Chapter XVI.

How it Might be made to do so.

But supposing these arguments succeed in convincing their judgment, it would still be competent for those who uphold the existing system to ask, "Well, does the Single Tax method clearer any cure for the evil—one that would act as a safety-valve, by which the landless people inside the occupied area could escape from the disabilities under which it is asserted they now labour?"

Can anyone doubt that, under these circumstances, the outside lands would act as a safety-valve? Can anyone doubt that the landless people within the zone would be attracted by a freehold title for nothing, absolute security for improvements, freedom from taxes on any of their business operations, and therefore from any deduction from any part of their industry? With these benefits, would they fear to page 36 incur the liability of an annual payment for public purposes equivalent to the value which their land from year to year possessed above that of the most desirable land which they could get rent free? Why, the tenants now pay an equal sum annually to private owners, who spend it on themselves, while the tenants pay taxes in addition, and also labour under all the difficulties of uncertainty and insecurity. There can be no doubt that they would flock to the new territory. They would there form a community of workers with no drones, of producers without any idle exactors who were mere consumers. They would be subject to no interference or inspection in their operations; they would enjoy secure ownership of all that they produced; they could bequeath, or sell for its market value, all their possessions, together with their freehold title. The title would bring them no premium, and that is the best of reasons in favour of their getting it for nothing at the outset. It would have no selling value, because it would carry with it the obligation to pay annually its full ground-rental value. In the control of the expenditure of this fund, and of the public services which were maintained out of it, they would have an equal voice with everyone else.

It may be asked, What should be done with deferred-payment settlers, special settlers, perpetual leaseholders, eternal leaseholders (as 999 years' tenants have been called), and others who are now holding land in various ways from the State? The answer is very simple—give them a freehold title at once, subject to the Single Tax, and leave off inspecting their operations and demanding any conditions of tenure.

In justification of the proposal to part with the freehold of Crown lands without payment, let it be asked, "Why should the State demand a purchasing price? Does it not want settlers? Does it not wish all willing men to work and to add to the national wealth? Certainly it does. Then why does it erect an artificial barrier against them round its remaining lands, with the result (1) of retarding settlement, (2) of reducing the capital which the settler has to lay out in improvements, and (3) of continuing to play into the hands of speculators and land-lords, and of perpetuating the evils which these classes are admitted to cause?"

Although, in repetition of much that has been urged, it may very well be here pointed out that in a district thrown open on the conditions suggested no land would be kept idle, because this would entail an annual loss upon the owner without offering to him the compensating advantage of a possible prospective advance in selling value. This absence of lock-up would bring great advantages to the new community, inasmuch as settlement would extend along lines of natural preference and suitability, Unobstructed by owners holding for a rise. Intending cultivators or users would be able to start as soon as they had saved enough to enable them to do so, and would retain their whole capital to lay out in improvements, which would from the outset aid their production.

For the same reasons, railways, roads, public offices, and every convenience would be placed in the most suitable localities. No owner would be interested in influencing expenditure towards his own land, to the detriment of that of others, because his assessment would be raised, in relation to theirs, in proportion to any advantage which he might thereby gain.

To such a community many would be attracted who did not wish to take up land for farming, for manufacturing, or even for building their homes upon. Many who did not incline to make a business venture would go there in search of employment. Their wages would be subject to no deduction for taxes or rates, and yet they would not on this account be accepting any favour, seeing that their presence and expenditure would maintain and increase the ground-rent fund by keeping up and adding to the volume of trade. They Would thus as truly contribute to public services as any of their land-owning neighbours did.

In such a community, where no improvements were taxed or rated, and where no producer suffered any deduction whatever from the value of his produce, much more labour would be wanted, and therefore better wages would be offered. Another circumstance which would tend to increase wages, and which would certainly act effectively, would be the facility with which any who had saved a little money, and who desired to set up for themselves rather than continue as wage-earners, could leave the ranks of hired labour to work for themselves, and ultimately to become employers. The calls upon wage-earners would be lessened, while their wages would be increased.

A State so constituted might safely borrow money, and would have a fair chance of wisely and economically laying it out in public works. Its cities and local bodies might do the same. Pressure would not be brought to bear by individuals and electorates, as at present, for the expenditure of borrowed money where no public work was needed. The experience of the whole of Australasia in this line conclusively proves that with existing methods of taxation, and under the system of party government, it is impossible to expend loans or public funds either honestly or economically.

The foregoing paragraphs are intended to elaborate a suggestion by which our Crown lands might be made to lessen the existing evils by acting as safety-valves to landless people within the occupied area. It is not, of course, pretended that any section of a country could be treated so differently from the rest. But, if that were possible, the new territory would certainly be the most desirable section to live in for all who simply desired to enjoy the fruits of their own industry without deduction, and who did not wish to take toll from that of others. But what could not be established at once by a stroke of the pen over a section of the country could be promptly commenced over the whole of it.

Such a condition as that described, so far from being Utopian, is one of the most sober and feasible, nay, even prosaic, of possibilities. page 38 It is within the reach of any democratic community which will intelligently and patiently think out its underlying principles, and then determine to vote it into existence at the ballot-box. Instead of involving, as so many dread, an advance into Socialism, it offers the freest scope for individuals to direct their own energies and to use their own capital. Instead of requiring more State inspection, regulation, and interference, or necessitating an increase of public officials, it would mean a reduction in every department.