Part II. True Woman Suffrage.

And now I will offer some remarks upon the question of True Woman Suffrage, no proposal for which has ever been placed before the country. I must decline to consider any demand for Woman Suffrage as other than counterfeit which does not include wives in the proposed enfranchisement; and I would warn you here—as a part of both questions—against the possible effect of a favourite metaphor which is used by the advocates of the measure I have discussed. They call it—that is to say a few of them do, those who address the ingenuous Radical—the "thin end of the wedge:'"¹ now I wish to impress on you that if by the "wedge" is meant genuine Woman Suffrage, this implement does not enter at all: indeed if we must have metaphor (though I think metaphor often misleads) the wedge is

¹ "The thin end of the wedge of justice will be inserted in our Constitution, at any rate, by Mr. Jacob Bright's Bill. Once recognize the truth that women should not be disfranchised by sex, and the rest will follow."—Examiner, January 4th, 1873.

page 32 not put to its proper function : it is converted into a hammer to weld and strengthen the resisting medium.

But the question over which there may be difference of opinion is as to the means of elevating women. Mr. Mill's eloquent book seems to me more powerful as a plea for the alteration of the Marriage Law, for the removal of legal disabilities, and for throwing open all vocations and occupations, than it is powerful as a plea for political page 33 power. And remember this—his whole argument is founded on the position of Wives. I think he exaggerates the slavery of their position : as when he speaks of each wife living "under the very eye of her master . . . . in a chronic state of bribery and intimidation combined," or when he describes her as "the actual bond-servant of her husband; no less so, as far as legal obligation goes, than slaves commonly so called." There are not a few husbands who—notwithstanding legal obligations—could tell a different tale. Marriage is as often slavery to the man as it is to the woman. Speaking broadly, it maybe said, that while a woman gains her independence by marriage a man loses it, and as far as I can observe, no amount of Voting Power enables him to recover it. I find it very difficult to reconcile Mr. Mill's confidence in the vote as an instrument of redress, with statements he makes of the dependence of women on men, and the improbability he thereby suggests of their making an independent use of it. At page 46, he says, that "the greater part of what women write about women is mere sycophancy to men;" also that the majority of the women of any class are not likely to differ in political opinion from the majority of the men of the same class. Is it then likely—as he asserts—that they will strike out an page 34 independent line upon a question in which the interests of women, as such, are involved? Can you fancy many women "tampering," as it would be called, with the Marriage Law, or—considering their alleged sycophancy to men—supporting a programme of Women's Rights, however just such a programme might be ?

My point of view in this question is that of regarding women in their normal relation to men; that is to say, the position towards men which the majority of them occupy. I hold the theory to be erroneous which treats them as a class apart from, or existing independently of, men. Now I trust I shall not be misunderstood. I do not say that women should not have their independent individual existence as far as they can create it. There are a number of women entitled to our highest esteem, whose lives are entirely separate from the lives of men. But we cannot, and ought not, to judge the whole case of the sex from a consideration of their exceptional position; neither should we impose duties and privileges on them which are not common to all women.

Again, as we should not argue the case upon a consideration of the exceptional position of certain women, neither should we argue it upon the exceptional qualities of superior women. Yet this is a very common practice. Certain dis- page 35 tinguished women are compared with ordinary or inferior men, and the average equality of the sexes is supposed to be established. It may be as well to note, on our way, that although women of genius are constantly quoted to attest the mental calibre of their sex, these eminent ladies manifest a remarkable indifference to the question of Woman Suffrage.

Then Mr. Mill quotes certain people who are distinguished by position—Queens and Princesses—who are supposed to have exhibited considerable talent for government; but the fact is that we know nothing of royal personages. If they commit error it is concealed from our vulgar knowledge. The King "can do no wrong" is a constitutional maxim. There is so much glamour thrown upon their proceedings that they are almost fictitious personages. Men require under a Monarchy ornamental persons at the head of the State, and a woman will serve this purpose better than a man, for her weakness and sex appeal to the sentiment of chivalry, and by this means obtain support and forbearance. If, however we are to go off upon this false issue and form judgment from the conduct of women brought up, for the political purpose of men, under the artificial conditions of royalty, I should like you to compare the opinion of Mr. Goldwin page 36 Smith on this subject¹ with that of Mr. Mill. But the question is really beside the main issue: this is not—"Who is to impersonate or to image the Governing Power?" but "From whom is it to be derived ?"

To vote means to govern, that is to say theoretically: of course under our Constitution and Electoral System the real power of voting is slight. But the theory is that the voters elect the Government: and it is with this object that the vote is claimed; it is a means to governing the nation.

This raises the question whether there is or there is not a natural province for women as there is a natural province for men. I am quite aware that in using this term "natural" it may give rise to a little feeling of triumph on the part of some of my adversaries. They will say "Here is the old plea of every oppressor," and Mill's inquiry will be remembered as to whether there was ever any dominion which did not appear "natural" to those who possessed it?—whether the dominion of the white man over the black was not alleged to be "natural?" &c. &c. But because a word has been misused it does not follow that it has no significance. No one will

¹ Macmillan's Magazine, June 1875. See Appendix iv.

page 37 gainsay me if I assert that it is "natural" (according to our present definition of natural) a man should protect a woman in the presence of danger, that it is "natural" he should serve as a soldier in war; nor on the other hand, if I said that it is "natural" a wife should bear a child, and that it is "natural" women should depend on the men who love them. It is not my fault—though it may be my misfortune—that I am compelled to use arguments and words which have been perverted to justify oppression and wrong doing. Reasons may be applicable in one case which are not so in another. Good government and bad government may be defended in precisely the same words. I dwell upon this because the following retort appears to be regarded by so many people as conclusive. "If you deny the claim in one case I do not see how you can concede it in another," it is said, when the two cases are entirely different; each must be judged upon its own merits. I am never deterred from acquiescing in a right because an unreasonable claim may be founded upon it. If it be asked—who is to decide as to the difference of case? I can only answer—Clearness of mind and an improved Public Opinion.

I beg, therefore, you will dismiss from your mind any prejudice which may have been created page 38 by the misuse of words. When I say "natural," I do not mean "usual;" I mean natural in the sense of conforming to a known invariable relation between persons or things.

Defined thus, I do not shrink from asserting that women have a natural province, and that the exercise of political power or government of the nation is inconsistent with it. Mill says at page 38, "What is now called the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing." It depends upon who is speaking, Mill's view in this matter appears to be Rousseau's, it is represented in the doctrine of the Fall of Man. Whatever is bad results from art and civilization; whatever is good belongs to nature—so back to nature : and what do we find there? the men fighting and the women treated as chattel. "Nature" appears to place women entirely at the mercy of men. Their independence is an artificial product: it is the outcome of civilization, and the growth of sentiment, but we shall err in supposing that there are no natural limits to such independence.

We cannot make women the equal of men in male strength; and there are certain male duties which result from this strength. Mr. Goldwin Smith truly says, that "the law, after all, though the fact may be rough and unwelcome, rests at bottom on the force of the page 39 community, and the force of the community is male. No woman can imagine that her sex can execute, or in case of rebellion reassert the law; for that they must look entirely to men," and he remarks:—

"In France, it is morally certain, that at the present moment if the votes were given to the women, the first result would be the restoration to power of the Bourbons, with their reactionary priesthood, and the destruction of all that has been gained by the national agonies of the last century. But would the men submit ?"

This passage from Mr. Goldwin Smith forcibly illustrates the necessity of the voting power corresponding with the real strength of the nation. Rebellions occur sometimes under male legislation. Peoples will submit to much vexatious legislation, rather than resort to rebellion; but when great questions are at issue, and there is national excitement, they will not submit to an oppressive edict if they consider they are strong enough to resist it: the knowledge, or even the suspicion, that such law is enacted by the vote of women supplementing that of a minority of men would be sufficient to provoke rebellion.¹ I trust that this grave point will be considered by my adversaries.

As I am very anxious that there should be an exact understanding upon the relative positions occupied by myself and opponents upon this question of Physical Force, I will quote one or two passages from the replies given by the latter, and will give them the benefit of their strongest points.

The writer in the Englishwoman's Review says, in reviewing my lecture, "Is moral force of no value unless backed up by physical force? . . . . Are we to go back to the policy of savage times, when might was the only right to frame our code? "Miss Fenwick Miller exclaims," Since the page 41 days of Rob Roy .... such an opinion as this argument implies of the rights of Brute Strength has never been enunciated."

I must ask you here to disregard mere declamation about "savage times" and "Brute Strength" which is indulged in for the purpose of giving an odious character to an agency which, as Society is composed, is indispensable. It is very easy to sneer at what Mr. Mill calls the "law of the strong," and the sneer is perhaps excusable when we consider how often it has been unjustly imposed and glorified by Carlylean hero worshippers irrespective of the cause it upheld, but the law of the strong settles some things wisely. The independence of nations has been achieved and is preserved by means of it. Good laws result from strength as much as bad laws.

Does this involve the absurdity of advocating "Brute Strength" as divorced from mind? Certainly not. Brute strength built the houses we live in, and it arrests the criminal, but there is mind to determine its exercise. What does this show? Clearly that beneficial power is derived from the combination of reason with strength.

Miss Lydia Becker in her pamphlet on Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, produces an illustration as follows :— page 42

"If it were thought expedient to invest women with equal property rights with men, and with the electoral franchise, the law would be as competent to secure their rights to women—notwithstanding any inferiority in physical power—as it is to secure the property rights of infants who are infinitely weaker than women, but who are in this respect treated by the law as the equals of the strongest men."

My comment on this is that the infants are not protected by infant made law. The law to be efficient and to command respect—especially at a national crisis—must be male made.

I am anxious that women should have equal property rights and equal independence with men, but they can never obtain it themselves. I not only concede this equality, but demand it—not from them, however, but for them—by male legislation. I hope at least that there are some among my opponents who will moderate their indignation, and endeavour to comprehend my views. I want all that the most enlightened women ask for. I am as strong a champion for their personal rights as the most devoted daughter of Mary Wolstoncraft can be, but I do not confuse personal right with political or military right. I hold that the personal right to be equal in the eye of the law, and to obtain redress for the wrong committed by men, does not involve the political right, and that the exercise of the latter will be damaging to the former. It page 43 requires a woman of masculine thought to demand in its full meaning personal and equal rights for women; now I believe that from the majority of women you will only get what is commonly known as feminine thought. I form my judgment upon observation of the common characteristics of women. I decline to decide this question upon an inference drawn from their exceptional characteristics.¹ It will be admitted that one common characteristic of the sex is timidity—timidity mental, not less than physical. During one of the discussions that followed the lecture, one gentleman turned with some impatience, if not anger, upon a previous speaker, who

¹ Mill's error on this point has been adopted by all his disciples. There can be no doubt but that he formed his idea of women generally from a consideration of his wife's peculiar character : in fact, in an unconscious manner he admits as much, for he says that one may infer to an almost laughable extent the character of a man's own wife by the opinion he expresses of women in general. Now although this assertion is absurdly untrue as far as men are concerned who have mixed much in the world, and who have women relatives and friends presenting every variety of character, it is probably quite true as far as Mill's own life and experience went, and he is at least entitled to receive the benefit of his own statement. Mrs. Mill was, from all we can gather, precisely one of those women—endowed with masculine thought—whose character was exceptional to that of her sex.

page 44 had suggested that women were not constitutionally fitted for political life, and asked him to state—"What there is in the constitution of a woman to hinder her from exercising a sensible choice between two parliamentary candidates ?" If the gentleman interrogated had bethought him of an appropriate reply, he would have said—"Constitutional Timidity."

Rival candidates represent rival ideas: one set of ideas may include a project of political enterprise, that is of reform, which may be very needful either for the nation or for women themselves, but the constitutional mental timidity of women will cause them to dread and oppose it. Of course I do not refer to the ladies who advocate Woman Suffrage. They are endowed with considerable mental energy, an energy that I value highly, though I wish it had taken another direction. My reference is to women as they are commonly characterised.

The Englishwoman's Review then varies the illustration and asks if Physical Force is so "What does our law mean by disfranchising the exponents of physical force, policemen, and soldiers ?"

It may be replied that soldiers and policemen are the voluntary exponents of force, and that they acquiesce in the condition of disfranchise- page 45 ment; it is certain that if they did not acquiesce they would rebel. There is no analogy whatsoever between their case and the case I put of the male majority declining to acquiesce in the decree of a feminine majority.

It may be said that it would be very wrong to rebel against a law which has been decreed by Parliament. Nevertheless, insurrections do occur, and men have been called patriotic for resisting an odious law. Mill said that the only justification for insurrection was the probability of success. I maintain that under woman-made law the prospect of this will tend to encourage insurrection.

Women, misled by a purely artificial condition, may declare that they are entitled to play exactly the same part as men—that they will make laws, share government, and enforce obedience to the official declaration of their will. The idle claim may be made, sentimentalists may applaud it, and party politicians may, during a sickly period, carry it into law. But, inevitably, whenever the real strain comes, under the flowing tide of energy and thought, and men are suddenly called upon to submit to an artificial yoke, not all the invocations of justice in the world, or the wildest rhapsodies over abstract right will lend strength to the brittle toy. The relative position of men and women will be reasserted in the midst of confusion, and page 46 society will learn that it can only advance under certain fixed unalterable conditions.

The Physical weakness of women and their dependence on men is a reason why female government should not prevail over male government as it might well do if all women had votes: it is also a reason—though not generally regarded as a degrading reason—why women are excluded from the Army, Navy, and Police. If we argued, after the fashion of the lady suffragists, from the exceptional women, this reason would not hold. Sir Robert Anstruther, M.P., while presiding over a Woman Suffrage meeting in Hanover Square two years ago, was considered to have made a successful retort to the physical strength argument by saying that he could produce a Scotch fish woman who would walk the wind out of me in five minutes.

I will make him a present of the following case, which I cut out, not long since, from a Northern paper.

"In the Dundee Police Court, on Saturday, two women, Gordon Stewart and Elizabeth Melville, mill-workers, were fined twenty shillings or twenty days, for fighting with each other in a field, on Thursday week. After both had got into boxing trim, the fight was conducted according to the etiquette of pugilistic science, and was witnessed by a crowd of females. There were three tough rounds, in which Melville was severely punished and latterly rendered insensible."

We are told of the brand of Electoral incapacity; but since women can fight so well it might be argued—why should they be humiliated with the brand of military incapacity? Yet we may say—without being accused of dogma or of invoking "the law of the strong"—that military service is inconsistent with the natural province of women.

I must endeavour here to clear up a misconception. It is assumed by Woman Suffrage Advocates that we declare women should not vote because they do not serve in the army. This is not so. The object of my reference to the army, navy, &c., is to show that there are certain offices from which women are excluded on account of sex, and without indignity. We must be governed, as it is necessary to repeat ad nauseam, by the general characteristics of women : timidity and physical weakness¹ disqualify them as soldiers.

Women are under no brand on account of their weakness,—their timidity, and the grace of their natural dependence—or they are under the brand of nature—if to be a woman is a brand. And I can quite understand that in some cases sex may be felt in a woman with honorable shame and regret: that is, when a woman posesses a masculine and vigorous mind with all sorts of capacities, and with an intellect far surpassing that of ordinary men. It is in her favour and our interest that I occupy the paradoxical position as some regard it, of objecting less to the woman vote than to the admission of women to Parliament. I know one or two women now whom I would gladly accept as my representatives in the House of Commons. It is women of this sort who very naturally repudiate dependence on men; but we must not, as I have urged before, commit the blunder of arguing the case of women on consideration of the exceptional qualities possessed by a few, nor suppose that these qualities can, by means of political enfranchisement, be made characteristic of women in general.

Let us now consider how far the natural character of women fits them to enter public life and give weighty decisions. I think it will be admitted that very few of them perceive page 49 that there is any connection at all between private and public life. Their domesticity has its drawback. They care only for that which is near them, for the actual which is within touch. The waves which come in from outer life and affect domestic circumstances, which indeed create and destroy them, they mostly ignore. Of course, I speak of average women. The position I am placed in of having, apparently, to draw up an indictment against the sex, is an extremely disagreeable one. I would rather dilate upon their private worth, but as it is proposed to confide the national destiny into their hands, it is necessary to discuss seriously their character and disposition for public life. If, then, we take women in the mass, we shall find that they exaggerate the worst characteristic of the English people, namely, a failure to appreciate the effect of indirect cause. I will illustrate my meaning. If we see a shot fired at us, it is easy to attribute the discharge to a gun; but it would be folly to blame the gun, we should consider who fired it, and the motives that prompted the hostility. Women, as a rule, can only perceive the gun, that is to say, the nearest visible cause of evil. They would not knowingly harm a fly, especially one that is in the room; yet, by means of their sympathy and influence, they contribute power- page 50 fully to the indirect causes of human suffering and massacre. They, more than others, are responsible for those

"Specious names learn't in soft childhood's unsuspecting hour,"

which sanctify the sword, and send men to kill each other. They hate war and adore the army. They will wring their hands over the battle field—their's to bestow the glory and to applaud the barbaric pomp and glittering pageantry which excite men to conflict. Their's the mission to teach children that other peoples are inferior and should be held in subjection, and when they have it, their's will be the vote for naval and military expenditure.

Those who think unorthodox, that is, unusual thought, they believe to be wicked. Wise thought must have some pomp and outward circumstance. page 51 Then they turn instinctively from all initiative movement. Even superior women rarely have sympathy with the struggling principles which determine the life of a nation. They are only interested in public affairs within the limits of the Parish, or in the cause blazoned round the land. They were not to be counted among the active supporters of the National Education League, but under the advice of the Clergy are warm supporters of Denominationalism in their respective parishes : they did not send us a single half-crown in support of Mr. Mill's Land Tenure Reform scheme, neither have they given much countenance (except the women who were concerned with the men) to the Labourers' cause, or to workmen's independent movements.¹

They are weak likewise in this way, they care more for persons than for ideas. I say weak, meaning weak for public life : for this very weakness occasions the regard that men prize, it may be the strength of their womanhood, the indis-

¹ Miss Fenwick Miller, in reply to this passage, asks me if I have never heard of Madame Roland and Charlotte Corday. But these women were the eccentricities of their sex; the first a noble one, and the latter, let us hope, a very rare one; a more treacherous deed than the one which lifted Charlotte Corday to fame it is almost impossible to conceive.

page 52 pensable condition of their domesticity and home help. But the quality is weak as far as the public good is concerned; and one bad result is that they love to have power personified, and are in consequence ardent supporters of Kings and Princes, Popes and Bishops.

I know the theory that accounts for all this. It is said these defects arise from a system of repression. Enlarge women's minds by giving them public responsibility and public interests: they will soon develope public spirit and public courage. This is what I doubt. Much of the timidity of women is due to their physical organization, and the narrowness of their outlook, the confinement of their life, to an original instinct. What they are is partly the result of primitive type, partly the result of what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls those "vague and deep combinations organized in barbarous times."

The extent to which the vote is likely to develope a sense of responsibility is much exaggerated. The direct power of the single vote is felt by the individual to be so infinitessimal, the corrupt or social influences which counteract it are so enormous, the issues it determines are so apparently trivial, that even persons of high public spirit are apt to become callous. Women page 53 with that passion for visible effect to which I have referred will fail to be impressed with its real importance. The theory of the educational value of the vote seems to me to be the illusion of those who have small practical acquaintance with the real men and women who compose Society. Surely the experiment of enfranchising all women is somewhat vast, somewhat rash, upon this slender speculation. Its only chance of success lies in the long process of time and in the lapse of a sufficient number of generations to transform the nature of women and create the artificial stock, and in the mean time !

"It hath not much
Consoled the race of mastodons to know
Before they went to fossil, that anon
Their place should quicken with the elephant;
They were not elephants, but mastodons."

And so are we living men of these generations; let us at least plead for our children and for those who follow them, if we may not plead for ourselves. It is right we should live for posterity; but we are not entitled to gamble away our heritage upon the mere chance of a remote benefit. And if the experiment does not succeed! If the total effect of the Woman Vote turns out so oppressive that it becomes insupportable to the majority of men, remember that nothing less page 54 than an insurrection will suffice to withdraw the vote. Professor Cairnes, in his reply to Mr. Goldwin Smith, suggests that at a crisis, if free institutions were likely to be jeopardised by the Woman Vote, the appeals of husbands, fathers, and brothers would induce a sufficient number of women to abstain from voting; that is to say, we are to surrender the power of suppressing free institutions into the hands of women (who do not want it!) in order to entreat them not to exercise it when political responsibility is put to its highest test.¹

There is another argument I may use. It is that political government by women conflicts with the ideal relation of man and woman. This ideal relation may be rarely fulfilled; men and women are trained to miss it; formalities, custom, and a bad marriage law, with social penalties that encourage hypocrisy, all conspire to make

¹ As I have been accused of mis-representing Professor Cairnes, in the above passage, I will give his exact words as they appear in Macmillan's Magazine for September, 1874. Mr. Goldwin Smith had said that "Female Suffrage would give a vast increase of power to the Clergy." Professor Cairnes, after remarking that he is quite unable to discover what the grounds are for such a supposition" proceeds thus: "Even if we were to make the extravagant supposition, that the Clergy are to a man in favour of personal government and absolutism," (it may be remarked in parenthesis that the extravagant supposition about the clergy "to a man" was Professor Cairnes' and not Mr. Goldwin Smith's) "there would still be husbands, fathers, and brothers, whose appeals on behalf of free government would not surely pass altogether unheeded. Is it being over sanguine to assume that at the worst a sufficient number of women would be kept back from the polls to leave the victory with the cause that is ' characteristically male.' "

page 55 true union rare; but nevertheless I think that all reform likely to alter the relation of the sexes should be considered with this ideal steadily in view; women going to the poll to govern men, to act as an opposing class (the whole theory of the value of the vote rests upon the supposition that they will oppose male legislation), this picture conflicts with the ideal relation.

Not one wife out of fifty wants to go to the poll whether she attains the ideal relation or not: the majority of wives are either indifferent or hostile to the vote. I do not refer merely to the thoughtless, I refer to the opinion of the most thoughtful of wives. I fancy I can hear someone say, "Slaves never wish to be free," but if they are slaves, does the vote give them freedom? The analogy is a forced one. Freedom in the case of Slaves means release from ownership. In the case of women, according to Mr. Mill, page 56 marriage constitutes the so-called slavery, and this is to remain. Since they continue slaves, how can they be expected to vote for freedom? According to the premiss they will insist upon shackles for themselves while possessed of the power of forging shackles for men.

There remains something to be said—as against the alleged Subjection—of the Dominion of Women. Previous to giving them a strength entirely foreign to their nature, it may be as well to consider whether their natural influence is not already excessive, and whether their feminine power requires to be supplemented by artificial or masculine power. I am aware that in the public treatment of this question, it is the fashion to ignore entirely the sex relation and influence; still I do not think we shall come to a wise decision unless we bear vividly in mind the potent force, derived from sex attraction, which is perpetually at work, whether we approve of it or not, establishing the Dominion of women. How much of the World's working power is not due to Woman motive? It may be concealed, but there it is supplying the fuel to men's energy. Women may disclaim the desire for homage, they may caricature it as constituting them the "puppets of a dream," but they may just as well attempt to alter the law of gravitation as endeavour to alter their own mode of page 57 attraction and the corresponding deference of men.¹

The woman who takes an interest in politics, such is her sex influence, exercises far more political power than any man occupying a private position. It is asserted that this is an injurious indirect influence, but the vote will not abolish it; on the contrary, if women are to become more interested in politics by means of the vote, it will make them all the more anxious to exert their influence whether it be described as direct or indirect.

I am quite sure that, whatever may have been my reasoning, I shall have done little to dislodge the intense feeling which some ladies have worked themselves up to on this question of Woman Suffrage. The roots of strong feeling run too deep to be affected by argument. I must, however, protest against the common supposition that strength of feeling affords any indication of the righteousness, wisdom, or ultimate success of a cause. If earnest feeling be the test of truth,

¹ "Surely their influence is strong enough as things are without their direct invasion of the political platform. As wives and mothers, as sisters, friends, and the first woman whom the young man loves, they have immense power over men" "Woman's Place in Nature and Society."

page 58 then Roman Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, and Freethinker are equally right. The fire of conviction belongs to each. Yet it is probable that one or the other is entirely mistaken. Of course, intensity of conviction is generally accompanied by so much earnestness of character and rectitude, resulting from fidelity to principle, that one hardly likes to discourage it, and yet we all know—when wedded to error and strong it has been the scourge of mankind. I would entreat ladies to look into history, and note how many movements, great and small, have been lifted into temporary notice, and have produced cases of martyrdom—entirely thrown away—far more heroic than is displayed by the martyrdom of submitting to the sale of silver spoons. Mill truly says, that "It is one of the characteristic prejudices of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, to accord to the unreasoning elements in human nature, the infallibility which the eighteenth century is supposed to have ascribed to the reasoning elements."

We have some American experience upon Woman enfranchisement, which hardly justifies the sanguine expectations of its supporters here. The experiment is only local in the United States, therefore the evil effect is limited, but the account page 59 I have here taken from an American newspaper¹ favourable to Woman Suffrage, is very suggestive:—

I should tell you that the Woman Suffrage advocated in America is the True Woman Suffrage.

In Massachusetts there are now 367,236 Male Voters.

Woman Suffrage will give 386,848 Female Voters,

giving the Women a majority of 20,000!

Now this is not the evidence of an opponent of Reform, but of a gentleman who is well known for his liberal views: and his paper was read before a society of advanced thinkers. There are many symptoms that the Woman Suffrage movement in America is commencing to languish. Mr. Abbot, one of the ablest of its advocates, tells us, in an article published last February,² that an "increasing number of free and thoughtful "minds" contemplate it with apathy, and even fears himself that "if women obtain the ballot by "the exertions of the enlightened few, they will "forthwith use it to destroy the very political ideas "to which they have owed their enfranchisement." This is a pretty strong admission coming from a supporter of the movement.

I will not detain you longer; but before concluding I must refer to the accusation which has been made against me of resisting the Woman Suffrage measure upon what are called "party" grounds. Only superficial, non-political people can be misled by a charge of this sort. Party

¹ "Woman and Politics," quoted previously.

² Index, February 1st, 1877.

page 62 does not signify to me a collection of men struggling for office : there is little chance of my becoming a Lord of the Admiralty under either Whig or Tory administration. Party signifies to me principle: it means veritable progress: association for the promotion of certain ideas. One of these ideas is assertion of the interests of the poor in the Political and Social Compromise that governs us, in a far broader sense than they are at present recognized as deserving. It is not a popular idea: neither are certain other principles I am stubborn enough to believe in, one of which is, let me say, the utmost practicable emancipation of women. My principles being unpopular, it follows that the association supporting them is by no means powerful. I care little for Party, but I care a great deal for the cause identified with Party. The case stands thus: I want what I believe is likely to benefit mankind, meaning by mankind both sexes. The Single Woman Suffrage party offers me—wrapped in specious phrases—that which I believe to be bad for mankind, and because I say "The advance of the good I believe in will be retarded by the success of this deceptive movement," I am accused of rejecting it upon "party" grounds, and Mr. Auberon Herbert writes to the Times to say that I find no difficulty in telling women that I would have page 63 given them the right of voting if they had agreed with my political views, but as they are not sufficiently fortunate to do so I decline to concede it. Now what is the ground of this mispresentation? Simply that when women make it part of their claim to vote, that they will contribute enlightened and valuable thought to Parliament, I express my belief that the contribution will be, as far as the majority is concerned, of a reverse character. The accusation of being actuated by "party" considerations is as childish as it is unjust, and it can have no force against one who occupies a position almost outside the two great governing parties.

In conclusion, I have a word or two to say upon the subject of progress. I was asked by the Chairman of one of my lectures to consider whether, even supposing the Woman Suffrage Measure to produce the reactionary effect I anticipate, other counteracting forces will not be likely to come into play which will preserve our momentum forward? I am not certain, to begin with, that there is a momentum forward; but if there is, I cannot perceive that this affords any argument for creating a hindrance. I am not a fatalist about progress. Indeed, I regard the belief in insensible inevitable progress—a progress to be obtained without human striving—to be as page 64 pernicious as any old theological belief that sent men striving on the wrong track. It absolves the majority of men from responsibility. There is surely no law to make us wise. I cannot believe it possible that progress will come to a people that does not make constant effort to be worthy of it. Progress of course means improvement. Individual improvement is, to a great extent, the result of individual effort, but it is affected by external circumstances and institutions. National progress means the improvement of these circumstances and institutions for the general benefit, (as for instance by an Education Act or Reform of the Land Tenure system), and must be the result of National effort. I look around and do not observe much sign of this. The men who endeavour to initiate national or political effort—politics being only a means to national effort—are too often ridiculed as theorists or decried as disturbers.

Of course, progress and national greatness must have some common meaning attached to them. There are those who regard France as having been greatest under Louis Quatorze and Napoleon, England as greatest under Pitt, Germany as greatest now. But mere military strength does not represent progress or greatness in my eyes. We may cast a "Woolwich infant " page 65 (an appropriate offspring of the 19th century), launch huge sea monsters, furbish up the deeds of our ancestors and celebrate Balaklava charges. We may, in the exuberance of ourwealth, despatch Arctic expeditions to the North, purchase the Egyptian canal, and display gorgeous processions of State pageantry in the East : we may prostrate ourselves, with kneeling elephants, at the feet of Royalty as the symbol of magnificence. Still, this is not progress. History—if there be progress, and history expands its stature to a corresponding degree—will push all this splendour and tinsel on one side, and will say, "At this time, what were the numbers and what was the condition of the English poor?" Here is the true test of national well being. Progress must mean moral growth; it must mean the general bettering of human life : less drunkenness, less brutality, less killing—greater susceptibility to ideas, and an uneasy conscience when wrong doing prevails, or when Civilization, as it is called, produces a "Black Country," a joyless landless peasantry, or city squalor.

All that we can say is, that we are surrounded by latent possibilities. If progress is to be evolved it will only be obtained by the exercise of human wisdom—certainly not by such an act of human folly as would be achieved by conceding direct Political Power to women.