by James Clad

Lately we have been hearing quite a bit about real or imagined fears of some sort of American 'sell-out' in the Paris talks.

It might be better to focus our attention rather on who the Americans may betray, and to whose mercy those betrayed are going to be left.

The Saigon authorities, of course, are understandably anxious and concerned over their future status.

If President Johnson's desire for disengagement is combined (as I now believe) with a wish for some alacrity to be attached to this move, then it is possible, or even likely, that we shall soon see the familiar Saigon faces cavorting on the Riviera in a manner equally as familiar the only difference being that they shall no longer be the nominal rulers of southern Vietnam.

Their increasingly hysterical assertions that they would never countenance a coalition governent with the Viet Cong may mean rather more than a sudden scarcity of airline tickets to Europe.

This repetitive and belligerent position is a telling sign in several ways.

First, it indicates that as far as genuine diplomatic consultation and co-ordinaton of policy goes, they have been nearly ignored by the Americans.

It further indicates they expect that their counsel is probably to go on being ignored.

Not basic

And this is because in a process of negotiation the position advanced at the outset is never formulated as to be so basic to what is regarded as the point beyond which you cannot retreat. If there was, or had been, any meaningful consultation with Saigon, such an extraordinarily basic statement of position would have been effectively precluded.

Each side in any negotiation always begins by demanding its optimal objective as the direction of subsequent negotiations.

What Saigon has done is to dispense with any optimal policy and instead, insistently (and publically) repeat their only credible and non-retreatable position.

This not only encourages the belief that the Americans would actually settle for a coalition government, but also strengthens the position of Hanoi who will now be content to wait for this favourable settlement secure in their belief that the Americans will eventually come around.

So, rather than being ignored altogether, Saigon has elected to assume a posture of belligerent intransigence?meaningless if devoid of American support?which has played right into Hanoi's hands.

Saigon's generals will not, and cannot, accept a coalition government because such an occurrence would immediately signal the abrupt political demise of these men.

Thus their stance, rather than being particularly "hard", is instead the only one which the configuration of mobilised power within Vietnam will permit with the absence of the Americans.

Others

The only other people who stand to be sold out at Paris arc those countries which have parroted the American position for all these years and have shown the flag at America's behest and in accordance with what they have considered their essential interests.

A "sell-out" to Australia and New Zealand, means a precipitous withdrawal that will hurt the respective governments domestically by making them look bigger fools than they had planned.

Of course, these governments don't feel particularly motivated to remain there after the Americans leave.

It is fairly laughable to imagine our ANZAC battalion bravely battling on alone against the Communist Threat.

I think that after the Americans have finally blown the whistle and departed for good (probably under a scheme which will tacitly admit the inevitability of Vietnamese reunification), we are going to see an interesting example of about-face rationalisation.

The commonsensical obligation to campfollow your protecting great power will replace the pretty unconvincing and "principled" rationale for intervention and it will be refreshing to return to a reality of some sorts, anyway.

Settle down

The frantic urgency to contain the sinister thrusts of our latest bogey-man is going to disappear mysteriously with some urgency of its own.

After some anxious fluttering and selfreassuring, we shall then settle back to a point where an expanse of sea, Caucasian supremacy, and the American Navy make it rather more convenient to Draw the Line for the fire next time.