The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 34
Chapter I. Meaning and Effect of the Vatican Decrees
Chapter I. Meaning and Effect of the Vatican Decrees.
I. In setting out to prove my first proposition—namely, 'that the Vatican Decrees have in no jot or tittle changed either the obligations or the conditions of Civil Allegiance'—I find myself undertaking to prove a negative. The onus of proving that the Vatican Decrees have made a change in our civil allegiance rests upon those who affirm it. Till they offer proof we might remain silent. It would be enough for us to answer that the Vatican Council in its Dogmatic Constitution on the Church has simply affirmed the revealed doctrine of the Spiritual Primacy, and of the Infallibility of the Visible Head of the Christian Church; that the relations of this Primacy to the Civil Powers are in no way treated; and that the civil obedience of subjects is left precisely as and where it was before the Vatican Council was convened.
(1) However, I will first examine what proofs have been offered to show that the Vatican Council has made the alleged change; and I will then give positive evidence to show what the Vatican Council has done. From these things it will be seen that it has neither changed, nor added to, nor taken away anything from the doctrine and discipline of the Church, but has page 11 only defined what has been believed and practised from the beginning.
The arguments to prove a change are two.
First. Mr. Gladstone has argued from the third chapter of the Constitution on the Roman Pontiff, that his powers have received a great extension. Mr. Gladstone, so far as I am aware, is the first and only person who has ever ventured on this statement.
His argument is as follows:—
He dwells with no little amplification upon the 'introduction of the remarkable phrase,' 'ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiæ,' into the third chapter; that is, 'non solum in rebus quæ; ad fidem et mores pertinent, sed etiam in iis quæ ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesiæ; per totum orbem diffusa; pertinent.' He says, 'Absolute obedience, it is boldly declared, is due to the Pope, at the peril of salvation, not only in faith and in morals, but in all things which concern the discipline and government of the Church' (p. 41). Submission in faith and morals is 'abject' enough, but 'in discipline and government' too is intolerable. 'Why did the astute contrivers of this tangled scheme,' &c. . . . (p. 39). 'The work is now truly complete' (p. 40). This he calls 'the new version of the principles of the Papal Church.' When I read this, I asked, 'Is it possible that Mr. Gladstone should think this to be anything new? What does he conceive the Primacy of Rome to mean? With what eyes has he read history? page 12 Can he have read the tradition of the Catholic Church?' As one of 'the astute contrivers,' I will answer that these words were introduced because the Pontiffs and Councils of the Church have always so used them. They may be 'remarkable' and 'new' to Mr. Gladstone, but they are old as the Catholic Church. I give the first proofs which come to hand.
Nicholas I., in the year 863, in a Council at Rome, enacted: 'Si quis dogmata, man data, interdicta, sanctiones vel decreta pro Catholica fide, pro ecclesiastica disciplina, pro correctione fidelium, pro emendati-one sceleratorum, vel interdictione imminentium vel futurorum malorum, a Sedis Apostolicæ Præside salubriter promulgata contempserit: Anathema sit.'1 This was an 'iron gripe' not less 'formidable' than the third chapter of the Vatican Constitution.
It may be said, perhaps, that this was only a Pontiff in his own cause; or only a Roman Council.
But this Canon was recognised in the Eighth General Council held at Constantinople in 869.2
Innocent III. may be no authority with Mr. Gladstone; but he says, what every Pontiff before him and after him has said, 'Nos qui sumus ad regimen Universalis Ecclesiæ, superna dispositione vocati.'3
1 Labbe, Concil. tom. x. p. 238, ed. Ven. 1730.
2 Ibid. tom. x. p. 633. See Petri Privilegium, 2nd part, p. 81.
3 Corpus Juris Canon. Decret. Greg. lib. ii. cap. xiii. Novit.
Again, Sixtus IV., in 1471, Writes: 'Ad Universalis Ecclesiæ regimen divina disponente clementia vocatis,'1&c.
If this be not enough, we have the Council of Florence, in 1442, defining of the Roman Pontiff that 'Ipsi in Beato Petro pascendi, regendi ac gubernandi Universalem Ecclesiam a Domino nostro Jesu Christo plenam potestatem traditam esse.'2
Finally the Council of Trent says:—'Unde merito Pontifices Maximi pro Suprema potestate sibi in Ecclesia universa tradita,'3 &c.
I refrain from quoting Canonists and Theologians who use this language as to regimen and discipline. It needed no astuteness to transcribe the well-known traditional language of the Catholic Church. It is as universal in our law books as the forms of the Courts at Westminster. The Vatican Council has left the authority of the Pontiff precisely where it found it. The whole, therefore, of Mr. Gladstone's argument falls with the misapprehension on which it was based.
1 Corpus Juris Canon. Extrav. Comm. lib. i. tit. ix. cap. i.
2 Labbe, Concil. torn, xviii. p. 527, ed. Yen. 1732.
3 Sess. xiv. cap. vii.
Such is literally the only attempt made by Mr. Gladstone to justify his assertions. But what has this to do with Civil Allegiance? There is not a syllable on the subject, there is not a proposition which can be twisted or tortured into such a meaning. The government of the Church, as here spoken of, is purely and strictly the Spiritual government of souls, both pastors and people, as it was exercised in the first three hundred years before any Christian State existed.
But next, if the Vatican Council has not spoken of the Civil Powers, nevertheless it has defined that the Pope, speaking ex cathedra, is infallible: this definition, by retrospective action, makes all Pontifical acts infallible, the Bull Unam Sanctam included; and, by prospective action, will make all similar acts in future binding upon the conscience.
Certainly this is true. But what is there new in this? The Vatican Council did not make the Pope infallible. Was he not infallible before the Council? He is, therefore, not more infallible after it than before. If a handful of writers, here and there, denied his infallibility, the whole Church affirmed it. Proof of this shall be given in its place. For the present, I affirm that all acts ex cathedra, such as the Bull Unam Sanctam, the Bull Unigenitus, the Bull Auctorem Fidei, and the like, were held to be infallible as fully before the Vatican Council as now.
page 151 Petri Privilegium, part i. pp. 61-66, and notes.
We are next told that there are some twelve theories of what is an act ex cathedra. We have been also told that there are twenty. But how is it that Mr. Gladstone did not see that by this the whole force of his argument is shaken? If the definition has left it so uncertain what acts are, and what acts are not, ex cathedra, who shall hold himself bound to obedience? Are the eighty condemnations indicated in the Syllabus ex cathedra? By this showing it is 12 to 1 that they may not be. It is an axiom in morals 'Lex dubia non obligat.' But if it be doubtful whether the Syllabus is ex cathedra, I am not bound to receive it with interior assent. Again, Mr. Gladstone thinks to aggravate the case by adding that page 17 the Pope is to be the ultimate judge of what acts are ex cathedra. And who else should be? Ejus est interpretari cujus est condere is a principle of all law. Mr. Gladstone has been acting upon it all his life. But, perhaps it may be said, why did not the Council put beyond doubt what acts are ex cathedra? Well, the Council has done so, as I hope to show; and has done it with as great precision as the subject matter will admit. It has given five tests, or conditions, by which an act ex cathedra may be distinguished.
But it may be said that doubts may still exist, and that doubts may still be raised as to this or that Pontifical act whether it be ex cathedra or not. Surely common sense would say, consult the authority which made the law; the legislator is always at hand, always ready to explain his own meaning, and to define the limits of his intention. If there be any thing unreasonable in this, all jurisprudence, including the British Constitution, labours under the same uncertainty, or rather the same inevitable imperfection.
I am surprised that Mr. Gladstone should have quoted the second paragraph of the chapter in the Vatican Constitution; and that he should have passed over the fourth paragraph, in which there are indeed the words 'potestatis sæcularis placito.' This is the only recognition of secular powers in the whole Constitution. In that paragraph two things are affirmed: page 18 the one that the free exercise of the supreme Spiritual power of the Head of the Christian Church may neither be intercepted, nor hindered, nor excluded from any part of the Church by any human authority; and, secondly, that all such acts of his Spiritual power are valid and complete in themselves, and need, for that end, no confirmation or placitum of any other authority. This independence is claimed for Christianity by everyone who believes in a revelation. Here is indeed a reference to Civil Powers; but, lest the Vatican Council should be held guilty of such innovations, I will add that such was the contention of St. Thomas of Canterbury against Henry II. in the case of the Constitutions of Clarendon, which were not 'cursed,' as Mr. Gladstone delicately expresses it, but condemned by Alexander III. in the year 1164. This, then, has not changed the Civil Allegiance of Catholics since 1870.
But I am not undertaking to prove a negative. I hope that I have shown that the evidence offered to prove that the Council has made the alleged change is nil. I affirm, then, once more that the Vatican Council has not touched the question of Civil Allegiance, that it has not by a jot or a tittle changed the relations in which the Church has ever stood to the Civil Powers; and that, therefore, the Civil Allegiance of Catholics is as full, perfect, and complete since the Council as it was before. These are affirma- page 19 tions capable of proof, and before I have done I hope to prove them. For the present it will be enough to give the reason why the Vatican Council did not touch the question of the relations of the Church to the Civil Powers. The reason is simple. It intended not to touch them, until it could treat them fully and as a whole. And it has carefully adhered to its intention. I will also give the reason why it has been so confidently asserted that the Council did touch the Civil Powers. It is because certain persons, a year before the Council met, resolved to say so. They wrote the book Janus to prove it; they published circulars and pamphlets before and during the Council to reassert it. They first prophesied that the Council would interfere with the Civil Powers, and now they write scientific history to prove that it has done so. I am not writing at random; I carefully collected at the time their books, pamphlets, and articles. I read them punctually, and bound them up into volumes, which are now before me. Mr. Gladstone has reproduced their arguments. But for this systematic agitation before the Council, no one, I am convinced, would have found a shadow of cause for it in its Decrees. Now, that I may not seem to write this as prompted by the events of the present moment, I will repeat what I published in the year 1869, before the Council assembled, and in the year 1870, after the Council was suspended.
page 20'Whilst I was writing these lines a document has appeared purporting to be the answers of the Theological Faculty of Munich to the questions of the Bavarian Government.
'The questions and the answers are so evidently concerted, if not written by the same hand, and the animus of the document so evidently hostile to the Holy See, and so visibly intended to create embarrassments for the supreme authority of the Church, both in respect to its past acts and also in respect to the future action of the Œcumenical Council, that I cannot pass it over. But, in speaking of it I am compelled, for the first time, to break silence on a danger which has for some years been growing in its proportions, and, I fear I must add, in its attitude of menace. The answers of the University of Munich are visibly intended to excite fear and alarm in the Civil Powers of Europe, and thereby to obstruct the action of the Œcumenical Council if it should judge it to be opportune to define the Infallibility of the Pope. The answers are also intended to create an impression that the theological proofs of the doctrine are inadequate, and its definition beset with uncertainty and obscurity. In a word, the whole correspondence is a transparent effort to obstract the freedom of the Œcumenical Council on the subject of the Infallibility of the Pontiff; or, if that doctrine be defined, to instigate the Civil Governments to assume a hostile attitude towards the Holy See. And this comes in the name of liberty, and from those who tell us that the Council will not be free.
'I shall take the liberty, without further words, ofpage 21 dismissing the Bavarian Government from our thoughts. But I must declare, with much regret, that this Munich document appears to me to be seditious.1 'The Œcumenical Council and the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff,' Petri Privilegium, part ii. pp. 131-5. (Longmans, 1871.)
'Facts like these give a certain warrant to the assertion and prophecies of politicians and Protestants. They prove that in the Catholic Church there is a school at variance with the doctrinal teaching of the Holy See in matters which are not of faith. But they do not reveal how small that school is. Its centre would seem to be at Munich. It has, both in France and England, a small number of adherents. They are active, they correspond, and for the most part write anonymously. It would be difficult to describe its tenets, for none of its followers seem to be agreed in all points. Some hold the Infallibility of the Pope, and some defend the Temporal Power. Nothing appears to be common to all, except an animus of opposition to the acts of the Holy See in matters outside the faith.
'In this country, about a year ago, an attempt was made to render impossible, as it was confidently but vainly thought, the definition of the Infallibility of the Pontiff by reviving the monotonous controversy about Pope Honorius. Later, we were told of I know not what combination of exalted personages in France for the same end. It is certain that these symptoms are not sporadic and disconnected, but in mutual understanding and with a common purpose. The anti-Catholic press has eagerly encouraged this school of thought. If a Catholic can be found out of tune with authority by half a note, he is at once extolled for unequalled learning and irrefragable logic. The anti-Catholic journals are at his service, and he vents his opposition to the common opinions of the Church by writing against them anonymously. Sad as this is, it is not formidable. It has effect almost alone upon those who are not Catholic. Upon Catholics its effect is hardly appreciable; on the Theological Schools of the Church it page 22 will have little influence; upon the Œcumenical Council it can have none.
'I can hardly persuade myself to believe that the University of Munich does not know that the relations between the Pope, even supposed to be infallible, and the Civil Powers have been long since precisely defined in the same acts which defined the relations between the Church, known to be infallible, and the Civil Authority. Twelve Synods or Councils, two of them Œcumenical, have long ago laid down these relations of the Spiritual and Civil Powers.1 If the Pope were declared to be infallible to-morrow, it would in no way affect those relations.
'We may be sure . . . that this intellectual disaffection, of which, in these last days, we have had in France a new and mournful example, will have no influence upon cither the Œcumenical Council or the policy of the Great Powers of Europe. They will not meddle with speculations of theological or historical critics. They know too well that they cannot do in the nineteenth century what was done in the sixteenth and the seventeenth.
'The attempt to put a pressure upon the General Council, if it have any effect upon those who are subject to certain governments, would have no effect but to rouse a just indignation in the Episcopate of the Church throughout the world. They hold their jurisdiction from a higher fountain, and they recognise no superior in their office of Judges of Doctrine, save only the Vicar of Jesus Christ. This preliminary meddling has already awakened a sense of profound responsibility and an inflexible resolution to allow no pressure or influence, or menace or intrigue, to cast so much as a shadow across their fidelity to the Divine Head of the Church and to His Vicar upon earth.
page 231 Bellarm. Opuscula adv. Barclaium, p. 845, ed. Col. 1617.
'Moreover, we live in days when the "Regium Placitum" and "Exequaturs" and "Arrêts" of Parliament in Spiritual things are simply dear. It may have been possible to hinder the promulgation of the Council of Trent; it is impossible to hinder the promulgation of the Council of the Vatican. The very liberty of which men are proud will publish it. Ten thousand presses in all lands will promulgate every act of the Church and of the Pontiff, in the face of all Civil Powers. Once published, these acts enter the domain of faith and conscience, and no human legislation, no civil authority, can efface them. The two hundred millions of Catholics will know the Decrees of the Vatican Council; and to know them is to obey. The Council will ask no civil enforcement, and it will need no civil aid. The Great Powers of Europe have long declared that the conscience of men is free from civil constraint. They will not stultify their own declarations by attempting to restrain the acts of the Vatican Council. The guardians and defenders of the principles of 1789 ought to rise as one man against all who should so violate the base of the political society in France. What attitude lesser Governments may take is of lesser moment.'
(2) I will now state positively what the Council has defined on the subject of the Roman Pontiff. The history then of the Definition of the Infallibility is as follows:—
1. Two Schemata, as they were called, or treatises, had been prepared: the one on the nature of the Church; the other on its relations to the Civil State.
The first alone came before the Council; the second has never yet been so much as discussed.
page 24In the schema on the nature of the Church, its Infallibility was treated; but the Infallibility of its Head was not so much as mentioned. His Primacy and authority alone were treated. In the end, the chapter relating to the Primacy and authority was taken out, and subdivided into four. The subject of the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was then introduced.
The reasons for this change of order were given in 1870, as follows:—
In all theological treatises, excepting indeed one or two of great authority, it had been usual to treat of the Body of the Church before treating of its Head. The reason of this would appear to be that in the exposition of doctrine the logical order was the more obvious; and to the faithful, in the first formation of the Church, the Body of the Church was known before its Head. We might have expected that the Council would have followed the same method. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that the Council inverted that order, and defined the prerogative of the Head before it treated of the constitution and endowments of the Body. And this, which was brought about by the pressure of special events, is not without significance. The schools of the Church have followed the logical order; but the Church in Council, when for the first time it began to treat of its own constitution and authority, changed the method, and, like the Divine Architect of the Church, began in the historical order, with the foundation and Head of the Church. Our page 25 Divine Lord first chose Cephas, and invested him with the primacy over the Apostles. Upon this rock all were built, and from him the whole unity and authority of the Church took its rise. To Peter alone first was given the plenitude of jurisdiction and of infallible authority. Afterwards, the gift of the Holy Ghost was shared with him by all the Apostles. From him and through him therefore all began. For which cause a clear and precise conception of his Primacy and privilege is necessary to a clear and precise conception of the Church. Unless it be first distinctly apprehended, the doctrine of the Church will be always proportionately obscure. The doctrine of the Church does not determine the doctrine of the Primacy, but the doctrine of the Primacy does precisely determine the doctrine of the Church. In beginning, therefore, with the Head, the Council has followed our Lord's example, both in teaching and in fact; and in this will be found one of the causes of the singular and luminous precision with which the Council of the Vatican has, in one brief Constitution, excluded the well-known errors on the Primacy and Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff.
The reasons which prevailed to bring about this change of method were not only those which demonstrated generally the opportuneness of defining the doctrine, but those also which showed specially the necessity of bringing on the question while as yet the Council was in the fulness of its numbers. page 26 It was obvious that the length of time consumed in the discussion, reformation, and voting of the Schemata was such that, unless the Constitution De Romano Pontifice were brought on immediately after Easter, it could not be finished before the setting in of summer should compel the bishops to disperse. Once dispersed, it was obvious they could never again reassemble in so large a number. Many who with great earnestness desired to share the blessing and the grace of extinguishing the most dangerous error which for two centuries had disturbed and harassed the faithful, would have been compelled to go back to their distant sees and missions, never to return. It was obviously of the first moment that such a question should be discussed and decided, not, as we should have been told, in holes and corners, or by a handful of bishops, or by a faction, or by a clique, but by the largest possible assembly of the Catholic Episcopate. All other questions, on which little divergence of opinion existed, might well be left to a smaller number of bishops; but a doctrine which for so long had vexed both pastors and people, the defining, not the truth, of which was contested by a numerous and organised opposition, needed to be treated and affirmed by the most extensive deliberation of the bishops of the Catholic Church. Add to this the many perils which hung over the continuance of the Council, of which I need but give one example. The outbreak of a war might have rendered the definition impossible. And page 27 in fact the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff was defined on the eighteenth of July, and war was officially declared on the following day.
With these and many other contingencies fully before them, those who believed that the definition was, not only opportune, but necessary for the unity of the Church and of the Faith, urged its immediate discussion. Events justified their foresight. The debate was prolonged into the heats of July, when, by mutual consent, the opposing sides withdrew from a further prolonging of the contest, and closed the discussion. If it had not been already protracted beyond all limits of reasonable debate—for not less than a hundred fathers in the general and special discussions had spoken chiefly, if not alone, of Infallibility—it could not so have ended. Both sides were convinced that the matter was exhausted.1
2. In order to demonstrate, if possible, more abundantly that the Vatican Council has not so much as touched the relations of the Church to the Civil Power, I will give a brief analysis of its Definitions in what is called the First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ.
1 Petri Privilegium, part iii. pp. 51-54.
Now of the First Constitution there are four chapters.
The first treats of the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Saint Peter. The sum of it is that Our Lord appointed Peter to be Head of the whole Church, and gave him immediately a Primacy, not of honour only, but of jurisdiction. There is here not a word of anything but the Pastoral or Spiritual power.
The second declares the Primacy to be perpetual. It affirms two things: the one that Peter has a perpetual line of successors, and that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in that Primacy.
The third affirms the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff to be full and supreme in all things of faith and morals, and also in discipline and government of the Church; and that this jurisdiction ordinary and immediate over all Churches and persons.
The fourth chapter treats of the Infallibility of the Magisterium, or the teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff. This chapter affirms that a Divine assistance was given to Peter, and in Peter to his successors for the discharge of their supreme office. It affirms also that this is a tradition received from the beginning of the Christian Faith. They, therefore, who tell us that the Vatican Council has brought in a new doctrine show that they do not know what the page 29 Vatican Council has said, and what it is that they must refute before their charge of innovation can be listened to.
1. | That the Council declares that the Roman Pontiff, speaking ex cathedra, has a Divine assistance which preserves him from error. |
2. | That he speaks ex cathedra when he speaks under these five conditions: (1) as Supreme Teacher (2) to the whole Church. (3) Defining a doctrine (4) to be held by the whole Church (5) in faith and morals. |
If disputants and controversialists had read and mastered these five conditions, we should have been spared much senseless clamour.
3. Lastly, it is to be observed that the Council has not defined the limit of the phrase 'faith and morals.' This well-known formula is plain and intelligible. The deposit committed to the Church is the Revelation of Divine Truth, and of the Divine Law. The Church is the guardian and witness, the interpreter and the expositor, of the Truth and of the Law of God. Such is the meaning of 'faith and morals.' It is a formula well known, perfectly clear, sufficiently precise for our spiritual and moral life. If questions may be raised about the limits of faith and morals, it is because questions may be raised about anything; and questions will always be raised by those who love contention against the Catholic Church more than page 30 they love either faith or morals. All argument against the Vatican Council as to the limits or extent of this formula is so much labour lost. It has not so much as touched the extent or the limits.
Such, then, is the whole of the first Constitution De Ecclesia Christi. It does not contain a syllable of the relation of this Primacy to the Civil or Political State, except to say that no human authority is needed for the validity of its acts, nor may any human power hinder their exercise. But these are truths as old as the day when St. Peter said before the council in Jerusalem, 'If it be just, in the sight of God, to hear you rather than God, judge ye.'1 I hope, then, I have justified my assertion that the Vatican Council has not changed by a jot or a tittle the civil allegiance of Catholics. It is as free and perfect now as it was before.
As I have affirmed that the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Head of the Church was a doctrine of Divine Faith before the Council, and that the denial of it was confined to a small school of writers, I might be expected here to offer the historical proof of this assertion.
But I have already done so in the year 1869, before the Council assembled. I would therefore refer to the second part of 'Petri Privilegium'2 for, as I believe, a sufficient proof. I will, however, in few words give the outline of what was then said.
1 Acts iv. 19.
2 Part ii. pp. 63-107.
It is acknowledged by the adversaries of the doctrine that from the Council of Constance in 1414 to this day the doctrine has been the predominant belief of the Church. I gave evidence of its existence from the Council of Constance upwards to the Council of Chalcedon in 445.
Next I traced the history of the growth of the opinions adverse to the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff from the Council of Constance to the year 1682, when it was, for the first time, reduced to formula by an assembly of French ecclesiastics under the influence of Louis XIV.
Lastly, I showed how this formula was no sooner published than it was condemned in every Catholic country by bishops and universities, and by the Holy See. The sum of the evidence for the first period was then given as follows:—
Gallicanism is no more than a transient and modern opinion, which arose in France, without warrant or antecedents in the ancient theological schools of the French Church; a royal theology, as suddenly developed and as parenthetical as the Thirty-nine Articles, affirmed only by a small number out of the numerous Episcopate of France, indignantly rejected by many of them; condemned in succession by three Pontiffs; declared by the Universities of Louvain and Douai to be erroneous; retracted by the bishops of France; condemned by Spain, Hungary, and other countries; and condemned over again in the Bull Auctorem Fidei.
page 321. | That Gallicanism has no warrant in the doctrinal practice or tradition of the Church, either in France or at large, in the thousand years preceding the Council of Constance. |
2. | That the first traces of Gallicanism are to he found about the time of that Council. |
3. | That after the Council of Constance they were rapidly and almost altogether effaced from the theology of the Church in France, until their revival in 1682. |
4. | That the Articles of 1682 were conceived by Jansenists, and carried through by political and oppressive means contrary to the sense of the Church in France. |
5. | That the theological faculties of the Sorbonne, and of France generally, nobly resisted and refused to teach them.1 |
But Gallicanism was the only formal interruption of the universal belief of the Church in the Infallibility of its Head. The Vatican Council extinguished this modern error.
II. Having thus far offered proof of the first proposition in my first letter, I will now go on to the second.
I there affirmed that the Civil Allegiance of Catholics is as undivided as that of all Christians, and of all men who recognise a divine or natural moral law.
1 Petri Privilegium, part ii. p. 56.
Mr. Gladstone requires of us 'solid and undivided allegiance.'1
I must confess to some surprise at this demand. The allegiance of every moral being is 'divided,' that is, twofold; not, indeed, in the same matter nor on the same plane, but in two spheres, and on a higher and a lower level, so that no collision is possible, except by some deviation or excess. Every moral being is under two authorities—human and divine. The child is under the authority of parents, and the authority of God; the subject is under the authority of the Civil State, and the Divine authority of natural or revealed religion. Unless we claim Infallibility for the State, its acts must be liable to revision, and to resistance by natural conscience. An unlimited obedience to parents or to States would generate a race of unlimited monsters. Surely these are truisms. Our Lord Himself taught this division when He said, 'Render therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.' But this all men admit when they think. Unfortunately, when they attack the Catholic Church or the Vatican Council they seldom think much.
1 P. 44. D
1 Rom. xiii. 5.
'Authority is nothing else but the result of numerical superiority and material force.'—Prop. 60.
'It is allowable to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes, and also to rebel against them.'—Prop. 63.
1 Rom. xiii. 1-4.
2 St. Peter ii. 13-15.
Let us take an example. The Italian people have been for twenty years spectators of a revolution which has overthrown the Sovereigns of Naples and Tuscany. I will ask two questions. First, would any Italian place himself at the mercy of another, if he should ask of the head of his religion what course as a Christian he ought to pursue?
And, secondly, what has been the action of the Pope in respect to the Italian revolution? He has said that to co-operate in the Italian revolution is not page 39 lawful. Surely, if Italians are free to form their conscience on the doctrines of the revolution, they are equally free to form their conscience on the doctrines of their religion. To deny this is to have two weights and two measures. The non-Catholic theory tolls us that the conscience of subjects is the ultimate test. Be it so; my conscience tells me that it is right to obey my religion rather than the revolution. If this be a divided allegiance, then it is Christianity which has introduced it, and not the Church. It was our Lord Himself who, by instituting His Church, separated for ever the two powers, Civil and Spiritual, thereby redeeming the conscience and the religion of men from the dominion of princes, and conferring upon the Civil Power the consecration by which it is confirmed, and the higher law by which its sphere is defined. It is all this, and not1 'our old friend the deposing power alone,' which I have described as teaching obedience to subjects and moderation to princes.2 In all conflicts between the Civil and Spiritual, the consciences of Christians will be decided by the Christian law.
1. | That the relations of the Church to the State
1 Expostulation, p. 52. 2 Temporal Power of the Pope, pp. 44-46, second ed. 1862. |
2. | That in its Constitutions or Definitions it has in no way touched the subject. |
3. | That the Definitions of the Council are 'declaratory' of doctrine already of Divine Faith, and that no new 'enactment' whatsoever was made. |
4. | That the relations of the Church to the Civil Power were left by the Vatican Council as they were known and declared by the Council of Trent and all previous Councils. |
'1. | A demonstration that neither in the name of faith, nor in the name of morals, nor in the name of the government or discipline of the Church, is the Pope of Rome able, by virtue of the powers asserted for him by the Vatican decree, to make any claim upon those who adhere to his communion of such a nature as can impair the integrity of their Civil allegiance; or else,page 41 |
'2. | That if, and when such claim is made, it will even, although resting on the definitions of the Vatican, be repelled and rejected.'1 |
I have shown that the Pope is not able, by the Vatican Council, to make any claim in the name of faith, nor in the name of morals, nor in the name of the government or discipline of the Church, which he was not able to make before the Vatican Council existed.
To Mr. Gladstone's first question, therefore, I answer, that neither in virtue of the Vatican Decrees, nor of any other decrees, nor of his supreme authority as Head of the Christian Church, can the Pope make any claim upon those who adhere to his communion of such a nature as can impair the integrity of their Civil Allegiance.
To his second question, therefore, the answer is already given. I have no need to declare myself ready to repel and reject that which the Pope cannot do. He cannot do an act contrary to the Divine Law; but to impair my Civil Allegiance would be contrary to the Law of God.
1 The Vatican Decrees, p. 44.
My reasons for saying this will be seen in the following chapter.