1865.

The Session of 1865 commenced on the 26th of July, at Wellington, the new Seat of Government, the necessary arrangements having been made since the previous December for bringing down the whole of the Government Staff' and records, and preparing suitable accommodation for both Houses of the Legislature. The Reply to the Address, which after a few amendments was adopted without a division, refers with satisfaction to the partial establishment of peace; intimates, among other subjects, the determination of the House to repress outrages; endorses the necessity of establishing her Majesty's authority in the Taranaki and Wanganui country, by opening roads, and by the formation of self-defending settlements; and thanks his excellency for the promise to despatch five Regiments to England at once, to be quickly followed by the remainder of the Imperial troops. It was to be expected that such questions as the imposition of a Stamp Duty to provide for the extraordinary expenditure caused by the rebellion, and that an alteration affecting the portion of the Customs' Revenue allotted to the Provinces, should create some dissatisfaction. The Loan of three millions, too hastily granted, was rapidly passing away, while the liabilities in- page 17 curred under the arrangements of 1863, and which there was not any possibility of honourably evading, were absorbing the balance, while at the same time the admirable Treasury arrangements initiated and carried out by Mr. Fitzherbert at a period of great anxiety and press of duty, brought, for the first time, palpably before the House, and to the latest date, the real financial condition of the country. It was when the burthen—the natural sequence of the policy—was about to be placed upon the shoulders; when the determination of the Government not to increase the indebtedness of the country became known, and the demand was made to meet existing and prospective liabilities by an increase of taxation,—that the self-reliant policy of Mr. Wold received its first rude shock, and a few of those who had previously given the Government of Mr. Weld an unfaltering support, became doubtful in their allegiance. The spirit thus evoked was not allowed to lie dormant; and local prejudices and local objects obscured those legitimate claims which, perhaps, in more favourable times, would have met with a more general advocacy. The first test-question of the Session was the Separation motion of Mr. Russell, who asked the House to affirm "that New Zealand should be divided at Cook's Straits into separate Colonies;" and on an amendment being proposed by Government, a division took place, which rejected the original proposition by 31 to 17. Then followed the Dunedin Reserves resolutions, which decided a disputed question of title respecting a Reserve in Princes Street, vesting it "in the Superintendent of Otago, in trust for the Municipality of Dunedin as originally intended," and which was affirmed by a majority of 29 to 17,—all the members of Government voting against it, preforming an amendment which referred the decision to the Supreme Court. This is one of the points in which it has been stated that I was unmindful that I was a representative from Otago; but it is well known to the House of Representatives, from papers laid before the Select Committee on the subject, that from the earliest period I took a most active part in all measures which tended to bring the case before a legal tribunal. I believed that it would be a bad precedent to leave to the decision of an Assembly, likely to be influenced by political combinations, any question bearing on the right to real estate. I held that the claim of Otago was indisputable on the grounds of equity, on which it page 18 should have been decided by the Court, and strong also in point of law : had I believed otherwise, I should have been equally opposed to the House deciding the point, though I was anxious that it should affirm the desirability of such an appeal, and remove the question from both Executive and Legislative action. With respect to the accumulated arrears of rent—amounting, I believe, to nearly £6,000—that sum, like all others for which the Treasurer was responsible, was brought into the Treasury instead of remaining at the credit of a subordinate officer. It was never used in any way, and there was not any intention of disposing of it until the Assembly had investigated the subject. I have since seen no reason to modify this opinion in the slightest degree. The "Representation Bill" was another vexed question. The principle of the Government Bill was that the number of members allotted to Auckland and Otago should be the same, and that there should be no reduction of numbers; and when it was proposed to alter this arrangement, I was ill opposition,—as I was also to some of the members from Otago when I advocated the allocation of the four members for Dunedin and Suburbs to two for the City proper, and one for the North and one for the South Suburb. My reasons for such advocacy were that I was desirous that these populous Suburbs should be fairly represented, and that they should not be lost in the denser population of the City proper. It is a maxim universally admitted, that towns do not receive the same proportionate numerical representation as country districts, for in such a ease London would have an equal representation with the whole of Scotland. I still adhere to the opinion I expressed in the Mouse, for the reasons just adduced.

"The New Provinces' Bill," which transferred the power to constitute new Provinces from the Executive Government to the General Assembly received my opposition. "The New Provinces' Act," then in force, was, in the absence of other legislation in protection of outlying country districts, a necessary evil. Session after Session attempts were made to repeal it by the substitution of some such protective measures as those reforred to, and such attempts I invariably supported. The present measure I regard as peculiarly obnoxious; as any political combination, while the House is in Session and while debate is hot, may be brought to bear to the injury of a Province whose members may be in opposition to the page 19 majority, or may be used as a means of intimidation. I regard the cause of rural districts to have suffered a great injury from the passing of this Bill, and the House of Representatives to have received a serious blow.

The attitude assumed by Government, in fixing the port of call for the Panama steamers at Wellington, was obnoxious to those who desired to make Auckland the port of call for the outward, and Otago for the homeward, voyage. I heartily supported the Government measure, and earnestly opposed the proposed change, believing the former to be not only the best for the whole Colony, for whom it was our duty to legislate, but also for Otago, which would suffer severely were the English letters to reach her viâ Auckland. My opinion on this point remains unchanged. The difficulties with the New Zealand and Panama Company were amicably arranged by the Government; and, through the invaluable agency of Dr. Feather-stone with the Government of New South Wales, the entire service will be performed at an annual expense of £53,000 to the Treasury, and at an increased rate of traveling. It was designed to continue the proportionate payment tor the Suez line after it was known that several of the Colonies of Australia had intimated their acceptance of the Imperial terms, unjust as they were; and, as a natural consequence, it was the intention to connect Melbourne with Otago, whether Victoria assisted or not. It was just possible, had some of the Australian Governments refused to accede, that New Zealand might have had the whole expense of the Panama scheme, and an inconvenient portion of the Suez route on its hands at one time if the Ministry had been precipitate.

Two measures introduced by the Government and passed—viz., "The Distillation Prohibition Ordinance Amendment Bill," and the "Post Office Having bank Bill," will, I doubt not, be found to have a most favorable influence on the agricultural interests and the industrial classes.

The "Outlying Districts Police Bill," introduced by Mr. Fitzgerald, and passed, is a very valuable addition to the statute law of New Zealand, and it is intended to meet the cases of Native districts in which gross crimes are committed and the criminals are protected. The land of the protecting tribe will be confiscated, and form a general fund for the establishment of a police force, and thus page 20 diminish the expenditure front the Colonial revenue for such purpose.

The "Native Lands Bill," also introduced by Mr. Fitzgerald, is another step in the right direction, and provides a means of investigating and deciding the title to land.

Still more important was the "Native Rights Bill," also introduced by Mr Fitzgerald and passed. It provides that all persona of the Maori race shall he deemed to be natural burn subjects of Her Majesty, and declares that the jurisdiction of the Queen's Courts of Law extends over the persons and properties of all Her Majesty's subjects in the Colony, This Bill may be regarded as the sequel and complement of the "Native Lands Bill, 1862," and defines for the first time the status of the Maori race.

"The Comptrollers' Bill" drawn up by Mr Fitzherbert, provides a much needed and wholesome cheek on the issue of public money, and strange to say was introduced by a Ministry who had been accused of extravagance. The introduction of this Bill was enumerated as one of its most important measures when the Ministry were strong in the confidence and support of the House.

The Bill to repeal the Surplus Revenue Act was mainly designed to destroy that partnership system of account keeping which entailed very considerable delay in the preparation of accounts. Since the burthen of paying the interest of the three million loan had been imposed, there was no hope of the Provinces having anything beyond the three-eighths of the Customs' allocated to them except by increased taxation, and it was desired by creating a joint interest injudicious retrenchment by the system proposed, that the Provinces would not be deprived of the proportion of the Customs' hitherto available, less the Surplus. The existing system, by dividing a surplus before the liabilities of the year are known and met, is evidently an erroneous one.

Independently of the objection taken to the increase of taxation in any form, there was a special exception taken to the shape which it assumed as a Stamp duty. It was acknowledged by many that the duty sought to be imposed was a fair one, though some preferred an income tax; but it was very generally and confidently reported that the amount which it was estimated would be received was scarcely one-fourth of the sum which would come to the Treasury, page 21 and thus that the Government were drawing up a scale very much in excess of what they required. In vain it was replied that there was no experience in a new country to guide us—that we had followed the calculations of New South Wales, a Colony in a somewhat analogous position—and that whatever the proceeds were they could not be expended without appropriation Time has falsified the confident predictions of the objectors, for the Stamp Act in New South Wales has not even realised what was expected from it. Suppose, however, that the New Zealand Bill had provided more than the calculations and hopes of the Treasurer indicated, the excess would have been available as surplus revenue divisible among the Provinces, or subsequent legislation might have remodeled the Act.

There was a Bill introduced by government, during the Session which received the energetic opposition of the Auckland section of the House and their supporters. Its object was to constitute essentially Native districts. Ever since I took an interest in the general politics of the country, I have been of opinion that this was the true solution of the Native difficulty. On the 23rd July, 1862, when addressing the House of Representatives. I said—"I regard ministerial responsibility, in our present circumstances, as an impossibility." I then recommended that the best way to deal with the Natives would be "to create the territory embraced by the Maoris into a new Province, and to make the Maori King Superintendent."

Again I wrote at a later date, simultaneously with assuming an armed attitude of self-defence within the European settlements, the districts occupied by the Native population should be created into a separate Province, under a chief or chiefs of their own, the government of which should be administered in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Waitangi, which exists between Her Majesty and the aboriginal inhabitants of the Northern Island;" and I still believe that, now the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui Natives have been chastised, we should withdraw within our frontier, and confine ourselves to defending our territory and our Native allies.

It has been said that the ministry under Mr Weld commenced a new war, incurred fresh liabilities, and thus necessitated additional taxation; but we seek in vain for the evidence. The campaign on the northern shores of Cook's Straits has been pointed out as the page 22 locality. To this I would reply that the chastisement of these tribes was a part of the original design, (see the sketch in this address of the Session of 1861,) and was also contemplated by the Whittaker Ministry in 1863, where the confiscated lands of rebel Natives "in the Thames and Waikato, at Taranaki and at Wanganui," are referred to as part of the "three-million" scheme; and it was a prominent portion of the plan of the Wold Ministry, endorsed by the Assembly, and was practically indicated by the troops moving South for the campaign. How important, this campaign was may be judged from the Governor's despatch to the Secretary to the Colonies on the 6th February 1865, when he writes : "I believe that Colonel Greer most accurately represents the state of feeling amongst the Native population when he says : The fact is, the eyes of all Martyrdom are on Taranaki; there is the head-quarters of their Atua or god, and if he cannot drive the Pakehas into the sea, I think they will give up as a bad bargain all over their side of the island."

A main and most important feature of the polity of the Weld Government was the organisation of Native levies by my late gallant colleague Major Atkinson, the Defence Minister, ably advised and assisted by the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, Mr. Maclean, even though in delicate health. The East Coast levies and the Wanganui Contingent, whose laurels, gathered on the Wanganui River in defence of their European fellow-subjects, were fresh, and whose ardour was irresistible, gallantly accompanied by the Colonial European forces, did more in a few short weeks to stamp out the rebellion than had been done in years gone by. In addressing you as your representative, I think it right to remark that my sentiments have always been in accord with the late Government on this subject. You will pardon me for quoting, in support of this position, the following extract from a speech in the House of Representatives on December 6th, 1864:—"We have not done justice to our cause by not encouraging the loyal natives who have offered their services in defence of Her Majesty and their European fellow-subjects. I believe were this loyalty encouraged we should find that we were at length approaching the termination of the war. It is our duty to employ every lawful means in our power—it is our duty to evince our confidence in these gallant, true hearted natives, and we page 23 can do it by showing that we appreciate their services and reckon them among those whom we can trust. Let us do this, and I do not doubt that ere long we shall be successful."

Deserted by the Mother Country in the hour of sore trial, plunged by the action of the Imperial authority into an undertaking beyond her strength, if, even the nominal sovereignty of Her Majesty is to be asserted,—the Colony looks forward with much anxiety to the future, and seeks far and near for some prospect of relief. No wonder, then, that in her anxiety to be unburthened she grasps at intangible remedies. There is one which of late has pre-eminently obtained not a few advocates, because it appears so easy of attainment and so effective in operation. The extreme northern section of the Northern Island demands Separation, because she desires not to submit to Southern interference in Native affairs; and the extreme southern section of the Middle Island prefers a like request, because it, seeks to be relieved from prospective pecuniary liabilities. It is well known that Wellington, Taranaki, and Hawke's Bay are opposed to Separation; and it is abundantly evident, therefore, that, admitting for the sake of argument, we handed over the Native difficulty in the Auckland Province to Auckland, we should still retain a sufficiency of the evil in the remaining Provinces of the Northern Island. Suppose again, that, allured by the prospect of becoming the heir to the vast Native properties which, owing to the rapid decadence of the Native race, will at no distant date be disposable, these Provinces succumbed to the Separation epidemic, what would become of the Maori, subjected to the experimental legislation of four different Provinces ? And how would it be possible to prevent an injury to one of the interior Native tribes exasperating the whole ? A ruthless grasping for land in Auckland would vibrate through the Island, and would lead to brigandage in Cook's Straits or on the East Coast. But suppose for an instant that such a course were practicable, is it just; is it generous ? It needs not to turn over the page of Maori history to discover the friendliness with which the weak and dependent British settler was received by a race of the noblest savages on earth. Every Maori hut was an Englishman's home when he needed shelter, and the hospitality of the race was exhibited as well amid the forests of the interior as on the more accessible sea coast. page 24 And what has been the return that we have made and propose to make ? Cajoled to accept the position of British subjects under the stipulations of the treaty of Waitangi, we have denied them the exercise of the rights with which they were then invested. The land was theirs by inherent right or treaty, but we fettered its disposal with stipulations which we had no right to impose, and which we should have removed at an earlier period than we did; I acknowledge that the motive was one of protection; but when contact with civilization bad taught the Natives the value of their estate, we should have removed the obstacles to its sale. The Maori, deserted by the British Government, which has handed over without his consent the power which it held, or assumed to hold, under treaty, feels that: the simplicity and generosity which characterised its earliest intercourse with civilisation has been shamefully imposed upon. He sees the most powerful nation, and said to be the most just one, hand over to the European settlers who, but as yesterday, were received hospitably on his shores, the power to deal with the lives and properties of his countrymen; and then, as if the bitter cup of humiliation and misery were not complete, he finds that the pecuniary reasons which benumbed the moral consciousness of the Imperial Government operating equally in a section of the community to whom the sacred untransferrable deposit has been in appearance transferred; and, who wish to follow the illustrious example set by Britain, and drop the burthen because it is too expensive to carry.

But, granted that this Native difficulty were overcome, are we, because Auckland demands Separation—which means, in case of a Native insurrection, dependence on Great Britain—are we to force the remaining Provinces of the Northern Island to unite with her Is Wellington, the Seat of the Central Government, and contemporaneous in settlement with Auckland, to be severed by force ?—is Taranaki, for whom we have suffered so much, to be cast loose from its union with the South, whether willing or unwilling?—and is Hawke's 'Bay, which but as yesterday was torn as a shred from Wellington to weaken her at the instigation of a rival, to be created into a member of the new Northern Colony ? When the 50,000 Maoris inhabiting the Northern Island, and when the settlers occupying the Provinces of Wellington, Taranaki, and Hawke's Bay page 25 come and seek for Separation, then, perhaps, the scheme might be deemed somewhat more practicable.

But it is vain to suppose, even then, that Great Britain would alienate fur ever the Crown Lands of the Colony until she had secured what in moments of sensibility she terms the" rights of "treaty to this remarkable race." Suppose she were to say—If all parties are agreed to separate, we will not oppose the movement—we will yield to the general wish; but we must secure the public credit by retaining a lien on the Crown Lands. When you were united, we handed them over to you to administer as you might fancy, subject to our interposition; but, now you desire to separate, we must see that the purchased lands of the Middle Island and the confiscated lands of the Northern Island are available to meet the liabilities already incurred, and those which are inseparable from the responsibilities you have assumed.—She might further say that while a single soldier remains in New Zealand we shall require an annual payment of £40 per man, and, to avoid the intricacies and unpleasantness of account-keeping, we will require half-yearly payments in advance. Something not unlike this has been shadowed forth in the English Spectator.

But we will suppose again that this difficulty were overcome; that the Natives were satisfied; that Wellington, Taranaki, and Hawke's Bay, had consented to become satellites to Auckland; and Nelson, Marlborough, and South land, to Otago or Canterbury, and we will suppose the British Government also satisfied. How are we to adjust the liabilities of the past? Are we to accept one of the Southern propositions, that the Middle Island undertake for three years to bear the entire cost of the interest and sinking fund of the three million loan, and that the Provinces of the Northern Island undertake to keep order in their respective Provinces, and be allowed to enjoy the proceeds of the confiscated lands ? Are we prepared to pay out some three-quarters of a million, and to release Auckland from any payment ? And what is to be done after the expiration of three years ? Who is to pay then ? If the British Government could not undertake to keep order in the Provinces—if the united Colony failed in such an undertaking—is there any reasonable prospect that Auckland alone, or Auckland, with its dependencies, would succeed ? And if, like the three million loan page 26 colonization scheme, the experiment should explode, is there not a probability that, while the Northern Provinces were enjoying the proceeds of the confiscated land, the Middle Island might be called upon to sympathize practically with their Fellow colonists, who were unfortunate enough to be the materials of a bubble bursting experiment? Or shall we select, as our remedy, another Southern proposition, that the whole of the past liabilities of the Colony be a first charge upon the revenues of the Provinces of the Middle Island, till peace be firmly established and the Queen's writ can be freely enforced among the aboriginals ? If we do select this remedy we shall enjoy the proceeds of our legislation for many a bitter day to come, for there is as much chance of such a writ running as there is of the promises of the mirage in the desert being realized.

But, supposing every difficulty overcome, and the advocates for Separation beginning to rebuild. One recommends a total separation of the two Islands, with or without the total destruction of the Provincial institutions; a second supports the consolidation of the Provincial Governments of each Island, with a federal union between the two; and a third propounds the absorption of Taranaki by Auckland, of South land by Otago, of Hawkes' Bay by Wellington, of Marlborough by Nelson, and then extending the power of Provincial Governments, and restricting that of the General Government. Or, in other words, it recommends undoing the legislation of the last few years, without remedying the evils which it was designed to counteract; and, in addition to this, the absorption of one of the oldest Provinces in New Zealand, because she has a hungry neighbour who longs for her rich confiscated lands, and also because she has been unwise enough to have been subject to long continued suffering, springing from the action of others. It suggests that all the evils of Provincialism be intensified, and the advantages of unity and a moderate centralism nullified.

I have no hesitation in affirming that I cannot accept any of these proposals. I am in favour of the destruction of the present Provincial system, and the establishment of counties and municipalities in its place, and the abolition of the power to legislate except on a few unimportant, points; in fact, I regard the proposed confederation of the British North American Provinces as a model, in many respects, worthy of our adoption. By it large powers are page 27 entrusted to the General Government. The General Legislature consists of a Legislative Council and a House of Commons. The former appointed by the Crown—the latter by the people, population being the basis of representation. I do not understand by this universal suffrage, which I oppose on every ground. The Legislation is almost entirely confined to this Parliament; and thus the six confederate Provinces of British America could not present a similar absurd anomaly to that which the nine Provinces of New Zealand present, of multiplying the statutes of the land on every subject nine fold, and exhausting the resources of the country by an intricate and unnecessary machinery. The Confederation wisely proposes that the Provinces should retain "all lands, mines, minerals, and royalties vested in Her Majesty, subject to any trusts that may exist in respect to any such lands, or to any interest of other persons in respect of the same." By a continued unity in New Zealand, the Crown Lands would be for over secured to each Province.

It may be mentioned, as a fact of great significancy, that the value of Provincial securities immediately rose in consequence of this proposal. Is it, therefore, too much to expect, that were our Provincial distinctions merged into one strong General Government, the public confidence would be restored—and that we should no longer hear of the depression which we now mourn ? It may he said that centralism would be injurious to the South, because it would have to share liabilities with which it had no direct interest; but it may be sufficient to say, in reply to such an objection, that of the seventy members of which the House of Representatives is composed, forty-one belong to the Middle Island, while only twenty-nine belong to the Northern. It is, therefore, evidently in the power of the latter to restrict the expenditure of the public monies to whatever extent may be considered just and desirable, and thus to meet and avert the evils which separation is professedly designed to remedy.

The question is very naturally asked,—How is it that a Government which was so strong on assuming office in November 1864, and which retained its popularity during the early part of the Session of 1865, should have collapsed so suddenly—some have ventured to say so pusillanimously—in July 1865 ? We need not go far for a reply : it collapsed because of the opposition which page 28 arose from its stern, unflinching determination to retrench the vast military expenditure at Auckland and elsewhere—its immovability on the question of the removal of the troops—its action in the transfer of the Heat of Government—its adherence to what the Colony required, in the establishment of the port of call for the Panama steamers at Wellington—and, above all, because of its unswerving resolution to avoid future loans, and to rely upon taxation to carry out the policy which Mr. Weld had enunciated, and which the Colony had in two Sessions deliberately affirmed, after the clearest explanations and the most deliberate debates. Mr. Weld held office for eleven months, of which nearly three and a-half were passed in Session, and he has the satisfaction of knowing that the little more than seven and a-half months of a recess will bear comparison with any preceding period in the history of New Zealand—and that, too, at a time when "the Government must be simply regarded as the assignees appointed to administer to an embarrassed estate," because the faith of the Colony had been pledged by a preceding Government. And what are the fruits of these eleven mouths administration ? An estranged Governor is converted into a cordial co-operator; a criminating public press in England ceases its vituperations and speaks approvingly; the tone of British statesmen is agreeably altered; the distinctly enunciated policy of the Parliament of New Zealand is promptly carried out by the removal of the Seat of Government; the removal of the troops is energetically and continually requested and urged; the honour of the Colony is vindicated by the fulfillment, of the engagement entered into with the Panama Company; a comparatively cheap and speedy postal service with England is established; rebel lands are confiscated and surveyed as rapidly us possible for the location of military and other settlers in the Auckland Province; never-ceasing measures to restrict the evil consequences of the colonization of 1863, are pursued; an uninterrupted series of military successes are obtained by Colonial troops and levies, European and Native, fixing the attention of England and restoring the prestige of the British name; various Departments of Government are entirely re-organized and remodelled, by which a more effective control over the public expenditure is established and enforced. These are some of the fruits of a policy which would have ripened into maturity had not the Representatives of New page 29 Zealand shrunk from the fulfilment of the engagements into which the Colony had entered. A dangerous friend has ascribed the retirement of Mr. Weld to an impossible finance, an impatience of retrenchment, a too great leniency to criminals. And where, I would ask, was the impossibility of its finance ? The policy to be carried out was not the policy of Mr. Weld, after the House had affirmed it in 1864, and re-affirmed it in 1865 : and if General Cameron had done in the commencement of 1865, with the large force at his disposal, what General Chute is now doing, the proposed 1,500 men of the Defence Minister would have dwindled down to 500, and eventually ceased altogether; but even had it not done so, the expense, tested by the results, would have borne a very gratifying comparison with the £40 per man or £400,000 annually demanded by the Imperial Government as a subsidy for the contingent of British troops. The urgent demands of the Colonial exchequer required immediate relief, and in the imposition of a stamp duty to meet that demand, Mr Weld acted wisely, and no less wisely when he resisted the attempt to appropriate any portion of the proceeds for Provincial purposes. And where are the grounds on which the charge of an impatience of retrenchment rests ? Was not the administration unceasingly occupied in legitimately restricting the paralysing expenditure at Auckland ? What could it do more than it had done? Take for instance the Loan expenditure from 1st of October, 1864, to 31st March, 1865, amounting to £570,485 8s 2d, published in the Gazette, and it will be found that nearly the whole expenditure is the result of the Colonization policy of 1863. The War expenditure alone, without reference to Imperial troops, amounting to £218,540 12s 10d, while more than £70,000 is incurred for settlement purposes; debenture charges and losses, £161,983 14s 1d; reinstatement of Taranaki, £88,337 12s 6d; for all of which, except the last item, the previous Government, and not the Weld Government, is responsible. From a paper laid upon the table of the House of Representatives it was made clear that at least £366,671 would be required before all the liabilities were discharged, and nearly the whole of this for the payment of forces, for which the Weld Ministry was irresponsible. Was there no departmental retrenchment ? Was the amount set down in the Native estimates which, page 30 for the first time, were brought down in detail for the examination of the House, a charge against Mr, Weld? Was it not distinctly stated by the Native Minister that this sum was placed there because the expenditure was going on at that rate, but that he intended to make a very large reduction so soon as practicable? And, moreover, was this amount the result of Mr. Wold's administration ? Far from being so; some judicious retrenchment had already been made on the establishment of the preceding Government and more was under arrangement. It was not to be expected that in the very crisis of a rebellion then: should be a sudden and organic change in a department having the particular charge of Native affairs. For those departments more especially under my charge as Postmaster-General and Commissioner of Customs, I can say that when I assumed office, in November, 1864, the rate of the Postal Departmental expenditure (and I copy from an official document) was £66,660, whereas on the estimates of 1865, it is only £57,451; and the Customs', with a large increase, of Revenue and extension of gold-fields, had only increased from £41, 311, to £46,673, including the probable expenditure at the Grey, Hokitika, and Stewart's Island, and does not include considerable reductions which were made at Auckland after the Estimates were printed. The Post master-General's report strongly points out the lavish expenditure, and urges the paramount necessity of retrenchment. It is unfair to compare the Estimates of 1863 with those of 1865-6, because in the meantime the Departmental expenditure had largely grown under the previous administration.

Whether the proposed retrenchment of Mr. Stafford is real and effective I leave to the next Session of the Legislature to declare. I am firmly of opinion that little retrenchment can be judiciously made beyond what the Weld Government promised and proposed to make.

In addition to the charges of submitting an impossible finance—of avoiding retrenchment—the Ministry of Mr. Weld has been charged with too great leniency to criminals, referring more particularly to the amnesty proclaimed just before his retirement. It was said that murderers were pardoned by that proclamation who should have been brought to justice. I can venture to say that each individual case received at the hands of the Government, in several successive Cabinet meetings, the most anxious consideration, and that it was not without much painstaking inquiry that a decision was arrived at. I do not say that in every case we acted rightly, for it is very difficult exactly to define the boundaries between war and civil murder. But I know that we acted conscientiously, and to the best of our judgment, that we entertained no squeamish sentimentality, and that the hand of justice would not have fallen short of the criminal when the evidence clearly pointed him out.

The retirement of the Weld Ministry was chiefly to be ascribed to the fact that, owing to certain political combinations in the immediate prospect of a dissolution, it was found impracticable to carry out the policy which had been deliberately affirmed in 1864 page 31 and 1865—when the Colony was borrowing—but unsupported when it was called upon to raise taxes and not to over burthen posterity.

But, while many may be disposed to admit justness of the argument that we have obligations which we cannot ignore, and responsibilities which we cannot shake off—still there are some who ever revert with increasing pertinacity to the cry, but "what can we do ? we cannot submit to have the revenues of the Middle Island expended for the benefit or relief of the North" In reply I would say that the Weld policy provided a remedy in the proceeds of the sale of confiscated lands, though not by an expensive colonization process; and, in addition, I may repeat what I have before expressed as my opinion, that we should retire within our defensible frontier, insist upon the European inhabitants defending themselves, aided by a fixed pecuniary assistance from the Colony; and as the Provinces of the Northern Island receive the whole of the Customs Revenue derived from the 50,000 Natives, and which may be estimated at the rate of about 15s a head, or rather more than £35,000, it is not unreasonable that this sum should be a first charge against the Customs' Revenue of the Northern Island, and be available for such defence, and assistance to our Native allies. The colonization of the North Island at the expense of the South has proved a costly and worthless experiment, ill devised and worse carried out. The pouring of vast hordes of defenceless and penniless families into Auckland, before the war was finished, and without the accompanying men of means, was the death blow to the scheme, which was doubtless much aggravated by the delay in obtaining possession of the rebel land on which to locate them, and which delay should have induced the Whittaker Ministry to have instantly stopped the immigration and the enlistment under the Loan Act of 1863. I have already referred to the glowing pictures which the Treasurer presented in 1863—how calmly he expatiated on the proceeds of the sale of the land covering all expenses, a declaration for which his colleagues of the Auckland Province are equally responsible—and what is the result ?

The Minister of Defence in 1863 (Mr. Russell), now tells us "that after giving the best of the land to the military settlers, and also good land to friendly Natives,' after taking these lands out of the blocks, and then taking out the hills and swamps, there would be very little left to dispose of." The present Minister of Defence (Colonel Haultain of Auckland), regards the total confiscated acreage at about 1,200,000 acres, and that, as only 400,000 would be available at 10s. an acre, there would not be produced more than £200,000, against which there is to be deducted as compensation to Auckland settlers, £75,000; compensation to Natives, £15,000; cost of settlement, £35,000; leaving £75,000 to meet all other liabilities. Now, supposing that we have obtained only one-half of the land originally proposed to be confiscated, though that is the best, we have but a sorry realization of the picture which was so fondly held out to our view. The Auckland members managed vir- page 32 tually to do away with the payment of half-a-crown an acre, which, in addition to all liabilities, was the demand of the Weld Ministry; but, as the Imperial Government have not given an unqualified sanction to the "Settlements Act," under which the land is confiscated, it is not improbable that there may be a veto to this uncalled-for sacrifice. If the Auckland papers speak truly, the land about Opotiki, which under the Act was forfeited to the Crown on account of the rebels not giving up to justice the murderers of the Rev. Mr. Volkner—this land, devoted to the creation of & police fund and charged with compensation to sufferers by the rebellion, has been handed over to Auckland on the sham principle above alluded to. Is it possible that the new Houses of Assembly will sanction this illegal transaction? is it probable that the Imperial Government will validate the transfer? After surrendering the confiscated lands to Auckland at a merely nominal price, can we in any justice refuse to hand over to Tararaki the rich domains which fall within her Province, and deal out, the same justice to Wellington?

The fact is that the South has been bound over hand and foot to colonize Auckland; and the process of colonization is still going on, and Southern statesmen, in pursuing the phantom of an impossible separation, ore withing parties to the act. They have the power to prevent the grievous sacrifice, but they prefer the modified Fenian cry of Separation to sitting down and by the legitimate means, which their legislative superiority confers, subduing the political paralysis. On them then be all the future consequences of a failure as certain as it will be expensive.

I have now finished the duty which I assigned to myself, and I have endeavored to give a fair and can did statement, of all the more important circumstances preceding the formation, and during the administration of the Weld Ministry. I do not seek any judgment at present on the conduct of affairs by Mr Weld's Government; I would rather await the period when the light shed around it by the actors and legislation which may succeed, will conduce to a right reading of this short page of New Zealand history. But while patiently awaiting this decision I cannot abstain from beating testimony to the patriotic and unselfish character of the services of my noble heated chief, and my colleagues in the late ministry. It is, and always will be with us, a subject of bitter regret that when the self-reliant policy was about to receive the seal of the Colony's sincerity and faithfulness there was a moment's hesitation as to the direction in which the path of duty lay. We may still hope that there is only a looking back, not a retrogression; because, as Mr Stafford has adopted, nearly in every particular, the policy of Mr Weld, and has announced his intention to introduce an income tax and if necessary a stamp duty to carry it out,—we may still hope that out engagements will be fulfilled and our duties performed. It may be a matter of little account who may be the administrators, so that the administration preserves the unity and the honor of the Colony.