Assimilation and rangatiratanga

From the late 1930s, the indigenous population of New Zealand began to increase very rapidly, largely because of 'a sharp decrease in Maori mortality'. The trend reflected a number of the developments discussed in this book, culminating in the Labour government's aims to include Maori in all the benefits of the welfare state. Assimilationist policies not only gelled with these Labour aspirations to raise the living standards of all disadvantaged New Zealanders, but also appeared to an increasing number of policy makers to suit the post-war indigenous situation particularly well and should therefore be accelerated. Not only were growing numbers of Maori physically separating themselves from their homelands, but other trends were relevant too – such as aspects of the ongoing reorganisation of farming of Maori-owned lands. Those which fitted official ideology were encouraged by the state, sometimes in turn feeding into the accelerated assimilation thesis. With regard to those Maori staying in the tribal regions, for example, the Department of Maori Affairs noted in 1949 that population concentration through consolidation was 'being widely promoted' because it 'had the advantage of being the most comprehensive method of approximating the goal of individual, or at least compact family titles'. This would bring Maori closer to the European model of land ownership and lifestyle modes.

In view of the multi-faceted strengthening of assimilationist pressures, Maori leaders and others promoting rangatiratanga had, at times, to adopt temporary fall-back positions as the major focus of their effort – such as page 248saving selected aspects of Maori culture from obliteration. But they never ceased to stress that their grand goal remained Maori self-determination. Thus Tirikatene, in his capacity as the highest official representative of his people, had cause to remind the Prime Minister that 'the fusion of the Maori people into the community of New Zealand as an integral part of it does not mean that the movement is to turn the Maori into a pakeha'.

For the state, in contrast, assimilation not only remained the ultimate item on the strategic agenda for Maori, but it also now seemed more achievable. An increasing number of bureaucrats and politicians believed that demographic, urbanising, farming and other trends within Maoridom held out hope that tangible progress could be made on this elusive goal. The Maori Welfare Organisation, a temporary measure in any case, might be able to assist assimilatory progress through its assigned work on socio-economic levelling and equalising.

Conversely, one question being asked in many Maori circles in the later 1940s was how far the welfare organisation could be used to resist assimilationist imperatives and pressures – or, better still, to assist autonomist impulses and strategies. Even if it might be an exaggeration to assess that the new committees were, from a Maori point of view, 'only a shell of the effective organisations' of the MWEO, the task faced by those attempting to harness them to the cause of rangatiratanga was huge.

Self-determinationists often did not think the effort worthwhile. In some quarters, for example, Maori leaders or rank and file continued to work through organisations which had been operating in wartime, officially or unofficially, and which remained in place informally. In some places these constituted effective rivals to welfare organisation committees, while in others they complemented them – or filled a space where official committees had not gone (sometimes because the unofficial institutions were there first). Because of the stigma within Maoridom that resulted from getting too close to the government, some of the welfare organisation committees resisted direction from head office, risking loss of access to resourcing.

Some of the fiercely independent branches of the Maori Women's Health League also functioned as local expressions of rangatiratanga, page 249however limited their formal aims might be. Yet such was the level of post-war Maori suspicion of a government which had dashed so many of their hopes that, because league groups needed to have some dealings with the authorities and because Maori Affairs tried to woo them, they too were sometimes viewed as creatures of 'pakeha Wellington'. All the same, they formed one section of a remarkable new development, the beginnings of a pan-tribal movement among Maori women.

Given that the tribal committees were mostly male-dominated, Maori women often tended to group together to focus on things of most interest to their own lives – issues such as family, health and housing. They were particularly inclined to organise as a result of their 'liberating' experiences during the war, when – especially when the men were away – they were often crucial for the success of the MWEO. In some areas Maori komiti wahine/women's committees had been created to assist the official war effort, and some of them continued on after the war.

Royal and other officials came to see the usefulness of women's groupings able to assist the tribal committees in 'aspects of welfare which are the prerogative of women', and encouraged existing ones to flourish and new ones to form. Maori Affairs and government alike, however, noted that such groups had thriven despite being outside the tribal executive and tribal committee structures – and perhaps sometimes because of it. The results were so positive that from 1949 the welfare officers were formally charged with assisting activist Maori women to establish a network of women's welfare committees.

The committees' main role was officially stated as bringing 'professional guidance' to Maori women in both home and marae settings. Royal had intended that they would eventually merge with the Maori Women's Health League, but the latter was cautious, fearing that this would add to perceptions that its autonomy was under threat. Moreover, the Crown's assimilationist agenda continued to worry some of the league branches: while they wished to acquire western expertise, they also aimed to incorporate tikanga Maori. Conversely, elements in the department feared that any such merger would lead to domination by the branches.

Despite their increasing official links, the women's welfare committees were often able, in effect, to operate autonomously. They could page 250concentrate on their own agendas rather than on those of the Crown's agents to a degree that the more entrenched and elected official tribal committee members could not. They were assisted in this capacity by the broad-ranging nature of their 'welfare' brief, which allowed them to work under the auspices of the 1945 Act without too much tension, and which fostered a sense of nationwide unity – their goals were uncontestable. A feeling soon grew, in fact, that the committees would be more effective if they acquired a united voice. Some began to talk of a national body that could become a powerful tool for distilling the experiences of its flax-root members and creating policies and platforms that could influence the government's words and deeds.

Some officials and politicians could see that such a body could also be a useful conduit for information flow, upwards and downwards, so long as there were some minimal safeguards. A national Maori women's organisation was seen as highly unlikely to challenge the indivisible authority of the state, a general reflection of the prevailing mores about the place of women in society, although there were others factors too. Several leading members of the welfare committee movement, for example, were educated, urban-based and interested in the practical realities of the migration experience. Their perspectives were far different from those of the traditionalist men who dominated many of the tribal committees and tribal executives, and the state could see their significance for assisting in the social adjustment to city life.

While the united voice of the women's welfare committees might sometimes put uncomfortable pressure on the government, then, it could also assist official aims of various types, including assimilationist ones. The league dropped out of preparatory discussions in reaction to the high profile of Maori Affairs in the developments, but welfare officers continued to encourage the women's committees to consider forming a nationwide organisation with a central secretariat. Over time, informal discussions led to official consultation, and a draft constitution was developed and then adopted at a conference in Rotorua in 1950. Female welfare officers, in particular, put a great deal of energy into taking this initiative further, helping establish district councils on a regional basis preparatory to setting up a national body.

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By March 1951 there were 160 welfare committees, with 14 district councils co-ordinating their activities, and membership was around 2500. That September a general conference of the welfare committees was held in Wellington, with delegates from what had now grown to 187 branches which reported to district organisations, and 27 independent 'isolated branches'. There had been a last effort to persuade the Maori Women's Health League to attend, but it remained sceptical that it could retain its decentralised structure and independence in the face of Maori Affairs' overview. A draft constitution was presented and endorsed, and the Maori Women's Welfare League, a powerful force for rangatiratanga, was founded.

Inside the Maori Welfare Organisation, rangatiratanga had made considerably lesser progress. In 1946 a book of instruction for American soldiers about New Zealand was republished. It pointed out that Maori communal endeavours and organisations 'live on persistently, to the puzzlement of Europeans, who are unaccustomed to seeing their scale of values cheerfully ignored'. The activities of some committees fitted this syndrome. While used to resistance to assimilation, the government would sometimes intervene when such tribal committees began to utilise the welfare organisation system to promote their own, autonomist perspectives – those trying, in effect, to reappropriate that which the Crown had bequeathed them from 'their' wartime organisation. Denial of any support was one method, and while some independently inclined committees did thrive despite this and other forms of state remonstrance, others 'found themselves floundering'.¹²²