The Objection to "Inquisitorial" Taxation.

There is a vulgar, but still very prevailing objection to an official assessment of property, and especially of income, as "inquisitorial." Nobody has any business to know—so say the promulgators of this objection—how much private revenue any individual enjoys. Personally, I wholly disagree with the holders of this opinion. I am page 20 strongly of the contrary opinion, namely, that the State, which protects property and income, has a perfect right to know, and ought to know, to what extent each individual member of the community is benefited by that protection, on purpose that he may be compelled to contribute to the cost of the State institutions, in just proportion to the benefit which he derives from them. No honest man, rich or poor, ought to object either to the acquirement of the knowledge, or to the collection of the proportionate income, by the State.

I can sympathise, to a certain degree, with those who shrink from the annoyance of having their private incomes exposed to the prurient and needless curiosity of the general public. But an official assessment for State purposes can and ought to be made, without necessarily exposing anybody's private affairs to so useless an indignity. The means of doing so is to have the assessment sent in by the owners of property and receivers of income themselves, to tribunals consisting of a very few commissioners in each district, being persons of as unimpeachable ability and integrity as the Judges, with every proper security for the confidential discharge of their duties, except in cases where public exigency should require publicity according to law.

These commissioners should revise the lists of assessments sent in, and summon any person who should send in an assessment, in their opinion too low, before them, in order that he may prove its sufficiency. They should hear the case, not necessarily in public; and then give a decision, which should be liable to revision on appeal to a public court at the option of the assessed person. In the case of landed or other fixed property, live stock, &c., it might be made legal for the State at once to buy it at the owner's valuation, if so evidently below the real value as to make it a good transaction for the State. This might also apply to false returns of income derived from such tangible property. The State might take the property, and pay the self-assessor the income as returned by himself. No such crucial test could be applied to incomes from professional pursuits; but the books of any person engaged in business might be subject to production before the commissioners as evidence, strictly confidential, unless the owner chose to appeal to a public court from their decision.

When this "inquisitorial" objection is raised, I submit that the value of private property and of private income from it, is continually brought before public bodies, in assessments for rating purposes in boroughs, road, drainage, river conservation districts, &c., without any such objection being raised. As to incomes not derived from tangible property, I would remind objectors that every person is liable to a most rigorous inquiry by the police as to his means of subsistence; and that it is the poor man, out of employment, whether through misfortune or through misconduct, who is liable to be punished with imprisonment as a vagrant if he cannot show what are his means of living. Why should the man who is rich, or well off, object to let the State know how much a year he honestly earns, in order that he may honestly, and in proportion to his earnings, contribute to the cost of that state of things under which his earnings and the comfortable enjoyment of them are secured to him, and protected from dishonest vagrants, whether rich or poor?

We make the Banks, as a condition of their monopoly of certain kinds of traffic in money, valuable securities, and credit, publish quarterly returns of their property and income. But we do not take advantage of the knowledge in order to tax the overflowing revenues of the shareholders. Why should we hesitate to treat every private dealer in money, valuable securities, and credit, in a similar manner, to the extent of requiring him to let the State know how much the State protects him in receiving year by year? Why should we hesitate in like manner to let Government know, for the same purpose, the earnings of every person whose income is derived from rent of land or houses, produce of land, professional knowledge and ability, the profits of trade, commerce, mining and manufacturing enterprise, prudence, and industry, or any other source ?

We have before us the remarkable example of the United States—that gigantic, progressive, and free Republic. The rich men there—the Astors, Vanderbilts, page 21 Webbs, Peabodies, &c., do not object to a fair assessment of their properties and incomes, or to the collection of a fair contribution in proportion to their value, towards the expenses of the American government, whether local or general. They are justly proud of the wealth which they, or their parents, have accumulated by unselfish foresight, sagacity, and a bold spirit of adventure in developing the productive resources and facilities for the creation of happy homes, contained in the country of their own birth, and of their ancestors' adoption. And they cheerfully bear their fair share of the burden imposed for the protection of earnings, whether large or small. I wish I could name some of the rich men of New Zealand without their feeling annoyed at the distinction, and without having to declare my regret that, as a class, they have not been distinguished by too energetic an emulation of those nobler attributes, which may fairly be claimed by their Trans-Pacific prototypes and contemporaries.

In the United States, a large portion of the revenue disposed of by Congress is derived from direct taxes on property and income. There, as here, there are local rates for local purposes, in Townships, Counties, and States. But every receiver of income above 1000 dollars, or £200 a year, or owner of property equivalent to such income, pays a contribution in proportion to their value towards the expenses of the President, Congress, and Federal Government of the United States. There are, indeed, some Customs duties, a portion being imposed for revenue purposes, and in diminution of property and income tax, on articles not being necessaries of life; and another portion for the purpose of protecting national industries: a class of taxation to which, however, I am wholly opposed—not only because I think it artificial, and in the end inefficient even for its avowed purposes, but because it is unjust, especially towards the poorer classes, inasmuch as it makes many necessaries dearer, and derives public revenue from private expenditure instead of from private revenue.