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Salient. Victoria University Student Newspaper. Volume. 34, Number 1. 1971

Laos

Laos

When South Vietnamese military forces invaded Laos three weeks ago the Vietnam war was shown even more clearly to involve the whole of Indo-China. But the extension was by name only. The force behind the thrust came not from the South Vietnamese ground troops but from the United States air, artillery, and logistic backing. It was nothing new for the people of Laos. The level of bombing over Laos by the US in the last year reached a higher level than any of that over North Vietnam. The significance of the invasion of Laos lay in the demonstration of the continued US commitment to an extended Indo-China war rather than a de-escalation.

New Zealanders had been told little of the Laos situation until the recent invasion. This news blackout extended over the last year but was most blatant in the weeks immediately before the invasion. But US Senator Stuart Symington heard enough in testimony before the Armed Services commission to observe that he "could shut his eyes and look back five years. It's the same optimistic briefing I got in Saigon 1965" This could be reported in the US press as could rumours from Vietnam pointing to the impending invasion. The comparison with the early days of Vietnam deserves a more detailed examination.

The first US involvement in Vietnam was well before 1965 and took the from of "advisors" (a more savoury term than "soldiers"). When the US invaded Cambodia last year the congress "Doves" forced the passage of a bill forbidding the use of even advisors in Cambodia. Instead there are "military equipment delivery teams" which according to Alvin Shuster (N.Y. Times Jan 29th) quoting US military sources "given the nature of the way here .....would find themselves in battle", however these teams would be dressed in civilian clothes to "show their combat advisory role". The Cambodian invasion and the South Vietnamese follow-up occupation showed remarkable lack of success. By early January 1971 the National United front—the forces in Cambodia supporting the deposed head of state Norodom Sihanouk reportedly controlled two-thirds of the territory. At the same time as New Zealand papers reported a "communist stranglehold" on the roads into Phom Penh, the Cambodian capital, a National United Front attack on the airport there succeeded in destroying almost every aircraft on the base.

Like Cambodia, the invasion of laos is a desparate attempt by the US to break up what it seems to think is the main source of the resistance of the Liberation forces—North Vietnamese support. The last six years have shown the fallacy of the theory that the only source of resistance of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to the US military invasion is North Vietnamese aid. The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of Cambodia, and the Pathet Lao must be fighting with the support of the people of their countries. Yet the US clings to the insane theory that resistance is carried into Indo-China on the backs of perspiring yellow. North Vietnamese communists, and to prove its theory it is apparently prepared to lay waste on the whole of Indo-China.

The US must consider that it has a lot to lose by withdrawing from Indo-China, and admitting that it had suffered defeat. To continue the war in Indo-China it must continue to expend enormous amounts of money and human resources which lead to enormous economic problems and the brink of civil war in America. What then keeps the war going?

There are long term economic benefits to be gained. Friendly uncritical regimes in South East Asia are of great benefit for the continuation of US commerce in the area, and the United States depends on its theory is apparently prepared to lay waste on the whole of advanced capitalist country.

The moral support of a small troop commitment and the flow of supporting statements from the allied countries must do much to bolster up support for administration policies and gives plausibility to an implausible policy. This is New Zealand's role.

To attempt to bring about the reversal of these supportive policies is the role of the protest movement in New Zealand, and in the other allied countries.

The anti-war movement in New Zealand is to all appearances dead or dying. Yet there is as much reason now as ever for the anti-war movement to be vigorously pursuing its objectives. The withdrawal of some or all of New Zealand's troops from Vietnam does not mean the end to New Zealand's support for US policy there. However the fact remains that the initial stimulus to the New Zealand anti-war movement the escalation of New Zealand participation in the conflict—is gone.

But on the 13th and 14th of March a national anti-war conference has been called with the aim of re-exerting pressure on the government to change its policy and to plan some sort of broad public action, to bring new forces against the pro-war government policies. It is hoped that the conference will devote itself to organising some sort of political and educational plan centred on a national anti-war mobilisation on 30th April this year.

Suggestions to be put to the conference include the possibility of a broad educational campaign with a nationally distributed broadsheet and a drive for sponsorship of the mobilisation from all sectors of the community, but the main idea of the conference is to draw in new ideas and new people. Responses so far suggest support of many groups who have not recently been involved in any anti-war activity.

The continuance of New Zealand's complicity in the Indo-Chinese war may rest on the success of this conference.