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Salient: Victoria University Students' Paper. Vol. 25, No. 6. 1962.

Cupboard love and a guilty conscience — The Roots of New Zealand Policy

Cupboard love and a guilty conscience

The Roots of New Zealand Policy

"Why not let the people of N.Z. keep ourselves as pure a European race as we possibly can?" No, this is not a quotation from the tirade of some present-day anti-immigration rebel. It is part of a speech made by Sir George Grey in 1880, quoted by Con. Bollinger in a talk to the W.A.C. on Wednesday, April 11.

In spite of our large Polynesian minority, he said, "we are essentially a piece of transplanted Europe, an offshoot of British 19th century civilisation." As far as foreign policy is concerned, this has meant that up until the Statute of Westminster in 1937, we remained the "Loyalist daughter" of a country thought of as "home" and the provider of all benefits and stimuli.

Through the supply of wool and meat to alleviate the growing pains of industrial Britain, "we became, in fact, an integral though far-flung part of the British metropolitan economy."

After producing these facts concerning N.Z.'s primary allegiance, Mr Bollinger then went on to discuss the relation of N.Z. towards its geographical neighbours. "A wave of Asian immigration in the period of the gold rushes and afterwards, caused a genuine panic." Rather too obviously, this fear was only the result of a guilty conscience over our favoured position at the fringe of an underfed and over-populated Asian mainland.

And this it was that inspired the Chinese Immigration Bill, during whose debate Sir George Grey made the remark quoted at the head of this report. At the same debate, the supposedly humanitarian Seddon said, "There is about the same distinction between a European and a Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a monkey." If leaders of a country could say this sort of nonsense, the irrational fears of the people themselves must have been considerable.

After switching to the justly feared Japanese efforts of expansion during the Second World War this fear has now turned full-circle, by returning its object to China and becoming aligned with the current "red peril."

The war itself was another indication of our foreign policy in times of national emergency. As has been seen, N.Z.'s economy has been so closely knit into that of Britain's, that military bonds are also strong. Froude. in the 1880's, noted that "the patriotism of the colonists was as inflammable as gun powder." And the Victorian era was typified by an attitude of "royalty-loyalty." Few objected to N.Z.'s participation in the Boer War, but among the dissenters was the Young N.Z. Party ("a capitalist war") and students from Victoria University, then in its first year.

The most outspoken anti-militarists during the outbreak of World War I were undoubtedly members of the Labour movement. Considering this vitality's existence so long ago, it is a wonder that the idea of international fraternity of labour pushes its way ahead so slowly. But then, ignorance and prejudice are very considerable barriers to such an idea.

Actually, Labour's golden hour was the period 1933-39. Because of N.Z.'s own struggle to implement a social programme, sympathy with democracies in a similar situation was deep and widespread. N.Z.'s stand in the League of Nations was completely against the appeasement policy of the Chamberlain era.

But soon war was upon us once again, and Savage returned to the loyalist cry: "Where Britain goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand." This war brought about two changes in our foreign attitudes:—
(i)Gave "Yellow peril" some basis (Japan's aims)
(ii)Shift of military allegiance from Britain to U.S., and Australia after Pearl Harbour, Guadalcanal, Tarawa.

The anti-Japanese attitude reached its highest point during this time when Semple was moved to describe the Asiatics as "slit-eyed yellow dogs."

The two major foreign policy moves have also reflected this pro-U.S., anti-Asia attitude.

Anzus Pact (1951) has been labelled a "high-class bribe" to gain Australian and N.Z. acceptance of limited re-armament in Japan, while offering the two countries support in the times of militarist attack.

Seato Alliance (1954) has only faintly recognised the Asian countries it is designed to help, is suspected by Asian neutrals. Indeed, Soekarno, Nehru and other leaders have all expressed doubt whether such another "western bloc" alliance can, or really wants to, help the peoples towards whom it is directed. N.Z. entry is wholly due to the newly re-oriented attitude to the "great white hope" of the U.S.

In this light, it seems fair that, should Britain join the Common Market, N.Z. is justified in breaking ties with the "mother-country" completely. So in conclusion, the two basic elements of our previous foreign policy:
(i)Oedipus-complex towards Britain
(ii)Guilt-haunted fear of "yellow peril"

are seen to be gradually dissolving with a more realistic approach. Such schemes as the Colombo Plan may have a strategic background, but seem, from the N.Z. standpoint, to have nothing but a good result as far as understanding and sympathy are concerned.

The true realisation must be that the only path to proper security lies in closer ties with Asia.

—M.B.