Other formats

    Adobe Portable Document Format file (facsimile images)   TEI XML file   ePub eBook file  

Connect

    mail icontwitter iconBlogspot iconrss icon

Salient. Victoria University Student Newspaper. Vol. 37 No. 3. March 20, 1974

Sharpeville — A Massacre Recalled

page 2

Sharpeville

A Massacre Recalled

South African policemen are shown rushing to participate in attacking the innocent and peaceful crowd; 705 rounds were shot, 30 entering from the front and 155 piercing the backs of bodies of the 69 Africans killed and 180 wounded in the Sharpeville massacre.

South African policemen are shown rushing to participate in attacking the innocent and peaceful crowd; 705 rounds were shot, 30 entering from the front and 155 piercing the backs of bodies of the 69 Africans killed and 180 wounded in the Sharpeville massacre.

By Bishop Ambrose Reeves, an Anglican minister in South Africa from 1949 to 1960 During the latter part of his service in South Africa, he was bishop of Johannesburg. An outspoken opponent of apartheid, he was active in arranging legal defence and relief for political prisoners and their families in South Africa. He organized relief for the families of those killed and wounded in the Sharpeville incident and arranged for an investigation of the incident. Shortly thereafter, he was deported from South Africa.

Events at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 shocked the world and are still remembered with shame by civilized men everywhere. Early that morning a crowd of Africans estimated at between 5,000 and 7,000 marched through Sharpeville to the municipal offices. It appears that earlier that day people were urged to take part in this demonstration. However, many Africans joined the procession to the municipal offices quite willingly. Eventually this demonstration was dispersed by the police, using tear-gas bombs and then a baton charge. Fortunately nobody was hurt.

I was not at Sharpeville when the shooting occurred but it was familiar territory to me. Time and again I officiated at the large African Anglican church there and knew intimately many of the congregation, some of whom were to be involved in the events of that tragic day. I could so well visualize the scene. Near my home in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg was a large zoo situated in acres of parkland. By a curious anomaly the lake near the zoo was the meeting-place for Africans working in the northern suburbs on a Sunday afternoon. After work they would leisurely make their way there in small groups—a gay, colourful, jostling crowd—families and individuals—chatting, laughing, singing, gesticulating and occasionally fighting. The thud of homemade drums could be heard shattering the Sunday calm. It could so easily have been like that on that crisp autumn morning in Sharpeville. Like that, but so very different.

During the morning news spread through the township that a statement concerning passes would be made by an important person at the Police Station later that day. The result was that many drifted to the Police Station where they waited patiently for the expected announcement. And all the time the crowd grew.

Reading from the police report on what subsequently happened, the Prime Minister told the House of Assembly that evening that the police estimated 20,000 people were in the crowd. This seems to have been a serious exaggeration. From photographs taken at the time it is doubtful if there were ever more than 5,000 present at any particular moment. They were drawn to the crowd by a variety of reasons. Some wanted to protest against the pass laws; some were there out of idle curiosity; some had heard that a statement would be made about passes.

Whatever may have brought them to the Police Station, I was unable to discover that any policeman ever tried either to find out why they were there, or ask them to disperse, in spite of the fact that their presence seems to have caused a good deal of alarm to the police. So much so that at 10 a.m. a squadron of aircraft dived low over the crowd, presumably to intimidate them to disperse.

The police claimed that the people in the crowd were shouting and brandishing weapons. The Prime Minister told the Assembly that the crowd was in a riotous and aggressive mood and stoned the police. There is no evidence to support this. On the contrary, while the crowd was noisy and excitable, singing and occasionally shouting slogans it was not a hostile crowd. Their purpose was not to fight the police but to show by their presence their hostility to the pass system. They expected that someone would make a statement about passes. Photographs taken that morning show clearly that this was no crowd spoiling for a fight with the police. Not only was the crowd unarmed, but a large proportion of those present were women and children. All through the morning no attack on the police was attempted.

An armed policeman looks down on one of the African victims of the massacre.

An armed policeman looks down on one of the African victims of the massacre.

Even as late as one p.m. the Superintendent in charge of the township was able to walk through the crowd, was greeted by them in a friendly manner and chatted with some of them. Similarly, the drivers of two of the Saracen tanks stated subsequently that they had no difficulty in driving their vehicles into the grounds surrounding the Police Station. This testimony was borne out by photographs taken of their progress.

As the hours passed, the increasing number of people in the crowd was matched by police reinforcements. Earlier there had only been 12 policemen in the Police Station: six white and six non-white. But during the morning a series of reinforcements arrived. By lunch time there was a force of nearly 300 armed and uniformed men in addition to five Saracens.

Yet in spite of the increased force that was then available, no one asked the crowd to disperse The police strolled around the compound with rifles slung over their shoulders, smoking and chatting with one another.

Scene Was Set for Explosive Situation

The scene was set. Anyone who has lived in South Africa knows how explosive that situation had already become. On the one side was the ever-growing crowd of Africans. On the other side was the South African police. Every African fears them, whether they are traffic police, ordinary constables or members of the dreaded Special Branch. Most policemen expect unquestioning deference from Africans.

The only action taken during that morning appears to have come not from the police but from two African leaders who urged the crowd to stay away from the fence around the perimeter of the compound in order not to damage it. Then Colonel Pienaar arrived in the compound. He appears to have realized that he had come into a dangerous situation and therefore made no attempt either to use methods of persuasion on the crowd or to attempt to discover what the crowd was waiting for. Instead, about a quarter of an hour after his arrival he gave the order for his men to fall in. A little later he said, "Load five rounds." But he said no more to any of his officers, or to the men. Later, Colonel Pienaar stated that he thought his order would frighten the crowd and that his men would understand that if they had to fire they would not fire more than five rounds.

During this time Colonel Spengler, then head of the Special Branch, was arresting three African leaders. He said subsequently that he was able to carry out his arrest because the crowd was not in a violent mood.

It is extremely difficult to know what happened next. Some of the crowd near the gate of the Police Station compound said later that they heard a shot. Some said that they heard a policeman say, "Fire". Others suddenly became aware that the police were firing in their midst. But all agreed that nearly everyone turned and ran away once they realized what was happening. Colonel Pienaar asserted that he did not give the order to fire. Moreover, he declared that he would not have fired in that situation. It was stated later that two white policemen opened fire and about 50 others followed suit, using service revolvers, rifles and sten guns.

Police Action Caused Devastating Consequences

Whatever doubts there may be of the sequence of events in those fateful minutes, there can be no argument over the devastating consequences of the action of the police on 21 March 1960 in Sharpeville. Sixty-nine people were killed, including eight women and 10 children, and 180 wounded including 31 women and 19 children.

According to medical evidence the police continued firing after the people began to flee, for while 30 shots had entered the wounded or killed from the front of their bodies no less than 155 bullets had entered the bodies of the injured and killed from their backs. All this happened in 40 seconds, when 705 rounds were fired from revolvers and sten guns. But whatever weapons were used the massacre was horrible.

Visiting the wounded the next day in Baragwaneth Hospital near Johannesburg, I discovered youngsters, women and elderly men among the injured. These people could not be described as agitators by any stretch of the imagination. For the most part they were ordinary citizens who had merely gone to the Sharpeville Police Station to see what was going on. Talking with the wounded I found that everyone was stunned and mystified by what had taken place. They had certainly not expected that anything like this would happen. All agreed that there was no provocation for such savage action by the police. Indeed, they insisted that the political organizers who had called for the demonstration had constantly insisted that there should be no violence or fighting.

Arrests Follow Massacre

To make matters worse, some of the wounded with whom I spoke in hospital stated that they were taunted by the police as they lay on the ground, by being told to get up and be off. Others who tried to help were told to mind their own business. At first there was only one African minister of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa who tried to help the wounded and the dying.

Later, 77 Africans were arrested in connexion with the Sharpeville demonstration in some cases while they were still in hospital. In fact, it was clear on my visits to the wards of Baragwaneth Hospital that many of the injured feared what would happen to them when they left hospital.

The attitude of the South African Government to the events at Sharpeville can be seen from its reaction to the civil claims lodged the following September by 224 persons for damages amounting to around £400,000 ($1,120,000) arising from the Sharpeville killings. The following month the Minister of Justice announced that during the next parliamentary session the Government would introduce legislation to indemnify itself and its officials retrospectively against claims resulting from action taken during the disturbances earlier that year. This was done in the Indemnity Act No. 61 of 1961. Money could never compensate adequately for the loss of a breadwinner to a family or make up for lost limbs or permanent incapacity. But it would have been some assistance. It is true that in February 1961 the Government set up a committee to examine the claims for compensation and to recommend the payment of ex gratia payments in deserving cases. But this is not the same thing, and in fact by October 1962 no payments had been made.

Failure of Police to Communicate with Crowd

Few commentators since Sharpeville have attempted to justify the action of the police. In fact, many of them have drawn special attention to the complete failure of the police to communicate with the crowd at the Police Station. If it had been a white crowd the police would have tried to find out why they were there and what they wanted. Surely their failure to do so was due to the fact that it never occurred to them, as the custodians of public order, page 3 either to negotiate with the African leaders, or to try to persuade the crowd to disperse. Their attitude was summed up by the statement of Colonel Pienaar that "the Native mentality docs not allow them to gather for a peaceful demonstration. For them to gather means violence." The same point was demonstrated even more graphically by one of his answers at the Court of Enquiry under Mr. Justice Vessels. When asked if he had learnt any useful lesson from the events in Sharpeville he replied. "Well, we may get better equipment."

What happened at Sharpeville emphasizes how far the police in South Africa are cut off from sympathy with or even understanding of Africans. At no time did the police express regret for this tragic happening.

Yet it would be folly to attempt to fasten the whole blame for the events at Sharpeville on the police. By the mass of repressive legislation which has been enacted every year since 1948, the South African Government has given the police a task which becomes ever more difficult to fulfil.

It was this legislation which was in-directly responsible for the tragedy of Sharpeville, and in particular, the "pass laws". Indeed, the immediate cause of many in the crowd assembling at the Police Station was the growing resentment of Africans to the system of passes.

History of Pass Laws

The pass system originated in 1760 in the Cape Colony to regulate the movement of slaves between the urban and the rural areas. The slaves had to carry passes from their masters. Subsequently, the system was extended in various forms to the whole country and was eventually collated in the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. This Act made provision for a variety of passes, including registered service contracts and for passes permitting men to seek work in particular areas. But through the years an increasing number of Africans had been given exemption from these laws.

In 1952 a new act, ironically called "The Abolition of Passes Act", made it compulsory for every African male to carry a reference book. To the Africans, reference books are passes for they contain all the details which were previously entered on the various pass documents. Failure to produce it on demand constitutes an offence for which an African may be detained up to 30 days while inquiries are being made about him. In the 12 months ending 30 June 1966 no less than 479,114 Africans were prosecuted for offences against the "pass laws". At the time of Sharpeville there were 1,000 prosecutions a day for these offences. By 1966, this had risen to over 1,300 a day. These figures speak for themselves.

Photo of an African woman breastfeeding a child

Pass Laws Extended To Women in 1960

In 1960 the Government decided for the first time in South African history to extend the pass laws to African women. In their case another fear was added that they might be subjected to manhandling by the police with a further loss of human dignity. In fact, by the time of Sharpeville it was estimated that three quarters of African women were in possession of reference books.

African wages in Sharpeville in 1960 were low, partly because African Trade Unions were not, and still are not, recognized for the purpose of bargaining with employers. Moreover, the continuing colour bar in commerce and industry meant, and still means, high minimum wages for white workers and low maximum wages for the black workers who make up the great majority of the labour force.

All this means two wage structures in South Africa which have no relation to one another: in the fixing of the black wage structure the workers frequently have no say at all. Several months before the tragic events at Sharpetille it was becoming obvious that those living in the township were facing an intolerable economic situation.

Sharpeville was not an isolated incident. The 10 years before Sharpeville had seen feverish activity by the opponents of apartheid. By means of boycotts, mass demonstrations, strikes and protests, the non-white majority had attempted by non-violent means to compel those in power to modify their racist policios. For example, on 26 June 1952, the Campaign of Resistance to Unjust Laws had been launched. The same day three years later (26 June 1955) 3,000 delegates had adopted the Freedom page 4 strators and strikers. In spite of great and frequent provocation by the police, Africans remained orderly and disciplined.

"Civilization without Mercy"

The crowd at Sharpeville was not attacking anything or anyone. Further, there is abundant evidence to show that they were unarmec As the late Sir Winston Churchill pointed out in a debate in the British House of Commons on 8 July 1920, "There is surely one general prohibition which we can make ... against what is called 'frightfulness'. What I mean by frightfulness is the inflicting of great slaughter or massacre upon a particular crowd of people with the intention of terrorizing not merely the rest of the crowd, but the whole district or the whole country". This is precisely what the police did at Sharpe-ville. On that occasion Sir Winston concluded his speech with some words of Macaulay, ". . . and then was seen what we believe to be the most frightful of spectacles, the strength of civilization without mercy". These are words which aptly summarize' all that happened at Sharpeville.

Certainly the Government of South Africa, though badly shaken in the days immediately following Sharpeville, soon regained control of the situation. On 24 March 1960, the Government banned all public meetings in 24 Magisterial districts. On 18 April, the Governor-General signed a proclamation banning the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress as unlawful organizations. On 30 March, in Proclamation No. 90, the Governor-General declared a state of emergency which lasted until 31 August 1960. During that time a large number of prominent opponents of Government policy of all races were arrested and detained without trial. In addition some 20,000 Africans were rounded up, many of whom were released after screening.

After some months, at least superficially, life became at least relatively normal. But underneath the external calm dangerous fires continue to smoulder: fires that can never be extinguished by repressive measures coupled with a Charter which had been drafted by the Congress Alliance. This took place at a massive gathering at Kliptown, Johan-nesburg. The following year (1956) the Federation of South African Women held a series of spectacular demonstrations against the extension of the pass system to African women. These culminated in a mass demonstration at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on 9 August. Some 10,000 women gathered there in an orderly fashion to present 7,000 individually signed protest forms. Again, from 7 January 1957, many thousands of African men and women for months walked 18 to 20 miles a day to and from work in Johannesburg in a boycott of the buses. Although in this particular case they gained their objective, all the various endeavours by Africans to secure change by peaceful means brought little tangible result.

Bodies of killed and wounded African men, women and children were left for hours. Police prevented help to the wounded.

Bodies of killed and wounded African men, women and children were left for hours. Police prevented help to the wounded.

The surprising thing was that in all this activity there was very little violence on the part of boycottcrs, demon-constant and growing show of force.

Outside South Africa there were widespread reactions to Sharpeville which in many cases led to positive action against South Africa: action which still continues.

It is my personal belief that history will recognize that Sharpeville marked a watershed in South African affairs. Until Sharpeville, violence for the most part had been used by the white minority. Over and over again, non-white civilians were injured by police action or by assaults on them when in prison. Until Sharpeville the movements opposed to apartheid were pledged to a policy of non-violence. But on 21 March 1960, when an unarmed African crowd was confronted by 300 heavily armed police supported by five Saracen armoured vehicles, an agonizing reappraisal of the situation was inevitable. Having tried every peaceful method open to them to secure change without avail, the African leadership decided that violence was the only alternative left to them.

Remember Sharpeville Think about Apartheid

Remember Sharpeville Think about Apartheid

As Nelson Mandela said in court at his trial in October 1962, "Government violence can do only one thing and that is to breed counter-violence. We have warned repeatedly that if there is no dawning of sanity on the part of the Government, the dispute between the Government and my people will finish up by being settled in violence and by force."

Outwardly things may go on in South Africa much as before. Visitors may find a booming economy, the white minority may seem secure in their privileged position for any foreseeable future, some urban Africans may have a higher living standard than formerly. But all this should not deceive anybody. The fact is that for the first time both sides in the racial struggle in South Africa are now committed to violence; the white minority to preserve the status quo; the non-white majority to change: change from a society dominated by apartheid to one that is non-racial in character.

The fact that at the moment this is being expressed through small bands of guerrillas who may be neither very well trained nor well equipped does not mean that they ought therefore to be dismissed as having little significance. After all, we have the examples of Algeria, Cuba and Viet-Nam before us as powerful reminders of what may result from very small and weak beginnings.

Unless there is a radical change in the present political and economic structures of South Africa a terrible and brutal civil war might not easily involve Africa alone but the whole world in a global racial conflict. The choice before the international community has been a clear one ever since Sharpeville. Either it takes every possible step to secure the abandonment of the present policies in South Africa or the coming years will bring increasing sorrow and strife both for South Africa and for the world. Sharpeville was a tragedy showing most plainly that the ideology of apartheid is a way of death and not of life. Can the nations recognize this before it is too late?