Philosophy of Doubt

Eagerness for certitude and the tendency to dogmatise are only two of many reasons why more doubt must be the slogan of a University. Add to these the littleness of Man's knowledge compared with the vastness of the yet unexplored, and the melancholy fact that time and time again unanimous opinions of the ablest men have been shattered by new evidence. In theology as In all other fields. Consider, too, the maelstrom of propaganda in this modern age. Mark Twain one said to Rudyard Kipling—"Young man, when you are about to write anything, first make sure of the facts; then you can distort them as you please."

Only by assiduous practice of the first part of this advice can we guard ourselves against the exponents of the second. For all these and other reasons let the student be a doubting Thomas not a worshipping disciple. Let him assume no infallible authority; neither Pope nor Professor, neither Bible nor Bulletin. Let him, in short, take the Royal Society's motto, "Nullius in Verba," which Haldane paraphrased, "Take nobody's word for it." Action, as Newman said, may be retarded by acting too rigidly on the motto. But look before you leap is a better guiding principle than leap before you look.

Even if my arguments are not free from personal bias, the conflict is real enough between the bases of religion and of University education. As it is between those of religion and science. This latter is discussed at length in Bertrand Russell's Religion and Science and more briefly in Whitehead's Science and the Modern World. Whitehead, one of the deepest thinkers of our time, said there—"It is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends on the decision of this generation as to the relations between them." Diatribes will not solve the problem; nor censorship, nor repression. The function of Universities is one that must breed agnosticism and heretical opinion; must undermine what is usually meant by faith. And both education and religion are frustrated if students have to juggle with two opposing attitudes to opinion—unquestioning acceptance and critical analysis. It is possible, often quite easy, to hold contrary opinions, applying each in different spheres of activity. Perhaps few of us are entirely free from this confusion. But can it be defended as a deliberate method of study?