Sir George Grey Pioneer of Empire in Southern Lands
High Commissioner of South Africa — (Continued) — 1854-1861. ætat 42-49Chapter XII — The Struggle for Federation
High Commissioner of South Africa
1854-1861. ætat 42-49Chapter XII
The Struggle for Federation
Settled policy of Her Majesty's Government before Sir George Grey's arrival in South Africa—Recognition of independent and buffer States—The High Commissioner's determined opposition to this policy—His heroic struggle for a united South Africa under the British flag—Successful opposition to Mr. Shepstone's scheme, and to the Boer Separatists in Natal—Beginning of the struggle for Federation in 1856—Petition for inclusion from the Orange River State—The brilliant dispatch of August 1858—Objects to be attained by Federation—The proposed form of the Constitution—Rejection of Sir George Grey's proposals by the Imperial Government—Recall of the High Commissioner—Justification of Sir Bulwer Lytton—Grey's repeated acts of disobedience in South Africa—The settlement of the Anglo-German Legion—Negotiations for the introduction of German families—Opposition to the reduction of the Kaffrarian vote—Reinstatement of Sir George Grey by the Duke of Newcastle on specified conditions.
Deeply as Grey felt about the objectionable clauses in the treaty, and anxious as he was for the suppression of slavery, it must not be imagined that his relations with the Boers were unfriendly. He knew little about the settlers beyond the Vaal, and wrote in contemptuous language about their government, but for the people of the Orange Free State he entertained great respect. He was indeed of the opinion that England had inflicted serious injury upon them by abandoning the sovereignty, and even went so far in his protests to British ministers as to question the legality of depriving subjects of their allegiance without an Act of Parliament. In his opinion the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty was a mistake, and he said so page 165plainly: "I have always regarded our retirement from that country, and the principle upon which it was effected, as a great misfortune to South Africa." And each year's experience strengthened his conviction that he was right.
But before the arrival of Sir George Grey in South Africa British ministers had determined to arrest any further extension of Empire by recognizing the existence of independent and "buffer" States, and discouraging any additional acquisitions of native territory. It is the fashion now-a-days to denounce this policy, and regard it as one of the most lamentable among the many instances of Downing Street incapacity. But it is too often forgotten that the policy was adopted out of consideration for the British tax-payer, whose resources were being strained to the uttermost. The "impolicy of Downing Street" is most apparent to those who do not take the trouble to inquire into the actual difficulties with which Imperial ministers were beset. Nevertheless the general experience of the past fifty years, and in particular the effects of Mr. Gladstone's easy benevolence in the eighties, indicate clearly enough that whatever might be urged in mitigation, it is a policy fraught with disaster for South Africa; and a glance at the accompanying map will show that it was one which during Sir George Grey's administration involved the High Commissioner in great difficulties.
Border belts have ever been the scenes of strife and confusion, and when the Basuto wished to remark upon the universality of misery he would say "all countries have their borders." When Sir George Grey went to South Africa there were borders everywhere. In Cape Colony there were page 166really two distinct settlements separated by a mountainous and uninhabited country extending over a distance of 500 miles; to the north-east was another province ruled by proclamation, and known as British Kaffraria. Hundreds of miles beyond that again, and separated from it by Kaffirland proper, was the Colony of Natal, abutting on the Boer Republics to the west, and Zululand to the north. Basutoland lay between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State, and every war that was waged between them caused unrest among the British subjects of Cape Colony in the immediate neighbourhood. The independence of the Republic beyond the Vaal was recognized in 1852, and the Orange River Sovereignty was abandoned the following year. Against this policy of separation, Grey definitely set himself, contending that if it were encouraged "South Africa must continue for years a mere chaotic mass of fermenting elements, in which while one difficulty is being crushed another is breaking out." He was therefore clearly at variance with Imperial ministers on this important question of policy, and the history of his administration proves that his mind was more definitely made up than theirs.
Shortly before his arrival Mr. Shepstone, a man of considerable ability and of great influence among the native tribes on the frontiers of Natal, had been negotiating with the British Government for the removal of 50,000 Zulus into Faku's country, where he was to rule over them as a practically independent prince. The scheme was not without reasons to recommend it. Trained to the use of arms by Tschaka and Dingaan, the Zulus were a formidable race, page 167and crossing the Tugela in great numbers they became a source of danger to the Government of Natal. At the end of 1854 there were 8,500 Europeans in that Colony, and 100,000 natives. The Imperial authorities had therefore, on the representations of Mr. Shepstone, offered no opposition to his scheme provided that England was involved in no further expense by putting it into effect. Shortly after his arrival Sir George Grey wrote to the Colonial Secretary against it, urging among other reasons that it was likely to cause trouble further south. He gained his point, and in 1856 Mr. Labouchere not only revoked the provisional instructions issued to Mr. Shepstone in 1855 empowering him to act, but instructed the High Commissioner not to sanction directly or indirectly any measures for putting the scheme into effect.
This was not the only victory he secured against the separatists in Natal.
It is hardly possible that a more singular and daring petition has ever been presented to the governor of any British province than the one transmitted by the Dutch immigrants of Natal in the early years of Sir George Grey's administration. Having asserted that they were entirely different from the English in religion, language, manners and customs, they declared that they had only become British subjects by force of circumstances. They therefore petitioned for a free and independent government such as had been granted to their friends and relatives north and south of the Vaal. The petition concluded with a warning that, if their request were not granted, "the old fire of exasperation might easily be revived and trouble ensue;" page 168for, said they, "we never will be, nor can become good or faithful subjects of the English Government!" Acting on the advice of a strongly-worded dispatch from the High Commissioner, the Colonial Secretary simply replied that no hope of attaining to a separate government could be held out to the petitioners.
But Grey was not content merely to arrest the tendency to further disintegration. Just as he strove for a policy of settlement in Kaffraria by which the natives would be more closely associated with the Europeans, so he strove for a closer unity not only for the scattered British possessions, but for all the European settlers in South Africa. The object of his ambition is clearly set down in a dispatch which he wrote at the close of 1856, wherein he advocated "a federal union amongst all these territories in which great individual freedom of action should be left to each province, whilst they would all be united under British rule." What he wanted, in short, was a "united South Africa under the British flag." He therefore wrote asking Her Majesty's Government if they might not be disposed to retrace the step which led to the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty. This Mr. Labouchere declined to discuss on the ground that "the policy of recognizing by treaty the formation of independent states on the frontiers of British possessions by emigrant British subjects, and thus raising an effectual barrier to the system of continual and indefinite expansions of the frontiers towards the interior, has now been for some time established."
But Grey was not to be denied. Mr. Labouchere went out of office, and another dispatch in 1857 informed Sir page 169Bulwer Lytton "that the inhabitants of the Orange Free State intended to ask to be included in a Federal government with Cape Colony." The High Commissioner therefore requested that instructions in this matter should be sent him. Before this dispatch reached England the Colonial Secretary had asked Grey to give his opinion on the incorporation of British Kaffraria with Cape Colony, and on the Federation of the South African Colonies generally. It has been said by one writer on South Africa that Sir George Grey "dreamed" of Federation in the middle of the last century. The dispatch which he wrote in August 1858 shows that it was a very wide-awake dream indeed. It is the best he ever wrote, and extends over nineteen pages.
There were two great practical difficulties which a federal union would do much to overcome: the discontent of the inland provinces in regard to customs duties, and the constant liability to native wars. The revenues derived from duties levied at Capetown, Simons Bay, Port Elizabeth, and East London had been placed under the control of the Cape Legislature for the sole benefit of that Colony. Those levied at the Port of Durban were used exclusively for the benefit of Natal. This gave rise to much jealousy and dissatisfaction in British Kaffraria and the Orange River Sovereignty, where the consumers of goods derived no benefit from the duties imposed. Under a federal system of government it would be possible to devise some scheme whereby the customs duties might be proportionally divided according to the several populations of the territories that really paid them.
The second difficulty was even more pressing. Grey page 170had frequently pointed out that want of union among the white races had emboldened the Kaffirs to make raids upon the European settlements, and in March 1857 had expressed the conviction that "it is by a federal union alone that these South African Colonies can be made so strong and so united in policy and action that they can support themselves against the native tribes." He complained bitterly that Kreli took every opportunity of fomenting discord among the natives when England was embarrassed by war with other countries; and also that without any apparent reference to its effect upon Cape Colony the government of the Orange Free State would go to war with the Basutos, and force the British subjects on their border into a condition of armed neutrality. By a federal union the prestige and power of the white races would be increased to such an extent as to render improbable any native war on a large scale in the future, and even if war were actually resolved upon, the fact that it could not be undertaken except by general consent would be a guarantee that there would be power and determination to carry it through efficiently.
Other results of the utmost importance to South Africa would follow from the attainment of a position of security: a stimulus would be given to trade, and the resources of the country developed. At the time of Grey's arrival in South Africa the opinion prevailed in some quarters that a Kaffir war was indispensable for the introduction and circulation of capital; that the country was important mainly from its position as a military station; and that a peace policy would be ruinous. In the judgment of the High Commissioner such views were founded entirely in error.page break
South Africa was, he believed, a great country with commercial possibilities that might be developed to any extent; and so far did he carry conviction among the colonists before the end of his administration, that they were willing to contribute large sums of money in support of a policy whose chief object was the maintenance of peace.
Nor was Grey unmindful of the value of federation in its effects upon the character of the settlers. Under the policy of separation South Africa had become a land of small states, wherein petty and parochial disputes were rife. By means of federation the people would at once be brought into touch with wider questions. Statesmen would arise whose business it would be to deal with questions of policy as broad as the interests they had to consider and provide for; while the increased facilities for education would lead to advancement in arts and civilization by training lawyers, divines, and men with literary tastes. It is easy to recognize in this the anxiety of the founder of Grey College, Bloemfontein, for the cultivation of a wider outlook among the Boers who had spent their lives on the frontiers of civilization.
And, finally, he considered that it was the duty of Great Britain to encourage some such scheme in the interests of humanity. If ever she were forced to retire from South Africa the settlers ought to be left in a condition in which they could provide at least tolerably well for their own safety, and ultimately attain to prosperity and greatness. If this were not done, anarchy and confusion would inevitably be the lot of the people, at least for a time, when left to their own resources.
The scheme which he outlined was one "in which great page 172individual freedom of action was left to each province, whilst they were yet all united under British rule." The general government was to be administered by a governor representing the British Crown, and assisted by a ministry responsible to a Legislature whose members were chosen by the people of the Federal States. The Legislature was to have power to pass laws on all general questions; to distribute the revenues proportionally; and provide for the general safety. There were also to be the ordinary local assemblies, with full and free scope in respect of all subjects which concerned their own happiness and prosperity, and possessing the rights of correspondence on all questions that affected the common weal. In addition to the number of States already existing, he suggested that Cape Colony might be divided into two or three parts. The Orange Free State had already expressed a desire to be included, and in time the Transvaal Republic might find itself forced by pressure of circumstances to join. Such were the means by which Sir George Grey hoped to remedy the most grievous ills of that distracted country, and raise it to a position of dignity among the countries of the world. When Mr. Chamberlain was at Johannesburg during his visit to South Africa he told his audience at the Wanderers' Club that "the day of small Kingdoms and States, with their petty and parochial jealousies, is past; the future belongs to the great Empires of the earth." Sir George Grey realized this half-a-century earlier; and had his views been accepted then, there would in all probability have been no necessity to allay a feeling of bitterness which is one of the legacies of the late Boer war. "Had British ministers in times past been wise enough to follow your advice there page 173would undoubtedly be to-day a British dominion extending from Table Bay to the Zambesi…. What the result would have been upon the welfare of the human race is a question I need not discuss; but there can be no doubt from an Englishman's point of view, the fact that your policy in this direction was so often rejected can only be regarded as a calamity." This was written by Mr. F. W. Reitz in October 1893.
But even in the knowledge of all that has happened since, there is something unfair in the vehement denunciations of the "impolicy of Downing Street" so frequently heard in recent years. No doubt in the light of future events Sir George Grey was right in urging his policy; and it may well be that the circumstances were such as to justify its adoption even then. But British ministers did not adhere to their own convictions without reason. The Empire was big enough. They were prepared to maintain the possessions already secured, but in the interests of the British taxpayer no further financial obligations should be undertaken. That was the policy affirmed by the Right Honourable Sir G. Grey in 1855, shortly after Sir George Grey's arrival in the country, and reaffirmed by the Duke of Newcastle in 1861, shortly before the Governor's departure for New Zealand. But there was another reason why Imperial ministers could not accede to the High Commissioner's wish: it would be inconsistent with the dignity of a great Empire to display such vacillation as would be manifested by the resumption of sovereignty in the Orange River territory after having so recently abandoned it. Such arguments are at least worthy of consideration, and especially the former. The Indian page 174Mutiny followed quickly upon the Crimean war, and the enormous expenditure involved left England in a state of financial exhaustion.
Sir Bulwer Lytton bestowed unstinted praise on the merits of the High Commissioner's dispatch, but informed him that Her Majesty's Government were "not prepared to depart from the settled policy of their predecessors by advising the resumption of British Sovereignty in any shape over the Free State." Meantime matters were proceeding apace in South Africa. Grey had not only encouraged the petitioners from the Orange River State, but had recommended their request to the consideration of the Cape Parliament in his speech before them on March 16, 1859: "You would, in my belief, confer a lasting benefit upon Great Britain, and upon the inhabitants of this country, if you could succeed in devising a federal form of government." After perusing this speech Sir Bulwer Lytton wrote the dispatch announcing the High Commissioner's recall.
Nor was there any other course open to him. It is true that the Imperial authorities had, on Grey's recommendation, revoked the provisional instructions issued to Mr. Shep-stone, and no doubt there was some ground for believing that when the Colonial Secretary asked him for his opinions on Federation, a change of policy was under consideration. But the request was made in a private dispatch and no mention was made of the Orange Free State. Despite all Grey's protestations to the contrary, he was guilty of disobedience in reference to a high act of policy. A study of the dispatches makes this sufficiently clear. In September 1858 Sir Bulwer Lytton reminded him that Her page 175Majesty's Government continued to be "strongly persuaded of the sound policy of maintaining the absolute separation of the Orange Free State from the British Dominions now that it has been accomplished;" and while awaiting the receipt of Grey's dispatch about Federation he warned him again on November 5 that "in the meantime your answer to all applications on the subject should be that you can say nothing without previous instructions from Her Majesty's Government." The receipt of this dispatch was acknowledged by Grey on January 13, 1859. It was two months later that he addressed the members of the Cape Parliament in favour of the petition from the Orange Free State.
But this high act of disobedience does not stand alone. It was only the last of a series from which it became clear to Imperial ministers that, where his own policy was in opposition to theirs, Grey was prepared to act in defiance of instructions. Sir Bulwer Lytton mentioned two, but there were more.
For the success of Grey's plan of settlement in British Kaffraria the introduction of settlers in large numbers was necessary, and within six months of his arrival he asked that 1,000 pensioners should be enrolled for agricultural and military work on the frontier. There were so few applications, however, that the matter was dropped. But in March 1856 the Colonial Secretary wrote a confidential dispatch informing the High Commissioner that the Crimean war was drawing to an end, and asking his advice concerning the settlement of an Anglo-German Legion on the frontier districts of Cape Colony. Grey was delighted with the idea, commended "the wise and prudent plan of Her Majesty's page 176Government," and induced the Colonial Parliament to guarantee £40,000, at the rate of £5 per head, for putting the scheme into effect Major Grant was sent out to confer with the Governor, and to give such additional information as might be needed in drawing up the preliminary arrangements. It is impossible now to discover the precise nature of the "additional information" supplied by Major Grant; but the Governor was under the impression that 8,000 soldiers were to be sent, and that they were to be accompanied with a "fair proportion of females." He was, however, doomed to disappointment. At the last moment the majority of those who were influenced by home ties and a feeling of patriotism declined to go. Eventually 2,300 arrived in the Colony, of whom 1,930 were males and 330 females!
From this time onward Grey argued that he had been the victim of a breach of contract. The men who arrived were, he declared, "the worst characters in the Legion, collected in some of the worst continental sea-ports;" and he pointed out how difficult under these conditions it would be to preserve even a moderate standard of morality and discipline. Time passed, and, when troubles came thick and fast upon him, he acted in such a way as to show that he in his turn considered himself justified in violating the conditions under which they were sent out. One of them stipulated that, if employed against the enemy, they were to receive the regular pay of Her Majesty's troops out of Imperial funds; but if used in aid of the civil power the Colonial Parliament must pay. In order to maintain discipline Grey kept them on active service, and therefore on page 177full pay, when there was no enemy in the field. In the early part of 1858 Lord Panmure instructed the Lieutenant-General of the forces that the "conditions" of settlement were being violated and the soldiers must be struck off full pay immediately. In due course Grey heard of this, and replied: "I shall do my best to induce the Lieutenant-General to refrain from acting on the recent orders until we can hear again from Her Majesty's Government," He succeeded, and Lieutenant-General Jackson asked to be indemnified for disobeying the instructions of the Secretary of State for War at the High Commissioner's request. In the dispute which followed, Grey defended himself by saying that if the soldiers were reduced to half pay it would be dangerous to travel through the country; and he sent home a report showing that five per cent. of them had already deserted and two had been hanged. He concluded the dispatch in a strain by no means exceptional when addressing himself indirectly to the War Office: "The censures of the Secretary of State for War have only made me more resolved to continue my duty to the Queen and to this country in such a manner that no fault can be justly found with me, and this without regarding what cost or sacrifice such a course entails upon me." He kept his word, and the soldiers of the legion were not reduced to half pay up to the time of his recall!
As with pay, so was it with the clothing of the troops. In 1858 Grey requisitioned 140 suits and 2,000 pairs of boots, and the bill was sent to the Secretary of State for War. There was nothing in the "conditions" of September 1856 to show that the Imperial authorities contemplated page 178such a responsibility; and Lord Panmure wrote at once to the Commanding Officer instructing him to recover the money; "by stoppage from the men to whom the clothing was issued." On hearing of this Grey wrote affirming that the soldiers had been sent from England "practically bootless," and he enlarged upon "their necessarily shabby, ragged and disreputable appearance." He concluded as before in the language of defiance: notwithstanding the order of the Secretary of State for War he had decided "with great reluctance" to depart from his instructions, "reiterated as these have been in such peremptory and positive terms." He would therefore order a supply of clothing from the military department, and "leave the question as to who shall defray the cost to be settled hereafter." It was ultimately adjusted—by the Imperial authorities; for in the first quarter of 1860 the Lords of the Treasury decided that the deficiency in connection with the army legion should be made up by the War Department.
But the War Office was destined to experience another rebuff still more galling. Lord Panmure had suggested in 1856 that a foreign legion should be sent to India; but the Board of Directors rejected his proposal on the ground that it was injudicious to make use of foreign troops in that dependency. Grey now (1858) decided to get the worst men of the legion off his hands by calling for volunteers for service in India. One thousand and twenty-eight offered, and they were dispatched forthwith, leaving only about one thousand in South Africa. The value of Grey's services in rendering timely assistance on the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny1 had page 179been recognized by the Imperial authorities, and he was no doubt relying on his personal prestige when he ventured upon so flagrant an act of defiance, and incurred so grave a responsibility. The War Office seems to have been reduced to silence, for the only official criticism that has yielded to investigation was contained in a dispatch from Lord Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which he expressed regret that so important a step should have been taken without previous reference to Her Majesty's Government or the Governor-General of India. But he had no doubt "that the removal of so large a portion of the legion would be beneficial to the Cape, as they had failed in the object of their introduction"!
Another quarrel arose out of the difficulties about the settlement of the Anglo-German Legion which affected more closely the relations between Grey and his immediate superior, the Colonial Secretary. In order to guard against the dangers which he foresaw in the great disproportion of males and females, Grey proposed that the Imperial authorities should send out German families, so that wives might be provided for the soldiers. At first there was some hesitation; but finally Mr. Labouchere decided that if the emigrants were as strenuous as they ought to be, their children would not be old enough to marry; and, further, that when all expenses were paid such an undertaking would involve an outlay of not less than £100,000. He therefore advised the High Commissioner to assist Irish females of good character to emigrate with a few good families. This dispatch was written on June 5, 1857, it reached Capetown in the Tynemouth on July 27, and its page 180receipt was acknowledged by Grey in a "separate" dated August 22.
Notwithstanding this he opened negotiations with a Hamburg firm on August 19, and six days later concluded an arrangement with Messrs. Goddefroy and Co. to send out 4,000 Germans, at a cost of £50,000, to be paid for by bonds bearing interest at six per cent, on the security of the Kaffrarian revenues. Now, at this time, the estimated expenditure of British Kaffraria was £60,000, and of this England contributed £40,000. When Lord Stanley heard of the arrangement he lost no time in explaining to Messrs. Goddefroy and Co. the source from which the Kaffrarian revenue was derived, and instructed them to arrest their plans for sending out emigrants to South Africa. On May 20 an agent of the firm crossed to England to explain to Lord Stanley that it was impossible to suspend operations entirely, as much had been done already on the authority of the High Commissioner, and their good name was at stake. Lord Stanley was therefore obliged to allow 1,600 emigrants to embark, and to pay £5,000 to cover the losses incurred by the suspension of the contract in regard to the rest. When the Colonial Secretary's remonstrance reached Grey, he defended himself by saying that at the time of making the arrangement he was not aware that Mr. Labouchere had rejected his proposals. Lord Stanley, referring to the date of his acknowledgment, pointed out that he "must have forgotten." A reference to the dates already quoted will show that his language might have been much more severe.
The other matter referred to by Sir Bulwer Lytton was page 181his opposition to the reduction of the Kaffrarian vote. In recommending his schemes for the civilization and improvement of the Kaffirs at the end of 1854, Grey asked for an imperial grant of £40,000 a year. He promised to effect a reduction after three years; and felt sure that after eight or ten years so much progress would be made that no further assistance would be required by the province from any extraneous source for these purposes. But the issue was not answerable to the design. In his estimates for 1858 no reduction was made. Lord Stanley recommended the Lords of the Treasury to continue the £40,000; but they replied by drawing attention to the cost of the war in India, and the state of the finances at home. The Colonial Secretary was therefore obliged to say that "with every disposition to hold out liberal aid to an administrator who possesses such high claims as you do to the consideration and confidence of Her Majesty's Government, it would not be justifiable to disregard the interests of the British taxpayer, by whom such ample contributions have already been made to the experiment of Kaffir improvement." The dispatch was highly eulogistic, but the instructions were decisive: Kaffrarian expenditure must be reduced on the spot.
Grey pleaded hard. He pointed out that by preventing war in South Africa, the British taxpayer had been relieved of the expenditure of great sums of money; that under his supervision the relations between the native and European races had so improved that he was able, on the outbreak of the Mutiny, almost to denude the country of troops, and dispatch them for service in India. Surely in the face of considerations like these it was wrong to throw his page 182schemes into jeopardy In order to save a paltry £20,000! Moreover, he argued that the determination of the Imperial authorities had taken him by surprise. He only received the dispatch in June, when he had already spent £14,000 of the ordinary vote; and he declared that it was now impossible for him to get through the year on less than £39,900 without serious injury to the Kaffrarian administration. Personally he was willing to do all he could to meet the wishes of the Imperial authorities. "I will give up my leave of absence, and immediately go to Kaffraria, where I will make every reduction in the expenditure which can safely be made, carefully watching the effect of each reduction. I will dispense with the services of the Secretary of the High Commissioner, making some other arrangement for the performance of the duties of that officer. The salary thus saved, and other trifling reductions which I can make, will effect a saving of nearly £1,000 per annum. I shall be able privately to get £6,000," There is something very attractive about this attitude of mind whereby an officer displays such genuine enthusiasm and self-sacrifice for the public weal.
But he pleaded in vain. It may reasonably be doubted whether some of Grey's schemes in Kaffraria were productive even of a considerable measure of the good which he attributed to them; but taken as a whole they were far in advance of any that had been tried before, not only in their effect upon the native tribes, but also in respect of the development of the resources of the country. It was heartrending to contemplate their abridgment, even though he had made promise of reduction three years before. But page 183the Lords of the Treasury were amply justified. The Indian Mutiny had followed closely upon the Crimean war, and Grey was all too likely to underestimate the strain upon the British taxpayer in his anxiety for the welfare of his own schemes in the Colonies.
Once more he decided to pursue his own course. The reductions which he was commanded to effect "on the spot" were not made, and in June 1859 Sir Bulwer Lytton wrote enclosing letters from the Treasury Chambers showing that the amounts voted by Parliament for British Kaffraria were exceeded by £46,495! Grey was instructed to do all that he could "to clear up these accounts," as well as to exhibit the objects to which the large surplus expenditure had been devoted. It was precisely at this time that another dispatch was written calling upon him to explain an expenditure of £107,000 over and above the amounts already submitted to Parliament for the settlement of the German military settlers! Truly this proconsul was great, and his superior officers cheerfully admitted it; but, in the face of facts such as these, is there any case against Sir Bulwer Lytton for writing the dispatch announcing his recall? Before he reached England there was a change of ministry, and Grey was reinstated by the Duke of Newcastle; but only on the understanding that his schemes for the federation of South Africa should be abandoned, and that he would render obedience to the instructions issued by the Colonial Office.
1 See Chapter XIII.