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The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 39

V

V.

I Am not sufficiently vain to suppose that what I have written previously on this subject has been exhaustive; I have merely touched some of the more important intellectual difficulties that surround and interpenetrate the Theistic position, and have endeavoured to show how absurd is the orthodox belief. Just now I shall turn from page 20 the purely intellectual aspects of the subject and point out a few of the Moral difficulties which meet the Theist—difficulties he either ignores or explains in a very unsatisfactory way.

The Theist proclaims a God who is infinitely good—goodness itself, in fact: whose "tender mercies are over all his works," who is Humanity's Great Father, and whose nature is Love. Now all this might have continued undisturbed in the world's creed, if, unfortunately, the facts of every-day life did not ceaselessly protest against such false doctrines.

If infinite goodness really existed, such a thing as evil would be impossible. I suppose no one will deny the existence of evil; even the most thorough optimist must sometimes be in doubt as to the correctness of his creed, except he be too stupid to reflect. A fit of the gout, sciatica, or a cancer would, I should suppose, convert the most devout optimist into something more or less rational.

In the esteem of most men both physical and moral evils exist in far too great plenty. Let us therefore reflect, I. If I had the power I would remove every evil out of nature and leave only what is useful and good. This I cannot do for lack of ability. Give me the power and I will undertake the task. But if I have the power to remove one evil and don't do it, you have the best of reasons for saying that I am not so good as I should be. Now the orthodox preach a God who, they solemnly assure us, is infinite in being and in all his attributes; his power and knowledge are absolutely infinite, and his goodness equal to either. But this must be false, for such a being could never have suffered to exist any evil whatever, even for one moment. A being infinitely good must will the existence of nothing but good; if he has all power and knowledge these must be subservient to his will—if he be sane. But evils do exist: these are the result (1) of his design or arrangement, for nothing could slip in unawares to him; or (2) he had not power to prevent nor is able now to destroy them; or (3) he is careless about their existence, and so does not wish them to be destroyed; or (4) he desires their existence, and actively favours their continuance. Which of these hypotheses is correct? No matter which; any one of the four is fatal to orthodoxy. If he arranged for evils in the original creation, or introduced them subsequently, he must himself be evil in the direct ratio of his knowledge and page 21 power; that is, on orthodox showing, he must be infinitely evil, for he is infinitely knowing and able. Did a being of boundless power and knowledge create evils, or create materials and forces that in their "workings" must evolve evils? The orthodox creed fairly implies this, though believers shrink from its open and blank avowal. So be it—the conclusion is inevitable, that he who made Nature, supposing it ever was made, and had full knowledge of what he did, must be solely responsible for all that Nature evolves. Evils and goods are equally his offspring, not begotten by momentary impulse, but after an eternity's (a parte ante) deliberation. But herein lies a contradiction; goods and evils, or in the abstract, good and evil, are diametrically opposed and incompatible. Therefore, an infinite being could not will both goods and evils, except alternately; and in that case they could not exist simultaneously, for infinite power would instantly execute any wish such a being might have; the moment he willed evils goods would cease, and vice versa. If the orthodox prefer to suppose a God who wills both goods and evils simultaneously, I will not at present contend with such an absurdity.

Again, no Theist would aver that evils crept into Nature or sprang up in its midst without his God's knowledge or power to prevent, as that would involve the conception of ignorance or weakness. Nor could the orthodox suppose that he without whom "a sparrow falleth not," and who "numbereth the very hairs of your head," could be careless of the existence of evils—that would un-God the deity at once. Lastly, to suppose the creator and ruler of Nature to desire the existence of evils, argues such a wicked or malicious state of mind as really to shock the most callous dogmatist in the world. What, therefore, can the Theist say? Evils exist. How can he hold the doctrine of an infinitely good, powerful, and wise God, with these un-deniable facts so constantly around him?

Of course, most believers resort to the fiction of a future life, and thus create a Utopian world to redress the wrongs of this; but that does not explain, it merely evades the difficulty. For the question is, not the continuance or redress of evils, but their existence. If the Theist could prove that evils existed but for one moment, he would still have to reconcile their existence with his God-theory—the length of time is quite another affair. If, again, the believer page 22 could demonstrate that all evils would be redressed and fully compensated, either here or hereafter, still that leaves the real point untouched; for the question is. How does he reconcile the existence of infinite goodness with the existence of evils? Compensation may make amends, it never can undo. Evils exist and the children of men groan under them. Bitter are the tears that daily run down sorrow's cheeks; deep are the pangs and woes of humanity. What! can they be compensated? Never. An eternity of unmitigated bliss would not obliterate the furrows ploughed by some woes that last but for an hour; if it could, what of the existence of the evil, no matter how short its life?

It seems to me beyond dispute that logic and common sense require the Theist to prove that no evil exists or ever did, or else give up his belief in an infinitely good God. To talk of his "permission" of evil for wise but mysterious reasons is mere shuffling. He who "permits" a known evil he has power to destroy or prevent is so far guilty of wrong; but with an Almighty God, to "permit" is to do, since there is no power but his existing, and hence the evil that results from his so-called "permission" is as actively produced by him as any other thing he ever effects. When man "permits" he merely declines to check the operation of certain forces not his own; when Almightiness "permits" he as actively works as he ever does.

Besides, it is sheer assumption to affirm that the unknown purposes of the deity are wise. We can never know that a man is wise except from his words and deeds: he whose words and deeds are best we regard as the wisest. Now we can read the character of God only in his deeds, for his voice we never hear. It is only those works that strike us as wise that can argue the wisdom of the designer of nature and its ruler. If some of his deeds are wise, others very doubtful, and others exceedingly unwise, tested by our own and our only standard, we can but conclude that his character is similarly mixed, uncertain, or heterogenous. If the Theist will prove the existence and perfect wisdom of his deity by independent means, then we will readily admit that we have the best of reasons for supposing even the most perplexing and staggering processes of nature are all wise and good, only at present we are too ignorant to comprehend how they are so. But the Theist first proves the existence of his God from these very processes of nature, and then argues the absolute perfection of his character from page 23 the same data; whereas nature merely presents evidence of an imperfect, unwise, weak, and very evil-disposed or else unfortunate deity. To argue perfection of character from imperfect works; absolute goodness from a mixture of goods and evils, in which the latter predominate; and infinite wisdom from a course of action in which wisdom and folly are freely mingled, is to ignore logic and to perpetrate an outrage upon common sense. And that the "constitution and course of Nature" do exhibit evils and goods, and at least as much folly as wisdom, none can intelligently deny.

On the whole I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Theistic belief in a being of infinite goodness is entirely at variance with the evidence. There is not, so far as I am aware, a single fact or logical argument to support it; while on the other hand, we know for certainty that infinite goodness does not exist, for if it did, evils would be impossible. What should we say in reply to one who asserted the theory of an infinite light? The only reply necessary would be to point to one dark corner! this would at once destroy the hypothesis. Just so the existence of one evil is sufficient to destroy all rational belief in infinite goodness. It is surely time for the orthodox, if they wish to escape universal scorn, to bethink themselves, and furnish some reasonable basis for their faith. So far they have done nothing of the kind; their whole creed is subjective, a genuine picture of their own imagination, but as destitute of objective reality as witchcraft or astrology.

But I shall be told, perhaps, that to destroy the belief in a God is to annihilate the very basis and sanctions of morality! There are people, by no means insane, who still use this bugbear to frighten people into the orthodox fold. It is curious to note how in every proposed change, the timid and the designing raise the silly cry that reformers are opening the floodgates, bursting the bonds of society, and otherwise ruining the world! Alas! how often this world has been ruined by reformers, inventors, discoverers, and others. I suggest that the theologian should go a step further, and declare roundly that, without belief in a God men would not know how to make boots, to till the ground, to eat or drink, to build houses, and so forth. This would be no more absurd than their cry about morality. I once heard a man in serious debate affirm that we should have no era to reckon the flight of time from, but for Christ! This page 24 I heard myself, and I was the unfortunate being who had to reply to it. I further heard once of a monarchist who solemnly assured a republican, that if we abolished the present form of government we could have no current money! "for," he queried, with invincible logic, "whose head could we put upon the coins but the queen's?"

Many believers are astonished when you tell them that morality, like science, art, money, manners, language, etc., is a purely social growth or production, in fact, no more divine than the art and weapons of war, or the skill and weapons of the poisoner. And yet it would be quite as easy to prove that money came from heaven as to prove that morality did. It is not my intention at present to go into the abstract question of morality, nor shall I attempt a philosophy of ethics; I shall merely show that the Theist has no monopoly of morality, that his theory respecting it is incorrect, and that, whence soever its sanctions may be drawn, they do not arise from theology. Let us see:

I. The Bible is held by a very large number of European Theists to be a book inspired by God, and a sufficient moral and a religious guide for man. I say they hold these doctrines, that is, have them in their creeds and formulas, but the best of them in real life, ignore the Bible, and walk by higher rules than it contains. As to the divine origin of the Bible, that has never been proved; the so-called evidence is unsatisfactory in the highest degree; and it would be nothing less than a calamity if such a book could be proved to have had any higher origin than other ancient works. It contains the silliest of stories—told, too, with all solemnity—the worst morality in the world; and we are assured it is all divine. Its precepts the churches them-selves never think of obeying; its examples they dare not follow, while large portions of it shock and horrify all civilised persons. The best morality of the Bible is commonplace enough, though paraded with such solemnity as to impose upon many tolerably enlightened people. The Bible is certainly not the source, nor can it ever be the standard of the world's Morality.

Let us next see if the Theist can draw lessons or elements of morality from Nature. I speak now of Nature apart from society, and I roundly affirm that Nature knows nought of morality, nor do ethics enter at all into her processes.

1. All through Nature the strong oppresses and eats up page 25 the weak, and the life of one being involves the destruction of another, often of thousands daily. This is not morality, and if done by the arrangement, or even connivance, of a being able to have prevented it, it must be characterised as monstrous iniquity.

2. Nature nowhere, in no way, manifests government. An overruling Providence finds a place in creeds—that is, in the fictions of the churches; but it exists nowhere else. Consider these few undeniable facts: (1) Nature has never yet been able to distinguish, in the very simplest cases, between right and wrong, crime and accident, sin and misfortune. For example—if a man jump down a precipice he is dashed to pieces—perhaps he deserves it; but if he should accidentally fall down he suffers to precisely the same extent; yes, if he is wilfully flung down by murderers, it is all the same in the end. Is that justice? Let us compare. A jumps wilfully off a house and is killed; B accidentally falls off, and meets the same fate; C is flung off by his enemies, and is also killed. The three bodies are taken before a coroner, and the jury, after being made acquainted with all the facts of each case, return the same verdict for all three. What should we say if they pleaded that, whereas A, B, and C did all come by their deaths by too precipitate a descent from the top of the house, therefore A, B, and C all alike deserved the fate they met? Such a verdict and defence of it would involve about equal quantities of truth, absurdity, and injustice. But Nature would justify that stupid jury, and they might plead in self-defence that, whereas the three died in consequence of their respective falls, it was evident that Nature regarded them as equally guilty, and they did not in the least desire to improve upon the ways of Nature. Now, if Nature must be taken as the exponent of deity, we can only conclude that deity cannot distinguish between right and wrong, for in the course of Nature, by which he governs (?) the sentient beings of this world, he treats accidents, mistakes, and the greatest misfortunes as if they were the greatest crimes, and oftener inflicts pain upon the innocent than upon the guilty.

(2) Further, if Nature teaches anything in the cases just supposed, it teaches that murder is an innocent deed, if not a commendable one; for, while the three who are the subjects of accident, suicide, and crime are killed summarily by the forces of Nature, those who murdered the one not only survive him, but possibly, as often happens, actually page 26 enjoy property and pleasures that honestly belonged to their victim. And it must not be forgotten that all natural forces are, if Theists speak truth, forces of God; in fact, mere results of his own will.

This is a point so often ignored that I must spend another sentence or two upon it to impress it on the reader's mind. All that is was created, so Theists say, by an Almighty and otherwise Infinite God. That being so, the forces of Nature are such only by derivation, nay, not derivation even—they are merely the power or powers of God himself, exhibited under certain circumstances or conditions. Now all natural processes must be nothing more than actions of deity—he does all that is done—if the premises of Theism are correct. This being so, the destructive processes of Nature, and those that give pain, are actions of God equally with those which evolve new life or mantle the face of man with pleasure. If all this is true, we have in Nature a clear, constant, and truthful exponent of God's moral character; and what a character! Justice and wisdom are entirely absent. Indeed, you look in vain to Nature, that is (indirectly) to God, for any one of those qualities esteemed among men, while many of those society everywhere punishes are very painfully and palpably present.

(3) To pursue this somewhat further, we may look for a few moments at some of the frightful evils that have and still do curse the world :

In an earthquake, a flood, or a storm, we see the deity roused to fury and venting his rage indiscriminately upon all who happen to be within reach. Not one of the victims deserves such treatment, as far as we know; certainly the infants don't; yet they are ground to powder, drowned or otherwise killed, as if they were the greatest offenders. Is that government? and moral government? The Turkish manner of ruling Bulgaria was a trifle to this!

Again, how deaf the deity is to cries and prayers! In railway collisions, falls of bridges, shipwrecks, and other catastrophes, you may call, no matter how passionately, to the ruler of Nature. He no more attends you than does the wind, the wave, the iron, the rocks that surround you. He might help without the smallest trouble or inconvenience, for he knows all, he hears all, is ever present, and has almighty power—so Theists say. A man who will not help when he sees calamity fall upon his fellows, is next to a murderer, and is justly execrated. Yet he may plead some page 27 seeming or partial excuses. What could we say, if we were certain there really existed a God who could look coolly on in the direst calamity that ever befals men? The thought is so sickening I dare not dwell upon it. Yet that is only one part of the subject. Human calamity! It is all planned and executed by the deity; no wonder he does not move to the rescue. And what does he, can he gain? It is all for nought! The devil is said to torment for his pleasure; not so the Almighty—he can never want a pleasure.

There have been millions of occasions in the world's history when the worst government worthy of the name must have interposed to prevent or remedy mischiefs among its subjects. What priesthood ever existed that did not speak and act in the name, and professedly by the authority of God, the Great Ruler? Where was that ruler when Moses and Joshua perpetrated such horrible villanies in his name? Where was he when the Pope and the Inquisition were perpetrating horrid lies in his name, and burning Jews and heretics for his pleasure? Did he ever interpose to prevent or close a war, or famine, or pestilence? When?

One case stands out in glaring colours as I sweep the horizon of the world's history. A company of fanatics or knaves concocted a scheme for conveying letters to the Virgin Mary in heaven. It was the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, and the church of La Compañia, in Santiago, Chili, was crammed with 2,000 women, deceived in the name of Deity, and panting to communicate with the Mother of God. Thousands of lamps lit up the temple, and thousands of yards of muslin festooned the place. Suddenly rose the flames, and played in horrid sport along the drapery. There is a panic, wild and horrible! a stampede for the doors, which are soon choked with quivering, dying humanity, and all exit is stopped. The ceiling catches fire, and streams of molten lead pour down upon their living flesh! The paraffin lamps burst in the heat, and shower down their contents in sheets and jets and wreaths of fire!

What an opportunity for a God! Where was he that he missed it! The people across the street could look through the church windows and see the agonised victims running to and fro in that hell, wringing their hands, and calling upon men, and angels, and God, to save them. Not a person who saw that sight—except Ugarte, the fiend-priest, who saved the Virgin's image and his own carcase, while he left the women to seethe and burn—except him, no other page 28 being in the universe would have hesitated to risk his own life to snatch one of those women from perdition! But, Theist, where was your God? Your great ruler of the world? Your Father which is in heaven and everywhere? Whose tender mercies are over all his works? Did he know? Was he by? O, Sir! you are the blasphemers, not we! You invent a God and give him all power, make him all-knowing, and invest him with absolute and boundless rule—then you write history, every page of which proclaims your deity an infinite fiend! Sir, burn your creed, or destroy history! Confess your errors, or else reconcile the course of the world with the character of your God! At present you outrage our best sentiments. Be ashamed and blush! Your Bible tells us your God at one time could so far demean himself as to order Aaron a bran new suit of holiday clothes, giving minute directions for every article, even to the pantaloons! At another time he stood or sat in stolid indifference, watching the agony of 2000 burning women deceived in his name, whose bodies were roasting in his own fire—for that fire would not have burned had he not supplied the power.

I might pursue this subject, but there is no need. I do not pretend to understand Nature; glimpses and broken gleams of truth are all that fall to my share. But what little I do know is all in favour of Atheism. The best light I have leads up that path; the purest and noblest feelings of my nature make me shudder at the God-conception—yea! even for its own sake. I cannot endure the thought that any being exists so great and so wicked as the ordinary orthodox God. The conception is altogether monstrous, unnecessary, and full of mischief; for the history of Godism is also the record of the densest ignorance, the worst folly, the deepest degradation, and the foulest crimes of our most unfortunate and bewildered race.