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Salient: Victoria University Students' Paper. Vol. 30, No. 4. 1967.

Treaty system could go

page 10

Treaty system could go

New Zealand has a very small war-machine. Could it, in all seriousness, do what presumably it is meant to do: defend us? Do we possess in our treaties and forces a comprehensive all-risks lowpremium coverage?

Defence in New Zealand, except when we're actually fighting, never seems like a life and death matter. It always has a low priority. Two weeks ago, a sum of about £25 million allocated for capital spending on defence last year was. apparently, returned to the Consolidated Fund, unspent. No orders were placed because, in tightening up the economy, defence is one area where saving can apparently be made.

External Affairs secretary Mr. Laking addressing students in the Memorial Theatre.His lecture was the first of a series of New Zealand's foreign policyMr. Laking asked that the lecture be not reported.

External Affairs secretary Mr. Laking addressing students in the Memorial Theatre.
His lecture was the first of a series of New Zealand's foreign policyMr. Laking asked that the lecture be not reported.

Our isolation and complete lack of sense of threat produces this funny attitude. As against comparative "developed" countries we now rank among the smallest anywhere as an armed power.

We give very little time and emphasis to our military capability. This is both the cause and the result of an excessive dependency on our present large allies, Britain, America and Australia. This might prove some day to be a dangerous and vicious circle.

First, our lack of arms against what will prove to be not a small but a very big threat to get this far. involves us in our present three treaties. These assume that our national interest which we are defending goes beyond our shores to the minor allies in Asia, and to general stability in the area. Fair enough. But second, we are involved in three treaties — SEATO. ANZUS, ANZAM—all three of which could be invoked at once, all three of which could involve a substantial number of our forces at a very distant incident, and any one of which could involve us gradually in a very big war.

So our few forces mean three treaties and substantial obligations to fight which we (couldn't do. without, say. conscription. Reverse the argument, build up the forces in alliance with Australia to give us safety and flexibility of response, and we could rehash or even scrap the treaty system.

Australia. Britain and the USA are each tied by treaty to come to our defence. In exactly what situations they would do so is rather up to them. The wording of the treaties can be taken in at least two ways. However, as we are unlikely to be beseiged or invaded in isolation, each power will probably be fighting long before we're hit. Except for the vulnerability of the sea-lanes, our isolation from Asia, the only area which really threatens, makes the treaties quite excessive for almost all conceivable situations.

Unfortunately, for the price of our treaties, we are substantially committed to fighting in other people's wars. The direct relevance of. say, a war in East Asia to ourselves is usually interpreted by a process vague to the point of absolute inpenetrability. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that either Britain or America, on whom we now rely for help in our defence, will stay indefinitely in the area. With an end to the war in Vietnam, and a new administration in Washington, the Americans might be very glad to start pulling out.

In the nude

Britain has indicated, through the defence review and Mr. Bowden in Canberra in February, that her involvement in the area will be reduced, while keeping the options open. So we will probably be helping to foot the bill some day for a combined British-Australian-New Zealand base in North Australia. This is probably the sort of arrangement which would most suit Britain's policy and budget.

Australia's spending on defence is now almost exactly 10 times our own. But she is still well away from total selfsupport. So while the letter of the treaties might remain, the substance of their fulfilment could just conceivably melt away.

We would be very suddenly in the nude.

Anyone with our relaxed attitude in a world arming to the teeth, with at least three arms-races now going on (Latin America. AmericaRussia-China, Israel-Arabs) must be either very safe or a fool. Obviously we're not the former, in our present stance of dependency. One can only conclude that we're the latter.

There is really no alternative way to diplomatic and strategic flexibility other than to arm for war to keep the, peace. As our interest so often coincide with Australia's, this sugggests common action in deployment. If any lesson stands out in history, it must, be that international goodwill is not, ever, a guarantee of a nation's peace. The road to hell has been paved with such good intentions. In the long run we have no friends: only interests. So good diplomacy and good defence are complementary aims.

Setting woolly-minded sentiment aside and bringing a little cold logic to bear, what is the actual nature of the threat? How safe are we?

Sadly the Vietnam debate seems to be cooling with no answer to this in sight. However, any threat there is must come either from the sea. the air, or overland across Australia. To even an optimist, the Asian theatre shows signs of getting a lot worse before it gets better. So the body of the threat comes from the danger of catalytic warfare in Asia involving us.

Such a war could come for many reasons: strategic, ideological, accidental, escalation out of a local conflict, for reasons of economics, selfdefence and peversity. Wars start, not in the minds of men. but because there's nothing really to stop them. They are an extension of diplomacy, a forceable expression of one's point of view. Possibly we should be amazed, not at how many wars there are (four or five moderate ones each year) but at how few.

In order of ascending seriousness, we now stand the risk off:

1.Sabotage of our overseas' interests, say by guerrillas as in Malaysia.
2.Sabotage of vital sealanes.
3One-country swoop on Australia, for which only Indonesia and Japan seem now to have the potential resources.
4A major non-nuclear Asian war, which would almost certainly come to involve America. Russia. Britain and possibly a European state or , two.

Nuclear war

5A general nuclear war.

This list is not exhaustive. Nor is it in order of probability. One stage could rapidly move into another. However, it illustrates the variety of threats for which we have to plan. The commonest sort of war in the nuclear age is the relatively small, but still possibly serious, brushfire type, fought with conventional weapons in a limited area like Vietnam. The biggest power's have been marginally or centrally involved in most of them.

America's interest has been, predominantly, the containment of Communism while it turns from the ideological society to the managerial society, as it appears to be doing in Russia. This, naturally, will take rather longer in an underdeveloped country like China, so America is following a policy which could be very long-term and possibly self-defeating. So America is likely to be involved, with us. in most of the ideological wars coming up.

Britain sees her military role in Asia, as anywhere, as being more a peace-keeping one. Here again, with the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, we could be involved in a foreign war. Britain's main advantage as an ally in this area is that she is likely to be able to police the main searoutes.

In short, our present lack of flexibility in our defensive arrangements and forces makes us less, not more, safe than we would otherwise be because it causes us to be so intimately tied in with the major powers. Little powers are always unwise to place their faith entirely in big powers. Big powers have many conflicting interests. For Britain and America, many of these do not relate to Asia at all. For instance, take this hypothetical case. Russia wishes to fulfill some modest ambition in. say. Asia, so to keep American involvement at a minimum she starts a threatening build-up around Berlin.

It is this kind of balanceof-threat situation, going on all the time, which could act on us like a vice. With four nuclear powers in this areaChina. America. Russia and Britain—and with French nuclear submarines now being, perfected, the situation has its complications. Imagine Japan land India both producing weapons and delivery systems.

The short-term answer to New Zealand's defence problems is complicated by the serious situation of our overseas reserves. All our material purchases require dollars and sterling. But in the long term, our spending could be at least brought in line with that of Australia's on a per capita basis. How it would be spent is a tricky matter. If we really committed ourselves to fielding a joint team with Australia, obviously the more complementary the weapons the less the strain on logistics.

Re-assessment

Primarily, any substantial re-orientation of our defence and strategic posture would require a re-assessment of New Zealand's place in Asia. In terms of defence, it obviously is just not on our doorstep. We are on the very fringe of the area. A vast amount could happen in Asia which would not remotely touch us. Were we to continue cur aid programmes on at least the same basis as before, and politely disengage from any military action not directly relevant to ourselves, Australia and certain of the Polynesian islands, we could make our world a much safer place.

"Dogs! Do you want to live for ever!" Frederick the Great lashed at some hesitant guards. One's sympathies go out to these honest fellows. No-one but a lunatic could long to be a dead hero. Immortality is really a very short-term sort of aim. People who make wars are obviously to be deplored, but there are plenty of them around. So long as there are. it would seem that in this world discretion is the better part of valour.