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A selection from the writings and speeches of John Robert Godley

Cape of Good Hope

Cape of Good Hope.

One considerable Colony alone has not been noticed in the page 291preceding review, and that is the Cape of Good Hope. At this place we maintain, not a garrison, but rather an army. The average force for five years would seem, by Parliamentary Returns to have been 7,000, and in 1857 is reported by the War Office at upwards of 10,000. Exclusive of all home charges, and of the cost of transport, the military expenditure of 1857 is returned at 649,878l., being nearly two-thirds of a million. In the same year was voted one of a series of annual grants of 40,000l., for civilizing the Kaffirs, and averting disputes with the natives. It is true that these efforts have given us the satisfaction of being able to say that we have not had a Kaffir war, but nine or ten thousand troops constitute such an army as England seldom has to spare for less favoured spots. The direct objects of Imperial concern at the Cape, in a military point of view, are the harbours of Table Bay and Simon's Bay. The subjoined Table will exhibit some of its leading statistics:—

Population. Imports into the Colony. Exports from the Colony. Amount of Military Force. Direct Military Expenditure in the Colonies themselves *
£ £ £ £
Cape 267,096 2,637,192 1,988,406 10,759 649,878
All other Colonies 7,615,575 56,452,628 48,052,055 36,492 2,325,994
Total 7,882,671 59,089,820 50,040,461 47,251 2,975,872

It is for Her Majesty's Government to determine the relative claims of different parts of the empire to the assistance of the mother country; but supposing that some reduction of the military expenditure abroad is judged indispensable, it seems a grave fact that a Colony of which the population is page 292one twenty-ninth of the whole population of the British Colonies, and of which the imports and exports are respectively one twenty-second and one twenty-fifth, absorbs more than one-fifth of the whole force allotted to the Colonies, and occasions more than a fourth of the whole direct military expenditure.

One remark is essential on this Colony. It is commonly said that the Colonists would be willing enough to undertake their own protection, provided that they might deal with the Kaffirs as they themselves consider best, but that this would entail a mode of warfare which would not be tolerated by public opinion in England. On the other hand, so long as British authority restrains the settlers from defending themselves in their own way, it is bound to find some efficient substitute. The result has been to produce an excessive drain of British resources for a single Colony; the expenditure, as above shown, is enormous, and it is not likely ever to be materially reduced except by a radical change of policy. Such a change would relieve this country from a heavy burthen, and, so far as concerns the demands both for men and money, would be a palpable gain. Whether it would be opposed to any just claims of philanthropy, or to the general duties of sovereign States towards their subjects, and whether also it would be irreconcilable with public opinion, are questions of a different kind, lying beyond our province. They can only be determined by statesmen engaged in the actual conduct of affairs.

This completes a review of the principal groups of Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it:—

First, That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a general and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.

Secondly, That in the West Indies and on the Coast of Africa the Colonies can neither pay towards the cost of troops, nor yet exist without them, and hence that if such possessions page 293are to be maintained at all, the only question for Government must be what is the smallest force which will answer its purpose.

Thirdly, That it is quite fair that the richer tropical settlements should contribute towards the expense of their garrisons, but that Ceylon and Mauritius are for the present the only Colonies which come within this category, and that both of these may perhaps, if it is thought of importance, be treated alike.

Fourthly, That the most difficult questions must arise with regard to large European settlements in contact with warlike neighbours, such as New Zealand and the Cape, but that each of these again must be dealt with according to its own condition; the chief of which have been above stated.

I think that the contribution should always be in money and not in kind, such as rations, stores, or barrack accommodation. This plan is shown by former examples to be unsatisfactory, and a fertile source of dispute.

Even if the contribution be calculated as a proportion of the whole military expenditure, I think that the amount should be fixed for periods of some continuance, since practical inconvenience and occasions of difference would arise from its constant fluctuation.

I cannot agree that the defences ought to be placed generally, and as a system, under local management. In the first place, the subject does not admit of being conveniently treated in detached portions; military and naval operations, and the preparations to be made for them, require an extended survey. In the next place, the welfare of the Queen's troops in time of peace, and the provision to be made for the success of the national arms in time of war, appear to me precisely examples of the subjects for which the Imperial Government must remain responsible, and which ought to be dealt with by the authority of the Governor, as Her Majesty's representative, and of the officer commanding the forces.

In conclusion, I must express my regret for the length of page 294this examination of the different Colonies, but it seemed to me that the true nature of the difficulties to be met could not be shown by any shorter process. What has to he solved is not one problem, but many. I despair of discovering upon them any self-acting rule which shall be a substitute for the judgment and firmness of the Ministers of the Crown for the time being. They will doubtless always be guided by a policy, but they can hardly expect to despatch such complicated and arduous questions by a single maxim. To deal with cases on their merits, to labour patiently against opposition in some quarters, and to welcome and reciprocate co-operation from others: these, in so wide and diversified a sphere as the British Colonies, appear to me tasks and duties inseparable from the function of governing, which can never be superseded by the machinery of a system however ably conceived or logically constructed.

(Signed) T. Frederick Elliot.