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Salient. Victoria University Student Newspaper. Vol. 37, No. 10. May 22, 1974

Portugal Background to a putsch

page 7

Portugal Background to a putsch

The following is the first in a series of three articles on Portugal by Tom Appleton. The second will deal with the socio-political and historical situation of the country while the third will take a closer look at its colonial empire and the African liberation movements. This first instalment tries to shed some light on the most recent developments.

The place: Litbon, Portugal.

The scene: Thousands of delirious people Dithering on Lisbon's central Rossio Place to hoist the Portuguese Mag and ting the national anthem. The entire population of the city seems to be gathering in the streets. Voices are tinging and shouting, scanning the most beautiful verses: "Victory, victory. Freedom. De-mo-cra-cy. Down with Fascism. Free the political prisoners. Close Tarafal concentration camp."

The time: May 8, 1945, Victory Day.

But Portugal was not to shed its dictator, Salazar, yet. The western allies, never known to have minded a moderate fascist system, even fully re-established Salazar into power and allowed hit country to join their ranks in Nato.

In 1966 Salazar celebrated his fortieth year in power, but only two years later he died of a brain hemorrhage. The man who took his place was Marcello Caetano.

Hit nomination was almost logical, even obligatory. A Catholic and originally a Monarchist, an embittered critic of democracy and parliamentarism, he was ideologically especially well prepared, to understand, assimilate and hail the military dictatorship.

He was a political empiricist and traveled extensively to Mussolini's Italy to receive his educative laurels there. Initially a dedicated advocate of "Lusitanian Integrslitm" — a kind of tight regime over the Portuguese African, Indian and Brazilian sphere of influence — he later abandoned these and other beliefs and ties, such as with the Monarchists. Hanging on tight to Salazer's band waggon he maneuvered himself into the position of Salazar's closest associate.

At this time Santos Delgado, one of Satezar's old associates and his representative with the armed forces, took steps to develop the regime into a monarchy. Caetano, who mind was more flexible, was opposed to this, seeing that such a move would seriously disturb Portugal's relationship with other European countries. Salazar solved the problem by deposing both of them.

From this time. 1968, dates Caetano's career in the political underground. Taking up a professorship at the University of Lisbon, he soon became its chancellor and retured in 1962. His image, which he worked at, was that of being a liberal.

At this time he sent a report to the overseas ministry suggesting a reappraisal and new regimentation of the colonies.

In this report Caetano stated that under the then circumstances any solution of the problem had to fulfill three conditions:
1)To allow the Portuguese diplomacy to change the international climate, especially towards friendly governments, favourably.
2)To not endanger national interests, particularly the lives and posessions of the Portuguese in Africa.
3)To be effective administrationally.

He goes on to say that "the only constitutional change one might attempt would be to transform the present national unity state into a federal state." "The Portuguese community would then comprise three federal states, Portugal, Mocambique and Angola, and the provinces of Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome, Macao and Timor. The Cape Verde Islands would receive the status of ilhas adjacentes."

In the international context of 1962 — General de Gaulle was about to grant Algeria independence, and other European African colonies were rapidly gaining a similar status — this attempt of liberalisation was Caetano's main political trump.

Spinola in the jungle of Guinea-Bissau, shortly before the death of Amilcar Cabral

Spinola in the jungle of Guinea-Bissau, shortly before the death of Amilcar Cabral

His argumentation goes on to show Just how far ha was willing to go: "Firstly, this is a considerable step forward on the way to the two province's self-government. Secondly, this change gives the settlers a larger say in the administration and arouses a sense of responsibility. Thirdly, it demonstrates internationally our dedication to evolution. Fourthly, it reconciles the desires for self-government in the provinces and the pressures from outside in the direction of autonomy, with the necessity to leave the provinces under Portuouese influence and to hold them by all means. Finally, this change within the frame of a federal constitution allows for a strengthening of the financial autonomy so that the provinces would need no more than the senate's permission for foreign investment."

This meant, in fact, by keeping as smell at necessary a political and military involvement in the colonies, to allow for at great at possible a financial exploitation. In other words, all that was new, was to Invite foreign capital from the western Nato allies, into the colonies so that there would be a massive common interest at stake, if the question of independence was raised.

Salazar was not the man to venture this very dicey project. He hoped to solve the problem by just sitting tight and hoping for the best.

As far back at 1951 Caetano had offered to replace Salazar. He learned to wait during those 17 years prior to his ascension to power, in 1968.

Forty years of Salazarism, political detention, censorship, and complete totalitarian strangulation had stifled and crushed all political opposition. There was no mobilisation, no global strategy, and except for Palma Inacios 'Revolutionary Unity and Action League' (a kind of political Dillinger organisation) all was quiet on the leftist front. Caetano had to do no more than quietly slip into the mould left behind by Salazar's death and take over. The ineffectiveness of the left can be seen from the fact that for ten days, after the old dictator's initial brain hemmorhage until his death, the government was all in disarray and immensely vulnerable.

In October 1968, just after Caetano had taken over the government with the blessings of the military, the church and the ruling oligarchy, he invited the exiled leader of the socialist opposition, Mario Soares back to Portugal, a move that was interpreted by the international press as a first sign of a more liberal rule.

In the following year, it wet announced, elections were to be held. They were too, but no opposition member managed to win a teat in the national assembly. Caetano's victory was one hundred percent complete; no doubt not a very intelligent way to demonstrate even a semblance of democracy.

After that, the experiment at liberalisation came to an end. Even the 1963 draft of change of the colonies' status was not implemented. Caetano was forced to imitate Salazar, with the difference of having lest influence (power) and having to be more hypocritical.

Under hit dictatorship, onward of 1971 Portugal's military involvement in Africa grew to enormous dimentions: 250,000 conscripts, 50 percent of the government budget put into defence, 100,000 draft dodgers and deserters, two million workers looking for work in other European countries (out of a population of 8.5 millon, this it one third of the active population, more even, when one considers that these two million are predominantly men).

After 1971 the opposition began to reorganise. In October of last year, further farcical elections were held. By decree It was forbidden to even mention the colonies. Those who wanted to vote for opposition parties had to use ballots made of different paper. Opposition members were not told of the exact localities or time of the election, they were not allowed to make public statements or print election posters, they were hassled by the police, etc.

It was obvious, that with the incrustation of government inside and the victorious liberation movementi in Africa the and of Caetano's government was drawing nearer.

Ironically, it was not brought about by the left, which had by now organised itself, but by the coup d'etat of an insider: General Antonio de Spinola.

A year ago, another general was close to ousting Caetano: Kaulza de Arriaga, a nuclear physicist and reorganiser of the defence ministry. He believed that a short and triumphant stint in the colonies would boost his image enough to catapult his political career rapidly upward. His understanding of guerilla warfare was that "a guerilla is like a fish in the water...if you can't catch the fish, you take the plug out." This meant, discarding the statement's jocular overtones, a series of unparalelled massacres, the best known being that at Wiriamu in Mozambique, which the London Times blew in June last year, a week before Caetano's visit to London. A Portuguese My Lai.

Salazar

Salazar

Characteristically, Caetano's reaction to the thousands of progressive and outraged demonstrators that greeted him was: "That's a problem of your police, not mine."

However it meant the end of Arriaga's brilliant political career. Spinola was, at that time, engaged in a campaign to "conquer the hearts" of the population of Guinea Bissau. If we understand, that Amilcar Cabral's Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) was immensely successful and controlled almost 80 percent of the country. If we understand that Portugal was hanging on there at the end of Its tether. If we understand that Cabral was murdered by members of his own party, to whom Lisbon had promised the independence of Guinea Bissau if the present leaders of the PAIGC were eliminated. If we understand that the Portuguese commander in Guinea Bassau at that time was Antonio de Spinola, and that he according to 'Newsweek' was awarded his government's highest military medal, "for his consistent success in keeping Portugal's Black African rebels at bay" than there is no reason why — until conclusively proved to the contrary — we should not assume, that in General Spinola we have before us the true murderer if Amilcar Cabral.

That fact alone should suffice to disperse all hopes for a coming democratisation of Portugal.

Caetano, who knew that Spinola "had been touted as a possible eventual successor to himself" ('Newsweek', March 25) tried to mater-mind his deposition less spectacularly than that of Arriaga's.

To understand how, we must understand the mechanics of censorship In Portugal.

There is virtually no aspect of Portuguese political and public life which It not controlled by censorship. All news is pre-censored and changed with ad lib additions. The regime can prohibit the publication of certain information and comments, it also controls the length, headlines and placement of the news in newspapers and on radio. The censors control everything, even the style of the news.

Not celebrating, but demanding freedom.

Not celebrating, but demanding freedom.

And not only do they control the press, radio and to, but also books, films, plays, even renditions of classical poetry and the lyrics of the famous Fado-songs. Also small ads, gossip columns, everything, The final decision lies with the "Prime Minister".

The education of the centers is generally of average and below average standard. Mostly they are priests and officers.

Certain books are banned, certain "subversive" words have been eliminated from the language, the names of certain persons may not be quoted under any circumstances. Speeches by the Pope, encylicas, even certain interviews of the dictator himself did not escape the censors' scissors.

It remains a mystery how under such circumstances, Spinola could have published "a slim new volume entitled 'Portugal and the Future', wherein he urged that Lisbon put an end to its costly colonial ward by granting the Africans partial independence." (Newsweek, March 11).

Is it anywhere near surprising that "right-wingers immediately began to lobby for Spinola's dismissal"? (ibid) Or the "Marcello Caetano has ventured no reaction beyond a discreet silence"? (ibid)

Indeed, only with Caetano's previous permission could the booklet have been published, and only with intent of deposing Spinola. Perhaps then, Caetano's speculation might have gone, he could himself have introduced some measure of change somewhere along Spinola's lines.

After the conservatives' demand that Spinola be fired, Caetano was only too happy to oblige. But Caetano obviously did not take into account that what had worked against him almost 20 years earlier, the firm entrenchment of the government, was no longer operative now to keep him in power. The government was sitting on a powder keg and Caetano tentatively had thrown the match himself.

Spinola's putsch must be seen as the equivalent in terms of a fascist totalitarian state, of an ascension to power of a "progressive" party in a parliamentarian society. It is the only way the ruling oligarchy can retain its power and it won't be long, before this is understood. There will be more bloodshed and unrest, because Spinola's pro-gressivanass will only go so far. It's the same tight collar with iron spikes inside, only one size bigger.

As for Portugal's colonies, Spinola's programme has left no doubt: "The country would be reduced to a 'muted canton of Europe' and perhaps indeed absorbed by Spain," to add to that country's Basque problem yet another one, in effect, Spinola's suggestions are almost identical to those of Caetano's 12 years earlier.

But what was already a political straight jackal than is not likely to be accepted by the African leaders today, who have had a taste of freedom and won't rest until after 500 years of the Portuguese yoke has been shaken off.

Caetano

Caetano