Varieties of Subjects with which Naval Intelligence has to deal.

A vast number of subjects are embraced under the term "naval "intelligence," some common to both divisions before mentioned, others specially or more closely connected with one rather than the other. I can, however, in the time only glance at some of the principal ones. Those common to both relate to hydrography, meteorology, the naval policies and arrangements of foreign nations as indicated by the war-vessels they build or buy, the material resources, active or dormant, of page 5 maritime nations, both as regards construction, refitment, and maintenance. The principles and details of construction, armament, machinery, appliances, and efficiencies or deficiencies of their warships; all matters relating to the personnel, both active and reserve, of their war navies. These headings sufficiently indicate what may be considered common to both branches of naval intelligence.

Special to blockade are—topography of coast and river districts,¹ embracing detailed information respecting railway and canal communications of war and mercantile ports. Railways may afford facilities for moving fleets of efficient torpedo-boats from one port to another more rapidly than water permits a blockading force to do, and it is reasonable to suppose an effort to raise the blockade of a port would be developed through a cloud of torpedo-boats. The relative power of concentration possessed by the blockaders and the blockaded must exercise considerable influence on the strategical distribution of the blockading force. Railway and canal communications may also to some extent affect the question of fuel supplies of the blockaded. As my intention is to refer almost exclusively to the direct protection of commerce on the high seas, I am compelled to refrain from closer consideration of intelligence having reference to blockade. There are, however, one or two general reflections worthy of special remark.

As regards hydrographical information, the experience of maritime nations testifies to the care and completeness exercised by our Admiralty in its collection, so far as oceans or seas are concerned. But it is doubtful whether we know as much as we ought to know about great rivers, such, for example, as the Amur, with its 583,000 square miles of hydrographic basin. No doubt the Millitary Intelligence Department in Pall Mall collects a certain amount of information respecting these, but military men know nothing of the naval aspects of the great rivers and their naval resources.

The short story I told in a former paper² here of the building and work done by the little Russian steamer "Aigun," in 1854, on the Amur, is a sufficient warning to us not to neglect the existence or development of naval resources many hundred miles from the coast lines. Obviously a naval, not a military, department should collect such intelligence, and divided responsibility should be avoided.

Respecting the policy, resources, the principles and details of construction, armament, appliances, and personnel, and that great host of matters and things which go to make up visible naval war power, I, for one, feel confident that our Admiralty struggles hard to obtain complete foreign information with the miserably scanty means provided by the country for collecting it. It is a noteworthy fact that, while we have a great military "Intelligence" Department, and besides have a military attache at the Courts of the great Powers, we are quite content that one solitary naval Officer should be charged with watching the naval developments and preparations of the whole of Europe! Yet invasions cannot be attempted, nor can we move even a

¹ See valuable paper on "Tactics of Blockade," by Captain S. Long, R.N.

² See "Russian Development and our Naval and Military Position in the North "Pacific," Journal, vol. xxiii, No. CI.

page 6 drummer-boy beyond our shores without a naval operation, great or small, being the primary step of military movements so far as we are concerned. Under the heads mentioned there is a great variety of information respecting foreign navies, which could, with great propriety, and should, I venture to think, be given by our Admiralty to naval Officers who have now no means whatever of obtaining authoritative information, and who, therefore, will be in war entirely ignorant of much they ought to know.

As regards seaboard topography, railway and canal communications, of ports, &c., such intelligence is, I believe, collected by the military department; but practical experience of war generally proves that sources of failure are most often found between the chinks of divided responsibility. The very startling announcement made a few weeks ago in the House of Commons, "there could be no doubt the naval "guns of England's fleet are inferior to the new guns on board the German, French, and Russian ships."¹ has been received by the country with comfortable complacency. It would be plunged in a state of excited indignation had it been asserted instead that the rifles of the Army were, without doubt, inferior to those of the same foreign Powers; but, as regards naval guns, it neither recognizes the seriousness of the fact, nor reflects that it is the natural result of divided responsibility. When we are at war there will be probably twenty heavy guns brought into action on the sea for every one on land, yet the manufacture and preponderating opinion controlling the construction and fittings of naval ordnance is vested in those who cannot fight them on the sea, and under the direction of a military department, knowing nothing practically of sea warfare. The Admiralty, which is directly responsible to the nation for the efficiency of everything appertaining to the fleet, has not direct control of its own ordnance. Nor is there any reason why the Admiralty should not itself collect intelligence in this matter of military seaboard topography, having, as it has, qualified Officers available for this service. Why should Marine Artillery Officers be employed as professors at the Staff and Military Colleges instructing military students in military art, while the Admiralty has to rely on the War Office for such topographical information as is necessary for naval operations on an enemy's seaboard?

I mention these things, not because, as all my former writings will amply testify, I either underrate or undervalue the great and grave importance of the military arms of England, not because I do not feel as thoroughly as anyone the necessity for purely military Intelligence Departments,² but because it is my endeavour to look beyond popular fancies and natural professional leanings, and to state plainly matters of fact as they appear to me. In dismissing from further examination naval intelligence in its general aspects or in the special aspects of blockade, I would submit that it would appear that while advancing

¹ Vide speech of the Right Honourable W. H. Smith, M.P., in debate on Navy Estimates, 1881.

² Besides the department under the War Office at home, there is also one in India.

page 7 science and modern appliances in no way diminish the absolute necessity of blockading an enemy's seaboard as the first step towards protecting commerce, they do diminish the probability of making a blockade effectual and complete; and in proportion as such probability is reduced so must increased precautions be taken for the direct defence of commerce on the high seas. It is now to this main portion of my subject ail further remark will exclusively apply.