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Race Riots in Malaysia

by Ozay Mehmet from the "Queen's Quarterly" magazine

Until May 13, 1969, Malaysia was generally regarded as one of the most successful examples of multiracial peace and harmony, primarily due to a judicious application of democratic partnership among her Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, none of which has a clear majority. On this evening of May 13, race riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur, the capital. Within hours, word spread across the city that Malays were invading the Chinese sections and indiscriminately killing innocent persons. In the following two days, unrestrained violence spread to other parts of the country, causing considerable loss of life and property. Official figures put the number of dead at about 200, but unofficial and more realistic estimates range from five to ten times that figure. On May 15 a state of national emergency was declared. The Constitution, and Parliament were suspended. Some opposition members were jailed and a press censorship imposed.¹

Analysis of the causes and effects of the May 13 events in Malaysia shed considerable tight on the political and social problems facing Western-style democracy in developing countries. They are, therefore, of more than academic interest.

Although racial hatred among the Chinese, Malays and Indians of Malaysia has a long history, as a rule it has been kept dormant beneath a peaceful surface. The race riots of May 13, 1969 and the aftermath mark a turning point in Malaysian affairs. While the surface at present appears peaceful, in fact conditions are far from being settled and may again explode in renewed racial violence and fighting with tragic and unpredictable consequences for the young Malaysian Federation.² After almost two years' of rule by decree, a much weakened Parliament was restored in February 1971, but there is a general feeling that the parliamentary system is in fact "on trial".³

There was more behind the May 13 riots than a spontaneous outburst of racial hatred. Just three days before, the ruling Alliance Party⁴ of the ageing and affable Tunku Abdul Rahman had seen its comfortable majority in Parliament significantly reduced in the West Malaysian elections. It was feared that, when the elections in East Malaysia were completed it would lose its two-thirds majority and thus its power to amend the Constitution. This prospect alarmed the Malay-ultras of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) who believed that the power to change the Constitution was essential to protect the economically-backward Malays against the wealthy and enterprising Chinese, who already dominated the economy of the country. Moreover, the electoral gains scored by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) in rural Malay areas at the expense of UMNO candidates threatened the very soul of the UMNO whose leadership tended to regard itself as the rightful guardian of the Malay community since Merdeka (Independence) in 1957. The PMIP gains were a major blow to the UMNO leadership, especially since it had campaigned vigorously not only to offset the PMIP influence, but in fact to unseat the only PMIP state government in Kelantan. The fact that the election results, particularly the PMIP gains among Malays, were totally unexpected by the UMNO is a sad reflection of their almost virtual isolation from the grass roots. Though mostly illiterate farmers and fishermen, the Malay peasants were realistic enough to disbelieve the exaggerated campaign promises of some UMNO politicians,⁵ but nonetheless they were naive enough to heed the fanatical warning of the PMIP candidates that UMNO was selling out Malaysia to the Chinese.

The United Malays National Organisation was not the only component of the Alliance which suffered a setback in the 1969 elections. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), under the ineffective leadership of the Finance Minister, Dr Tan Siew Sin, lost so heavily to the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Parti Gerakan Rakyat that it no longer represented the majority of Chinese. Accordingly, at a special meeting on May 12, 1969, the MCA leadership decided to withdraw from the Alliance Government, a decision which drew a prompt acceptance from the UMNO ultras who pressed for a say in the naming of new ministers "following MCA's poor showing in the election".⁶ The outbreak of riots the next day overshadowed the apparent collapse of the Alliance Party, but it is quite significant that MCA politicians have played no more than passive and reluctant roles in subsequent developments.

What caused the downfall of the MCA? The answer to this question provides a revealing account of the radical and political problems of Malaysia. Under article 153 of the Constitution, Malays are granted "special rights" designed to speed up their economic and social development to standards enjoyed by Chinese and Indians. However, this article also states that these "special rights" should not be exercised at the expense of the legitimate rights and interests of other communities. In this conflicting constitutional provision lies much of the source of Malaysia's current problems.

The Alliance Government, until May 1969, attempted to follow a mid-stream course with regard to the implementation of the "special rights". On the one hand, it embarked on a vigorous programme of rural and community community development calculated to benefit the bulk of the Malay community. At the same time, expansionary economic policies in manufacturing, construction, and urban-centred industries benefited the highly-urbanised Chinese population. However, these policies also encouraged a growing influx of Malay youth into towns in search of government jobs and opporunities. Until 1967 unemployment was too small to warrant serious Government action. Although there was a rapid population growth in the postwar period, there was at the same time a considerable expansion of public education particularly at the secondary school level, and this had the effect of postponing until 1967-68 the thrust of population increase on the labour market. Increasingly, Malays expected, on account of their special rights, Government patronage in the allocation of public service jobs, which have traditionally had great appeal to them owing to the advantage of job security. In trying to satisfy Malay expectations, the Government generated concern and mistrust among the Chinese and Indians who felt better qualified.

Non-Malay concerns were already building up because of the intention of the Government to make Malay, long the de jure National Language, the sole medium of instruction in public schools. Traditionally, public education in Malaysia was organised on racial lines with equal recognition of Malay, Chinese, Tamil, and English as languages of instruction. The Chinese, who have always placed great value on education, especially higher education, were particularly disturbed by the reluctance of the Alliance Government to expand university education on multi-racial lines while it went ahead with plans to open colleges of Malay and Islamic studies for the benefit of Malays. Similarly, the establishment of technical and vocational schools, notably the MARA Institute of Technology in Petaling Jaya, where admission was restricted to Malay students, aggravated fears among the Chinese and Indian communities that they were being systematically relegated to the category of second-class citizen, deprived of government jobs and educational opportunities, and under increasing threats to their languages and cultures. This growing feeling of inferiority among non-Malays was also being reinforced by increasing awareness that their political representatives in the Alliance Government were unable or unwilling to arrest the trend of pro-Malay policies.

The election campaign of 1969 was conducted against such a back-ground of widespread concern and racial tension. In this atmosphere of tension, the opposition parties played a crusading role, attempting to expose the Alliance Government as the architect of the bumiputra policy aimed at making Malays first-class citizens and relegating all other races to inferior status. The DAP and the Gerakan, both heavily dependent on Chinese voters even though they were multi-racial in outlook, campaigned vigorously for "Malaysia for Malaysians" and "A just and equal society". Judging by the election results, these slogans were widely effective, since the Chinese community in Malaysia has a tradition of being a reluctant voter.

The results of the May elections caught everyone by suprise — the Alliance, the opposition parties, and the country. The Tunku, sensing the significance of the setback, promptly promised a "more dynamic and progressive cabinet".⁷ The opposition parties, particularly the DAP and Gerakan, believing that one-sided, pro-Malay policies would not give way to justice and equality, organised "victory processions" in Kuala Lumpur. Mostly led by and participated in by Chinese, these processions provoked the ever sensitive Malays, who tended to interpret the election results as their defeat. The result was the eruption of riots on the evening of May 13, 1969.

Race riots were initially confined to Kuala Lumpur and its vicinity. Subsequently, they spread to other West coast states, notably Malacca, Negri Sembilan. Perak. Other parts of the country, taken by surprise at the outbreak of riots after an electrifying election rather than during it, as was widely expected, remained generally calm but tense. In view of this fact, it has been questioned if the declaration of a national state of emergency was in fact justified.⁸ This, however, is largely a hypothetical question. In the explosive atmosphere of May 1969, with a real prospect of racial fighting engulfing the entire nation, it is simply impossible to deny that the declaration of a national emergency had a preventative effect.

What does appear to require examination, however, is the constitutional legitimacy of the state of emergency. Under article 150 of the Constitution, a state of emergency can be declared only if authorised by Parliament. In the event that Parliament is not sitting or cannot be convened immediately, then the executive can advise the King accordingly. In this latter event (which is the relevant case), Parliament must be convened, at the earliest possible moment, in order to affirm or negate the proclamation of a state of emergency, It is evident that the spirit of the Constitution, if not its letter, has been violated, since no attempt was made to convene Parliament following the declaration of emergency. In January 1970, a National Consultative Council was formed. Although it included members from various walks of Malaysian life, it was boycotted by the DAP, the Gerakan, and the Labour Party. At any rate, this body could in no way be regarded as an equivalent of Parliament.

Suspicions concerning the constitutionality of the state of emergency lend support to fears that the race riots were deliberately brought about by Malay extremists in order to stage a disguised coup d'etat replacing the Alliance rule of Tunku Abdul Rahman with an aggressive pro-Malay government dedicated to the so-called bumiputra principle; supremacy of Malays as masters of the country. There is, to be sure, some supporting evidence for this viewpoint. In the first place the official justification offered for the declaration of emergency (namely, that there was increased danger to national security on account of Communists and "bad elements") was hardly convincing, since the Communists and the Labour Party had campaigned, unsuccessfully, for popular page 11 boycott of the elections,⁹ Secondly, during the summer of 1969 there were repeated attempts by Malay students, led by extremeists, to oust the Tunku in favour of some type of Malay dictatorship. Yet another piece of evidence concerns the Chief Minister of Selangor, Dato Harun bin Hadji Idris, whose term of office was put in serious doubt as a result the state elections in Selangor which produced a 14-14 deadlock and the prospect of a new election. Whether or not Dato Harun saw any personal advantage in some form of disturbance is a matter of conjecture. It is a fact, however that the May 13 incidents started in front of his house in Kampong Bharu (a Malay section of the capital) and were preceded by a political meeting in his house attended by Malay ultras and a large Malay crowd.

No matter why, how, or by whom it was started, the racial violence which was unleashed on May 13 has brought Malaysia to a new cross-road leaving behind an impressive record of peace and harmony and embarking on a course both uncertain and dangerous.

The declaration of emergency ushered in a new instrument of government: The National Operations Council (NOC) headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. The Tunku, under pressure to step down, was relegated to a position of an elder adviser. Although entrusted with all executive and legislative power, the NOC was apparently conceived as a temporary emergency cabinet in the confused and tragic climate prevailing at the time when the new cabinet was yet to be formed and the MCA pull-out was threatening the very foundations of the Alliance party.

The immediate task facing the NOC was the restoration of normalcy by putting an end to the tide of violence, arson and looting. As conditions began to improve, Tun Razak and his deputy, Dr Tan Ismail, who was recalled from retirement to join the NOC and assume the duties of Minister of Home Affairs, quickly dispelled any hopes of an early return to parliamentary democracy Tun Razak argued that the task was "not only bringing the country back to normal but also ensuring that the disturbance did not recur".¹⁰ Tun Ismail was even more emphatic, in a speech over Radio Malaysia soon after his appointment, he categorically stated that democracy in Malaysia was dead, having died at the hands of the opposition parties.

As already mentioned, there were significant reasons for this reluctance to reconvene Parliament and restore democracy. For one thing, there was strong opposition to such a development among the Malay intelligentsia, who tend to prefer the benevolent rule of the Malay-controlled NOC. For another, reconvening of Parliament with freedom of speech would almost certainly lead to potentially dangerous questions about the events during and after May 13, 1969. Even the Tunku, well known for his respect for democracy, has warned that "the majority of the people of this country...are agreed that there is no hurry to return to parliamentary democracy.¹¹ When Parliament was finally restored in February 1971, its powers and privileges were so severely restricted that it can hardly approximate the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy which existed until May 13.

It is therefore appropriate to inquire whether, in fact, democracy in Malaysia is dead, at least in the sense of involving participation of all races in the process of legislative and executive decision-making. Certainly, the NOC based as it is on the power monopoly of one race and aimed at the achievement of Malay supremacy against economic and political realities, does not offer a viable alternative to the democratic system which prevailed in the country since Merdeka. A multi-racial country such as Malaysia, in which no single race holds an absolute majority, can achieve stability and prosperity only on the basis of multiracial partnership. This is the fundamental lesson of the Alliance rule, despite its limitations.

The record of the NOC has been far from promoting peace and harmony among the peoples of Malaysia. One of its first decisions was to mobilize four additional all-Malay battalions, ostensibly for the purpose of warding off an increased Communist threat on the Thailand-Malaysia border, but more candidly for bolstering up Malay defences against possible Chinese counter-attack.¹² Subsequently, educational policies were changed by decree to make Malay the sole language of instruction in public schools starting, in 1969-70, with the first year of elementary school. During the summer of 1969. labour laws were similarly altered in order to restrict jobs to work-permit holders, and doubts were raised about the legal status of non-Malays in the country. Although the prospects of a large-scale expulsion of non-Malay population cannot be regarded as high, the jobs and welfare of some quarter million, permit-holders, mostly Indian plantation workers, remain in jeopardy, even though work-permit regulations were recently relaxed to extend the duration of permits previously marked as "non-renewable".¹³

No doubt, these and other discriminatory measures have been taken largely to placate Malay extremists and to offset the growing influence of the PMIP, which, unlike other opposition parties, can hardly be banned or regulated by the NOC and therefore continues as a serious threat to the survival of the UMNO and the NOC leaders. But such measures contribute to an ever widening gulf among races and to further polarization of politics in Malaysia. No amount of lip-service paid by the NOC leadership to the ideal of a multiracial society, including show-pieces such as a Department of National Unity and "Goodwill Committees", is likely to remove the deep scars and bitter memories of the May 13 events. To be sure, the Chinese community is already showing its resentment in a number of ways. During summer 1969, Malay farmers suffered considerable loss of income due to the Chinese boycott of the season's crop of durians and other tropical fruits. Embittered racial relations have hit both economic and social intercourse and are lending to polarize the population on ethnic lines. Of no less importance is the fact that the racial policies are tending to push an increasing number of Chinese youth into secret societies and into the arms of the communists.

On September 21, 1970, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down and was replaced by his close friend and long-time ally Tun Razak.¹⁴ The resignation of the Tunku was not unexpected as he had publicly announced his intention on August 20 1970 and had been aspiring to a carefree retirement for a long time before, The Tunku's departure from the political arena raises new doubts because his successor, despite his impressive credentials as an efficient administrator, lacks a wide popularity and is regarded with a considerable degree of suspicion among the Chinese. Moreover, it is highly likely that Tun Razak will prefer to govern through the NOC, relying on an inner group of Malay nationalists including principally Dr Ismail and Tan Sri Ghazali Shaft. An enfeebled Parliament, far from providing a forum to ventilate real issues and grievances, is likely to generate dissatisfaction and racial polarization as well as factionalism among the Malay politicians whom the Tunku so expertly managed to hold together. It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how the Malaysian experiment in constrained democracy will work — and for how long.

The root causes of racial strife in Malaysia stem, not only from historical, religious and cultural factors, but most importantly from the glaring disparities in living standards and economic opportunity among her [unclear: r] peoples. Unless and until this basic problem of disparities is overcome (and undoubtedly it will require considerable time and effort), jealously and hatred between the Malays and non-Malays will persist, leading, at some future date, to another round of racial fighting.

Significantly, leaders such as Tun Razak and Ghazali Shafi possess many of the qualities required for this task: both men have proven abilities as administrators capable of implementing new and radical programmes, and both are dedicated to the task of closing the gulf between the poor Malay peasant and the rich Chinese. Their most formidible problem will almost certainly be the extent to which they would be willing to invite and actively encourage Chinese capital and enterprise to resolve the problem of economic disparities. One of the fundamental paradoxes of Malaysia is that political power rests with the economically backward Malays while economic power lies in the hands of the Chinese unable to participate fully in the political life of the country and therefore unwilling to invest in her development. Pragmatically, the Government ought to utilize Chinese resources to the fullest to promote speedy economic and social development of the Malays; and the Chinese would be quite willing to cooperate provided their suspicions were dispelled by genuine Government action to offer them a partnership — as in the days of the Alliance Government. But this would inevitably encounter strong opposition from the UMNO and PMIP ultras who exercise a fanatical influence over the numerically strong but politically backward Malay peasantry. A return to a constrained democracy, as the present Parliament at best can signify, may be a compromise solution, but it is unlikely to prove durable.