Ingredients: Anzus. refurbishing job, new weaponry, complicity, liberalism.

Results: The West's biggest military complex for thermonuclear purposes outside the U.S., less than 1,000 miles from New Zealand and approaching fast (Omega) or even established (Woodbourne, Mr. John).

The main difference between radicals and liberals is that the former see things more in objective terms; they can draw a dividing line. Liberals on the other hand, because they seek essential consenus in the polity, find it hard to draw lines. They also play by a set of rules, and they rely upon all men accepting these; this makes them vulnerable to any rule-breakers.

Thus, politics being the art of the possible, liberals are thereby either all-time losers, or liberalism is irrelevant. Or both. In the advance of the military political-industrial complex to greater power, in the while Pacific Dominions, liberals have not been a counter.

In Australia and New Zealand liberals can often be heard disparaging explicitly anti-communist pacts such as SEATO, while the other major anti-communist alliance both countries belong to, ANZUS, is treated with flippancy, or ignored, ANZUS was a child of the Cold War at its height, a product of the pre-missile era. The delicate equilibrium of the missile balance of terror at that time had yet to come: when it did the apparent usefulness of ANZUS as part of the defence perimeter of containment was rendered largely obsolete.

To recapitulate. ANZUS has always been regarded as a

"kind of double indemnity policy for the contracting parlies, an insurance to Australia and New Zealand against the resurgence of Japanese militarism, remote though that possibility might be, and an insurance to the Untied States against the loss of or any threat to Japan." (1)

On this basis, there seemed to he something in it for New Zealand and Australia if Japan after 1951 could be considered a real danger. It was held as the least the Pacific Dominions could settle for. As Nash said of ANZUS:

"On the evidence, it does not seem much. It has not the same bite in in clauses as have the clauses in the North Atlantic Treaty." (2)

Australian and New Zealand accepted the "soft peace" with Japan of 1951 since the United State, was allowing part of its skirt to protect them. This view, however, does not take into account the other security treaties the U.S. signed at that time: the mutual security treaties with the Philippines, and Japan itself. These other agreements first make clear the real meaning of ANZUS.

The three interlocked with the Japanese Peace Treaty, and, "by a unique westward extension of the Monroe Doctrine, the Untied States declared her intention to defend a ram part of islands and territories stretching from north to south in the Pacific Ocean, and to create machinery to effectuate this purpose." (3)

The sequence of events leading to ANZUS and the rest of the package deal (later 10 include treaties with South Korea and Formosa, as well as SEATO) included Korea and the extension of the Cold War 10 the Pacific in 1950, and the emergence of China as a formidable socialist and military force in Asia.

Anzus is, then a strong unit in the anti-communist alliance. In this there was advantage to America in being assured of the actual or possible use of bases or territorial facilities.

But this is not evident on first reading Anzus, for neither bases nor installations are mentioned. What has happened is that the treaty has given new life: Australia and New Zealand signed into the U.S. power system, "and this imposes obligations on us. . . ." (4). Mr. Gorton now says the treaty

"provides that we shall co-operate in the establishment of installations to help our joint defence. Under Article 2 we have an obligation jointly to maintain and develop our collective capacity to resist armed attack." (5)