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Salient: Victoria University Students' Paper. Vol. 28, No. 7. 1965.

The Present Dilemma

The Present Dilemma

All participants agreed that [unclear: th] issues in South Vietnam were [unclear: in] credibly complex: equally, all [unclear: par]ties were prepared to tackle [unclear: thes] issues forthrightly.

Has the USA a right to be [unclear: i] South Vietnam in the first place is containment a viable policy What of the "Domino theory"? [unclear: T] what extent is the Viet Cong [unclear: a] indigenous movement, to what extent is it controlled by Ho [unclear: Ch] Minh? What is the exact role [unclear: o] North Vietnam in the present [unclear: con]flict? Of China? Of Russia? Is [unclear: th] USA policy toward China [unclear: realist] in the present setting? What is [unclear: th] USA policy toward China? Have [unclear: w] done enough to bring about [unclear: politico] economic stability in this area; Is not such a policy a better [unclear: defenc] against a countervailing [unclear: ideolog] than open warfare?

If Hanoi wanted to stop the Viet Cong Could they?

All these and many other questions were debated—for the most part in a calm and rational fashion —by both sides. To deal with all the questions and all the answers that were proposed would be manifestly impossible in a short article and would be an injustice to the complexity of those issues. The following summary points emerged:

On the Indigenous Support for the Viet Cong:

"It is widely agreed that the Viet Cong controls 50 per cent of [unclear: rura] South Vietnam. The Viet Cong is successful not because of its socioeconomic policy but because of its organisational skills: organisational control does not necessarily mean widespread public support Contrarily, there is evidence against such widespread public support: The Diem regime made many enemies, yet few of them joined the Viet Cong." (Professor Robert A Scalapino, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley: Principal speaker in favour of the Administration's policy).

"It is agreed by the supporters of USA Government policy that the Viet Cong is a carbon copy of the Viet Minh. The Viet Minn led the revolution against the French —could they have led such a revolution without the support of the people?" (Professor Williams, Wisconsin).

• Of Violence, Terror, Destruction and Murder:

"There has been violence, terror and murder on both sides — to establish where or on whose shoulders the balance of terror lies is a fruitless pastime and serves no useful purpose." (Professor Scalapino).

page 7

This was one of the few [unclear: oints] of unanimity.

Of the Role of North Vietnam:

"While there is considerable [unclear: con- uence] of interests between Hanoi [unclear: nd] the Viet Cong, can we [unclear: auto-atically] assume that the two are [unclear: e] and the same? Is this congru-[unclear: ce] of interest sufficient to enable [unclear: anoi] to recall the Viet Cong? [unclear: ould] they do so?" (Professor [unclear: ahin]).

"In 1963 the North Vietnamese [unclear: mmunist] Party abandoned its [unclear: utrality] and allied itself with [unclear: iping] this must have had some feet on the policy formation of [unclear: orth] Vietnam as a whole."

"The Viet Cong are clearly linked Hanoi; Hanoi is clearly linked China. But, If on all sides we [unclear: ust] ask the question 'What does [unclear: a] think and say?' then per-[unclear: ps] Asian Nationalism is doomed [unclear: on] the start." (Both Professor [unclear: alapino]).

Comment: Clearly the role of [unclear: orth] Vietnam is critical in the [unclear: etnamese] conflict: it was clear [unclear: om] the debate that not enough is known as to the level of indig-[unclear: ous] support for the Viet Cong in [unclear: uth] Vietnam It is equally clear, [unclear: ing] newspaper and information [unclear: ports] as a criterion, that the USA Administration is not suffic-[unclear: ntly] clear on this point.

If the Viet Cong is an indigenous [unclear: ovement] can military action [unclear: ainst] North Vietnam be sustained [unclear: plomatically], politically or mor-[unclear: ly]?

Contrarily if indigenous move-[unclear: ents] are being "used" by North [unclear: etnamese] agents for political [unclear: poses] then, in that case, a differ-[unclear: t] situation would clearly prevail, clear answers to the above questions are known, then they should more widely known.

Of China's Role:

"We (the USA) set ourselves [unclear: als] in South-East Asia which [unclear: not] be achieved by the means [unclear: e] are willing to employ. If you [unclear: se] yourself the wrong question [unclear: u] find it extremely complex to [unclear: ve] a simple and correct answer [unclear: here] is an essential contradiction [unclear: tween] what we profess to want [unclear: d] the policies and risks we are [unclear: epared] to employ … If you [unclear: ally] want to achieve in Asia what [unclear: e] spokesmen for our government [unclear: y] they want to achieve in Asia, they must be prepared to go to [unclear: ar] with China." (Professor Hans [unclear: rgenthau], professor of Political [unclear: ience] and Director, Centre for [unclear: e] Study of American Foreign pol-[unclear: y], University of Chicago).

"We (the USA) sit here with a [unclear: jection] of Asia as we would want We upset the non-aligned. We [unclear: ing] in far more arms than our [unclear: ponents]. A great deal has happened in the last 20 years, but not the field of Sino-USA relations, [unclear: n] the USA hope to contain China [unclear: hen] she does not even have offic-[unclear: l] relations or contacts with that [unclear: untry]?" (Professor Mary Wright, [unclear: ofessor] of History, Yale Univer-[unclear: ty].)

"Can China be contained mili-[unclear: rily], when in fact her influence exerted politically, economically [unclear: d] diplomatically?" (Professor [unclear: rgenthau]).

Of American Military Activities:

"The introduction of USA troops [unclear: d] increased air power is a com-[unclear: ensatory] move to overcome polit-[unclear: al] instability. Can the USA, by self, bring about stability? As resident Kennedy said, 'In the [unclear: nal] analysis it's their war—they [unclear: he] Vietnamese) are the ones who [unclear: ave] to win or lose it. We can help [unclear: em]. We can give them equip-[unclear: ent]. We can send our men out [unclear: ere] as advisers. But they have win the war'." (Professor Kahin).

"Is the present military pledge of any military or political group in [unclear: etnam]? Can the USA 'hold' [unclear: etnam]? If so, how many men [unclear: ould] be needed? Or, does our [unclear: ledge] to support Vietnam not demand a minimum degree of per-[unclear: rmance] and co-operation from [unclear: aigon]—political as well as mili-[unclear: ry] Does our pledge to support [unclear: at] country not also demand some [unclear: gree] of popular support for the [unclear: overnment] of that country? To [unclear: ontain] South Vietnam militarily, has been estimated that the USA [unclear: ould] need to use up to one million [unclear: en]. The United States does not have forces of this size immediately available: to send a small proportion of this number of men would use up our entire strategic reserve. We would be over-committed, and we would endanger our obligations elsewhere." (Professor Kahin).

"If we do pull out of Vietnam then there will be war." (Professor Scalapino).