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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 69

Party Government

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Party Government.

On the motion for going into Committee of

Dr. Hodgkinson said,—I beg to move the following resolution: That a Committee be appointed to consider and report as to the possibility of devising a system of appointing the Executive Government such as may be free from the evils of the present system; to report in a fortnight: the said Committee to consist of Mr. Saunders, Mr. Tanner, Major Steward, Mr. Samuel, Mr. Verrall, Mr. O'Conor, Mr. Monk, Dr. Newman, Captain Russell, and the over. Any one who looks impartially at what has taken place in this colony must recognise that the present system is a great curse, and has indirectly led to ruinous expenditure and indebtedness. The part of this subject which I wish to deal with chiefly is the historical part. I am aware that the great difficulty of getting fair consideration for this subject is that the minds of honourable members are prejudiced, and they have foregone conclusions upon the subject. The impression upon the minds of most honourable members has been that this proposal is a great novelty, and that the present system of party or Responsible Government is necessary to the existence of parliamentary government and institutions. There never was a greater fallacy than that. If we trace back the origin of this system, we shall find that it is of very modern origin, and, in fact, has only been in operation about a hundred years, and that in the great and most glorious times of English history, when the liberties of England were secured, this system of Responsible Government was utterly unknown, and is also utterly unknown among the greater part of the English-speaking race at this present time. It has never existed in the old American colonies or in the United States—and we know that the centre of gravity of the Anglo-Saxon race is now on the western continent, and not in the little island of Great Britain. If we go back to trace the origin of this system we must go back a considerable number of centuries—to the first origin of Parliaments, which has been traced back to the Anglo-Saxon period. But that really was not the origin of Parliaments. There was then a national system, but not a representative system. True Parliaments did not come into operation until the close of the thirteenth century, and at that time the Kings had no Ministry, such as we have, but they had a Council, which came to be called the Privy Council. Now, this modern system of Cabinet did not come into operation until several centuries afterwards. It commenced in the days of the Stuarts—the days of James I., Charles I., and Charles II. The Kings at that time, as history shows, instead of taking the advice of the whole number of the Privy Council, selected a few of their own particular friends, in whom they had the greatest confidence and for whom they had the greatest liking, and separated them from the rest of the Privy Councillors so far as this: that they only called this select number together. And that is how the name "Cabinet" came into use, because they were assembled in a cabinet. I may add that this caused a great deal of jealousy and dissatisfaction, as we are told by Clarendon, the historian, that it was considered a sort of precedence of certain Privy Councillors, which created ill-feeling. Those who are readers of history will recollect that was in the time especially of Charles II., and that was the origin of the word "cabal," which is so well known. The initials of the names of a certain number of these Councillors gave that name. This system went on, and there was nothing like Ministerial responsibility until the time of William III. In the time of William III. it came about that the King, being a constitutional King, did not insist on appointing Ministers who were not acceptable to the Parliament. I may say that at that time, and for some time later, page 4 the position of Ministers of England was very much more like that of the present Cabinet of the United States of America than like the system now in operation in England. We know that as late as the time of William III., though great advances were made in the direction of constitutional liberty and freedom of Parliament, the system of Responsible Government had not got fully established. I may say that the origin of it was, no doubt, a desire to re-strict the power of the Crown. In those days the power of the Crown was the most dangerous thing the people had to fear, and the object of the system of Responsible Government was mainly to diminish the power of the Crown. We find that it did not succeed in doing that for some considerable time. Fortunately for England, the succeeding monarchs were men or women of comparatively weak character. The two first Georges were so; but when George III. came to the throne, though not a man of much intellect, he was a man of much strength of character, and he really ruled the country very much in the way that a President of the United States now rules with his Cabinet. He nominated the Ministry. They were called the King's friends, and he appointed them without any regard to the wishes of Parliament; and, as is well known, Lord North accepted that position. Under this personal government of the King of England, George III., the American Colonies were lost to England. That was one of the most deplorable results of personal government. Those who look into the matter will find that it was not until the advent of the Rockingham Ministry, in 1782, that this system of Responsible Government in England was fully established. I may say that when government by a Cabinet first came into operation the custom was that the Ministers should deliberate with the King. The King presided until the time of William III., when, in consequence of foreign wars and the absence of the King from England, it was necessary that the Cabinet should meet without the King: and after his reign the practice of the King presiding at the Cabinet was never resumed. Up to that time I may say there was no unity in the Cabinet; every Minister acted as the Ministers of the United States do now, independently in his own department, and there was no such official as our modern Premier. In fact, honourable members, I dare say, will be rather surprised to hear that the office of Premier is an exceedingly modern institution, and was first looked upon with great jealousy. Lord North himself says that the Premier was regarded with distrust as having too much precedence over the other Ministers. In fact, the term "Premier" is not known to the British Constitution at all, and, as a matter of fact, it was never used in any official document until the Treaty of Berlin was signed. That treaty is the first official document which recognises the term "Premier," and the title there is "First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister of England." Now, under the Commonwealth of England, which, whatever may be said, was perhaps the most glorious time of English history—under the Protectorate these was no such system in operation whatever, there was a Council of State, and some of the most illustrious men were upon that [unclear: Coun] such as Sir Harry Vane, Colonel John [unclear: Hutc] son, and others. Of course, at the [unclear: restora] of the Monarchy that system ceased, and the system of Cabinet government came into [unclear: operation]—that is, government by a selected number of the members of the Privy Council chosen by the King. The first development then, of this system of Cabinet government was that a select number was separated from the Privy Council; the next was that they were not selected by the King from his personal friends, but from the dominant party of the House of Parliament—from that party which had a majority: but that did not come into operation for some considerable time. In the time of William III. the King still [unclear: lected] his Ministers from either side of the House, and he considered that they should as independently of each other, and not [unclear: be] body under the control of the Premier. The the next remove was that they were not compelled to deliberate in the presence of the King, but deliberated apart in a cabinet, and tendered their advice to the monarch. to next move, I believe, was that the monarch was expected to take their advice; and that about completed the system of Cabinet government. For some time the [unclear: Pre] did not possess the power which he has now—for a long time he was not considered; [unclear: time] head of the Cabinet in the same manner than he is now; and, in fact, it is generally admitted that the system of Cabinet government as we know it now was not actually in existence till the time of the Rockingham Ministry, in 17th Then, there is another very significant fact: the greatest writers on the English Constitution Ce Lolme and Blackstone, ignore this system of Responsible Government which honourable members consider so essential to parliamentary government. It is completely ignored by these writers. This fact itself would show that it is not at all necessary to parliamentary government. Another important fact is that when this system was instituted it was not considered necessary that the Ministers should have placed in Parliament at all; and, as an actual fact, this day there are two or three monarchies it Europe in which they are not required to be present, unless that has been altered within the last few years. That is the case in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and also in [unclear: Spain] and I believe I am right in saying that it is also the case in the English colony of the Cape of Good Hope. The Ministers are not necessarily members of the Legislature; and when they are not members they are allowed to sit there and to speak as occasion requires but not to vote. In confirmation of what I have been stating, I wish to read from one of the recognised authorities. Cox, in his "Institution of English Government," page 258, says,—

"In the history of Parliament only a very small space is occupied by party government, page 5 and it has prevailed only for comparatively short and interrupted periods of the last and present centuries. We look in vain for any trace of it in the best epochs of the history of Parliament—such, for example, as the latter part of the reign of James I. and the earlier part of that of Charles I., the epochs of the Grand Committees of Grievances and the Petition of Right."

Now, another matter in connection with our present system of parliamentary government which is of some importance is that of asking questions in Parliament. That is also of modern date. It only dates back to the times of Sir Robert Walpole. As for precedent for this institution of an elective Executive, which a great number of members are in favour of, there are to a certain extent precedents for it even now in Europe. In the Kingdom of Norway, though they have not an elected Executive in the sense in which we speak of it, at the close of Parliament the House elects a Committee to look over the public accounts and the welfare of the realm. That is very much such a body as we wish to see appointed to conduct the business of this country. Then, in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as I have said, though they have a Responsible Ministry, they are not required to be members of the House; nor are they in Denmark—as regards the great institution called the Rigsrad, the Ministry are not required to be members of that body. Then, in the German Empire there is no such thing as Responsible Government to this day, and yet the Germans consider that they have a Parliament and that they are a free people. The system of Responsible Government exists in the Kingdom of Prussia and in some of the other States of the German Empire, but it does not exist in the Constitution of the great German Empire itself. They have a system there very much resembling that of the United States of America. I do not wish to say much about the Constitution of Switzerland, as I hope other honourable members will deal with that part of the subject. In Switzerland, when the Legislature meets, an Executive Committee or Council is elected by the Legislature for the term of the Parliament, and it remains in office during that Parliament. There are no votes of no-confidence and so forth, over which an enormous amount of time is wasted under our system, which leads to great evils. In fact, I feel quite justified in saying that our system, after all, is not really government by party, but government by faction. Under the peculiar system in America the President nominates his own Ministers, and they are really superintendents of departments of State. They do not sit in Congress, bat convey all information by letter to that body. Under the United States Constitution the power of the President is counterbalanced by the Senate, which is the most important institution in the American Union, and has no doubt been the salvation of it. And I should very much like to see our Legislative Council Improved so far as to have some resemblance to the American Senate. If the Constitution of New Zealand, as originally provided for and introduced by Earl Grey, had been carried out in its integrity, we should have had a Legislative Council closely resembling the American Senate; and I am bold to say that if that had been done New Zealand would not have been in its present deplorable state of indebtedness and bad government. I am not finding fault with our present Cabinet: I believe they are the best we can get. I contend, however, that modern Responsible Government is bad at the best, under any circumstances. Now, with regard to the individual States of the American Union, they have a system closely resembling that of the Swiss Government. For instance, we will take the State of Maine, whose Governor is chosen by the legal voters of the State on the second Monday in September, and holds office for one year. He is assisted by a Council of seven persons, who, with the remaining State officers, are chosen by the Senators and Representatives in Joint Convention. In Indiana the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, Attorney-General, and Superintendent of Public Instruction are chosen by the people at a general election held on the second Tuesday in October. The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor hold office four years, and the others six years. I shall leave to other members who wish to speak to enlarge upon the evils of party government. I will only say, myself, that I believe, instead of being essential or necessary to parliamentary government, it is quite the reverse. I may say, to sum up in a few words, that, whilst the Parliament, or a large section of the Parliament, are continually thwarting the Ministry, harassing them, and trying to destroy and mutilate their measures on the one side, the Ministers themselves sometimes, owing to the system and not to the men, overbear their own followers, and compel them to vote for bad measures or else to submit to what they consider a greater evil—that is to say, a change of Ministry, which would result in a much greater number of bad measures. In fact, there are innumerable trains of evils connected with this system, which I hope other members who intend to speak will bring out. I think I may conclude my short discourse by another extract with regard to the evils of this system. Its instability is one of its greatest evils. As a matter of fact, in the present Kingdom of Italy there were twenty-live Ministries within eighteen months. That shows the operation of it. We know that in England they occasionally last four or five years, but it is a rare thing; and in New Zealand the changes have been very frequent. I believe, some sixteen or eighteen years ago there were about five Ministries within a year, or a very short time. I am not speaking merely from any peculiar views or theories which myself and others have adopted, but I am only saying what are recognised facts, even by those who admire this present system of Responsible Government and are considered great authorities upon it. Cox, who has written a book which is considered a class-book on this sub- page 6 ject, describing the results of party government, says,—

"Party diminishes responsibility by dividing it; subjects the Executive Government to sudden and dangerous changes; it confers office upon the wise and the upright together with the incompetent and the corrupt, and in turn ejects them from power simultaneously; degrades politics from a science to a warfare, assigning public office not to the ablest men necessarily, but to those who have the greatest political power."

That last sentence tells a great deal. Now, what did we find when we met here three years ago? We were ninety-five members. We found ourselves as helpless as a flock of sheep. We were told there were only two men we could follow, and we were compelled to follow them as a flock follows a bell-wether, because of this system. These two men were both men of considerable talent and ability—Sir Harry Atkinson and Sir Julius Vogel. Now, though they were, under the present system, the only men who could lead the House, or whom the House would acknowledge as leaders, yet I do not believe they were the best statesmen by any means. I believe some members of this House holding very humble positions, and who do not come to the front, would really manage the affairs of the country, as Councillors, much better than either of these two gentlemen. Under the present system the leader of the Ministry or of the Opposition must be a sort of oratorical gladiator, but it does not at all follow he should be a statesman. I admit there have been examples where men capable of leading the House, such as the great Chatham and his son William Pitt, have been great orators and leaders, and, at the same time, statesmen; but Nature is not lavish in that way. It rarely happens that a great statesman is a great talker, or fit to be a leader under the system we have here. For instance, take Bismarck. He would not have been looked on as a parliamentary leader. Take Washington, Franklin, Oliver Cromwell, and others.

Mr. W. P. Reeves.—Bismarck was a parliamentary leader.

Dr. Hodgkinson.—He was not a great talker. He had a great contempt for talkers.

Mr. W. P. Reeves.—He was a great talker—a first-class orator.

Dr. Hodgkinson.—We know that under this system of government a man must be a talker. I know Beaconsfield got a great name, but for my part I must confess I have not much respect for him. There are exceptions: John Bright was an orator and a statesman.

An Hon. Member.—What about Gladstone?

Dr. Hodgkinson.—Gladstone I do not say anything about.

An Hon. Member—Sir Julius Vogel.

Mr. W. P. Reeves.—Sir Robert Peel.

Dr. Hodgkinson.—I would just allude lastly to a passage in Cox, to show the working of this system: that a Parliament may meet as we did, and be comparatively helpless—that is, for want of a leader having certain qualities considered necessary in a leader of the House; but these qualities do not involve statesman ship. But I will leave it to other members who wish to speak to deal with the question in into various aspects.

Major Steward.—I propose to second the amendment. The question which has been submitted to this House by my honourable friend is a very large one, and is one which, although it may be received with incredulity and opposition by members of this House, will be hailed throughout the country: because I feel satisfied public opinion from one end of the colony to the other is best represented by a quotation from Shakespeare—"A plague o' both your houses!" I do not refer to the two Houses of Parliament, but to the two houses of party in this case. Sir, wherever you go, from the North to the South, travel in railway-carriages travel in stage-coaches, meet people upon the street, and what do people say? "Why do you waste so much time in Wellington? Why do you go up there and have abortive [unclear: sessices] year by year? Why do you for six or seven weeks occupy the whole of the time in fighting and talking of the possible motives of one Government or the other—of mistakes made in 1879, 1882, 1886, and other years—and the in the poor, miserable four or five weeks which remain of the session, hurry through a large amount of work, neglect altogether a still larger amount of important work, and do such work as you actually get through in such slovenly manner that you are constantly occupied afterwards in mending it and [unclear: tinkering] up?" That is what is said from one end of the country to the other, and it is said with justice. I make no apology for taking part in this debate, in the hope that we may indicate to the people of New Zealand a way out of the difficulties in which we are now placed. I care not whether it be a matter of two, these four, or five hours—a debate on a question of this sort is far more worthy of the hall of this Legislature than debates which take place hour by hour over this Bill and the other Bill, or the more miserable process of stone walling this Bill or the other Bill. If it costs a week a month, or a whole session, yet if we can devise a means whereby we may escape from the miserable condition in which this Parliament is plunged we shall have done a great thing. I am sorry that the House is thin. I hope there will be more members here before I have done speaking; but whether members listen or no I care not. What will be said to-night will be carried through the length and bread of the land; and depend upon it, Sir, it will in time reach the hearts of the people of New Zealand, and there will be a strong movements for something in the direction which the honourable gentleman indicates. Could there be any system more likely to bring about the wretched condition of things which we now have than the system we have adopted in this country, in slavish imitation of older countries?" I say that, not only in this county but in other countries, the system of party government is becoming effete; that it is at an anachronism; that it has ceased to work. page 7 Look to Victoria: what have we there? A coalition Government. Look to the Old Country: what have we there? The Conservatives kept in power by a section of the Liberals. When it comes to the pass that no one party is of itself able to govern the country—the moment a coalition becomes necessary—then, Sir, party government is shown to be a failure. The suggestions I would put before the House, or before the Committee if it be granted, will be in the direction of letting the whole House select its Government, instead of a portion of the House. What have we now? An elective Government—a Government elected mediately through one man, by one-half of the House plus two or three, being the majority by which a want-of-confidence motion has been carried, which places that Government in office. But if we take off the number of the Ministry themselves it will be found that the party which has the choice of the Ministry is perhaps in itself a minority of the House. But, even, Sir, supposing there were an absolute majority of two or three on the one side which is in charge of the administration of the colony's affairs, what of necessity happens? The other side of the House, who have had no voice in the choice of these gentlemen, from that moment range themselves in opposition, for the purpose of doing their very utmost to turn the Government out and have the selection of a Government themselves. Take the position of the gentleman who is sent for to form a Ministry. He ought to have the whole House from which to make his choice: any honourable gentleman who is best suited for the administration of lands, any gentleman who is best suited for the administration of the Justice Department, or for any other department he should be able to take that gentleman with him, irrespective of whether he sits upon your right or upon your left. Instead of being able to exercise that choice, however, he is restricted to the one-half of the House, the party that has supported him. He has to leave out gentlemen who would be admittedly the best to join him; and from that moment there is weakness in his Government. Under the system of an elective Executive what would happen? The whole House would nominate, on a date fixed by you, Sir, when it came from the country after an election, candidates for election as members of the Executive Government. On the following day a ballot would be taken, and then the gentleman so appointed would have the opportunity seeing whether they could act together. Any gentleman, if he did not wish to act, could decline to do so, and a fresh ballot would be taken. And then, say, within forty-eight hours, or seventy-two hours at the outside, you would have a selection made just as effectually and infinitely better than, could be made from the party on one side of the House or from that on the other. They could go into office and remain in office during the life of Parliament, though, if it were necessary, any one Minister, or the whole of the Ministers, might be removed in a very simple way without the process of a want of confidence motion. With an Executive thus appointed, the House could deal with measures as brought down, on their merits, without the question behind as to confidence or no confidence in the Ministry. As matters now arc, every one of us in this House is frequently, constantly, put into a false position, because we have to vote upon confused issues. A measure is presented: upon its merits you dissent from it, but the Ministry, as it is said, puts its foot down, and, if a member of the Ministerial party, you must vote for the measure because it is a measure of the Ministry. Under such a system as I propose that would not happen. Ministers' seats would not depend upon their carrying measures. Ministers would be free to vote upon measures individually, just as members of the House would be; the good sense of the whole House would be brought to bear upon each measure, and everything would pass or be rejected upon its pure and simple merits or demerits. Is not that an intelligible position, and is it not a possible position? With regard to party, some honourable gentlemen may say you cannot do without party. I say, Sir, that with an elective Executive you will have a party, but you will have a party of principle, a party of the occasion, a party of the hour, a party for each measure when it comes before the House. Take, for instance, the Local Option Bill. Those honourable gentlemen in favour of the principle of local option would rally round the measure and do their best to carry it, while those who disapprove of local option would be equally united, but for that occasion only. That measure disposed of, whether carried or rejected, when the next measure came up these honourable gentlemen would be differently divided. They would be divided again upon the merits of the measure, and so on. It would be a party of the occasion—not, as we now so often see, a party of general average, a party absolutely divided by principle. What do I mean by "a party of general average"? I mean this: Every honourable gentleman knows that he is on one side or the other not because he is opposed to all the measures of the one side or approves of all the measures of the other, but because, on the average, he is more nearly agreed with that side on which he is. Then, too, he has to vote for the party to which he has given his support, and when it becomes a question of party he has to vote for or support, or abstain from voting against, the party to which he has allied him-self. That there is a great difference of opinion on this subject I have not the smallest doubt—that is to say, as to what is the best remedy for the evils of party—but there is a growing public opinion that a remedy must be found. A writer in a Dunedin newspaper of large influence says this:—

"The colonies to which free institutions have been granted wisely adopted the constitutional principles which rule in England, and established parliamentary government—so far so good—but under conditions essentially different. They adopted, further, the party page 8 basis, although parties, in the political sense of the word, did not exist; nor were there then, or are there now, distinct lines of public policy—except, perhaps, in the Canadian Dominion—on which parties could be organized. The mistake of a too-slavish adherence to the model has proved most mischievous and costly in New Zealand. A very large proportion of the time during which successive Parliaments have been in session has been occupied with struggles, little other than personal, for office. In consequence the business of the country has been impeded, useful legislation obstructed, and, worse than all, revenue and borrowed money unremuneratively and extravagantly expended, with the distinct purpose of securing majorities in the representative Chamber. How many of the millions raised under the public-works policy have been practically wasted in this way! Is not the term 'political railways' a by-word; and has not more than one Colonial Treasurer been constrained to admit that he has been forced to propose appropriations which were beyond the legitimate means of the colony?

* * * * *

"Whenever a Ministerial crisis occurs the honourable gentleman who is called on to form a new Ministry finds himself at once restricted, in the selection of the best men, by the necessity of having to take his colleagues from his own side of the House, although on the other there may be the men notoriously best qualified for certain important administrative offices. He is tied and bound, however, by the exigences of party, and, moreover, cannot even exercise his judgment among his own supporters: considerations of locality have to be attended to, and each provincial district demands representation in the Cabinet. The consequence not infrequently has been a weak Ministry, constrained to maintain itself in power by concession and political bribery—unable to effect required legislation and thus forward the progress of the colony."

Well, Sir, it is not alone in this colony that we find such opinions expressed: in England the same things are stated. A writer in the Circle says,—

"It seems to me that party government has come to be a vehicle for self-seekers' ambition. It is a snare and an antiquated delusion. Political programmes of party are snares also. True men should owe allegiance to measures, not to party. . . . Government by brag and shout cannot be tolerated for ever.

"If that hateful fiend party could be slain, political warfare might be carried on under far less debasing conditions. In every political struggle there would be a nearer approach to true unity on either side, instead of a false and forced cohesion of chance particles. A party man discovers his advocacy is compelled to measures distasteful or even hateful to him. If he break with his party, and join the opposing camp, the same lot will be his fate. To be minus party is, under the present baneful system, to be minus political influence. Party allegiance results in a want of force and heartiness in political life. A man compelled against his will to vote and to think in the same way as his leader is a man robbed of the power to use his faculties. What is the result of this blighting influence but a political deadlock? Let us revert, as Sir Bartle Frere once said to earlier, simpler, and purer methods. We have had enough of government by party. . . . Our present system of government in eating into the very marrow of our national life; it is making all men think, with the cynie that the very words, 'patriotism,' 'honour.' 'truth,' 'earnestness,' and the like should be relegated to a glossary of obsolete phrases.

"Lifelong allegiance and subordination a party or to a chief mean to the thinking man lifelong intellectual enslavement; for the thoughts of men are diverse. It is impossible to conceive of a man, not being a drone [unclear: na] a half-witted nonentity, who can find himself in accord with the views of any party or chid whatsoever upon all points. There must be some different planks in his platform. Political principle under the party system [unclear: come] to mean political dishonesty. Smothered subordination and half-hearted political action are the inevitable products of this accursed legacy of party government, seeing that [unclear: n] man can give heart-whole help to measures be secretly despises.

* * * * *

"It is an undoubted fact that our political procedure—not our political life—is . . . . tottering to its grave; it is more than festered and rotten—it is in its death-throes."

That, Sir, is the opinion of a writer at Home Now, Sir, under present conditions, rail-sitters and free-lances, the so-called independence men, are regarded as little short of nuisances and while there is party in this House I shall always be found with the party which in nearest to my political views, and to be a staunch party man. But if I could get rid of this wretched thing, so that we might vote according to right, according to principle, and range ourselves in the parties of the occasion of the hour, that is what I should like to see But honourable gentlemen say, "Yes; but there be any remedy for the present state of things devised? Show us where anything such as you suggest is in operation." Well, Sir, I hold in my hand a standard work on the Swiss Confederation, written by Sir Franca Adams, late Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne; and I will read two or three short extracts from that work, which are of an exceedingly interesting nature. In Switzerland they have two Houses, as we have; and, by-the-by, I may say that in Switzerland there are certain points of similarity, as there are pointed of dissimilarity, with New Zealand. There is a similarity of position—that is to say, there is isolation from other countries; though in the case of Switzerland it is divided from others countries by mountains, while in our case the division is by sea; and Switzerland is marked by the same instincts of freedom, and his the same love of free institutions, as we have. It page 9 las two Councils. One is called the National Council, and is elected by manhood suffrage; the other is the Council of the States or Upper House, being elected by the Governments of the Cantons, which in some respects resemble, and in other respects are dissimilar to, our old Provincial Councils. Then, the two Houses sitting together are the Federal Assembly; and the Federal Assembly elects what is called the Federal Council, but what we call the Ministry, which "is in the nature of an Executive Committee for the transaction of business." How, Sir, I read,—

"The members of the Federal Council are re-eligible, and in point of fact the same individuals remain in office for a number of years, withstanding differences among themselves, and between some of them and a majority in the Assembly. . . . The Federal Council, having been elected by the Federal Assembly for three years, cannot be dissolved by that body in the interim, any more than it can itself dissolve the Assembly. It does not in any way depend upon the majority in the Assembly. Its members, each in his own department, prepare Bills and resolutions, either suggested by one of the Chambers or of their own initiative; and these measures, when agreed to by the Council, or even a majority of its members, are submitted to the Chambers."

Ministers are free to vote upon these measures though brought down by Ministers, just as members of the House are; and Sir Francis Adams says,—

"Perhaps the most remarkable sight is that which occasionally occurs when a debato arises in either question when the difference of opinion of members of the Federal Council is very marked, and it has happened that two of the body have risen in succession to support, dissimilar views. The debate once over, no particular friction results between the two colleagues; both victor and vanquished may spend the evening together in the same continue their discussion amicably or not at all, and they will sit serenely together on the morrow in Cabinet Council as if nothing particular had happened."

There is another very convenient expedient. All the legislation passes through the hands of the Ministers. There are none of what we call private members' Bills; but members of the Assembly bring in what is called postulate a motion or resolution affirming the desirability of a measure, and, that being agreed to, the Executive Government introduces the measure. The writer proceeds,—

"The right of initiative, exercised particularly as to Bills and motions of various kinds, belongs to each Chamber and to each member. Thus, either Chamber can recommend to the Federal Council that it shall draw up and present a Bill on a particular subject to the Federal Assembly, or a member can suggest one to his own Chamber, and, if accepted, it will then be referred to the Federal Council, with a request to draw up the necessary Bill for the consideration of the Assembly, or the Federal Council itself presents one upon its own initiative. The Cantons can also exercise the right of initiation by correspondence."

And the Government can make a proposal, and the House may not only dissent from it, but may carry something diametrically opposite, and the Executive Government carry out that proposal. Thus,—

"When it became necessary to pass a law respecting railways, and the Federal Council proposed that they should be constructed by the State, the Chambers decreed their construction by private enterprise; and, again, in the case of the law passed by the Chambers granting a monopoly to the Confederation in the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors, they adopted quite a different principle from that originally proposed by the Federal Council. Nevertheless, in both instances, the latter accepted the measures of the Chambers as a matter of course, framed the necessary Bills, and loyally executed their provisions after they had come into force."

Therefore the Swiss Parliament is really a representative Parliament with greater powers than ours, because it governs the country according to the will of the country which it has been elected to represent. I have only one more short extract to read, and then I will pass on. It is this:—

"Collisions between the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly do not exist. If any measure proposed by the former is rejected by both Chambers, or by one, and thus does not become valid, . . . the Federal Council accepts the rejection; it asks for no vote of confidence; nor docs anything ensue in the shape of what we should call a ministerial crisis. Similarly, there is no question of a dissolution of the Chambers when the people reject measures passed by them. The Federal authorities, whether legislative or executive, being chosen for a fixed term, remain at their posts during that term."

Now, this system has been in operation since the proclamation of the new Constitution in 1874; and we have the assertion of Sir Francis Adams, which will not be challenged as that of an insufficient authority, that it has given general satisfaction throughout Switzerland. When, therefore, I am told that this system of an elective Executive has not been tested, I reply that it has been brought into operation and has been found to be successful in its operation; and that it is likely, if brought into operation here, to amend a state of things which loudly calls for amendment. Now, this is not a new matter with me, or with a large number of members of the House. Three years ago I drew up a series of resolutions on the subject, which appeared on a Supplementary Order Paper, but an opportunity did not occur for moving those resolutions in the House, though I may say a large number of honourable gentlemen thought with me and were prepared to support the resolutions. It was decided that we should meet in the following year; and last session we did meet to consider the matter, and discussed the question as to whether we should submit the matter to the House, and through page 10 the House, to the constituencies. We agreed, however, that it was a measure which we can only here initiate, and that it may take years to ripen—though I think, myself, that it will ripen much more quickly than honourable members generally suppose—and that the most convenient time for bringing it forward would be immediately before the general election. This year, very soon after the House assembled, twenty-six honourable gentlemen met together, of whom sixteen remained as a working committee, and it was agreed that we should approach the Premier and ask for an opportunity to be afforded us of bringing the matter before the House. The. Premier courteously said he would give us an opportunity after the financial debate: but, unfortunately, just about the period of the financial debate the Premier's illness prevented him from any longer taking part in the business of this House. We then approached the acting Premier, who was good enough to say that he would move to give us last Monday evening. The acting Premier made the proposal to the House, and we asked the House to give the Monday evening, so that we might not interfere with the other business of the House; but the House thought fit not to give us the opportunity asked for, and we were driven to the only resource then open to us. I would point out also that, until we attempted to move the motion last night on going into Committee of Supply, we did not attempt to press the matter, desiring that the House should have the opportunity of doing two or three days' work in Supply before we entered upon the diversion, if I may call it so, of this debate. But

The best-laid schemes o' mice and men Gang aft a-gley.

The House did not do any work the first night of this week, though owing to no fault of ours; the next night it did a little, and last night we were anticipated in our endeavour to move the resolution owing to the honourable member for Sydenham having been more successful in his effort to secure the right. The resolutions which I put on the Order Paper two years ago I will read, and then I will wind up with a few remarks. I will read the resolutions because I wish to put them in Hansard, and also to show honourable members that we have thought out this scheme—that, though we do not bind ourselves to every word of it or to every proposition, we have submitted something which we think would be a workable scheme. It was this:—
"1.Upon the first assembling of Parliament after each general election, so soon as the House shall have elected the Speaker, it shall proceed to choose six members of the Executive Government in manner following.
"2.Nominations of candidates shall be handed in to Mr. Speaker on the day following that upon which he is himself elected, and shall be signed by twenty nominators in each ease and by the candidate nominated, all of whom must be members of the House of Representatives.
"3.The list of members nominated shall appear on a special Order Paper, to be issued immediately upon the close of the nomination and Mr. Speaker shall appoint a time (not being less than twenty-four nor more than forty eight hours after the issue of such list if nominations) for the taking of a ballot for the election of six members of the Executive.
"4.The six candidates having the highest number of votes shall be declared elected, and shall enter upon office forthwith: Provided that, upon the result of the ballot being declared, any member elected may decline to serve, and thereupon a fresh ballot shall be taken to fill the vacancy.
"5.The six members so elected shall choose two colleagues from among the members of the Legislative Council, or, if they shall be unable so to do, may advise His Excellency to call to the said Council one or two persons, as the case may be, to be members with them of the Executive Council.
"6.The eight members of the Executives so elected or chosen shall appoint one of their own number, who is a member of the Housed of Representatives, to be Premier, and shall allocate the portfolios of the several departments among any seven of their number as they shall think fit.
"7.Such Executive and the several members thereof shall continue in office until the assembling of a new Parliament, and thereafter until the election of their successors unless either of the following contingencies occur, that is to say,—
"(a.)Unless such Executive shall resign as a whole:
"(b.)Unless four or more members thereof who are members of the House of Representatives simultaneously resign, or are balloted out as hereinafter provided, in which case the whole Executive shall be deemed to have resigned:
"(c.)Unless upon a test-ballot, as herein after provided, one or more members, not exceeding four, shall be balloted out.
"8.A test-ballot upon the proposal that the whole Executive or any member or members thereof be removed from office may be demanded by requisition to Mr. Speaker signed by not less than thirty members of the House, and thereupon Mr. Speaker shall appoint a time within forty-eight hours of his receipt of such requisition for the taking of a ballot upon such proposal.
"9.The member or members in respect of whom such ballot is taken shall be disqualified from voting therein, and no such proposal shall be deemed to be carried unless affirmed by an absolute majority of the whole House after deducting from the number of the House the number of members so disqualified from voting.
"10.If upon a test-ballot in respect to four or any less number of members of the Executive, one or both of the members thereof having a seat or seats in the Legislative Council is or are balloted out, then his or their place or places in the Executive shall be filled up by the remaining members thereof so soon as the page 11 other vacant seat or scats, if any, shall have been filled up by ballot of the House.
"11.If any member of the Executive so balloted out shall have been called to the Legislative Council for the purpose of joining the Executive, then upon ceasing to be a member of the Executive he shall also cease to be a member of the Legislative Council.
"12.Not more than one test-ballot as regards the Executive as a whole, or as regards the same member or members thereof, may be demanded during the same session of Parliament."

Now, to consider that scheme, and any other scheme that members of this House may wish to submit, we ask for a Committee to be appointed. That Committee could search for precedents in the history and Constitutions of other countries, and see if it be possible to devise any better state of things than the present system of party government. No harm can come of it. The report can be laid on the table of the House, and the country will be able to judge whether there is given therein any indication of any new departure which might be taken to the benefit of the country. I am not at all surprised that a large number of members view this question with indifference. I am surprised that so many members sit listening as are now listening to me. Nor am I surprised that there are a number of members who regard this matter with incredulity or offer strong opposition. Nay, Sir, let me say that I am neither to be dismayed by ridicule, nor overborne by the prospect of opposition to come. What is the history of all reform? That it is born in ridicule and nursed in opposition, but grows in strength until it is finally accepted. It is so, and has been so, with every reform that has ever been initiated in the history of the world. Time was, some nineteen centuries ago or thereabouts, that the Temple of Diana was one of the wonders of the world, and there came forth a humble preacher who taught a new religion, the religion of the Nazarene, and there was a great rushing-together of Demetrius and the silversmiths, and a clamant cry, "Our craft is in danger!" Aye, Sir, the craft was in danger, for the new evangel triumphed, and the temple and the craftsmen have gone down into oblivion. It may be that our numbers to-night are few; it may be that our voice is feeble; but, Sir, the finger of the child can move the starting-bar of the thousand-horse-power engine, and there are places in the world where the clapping of hands is carried from hill to hill and from mountain to mountain, until the gathering echoes resound like the roll of the thunder, or the roar of a park of artillery; and I venture to predict that the voice we shall wake to-night will grow louder and louder until it will come into I this House with an imperial and imperious demand for reform that can no longer be I resisted. I beg to second the motion.

Mr. Tanner.—Sir, I fear that the very few remarks I shall make on this subject will fall rather flat after the eloquent address of the honourable member for Waimate. This has been for some time his great measure of reform, and I very much regret, for the sake of those who are absent, that there were not many more here to listen to his remarks. I feel satisfied that his concluding remarks bore the impress of truth, and that they will be received with attention from one end of the country to the other. Seeds have to be sown before the plants will grow. The seed of this reform has been sown to-night, and I think the honourable gentleman's prediction will come true, and that in the near future some reform of the kind he advocates will be forced upon this House by the country. To avoid travelling over the same ground that the honourable gentleman has so well travelled over, I will confine my remarks more particularly to an aspect of the question which has not been largely dwelt on, and that is the moral aspect. One would naturally shrink from referring to this view of the case, because in doing so one is bound to refer to the unhappy state of things which has existed. We have witnessed on many occasions, and, I may say, particularly in the present session, the bitterness of party strife, which, as the honourable member for Waimate has said, has led to bitterness of feeling, to the sacrifice of time, and to the sacrifice of the money of the country. These are matters which have been brought before us in a very emphatic and a very unpleasant way during the present session, and I am much afraid that we are not yet through with them. We notice it on every question. Whether it be finance or whether it be some Government Bill, we still sec those bitter party feelings displayed to such an extent that the real merits of the question at issue are lost in them. Sir, we have seen a great deal and heard a great deal under party government which otherwise we should never have seen or heard. We should never have had the charges and counter-charges which we have so often heard on the floor of this House were it not for the bitterness of party feeling. But I will not dwell longer on our experiences in this matter. I prefer to illustrate what might occur. A circumstance such as this might occur: that an Opposition, having failed, after several trials of strength, to oust the Ministry, might make up their minds to so damage the estimates as brought down by the Ministry as to provoke the Government to say that it is impossible for the government of the country to be carried on with such mutilated finance, and to decline to proceed with them. Then the Opposition might seize the reins of power; and what would they do? They would at once take up the estimates of the outgoing Ministry and rein-state all the reductions, and say that, after looking into them, they found it was absolutely necessary to reinstate them in order to carry on the work of the country. Sir, such a state of things is possible, but I will give this House the credit that I do not believe the members composing the Opposition would descend to so low a piece of trickery as that. Then, there is another view of the position which an Opposi- page 12 tion might take up. There might be such a state of circumstances in Parliament that the Opposition, having, as I have said, failed to oust the Government, might take this view of the case:They might determine upon so stonewalling the estimates that Parliament might arrive at the day of its death by effluxion of time, and then the Opposition would be in the position of forcing the Government to pass short supplies and call together the new Parliament immediately afterwards. Again I say I do not believe that the gentlemen composing the Opposition in this House would descend to such a trick as that. These are illustrations of what might occur. I will now state, by way of illustration, what has occurred, and in doing so I will read an extract from a paper to which reference has been made in this House on one or two occasions. It is a very short extract, and it is taken from a paper which has been spoken of in complimentary terms as being very correct in its statements.

Mr. Speaker.—It is not in order to read newspaper comments on what takes place in this House during the current session.

Mr. Monk.—Hear, hear. We want original matter.

Mr. Tanner.—You shall have original matter. I am aware, Sir, that it is not in order to read anything from a newspaper in reference to debates in the House, but I wished merely to give an illustration.

Mr. Speaker.—The honourable member cannot read comments from a newspaper on what has taken place in the House in the present session.

Mr. Tanner.—Then I will not read it, but will simply state that a reporter, who is known to be very correct, had an interview with a member of the Opposition, who stated that, though the retrenchment party were assisting the Opposition to reduce the votes, it was not retrenchment that the Opposition cared about, but to get rid of the present Government. Then, Sir, I myself heard a remark which corroborated that. One honourable member asked a member of the Opposition how far he intended to go with retrenchment, and the answer was, "Bother retrenchment! It is not retrenchment we want, but to turn out the Government."

Mr. W. P. Reeves.—Do you believe it?

Mr. Tanner.—I do believe it. I am glad to hear the honourable member for St. Albans deny it for himself; but he cannot deny it for the whole of his party. As a further illustration, I may mention that an honourable member said last night, during one division,——

Mr. Speaker.—The debates of last night cannot be referred to in the present debate.

Mr. Tanner.—I am not referring to a debate—it was not during a debate that this took place; but an honourable member said that, although he was very much opposed to a vote, he must go into the lobby with the Opposition in support of his party. I am mentioning these things as illustrations of the moral aspect of party government; and it is important that we should see it in all its aspects, so as to estimate the value of any efforts which are [unclear: made] bring about a change. This brings [unclear: me] another phase of the moral question. I member many years ago seeing an illustrated paper brought out down south in which, one page, was pictured a Cabinet Council Ministers were in conclave; and one of these Ministers was an old Scotchman, a well-known man, and a very conscientious and upright man, and he was told he must make a certain statement in support of his party; but thee man said, "I cannot do it; it is not true." "Tut, mon," was the answer, "that has nothing to do with it; you must say it to support your party." On the opposite page is an illustration of that gentleman going out and wringing his hands and saying, "What [unclear: it] to be a Minister! You need to tell so may lees." I think that that illustration willed mend itself to all of us. I am sure [unclear: that] can understand that the exigencies of party government require such a state of things quently. It is not only what members may say in support of their party, but there is also another view of the case, and that is that honourable members, in support of their party may be sometimes forced into acting a [unclear: "lee] You recognise, Sir, that I use the [unclear: Scott] pronunciation of the word, as it is less [unclear: hand] than the English. I say, when a member walks into one lobby and his conscience go into the other, that he is acting a [unclear: "lee] These are the necessities of party government The remedy that is suggested by the honourable member for Waimate—that the Government should be elected by ballot from the House-commends itself to my consideration, and I think it will eventually commend itself to the favourable consideration of the country We can understand that under a system of that kind you would have a Government that would have the support of the House as a whole. They would feel that the men who had bed selected by ballot were entitled to their loyal support, and I feel satisfied they would gets it. Some say that the danger of a Government of that sort would be that it would be too strong and if there were no organized opposition to it they might have more supreme control over affairs than perhaps they ought to have. But there is no greater mistake than that. If you had a Government of that kind the whole House would really be an Opposition, because every member, without reference to party would feel it his duty to criticize the measures of such a Government as well as its finance. I was speaking with an honourable member on the subject of party government and he referred me to a well-known [unclear: book] the subject; but I do not think we need to read up this question. We do not need to study theories upon it. We have practical experience of it, we have the book of Nature before us and all round us, and we see the effects of party government; and that is sufficient for us to arrive at a conclusion without reading anything about the theory of it. I fear that there is very little hope of any improvement. As to those in favour of party government, I page 13 should like to hear if any of them have anything to say in the way of hope of improvement of the present system. Human nature forbids it. Those who are out are ambitious to be in, and those who are in are anxious to remain there; and that will ever be the same. The time may come when human nature will be so changed that these feelings may not influence men; but it will only be when the wolf dwells with the lamb and the leopard lies down with the kid. Not till then will human nature be so changed as that party government will be rid of those feelings and those frailties which at present beset it. The only thing we can hope for is that we may adopt some measure to minimise the evils of which we complain. It is in the direction which has been moved in this resolution that our object maybe attained, and I hope that this House will allow it to pass and so give practical effect to it. If this were a discussion upon a mere matter of theory it might be said that nothing useful would come of it, but here we have before us a practical suggestion, which I hope this House will affirm.

Mr. O'Conor.—I regret very much that a subject of such importance as this undoubtedly is should be brought on for discussion in this House in this way. It appears to me very unfortunate that we are discussing a matter of this kind on a motion to intercept Supply. I believe that there is no question which has been brought before this House this year or for many years past in which the country at least takes a greater interest. It is acknowledged from one end of New Zealand to the other that there is some screw loose in connection with the business in this House. People ask themselves in every electoral district, "How is it that we send intelligent, reliable men to the House, and that they give us such results upon their appearance in Wellington?" We meet here year after year and endeavour to deal with the public business, but very often the scenes in this House are such as should bring a blush to many of our faces, and the business we do for the country is of the smallest possible dimensions. And why is that the case? Cannot our strong common-sense tell us? It is our system of government: although we endeavour to make it as pure as possible—for instance, we have a Disqualification Act, and that is drawn up expressly to take away all personal incentive to the actions of honourable members, guarding, as it were, the Government of the day, or the party in power, from being able to offer any bribes or inducements to honourable members to vote otherwise than as their consciences direct them. We have a very eloquent invocation daily recited by yourself, Sir, in order that we may guard against party affections and prejudices. Rut all that is of no avail. The fact remains, the "apple of discord" has been thrown in amongst us in such a way that there is no resisting it. The moment any young politician enters the arena of this House he is at once tainted with it. As soon as a member is elected to represent a constituency he finds on his arrival in Wellington if not even before he leaves his district—that traps are laid by one party and the other in this House in order to get him to support their side. He comes up to Wellington with high aspirations, thinking he is going to leave his mark on the records of the country and do some good for his fellow-colonists. What docs he find? He finds that he must enlist upon one side or the other. If he goes under the flag of the Government—no matter which Government is in power—he is told that the first object of a Government and their party is to preserve the existence of the Government. If he goes to the Opposition side he must be enrolled under their banner, and is told that the first duty of the Opposition is to turn out the Government. He must vote with his party; he must renounce his conscience and his individuality; his aspirations must be renounced, and he must be as a soldier. That was strikingly impressed upon me in the early days when I was first elected to this House. A question arose wherein a well-known politician—one who took a prominent part in the affairs of this country—questioned me in consequence of some votes which I had given.

Well," he said, "you were returned to support the Government." I said, "Yes, I shall give the Government a discriminating support." "What!" he said, "a discriminating support! Who ever heard of a soldier in an army giving, his general a discriminating support? Our opponents are supposed to vote for us when we are in the right; we want our party to vote for us when we are in difficulties—when we are in the wrong, in fact." I said I could not follow him to that extent. That has been the secret of my action since I have been in this House: I have refused to be entirely bound by party lines; I have supported that which I thought for the good of my constituents and the colony, and which commended itself to my judgment; and I have voted against proposals when I did not approve of them. Certainly, sometimes we are obliged to compromise, but in all great matters a man who takes the straight course is looked upon as a free-lance—a term of contempt—or an independent member, which, strangely, is also a term of contempt. The Government of the country is frequently in the hands of a set of men who often differ from us very materially, and who lead us wrong. It is a very well-known thing that, in order to preserve their power, extraordinary things have been done by Governments. A seat on the Supreme Court Bench has been filled in order to keep a dangerous opponent out of the way. We know that seats in the Legislative Council have been filled over and over again to retain party power, and also that the Civil Service itself has been actually gorged in order to give some reward to those pressing for a return for their support. What of the immigration and public-works policy? What of the way in which our great loans were expended? Is it not acknowledged on all sides that the greater part of those loans were spent on political works? What does that mean? It means, really, in bribes given to members of this House to support a party. I can well remember when page 14 the immigration and public works policy was agreed to. There was a clause in the measure which was looked upon as the safeguard of the country. It was this: that wherever railways were built a guarantee should be taken from those who would be benefited by them—the landowners in the neighbourhood—in order to insure that no ultimate loss should fall upon the colony. Those who wanted the railways accepted that in the first instance; but before very long they entered into a combination, and they were able to say to the Government of that day, "You must take that clause out," just in the same way that some honourable gentlemen have lately said to the Government, "You must reduce your estimates." And the Government had to do so, because there was a combination which threatened their very existence if they did not acquiesce. And so this will continue until some very powerful hand indeed is stretched forth to put an end to a system which has entailed, and still entails, such enormous sacrifices upon the colony. This system of party government is acknowledged to be favourable to combinations,—to government by selfish rings. We know that a Government is seldom supported by a majority of more than seven or eight votes. What does that do? It invites combinations; and any combination that is sufficiently strong to put a Government out of power can go to that Government and say, "You must do so-and-so, or we will vote against you." The Government usually gives way. Thus we have the great shipping companies evading taxation, both property-tax and stamp duty, and entailing a loss to the colony in the marine service of £22,000 per annum. My experience of Governments is that to leave office is the very last thing they want to do. They want to hold office, and they unfortunately give way to nearly all of these combinations. Thus I believe a great deal of evil has been worked in this country, and the demoralisation of this House has been rendered complete; so that honourable members having the best intentions have been heard to say in this House, "Oh, that we could do away with party government, and that the question of office was no longer a source of rivalry and dissension! Then we might have wise and honest administration." When the loan-money is ex-pended the means adapted by human ingenuity for the purpose I have referred to will not be exhausted. The apple of discord is thrown into this House by the very fact that the Government benches are the reward given to foster dissension; and every Opposition must take up the position that it will have to discredit its opponents on the other side in every possible way in the eyes of the country in order to get into the place of the Government. Hence the wrangle and abuse. What does that involve upon those who undertake political life? A penalty which they by no means deserve. It has become a by word, and it is even said by honourable members themselves, that there is scarcely anything respectable to be found in politics. A man who enters a House like this for the first time and hears honourable members speaking of one another in the [unclear: te] sometimes used must wonder [unclear: whether] are sent here to abuse one another, and, not, why the business of the country received so little attention, while we seem intent upon painting each other as capable of any [unclear: e]—in fact, as the lowest dregs of society Sir, that is the penalty we have to pay, and 3 such is the bane of the system, which introduces discord, jealousy, and personal rivalry into our House. I say it is folly to have a Disqualification Act, it is folly to utter the invocation I spoke of, if we do not apply a remedy and put a stop to it. A comparison with other governing bodies will [unclear: show] the difference at once; and such comparison can be made under the roof of this same building. In the Legislative Council, which is by no means composed of men superior to the members of this House, they can manage to do their business without all this [unclear: accrime] and all these disgraceful exhibitions and party fights, and they can do it in a reasonable time. They do the same business [unclear: that] do in one-tenth the time and at far [unclear: less] to the colony. And why? Because [unclear: there] no political strife in that House: that is the whole and sole cause of it. Sir, we know perfectly well that, no matter what our intentions are—we may have the best possible intentions—yet if the Evil One introduced party strife he spoils all. There is no [unclear: coun] of any State or country in the world whose wisest men would not have their best effort set at naught if personal animosity and [unclear: dis] once enter into their councils. Take the illustration from great things to small. Given a pack of hounds ready for their work: if any person is malicious enough to throw a few bones amongst them all the effects of the training will be lost—the dogs will be flying at each other's throats, one hound will be tearing another, and presently they will be maimed and unfit for work. Sir, we are not sent here as a pack of hounds, but as intelligent human beings to do the business of the country, and yet, when we come here, from the day of the first opening of this House to the day that it is closed, party, the angry [unclear: how] and shrieks of party, run through everything that is done. It influences every member of the House; there is no question, however small it may be, into which party does not enter. Have we not over and over again decided that this House cannot set up any tribunal, or anything like an ordinary Committee of the House to settle matters? Although we call ourselves the highest Court in the land, we find that we are so biassed by party that cases cannot safely be brought before us. Have we not already divested ourselves of the power we had of deciding upon election petitions? Have we not in consequence of this terrible blight of party faction, already passed of our own accord from the control of our own railways? And lately have we not seen exhibited in Committees and in the House the impossibility of coming to any conclusion without mixing party up with it! page 15 Well, Sir, I think, when that is so plain to members, and when we know it is so plain to the country, it is our duty to endeavour by some means to find out the real cause and to apply the remedy. The honourable member for Waimate deserves the thanks of this House and the country for the pains he has taken in bringing this matter forward. I am not going to follow him so far as to say that I approve entirely of the remedy he proposes; but I say these things are all worth thinking about, and that certainly everybody in the country who has thought the matter over will allow that there is a blight over our political institutions; that our system of party government has been on; trial, and is found wanting; and that, by comparison, we find that everywhere where people are endeavouring to manage public affairs they carefully avoid placing before them a bone of contention such as we have here. We have growing in our midst a great labour movement; and I ask, what does the House think would I become of that movement if by some arrangement they established party divisions, so that their delegates would set to quarrelling when they met to do business? Sir, these working-men of the country know better than that: they avoid personal altercation; and business that would take us three months to do they finish in four or five days. And why? Nothing blurs their vision, nothing troubles them except the discharge of their duty. And another thing is that these men are paid by those who send them; and the people watch them, and; see that they do their duty and nothing more. But here we have fallen into an unfortunate state of things, and, as is the case in another place, many members of the House will not hear the word "reform" spoken of. I agree with the eloquent peroration of the honourable member for Waimate that it is impossible to got reforms in this Parliament. It has pretended ever since it came into existence that it would effect reforms; but it is a farce. There is no greater leak in the ship of State than that which has taken place and is now taking place through this system of party government. I have shown what took place with regard to the expenditure of the loans; every member of this House understands it, and can trace it in his own district, or, if not in his own district, in the neighbouring one: all know that, if this is not discontinued, the I selfish attempts made in former times to waste the public revenues and evade taxation will be continued in future, and will be repeated as long as this system encourages it. I do hope, Sir, this House, or, at least, the members who are here, will think this matter out, and that they will endeavour to assist in bringing about the reform that is necessary. That reform need not involve any violent change or risk. I ask honourable members, would it matter if we had the honourable gentlemen on those Treasury benches appointed in some such way as has been suggested? It is not asking the House to divest itself of its power of appointing Ministers to do the executive work of the counts. No; they would have it more in their power than they have at the present time, because just now there are many members on the Government side who perhaps disapprove very much of the action of a Minister and would be glad to send him away, but the system of party government prevents anybody doing that who is at all inclined to support the Government as a whole. We ought to be able to devise a plan to put in office those who are most fitted for it, apart from party distinctions. If we were to decide upon accepting the proposal of the honourable member for Waimate, what risk would be involved to the country? Would it take away from us any power? Surely it would deprive us of no power, nor would it by any chance put the power of the Executive into weaker hands, or into hands less to be trusted than those generally intrusted with that power under the present system. I think, as the honourable gentleman remarked, it would extend the choice of the House to what we now call both sides, because there would be no sides then, except the right and the wrong, upon every question. It would enable us to take the wisest and the most experienced men to fill these positions. Now they are all selected from one side, and are appointed upon no principle excepting that which is inscribed upon the banner of party—preservation of its own existence. If one honourable gentleman coming from a district is likely to bring the support of a certain section of that district, he is taken into the Ministry. Then, if a member excels in debate, whether he knows anything of the administration of public affairs or not, if he is a good talker and can be useful by making a good speech, he is looked upon as very desirable; and the result is that Ministers who have been so selected have, as a rule, to trust entirely to the permanent heads of the departments, who are the men who are really administering the affairs of the country. I believe that if we had men with a little more permanence on those benches, selected from each side of the House or from outside it, the result would be that we could dispense with a great deal of the expenditure that is now incurred in the Civil Service. I believe the Civil Service will never be reformed under the present system. I think, if four of the wisest and best men in the country were selected, whether in or out of the House, and they were put in charge of the affairs of the country, they would soon have a different service, do away with a great deal of red-tapism, and make economies that are not at all within our reach now. Sir, in conclusion, I have only to say that I very much regret that this great question is before the House in such a very inconvenient way; but, notwithstanding that, I hope the House will appoint the Committee, because I think, if this matter is thoroughly gone into, evidence taken, and the facts compiled, the public will then get some information. And if we, who are advocating change and reform, are in the wrong, we still say, Throw light upon the subject, and show that we art? in the wrong. All we want in the matter is more light. We want to see the matter fairly page 16 discussed, and we want it remitted to the country. I do not think the House will give a favourable decision on the subject. We know that a great many will not even hear it spoken of. For instance, some of the gentlemen on the Ministerial benches would think it absurd to bring in any system that might displace them; and those on this side who would be Ministers must also have a sort of vested interest in the matter, and we know that the aspirants to the Ministerial benches far outnumber the Ministers. These and their friends pooh-pooh a proposal of this kind; but those who have sat a long time in this House, and have watched the result of the system of party government every session, must have experienced feelings of disgust with the proceedings; and, as the public outside are loud in their condemnation, we ought to be able to show that it is not the fault of the men, but of the system. That should be our common object: it is mine. I find no fault with the men—under other circumstances they are men that New Zealand might be proud of; but their hands are tied, their projects are entirely nullified, through the wretched system in vogue, so unsuited to our circumstances.

Sir J. Hall.—Sir, I will not detain the House more than two minutes. If I vote for this resolution it is not that I am very sanguine that it will bring about any great result, but I shall vote for it to testify my profound dissatisfaction with the working of the present system. The outcome of the present system is increasingly to prevent questions from being considered upon their merits. Year by year we find this to be more and more the case. We see honourable members day after day voting against questions which we cannot believe they really are adverse to, and, on the other hand, voting in favour of proposals which we cannot doubt that they themselves disapprove of. A still greater misfortune is the terrible—I may say the awful—waste of time which takes place in this House. This has increased, is increasing, and in the present session has reached a climax. I was a member of this Parliament sooner than any other member now in the House, and I say without hesitation, and I am sure the older members will agree with me, that there never has been in the history of New Zealand a session in which so much time has been wasted as there has been during the present session. Recently, Sir, I had the opportunity of ascertaining public feeling in the part of the colony in which I live with respect to our proceedings, and I never remember a time in which there was so universal a feeling amongst all classes of disapproval and, I may say, disgust with the proceedings of the House as there is at present. Under these circumstances, I think we ought not to say "No" to a proposal which invites us to appoint a Committee to inquire whether a better system cannot be devised. Party government in times gone by was a system under which men agreed to subordinate minor differences of opinion for the purpose of promoting great principles on which the party were agreed. But is that the case in this colony at the present time? Who can say what are the great principles which divide the side of the House from that side? We are not divided by principles at all, but rather by personal combinations; and to the interests of these personal combinations the time [unclear: of] House and the great interests of the country are subordinated. I am not sanguine [unclear: that] great result will proceed from this inquiry, be I cannot vote against it. A remark which from the last speaker induces me to one course which I think the Committee might usefully take: that is, that they should collected information as to the various systems of executive government in other countries, [unclear: have] reported to the House, and printed with their report, so that at the coming elections we can submit information to the electors which will be something for them to think over and discuss. I shall vote for the resolution, [unclear: an] heartily wish the Committee success in their work.

Mr. Saunders.—Sir, I have been [unclear: wai] in this debate in the hope that I [unclear: should] something on the other side. I do [unclear: not] following people who entirely agree [unclear: with] At the same time, it is extremely [unclear: gratifying] me to hear the agreement of the last speak with this proposal, and I am sure that [unclear: if] had known he would look at the [unclear: proposal] the friendly light he does his name would [unclear: h] been placed at the top of the Committee. I am sure, notwithstanding his very numerous engagements, that we shall have the [unclear: plea] of his assistance and counsel and all his [unclear: pdent] advice. I do not think any person will suppose that those of us who are prepared to support a Committee of this kind are therefore necessarily all agreed as to the exact kind of government we wish to substitute for the present system. I am prepared to admit entirely the assertion of those who say that there is an such Government in the world as the English Government. I am prepared entirely to admit that it is the best system of government in the world. There is no Government to be compared with it. But it does not follow that the system adopted in England is exactly the best for us. The Constitution of England has often been described as not being a creation but a growth. It is something that, after the experience of centuries, gradually improving, and being strengthened, and modified, and purified by many a severe trial, has arrived at a perfection exactly adapted to the people amongst whom it is worked. And, Sir, I am convinced that such a system requires what we have not got. It requires a Parliament of intelligent men who are not largely interested in the receipt of taxation, but who are always sure to suffer personally from national extravagance. The Executive Government in England is entirely under the control of men who are [unclear: tax] payers, and who have a large interest in maintaining the economical expenditure of the country. Unfortunately, we—although I think we started very well with what is called Responsible Government—have got worst and page 17 worse in every change that we have made. There is not the slightest doubt that the first thing that set us entirely wrong was the public-works system—a system of borrowing money and scrambling for it in this House. That demoralised this House; and when this House became demoralised the Government followed as a matter of course. Now, Sir, in England you have, perhaps, a dozen men occupying the Government benches, and you have 670 men, most of whom are large taxpayers, constantly watching their proceedings; and it is interesting to see that in England no Government, no matter what qualifications they may have, would be allowed to occupy the Government benches if they continued to do what our Governments have done for the last twenty years—to constantly plunge the country deeper and deeper into debt. I will read, by the permission of the House, an extract from a speech of Sir Robert Peel when he introduced a measure for the imposition of the income-tax into that august body over which he so ably presided. Sir, it is a model speech in every respect. It was a model action of his, and I am sure I need make no apologies to this House when I ask honourable members to listen to a few sentences from that speech. What I am particularly struck with in that speech is the seriousness of the maimer in which he speaks of the fact that for the last five years before he came into office there had been a deficiency in the revenue. And what was that deficiency? Why, that deficiency in the sixth year amounted to ten millions That deficiency, according to the population of England at that time, is about equal to a deficiency of £30,000 a year in our revenue. Now, Sir, how happy we should think ourselves, and how happy we should be, if our annual deficiency had never been greater than that! There is not a year for the last twenty years in which we have not been spending half a million more than our income. And yet we must be great people: we must copy all the grandeur and greatness of the great British Parliament, and be extravagant where richer and wiser countries would be economical. This is the speech of Sir Robert Peel, one of the greatest statesmen that ever lived in England, and a man whose legislation, I believe, effected more good for England than that of all the other legislators who have lived for the last hundred years. This is the way he addresses the Parliament in that great speech in which he proposed an income-tax of 7d. in the pound—and I ask honourable members to mark the serious way in which he speaks of a deficiency which our Treasurer would laugh at, or perhaps call ft surplus:—

"I mean to lay before you the truth,—the unexaggerated truth, but to conceal nothing. I do this, first, because in great financial difficulties the first step towards improvement is to look those difficulties boldly in the face. This is true of individuals; it is true also of nations. There can be no hope of improvement or of recovery if you consent to conceal from yourselves the real difficulties with which you have to contend. . . . The deficiency in the last five years amounts to £7,502,000, and to that actual deficiency I must add the estimated deficiency for the year ending the 5th April, 1843, £2,570,000, making an aggregate deficiency in six years of £10,072,000. I am sure that I shall not be blamed for making a full and unreserved disclosure of our financial situation. I do it, as I said before, because I am deeply impressed with the conviction that a full knowledge of the truth is the first step to improvement. . . . Will you, I ask, have recourse to the wretched expedient of continued borrowing? I should think I was disgracing the situation I hold if I could consent to such a paltry expedient as this. . . . I apprehend, therefore, that, with almost universal acquiescence, I may abandon the thought of supplying the deficiency by the miserable device of fresh loans, or an issue of Exchequer bills. ... I cannot consent to any proposal for increasing taxation on the great articles of consumption by the labouring-classes of society. You will not adopt the miserable expedient of adding, during peace, to the burdens which posterity will be called on to bear. You will not permit this evil to gain such gigantic growth as ultimately to place it far beyond your power to check or control. If you do permit this evil to continue, you must expect the severe but just judgment of a reflecting and retrospective posterity."

Sir, I read that because I think it is one of the best examples we could possibly have before us as to the manner in which we should face our difficulties now. The contrast with our Treasurer's conduct reflects the greatest possible censure upon the conduct of this Parliament during the last twenty years, and shows in a striking light how Responsible Government might do well in a country where the Ministers could and did address the Parliament in these terms, although it cannot do hero in a country where we have been demoralised, where we are really governed by Civil servants and tax-receivers, and are expected to scatter borrowed money, to the ruin of those who will come after us. In Sir Robert Peel, too, we have one of the best samples I could bring before this House to show how a truly great man is prepared to give up party. If you look at Sir Robert Peel's greatest and noblest actions you must be struck with the courage with which he followed his conscience, even to lose his party support, preferring honourable obscurity to dishonourable distinction. He had been opposed for years by Cobden; he had listened to Cobden's arguments, and he had listened to them attentively and fairly; and the result was that year after year he saw that the Radical Cobden was right and the Tory Peel wrong, and he gave up the Tory; he became the Radical in all but the name, and took taxes off no less than seven hundred and fifty articles, and put on an income-tax, which caused the Parliament of England to watch carefully over the expenditure of the country ever after; and the result of that tax has been that from that day to this England has never page 18 exceeded her revenue in time of peace, and very seldom, and very slightly, in time of war, and, besides meeting her engagements, besides always meeting her expenditure with her revenue, she has paid off since then £100,000,000 of her national debt. But even at the time Sir Robert Peel spoke of the calamity of the revenue not meeting the expenditure, the revenue was more than meeting the expenditure, because in his calculations he did not take into consideration the base thought that an English Parliament would seize her sinking fund, as we have done, or cease to pay £2,000,000 a year off the national debt. Now, Sir, if you follow down all great men I do not think you will see a single instance in which there is accomplished great good but when it is done by men giving up party ties and party obligations. The honourable member for Waimate, a strong party man, complimented the independent members of the House by saying we were "simply nuisances;" but, Sir, these simple nuisances appear to have effected nearly all the great reforms that have been effected in the British Parliament. Cobden began as a Radical: he sought to work with the Radicals; but when he found Peel willing to give great relief to the taxation of the country, and to give cheap food to a starving people, he never hesitated for one moment to follow him, notwithstanding his having the reputation of being a Tory. Lord Shaftesbury entered the British Parliament a rabid Tory. He believed in Toryism to the backbone. He could not think any one light but a Tory. He thought John Bright one of the greatest obstacles to his schemes of benevolence, and wrote and spoke of him as one of his greatest enemies; but after the experience of years he came to find his great reforms must be accomplished by the assistance of the far wiser John Bright and his followers, and he did not hesitate to commend him in terms as strong as those in which he bad once condemned him. He was glad to accept him—as, previously, even Clarkson and Wilber-force were glad to accept the assistance even of O'Connell, Radical as he was. And so you will find, if you trace down all the great reforms that have been effected in the British Parliament, they were effected by men who were determined to get what was right for the people of England, even if it should be got by sacrificing party ties or being called by mere party men "simple nuisances." If we come down to the history of our own country what do we find? We find the most economical Governments by far are those that were ruled without Responsible Government. If you take the provincial system of this country you will find that those Governments which were economical were those Governments that had no Responsible Ministries. Those Governments that got over-whelmed in debt were the Provincial Governments that took up the farce of imitating in their petty Provincial Councils the great British Government by appointing Responsible Ministers. The Marlborough Province had no Responsible Government, and when she came out of the provincial system she actually paid a balance over to the Treasury. So did [unclear: Na] and Hawke's Bay; and Nelson kept [unclear: compl] out of debt under the three Superintendent who never adopted Responsible Government but got deeply in debt under the [unclear: one] did. But Canterbury and Otago, [unclear: the] provinces that had such large revenues, up Responsible Government, and got [unclear: alm] as disgracefully in debt as we [unclear: have] with our party General Government. so did Wellington. And I would wish to [unclear: po] out how the influence of extravagant government hangs on to this place at the present time, and demoralises all around it. I am [unclear: ti] that the Wellington College at the present time has got into debt to the extent of £14,000 and £3,000 of it they got from some be for which they are paying something [unclear: like] per cent, interest. They have got into do to that extent for teaching and boarding about a couple of dozen children. Could anything show more conclusively how these demoralising associations hang to us, how the wretched [unclear: stem] called the public-works system has do moralised not only this House, but has demoralised by example all our local institutions? I do not think you could have a greater [unclear: pe] that the system of Responsible Government if not adapted for such a small [unclear: community] this, and with such imperfect watching as it is likely to get in our small community, over whelmed with tax-consumers. I do not, so entirely agree with the programme that have been read by the honourable member for Waimate. I think one thing we should endeavour to do in changing our government would be to do with a much smaller Government. I a inclined to think the system in vogue in the United States, under which are elected a President and Vice-President, would be much better than electing six men in this House. [unclear: Fewe] and less frequently changed Ministers would lessen the present excessive power of the upper Civil servants.

Mr. Taylor.—What about a Governor?

Mr. Saunders.—A Governor is an [unclear: oment], and I think he is very useful. At all events I may say, as I have been asked the question, I should like to see a Governor appointed by the Old Country, because I like to see some strong and definite friendly connection kept up with the Old Country. Under any circumstances, however, that would not be essential to our system. I think we should have this great advantage: If we had only two men sitting in this House holding office, we should not have, as we have now, Ministers voting for everything on their own behalf. Six men voting here will be equal, when this House is reduced to seventy-four members, to some thing like sixty men voting in England, and if you had sixty men voting in England for their own measures you would absolutely destroy the independence of the House. I have not the slightest doubt that that is one of the very great faults in connection with the legislation of this country. Of course these six votes are annulled, because we know that, while there are six men sitting on those benches con- page 19 stantly voting for their own measures, there are quite as many men on the opposite side of the House voting against them, irrespective of merits or demerits, or of the benefit or injury that would accrue by the passing of any measure; but two blacks do not make a white, and it is a loss to the country to have a large portion of a small House voting for such objects, instead of voting for the public good. If we had some system of a more independent character, in which we were not obliged to follow party lines, and were not necessarily influenced by party feeling or party contention or advantage, we should have very much better government than we have at present. Nothing could be clearer than that we want something in the direction of what is indicated in the motion moved by the honourable member for Wallace. We want a Government that does not hourly depend upon the will of the majority of men in this House. We want a Government with the courage, the power, the firmness, and the opportunity to come down to this House and rid us of that everlasting nonsense which goes on in the House week after week without contributing one iota of information to the House. We might have a small Executive, who were placed securely in their office, and who proposed whatever they believed to be light and desirable, without any consideration as to how it would affect their seats, and would not hesitate to bring down what was beneficial and advantageous to the country at large. I believe we must have some such thing before we arrive at a satisfactory financial policy. If any Government were to be honest and resolute enough to cut down the expenditure to meet our revenue without additional taxation and without borrowing, I believe that Government would give 'dissatisfaction, and would be removed at once. If we could have an arrangement of this kind:that two men should be given the control of the affairs of this country for four years, or during good behaviour, and propose what measures they thought were beneficial to the country,—I believe we should then have measures proposed and carried such as cannot be carried at the present time. This is a lengthy and large subject. I could not do any kind of justice to it without occupying a great deal of our time. We do not want to decide just now what kind of government we should have. I think we are all quite agreed we want something a great deal better than we have got. We want better government, and we want better control of the debates of this House.

Mr. Taylor.—No, no.

Mr. Saunders.—We want a great deal more power to say that our discussions have reached the amount of deliberation which is advantageous and beneficial to the country. We do want power to prevent two or three honourable members from occupying two-thirds of the time of this House, and that without contributing the smallest possible amount of information or knowledge upon any subject. Then, I think, Sir, there is only one other thing I need mention. It is an opinion which I offer with some hesitation, because I know from experience that my honest advice to my own class will be misreported and misrepresented. But, still, I wish to say that, at a time like the present, we particularly want a Government who are secure in their seats, or so secure that they are not obliged to hoist or pull down their policy to every breeze that blows, and to destroy the prosperity of the country with panic-legislation. We have seen a great deal of this. We have seen how every Government, for twenty years, has been obliged, whatever their own convictions may have been, to advocate, support, and carry out what was called the public-works policy. We have seen a Government not long ago obliged to enter upon much useless expenditure in the way of defence, simply because there was a panic throughout the country, and they were obliged to follow it. We have seen a Government ready to sacrifice all the lands of the country, without any proper restrictions, because the Midland Railway was popular for a time. And now we have a time when the labour of the country is entering into unions and combinations which frighten the Government and the members of this House. At such a time the working-men of this country want, not flattery, not sudden and panic compliance with all that they ask—no, Sir, they want good advice; they want good honest action; they want good information from persons who know something of the great laws which can never be violated with impunity. They do not want any pandering to them, they do not want panic-legislation at a moment's notice, but the knowledge that they should have before them as to the way in which our legislation affects the industries of this country. We have politicians in this country putting on taxation here and taxation there, and pretending that by that means we are going to foster the industries of the country. Sir, what we want is a knowledge of political economy on the part of the legislators and the Governments of this colony. We want to enlighten the working-men of this colony, to show them what their real interest is; because their interest is the true interest of us all, and if we can do what is best for the working-men of this colony we shall do what is best for the colony itself. Even if I were not a working-man myself, if I were not one of the poorer men in the country, I would still say, Do not pander to, do not flatter the working-man; do not run into panic-legislation because we have a certain amount of unionism in this country. It is your duty to find heads for those who have none, it is your duty to show them what is really best for their own interests, it is your duty to advise them when they go wrong; and it is not your duty to follow them in a panic. That is why I think it is so much better to have a strong Government, a Government placed in such a position that it will not be obliged, as I said before, to trim its sails to every breeze of popular opinion, but will be able to show sound brains, exercise sound judgment, and act in honest disinterestedness in order to deal page 18 exceeded her revenue in time of peace, and very seldom, and very slightly, in time of war, and, besides meeting her engagements, besides always meeting her expenditure with her revenue, she has paid off since then £100,000,000 of her national debt. But even at the time Sir Robert Peel spoke of the calamity of the revenue not meeting the expenditure, the revenue was more than meeting the expenditure, because in his calculations he did not take into consideration the base thought that an English Parliament would seize her sinking fund, as we have done, or cease to pay £2,000,000 a year off the national debt. Now, Sir, if you follow down all great men I do not think you will see a single instance in which there is accomplished great good but when it is done by men giving up party ties and party obligations. The honourable member for Waimate, a strong party man, complimented the independent members of the House by saying we were "simply nuisances;" but, Sir, these simple nuisances appear to have effected nearly all the great reforms that have been effected in the British Parliament. Cobden began as a Radical: he sought to work with the Radicals; but when he found Peel willing to give great relief to the taxation of the country, and to give cheap food to a starving people, he never hesitated for one moment to follow him, notwithstanding his having the reputation of being a Tory. Lord Shaftesbury entered the British Parliament a rabid Tory. He believed in Toryism to the backbone. He could not think any one light but a Tory. He thought John Bright one of the greatest obstacles to his schemes of benevolence, and wrote and spoke of him as one of his greatest enemies; but after the experience of years he came to find his great reforms must be accomplished by the assistance of the far wiser John Bright and his followers, and he did not hesitate to commend him in terms as strong as those in which he bad once condemned him. He was glad to accept him—as, previously, even Clarkson and Wilber-force were glad to accept the assistance even of O'Connell, Radical as he was. And so you will find, if you trace down all the great reforms that have been effected in the British Parliament, they were effected by men who were determined to get what was right for the people of England, even if it should be got by sacrificing party ties or being called by mere party men "simple nuisances." If we come down to the history of our own country what do we find? We find the most economical Governments by far are those that were ruled without Responsible Government. If you take the provincial system of this country you will find that those Governments which were economical were those Governments that had no Responsible Ministries. Those Governments that got overwhelmed in debt were the Provincial Governments that took up the farce of imitating in their petty Provincial Councils the great British Government by appointing Responsible Ministers. The Marlborough Province had no Responsible Government, and when she came out of the provincial system she actually paid a balance over to the Treasury. So did [unclear: Na] and Hawke's Bay; and Nelson kept [unclear: compl] out of debt under the three Superintendent who never adopted Responsible Government but got deeply in debt under the [unclear: one] did. But Canterbury and Otago, [unclear: the] provinces that had such large revenues, up Responsible Government, and got [unclear: alm] as disgracefully in debt as we [unclear: have] with our party General Government. so did Wellington. And I would wish to [unclear: po] out how the influence of extravagant government hangs on to this place at the present time, and demoralises all around it. I am [unclear: ti] that the Wellington College at the present time has got into debt to the extent of £14,000 and £3,000 of it they got from some be for which they are paying something [unclear: like] per cent, interest. They have got into do to that extent for teaching and boarding about a couple of dozen children. Could anything show more conclusively how these demoralising associations hang to us, how the wretched [unclear: stem] called the public-works system has do moralised not only this House, but has demoralised by example all our local institutions? I do not think you could have a greater [unclear: pe] that the system of Responsible Government if not adapted for such a small [unclear: community] this, and with such imperfect watching as it is likely to get in our small community, over whelmed with tax-consumers. I do not, so entirely agree with the programme that have been read by the honourable member for Waimate. I think one thing we should endeavour to do in changing our government would be to do with a much smaller Government. I a inclined to think the system in vogue in the United States, under which are elected a President and Vice-President, would be much better than electing six men in this House. [unclear: Fewe] and less frequently changed Ministers would lessen the present excessive power of the upper Civil servants.

Mr. Taylor.—What about a Governor?

Mr. Saunders.—A Governor is an [unclear: oment], and I think he is very useful. At all events I may say, as I have been asked the question, I should like to see a Governor appointed by the Old Country, because I like to see some strong and definite friendly connection kept up with the Old Country. Under any circumstances, however, that would not be essential to our system. I think we should have this great advantage: If we had only two men sitting in this House holding office, we should not have, as we have now, Ministers voting for everything on their own behalf. Six men voting here will be equal, when this House is reduced to seventy-four members, to some thing like sixty men voting in England, and if you had sixty men voting in England for their own measures you would absolutely destroy the independence of the House. I have not the slightest doubt that that is one of the very great faults in connection with the legislation of this country. Of course these six votes are annulled, because we know that, while there are six men sitting on those benches con- page 19 stantly voting for their own measures, there are quite as many men on the opposite side of the House voting against them, irrespective of merits or demerits, or of the benefit or injury that would accrue by the passing of any measure; but two blacks do not make a white, and it is a loss to the country to have a large portion of a small House voting for such objects, instead of voting for the public good. If we had some system of a more independent character, in which we were not obliged to follow party lines, and were not necessarily influenced by party feeling or party contention or advantage, we should have very much better government than we have at present. Nothing could be clearer than that we want something in the direction of what is indicated in the motion moved by the honourable member for Wallace. We want a Government that does not hourly depend upon the will of the majority of men in this House. We want a Government with the courage, the power, the firmness, and the opportunity to come down to this House and rid us of that everlasting nonsense which goes on in the House week after week without contributing one iota of information to the House. We might have a small Executive, who were placed securely in their office, and who proposed whatever they believed to be light and desirable, without any consideration as to how it would affect their seats, and would not hesitate to bring down what was beneficial and advantageous to the country at large. I believe we must have some such thing before we arrive at a satisfactory financial policy. If any Government were to be honest and resolute enough to cut down the expenditure to meet our revenue without additional taxation and without borrowing, I believe that Government would give 'dissatisfaction, and would be removed at once. If we could have an arrangement of this kind:that two men should be given the control of the affairs of this country for four years, or during good behaviour, and propose what measures they thought were beneficial to the country,—I believe we should then have measures proposed and carried such as cannot be carried at the present time. This is a lengthy and large subject. I could not do any kind of justice to it without occupying a great deal of our time. We do not want to decide just now what kind of government we should have. I think we are all quite agreed we want something a great deal better than we have got. We want better government, and we want better control of the debates of this House.

Mr. Taylor.—No, no.

Mr. Saunders.—We want a great deal more power to say that our discussions have reached the amount of deliberation which is advantageous and beneficial to the country. We do want power to prevent two or three honourable members from occupying two-thirds of the time of this House, and that without contributing the smallest possible amount of information or knowledge upon any subject. Then, I think, Sir, there is only one other thing I need mention. It is an opinion which I offer with some hesitation, because I know from experience that my honest advice to my own class will be misreported and misrepresented. But, still, I wish to say that, at a time like the present, we particularly want a Government who are secure in their seats, or so secure that they are not obliged to hoist or pull down their policy to every breeze that blows, and to destroy the prosperity of the country with panic-legislation. We have seen a great deal of this. We have seen how every Government, for twenty years, has been obliged, whatever their own convictions may have been, to advocate, support, and carry out what was called the public-works policy. We have seen a Government not long ago obliged to enter upon much useless expenditure in the way of defence, simply because there was a panic throughout the country, and they were obliged to follow it. We have seen a Government ready to sacrifice all the lands of the country, without any proper restrictions, because the Midland Railway was popular for a time. And now we have a time when the labour of the country is entering into unions and combinations which frighten the Government and the members of this House. At such a time the working-men of this country want, not flattery, not sudden and panic compliance with all that they ask—no, Sir, they want good advice; they want good honest action; they want good information from persons who know something of the great laws which can never be violated with impunity. They do not want any pandering to them, they do not want panic-legislation at a moment's notice, but the knowledge that they should have before them as to the way in which our legislation affects the industries of this country. We have politicians in this country putting on taxation here and taxation there, and pretending that by that means we are going to foster the industries of the country. Sir, what we want is a knowledge of political economy on the part of the legislators and the Governments of this colony. We want to enlighten the working-men of this colony, to show them what their real interest is; because their interest is the true interest of us all, and if we can do what is best for the working-men of this colony we shall do what is best for the colony itself. Even if I were not a working-man myself, if I were not one of the poorer men in the country, I would still say, Do not pander to, do not flatter the working-man; do not run into panic-legislation because we have a certain amount of unionism in this country. It is your duty to find heads for those who have none, it is your duty to show them what is really best for their own interests, it is your duty to advise them when they go wrong; and it is not your duty to follow them in a panic. That is why I think it is so much better to have a strong Government, a Government placed in such a position that it will not be obliged, as I said before, to trim its sails to every breeze of popular opinion, but will be able to show sound brains, exercise sound judgment, and act in honest disinterestedness in order to deal page 20 with the wants and great interests of this country, and to do what is right and wise, and not merely what is popular for the time.

Dr. Newman.—Sir, the persistency with which the honourable gentleman who has just sat down acts the Jeremiah of this country is really wonderful; and he never rises without one calling to mind that verse in Scripture, "I am like a pelican crying in the wilderness." He seems to think that this world of New Zealand is everlastingly going to ruin because of the extravagance of a few years ago. Now, I do not believe that any particular change of Government is going to work a revolution in this country, but I do believe that very considerable changes ought to be made in this House and in the manner in which it conducts and manages its business. But, before I go on to that question, I should like to say that I think it would be a very good thing if the honourable member for Lincoln could only get rid of that idea of his which he has been dinning into our cars for years, that no good thing can come out of this City of Wellington; and let me suggest that before the honourable gentleman gets up to talk about the institutions of this city he should at least get up the facts. For instance, he comes here this evening and tells us that the Wellington College and Girls' High School are £10,000 in debt, and this expenditure has been incurred by institutions which educate only a couple of dozen children. In repeating that statement time after time the honourable gentleman is scarcely doing himself justice.

Mr. Saunders.—I did not say it before tonight. I did not know of it until yesterday.

Dr. Newman.—I do not know how long the honourable gentleman has known of it, but he said it twice to-night. The fact is that the Girls' High School is the second largest institution in the colony, and has within it over one hundred and fifty pupils; and if the honourable gentleman had taken the trouble to inquire or to look at the statistics he would have seen that in the boys' college there are one hundred pupils. So that the honourable gentleman's couple of dozen amounts to two hundred and fifty. It is part and parcel of the honourable gentleman's usual way of looking at things in Wellington, and unless he is a little more careful in his facts he must not blame us if in future we do not place very much reliance on his statements. Now, I believe that this country will never be satisfactorily managed and governed until we have radical changes in the arrangements and methods of this House. It has been well said that this House itself is a growth,—that the laws which govern the management of this House are a growth; but, Sir, they have passed beyond the period of growth. They have become cast-iron, which does not grow; and what I feel and complain of is that we have grown into a system of worshipping as a fetish and retaining rules, forms, and ceremonies in this House that are utterly absurd, and are a burden rather than a help to us. I maintain that the House cannot properly do its business until our rules are altered. Look how [unclear: wel] London County Council manage their business. They are a body of one hundred and the strong, forty more members than we [unclear: have].They have the management of moneys large amount than the revenues of this [unclear: colony] they manage their business in far less [unclear: time] we do. And why? Because, for one [unclear: thing] Speaker of that Council, Lord Rosebery, a man has spoken for ten minutes, [unclear: tinkle] little bell and prevents him from occupied any more time. If a man in that [unclear: Cou] Council brings forward a proposal he is allowed twenty minutes, and if he talks more than the Chairman tinkles the bell and he [unclear: has] sit down, unless by a special vote of the Council he is allowed to go on further. What wanted in this House is a rule of this [unclear: someone] under which, unless a man is introducing Bill, he will not be allowed to speak for many than twenty minutes; and I think that, will very little attention to the composition of the speech, pretty well every man in this [unclear: Ho] could say all he has to say within a few minutes, instead of going on an hour or two hours. Another thing that we must introduce is a system of closure. In the [unclear: Hou] of Commons it has worked admirably. They have there over six hundred members; they have their party divisions and their [unclear: par] quarrels; and yet for some time past they have worked very well indeed under a system of closure. I have been very loth for sometime past to give in my adherence to a system of closure; but I do hope that the next Government which sits upon those [unclear: benches] session will introduce as a first and most [unclear: v] measure some system of closure. [unclear: When] once get away from this House and from the precincts of this building and look back at the proceedings of the House and the newspaper reports thereof, we cannot help seeing [unclear: an] feeling that we go on day after day wasting time in a way that is scandalous. We come here and sit day after day and do nothing talk. Not a measure has been passed yet, a here we have these wretched estimates which the Government promised to [unclear: Kn] £50,000, being discussed night after night in the hope of saving some small sum. Hour after hour is spent in this way. Those who an anxious that something should be done [unclear: to] the country out of its difficulties and put it in a better position have no opportunity of saying or doing anything, while some few honourable members, day after day, take up one-half of the time in making long speeches about nothing. We see men talking at half-past two when the House meets, and one is driven home sick at three o'clock in the morning by those honourable members still talking. That is the way the House does its business. As to question of party, I think there always will be party government more or less, although this too, is one of the shams and pretences that we are always worshipping. It is largely a "toss up," when a man enters the House, which side he will take, and then he finds that he is tied to support that party right or wrong. It is a page 21 system inherited from the past, which has come to be treated as a fetish, but which we have no right to worship as we do. I say that, when a Government is selected and has been placed on those benches, it ought not to go off them until an actual vote of no confidence has been passed in them, and, if they choose to bring down a whole lot of these rubbishy Bills year after year, we should have a perfect right to fling them out as fast as we choose, without reference to the position of the Government. Another reform is this: When a weak Government get on those benches we have this alternative—and it is a serious alternative to a number of honourable members—that if we rote against the Government and turn them put we have to face a dissolution. Even now that we have triennial Parliaments, this power of dissolution rests entirely with the Crown, that is to say, in the hands of the Premier, and he can, at any time almost, put the country to the cost of a dissolution and a Second session. There is another reform which I think we should take from the French House of Commons. If we are dissatisfied with the Minister of Lands or with the Minister for Public Works, it should be open for us to table a motion and say that, whilst we agree with the policy of the Government, we do not agree with the Minister for Public Works, or the Native Minister, or whoever it might be, and, if that were carried the Minister should retire, without affecting the position of the other Ministers. That actually occurs in the French Chamber, and I am told that it acts there exceedingly well. It is certainly a convenient method of getting rid of an unpleasant or unsatisfactory Minister without affecting the position of other Ministers. It was Mr. Service who told me, eighteen months ago, in Melbourne, that the most satisfactory Ministry he had known of was when he and Mr. Berry were in partnership, for they had sixty-five loyal supporters and only about five in opposition. Then they had a nice strong Government. I was very glad indeed to see that this wretched system of party government is being condemned in the country, and that the Labour Council at Dunedin have actually taken up the question of the referendum and put it in their platform. No one can read that admirable book of Sir Francis Adams on the Swiss Constitution without recognising how valuable a thing the referendum is, what large powers it places in the hands of the people, and what a convenient thing it is to the Government working under it. I believe it is a wise provision. If the Government bring down a measure which is unsatisfactory, it is referred to a vote of the people, and the people vote Aye or No; and the result of that is that you can keep a Government in while throwing its measures out; and that is a very convenient thing if you have a Government that is not overwise in its measures: and I think that most of our Governments are unwise, because they will not take the trouble to consult honourable members and find out what are the wants of the country. I hope that this resolution will be carried, and that the Committee will set to work, and that the country will be educated in this matter, because, although there are only a small number of members in the House in favour of this motion, if we can get half the people of New Zealand in favour of it the movement will be successful.

Mr. Taylor.—I intend to vote against this amendment, for this simple reason: I have listened to the arguments, and what does the honourable member for Thorndon wish to inculcate? That we should have government by squattocracy. I cannot understand why honourable gentlemen have dealt with an important question in this way. I am astonished that an honourable gentleman representing a Liberal constituency like the Wellington District should advocate that a Ministry of four or live should be fixed in office for three years without any control and without liability to attack. I am surprised at this waste of time. As to the Liberalism of the honourable member for Lincoln, if I may be allowed to use the term, he is as full of egotism as an egg is full of meat.

Mr. Speaker.—I cannot allow the honourable gentleman to use that expression.

Mr. Taylor.—I simply say this: that we are constantly told that the gentlemen who are supporting this amendment are the only men who have common-sense or knowledge. I entirely demur to that. I can say this, and I can prove it: that I can give as conscientious a vote and can make as good a speech as he can. The honourable gentleman is too fond of using other people's brains, for he is always full of extracts and quotations from authorities. I do not do that. I like to deal with questions as they come up, without going outside to find information I do not possess. The honourable member for Lincoln is a very able gentleman, but I was sorry to hear him running down unionism in the colony, and to hear him saying that the working-men had no right to use unionism to protect their interests. What do we see in this House? I do not want to particularise or to indicate any member of the House; but I say that unionism is rampant here, and especially in connection with the Union Steamship Company. We all know the control that the chairman and proprietors of that company have over this House, and in another place that I will not mention. I trust the honourable member for Lincoln will by-and-by come to realise this fact: that the working-men of this colony have as perfect a right to join together to protect their labour as the Union Steamship Company, or capital, or the Bank of New Zealand. Then, there is the honourable member for Selwyn, who is not in his place. We know that there is an election coming on, and that the honourable member for Selwyn is a very large factor in a question of the kind. So far as the honourable member for Lincoln is concerned, I should not have said a word had it not been that the honourable member was simply, if I may use the word, offensive to people like myself.

Mr. Harkness.—Who?

page 22

Mr. Taylor.—The honourable member for Nelson is very fond of interrupting, which was never done by the late member for that city when sitting here. The present honourable member is not very fond of making speeches or of telling his constituents of what is going on in Parliament. He is one of those persons who might just as well stop at home, and the Government could save the whole of his honorarium and telegraph the news over to him. Then, we find gentlemen like the honourable member for the Buller and the honourable member for Waimate getting up and talking about morality, and absolutely wanting to gull honourable members. The honourable member for Waimate, if he is returned at the next elections, is coming down as an independent member; so we can quite understand why all this—I was going to say twaddle, but I will withdraw that term and say—very valuable information is given to us. The honourable member is paving the way for sitting on a rail; and why? Because he thinks that, if he is returned again, he will have a chance of having a seat on those benches. I am satisfied that no system of government will please many members in this House unless they are placed on those benches, with £800 a year and travelling-expenses and house-allowance. It is quite time now we got into the estimates. This motion emanates from the honourable member for Waimate, and the honourable member for Wallace was only the instrument for wasting four or five hours. I intend to vote against this motion, and hope the Government will raise their power and voice against this continual obstruction that is brought in their way.

Mr. Harkness.—I should like to inform the honourable member for Sydenham that I am not at all ashamed of my particular opinions, and not afraid to make them known if there is occasion to do so. I desire to record my vote against the resolution proposed by the honourable member for Waimate. While giving to him and to those who have supported him to-night every credit for honesty of purpose in bringing a resolution of this character before the House, I think every one who has given the matter any consideration must realise at once that it is a very abstract question, and one that is entirely beyond the present region of practical politics. The honourable member for Wallace, who introduced this resolution because he happened to be the first to catch the Speaker's eye, tells us that party government is of very modern growth—in fact, that it has only existed for a hundred years. If you will allow me, Sir, I will read an extract from Ransome's "Rise of Constitutional Government in England," wherein it is stated,—

"Marlborough tried to work with a mixed Ministry, but he failed just as William had done; and, Tory as he was, he found it necessary to change his colleagues for Whigs, for that party alone could maintain a majority. From his time the principle was fixed, not by choice, but by necessity, and it became an axiom of English politics that the party which has a majority of the House of Commons [unclear: sho] be that from which the Sovereign [unclear: chooses] Ministers."

Now, Sir, that is considerably more [unclear: than] hundred years ago. Then, the honourable member for Waimate says that this idea of party government is an antiquated one. Here, then we have these two advocates of one principle differing on so material a point that they cannot agree as to the age of party government. In discussing this question they have lost sight altogether of a very important matter. They referred to party government only as we find it in this House, but I think we must go further afield. Party government in this House is but a reflex of party feeling in the colony and in the world around us. Therefore if we wish to do away with it in this House we must remember that we are endeavouring to do away with it in all parts of the colony. Burke has said "'Party' is a body of men united to promote, by their joint endeavours, the national interests upon some particular question on which they are all agreed." These divisions of party have existed in the Old Country for a very long time and they continue to exist. The differences there are wide, but they are only differences of opinion. Whilst the honourable member for Waimate, in his very able speech in seconding the resolution of the honourable member for Wallace, introduced us to all the sins that he presumes belong to members of this Legislature, he forgot to introduce to us any of the advantages belonging to party government. He only gave us one phase of the truth, but if he were candid he would have shown the other side of the picture. In the first place, why are the good effects of party government? I maintain that they are numerous and advantageous. In the first place, it gives substances to young politicians, who at first have colourless opinions, so that they become permanently attached to the side they join and give evidence of the principles they take up. There are certain general rules that guide us in morals and lead us into a certain line of conduct in life. So, I take it, there are general rules that guide us in political life as well, and these principles which are believed to be just and right enable men who are true thereto to overcome seductions and influences to which they would otherwise yield, and give firmness and integrity to such men and increase their wisdom. In the next place, I take it that one good thing in party government is this: that it embodies the opinions of the nation for the time being. Now, these opinions of the people around us are sometimes violent and strong, and have vent only in representative institutions such as this. If it were not so, these opinions would burst asunder the whole machinery of our social moral, and political life. Of the advocates of this change I would ask three questions. Have they ever known in any free country a Government that was without definite and distinct party lines? Can they expect, on the other hand, a free country to exist without parties? And, in the third place, is it desirable that any free country should exist for any length of time page 23 Without distinct parties? I take it that these questions can he answered with reference to the present and past history of free and civilised nations. When we use the word "free" we mean by that that the citizens have a right to take, and do take, direct and positive action in those things which make for good government; and we must candidly admit that there never has existed a free country that has fought to develop constitutional law and right principles, and that has striven to solve those problems in daily life based upon right and justice, where there have not been parties. Without a struggle there is nothing attained either in the social, moral, political, or physical world, and wherever this struggle is there must of necessity be party. Without parties it as impossible to have a loyal, a steady, and an effective opposition, which is a safeguard of the public peace. The want of a steady and effective opposition in antiquity and in the Middle Ages was the result of factions and not of free parties. Without parties the very wisest measures would never have been carried, and many of the best measures which have been introduced would have remained harsh and unmodified. Parties, well understood, clearly defined, are a strong opposition to the restless and shallow theorists, who would be led to results which would be disastrous to the country and disastrous to the party. In conclusion, I should like to quote a writer who has said,—

"It is only mock philosophers who are always lamenting about political and party divisions and strifes. Looked at rightly, these political strifes and parties are the workshops of our national liberty and our national prosperity, and from the heat and hammering of political strife and political opinions there come form and temper and strength."

The great change we need is not so much to do away with party as the change pointed out by the honourable member for Thorndon in the forms and procedure of this House, and, when we have that, we shall find our party government will be of advantage to all.

Mr. Ward.—I do not think that the time of the House has been wasted in considering the motion which has been submitted to us for consideration to-night. It was not my intention to speak until I heard the honourable member for Nelson address the House. I am sorry the honourable gentleman is not in his place, but I mentioned to him that I should perhaps traverse a few of his statements during the few remarks I intended to make. I was very much struck, when the honourable gentleman was addressing the House, by what I conceived to be the very sarcastic speech he delivered. His arguments were entirely opposed to the way in which he said he was going to vote. He elaborated his arguments in fine and polished sentences, and he made a very nice speech, and he quoted Burke in support of some of the statements which he made. He talked about the present system of party government causing a cohesion of principles, and he went on to affirm that those who followed the party system here were likely to get fixed ideas into their minds and to advocate them outside the House. If the honourable gentleman did not intend this to be sarcasm, then I do not know what sarcasm is. I asked myself, while the honourable gentleman was addressing the House, could he possibly have considered what the present system of party government had caused him to do time and again in this House? Why, the honourable gentleman is a Free-trader, and yet he has, in following out party lines, as he necessarily must do under our present system, time and again voted on Protectionist lines! The honourable gentleman, in theory, is an economist, and I have no doubt if he were to give effect to his ideas in the House and apart from the party system we should find him voting in that direction; but he has frequently had to vote opposite to his views. Taking his own experience of the party system, the honourable gentleman ought to support the motion of the honourable member for Wallace, for under the existing system he certainly has had to vote straight against some of his professed principles. As I have said, it is not my intention to go at any length into this question. The honourable member for Wallace and the honourable member for Waimate have very ably placed their views upon this very important question before the House. I do not commit myself to the amendment, or to the series of proposals which the honourable member for Waimate has submitted to the House. I support them because the present system is not at all satisfactory. There is something undeniably radically wrong, and which requires to be altered. On entering this Parliament I very quickly discovered that it was quite impossible to have the business of this House, no matter how anxious honourable members might be to do so, conducted upon anything like business-lines; and every session since I have been here we have had, day after day, a great deal of time wasted. I attribute the blame entirely to the system under which we are working. I am not at all sure that a referendum, which some honourable members advocate, is the right thing to take the place of the present system. I should be sorry to see the party element entirely displaced. My idea is that it should be improved, with a view to the more expeditious despatch of business. That a change of some kind is necessary there is no doubt in my mind. I shall heartily support those honourable gentlemen who are endeavouring to bring about some change, and I feel sure that this discussion will be productive of some good.

The House divided on the question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question."

Ayes, 27.

Noes, 25.

Majority against, 2.

Amendment negatived, and motion agreed to.

George Didsbury, Government Printer, Wellington.—1890.