the Holy One, and our experience of His redemptive power.

A third and most potent cause of religious and moral scepticism is the widespread influence of the philosophy generally described as Materialism, and sometimes called Naturalism, According to this philosophy, the ultimate reality is matter and force. From this ultimate reality everything proceeds by necessary sequence The ceaseless interactions of this primal entity, which, for the sake of brevity, we will henceforth call matter originate and carry forward the evolutionary process of which we hear so much. What we call mind is merely; [unclear: a] peculiar function or activity of matter, organised in [unclear: a] particular way. Such is thorough-going materialism, This it is the negation of all religious and ethical beliefs, worthy of the name, goes without saying. Nay, Materialism obliterates any intelligible distinction between truth and error, for surely it is absurd to predicate either truth a error of that which is the outcome of a necessary process. According to the theory before us, my brain is entitled to claim the sanction of inviolable physical necessity as well as the brain of the man who says there is to God.

It is sometimes said that religious scepticism is the direct and necessary result of the triumphal progress of that group of sciences described as physical. This is a very grave error. Could it be proved that the best established results of physical science necessitate the conclusion that matter is the ultimate reality, and the sufficient explanation of everything that comes to pass, then I presume that the vast majority of men would be forced to admit page 13 that all religious beliefs are illusions, or rather delusions. That Materialism is not a manifest inference from the accepted finding of natural science is abundantly proved by the fact that multitudes of theologians, and philosophers too who cherish religious beliefs, frankly accept the best established results of physical science as valid knowledge. Nay, more, they glory in the triumphs of physical science for this among other reasons, that those triumphs are a splendid and convincing exhibition of the essential rationality of the human mind, and the essential intelligibility or rationality of the world which mind progressively interprets. As they interpret this double and corresponding rationality of mind and nature, it is a powerful argument in favour of Theistic belief. Physical science is not antagonistic to religious belief; though, unquestionably that Materialistic philosophy which so many second and third-rate scientists have been led to adopt, is utterly destructive of all really religious and ethical belief. I have advisedly said that, speaking broadly, only second and third-rate scientists frankly adopt a Materialistic interpretation of the Universe, This is a fact which wants to be known, especially in the interests of that largo class which is apt to be unduly impressed by numbers and clamour and rhetoric, rather than by real weight of scientific authority. Take, for example, the original thinkers and discoverers, past and present, among that most important class of scientists called physicists. Who well and Naville, both first-rate authorities in such a matter, call special attention to the fact that the great discoverers of the past were devout Theists. You must descend to the men of mere talent, to analytic as opposed to constructive thinkers, before you reach those who imagine that a rational interpretation of the Universe does not need to postulate the existence of a personal God.

Let us come now to the great physicists and mathematicians of the present generation. I take it that Lord Kelvin, better known as Sir William Thomson, stands head and shoulders above all living physicists, und yet he is a humble and convinced Theist, who is not ashamed to confess that, as he knows the order of the page 14 physical Universe, it can only be conceived as the outcome of purposive or designing intelligence. But this is precisely the kind of question in which his convictions ought to weigh vastly more than the opinions of a host of minor physicists, who cannot even pretend to follow him in his highest scientific and mathematical achievement Then we have physicists belonging to the immediate past such as Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, Adams, Cayley, and Balfour Stewart. In the ranks of the living, we find such men as Tate and Stokes, Where are the peers of this galaxy among the other group of physicists which has adopted a materialistic creed? But some one may be disposed to ask, What of Tyndall ? That he had a brilliant literary and expository gift is known to all readers and students. By his careful experiments and lucid expositions, he did much to popularise science; and especially he did much in the way of confirming and disseminating the splendid discoveries of Pasteur. Who, by the way, was also devoutly religious.

The mere fact that the greatest physicists in all ages have been convinced Theists, sufficiently evidences the face that physical science, rightly understood, is neither Atheistic in itself, nor does it lead to an Atheistic philosophy, On the contrary, the foremost physicists, past and present affirm that the supremely intelligible order which obtain in the physical universe necessitates the conclusion that its ultimate cause is ordering intelligence. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that the magnificent progress of physical science has incidentally led many to adopt a creed prachcally, "not avowedly, Materialistic and Atheistic how this has come about is tolerably evident-The scientific method has led to important discoveries so assured, and a progress so continuous, that many physicists and naturalists have rashly leapt to the conclusion that the objects of sense perception constitute the only material of knowledge, and that scientific method is the only instrument of discovery. According to this mistaken view science can be nothing but exact knowledge of the law of "the re-distribution of matter and motion," Outside this sphere there can be no such thing as certainty—that is page 15 verified knowledge, The narrowness and arrogance of this school reflected in their manner of speech. In their vocabulary, science means the physical sciences. Theology is not a science, but at best only a vague sentiment, having reference to the unknowable. In other words, this class of physicist and naturalists so glorify the physical science that they deny the validity of all knowledge, or belief not provable by what they call scientific methods. It is further assumed by this very uncritical school of physicits that the data, and established theories of physical science, are scepticism-proof, inasmuch as they are free from all the difficulties which attach to religious and ethical beliefs, and are proved by a method which makes no use of faith elements. In a subsequent Lectura, I hope to prove that this assumption is ridiculously mistaken, Here, and in closing, I may remark that even the existence of an external world cannot be demonstrated. Balfour affirms that the argument for the existence of God is stronger than that for the existence of an external world, and it would be difficult, " not impossible, to prove that his statement is extravagant. It is not creditable culture of those physicists who are not aware of the face that all physicists assume the truth of first principal and data of experience, not one of which can be proved in the technical sense of the word, and every one of which has been questioned. And yet in the face of this and such like facts, it is assumed that "the verified facts and doctrins of physical science rest on an evidential basis so strong that it cannot he challenged, whereas all other beliefs are intrinsically doubtful. The reasonableness of this assumption I shall test in my next Lecture.