The Pamphlet Collection of Sir Robert Stout: Volume 16
Part I
Part I.
First, then, I observe that a miracle is defined as "a visible interruption or suspension of the order of nature for a providential purpose." In regard to this I would ask, why has a phenomenon to be visible ere it can be a miracle? In what sense is the term "visible" used here? Is it objectively, and if so, is man to be considered the only agent by which a miracle can be completed, or may some inferior organism, say a monkey or a mollusc, share with him the power necessary for such an operation and compete with him for a dignity so great and exalted?
Or is the term "visible" to be used in the more obscure and general sense, "that it may be seen?" If so, then by its vagueness or futility, it is useless here, and worse than useless, it is a dummy that cumbers the ground and makes progress difficult; for what indeed is this, if anything at all, but requiring a certain magnitude as a necessary quality of a miracle. But, if a miracle is possible at all, might we not have one on so minute a scale as to be incapable of recognition in any way by a finite being?
I cannot but consider the term "visible" useless here, though no doubt there are reasons for inserting it.
The next term of the definition is, that the event must be for a "providential purpose" in order to be a miracle.
I can only take this qualification as an attempt, in a spirit of weak but pardonable jealousy, to imply that creeds other than the author's own have not, as assigned, the usual miraculous basis, for I suppose that this term is used with a compound meaning—first, in the sense as implying that God is the agent, next that the event itself must be for a purpose useful to us. page 7 Indeed, this last meaning is denoted for it as I find further on, and is stated as follows:—
"A miracle, according to its definition, is alleged to have been wrought for a providential purpose—that is, for the sake of the moral beings who inhabit the earth." Not to make light of so serious a matter, I cannot avoid thinking the word moral is not chosen with a proper regard for those unfortunate people who are liable to be troubled in their readings with suggestions arising out of, but foreign to, the idea sought to be conveyed One naturally conceives that any miracle would be performed more for the sake of immoral than moral beings. Now, the word "human" would have kept such unfortunate people to the correct idea without, as I think, taking anything from the force with which it is intended to strike them.
However, we will let this pass, and proceed with the necessary examination. Why, I would ask, why is it necessary that this visible suspension of order before it can be considered a miracle must be for a "providential purpose"? Surely if a miracle with it, it is one without it. Again, is it not evident that, if we insist upon making up the definition of a miracle with this term included, we have a condition imposed which we can never know has been complied with, so that if a miracle happened before us we could never determine it to be one? Allowing, however, that one may judge whether an event is a miracle or not, by appearances in a general way, I would ask answers to two questions for my guidance.
First: Would it not be a miracle (audible in part) were a donkey to address his rider in human speech, and to be gifted for the nonce with spiritual sight, and so be able to save his rider's life, and thus to secure his blessing for a "chosen people"?
Second: Would it be a miracle were a serpent to address in like manner a woman for her moral down-fall?
page 8According to the term of the definition I am examining, it appears to me that the one is a miracle, the other is not. But if not, what is it? Or, to take a recorded case of unnatural development—that of serpents from rods, performed by jugglers and by a deistical priest respectively—is such to be classified as a conjuring trick or a miracle according to the purpose for which it was wrought? and does the nature of this purpose distinguish the wizard from the inspired miracle-worker?
Of course our author, by assuming that an event has to be for a providential purpose so that it may be a miracle, by implication recognises that a suspension of the order of nature may occur which is not for providential purposes. May I ask, then, how such phenomena might be defined? Does it not seem better for us to drop these qualifications altogether? If we do so we have the residue—a miracle is an interruption or suspension of the order of nature.
Taking now of this residue of the definition the term "interruption or suspension of the order of nature," I cannot feel sure of the meaning intended to be conveyed by the word "order." I cannot see how it can be "suspended." It appears easier to conceive of law being thus affected, perhaps though the author intends "order" to be used only in the sense of law, I look forward that I may get the sense in which it is used here, and find that "order of nature" is used as an equivalent for laws of nature, which latter, as owned, is the "more common expression"; and this change is effected professedly to escape ambiguity, "law of nature implying a law-giver and an agent whose action should be regulated by it." But, to my mind, order of nature implies an order-giver and an agent, etc.
However, this does not much matter now. What has to be done is to ascertain if this equivalence is observed and kept up in the argument, for I cannot page 9 get rid of the idea that law means, or can mean, something different from what order can—that order in its usual sense denotes a regular succession (say of events), which law in its proper scientific use does not, but rather continuity, persistence. Turning to page 9, I find a very clear illustration of the meaning here attached to the word "order" in the premise uselessly manufactured for us to show that the sun will rise again. In it we find that the idea of regular succession is the sole meaning attached to the word order, as will be shown in due course. It is of vital importance to distinguish between this meaning of order, and that of law as used in the exact sense it should be for any controversy of this nature. Law, as I apprehend its meaning, is simply "the formulæ of phenomena which have a constant tendency to occur," and it is failing to appreciate or overriding this difference that has, as I conceive, led the author astray. It cannot be denied he is in first-rate company, but this only makes it the more necessary for me to notice the matter. For instance, a law of matter is that it has a continuous tendency to rush to matter: we here imply no succession of events, but a continuous event, no regularity, no periodicity of incidents, but a regular immutable tendency.
It is confounding these two terms with each other, neglecting to observe this difference, and using them indiscriminately, that spoils many of the extracts appearing in the pamphlet.
"A law of nature is not an agent or an agency by which substances are coerced; it is not a creator of phenomena, but their formulæ." To argue for immutability of the order of nature in the sense of immutable periodicity of events is so excessively foolish that we cannot be expected to do it.
The author has dropped the term law, as "commonly used," to avoid an apparent ambiguity, and, in page 10 his choice of a substitute, has got hold of a real one, or at any rate has one several sizes larger than the one he boggles at. He has strained out a gnat, only to swallow a camel.
Possibly this shirking of the term law is occasioned by a knowledge of the Biblical text, "God gave them (the works of nature) a law which cannot be broken," as it would obviously be very inconsistent for a champion of such statements to argue that this law may be broken.
So far, I think, J have clearly shown that the author's definition of a miracle is too rigorous, too exclusive a one, to be of any use. The task of identifying an event as a miracle, which seems even now an impossible feat, is, with such qualifications for it as he lays down, an infinitely more difficult one.
For man to be able to recognise an event as a miracle, does it not occur to the learned author that he must possess infinite knowledge, or else (leaving these new qualifications alone) how is he to know that the order of nature has been suspended? He can only be assured that what little he knows of this order appears to be so.
Upon logical grounds, therefore, does it not seem absurd to argue for the possibility of what we can never prove, when all scientific experience and every deduction from this points to its impossibility?
I can assure the author that were the strangest event to happen, scientific people—that is, all those who use their reason for discovering or knowing natural laws or truth—would never admit it to be a miracle. Supposing, for instance, anyone were to take a cock Moa, put him into a mesmeric trance, then remove a rib from him, and, presto! a fine adult hen bird is produced from it, completely equipped to obey the Biblical injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply." We might be very much astounded; some might lose their page 11 heads over it, but those who did not would only endeavour to ascertain the cause of the phenomenon.
Theologians may continue arguing that what appears as the most impossible jugglery to us can be performed if a providential purpose is the object. It is all very well, however, to talk of providential purposes; but is there not always one on the way? This, however, is, as far as science tells us, not effected by sudden, by miraculous interventions, but by the cumulative effects of infinitely little movements over immense periods of time, and it is here, that all which is truly miraculous, or at least wonderful, lies. Are we not, in our blind eagerness for miracles, passing real wonders by in order to take up with illusions?
In concluding this part I have to notice the definition of another term, not so much in a critical spirit, but only that in the introduction to this a slur is cast upon the common sense of a large number of persona Thus, in defining the precise meaning of the term reason, the author commences by saying: "Few things are more remarkable than the readiness with which most persons, when they meet with an alleged fact, or an argument which they are unable to answer or refute, avail themselves of the stock phrase—that it is contrary to reason."
Now, is it not clear that this is an elliptical expression, one authorised by long usage on account of brevity, and as indicating, when filled in as common sense dictates, the precise and the full idea intended to be conveyed by it.
The author is quite right in defining this term of the question he discusses, but I do not see why those who use it should be spoken of in this somewhat contemptuous tone. Using the short term in this manner can hardly indicate ignorance or a lapse of judgment. If I might make an observation here, I would say that the filling in of the elliptic expression page 12 "opposed to reason," is not completed by the author. I would amplify thus—the conception of a miracle is against a deduction of reason: I conceive the author's amendment makes this one necessary. Considering he frequently expreses himself elliptically in his pamphlet, we may be sure that this shorthand way of imparting our ideas has not gone out of fashion yet; but, if he intends to indicate that the degree of this ellipse is here too great, all I would say is, that he himself makes use of a phrase exhibiting this property to a far greater extent than the one objected to does. For instance, we have in his pamphlet "the axioms of geometry are simple modifications of space"—surely this requires considerably more "padding" than the one to which he takes exception.