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A play with a cast of 250,000, a setting the size of
The reader must find things hard to follow at times, as I did myself in the more than ten years, on and off, that I worked on this campaign; but the glossary and index have been made as useful as possible as guides to the maze and the people in it. Fuller explanations and introductions in the text of the work would have made it intolerably long.
Many readers will doubtless think it is too long already; but this campaign deserves close attention. It was in my view the greatest campaign of the New Zealand Division. I have examined it from all angles and at all levels and some of the deeds and some of the doers sparkle with interest.
I began my studies with a brief but rewarding collaboration with
The German Military Documents Section of the Department of the Army,
Mr
The late
Many officers overseas and almost all senior surviving New Zealand officers have contributed in some way and very many junior ones. Interviews of repatriated prisoners of war conducted in England in
Members of
Professor
To all these and to many others unnamed I am deeply grateful.
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.
IN the history of the New Zealand Division the campaigns in Wehrmacht on the mainland of
See To Greece, and Davin, Crete, in this series.
Of the 16,700 men who had sailed to help ward off the German threat to Rt. Hon. P. Fraser to acting Prime Minister,
It was in arms and equipment, above all in transport, that the Division was reduced to penury. All guns and vehicles had been lost, most small arms, even personal belongings in many base kits
Sixth Brigade, having missed the holocaust of
By See Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War (hereinafter Documents), Vol. II, pp. 33–5.
The future of these reinforcements was much affected by a new War Office plan Organisation Plan 36 of the Field Force Committee (briefly FFC 36). See Documents, Vol. II, pp. 1–15 and 22–69; Stevens, Problems of 2 NZEF, pp. 38–9; Long,
Other matters which Fraser tackled before he left Egypt included
This clarified See p. 24.
The Prime Minister was sharply dissatisfied, now he knew the facts, with the Government's briefing prior to the Greek campaign, and interviews with men back from See Stevens, pp. 93–6, McClymont, pp. 19–20, Scoullar, Battle for Egypt, pp. 3–4, and The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941, pp. 81–4.
There had also been criticisms of operations in McClymont, pp. 489–90, and Wood, The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs, pp. 188–9.
I have often worried over the anxiety I caused you when I unloaded my cares on you in conference and the whole details are placed before us — we on the other hand are free to express ourselves — and we must accept a share of the responsibilities. Thanks to you we have developed a new method - conference before the details are fixed…. I have never been so happy soldiering as now and never had more confidence — I cannot say more.
None of the other brigadiers who served in
Meanwhile Fraser had obtained opinions on See Kennedy, The Business of War, p. 160, and Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 274–6.
Mr Fraser's own position was in some ways like See Wood, pp. 216–18.
On the delicate preliminaries to the campaign in
EVEN the experts were baffled in mid- See Gwyer and Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III (in preparation), and for an unofficial American view, Higgins,
The security of the bases in the Cunningham, In dealing with A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 402.Reichsmarschall Wehrmacht instead to conquer
This was as Churchill suspected, but his hopes needed no such rich nourishment and he refused to wait. He had ventured to
The Grand Alliance, p. 298.
Dill to Grand Strategy, Vol. II, pp. 530–2.
Despite heavy commitments elsewhere, Wavell had been anything but hesitant in his handling of the desert operations. An Axis assault on brevity), he tried in the middle of the month to regain the frontier area and perhaps relieve battleaxe was intended not merely to recover this lost ground but, as Churchill wrote on 27 May, to ‘inflict a crushing defeat upon the Germans in
Such a victory over German forces was a consummation greatly to be desired; but its ingredients were essentially military, and of these Wavell was the better judge. He had hoped to mount battleaxe before the full weight of the newly-arrived 15 Panzer Division could be brought to bear, but this hope faded early in June. He voiced misgivings, too, about British equipment in the light of current reassessments: the cruiser tanks were unreliable, the infantry tanks too slow, the armoured cars too lightly armed and armoured, and the enemy anti-tank guns unexpectedly powerful. It was therefore a gamble to attack with fewer tanks and perhaps fewer infantry than the enemy; but Churchill refused to see
The desert operation fell far short, in the event, of Churchill's expectations and short even of the limited success for which Wavell hoped. The infantry tanks (‘Matildas’) of 4 Armoured Brigade destroyed or damaged 50 out of 80 of the tanks of 15 Panzer Division in one morning and overran many guns; but
To Churchill, however, it was a ‘most bitter blow’ and he received it alone at Chartwell, where he ‘wandered about the valley disconsolately for hours’. The Grand Alliance, p. 308.
Wavell was now tired out and in need of a rest. The bombardment by memoranda from A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 402.battleaxe settled the issue and the decision about the future of
At the end of June he changed places with
That The Grand Alliance, p. 309; but in
Butler, pp. 530–2, italics added. Also quoted by Connell, pp. 246–8, who points out that this letter was not received until 21 July.
The Grand Alliance, p. 310.
battleaxe was promptly forgotten. battleaxe had expended the prime requisites for a major offensive, and the new commander-in-chief, with Dill's backing, was not slow to point this out.
See Harris, Bomber Offensive, pp. 153–4.
On 15 July
To the Defence Committee this seemed agonisingly slow. Now was the time to strike, or within the next few weeks, while the Germans could least afford diversions from their vast effort in
There and at Chequers the argument continued. There was indeed much to be said for an early offensive and Auchinleck heard it over and over again: the political and military need to help crusader. He outlined the immense labours which must precede it in office and workshop, on the parade ground, and in the desert itself. Assessing strength by counting tanks, guns and heads was of little use. Training at all levels was all-important; to skimp it was to invite disaster, as battleaxe had shown.
It was crusader on 1 November.
There remained, however, a marked difference between Code-name for a large convoy through the tiger
crusader's greatest attraction was the expectation that it would yield airfields in barbarossa and as a kind of rebate from the loss of Luftwaffe units were transferred from
In the rarified atmosphere of high strategy the New Zealand Division, while recuperating from battleaxe plan did not include as ‘an indispensable preliminary and concomitant’ a sortie from The Grand Alliance, p. 308.
When Wilmot, brevity and then battleaxe failed, the relief of Tobruk, p. 167.
See Bayonets Abroad (2/13 Battalion, AIF), p. 108, and ‘Silver John’, Target Tank (2/3 Anti-Tank Regiment, AIF), pp. 108–16.
7 Aust Div. Though in accordance with his wishes.
Undoubtedly connected with this decision was a sudden, brief flurry of activity among the New Zealand authorities at
Opponents of the relief fought a determined rearguard action, but See Playfair, crusader with a garrison of bits and pieces—British, Poles and disappointed Australians. The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. III, pp. 22–5; Hasluck,
Oil from the Sahara was then a mere dream.Crusader was to take place in a corner of the world's greatest desert, the desert which stretches from the
Among the few fertile parts are the Green Mountain (Jebel Akhdar) of
Between El Alamein and
The main escarpment on the Egyptian side took shape south of
Libyan side of the frontier to restrict the wanderings of the
In the summer and autumn of Strada del'Asse or
Even near the coast the desert miles drank petrol copiously and posed many awkward problems for an army like the British in which everything on the ‘Q side’ stemmed from Railhead. By this European doctrine Railhead was a benevolent institution established as near to the scene of fighting as comfort and convenience allowed. From Railhead came the troops, tanks, guns and other vehicles of the fighting formations. From it also came the supply lorries, like dusty or muddy pearls strung together in road convoys bearing food, ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment, medical supplies, comforts—whatever was needed. Back along the network of roads came the ‘empties’, the wounded, and, if Fortune smiled, the prisoners.
Thus it was in theory; but the desert decreed otherwise. Railhead there was indeed, by a happy conjunction of foresight and luck; but it was 140 miles by road from
Each mile the railway advanced westwards from See By Smith, ‘Military Railway Construction in New Zealand Engineers, Ch. 2 (in preparation). Operating the railway was a military rather than a civilian task and 16 NZ Ry Op Coy had some exciting adventures. A section of the Div Ammunition Coy for seven weeks carried sleepers for the railway extension.battleaxe indicated that none but an offensive on the largest scale offered hope of success, more and more labour was applied and by average of two miles per day—bewildering to desert navigators who were apt to find their calculations wildly astray on their return journeys. The aim was to set up a new railhead and have it working as far west as possible before crusader opened; but there were some who felt the New Zealanders had raised their sights too high. All criticism, however, was happily confounded when the new line reached Proceedings of the New Zealand Institute of Railway Engineers, History of the Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry crusader, at least in the early stages, down to manageable proportions.
In one way, however, the railway robbed Peter to pay Paul, since the locomotives needed more water than the whole desert army would drink, and demanded a huge increase in the supply. In fifty-six days seven pumping stations and ten large reservoirs were built and 145 miles of water pipeline laid—a vast programme completed, like the railway, in the nick of time to meet the needs of New Zealand Engineers also contributed, 18 Army Troops Coy being engaged throughout and many detachments from New Zealand divisional units from September onwards.crusader. By
These great construction works went hand in hand with other capital outlay on the forthcoming offensive: airfields in the Canal Zone for heavy bombers, forward landing grounds for light bombers and fighters, and roading and similar works as far afield as
On the frontier July and August passed quietly, though in the coast sector three columns ( Goodheart, fait, hope and char in current Signals jargon) took turns at playing a dangerous game of provoking an enemy who in his strong arc of defences covering The History of the 2/7 Australian Field Regiment, p. 73.
This was a project on which
General-of-Panzer-Troops Oberkommando des Heeres, abbreviated OKH.OKH. In mid-August Panzer Group Africa, and German Africa Corps,Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK).21 Italian Corps, and 55 Italian
Savona Division (in the frontier area); but its only mobile troops were 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions. The 20th Italian Mobile Corps, not yet battle-worthy, remained directly under Bastico.
The non-mobile troops, including a German division (Division z.b.V.Zur besonderen Verwendung—For Special Purposes.Afrika) in course of being formed from independent regiments and battalions, had plenty to do either on the
A limited operation of some sort was clearly called for and in mid-September it was provided: a raid, code-named Midsummer Night's Dream, aptly enough.sommernachtstraum, 21 Panzer Division to overrun a supposed British dump some miles south of
The British covering forces, however, were amply forewarned by the roar of engines and tank tracks in the still desert night. The leading battle group came on fast soon after dawn but the British withdrew even faster, though one South African armoured-car commander was able to report that he was ‘lying a close second to a German tank’ in an exciting race. Goodheart, loc. cit. Ibid.
The night of 14–15 September had on the British side an exciting uncertainty and various detachments prepared themselves as sacrificial offerings if the Germans continued the advance. As far back as Mersa Matruh 5 South African Brigade sent a battalion forward as a delaying force. But no sacrifice was demanded and on the 15th the German armour headed westwards, pausing only to shake its fist at armoured cars which followed insolently close.
The dream had ended. How happy the awakening was can only be surmised from the German documents and contemporary comment was understandably guarded. There was some consolation from the capture of a South African office truck with three prisoners and some interesting papers (as against 12 Germans and 16 Italians captured). But sommernachtstraum came at an unfortunate time from the viewpoint of German Intelligence. One of its main objects was to reassure crusader. But sommernachtstraum offered for the view that British moves would not clash with his attack on
As a fillip to German morale, which was also intended, the Dream can have paid but a small dividend, the British mobile troops being adept and pugnacious with their guns and too slippery for effective reprisal, while the ‘carpet bombing’ which the Germans experienced for the first time at 5 Panzer Regiment dropped drastically from 110 to 43, a difference of 67 which was made up so slowly that it was not until November, on the eve of crusader, that the former total was reached. Some of the 67 may have been in workshops for routine overhaul but the majority were probably damaged in some way or other, though only two tanks were abandoned on the field.
In aircraft the situation was even worse. Though the enemy got slightly the better of the fighter clashes, the balance swung heavily against him after a raid on the crowded Panzer Group war diary plaintively records on 15 September that
Fliegerfuehrer Afrika, the all fighters at
When the fuss died down preparations for crusader went ahead quietly. The 4th Indian Division under Major-General Messervy assumed command of all troops in the forward area and its 11 Infantry Brigade took over the coast sector later in the month. The 7th Armoured Division also moved up inland, strengthening the covering forces and promising heavy punishment to any similar reconnaissance-in-force the enemy cared to attempt. As a further insurance the New Zealand Division began to assemble 180 miles behind the front.
Fortified as a ‘box’ by 4 NZ Bde a year earlier (see McClymont, pp. 53–4) and subsequent occupants.
The New Zealand Division, less 5 Infantry Brigade, Still working to fortify a line near crusader. Such a commitment came well within the prescription ‘affecting the safety of the NZEF’ and a final decision entailed consultation between the
Comments on my preliminary narrative,
At a government-to-government level a new relationship was emerging. In the course of his prolonged visit to the Mr Fraser had attended a meeting in This was early in May and the situation See McClymont, pp. 491–513, for full text.vis-à-vis débâcle? It was a protest rather than a question when Fraser asked, ‘What steps are being taken to avoid a recurrence of a situation under which well-trained and courageous troops find themselves battered to pieces from the air without means of defence or retaliation?’ Looking to the future he added, ‘Is the vital importance of air and armoured reinforcement of the
The answers were only mildly reassuring. Though the questions were restricted chiefly to the two campaigns they were in effect a challenge to the direction of the whole British Commonwealth war effort, as Mr Churchill was not slow to recognise. While in London Fraser did not press, as Menzies had done, for permanent representation in the War Cabinet; but he was no less anxious for prompt, full and frank consultation on all matters of vital concern, and the crusader preliminaries were to provide a remarkable example of how far Churchill was now prepared to go to meet his criticisms.
These preliminaries also indicate, however, some initial uncertainty on
For full texts of the main messages see crusader—on 13 September—the Division was already on its way to Documents, Vol. II, pp. 70–8.
These requests caused some commotion. An interim acknowledgment went to Fraser, Brigadier
It is well to state that under the agreement between the British and N.Z. Governments the NZ Govt. reserve the right to consult me upon any question of policy. From time to time they have done so.
Under my charter I have the right to consult them upon any question of policy.
He evidently expected trouble; but
22 September 1941 My Dear,Freyberg Many thanks for your letter of the 17th and for sending Stevens to see me. I am grateful to you for letting me see the cables and thoroughly appreciate the way in which you drafted the replies. Your attitude is most helpful and you may rely on me to do all I can to help you give your Prime Minister as much information as I possibly can, consistent with the need for secrecy, so that he may be re-assured as to way in which the New Zealand Division will be employed and commanded in any higher formation in which it may be included….
Not the least of the Commander-in-Chief's burdens arose (and were to continue to arise) from pre-war neglect by British Commonwealth leaders to work out the implications of Dominion independence for a joint war effort. All was now makeshift at a personal level, with a premium on tact, and in this—at least in this first instance—neither Auchinleck nor
Thus Fraser received his answers (dated 19 September), and though they told him little about crusader they were enthusiastic about the battle-worthiness of the Division, about which Fraser was asked to make no statement ‘just now other than that Division is in good heart’ because of the ‘vital need for secrecy’. The questions are set out below with the answers in italics:
In what operation is division to be engaged? We are carrying out intensive desert training for defensive or offensive operations.
What role is it to play in these operations? Role not yet disclosed and as you will realise depends on many circumstances.
Is it completely equipped in all respects up to war establishment? Division is probably best equipped in Middle East right up to War Establishment except for items which are not available here or are at present in process of being made up.
If not what are deficiencies? 28 light tanks for Divisional Cavalry proportion light anti-aircraft guns both of which will shortly be supplied. Anti-aircraft Regiment at present on defence of aerodromes but returning to Division for training in mobile desert operations. Shortage Anti-tank rifles 5th Brigade shortly to be made up.
Are you satisfied that the Division is ready for action? Yes Division is trained and when deficiencies mentioned in para 4 made up Division will be fit for war in every way.
Is adequate AFV support available for contemplated operations? Importance AFVs is fully realised and our strength now much greater and adequate deal with estimated situation Western Desert.
Is adequate air support available for contemplated operations and have appropriate arrangements been made for its use in conjunction with land forces? Importance of air support realised and no operations could be contemplated unless it is adequate. Situation of course entirely different from Crete as fighter aerodromes available at all stages.
Since your visit here attitude to air co-operation between RAF and Army completely changed. RAF are doing their utmost and combined exercises are being carried out.
‘I do not think there is any Division superior to ours in
We will be part of Corps commanded by General Godwin-Austen specially selected after successful command in
East Africa andAbyssinia . We will be with Indian Division and possibly South African Division. I am authorised by C.-in-C. to let you know for your personal information that General Cunningham late C-in-C East African campaign will be in command of operations as a whole.
With these bare bones of a small part of the battle plan Mr Fraser contented himself for a fortnight. Then he sought more information, this time from a different source:
4 October 1941 Following is for Prime Minister [
United Kingdom ] from Prime Minister:For various reasons it would help us very much here if you could for my own personal information give me an indication when action in
Western Desert is likely to commence.
But Mr Churchill was not to be drawn. Thanking Fraser for his ‘Winch No. 1’ When Fraser used Churchill's own code-name in his reply the name pefra was suggested for future messages, initiating the winch-pefra correspondence which continued until
date of operation uncertain owing to Australian demand to release all their troops from restriction [i.e.,
Fraser did not mind waiting; but in the interim Documents, Vol. II, pp. 73–5.
Fraser at once rushed to arms, his post-
Churchill's first answer on 15 October, a brief assurance based on Gwyer and Butler, op. cit.; see also Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939–1945, Vol. II, pp. 170–1, and Owen,
Fraser thanked him on the 25th and there, for the time being, the winch-pefra correspondence rested.
As soon as Auchinleck heard of Fraser's The documentation of this episode unfortunately lacks a personal letter from
In the five convalescent months June to October the Division recovered its strength and grew stronger than ever. It digested what was needed of four reinforcement drafts, Later sections of the 4th and the 5th Reinforcements (May), the 6th (July-August), and the 7th (October), with an average of 4000 each.
The organisation behind the Division, too, became stronger as See ‘… in my efforts to get the Force together for training I am frequently at variance with Higher Military opinions. ‘General Blamey will not lend a single Australian unit. His policy has made him non persona grata. While we lent everything we were very popular. As soon as we asked for our units back they looked upon me as a Fifth Columnist.’Documents, Vol. I, pp. 50–2.esprit de corps above regimental level and in the case of New Zealand units difficult to administer, since it raised problems of discipline, for example, and pay which were better avoided.
When 14 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, to take one case, completed its training in August, the activities of German night bombers against
Similarly, when GHQ noted in a Divisional movement order that 4 Reserve Mechanical Transport Company was earmarked to go to
Current demands for the services of the New Zealand brigades and some specialist units in various capacities clashed, as usual, with the training and re-equipping of the Division for operations. All three brigades served in the Canal area at some stage and had a taste of night bombing there, luckily with no loss other than of sleep. To their miscellaneous duties 5 and 6 Bdes had to add stevedoring at
It was easy for the various commands in the sommernachtstraum), though the Division was in any case taking over the ‘command, care and maintenance’ of the and still was with crusader approached the senior South African officers became increasingly anxious.
A similar fate might have threatened the two New Zealand brigades: though much had already been done to the
Bit by bit nearly all the Division assembled at A point of departure strikingly marked by the Great Pyramid and the enigmatic Sphinx. Items carried by Yet another ASC company was needed to move the whole Division simultaneously and one was duly lent by the RASC. Several non-divisional entities were also formed during the month: ‘T’ Air Support Control Signals Section, ‘A’ and ‘B’ Field Maintenance Centres, and ‘X’ Water Issue Section, all needed for the vast Corps organisation within which the Division was to operate.portées (lorries adapted to carry or tow 2-pounders) and 75-millimetre guns, and the Engineers and Signals to a variety of new equipment. All received their share, too, of four-wheel-drive trucks and lorries from
‘The New Zealand Division in
The various units, sub-units, and individuals meanwhile did all they could to fit themselves for the desert. Navigation—a strange term in army circles—was much studied by officers, NCOs and drivers, with magnetic or sun compasses for bearings and
A series of operation orders and instructions, both written and oral, were issued on 8 October for the first full-scale brigade manoeuvre.
With minor variations, Sidi Clif and
Quotations are from
Veterans of
To
BATTLEAXE had been viewed at GHQ MEF as a disaster and it was only by displaying this spectre, with dire warnings of possible repetition, to the service and political heads in Headquarters Western Army was formed in crusader until administrative facilities promised adequate support. It was plain enough that battleaxe had been uncomfortably constricted by the inability of the supply services to support an ambitious tactical plan and Auchinleck was determined not to let crusader suffer under the same handicap. The comparative freedom from administrative limitations, however, was like strong and unaccustomed wine to the planners and went to their heads. Much time was wasted on a quite impracticable scheme to by-pass not only the frontier defences but the crusader was concerned only with capturing
Cunningham elected to try to trap the enemy armour between the frontier and a line some miles west of
More crusader details were revealed at a conference at Army Headquarters on 6 October attended by divisional and corps commanders and corps and army staff officers.
13 Corps, with NZ and 4 Indian Divisions and 1 (Army) Tank Bde (with I tanks and a field regiment). 30 Corps was to include 7 Armd and 1 South African Divisions and 22 Guards Bde. Comments on my narrative,
Thus began an argument, which echoed through later discussions at Corps and Army level, about the command of the third armoured brigade group.
The plan as outlined at this conference promised to disperse Eighth Army in a way that was daring, to say the least. Thirteenth Corps (Northern Force) was to make a left hook northwards to hem in the frontier positions, 30 Corps (Southern Force) was to drive north-westwards to
The strength and capabilities of the British armoured force were matters for the experts and i.e., put under command of the brigades.—Minutes of the conference.Pzkw III and possibly of the Italian M13 too, though it was still thought that a British armoured brigade was stronger than a panzer division. What was proposed for the infantry was a different matter and in some ways worrying. Frequent mention of brigades instead of divisions and the detailed allotment of tasks raised suspicions that Eighth Army was too ready to fight with detached brigade groups, which would reduce the potential of the force as a whole and make inefficient use of the field artillery. crusader conference with his brigadiers on 17 October that the field regiments were ‘not to be decentralised
Eighth Army tended also, he felt, to underrate the opposition likely to be put up by German troops.
As if these handicaps were not enough, the South African division was condemned to leave its third brigade behind in
the plan to relieve
Two days before we marched out to the Battle I asked for an appointment with the Army Commander and said ‘You are attacking Five Italian Divisions and more than a German Division with two Brigades of South Africans and you will fail & we shall be ordered in the end to march upon
TOBRUK . We are ready to do so. All our plans have been made with that object in view. I do wish to say that it is imperative that we should go as a complete Division not a two Brigade Division as inCrete ’. I went on to say that we had been trained to work and fight as a complete Division and as such we were only half as strong if one of our three Brigades were detached.
‘I doubt if I made any impression on General Cunningham,’ he wrote later to the Minister of Defence (
With these reservations—that he disliked what he later called the Brigade Group Battle and that he was reluctant to move into crusader plan, that the first great tank clash would be decisive, seemed reasonable enough. As he explained in the same cable,
This like all modern battles is in first place battle of machines and exploitation by lorry borne fighting troops of all arms.
The opposite of the German doctrine by which all arms combined in the attack and the armour exploited success.
Had he been party to the discussions which settled the details of the armoured corps plan and the sally from
The plan for the armoured corps was a curious mixture, reflecting, long-standing uncertainties of armoured doctrine in the Britis Army which left the main questions of command and organisation still unanswered. Differences of outlook between the cavalry and the Royal Tank Corps had not been resolved by combining them in the
Against this background General Cunningham's assignment appears formidable. With no established body of theory to guide him and no real experience of tank warfare, he was to take into battle by far the largest British tank force yet assembled. Important parts of the scheme, moreover, had already been settled when he arrived—the establishment of his main striking force (7 Armoured Division), for example, and how the I tanks were to be used.
The armoured corps headquarters lost its first commander,
One of the worst features of the plan, as expressed in the minutes of this conference, was the treating of the role of the armoured corps as if it were a specific objective. The role was, as Eighth Army Operation Instruction No. 13 of 9 Nov.
This was a bold scheme and, granted the assumption that the British armour could defeat the panzer divisions, a sound one; but Cunningham would not accept it. He doubted whether the enemy armour would be drawn and feared that it might move instead against ‘our other columns’—presumably 13 Corps. The enemy
Here after months of privation was the reward offered by the stout defenders of
The main outline of the campaign as Cunningham visualised it is set out with admirable clarity in the minutes of the conference: first the tank battle, then the relief of
Auchinleck chewed over the various alternatives offered the enemy at different stages and set down the results in notes of
his armoured forces south of escarpment to a suitable area north of Trigh el Abd and west of
In that event ‘we must accept battle and concentrate the strongest possible armoured force against him in this area’—other than I tanks that is. Auchinleck's despatch, ‘Operations in the The London Gazette,
Despite his confusing elaborations, Auchinleck was reasonably clear about driving with all available cruiser tanks towards Ibid, p. 377
There was no way by Cunningham's plan of concentrating the strength of Eighth Army against the enemy's mobile forces. The garrison could throw in a considerable weight of tanks, guns and infantry, but only if the main battle took place somewhere near
Norrie pleaded at a corps commanders' conference on ‘Eighth Army Report on Operations’, Phase I, Preparations (
As time passed it became clearer in some quarters that the best plan was to despatch the full striking force of 30 Corps to ‘D 1’ was the opening day of the offensive, ‘D 2’ the second day, and ‘D—1’ the day before, a system later changed to ‘D Day’, ‘D + 1 Day’, ‘D—1 Day’, etc.
In its final shape, therefore, the armoured corps plan was to cross the frontier at Fort Maddalena, 45 miles inland, after a carefully concealed approach march, and then drive north-westwards to Gabr Saleh, with armoured-car patrols fanning out to the Trigh Capuzzo. The enemy was expected to show his hand at once and Cunningham would then decide whether Norrie should head towards
In this phase 13 Corps was merely to prevent enemy mobile forces from passing through the frontier fortress line to threaten the L of C of Eighth Army. A motorised force was to be ready to drive
Norrie made a final appeal at a conference on 14 November to be freed from the task of protecting 13 Corps, and was told that this was ‘really the same as the protection of the lines of communication of the 30th Corps’, Eighth Army Report, p. 5 (para. 11).crusader campaign.
This remarkable confidence in the British armour was maintained, too, in the face of steadily accumulating evidence of changes in enemy dispositions which promised heavier opposition than had been bargained for. Two mobile Italian divisions were now known to be guarding the desert flank along the line of the Trigh el-Abd westwards from Bir el-Gubi, 35 miles south of Ariete Armoured Division, was now well placed at Bir el-Gubi to intervene in the projected tank battle or to oppose the relief of
The British armoured force which was thus expected to take in its stride the addition of another armoured division to the strength of its opponents was itself anything but homogeneous. Its most experienced armoured brigade, the 7th, was equipped with an odd assortment of cruiser tanks of various kinds and ages, including only one full regiment of the latest Crusaders. Another brigade, the 4th, which had successfully engaged 15 Panzer Division in
(Each brigade also had a troop of Bofors light anti-aircraft guns and a troop of sappers.)
The 4th Armoured Brigade Group was detailed to guard the left flank of 13 Corps, which possessed an I-tank brigade and a mass of mobile artillery and infantry. The other two brigades, with a smaller quota of supporting arms and perhaps no outside help, were to ‘seek out and destroy the enemy armour’. The Support Group had 36 field guns, 36 anti-tank 2-pounders and 16 Bofors as well as two motorised infantry battalions (each less one company). No BRA was appointed to 30 Corps till 19 October, however, too late for him to initiate a firm policy of concentration for the large number of 25-pounders in the armoured division. The invaluable medium regiment in 30 Corps was to take no part at all until the armoured battle was decided. Thus 7 Armoured Division was to enter the fray with three armoured brigades and the Support Group,
It could be said of the contributors to the Army plan that, like a certain Biblical tribe, their name was Legion; but the plan was in a special sense Cunningham's own. It disregarded his Commanderin-Chief's main injunctions and Norrie's weighty objections (with which in the end Godwin-Austen concurred) and reserved for an army commander with no experience of armoured warfare or desert conditions the decision on which the whole shape of the battle depended. In effect Cunningham was making a highly unusual effort to The ‘blower’ was the main medium for passing orders in tank warfare, but according to a friend Cunningham ‘hadn't a clue as to how to talk on the air’—a failing he shared with most if not all likely candidates for his command.plan an encounter battle—and with unfamiliar forces and techniques.
This was an impossible condition and ruled out a sally by the garrison before the third day. That Cunningham was not altogether unaware of this is suggested by his undertaking to remain close to Norrie ‘from D1 until sufficient battle information is forthcoming to enable a decision to be given as to your future movement from the area GABR SALEH’. Operation Instruction No. 13.crusader plan.
THE Axis leaders were also guilty of dividing their forces in the
The tale of sinkings between Nita went down, then Maddalena Odero, Esperia on the 20th and
cruisers Penelope and Aurora with attendant destroyers from all sunk on 9 November together with two Italian destroyers, a disaster which the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, found ‘inexplicable’ and which left Mussolini ‘depressed and indignant’.Ciano's Diary, p. 395.
Though the opening days of crusader saw a further deterioration in the Axis supply situation, the long pause in the fighting had nevertheless allowed the Germans to build up reserves of ammunition, petrol and rations which seemed adequate for the operations Rommel contemplated, and his quartermaster reported accordingly on 11 November. The enormous strain to which his organisation was shortly to be subjected was unforeseen; but it proved that despite the almost incessant barrage of German complaints about Italian shortcomings on their L of C, the Germans had managed to acquire a considerable amount of ‘fat’ and were able to live off it in an emergency.
The long-term outlook for Axis supplies in North Africa had come under Comando Supremo in Rome. It was there, on the Duce's doorstep, that
The first step was to commit U-boats, half a dozen in August and more later. Only four U-boats entered the crusader started, but they soon made their presence felt by sinking Ark Royal (14 Nov) and Barham (on the 25th). Luftwaffe units were brought back from
Commander-in-Chief South.
crusader and he was too attentive to Italian sensibilities to achieve his main purpose of a unified Italo-German command under Kesselring. Nor was he able to make his way to good effect through the political maze of relations with Vichy France and
However much sommernachtstraum) to weigh with care any evidence pointing in that direction. The documents are eloquent on the inability of the Axis partners to see eye to eye on this point, though Mussolini remained anxious throughout to regain Ciano's Diary, p. 399. Ariete Armoured Division at El Gubi and
Preparations of the magnitude required for crusader were impossible to hide satisfactorily and the steady advance westwards of the desert railway told its own story. OKH Intelligence reported on 8 October an ominous British build-up evidently intended for a desert offensive, but a month later on the flimsiest evidence it changed its mind. Rommel's mind, however, had long since been closed to everything but the None of the conditions were in fact met and at the last moment, with overwhelming evidence of an imminent invasion from Egypt on the largest scale, Bastico was near to panic. He wrote to Cavallero on 11 November (with a copy to Rommel) listing the unfavourable omens and begging him to reconsider ‘in the minutest detail’ the date for starting the attack, a matter which was supposed to be for Bastico alone to decide. By November, however, the priestess of the Delphic Oracle could not have dissuaded Rommel, though he continued to go through the motions of consulting the Italians. He had flown to Rome on 1 November and there, when Bastico's letter arrived, he was soon able to win Cavallero's support and extract from him a stern order that the operation must start as soon as possible. The tentative date was the 20th but a final decision on that rested as before with Bastico, a situation more in keeping with comic opera than with the heavy drama of war. Rommel returned to his headquarters at crusader had already started.
Rommel's confidence in his ability to ward off an attack from Egypt rested on an almost fatal misconception that his own L of C were inherently more secure than those of the British. He had lived for too many months too close to his own situation to see its essential weakness and he assigned the line of frontier forts built during the summer under his watchful eyes a greater tactical influence on British operations than the facts warranted. This line would indeed force the British to move deep into the desert to outflank it, and he thought that in so doing they would inevitably expose their L of C to a counter-thrust. His categories of thought on this subject were naturally restricted by the material shortages which were his daily burden and the keynote of his very existence, and he could not conceive of the vast dumping plan for crusader utilising great fleets of lorries and techniques altogether beyond his resources. Thus he could not see that the farther south within reason the British swung the less vulnerable would be their L of C and the better placed they would be to cut off his own supplies at the
One detail of the Panzer Group Africa order for the attack on
The Tobruk garrison, as things turned out, was the chief loser from the successive postponements of crusader. The plan required it to be ready to start its sally by dawn on the second day and operation orders were therefore issued on 12 November, to be followed by a pause of uncertain duration. As the uncertainty was prolonged the pause grew into an uncomfortable hiatus during which Africa Division relieved 25 Bologna Division in the eastern sector, guns of all calibres were moved into battle positions on this front, and 15 Panzer Division, Bologna and
Prejudice combined with deliberate deception to keep each side very much in the dark as to the other's activities and intentions. General Headquarters, Panzer Group was to admit of the possibility of being forestalled by a British offensive.
The Cairo authorities were ‘not convinced’ by testimony of prisoners in mid-November about Axis intentions; and similarly, when a Panzer Group staff officer read in his copy of Bastico's letter to Cavallero of statements by captured British signals officers he noted, ‘These are certainly lying.’ That the far-reaching changes in Axis dispositions passed practically unnoticed may be balanced against German under-estimates of the strength of the garrison which were, under the circumstances, no less remarkable. How far these erred may be seen from the following table:
Thus what was estimated to be a comfortable margin of superiority for the assault on which Rommel was prepared to stake his whole reputation was in reality rather different. Even his great predominance in artillery was worth less than its face value in view of organisational and doctrinal obstacles to its use in proper concentration at the point of assault. Moreover, the garrison disposed of heavy anti-aircraft and coast guns, many of which could be used landwards. In numbers of British tanks the final estimate was nearly 90 short, and 69 of these were Matilda tanks, the kind which had inflicted heavy losses on 15 Panzer Division in
But this was not to be. The earliest Rommel could attack was the 21st; A firm date for the assault on crusader opened.crusader prevailed and the assault on
When Sir Winston Churchill wrote of Auchinleck's failure to mount crusader by The Grand Alliance, p. 364.
As late as the end of September, when Eighth Army was born, British strength in the desert was little greater than it had been before battleaxe; in some respects it was less. By mid-November cruiser-tank units and mobile infantry were trebled and the number of I tanks doubled and administrative backing allowed considerable freedom of manoeuvre, while the level of training, though still in many ways disappointing, was much higher. The main German striking force, on the other hand, had changed very little. A division of ‘positional infantry’ had come into being and an army artillery command, and there were now five Oasis Companies to help garrison the frontier strongpoints. With the creation of Panzer Group Africa these German troops had strengthened Rommel's claims to a decisive influence on Axis land operations in North Africa. At the last minute, too, much-needed German medium and heavy artillery (up to 210-millimetre) reached the Africa Corps, which had undergone what might be called a partial face-lift. A reshuffle of existing resources with the addition of one or two sub-units of artillery enabled
The increments to Axis strength in a battle of manoeuvre were chiefly Italian: 20 Mobile Corps, consisting of Ariete Armoured Division backed by
The positional infantry at The Italian 21 Corps under Gen Navarrini ( Brescia, Trento, Pavia and
The Sollum Front (as the Germans called it) was in rather better condition. Shortage of anti-tank mines had entailed a last-minute rush to complete the all-round defences of the southern strongpoints, ‘Frongia’ and ‘ Named after Italians and a German who had died in the desert fighting.Oasis Companies or, in the case of 104 Infantry Regiment and supported by powerful German 88-millimetre or Italian 75-millimetre HAA guns in anti-tank roles. Behind this line was a minor position at Oasis Company, and the strong and well-manned defences of West Sector and came under Major-General de Giorgis of Savona Division, with headquarters at East Sector, though the bulk of the troops in both cases were Italian. The whole front came directly under Panzer Group command, together with 21 Panzer Division and two German reconnaissance units, for quick action in case the British
The Germans nevertheless possessed one advantage which, in the event, almost outweighed all their disabilities: their anti-tank guns and tactics outclassed those of the British. In the long stalemate which followed brevity and battleaxe (when these German weapons were introduced) the British neglected to find a way of overcoming this handicap.
One solution, the introduction of a more powerful tank and anti-tank gun, the 6-pounder, was denied them; for it was only just going into production after much delay. See Postan, As Brig Davy instructed 7 Armd Bde on 17 Nov. Wilson, British War Production, p. 194. Eight Years Overseas, p. 28.
The Germans could therefore deploy detached elements—reconnaissance troops, for example, and flank and rear-guards—
Letter of crusader Auchinleck remarked to his Army Commander that ‘British soldiers with inferior tools have often beaten … enemies much better equipped than they were in the past, and they will do it again if properly led.’
Two partial remedies of even this deficiency were already at hand: in the 25-pounder the British had a gun well-adapted to the task of neutralising the German ‘88’, a clumsy and vulnerable weapon in its current form, and to a lesser extent the 50-millimetre anti-tank gun; Not to be confused, as all too often it was, with the short-barrelled 50-millimetre then mounted in the Pzkw III. The tank gun had less power of penetration than the 2-pounder or the US 37-millimetre (mounted in the Stuart tanks).
Eighth Army was badly organised to meet this deficiency. The armoured corps which was to fight the crucial battle against enemy tanks had far fewer field and anti-tank guns than 13 Corps and had no heavily armoured I tanks at all. The British I tank Mark II, the heaviest tank in the desert, had long since acquired a reputation among the Germans and Italians of being invulnerable to anti-tank fire except at short ranges, and the damage it inflicted on 8 Panzer Regiment on 16 June was still fresh in the minds of men of 15 Panzer Division. Throughout
IN the New Zealand Division defence against tanks was much canvassed, but the true prophet here, as elsewhere, passed unrecognised. Anti-tank mines could be had in reasonable quantities and the new CRE, Brig Clifton having been released on 18 Oct by crusader and made no use of this valuable weapon. The New Zealand sappers were asked on occasions to lift enemy mines, but never to lay their own, though the threat of tank attack was a constant and at times overwhelming burden. Defensive minefields were too passive to accord with current views; they attached more value to the ground they protected than prevailing opinion allowed. ‘portée action’ similarly became the rule rather than the exception in the anti-tank regiment; ‘ground action’ usually allowed better concealment and more effective fire, but it smacked too much of static warfare.
In organisation and tactics the Division had a sort of semiautonomy, however, and some interesting experiments were conducted. Reconnaissance, for example, needed to be swift, far-reaching, and thorough; but the Eighth Army units concerned, the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry among them, were not equipped to fight for information against any but the lightest opposition—always a matter of concern and at times a grave weakness. Divisional Cavalry had only the lightest of tanks and some Bren carriers, and it was an interesting move to attach a troop of 25-pounders to the regiment at the start of the campaign, with anti-tank troops added as circumstances required. Other innovations, such as the counter-battery organisation, There had been a CBO in
The days at Among them an 8–0 victory over a South African brigade at rugby football on 8 Nov. For some amusing repercussions in 20 Bn see Infantry Brigadier, p. 80.
Cunningham had already introduced himself at the end of September and made a warm impression; he was a personal friend of B. I. Bassett, in a letter home, crusader, and one New Zealand staff officer described him on this occasion as ‘first-class stuff’.
As details of the crusader plan seeped down through the ranks, which they inevitably did despite careful security measures, all reservations and misgivings were filtered out and what was left gave no grounds for any but the purest of enthusiasms. ‘An IO from Div HQ expressed the opinion’, says the 28 (Maori) Battalion diary for 8 November, disregarding grammar, ‘that resistanc would
move to fwd area taken for granted, location generally guessed as
Siwa , details not known.Morale excellent. Slight uneasiness about
RAF [Greece andCrete again!] countered by evidence ofRAF strength in the area.Rumours—NZ Div to attack the Italians, the UDF
the Germans. Move to fwd areas and an attack in the very near future accepted as facts…. Union Defence Force (of South Africa).
That the Division would be challenging a power that was supreme in the continent of
One detail of
While the Division's part in Brigs Miles, crusader seemed simple and certain at platoon level, as is usually the case with troops in good heart, it was the subject of ceaseless elaboration by the various staffs and of numerous conferences and discussions at the command level.
crusader opened. The regiment therefore moved independently from
The Corps and Divisional plans had by this time taken firm shape, with ample documentation, and what emerged was what might be expected of formations intended to mark time while another corps fought the decisive battle. A negative character predominated, effort was to be fragmented, and there was much labelled ‘anticipatory’. Though there was some attempt to give vent to the surging offensive spirit of the troops, the sum total, if the armoured battle took its intended course, would nevertheless amount to extravagant waste of the potentialities of a force of two strong infantry divisions (with four fully and two partially mobile brigades), a brigade of heavily armoured tanks, and an impressive array of all kinds of mobile artillery. But
The first task laid down by ‘13 Corps Instructions for Battle’ (12 November) was to ‘protect the L of C running westwards from No. 2 Fwd Base’, but the detailed tasks allotted to Messervy hovered uncertainly between defence and offence and were more concerned with covering the right flank of the New Zealand Division than with guarding against a body blow aimed at the main railhead of Eighth Army. So lightly, in fact, was this danger assessed that Messervy was expected to commit his one mobile brigade at an early stage to an attack on the strong defences which anchored the south-western end of the frontier line near crusader started, by which time, if things went reasonably well, the need would have passed.
In the opening moves of Called by the enemy ‘ One medium regiment (6-inch howitzers and 4.5s), four field regiments, two anti-tank regiments and three independent companies, and a regiment of Bofors, a total of some 300 guns, as compared with 172 in NZ Div (though exchanges soon strengthened the latter at the expense of 4 Indian Div).crusader the New Zealand Division and
The New Zealand Division was to cross the frontier and form up south-west of Bir Sheferzen by midnight on 18 November, ready to push northwards next day to the Trigh Capuzzo at
Until the enemy armour was pinned down or defeated, however, the New Zealand Division was to stand on guard in the best possible anti-tank posture at its station just across the frontier, covered by 4 Armoured Brigade. Then would come the hemming in of the frontier garrisons, the capture by the Indian division of the two
An insistent question remained: was it more urgent to cut off the escape of the besiegers of Appreciation by Capt R. M. Bell, GSO III (I), 10 Nov.
Units of 5 Infantry Brigade Group began to trickle westwards from He was soon to see fighting as fierce as at Beaumont-Hamel in that battle where he won his VC.
By next morning practically the whole of the Division was for the first time assembled as a complete entity, an historic occasion. In an area twelve miles by eight the 2800-odd vehicles rested 200 yards apart in brigade laagers, with clusters of men among them, and here and there a staff car or truck tearing a thin ribbon of dust from the flat, scrub-covered desert. The troops rested as much as possible and enjoyed the clear, warm day. The unhurried routine included distributing rations, water and POL, Petrol, oil and lubricants.
Conference notes in 5crusader. ‘No battle is easy’, he began. ‘This one promises to be a very tough one.’ The Germans were on the defensive and would pick their ground well. ‘They realise the value of AFVs’, he added, ‘and they will not hesitate to use them in a desperate counter stroke.’ He did not think the Germans would risk fighting in the open and considered they would rely on aircraft and anti-tank guns to reduce British tank strength and then ‘launch Counter stroke to re-establish his line at crusader file.
Spirit of the B.B. British bulldog. As a final (and still unavailing) step to encourage the use of anti-tank mines, 6 Fd Coy demonstrated laying and lifting them to the assembled officers.
Parties left in the afternoon to reconnoitre brigade and unit lines in the area which was next day's destination. In the present area units regrouped for this move and Divisional Administration Group (under the CRASC) came into being, with all ASC units except troop-carrying transport, Divisional Workshops and Ordnance Field Park, and the Salvage and Mobile Surgical Units, removing from the brigade groups vehicles they did not need.
It was not until next day, when the Division drove westwards in one vast array of ‘transport, tanks, guns and carriers covering the whole panorama of the desert plain’ (as
Looking round from any slight vantage point … the whole expanse of desert was peppered with moving vehicles as far as the eye could see—and on the horizon fresh lines of black specks were popping up like puppets on an endless chain…. the country was very stony—great slabs of ‘crazy pavement’ at times and patches of scrub. No air interference but five Messerschmitts seen in the sun. GOC's diary.
The experience of driving towards the enemy in the company of nearly 20,000 men with no apparent doubt among them was as impressive as the spectacle. From the post-
This exercise and the various layouts adopted by the three brigades on the move and at rest did, however, illustrate one aspect of the differences in kind and character between the three brigades which had emerged in more than eighteen months of corporte extence. Fourth Brigade Now commanded by
On the score of battle experience 6 Brigade had some leeway to make up, having missed the Lt-Cols Andrew, VC, and Dittmer, MBE, MC.
All three brigades had attained some degree of unity of spirit which was consolidated in various ways by the characters and methods of their commanders. Barrowclough Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr);
Capt Bassett, who had served a gruelling initiation as BM of 10 Bde in
Hargest approached Stewart, crusader bursting with confidence. With four battalions his 5 Brigade was the strongest and he was sure it would acquit itself well. All his battalions and his field regiment had lost heavily in The New Zealand Division, 1916–19, p. 178.
Other than the news that the Ark Royal had been ‘sunk at last’ after several premature claims by ‘Lord Haw-Haw’ on the German radio.everything forward. He is going to counter attack. It is not a battle of positions, it is a matter of destroying one another's armies.’
The impending moves, however, were already viewed with concern in some quarters. Travelling in low gear across rough desert had already used up 40,000 gallons of petrol instead of the 25,000 allowed for: 3¾ miles per gallon per vehicle in place of the estimated 6 m.p.g. The Division was more than 15,000 gallons short of current needs and the Petrol Company had to make two trips to the nearby Forward Base, working until long after dark. The complicated scheme for rationing Eighth Army also had teething troubles and the Supply Company had similar difficulties, so that units had to draw on their reserves. A full-scale divisional move into action was a different matter from manoeuvring brigades in the well-known hinterland of Lt-Col Weir of The Div IO, the Engineer IO, most of the Provost Coy, and several others.
As it approached the frontier, 30 Corps too had become no stranger to broken springs, nor even to broken axles. Lack of training and desert experience was only too evident in some units. Not until 16 November, for example, did the South Africans make their first major essay at moving cross-country by night, and the arrival next day of what their historians call a ‘Churchillian exhortation’ ranking crusader in advance with
More than 80 miles to the south, ‘Force E’ of the Oases Group under With HQ 29 Indian Inf Bde, a South African reconnaissance battalion and most of an armoured-car regiment, field, anti-tank and LAA batteries, a section of sappers and miners, and an Indian infantry battalion. See Kay, The Long Range Desert Group in Libya, 1940–41 (
Had the Germans not been so intent on their own schemes they must have discovered what was afoot. The Italians had been only too ready to take note of the various warnings; but even they failed to get wind of the vast moves taking place from the first week in November. De Giorgis of Savona Div thought an ‘enemy offensive to be imminent’ as early as 14 Nov and issued orders accordingly. See Manzetti, Seconda offensiva britannica in Africa settentrionale e ripiegamento italo-tedesco nella Sirtica orientale, 18 Novembre 1941–17 Gennaio 1942, the Italian general staff history.
Yet the best evidence of all was solemnly recorded in Panzer Group records without a suspicion of its real significance. The fact is that the
From the ‘Royal Air Force Operations in the crusader began in mid-October in a gradually increasing programme of bombing from
Air Headquarters, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC, Legion of Honour (Fr), Distinguished Service Medal (US), Order of Leopold (Bel), Croix de Guerre with Palm (Bel); born crusader was to serve the purposes of the Navy and
Thus the handful of Me109Fs at the disposal of Fliegerfuehrer Afrika, Luftwaffe units would rectify this for the
Froehlich's situation was unusual. He was under the command not of Rommel but of General Geissler of X Flying Corps in Luftwaffe units in North Africa with those of the forward units of
Axis air strength in
This is the same, if the serviceable aircraft at the start of crusader, the full total then being 436, to which might be added 186 in
Tedder's total force of serviceable aircraft was over 700, two-thirds of them in the
For details of New Zealand airmen serving in this theatre see Thompson, New Zealanders with the Royal Air Force, Vol. III. One of them was Wing Cdr E. W. Whitley, DFC, who gave his name to the special force (Whitforce) assigned to cover the Oases Group and attack the coast road in western
THE British cause gained a valuable, if intractable, ally in the weather, which timed its intervention to perfection. ‘Sandstorm, thunderstorm and torrential rain towards evening’, the war diarist of Panzer Group wrote at
The British reconnaissance regiments saw only the lightning flashes as they drove forward in the night 17–18 November to their various rendezvous in crusader offensive. They could not conceive of defeat. They could feel, if they could not all comprehend, the historic nature of the occasion and no lack of the will to win would withhold from them success in full measure. They were out to gain if they could the first great land victory of the war over German forces.
These generous and general feelings were mingled with local and personal reactions to the details of the advance. B Squadron of the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry pushed through the Wire before midnight on the 17th under command of
The skyline south of B Squadron hid the mass of 30 Corps after it crossed the frontier, preceded by petrol lorries, and refuelled its 500 cruiser tanks a dozen miles inside From right to left, KDG (less one squadron) leading 4 Armd Bde, 4 SA Armd Car Regt leading 7 Armd Bde, and
All went like clockwork until noon, when B Squadron saw King's Dragoon Guards coming up on time from the south and was mystified when the armoured cars veered east and set about ‘capturing’ the right-hand troop. Their error discovered and no harm done, the King's Dragoon Guards moved on north-westwards with red faces and soon struck more opposition, this time genuine, by
By this time all three armoured-car units of 30 Corps had run up against their counterparts on the enemy side, Named after Lt- The reconnaissance group of the Wechmar Group3 Recce Unit, who had 33 Recce Unit and an anti-tank company also under his command.RECAMItalian Mobile Corps.3 and 33 Reconnaissance Units headed for the Trigh Capuzzo, appealing for help as they went, and RECAM retraced its steps towards El Gubi. By dusk 4 and 7 Armoured Brigades had reached their allotted stations and the 22nd, held up by refuelling troubles, was ten miles short of its destination. No more than slight skirmishes had taken place, to which the enemy near Luftwaffe at
The paucity of opposition anywhere was mystifying and the 90-mile advance of 30 Corps ended up rather lamely in a wide arc north of Gabr Saleh more or less as ‘Narrative of Events’, dated At
There was no solution within the framework of his plan to 30 Corps order of ‘some time before midnight’, as quoted by Ariete at Bir el-Gubi and directed the attention of 22 Armoured Brigade and the Support Group to that position, at the same time forbidding the 22nd to cross the Trigh el-Abd. This
This was a sorry outcome to a day which offered rich reward. The weather which had cloaked Eighth Army's approach made it doubly certain that
Not all of this was a fault of the plan and CRUSADER for what it was: an attempt, unconnected with current Axis schemes, to force a decision in 21 Panzer Division, and indeed those of
Commanding Panzer Group Africa in D AK Headquaarters.
DAK war diary.
155 Infantry Regiment to form a front facing south and south-west between
The contradictory elements in the orders at different levels in 30 Corps could have been reconciled during the night by more experienced staffs; but haste has its price and CRUSADER came too soon for the Corps and Army headquarters to acquire the necessary skill. Gott's headquarters, on the other hand, was of long standing and none questioned its proficiency, so that at times the tail seemed to wag the dog. Thus Gott's worry about his left flank, unknown to Cunningham and not properly realised even at Corps, led to a
The 11th Hussars promptly reported enemy tanks on their objective and the troopers drove on eager to get to grips with them, which they did at noon, with Royal Gloucestershire Hussars leading, 4 County of London Yeomanry on the left, and a mere eight field guns in support. Fortunately the Italians were not yet well established at El Gubi. The tank regiment of Ariete (the 132nd) had only reached there the day before, elements of 8 Bersaglieri Regiment were digging in when 22 Armoured Brigade arrived, and the bulk of the division was still to the north. The Italians were nevertheless able to bring down very much heavier supporting fire than was available for the British tank units, 132 Tank Regiments counter-attacked strongly in the afternoon, and the day ended with the Italians still at El Gubi and both sides licking fairly extensive wounds. Some fifty Italian tanks were destroyed or damaged and at least as many Crusaders, and the 22nd captured 200 enemy, six times as many prisoners as the Italians claim.
Such results would have been highly gratifying against either of the panzer divisions, but against a formation which was not even under Rommel's command (unbeknown to Eighth Army) and before the bulk of the German armour had been engaged they were calamitous, though sanguine first reports tended to hide this fact. Gott's impulsive action in ordering this attack without so much as consulting his own corps commander was at the root of many of his later troubles; yet such was his prestige that when Norrie joined him in the afternoon, after getting Cunningham's decision to make his main thrust towards
The reports which came in to Norrie and Gott at the latter's headquarters in the afternoon suggested that the relief of
From a wider viewpoint things were less satisfactory. The 4th Armoured Brigade north-west of
The looseness of command which had allowed 7 Armoured Division to break up into separate groups pursuing independent aims was apparent at lower levels as well. Thus 4 Armoured Brigade allowed one of its three regiments, 5 Panzer Regiment with added artillery was slowly assembled under Panzer Group nor Africa Corps had yet got down to serious thinking about the new situation.
The official tank strength of 5 Pz Regt at the start of CRUSADER was 120, but next day it dropped to 83, a difference of 37 which cannot be accounted for in terms of battle losses and may have some connection with losses in SOMMERNACHTSTRAUM or with a wish to reassure 21 Pz Div to carry out its role while Rommel attacked
In actual fact the two groups were fairly evenly matched (in the absence of
The absence of Africa Corps. Not only had
The dispersed British armoured brigades were therefore given a few hours' grace on 20 November to concentrate against the German armour, either in attack or in defence of vital ground. But the indecisive outcome of the first clash with the Germans was claimed in some quarters as a victory and the grave danger in which Gatehouse now stood was not recognised. The next few hours could be critical and the battle needed firm control; yet at 5 a.m. on the 20th Cunningham flew back to his Advanced Headquarters in the
Stephan Battle Group attacked southwards again in the morning of the 20th but found the fast Starts elusive and the guns of Knabe Battle Group (artillery, machinegunners and infantry of 21 Panzer Division) tried to come in on Stephan's left but was held up by KDG, reported as a strong force of tanks and guns. In mid-morning Stephan swung to his left rear to help Knabe and by noon, with almost no ammunition left, both groups broke off the action and withdrew north-eastwards. Tank losses were by German estimates eight British against four German; but British claims were far higher and again converted an indecisive action into supposed victory. Meanwhile
That rejoicing might be premature was soon learned when 4 Armoured Brigade moved a few miles north later in the morning and was then warned that the two panzer divisions had linked up and might shortly stage a combined attack. This was just what Stephan Battle Group in much the same haste and ignorance of the opposition as
The danger was fortunately not as great as it appeared. A shortage of ammunition of which 21 Panzer had complained early in the morning developed by the afternoon into a complete breakdown of administrative services, leaving the whole division temporarily stranded a few miles west of 21 Panzer could not move. So 15 Panzer attacked alone in the late afternoon, into the setting sun and too late to achieve a decision against the 100-odd tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade. Even this division was short of petrol and it was confused by the deceptive mass of British transport, which obscured the centres of resistance and thinned out German artillery fire as targets seemed to expand alarmingly. The three British armoured regiments were nevertheless gradually pushed back south-eastwards across the Trigh el-Abd in furious fighting, and when the leading elements of 22 Armoured Brigade arrived from the west at dusk they were more than welcome, though too late to do much this day.
This time the enemy camped for the night on the battlefield and damaged Stuarts not towed away were irretrievably lost, whereas 15 Panzer by its own accounts had lost no tanks at all. Since 4 Armoured Brigade had this day lost more than forty tanks from all causes this outcome was highly ominous, though the bad omens were hidden in greatly inflated claims of German tank losses, which had so far been no more than a dozen all told. Gatehouse now had only 97 of the 164 tanks with which he had entered
The switching of 22 Armoured Brigade from El Gubi put paid to rather vague plans of installing a South African brigade as a new tenant there in place of Ariete and of sending the 22nd to join
The need of more infantry at Africa and
It needed a sanguine disposition to see this as a promising situation, now 22 Armoured was diverted to the east and the South Africans had the curious role for infantry of containing an armoured division. Norrie, ‘Narrative of Events’.
Gott was at this time unaware that the enemy retained the Cabinet Office official narrative, ‘General Auchinleck's Offensive and the Relief of
This was a haphazard way of mounting an operation of immense significance for the whole campaign. In the planning stages it had been realised that a premature sortie could expose the
By an ironic turn of events the enemy was planning such a move, though not as a retreat. After breaking contact at Gabr Saleh, 15 Panzer was to swing right, 21 Panzer was to come up on its right, and the two were to advance north-westwards at 6.30 a.m. on the 21st through Africa Corps could be sandwiched in the midst of 7 Armoured Division, with South Africans and part of the
There was no prima facie case for preferring this move to the more obvious one of driving home the advantage which 15 Panzer had gained the previous evening by a combined attack southwards from Gabr Saleh, and Panzer Group to specify these. The decisive influence seems to have been crusader as a major offensive and its corollary that the British
Africa Corps from the frontier areas, however, would leave the strongpoints there to their own resources, and
Dawn on the 21st brought with it high hopes that crusader would gather speed and weight and quickly achieve victory. The Tobruk garrison would direct its strong tank force and artillery and two brigades of infantry against the Italians in the east and south-east and burst through to Ed Duda, while
The Tobruk sortie had been planned as a second-phase operation, after the battle of the armour. No threat of tank attack was envisaged as the break-out forces broke through to Ed Duda and linked up with 30 Corps, and from there they would begin at once to ‘roll up’ the remaining siege troops, in conjunction with the infantry of 30 Corps. But this was not what
The night of 20–21 November was filled with stealthy movement as four bridges were put across the anti-tank ditch in the south-eastern sector of the Quoted in the
The ease of this success on the left, however, was like a blue patch of sky in a thunderstorm. The 2nd Black Watch on the right suffered fearful losses and the survivors had to draw on the deepest resources of the human spirit to sustain themselves and the traditions of their regiment in its hardest struggle since Loos, Fergusson, In terms of killed, some 200, the Black Watch lost about twice as many here as any NZ battalion in a single action throughout the war.The Black Watch and the King's Enemies, p. 111.éalan of the Black Watch in the attack had been equalled by the remarkable persistence of the defence in the face of formidable tank-and-infantry pressure. Later in the morning D Company of 1 Bedfords and Herts came up to reinforce the Black Watch, whose numbers increased by evening to eight officers and 196 other ranks.
The carriers of 2 Queen's had been repulsed at Tugun at 7 a.m. and tried again at ten with no better result. A heavier attack was needed but took some time to prepare. Meanwhile the Black Watch had suffered fire from ‘Jack’ a little to the north-east and ‘a weak coy’, with two troops of 4 Royal Tanks and supported by 104 Royal Horse Artillery, quickly seized this position at about 10.30 a.m. This was a more significant move than at first appeared. Not only did it forestall a much larger operation intended for the same purpose, but ‘Jack’ proved to be the headquarters of Meythaler Battalion and the kingpin of the defence on the left. Major Meythaler had signalled his divisional headquarters at 10.25 a.m. that all was quiet; ‘9 British tanks out of action on mines’, he added, and ‘10 tanks still waiting ready to attack us’. Then there was silence. Meythaler himself was captured and General Suemmermann was left to guess what had happened.
This gave a lodgment in enemy territory three and a half miles deep and ten square miles in area. An outer ring of enemy strongpoints was more loosely connected and could be more easily penetrated and there was, moreover, a considerable amount of artillery, mostly Italian, which now lay open to attack in the intervening spaces. The 28 assorted cruiser tanks and 21 light tanks of 1 Royal Tanks had been meant to sweep unaided through this area, overrunning various headquarters and creating confusion; but this naturally took no account of the many undetected minefields which interlaced the front and of the anti-tank guns which lay in ambush, to which the thickening haze of dust and smoke added another obstacle. Thus 1 Royal Tanks lost four tanks to mines at the start and was held up by guns at ‘Wolf’, south-east of Tiger, until the I tanks of 4 Royal Tanks could engage them. With this
If the raids of 1 Royal Tanks had achieved less than intended and the rear areas had proved less vulnerable than the planners imagined, they had nevertheless caused much alarm in the enemy camp and brought Rommel himself to the scene. He was desperately anxious to prevent a link-up between the garrison and the British at Kriebel, 3 Reconnaissance Unit and a scratch force of guns of various kinds, including Suemmermann's last company of anti-tank guns. Much of the opposition 32 Army Tank Brigade (which was now in command of the sortie) attributed to existing strongpoints undoubtedly came from this mobile force and a German author speaks of ‘bitter, costly fighting’ here.Feldzug in Nordafrika, an unpublished narrative complied at the end of the war in conjunction with German officers who took part—a valuable adjunct to the contemporary German documents. Kriebel was GSO I of 15 Pz Div in crusader.
The chief concern now was to make fast the valuable gains until the advance to Ed Duda could be resumed. Prisoners taken so far numbered 1100, half of them German, and any alarm which Africa Division described the outlook as ‘very serious’ and added that the next day ‘would probably bring a crisis.’
‘Rugbet’ = wadi; ‘en-Nbeidat’ = the Abeidat, the chief bedouin tribe of the region.155 Infantry Regiment, on the escarpment north of the airfield and the lower ground to the west, was in the path of the British advance to link up with 361 African Regiment on Point 175, just to the east. The latter, though ill-equipped, had the better position, being covered to some extent by a deep wadi—Rugbet en-NbeidatPavia Division) who were working their way eastwards along the southernmost escarpment from Bir Bu Creimisa greatly outnumbered in infantry the British at
From the British viewpoint everything depended on these tanks and on the early arrival of 5 South African Brigade. Meanwhile three companies of 1 King's Royal Rifle Corps—the ‘60th Rifles’—and A Company of 2 Rifle Brigade prepared to attack northwards. Planners calculated and consulted throughout the night to get this small force across the billiard-table surface of the airfield, an oblong cleared of the low scrub which dotted the surrounding desert and mercilessly exposed to enemy fire. Then the infantry was to seize the escarpment to the north and gain observation over the Trigh Capuzzo as a first step towards linking up with the Wake and Deedes (editors), Swift and Bold, The Story of the King's Royal Rifle Corps in the Second World War
The attack was due to start at 8.30. a.m. and an hour before this the enemy shelled the whole length of the starting line as if to
The attack on
The infantry, meanwhile, followed in widely extended order. A filmy veil of dust and smoke lingering from the shellfire gave welcome cover as the men trudged across the airfield and little fire came their way. All companies, however, ‘came under very severe fire from all arms and were forced to get down’ when they emerged from this veil 200 yards short of the escarpment. Ibid., p. 66.Swift and Bold, p. 65.
The 60th Rifles lost 3 officers and 26 other ranks killed and 55 wounded in this very fine action; enemy dead might have been as many as 300 and some 700 German and Italian prisoners were collected. ‘There were large numbers of all kinds of machine guns, mortars, anti-tank rifles and quick-firing Probably ‘automatic’ is meant.Swift and Bold, p. 66.
Unfortunately 6 Royal Tanks had not waited for this propitious time to start the drive to Ed Duda. The regiment knocked out five German tanks on the way to the Trigh Capuzzo; but a ‘special detachment’ (including Regimental Headquarters) despatched unsupported towards Ed Duda drove through a German engineer company on
Why Africa Corps at
Quoted in the
Norrie's hopeful interpretation of the situation early in the morning, however, had set in motion a train of events which, though intended to be subsidiary to the armoured battle, proved in the end decisive: he recommended starting the operations of 13 Corps. crusader plan, nevertheless, and all the more so since 4 Armoured Brigade was released from its protective role. Then
None of these officers had any idea of the real trend of events. One report Armoured fighting vehicles, normally tanks, though armoured cars would be counted.
Everything put in Gott's hands except the South African brigade had slipped through them. Quoted in the Ibid.débâcle in the morning, when a large part of 6 Royal Tanks disappeared below the escarpment at must link up with the sortie if it reached Ed Duda: ‘this would appear to involve only a short night march’, he added.
Ibid.crusader plan now allowed him to influence the
The Army order to 13 Corps about the New Zealand brigade stated that it was to move ‘with all possible speed’
In reality Eighth Army had lost 180-odd tanks this day against a loss of fewer than twenty enemy tanks (including eight Italian tanks claimed by South African guns). Had Cunningham and his corps commanders realised that by this time .30 Corps was not outnumbered in tanks by its opponents—it barely reached parity with the Germans alone—they would have been thunderstruck. So long as 1 and 32 Army Tank Brigades remained in different compartments of the battle from that of 7 Armoured Division, Gott's major purpose of seeking out and destroying the enemy armour was now beyond his strength.
It was a stroke of luck that neither Africa Corps was split up,
Now was the time to smash through the weaker of the two panzer divisions, the 21st, and the battered 155 Infantry Regiment and join hands with the
As General Norrie learned the details of the previous day's fighting and formed a better appreciation of the situation, however, he gave up the idea of pushing through to Ed Duda on the 22nd and postponed the last stage of the
The morning's operations on the 22nd were deceptive. Skirmishes took place at various points from The Royal Artillery Commemoration Book, 1939–1945, pp. 188–9, is the source of the quotation.
The panzer troops were accustomed to a faster tempo of operations than their opponents and planning in Eighth Army was apt to be outdated by sudden and unexpected German moves. Thus Gott placed a sanguine construction on a lull at 1.30 p.m. and conferred on the landing ground with officers at hand, deciding to bring up 5 South African Brigade to repeat on a larger scale the attack of the previous morning to gain a wider base on the 21 Panzer attacked.
This was on Rommel's own initiative. With a hazy idea of what Cruewell intended with 15 Panzer Division, he came up to Ravenstein's headquarters and ordered what he thought would be a supporting operation:
The victory thus gained had deep foundations. Never did the panzer troops give a plainer demonstration that their battle tactics were in a class far above those of their opponents. Neither side had any shortage of courage or determination and it was the superior combination of all arms which allowed 5 Panzer Regiment to make steady progress in the face of counter-thrusts by the yeomen of 22 Armoured Brigade. Campbell and his dwindling band of gunners
5 Panzer Regiment.
The 4th Armoured Brigade was slow in arriving and by the time its 108 Stuarts were within striking distance the remnants of the 22nd were making a valiant but unavailing stand on the airfield. All eyes were on the German tanks which appeared from time to time through the haze of dust and smoke, and the 25-pounders engaged them whenever they could over open sights, neglecting the ‘88s’ and 50-millimetre guns which were doing most of the damage. But this was not the occasion for a revision of British armoured tactics and the Stuarts when they came were introduced with care lest they too became burnt offerings to a more skilful enemy.
Gott and Gatehouse conferred briefly south of Point 175 and then 3 and 5 Royal Tanks edged gingerly westwards south of the airfield until the former linked up with 22 Armoured Brigade. But 5 Panzer Regiment some anxious moments),
The 22nd Armoured Brigade had suffered heavily and now had only 34 tanks, Three were destroyed, twelve damaged, and two broke down, a total loss in 5 Pz Regt of 17 tanks. 15 Panzer Division von Ravenstein had been able to defeat the British armour, with help only from the
‘The final scene’, as 15 Panzer Division to make ‘a wide swing to the south-west’ and attack the enemy facing
The commanding officer of the leading tank battalion, Major Fenski, picked his way carefully through the darkness in his armoured command vehicle and suddenly found himself in the midst of a British laager. At ten yards he identified British tanks and with remarkable presence of mind he drove through to the far side, at the same time ordering 1 and 2 Companies to swing left and right respectively to surround the enemy. What followed is described in the divisional war diary:
The tanks shone their headlights, and the commanders jumped out with their machine pistols. The enemy was completely surprised and incapable of action.
So far there had been no firing. A few tanks tried to get away, but were at once set on fire by our tanks, and lit up the battlefield as light as day. While the prisoners were being rounded up a British officer succeeded in setting fire to a tank.
This coup on our part got the rest of 4 British Armoured Brigade with light casualties to ourselves. The brigade commander, 17 officers and 150 other ranks were taken prisoner.
One armoured command vehicle, 35 tanks, armoured cars, guns and self-propelled guns,
other fighting vehicles, and some important papers fell into our hands. i.e., 2-pdr anti-tank
portées.
The Germans were mistaken about the brigade commander, as Gatehouse was away at the time and escaped capture; but they captured most of brigade headquarters and 15 Panzer Division. For the next day 4 Armoured Brigade was an uncomprehending and uncooperative spectator of the battle, and three days later, after communications were restored and stragglers gathered in, it still numbered only 37 tanks. On the other hand
The armoured part of the crusader plan had now broken down completely, and with the exception of a solitary action on the 27th the armoured brigades did no more significant fighting, though their presence (reorganized as a composite brigade) as a ‘fleet in being’ was not without some influence on the campaign. From now onwards the guns and infantry, supported by the two army tank brigades, carried Eighth Army's burden and faced up as best they could to the still-undefeated enemy armour. Rommel and Cruewell had won the first phase and looked for ways and means of sealing their victory.
Meanwhile the South African brigade destined for 155 Infantry Regiment had been filtering along the southern escarpment and by noon reached as far east as Point 178, which overlooked the whole battlefield. Ensconced there among the rocks with anti-tank guns and MGs, they were not easy to dislodge and 11 Armoured Brigade gave them a wide berth. In his anxiety to get 5 South African Brigade to
Without much ado Armstrong sent in 3 Transvall Scottish at about 1 p.m., supported by only eight 25-pounders. They had to cross a mile of flat desert thinly sprinkled with low camel-thorn and had some 500 yards to go when the enemy opened intense fire and forced the infantry down. Little further progress was made, the commanding officer,
The tank battle being in Hagfet = cistern, but the feature was the head of a wadi.
Pienaar raised strenuous objections to a night march and when
Some such arrangement was essential if 30 Corps was to join hands with the Ariete was free to move in or out of El Gubi as it pleased and the ‘masking’ troops were left in the end guarding the front door of an empty building.
A junction with the 21 Panzer Division in the afternoon.
In four days Eighth Army had lost some 530 tanks Including 35 I tanks of 42 and 44 R Tks lost on the 22nd at If the tank strength of 21 Panzer at the outset was 83 and not 120.Ariete the score was even; against the panzer divisions the British tank units were outclassed in a way that defies explanation in terms of personalities or of relative armour and armament, the terms chiefly considered in the
The German 50-millimetre and ‘88’ were indeed much better as anti-tank guns than their British counterparts; but the British could also boast of technical advantages. The essential difference was not of equipment, but of method. The Germans were favoured by a tactical doctrine, inspired by British prophets unhonoured in their own country, See, inter alia, The Tanks, The History of the Royal Tank Regiment, Vol. I, Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 20, and Ropp, War in the Modern World, Ch. IX.Panzerdivision, a powerful and versatile organisation of tank crews, gunners, engineers and infantry all trained to work in close harmony, and it had no parallel in the British Army, a fact so clouded by terminology that it was seldom perceived. British tanks there were, of course, and armoured battalions and brigades assembled in one or two armoured divisions with mobile guns and infantry; but the theoretical foundations were insecure, tactical doctrine varied from unit to unit, and damaging heresies flourished.
Among these was the belief that British heavy tanks, condemned by inadequate engine power to be slow-moving, should only be used to help infantry and the lighter and faster tanks should have independent roles requiring little or no co-operation with other arms. In battleaxe 7 Armoured Division had included a brigade of cruiser tanks and one of I tanks and the failure of the offensive was officially attributed in large part to their conflicting requirements. But the I tanks had in fact more than held their own with 15 Panzer Division and in the long lull before
THE operations of 13 Corps were conducted against a background of misconceptions of which the most important was that the damage inflicted on the enemy armour in the early days was greater than 7 Armoured Division had suffered. The history of later phases has for this reason an odd air of unreality. Truth was not only stranger than fiction; it was incredible. Had the true position been known no responsible commander in 13 Corps would have accepted the commitments which led to the relief of
This state of affairs arose from many causes, of which the hardy optimism of Eighth Army was not the least. In 13 Corps there was no disposition at all to take a gloomy view of events, estimates of enemy losses were accepted as a routine and could not be checked, and severe fighting took place before some units were even prepared to concede a proper respect for the enemy. Indeed the first two or three days were something of a trial for men who had crossed the frontier on the 18th in expectation of sudden and violent action and then a headlong pursuit of the enemy, and had found instead that they had to cool their heels in some nameless area of desert while the critical battles were being fought elsewhere. When highly-coloured reports came in of first engagements, these men itched more than ever to start their own tasks.
It was not until ten o'clock at night on 18 November that the New Zealand Division began to pour through gaps in the frontier wire at See
Daylight revealed mainly domestic matters (congestion at
As the day progressed the absence of enemy aircraft provoked much comment. The
Each brigade was now allotted a squadron of
My feeling is that ‘I don't care what the Boche is doing. I would go slap for
Tobruk . If we wait he will get his air [force] up. I don't think he knows where we are.’
The next morning, 20 November, dawned bright and good news soon came in. B Sqn was now back and B Tp of Ariete had lost 45 tanks and 200 prisoners and 21 Panzer had also been hard hit. Five miles to the north 4 Armoured Brigade had joined battle with some 180 tanks and
Then came a puzzling hiatus. From 5 Brigade shell bursts could be seen to the north-east and Divisional Cavalry heard the hammering of guns to the north-west and had an anxious few moments from eight tanks, which luckily proved to be Stuarts of 4 Armoured Brigade. Hopes rose with reports that the enemy in front of this brigade was retreating. But
I said we were ready to go out and help. Only way to move bodily, cannot take guns without denuding ourselves. Alternatively they could come on to our flank to rally or go to our rear. If the 4 Armd Bde is ordered to rally we can take a strong bump. ‘We are omnipotent. If you want us to advance let us know. If they ask for help, we will have to consider how best we can do it.’ Strong Cav patrol of ours is going over to contact 4 Armd Bde.
A little later, when both panzer divisions were identified and located north of 4 Armoured Brigade, 13 Corps suggested to Army and 30 Corps that Gatehouse might rally if necessary ‘on left flank NZ Div who are strongly posted in present area.’ The patrol of Divisional Cavalry duly got in touch with Gatehouse and offered New Zealand help, which he rejected. Later in the afternoon the dual role of 4 Armoured Brigade was dropped with
21 Panzer Division which was wrongly reported to have four infantry battalions as well as its tank regiment and artillery. Hargest watched
‘
The GOC's confidence was founded like that of other senior officers on the belief that the British armour would prove too strong for its opponents. Even with both panzer divisions in the frontier area and 4 Armoured Brigade released from its protective role, there seemed no great cause for concern, though local and temporary difficulties might arise. But the morning of 21 November brought relief from even these minor anxieties. When all the German armour made off at an early hour towards
battleaxe had given hints of what the New Zealanders might have to meet on their march north and in the light of that campaign
The situation as understood at
Divisional Cavalry had duly moved off at 11 a.m. with its three squadrons in line on a front of some ten miles, driving northwards over flat desert, past a few wrecked aircraft and on to the Trigh Capuzzo. A Squadron soon came upon
In the course of its advance 5 Brigade was authorised to undertake all the tasks tentatively allotted by the Divisional plan and Hargest was in a tremendous hurry to get as much done as possible before dark. When Lieutenant-Colonel Eight field guns, four Bofors, four Vickers and a section of sappers, with a handful of stretcher bearers.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Meanwhile an instruction was signed at Brigade Headquarters at 10.35 p.m. allotting
The brigade staff was also planning another operation against an objective which was to prove in the event undefended, battleaxe. The instruction was signed at 11.15 p.m. and 21 Battalion Group was to be ready to attack any time after first light on the 22nd. The defences as known up to 6 November and overprinted on current maps showed only a few scattered diggings and a little wire in the area, with some transport to the south-west, and there was nothing to suggest that enemy might be found there in strength; but it was better to be sure than sorry.
While 5 Brigade swung right to face
Despite this muddy ordeal, however, the brigade gained an even greater measure of surprise than 5 Brigade. The 250-foot escarpment dominated the coast road and the ground to the north and opened up as day dawned a peaceful panorama of unsuspecting supply and service units, mostly of 21 Panzer Division, which were scattered along both sides of the road. First success went to a German detachment which decamped from alongside 18 Battalion at first light and made off rapidly towards
On its journey to Bir el-Hariga 6 Brigade met even worse going than 4 Brigade and floundered through the mud in increasing confusion until, at 1 a.m.,
These had reached
One Bde Gp will definitely be required to move west-wards 22 Nov to pass to comd 30 Corps. Location to which Bde is to go will be signalled later. Ack.
Then came further details, timed 8.45 p.m. and received at 12.50 a.m. on the 22nd:
As situation north of escarpment is still obscure 6 Inf Bde Group will move south of line BIR EL CHLETA 454403 and point 175 438404 destination follows later. Maximum AG 93
will be taken for VALENTINES. Probably fuel.
Second line transport will accompany Brigade group. Ack. Actually Matildas, as Gentry soon learned, not Valentines as Norrie had been given to understand and as he wanted.
No urgency attached to either message and 13 Corps seemed to confirm this in reporting at 8.10 p.m. on the 21st that 170 enemy tanks were thought to have been hit and that the Italians were ‘rapidly withdrawing crusader plan were favourable and the ordering of the move by Eighth Army was taken as a good omen.
Breakfast time on 22 November therefore saw the Division's operations developing according to plan and with good auguries. Soon afterwards a heavy shower of rain ‘made conditions unpleasant’, as the Divisional Cavalry diarist noted, and clogged rifles and Bren guns with sand. A mile or two to the south
Hargest had been refused permission to attack
Hargest and 21 Bn war diary.
Allen's plan must be inferred from what happened. The fighting patrol already in being, 15 Platoon with a section each of carriers and mortars, as the spearhead was to attack what was thought to be an outpost of the
The ‘outpost’, however, proved to be the main position and the fighting patrol spent a miserable hour or so establishing this fact. Under Captain
Ferguson spoke to Allen by R/T and the latter at once came up by carrier, heedless of the fire he attracted. A quick study of the ‘buildings, concrete emplacements, dugouts, native houses, wire and petrol dump’ Ferguson.
Allen now committed A Company and its lorries drove up quickly between B Company and Ferguson's detachment. As the vehicles drove boldly forward, however, they were hit one after the other by anti-tank and small-arms fire and put out of action. The riflemen dismounted roughly level with B Company and splashed through puddles of water in a series of charges until they, too, could get no farther. Many were hit in vehicles or in the act of vacating them, and the slightest movement from those on the ground attracted keen enemy attention. The 25-pounders of 47 Field Battery gave continuous support and scored several successes but were too few to subdue the MG fire, though they hit an ammunition dump which went up in several explosions, one of them heavy enough to shower A Company with fragments.
There was little Allen could now do with his own resources and when Major D Tp, 28 Fd Bty.
At dusk C Company had almost reached the wire, but was faced with some thirty MGs in strong positions. Against such opposition only a well-prepared assault offered hope of success, and after dark the possibilities of a battalion attack by night or at first light next morning were canvassed. Allen in the end settled for an attack two
The 25-pounders continued to fire and by their flashes and the light of a burning A Company lorry the companies disengaged and withdrew to the B Echelon area, the lorries coming as far forward as they dared to pick up their loads. There a hot meal awaited the men and was eagerly eaten.
Losses in this abortive action are given in the unit diary as 13 killed and 65 wounded; but the question of why such heavy losses were accepted for such a minor (and in the end fruitless) action remains unanswered. One officer concerned remarked that 55 Savona Division at crusader this was the most unrewarding.
The hasty and haphazard mounting of the Stevens, III Battalion of the Italian 16 Infantry Regiment, with supporting arms which included several Italian
I Battalion and Regimental Headquarters reinforced by 12 Oasis Company and other German detachments, including the crews of 88-millimetre guns which could fire with deadly anti-tank effect at ranges upwards of Fourth Indian Division, p. 91.
The Omar Nuovo operation was in essence an infantry battalion attack, carried out by 1 Royal Sussex, but with a weight and quality of support which might have made 21 Battalion (had they known of it) green with envy. First two formations of Marylands sprinkled the target with bombs, followed by twenty-three low-flying fighters with blazing machine guns. Twenty minutes later, at noon, the 4.5-inch guns and 6-inch howitzers of 68 Medium Regiment and the 25-pounders of 1 and 25 Field Regiments, RA, fired timed concentrations and laid a thick smoke screen to shield the right flank from the Libyan Omar guns. Two carrier platoons led off at 12.20 p.m., but the two squadrons of Matildas which were meant to be right behind them were twenty minutes late and lost much of the benefit of the artillery programme. Next came two companies of infantry in lorries, then the reserve squadron of I tanks, and finally the rest of 1 Royal Sussex, an anti-tank battery, and another field battery.
Several tanks and perhaps some carriers came to grief on minefields, some of which were unmarked. Then there was a brief pause as anti-tank guns, including ‘88s’, As was thought, but a German map of 16 Nov marks the Omar Nuovo guns as Italian 75-mm HAA in anti-tank roles, which were almost as good as ‘88s’.
In rallying the tanks struck more mines and the new assault was thereby delayed until 3.15 p.m. It went in on a narrow front, as minefields dictated, with B Squadron, 44 Royal Tanks, leading with troops in line ahead. Driving through the narrow neck between minefields, B Squadron found itself heading straight towards two ‘88s’, and the leading troop, having no alternative, increased speed to close with them, making it impossible for the following tanks to open out into more effective order. Thus the squadron tackled a powerful anti-tank position ‘practically line ahead’,12 Oasis Company, and well over a thousand Italians still resisting. By infiltration during the night the Punjabis were able to tighten their grip and gain a thousand more prisoners next day; but the western part of the fortress was stubbornly defended (and was not captured, as it happened, until the end of the month).
Omar Nuovo was thus seized and the even stronger Libyan Omar breached in the afternoon of the 22nd, and According to the e.g., in 42 Royal Tank Regiment 1938–1944, p. 10.
Messervy's striking power was now greatly reduced and it was out of the question for some time to eat any farther into the frontier line. ‘Cova’ was strongly held, as 4/11 Sikh found in the course of its covering operations, so a Corps plan of 7.20 p.m. to take this next day and
Good news meanwhile flowed continuously to Hargest's headquarters from 23 Battalion during the 22nd, outweighing any misgivings the 5 Brigade commander may have felt about the
The Maori attack went smoothly according to plan. The rifle companies dismounted at
Among the few casualties of this early fighting was Dittmer himself and for the time being Major Sutton took command, succeeded later in the day by
Casualties in the actual assault were few, but shellfire on inhospitable ground caused several deaths and wounded many men. By dusk the dead numbered 20 and there were 34 wounded, Captain
The capture of Upper Sollum sealed off the large Straker, in a report dated
For the enemy the greatest embarrassment from 5 Brigade's operations was that the frontier strongpoints could no longer get water and other supplies from East Sector, for neglecting to put Panzer Group Headquarters the impression gained ground that the British meant to capture Panzer Group battle report states, with evident relief. But the presence of strong British forces in this area could not be viewed lightly and the situation at Panzer Group learned in the following signal from Savona Division received at 2 p.m. on 23 November:
A reconnaissance force must be pushed straight forward to
Sidi Omar asBir Ghirba is not threatened at present. If possible provide immediate air support forSidi Omar where the position is critical as a result of heavy attacks in superior force.
This had profound consequences; but General de Giorgis failed to indicate that Omar Nuovo and half of Libyan Omar (‘Panzer Group somehow gathered that his headquarters had fallen into British hands.
In the morning of the 22nd
Twentieth Battalion had had a busy morning at
This called for further action and
A brave and resourceful German officer, Captain Briel, CO of 606 Anti-Aircraft Battalion, was 21 Panzer Division, and it was this platoon with supply personnel, mostly Italian, who supplied the opposition, reinforced later by men from Briel's headquarters. The immediate object was to cover the evacuation of the dumps of
The methodical exploitation of the surprise gained in the night move to
Leave minimum Tps to observe enemy
BARDIA and send remainder your tps clear up area North roadBARDIA -TOBRUK and advance onGAMBUT which enemy aircraft still using. Advance West will best assist VZV [not deciphered] plan.
6 Inf Bde now under comd 30 Corps. Presume you NOT wish take all Tps other than those guarding
Grid 46 was a north-south line just west of
Gentry went to 4 Brigade about 3.30 p.m. and in the absence of crusader operation order and caused no surprise. The brigade staff seem to have understood that they were to take over from Divisional Cavalry, and
Fourth Brigade (less the 20th) deployed around Bir el Baheira soon after dark. Divisional Cavalry had gone before 19 Battalion arrived and could not therefore detach the squadron which crusader plan, and it carried no hint that all was not well on the
THE tasks now confronting the New Zealand Division were indeed more ambitious than anything the crusader plan proposed; but the circumstances were far less propitious than any previously envisaged. What 5 Brigade for this ‘masking’ role. This meant disappointing Hargest, who badly wanted to take further advantage of his position in rear of the enemy's frontier defences; but 5 Brigade and let Hargest rejoin the Division and share this success.
The view of the battle on which these hopes were founded was almost totally misleading and it was only slowly and partially corrected. The armoured battle had been lost not won and the Division was venturing westwards against a far stronger enemy than 1 Army Tk Bde (less 42 R Tks), with 8 R Tks (Valentines) and 44 R Tks less B Sqn (Matildas) and 8 Fd Regt, RA; 65 A-Tk Regt, RA, was to follow.
The mission to
The changeover from Matildas to Valentines for 6 Brigade, in accordance with With spurts of more than 12 miles per hour.
After a few miles, however, there came a dramatic intervention which changed the whole outlook. A liaison officer from Barrowclough's report in the 6 Bde war diary. This still assumed that 6 Bde was travelling via Gabr Saleh, as Norrie had at first been led to believe, and he wanted the tanks to take the much quicker direct route.
This was a startling order and troubled
The liaison officer's account suggested local setback rather than general disaster in the armoured battle. He offered the whimsical and contradictory estimates of enemy tank losses then being fed back to Corps and Army and made it all the harder to comprehend how the Support Group could have got into serious trouble.
At some stage of the journey a messenger from 30 Corps passed unseen on his way to
Have received orders from 30 Corps that you are to take your Bde Gp with all haste to relieve Support Gp of Armd Corps who are surrounded at
SIDI REZEGH 428405. You will receive no further orders but you will start fighting and get in touch with Gen GOTT comd 7 Armd Div who is surrounded there. Recognition signal is two red verey lights. Leave your 2nd line [transport] at present location or send back eastwards. You must decide quickly whether you go by rd or part on escarpment.
This sounded as though the whole of 7 Armoured Division and not just the Support Group was surrounded, a very much worse situation than the LO had suggested; but it did at least vaguely outline a course of action and Barrowclough pressed on. But it was already getting dark, Veale's tank crews were worn out, and the brigade staff with a sleepless night behind them and a day of work and
During the halt a
Nov 22
Secret
To/G.O.C. N.Z. Div
or Brigadier of Selected Bde
Co-operating with 30 Corps
Situation as marked on Map (1030 hrs) [not preserved] L.O. has full details of our tps & enemy—also
Tobruk progress.Your Task in General is to secure an all round defensive locality about Pt 175 438404. Bring your Valentine Tanks.
After securing this, gain touch with troops of 7th Arm Bde & 5 S.A. Bde about SIDI REZEGH.
I suggest you shd move S of escarpment from GASR EL ARID to avoid climb later.
My HQs Pt 179 448360——[west of Gabr Saleh]
Am sending you W/T set on my frequency—
(sgd) C. W. M.
NorrieLt General30 Corps
Thus Norrie had by this time learned that the New Zealand brigade was taking the direct route along the Trigh Capuzzo; but when he specified shortly after 10.30 a.m. on the 22nd that 15 Panzer. If the LO was no better informed on other points
In an appreciation signed at 2.15 p.m. In quotation marks in
In such a frame of mind
Hard as these reports were to understand, they seemed clear enough on one point: it was a shortage of infantry and not of tanks from which 30 Corps was suffering. This was of course what
C/1398
My Dear Corps Commander,
I have seen a LO from 30 Corps and also a personal one from General Gott, 7 Armd Div.
I am taking
Musaid and clearing the enemy out of the areaCapuzzo -Musaid -Salum. This should be done at dawn tomorrow. In view of the general situation I suggest that I re-arrange my forces aroundBardia as follows:—20 Bn and sqn tanks astride the road
Bardia -Tobruk and on the escarpment.One Bn of inf at
Musaid .Two coys of inf at
Capuzzo with sqn ‘I’ tanks.Remaining two coys in Bde Reserve at
Sidi Azeiz .Although this would leave the garrisons very weak, I could if necessary take the remaining two bns under
Brigadier Hargest and get him to join forces withBrigadier Inglis who has two bns of the 4 Inf Bde, two sqns of ‘I’ tanks and the Div Cav. I suggest that this force could march onTobruk along the escarpment to break through the Bologna Div, or such other help as is necessary. I feel I could do this starting early in the morning.If this is done it would be necessary to get the 4 Ind Div to extend their boundary up to
Capuzzo .Yours sincerely,
B. C.FreybergP.S. I have as you know dispatched the 6 NZ Inf Bde with all haste complete with Valentines, to relieve the Support Gp. I know they will do well.
There followed a busy hour of consultation, first with Miles about the guns, then with This was the ground of which Crusader.
This go-for-Bologna Division and join hands with the
Other minds, however, were working parallel to his. Cunningham had given it as his opinion as early as 21 November that the
6 NZ Inf Bde will revert to comd NZ Div on receipt of this message. Comd NZ Div will leave minimum troops necessary to keep enemy under observation from incl sic] enemy attack during advance westwards.
The drawbacks to the scheme to put
[Gen Cunningham] told me that … it appeared to him that it would become more and more an infantry battle and that he hoped that 1 S.A. Div would soon be able to play their part as originally planned.
The question of command of 6 N.Z. Bde. was discussed and I explained that, as it was some 40 miles away, it was very difficult for me to control, unless some special arrangements had been made about communications. I was given their call sign, but this was of course useless without their frequency and it became imperative that they should be sent an anchor set, if it were to be subsequently put under my command.
I suggested that 6 N.Z. Bde. should be commanded by their own Div. Comd. or by 13 Corps. I discussed this matter with General GOTT, and to make certain, he sent off at dawn on 23 Nov. a liaison officer with W/T set and tank for the particular task of establishing contact. As events turned out, it was a most provident action on the part of G.O.C. 7 Armd. Div.
This should of course have been considered long before, when the detached role of 6 Brigade was made part of the Crusader plan. But
Effective command could not be exercised without proper wireless links and codes and Eighth Army was then curiously inflexible in these respects. For the next week the
All the senior officers concerned—Cunningham, Norrie, Godwin-Austen, Gott and crusader plan with various modifications as befitted their personal misconceptions of the situation. None quite realised at this stage that the plan and the reality were utterly different and that the current scheme to bring up more infantry for the
By the morning of the 23rd
See 13th Corps Commander and say:
We think we have cleaned up all around
There is a considerable force of enemy in
We also think we have cleaned up and occupied The Maoris had not yet attacked Upper Sollum and there was no plan to tackle Lower Sollum.
4 Bde have cleaned up the wadis immediately West of
Messervey [sic] might take over command of our 5 Bde.
I suggest Div HQ should move to
Administration: We can carry on as we are at the moment. We have three days' water, petrol, oil, food, and ammunition in hand. We could either transfer to 30 Corps or go as we are if they put in another link.
We shall take
Corps Commander could release Hargest's 5 Bde by relieving them by 4 Indian Division. I could bring him [Hargest] to
We will leave 5 Bde Gp at
4 Bde Gp will be in
The 6 Bde Gp interposing on the flank of the Armoured Bde opposite
Position Summarised
1st Phase. Move with all troops available join with 6 NZ Inf Bde and march on to
2nd Phase. To relieve 5 Inf Bde which could come forward to join us.
Agree Phase 1. Do not send 4 Bde north track
An earlier situation report (8.40 a.m.) was not received until 11 a.m. and its contents evoked less concern than they warranted, perhaps because of the rush of work related to the Division's impending departure for
1 SA Div take over responsibility for
This put the current task allotted 6 Brigade in an odd light and could well have appeared highly alarming at
My dear,Freyberg The Army Comd has just been here. He has arranged that—probably with effect from 24 Nov—13 Corps takes over the operations for the relief of
TOBRUK —Troops under comd 13 Corps will be your Div, 4 Ind Div and at least one Inf Bde Gp of 1 S.A. Div—I am now going to see Comd 30 Corps to discover exactly what S. Africans he will hand over to me.The general situation seems to be that the enemy still has some 100 Tanks, location NOT definitely known; that he appears to be organising a North and South position somewhere West of BIR EL GUBI: that the
SIDI REZEGH situation is and will remain critical until your 6 Inf Bde Gp arrive; and that the TOBRUCH sortie is making slow progress which will be accelerated by the arrival of your 6th and 4th Bdes.Your Liaison Officer [Sanders] has just come and I have sent you a message approving of your proposals for Phase I. You will, I hope, realise from the above that the urgency of clearing the area North of the main road
BARDIA –TOBRUK is less than that of relieving the situation in the areaSIDI REZEGH – TOBRUCH. So I have asked you NOT to get committed North of the main road. BUT LOOK AFTER YOUR RIGHT FLANK in view of Enemy Tanks—Lack of 3rd Line [transport] for 4 Ind Div and lack of troops will prevent them from taking overCAPUZZO until 24 Nov and I doubt whether they could take over any distance Northwards for the present. So though I would like your troops picquetting that area to be reduced to a minimum (say two Bns and one Sqn Tanks) leaving as many as possible free to operate Eastwards [sic], I cannot hold out hopes for the whole area being taken over by 4 Ind Div, as I would like—Would you object strongly to such of your troops as have to remain being placed temporarily under command of 4 Ind Div?Will you please send me a signal in answer to this question?
D.A. & Q.M.G. is coming with me to H.Q.
30 Corps to discuss all maintenance questions the answers to which I will give you as soon as I can. Underlined in original.
Yours sincerely,
A. R.
Godwin-Austen
A reasonable inference from this would be that the
The actual situation, however, was far blacker than anything Cunningham envisaged and it was getting quickly worse. The two panzer divisions could still muster 170-odd tanks and Ariete some fifty and they were all taking up position with strong support to destroy the remaining British forces south of
Not knowing that he was hors de combat.
Have little information regarding enemy troops on line our advance from East. Position 6 Inf Bde will be South TRIGH CAPUZZO moving on Pt 175 438404. 4 Inf Bde is moving
Fourth Brigade had meanwhile moved off at 9.15 a.m. for Africa Corps.
At 3 p.m. the brigade drove on to
3 Reconnaissance Unit between Bir el Chleta and the escarpment at Point 172, the scene of a skirmish at dawn this day with 6 Brigade.
After irritating delays and several minor mishaps,
Thus Divisional Headquarters ended the day near where 6 Brigade began it. Barrowclough had meant to pass south of Bir el Chleta on his way to
An officer saw two tanks with British markings which somehow looked odd and he drove over for a closer look; but they ‘disappeared in a cloud of dust’.
Above the escarpment 26 Battalion missed most of the excitement and took only two prisoners, though
To Brigadier
The delay here, as things turned out, was well worth while. The bivouac so violently disturbed had been that of Africa Corps Headquarters, which was now shattered, its main wireless links captured or smashed, and most of its staff on their way under New Zealand escort to the Egyptian frontier.
As 6 Brigade drove westwards above the escarpment its right flank was raked from time to time by small-arms fire from the rough crest and the detachment of the 25th guarding this flank had to overcome a series of MG posts in wadis along the route. The brigade group carried on and passed out of sight and when the carriers remounted the ridge the flank guard hastened to regain its position, guided by the lingering haze of dust. At 10.30 a.m. Barrowclough halted as planned at the
The open, scrub-covered desert in front gave little evidence of friend or foe and disclosed its few features with such relutance that the ground was not easy to reconcile with the map. To the left front occasional bursts of MG fire came from a group of captured Stuart tanks, formerly of 4 Armoured Brigade, which had run out of petrol. Among them were salvage parties with lorries and several of the latter drove off hastily to the south, chased by rounds from 33 Anti-Tank Battery. More fire came from the right, where enemy parties were holding out in the wadis and re-entrants of the escarpment, though there was no sign of formed bodies of troops of significant size. Below towards the coast a vehicle here and there in the distance served only to emphasise the emptiness of the scene.
A few minutes after 6 Brigade halted 6 Bde Log Diary.
C Sqn Tanks given Tp of 25 prs and tanks to go and mop up the 50 M 13 tanks—speed essential—when job is done to report back and stay on ground. Also with Tanks two Pls of Inf to help mop up.
The Valentines would therefore not be at hand to help the infantry on to Point 175, which was the main objective; but there was nothing to suggest they would be needed.
There was some reason to believe Point 175 might be defended, though not strongly, and Barrowclough decided to deploy 25 Battalion, with a field battery and an anti-tank troop, 29 Bty,
The start line faced north-west and stretched across 800 yards of gently-sloping desert between the top of Rugbet en-Nbeidat and an unnamed wadi two miles west of Esc-Sciomar. B Company of 25 Battalion formed up on the right and D on the left with equal frontages, with C in reserve 800 yards behind D.
The platoons moved off at the appointed time, expecting no more than one or two machine guns to oppose their advance. The men were well dispersed and hard to see at a distance in this tufted desert and carried on silently towards a vague objective some
Meanwhile
This was a bold and generous interpretation of the instructions from Norrie and 6 Bde Log Diary.
Any danger of tank counter-attack was enough to warrant this change of plan; but Five months after battleaxe!
Just beyond the horizon Africa Corps was getting ready to crush the last remnants of the British armour and end the threat to the siege of
IF they counted tanks as trumps, by the morning of 23 November Ibid. Norrie, ‘Narrative of Events’.30 Corps was described as ‘still very confused’.30 tanks remained in 22 Armoured Brigade and none at all in
Daylight revealed, however, that the field company and ambulance and most of the B Echelons of 1 South African Brigade had gone on by mistake in the night and ended up some miles ahead of the main body. Hampered thus by masses of transport in front of his fighting units, More likely west.The History of the 7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery, 1939–1945, p. 37.
5 South African Brigade had stayed where its abortive attack of the previous afternoon had left it and was now at the head of the Corps. The 3rd Transvaal Scottish faced across a thousand yards of arid plateau (too thin a slice on which to deploy any armour available in face of German anti-tank guns) to where elements of 155 Infantry Regiment still clung to the southern escarpment. The Scottish had brought back their wounded and consolidated their positions as best they could in the dark. To their right rear 2 Regiment Botha faced east and to their left rear 1 South African Irish looked westwards across empty miles of thin scrub towards Hagfet en-Nezha, the area to which Norrie had hoped the South African position might be extended. The best that could be done for the moment in this direction was to station what was left of 22 Armoured Brigade (30 tanks by one account, 45 by another, organised in a composite regiment) on this flank, while the remnants of the Support Group lay east of 2 Botha. A handful of 3 Transvaal Scottish; but this was not, as it happened, where danger really threatened. Gott later ordered up 2 Scots Guards, and this unit made its way northwards but arrived too late to fit properly into the defensive scheme before the enemy struck his main blow.
The first blow was not as heavy as Africa Corps Commander either ignored his orders or failed to get them in time. The
Both Ariete pushed north-eastwards towards 21 st Italian Corps would meanwhile maintain the siege, the two German reconnaissance units would ‘reconnoitre in force’ along the 155 Infantry and 361 Africa Regiments would remain in their present positions in Army Reserve. Ariete was not under
15 Panzer Division with the tank regiment of
Only the first part of this, the morning advance, was disclosed in the Corps order which reached 15 Panzer was to ‘destroy everything that opposed it during the day, even if it meant veering a little from its axis and direction.’15 PZ Div war diary.15 Panzer with 5 Panzer Regiment added—was inspired or embarrassed by having his Corps Commander so far forward is not recorded. 21 Panzer, which he wrongly thought to be directly facing the remnants of the British armour. This misconception hampered his grasp of Panzer Group order) 155 Infantry and 361 Africa Regiments (according to 21 Panzer) were put under
The Africa Corps diary describes
The advance was held up for half an hour by the non-arrival of Battle report of Led by the South African test cricketer Bob Crisp, then a captain in 3 R Tks. See Duffus Actually two-thirds of it, called 5 Panzer Regiment, which actually topped the escarpment just as 15 Panzer moved off and was led forward on the left of that formation and not on the right as ordered (and disappeared over the horizon not long before 6 New Zealand Brigade appeared on the scene). A mist covering the ground at dawn had lifted and the advance to the south-west from Point 175 over ‘flat, firm ground5 Pz Regt.Corps diary says. Some twenty British tanks counterattacked but were repulsed and another fourteen caught refuelling
15 Panzer. The scene quickly became one of the utmost confusion, gradually clarifying as the transport fled in all directions so that 15 Panzer emerged as a target for British and South African guns to the north, west and south. The opposition was nevertheless so disorganised that Corps diary. But many minor engagements were still in progress, among them one to rescue a troop of 33 Artillery Regiment captured by British tanks,Beyond the Laager, pp. 33–46, and Crisp, Brazen Chariots, pp. 74–81.15 Panzer which knocked out four British tanks in the course of it. The CO of I Battalion, 8 Panzer Regiment, was killed while trying to break through a column, several other German tanks were knocked out, and the regimental commander, 21 Panzer to attack southwards; but nothing came of this and he decided in the end to break away towards Bir el-Gubi to link up with ArieteDi Nisio Group, which included 132 Tank Regiment.
30 Corps trapped in this vast pocket; but 5 Panzer Regiment, which reached 15 Panzer. The rest of the division pushed on and at 12.35 p.m. met Ariete eight miles north-east of El Gubi. In so doing 8 Panzer Regiment was further disorganised by swampy ground and shellfire from several directions. Halting just in time to miss getting bogged down, 15 Infantry Brigade used its artillery to subdue the fire from the south; but the fire from the north kept increasing and because of the swamp the troops could not assemble beyond the range of the guns. It was vital for
A new principle was embodied in the ‘long wave of tanks’ scheme and 5 Panzer Regiment on the right, 8 Panzer Regiment in the centre, and 132 Tank Regiment on the left. In the absence of the rest of 21 Panzer the guns and infantry of 15 Panzer had to be spread over two panzer regiments instead of one, so that 15 Infantry Brigade covered twice his normal front: 200 Regiment was to follow 5 Panzer Regiment, 115 Infantry Regiment to follow 8 Panzer Regiment, and the infantry of Di Nisio Group would co-operate with 132 Tank Regiment. The 33rd Artillery Regiment was to be thinly disposed over the whole front of 15 Panzer, though the Abteilung which was supposed to support 200 Regiment did not in the event arrive until after dark. So far as possible the infantry were to remain in their vehicles and follow close behind the tanks.
This scheme was weakened by ignorance of the nature and extent of the opposition, and it is not surprising that in the event only the central segment of the long line was aimed at the main centre of resistance (5 South African Brigade) and the two wings tended to skim past the flanks. This was to be partly rectified when 5 Panzer Regiment later swung westwards and Di Nisio made vaguely threatening moves against the composite regiment of 22 Armoured Brigade to the west of 1 South African Irish. But the main weight of the attack was not concentrated to good effect and by far the greater burden was borne by 8 Panzer Regiment and 115 Infantry Regiment.
The menace of these movements to the south and south-west was plain and See
This went on to the accompaniment from noon onwards of a steadily increasing bombardment by the many guns of 21 Panzer and the enemy Army Artillery in the 15 Panzer, and the Transvaal Scottish on their rocky ground, reinforced by an MMG company, calmly awaited an attack from the north. The gunners in the South African laager were badly placed to counter the fire from the north and were not well off for ammunition; but the German accounts testify to the accuracy of their fire on 15 Panzer Division.
Headquarters of 6 Brigade knew nothing of all this when 26 Battalion was sent south-westwards, and when portées of L Troop led the way and reached Garaet en-Nbeidat, a mile or more east of 2 Regiment Botha, at about 12.25, though the great size of the laager in front made it seem closer. From a slight rise in the scrub-covered desert, littered with the derelicts of battle, the men could see occasional shelling ahead to which the South African guns replied; but there seemed no cause for alarm and Page signalled back to 6 Brigade that he had reached his destination without meeting enemy, was in touch with the South Africans, and would try to link up with 25 Battalion at Point 175. Page then went forward to report to whoever was in command and before reaching the South African laager met General Gott.
Page had only the vaguest idea of what was expected of him and looked to
With some misgivings
A section of infantry in a lorry accompanied the carriers on their mission to 25 Battalion, and after a mile or two this party passed through the wreckage of a tank battle. Less than a thousand yards past this the carriers, which went on ahead, came upon elements of both 24 and 25 Battalions. The infantry section, waiting among the derelicts, were much moved to see other men of their brigade as distant figures advancing through fire against the defenders of Point 175. Soon the carriers came back with word that losses were heavy and both battalions were now committed to the attack. The small detachment itself came under shellfire and made its way back to Garaet en-Nbeidat, its task accomplished.
The battalion had meanwhile been watching with some concern as shellfire thickened on the South African positions, and by 2 p.m. gained a more personal interest when a few light shells landed in the 26 Battalion area. Soon after this tanks could be seen in the
What was in fact taking place was one of the heaviest tank attacks of the desert war, always to be associated by the Germans with the formidable title this day bore in the Lutheran calendar, Totensonntag—Sunday of the Dead. In keeping with this aweinspiring name some 110 tanks of 8 Panzer Regiment bore down on the South African B Echelon area, now bristling with anti-tank guns, and on the southern part of the Irish, closely followed by the two battalions of 115 Infantry Regiment in their vulnerable lorrries, while on the right more than fifty tanks of 5 Panzer Regiment skirted the eastern flank and then dashed in among the South Africans, losing touch in the process with the tardy 200 Regiment. As the tanks broke from their assembly area and raced across the open ground towards the South Africans they were met by fierce fire over open sights from some twenty-four field guns and by fire from all 2-pounders within range. Many of the latter, lurking among the lorries, did not disclose their positions until faced by a target it was impossible to miss, the ‘long wave of tanks’ at point-blank range.
Some of the tanks which survived this deadly fusillade were soon among the vehicles, with 8 Panzer Regiment personally leading them at the head of II Battalion on the left, and there they struck further trouble as isolated tanks or small detachments were picked off by guns farther back among the mass of transport. Much of this transport began to move to escape the fire and thereby caused more confusion on both sides, to which the black smoke of blazing tanks and transport, the grey veils of gun smoke, and the churning turbulence of dust all added their share in a pandemonium of violence. Cramer had firmly resolved to keep straight ahead into the heart of the British position, ‘paying no attention to flank threats’, and by 3.30 p.m. I Battalion (under 115 Regiment a chance to catch up; but the defence seemed quickly to recover its vigour and Cramer realised that he had no choice but to push on with or without supporting arms. I Battalion therefore fought its way slowly northwards through heavy defensive fire and Cramer led II Battalion round to the north-west, to ease the task of the following infantry by meeting another and dangerous threat in the form of a tank counter-attack by the composite regiment of 22 Armoured Brigade.
The following infantry were all part of See Schmidt, pp. 105–11.15 Infantry Brigade under 200 Regiment. But it was 115 Regiment on the left which had the harder task. Advancing on a broad front, this regiment meant to keep to its lorries as long as possible; but when I Battalion, Major von Grolmann, were killed and Major Goettman of II Battalion was gravely wounded while dismounting. The infantry tumbled out of their lorries and were for a short time pinned to slit trenches or any other cover they could find,115 Regiment under way again. The adjutant, 200 Regiment, which had likewise been daunted by the defensive fire and which Menny now ordered to swing to the right to conform with 115 Regiment, thereby taking the motor-cyclists and machine-gunners right out of the main arena and involving them in an action of their own against 26 New Zealand Battalion, as well as depriving both panzer regiments of effective infantry support.
This was a matter which greatly concerned Cramer of 8 Panzer Regiment, and at 4.20 p.m. he made a remarkable decision to let I Battalion carry on unaided its difficult passage into the heart of the defences while he took II Battalion round by the left to the south to disengage and bring the infantry forward at all costs. After a massive and expensive effort, however, the scheme fell through and Cramer found himself pushing northwards once more still without infantry support, and as a last resort called forward the panzer engineer battalion in some armoured troop-carriers, the rest of the sappers travelling on the outsides of tanks. The opposition of cruiser tanks of 22 Armoured Brigade among the mass of transport was with difficulty overcome, and the regiment pushed forward in what the regimental and divisional reports both call ‘an epic of bravery and soldierly self-sacrifice’. Behind it were solemn batches of prisoners in the care of the sappers and infantry and a waste of flame and smoke speckled with wrecked tanks and lorries, with here and there a gun destroyed at close quarters, its crew killed or wounded.
Cramer also had 5 Panzer Regiment under his command for this attack and the regimental report makes some scornful references to the lack of help from this quarter. But RECAM. But the weak oddments of British armour were too ill-informed about the situation at large to intervene to good effect.
Only the composite regiment of 22 Armoured Brigade could do much to help the South Africans and its dwindling band of tanks fought a solid and skilful action, falling back by degrees through the huge laager, at one stage passing right through the main MDS, to be followed, with equal solicitude for the wounded, by the German tanks. Then came Brigade Headquarters, which had heard very little of what was happening after the attack started and first learned of the progress of the panzer units when a staff officer recognised German tanks only 300 yards away. Armstrong and most of his staff were captured and the tanks carried on northwards, still meeting strong opposition from the guns guarding the northern perimeter, though the Transvaal Scottish, taken from the rear, could do little and were soon badly disorganised. Lorries swarmed towards the eastern flank to escape the enemy and drove wildly towards and past 26 Battalion on their way to safety, carrying with them
Brigadier Armstrong had sent an engineer officer, portées, and all four drove to the western side of the position. At the same time 30 Battery was told to drive over to help the South Africans and the eight 25-pounders were hooked on and driven westwards through the battalion.
No sooner did the field guns reach the 26 Battalion FDLs in a line north of L Troop when vehicles burst out of the laager ahead and raced towards them, small-arms fire began to come through the area, and vehicles flooded through at high speed with South Africans clinging to them—the first indication to most of the 26th that they faced a South African brigade. Captain
After a pause of uncertain duration, what was thought to be a disabled Valentine tank on the right flank suddenly opened fire and put one of the portées out of action; the solid shot came to rest on the deck of the portée and was found to be of 50-millimetre calibre, which identified the tank as a Pzkw III. This was quickly finished off by the other three guns and they turned their attention to more tanks which now appeared, apparently from the South African lines. The range was still too great for effective 2-pounder fire, but the 25-pounders carried on by indirect fire and later over open sights. A second 2-pounder, after firing three or four rounds, was disabled and the driver mortally wounded. This left two 2-pounders and these found a profusion of targets, which they engaged as fast as the crews could load, aim and fire, while any spare gunners manned Bren guns and rifles on the ground. More 2-pounder shot was soon called for and used up—from the two disabled portées, from the troop reserve, and more still provided from somewhere or other by the troop commander, Lieutenant
At the end of about an hour the two anti-tank guns had fired more than 300 rounds each, a phenomenal rate of fire for such equipment, at ranges between 600 and F. C. Barker and four others.Pzkw III and IV; but at the time of crusader not many of the German tanks had strengthened or reinforced armour plate and they were on that account much more vulnerable. L Troop claimed a high score in tanks in this energetic action, and one careful estimate was that twenty-four were knocked out and ‘only those going on fire were counted’.5 Panzer Regiment and 200 Regiment.
The report of Almost certainly the 5 Panzer Regiment admits the loss this day of twenty tanks all told (including two ‘technically’ damaged) and it is most unlikely that all these were lost to 26 Battalion. But this report testifies that Page's group gave Stephan much trouble. The regiment ‘came under heavy shell fire, particularly the right flank and II Bn’ at 3.15 p.m. and soon after this was harassed by British tanks on the right. Then the regiment ‘was opposed by very heavy A Tk fire from the MT columns, shell fire from a large number of batteries, the enemy tanks, and SP guns on the right flank,portées of L Troop.I Battalion became entangled in the great mass of South African vehicles and fought its way forward ‘under fire from both flanks, destroying enemy tanks, guns and batteries’, until it linked up with ‘about 15 tanks’ of 8 Panzer Regiment south of the airfield of 8 Panzer Regiment must somehow have become involved, which is not altogether implausible in view of the disorder into which Cramer's regiment was thrown by the fierce resistance in the South African laager.
What might reasonably be supposed in this connection is that 5 Panzer Regiment headed at first towards 26 Battalion rather than 5 South African Brigade and was encouraged to correct this error by the fire of 30 Battery, 4 RHA, and L Troop of 33 Anti-Tank Battery. But it is also likely that some of the ‘tanks’ claimed by L Troop were actually half-tracked carriers of 200 Regiment (as Briel's LAA carriers on the 115 Regiment. After this 2 MG Battalion on the right of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion and the two advanced on a broad front and in depth without tank or field artillery support.
Their attack progressed slowly, hampered at first by soft ground, and though they met less fire than 115 Regiment had faced, the men soon dismounted and continued on foot, covered by their
15 MC Bn had 13 MMGs and 33 LMGs and 2 MG Bn 36 MMGs and 10 LMGs, while a normal German motorised infantry battalion had 6 MMGs and 57 LMGs; all had 6 heavy mortars and 9 light ones.115 Regiment into the heart of the South African defences and it was not until after dark that they made any substantial progress at all.
As night was falling 115 Regiment pushed two companies through to the southern escarpment and the rest of the regiment came to rest just north of the positions originally held by the Transvaal Scottish, guarded by anti-tank guns and ‘88s’ and holding the impressive total of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion advanced quickly as opposition dissolved into the night and ‘small rearguards gave themselves up to the attacking troops as they exploited’.200 Regt battle report.2 MG Battalion, according to the regimental report, ‘was again forced to ground by very heavy mortar fire about 200 metres short of the enemy defences’.
This was unquestionably 26 Battalion, which blazed away furiously at dusk and for some time after at what looked in the deceptive half-light (to a sergeant of L Troop) like ‘the whole German Army’. Some of the ‘mortar fire’ came from 30 Battery, which fired into the oncoming vehicles and infantry at a very rapid rate until some guns ran out of ammunition and had to withdraw in search of more. A Company was hotly engaged and an NCO of the mortar platoon says the enemy ‘came in droves with fixed bayonets … until their faces were quite recognisable’. Even the reserve mortars were soon firing at maximum elevation i.e., minimum range, unlike the field guns. Maj B. J. Mathewson, ED; Westport; born Westport,
The night had darkened, the enemy sounded very close and Wesney soon disappeared into the blackness at the head of his men. But the sounds proved deceptive and B Company charged a long way without making contact, though it ran into fire which killed Wesney and six others and wounded three more before the company was called to a halt. portées in his pick-up truck, bringing with him a German he had captured, Page brought up the rear of the group with the carriers, and all made a fast journey back to Brigade Headquarters at Esc-Sciomar. The action had cost no more than 12 killed and about 20 wounded altogether in the battalion group, whereas 200 Regiment had 10 killed, 46 wounded and 61 missing, a considerable number of them due to 26 Battalion. These losses, however, were dwarfed by those of 5 South African Brigade, which at ‘
‘HERE is our present position on map’, McNaught told his company commanders when he gave out his revised orders at 11.37 a.m. ‘There is Pt 175 1½ miles away. You can see a tallish object, call it “Cairn”. Beyond is what looks like a blockhouse. Call it “Blockhouse”.’ Actually a rest house for travelling bedouin of the Abeidat tribe, though the name Blockhouse stuck to it in NZ Div. The quotation is from McNaught's orders as he reconstructed them in S. W. Brown, Mortar Pl.
The cairn and the Blockhouse beyond were in the respective areas of II and I Battalions of 361 Africa Regiment, commanded by I Battalion under II Battalion under 21 Panzer) could cover the western slopes of the position. The regiment was not well served by the artillery in the Africa Corps attack; but its allotment of machine guns and mortars was above average and gave each battalion much greater firepower than its New Zealand counterpart.
I/361 Regt (and presumably II Bn) had 8 MMGs, 61 LMGs and 10 heavy mortars (cf. no MMGs, 50 LMGs and 9 3-inch mortars in 25 Bn at the outset).
A well planned battalion attack with strong I-tank and artillery support along the lines of the ‘Sidi Clif’ manoeuvres might have made short work of such defences; but McNaught had to produce a stream of orders at very short notice indeed. There was no time for finesse. ‘I can almost hear myself saying to myself “make it simple, make it simple” ’, he wrote later. What he told Major Veale, the I-tank commander, and the company commanders was under the circumstances a model of clarity and concision. The intention was simply ‘To capture and hold at all costs “Hill 175” ’ and the tanks were to advance in two waves, the first (with the carriers close behind) at 15 miles per hour to seize the objective, the second at infantry pace with C Company, 800 yards behind B and D. The tanks were to wait until the infantry were on the objective and then, after consulting McNaught, they would move back through B Company to rally. The infantry were to dig in on the ‘forward half of high ground’ and be ready for a ‘quick counter-attack’. When A Company finished its current task it was to move up behind B. The field guns were to fire slow concentrations on what looked like trenches near the cairn and on the Blockhouse in the distance until the FOOs took over. Two anti-tank portées were to travel 800 yards behind each leading company. At 12.20 p.m. McNaught proposed to take his forward headquarters to within 500 yards of the cairn, keeping in touch with the companies by wireless.
A Company with a section of carriers had meanwhile been investigating fire to the right rear and the carriers came under anti-tank fire which 9 Platoon was sent forward to overcome. A machine gun on the edge of the escarpment was quickly dealt with and 9 Platoon carried on down the slope towards the Trigh Capuzzo.
C Squadron in any case reached the starting line as ordered and the first wave swept forward at top speed, closely followed by the carriers, and was soon among the enemy in shallow trenches around the cairn, where the carriers helped to round up prisoners in large numbers. In some of the numerous small wadis and re-entrants in the escarpment to the north, and in the Rugbet which curled round from south to north-west and beyond it, however, there was ample concealment for anti-tank guns and for a few German tanks which appeared in due course. These found the Valentines easy targets silhouetted on the high ground and quickly disabled three or four of them.
D Company ‘just plodded up the slope’ P. D. Greenlees, 18 Pl.
The prisoners taken here numbered 200 according to Hastie and they were soon grouped together and sent back towards the rear with an escort of three or four men. D Company thought for the moment that the action was over and, according to one man, ‘there was a great scramble for the usual loot’. Casualties were not numerous: three wounded in 17 Platoon, a sergeant killed and two or three besides Handyside wounded in 16 Platoon, Holt's two successors (one after the other) wounded in 18 Platoon, and a company runner and mortar corporal killed or mortally wounded. C Company followed half a mile behind and met little fire until it was well forward, though the platoon on the left, 13 under Second-Lieutenant
McNaught had kept his word and by 12.30 p.m. had his Advanced Headquarters a few hundred yards south-east of the cairn; here the wireless truck and a few more vehicles were soon joined by the ammunition lorries and some of the company transport. He sent Hastie word to dig in where he was and Hastie asked in return for the platoon trucks with tools, which were duly promised. Then McNaught spoke with Major Veale of C Squadron, who thought the infantry were ‘pressing on past the objective because the enemy were surrendering in handfuls’ Veale's report in the 8 R Tks diary. Hastie, report.
Captain
B Company had meanwhile struck trouble of various kinds and its task turned out to be very different. On the right 10 Platoon under Second-Lieutenant Cathie (
In contrast with the sporadic in-fighting of Cathie's platoon, 11 Platoon on the left, led by Lieutenant
By this time most of 11 Platoon, without tank support, seems to have passed the top of the feature and was approaching the headquarters area of II Battalion, 361 Africa Regiment, which was strongly defended, though the men of course knew nothing more than that bullets were whistling about them in countless numbers from sources they could not locate. As they went on Tredray, who had led them unflinchingly onwards, was killed and at least six more
In the gap between B and D Companies the three Valentines made a good pace across the flat top of the hill and kept any enemy in the area quiet. Continuing northwards, all three were crippled in quick succession near the top of the escarpment, though their crews continued to man their guns. When 15 Platoon, following the I tanks, reached the scene, the men quickly killed the crew of the anti-tank gun responsible. Then they found themselves threatened by a German tank which came to the top of the slope and, to their immense relief, backed down again. Heavy mortar fire came down on 15 Platoon and an infantry counter-attack from the west was repulsed with difficulty. The platoon commander,
This proved a disastrous decision, as the hidden enemy was much closer than Robertshaw thought. As soon as the men rose to their feet they drew terrible fire, which killed or wounded most of them in a matter of seconds. Robertshaw watched this with horror and dismay but could do nothing to help. Taking advantage of the cover offered by one of the disabled tanks (and of the knowledge which the firing revealed of the enemy's whereabouts), he got safely back to B Company. Of the 34 men who had set out with the three tanks 14 were killed, 9 wounded and ultimately safe, and 6 were wounded and captured. The platoon sergeant was the only other man who got back safely that day. Before Robertshaw left, one of the three tanks was hit again by a heavy shell and burst into flames, and he was shocked to see the crew shot down as they tried to make their escape.
Thus 15 Platoon failed to plug the gap between B and D Companies and the B Company action broke up into a series of minor though intense engagements, helped here and there by I tanks which were used up in ones and twos in gallant response to local demands but in a manner quite contrary to all teachings of how these valuable machines should be employed. Captain portées supporting B Company, commanded by Lieutenant portée left could not cover the whole two-mile flank and the Valentines here were all stationary and mostly wrecked.
Men of C and D Companies soon saw for themselves what the German anti-tank guns could do to the heavily armoured I tanks, not only in terms of ugly holes and blazing interiors but in gun barrels bent into odd shapes or in one case shot off altogether, so that the turret looked like a face without a nose. When McNaught ordered Veale to stay another ten minutes the Valentines at hand descended the gentle slope towards the Rugbet and there ran into deadly fire. Six were knocked out in one group some 300 yards north-west of the cairn, two of them fiery wrecks and the rest badly damaged, while several more were damaged but could with-draw either with useless guns or with wounded or dead members of their crews as passengers. Theirs was a brave but unavailing effort to ease the burden of the infantry and put an end to the stiffening opposition, and when Veale ordered them to rally at 1.10 p.m. only four tanks came back. Of these there was Veale's tank with a ‘holed fuel tank’, another with a 2-pounder jammed and a gunner wounded, a third with a wounded commander and badly damaged suspension, and the fourth with ‘front idler wheel buckled’. 8 R Tks war diary, report by Maj Veale.
When elements of C Company and 18 Platoon of D Company resumed their advance on the left they were first mortared and then came under fire from machine guns to their left front which they could not pinpoint, as well as getting showered by splinters from shells bursting low overhead, a type of fire they had not met before. By a natural impulse they tended to wheel left to face this flanking fire, and those on the left were soon halted and forced to
Ormond had meanwhile settled his sections in shallow German slit trenches and sangars to face what was evidently a serious threat. Then he went forward with his runner to reconnoitre. Some 40–50 Germans stood up 150 yards away as if to surrender and he beckoned them over; but they did not come, and when he started over towards them he noticed more lying on the ground and in the background a tank which fired occasionally towards his men. So Ormond returned in haste, his runner getting killed on the way by the tank. The enemy was by this time visible from where 13 Platoon was and Ormond moved from trench to trench to encourage his men, who were running short of ammunition and making what use they could of captured small arms. Ormond himself fired several German rifles and concluded that their former owners had been ‘pretty rattled’ because their sights were still set at 1200–1400 metres.
Major Hastie was puzzled to know where the fire was coming from and worried because his men had such slight cover, mostly little more than ‘a few very shallow holes and clumps of tussock’. He sent a runner to McNaught to explain that he could not move because of heavy fire from the left flank. After this he was talking to a sergeant who came to report that Handyside had been wounded when the sergeant was killed. Then he saw a tank turret rise on the left, and a moment later the whole tank followed by two others which looked like Valentines. Each had a detachment of infantry co-operating closely with it, the tank coming forward a short way and the men dashing up to it in extended line and then going down while the tank made another bound forward. By this careful means the enemy worked his way into the area of 16 Platoon despite spasmodic fire directed at the following infantry from elements of C and D Companies not immediately threatened by the tank guns. A carrier then appeared on the scene, slowly withdrawing before the tanks but losing no chance of firing at the German infantry. It drew much fire and ‘fought a good rearguard here’ according to Handyside. Private 12portées of K Troop under Second-Lieutenant
With nothing to combat the advancing tanks, C and D Companies had no choice but surrender, a contingency which had never entered the head of any man until he found himself staring at point-blank range at the tank machine guns. One or two here and there gave a last defiant burst of fire and Hastie saw a sergeant of 17 Platoon who ‘very coolly got an officer’. Hastie buried his maps and other papers and rose to his feet, noting Heslop doing likewise. Heslop's comment to those around him was, ‘Looks like we've had it’.
Thus two companies were lost within an hour of taking their objective and with it a large number of prisoners. It is clear from the accounts of what Quin and Ormond did that the enemy was already strongly posted in the wadi on the left flank when D Company advanced, and prior reconnaissance could have disclosed this important fact. But bad luck also played its part: it was the merest chance that Ryan's two portées were distracted by the ‘derelict’ to the south at the critical time, and the enemy was lucky in introducing three tanks here without at once meeting these guns or one or more of the Valentines, which were still in the forward area and well able to deal with them.
The men were well treated by their captors, apart from one or two who were wounded, perhaps inadvertently, after they raised their hands, and were soon marched down the gully. No sooner had they gone than shell and mortar fire started to fall in the area, discouraging any exploitation of the German success. The 29th Battery and the mortar platoon had evidently corrected their sights, and Hastie when he looked back saw the three tanks circling north-westwards and later saw one in flames.
Ryan's section of K Troop at last came into action against two of the tanks, too late to save the two companies but not too late to avenge their capture. The crew of the gun K4 saw what Ryan thought was a light Italian tank followed by what looked like a Valentine ‘flying our recognition signals’. K3 and K4 both engaged the light tank and it fired no more, though it kept coming to within 50 yards and then burst into flames. Then Ryan directed K3 on to the ‘Valentine’ and scored several direct hits in addition to two ‘sticky bombs’ Anti-tank grenades which stuck to the armour of a tank and then blasted inwards.
Among the many figures on the bullet-swept slopes of Hill 175 none was more prominent or inspiring than that of McNaught himself, calm and unhurried, pipe in mouth, apparently unconcerned about the fire which came his way. A general counter-attack was evidently in progress and about 2 p.m. he realised from observation and the tales of a few survivors that the two companies had been ‘largely overrun’. At about this time Captain
This company had meanwhile finished its task on the escarpment to the right rear, and when Captain
By some misfortune 8 Platoon found itself without transport and came forward on foot, meeting murderous small-arms fire which killed four men at the outset and made this advance an unforgettable experience for those who survived. By the time this platoon reached the front A Company had lost 15–20 men killed and twice that many wounded, and now consisted of little groups out of touch with each other and somewhat bewildered. A Company was now too few and too disorganised to drive the enemy back; but the Germans were rebuked if not repulsed and were no longer venturesome on this part of the front. Lieutenant
it was impossible to obtain a coherent appraisal of the situation, a continuous stream of wounded was passing to the rear, enemy fire was intense, and our own 6th Field were putting down a spot barrage that was suicidal in its closeness, captured German vehicles were shuttling up and down between Brigade H.Q., Bn H.Q. and the attached arms. A Company was desperately short of ammunition…. Enemy fire from concealed positions and Tanks decimated the Company before 100 yards had been covered.
Roberts himself had been badly wounded in the leg and lay, like many of his men, with bullets passing inches overhead and no chance of succour until the firing died down.
Things were no better at Advanced Headquarters, where McNaught had already been twice wounded and the Intelligence and Signals Officers were both badly hurt. Many vehicles, including ammunition lorries, were in flames and it was evident to Major Burton when he came forward at this stage that they had been taken too far forward on the bald plateau and could serve no useful purpose there. At about 2.15 p.m. the wireless truck was destroyed and its crew killed or wounded and Burton sent several other lorries a few hundred yards back. He reported to McNaught and then moved over to the escarpment, where he collected some stragglers and stationed them on the edge to cover the rear of B Company, which was now threatened by a series of minor counter thrusts. Then he sent back word for every able-bodied man of his own company to come forward at once. With these and the few men of 11, 12 and 15 Platoons still in action he formed a two-platoon front facing north, with its foremost posts below the crest.
Cathie and 10 Platoon had meanwhile been carrying the fight to the enemy along the escarpment until increasing infiltration with thak support forced them back. A charge down the slope had gained a dozen prisoners, including two or three officers, but two enemy tanks snatched them back from their escorts. One of these tanks was then knocked out by K2 and Cathie's men ‘popped off the personnel as they came out of the tank’. When enemy pressure became too great to hold by such tactics, Cathie chose a commanding point on the ridge (getting a bullet through the shoulder in so doing) and disposed 10 Platoon for a last-ditch stand. Two corporals and a medical orderly were killed here, but ‘this point simply had to be held’, Cathie says, and 10 Platoon kept up fire against all enemy movement below.
McNaught had done his utmost and now had to ask Barrowclough for help. What little was left of Advanced Headquarters was now practically in the front line and McNaught was weakened by loss of blood. Limping badly, he was still an inspiration to those who could see him moving about disdainful of cover, and for some time he personally directed the fire of the two mortars. Wireless was now working only between 29 Battery and its two FOOs and the casualty rate among runners was high. One who did outstanding work was Private
When the call for help reached Brigade Headquarters it was only too plain that the battalion was in trouble, and the blazing lorries at McNaught's headquarters with their continual explosions of ammunition served as landmarks and danger signals. Men of 24 Battalion were uneasily aware that their associates of the 25th were not getting all their own way. One officer was very much on edge and said several times to his men, ‘We should not wait—we are wanted up there, I am certain they can't get word back.’ Lt H. Thompson (18 Pl), as reported by
When D Company of 24 Battalion drove forward to the point indicated the men came under heavy fire as they left their lorries, and like others of the 25th they were none too sure of its source. They could see movement on the crest above and promptly engaged it with their Bren guns. B and HQ Companies of the 25th had had no warning that help was coming and naturally responded to this challenge. Burton, who saw it all, says, ‘a hail of bullets whistled overhead and looking over the edge … we could see khaki forms crawling towards us …. then one of our guns replied. When the enemy came a little closer we all held our fire for the attackers were … a portion of a company of the 24 Bn.’ Captain McBride managed to get in touch with McDonald and this exchange of fire ceased. The attention of the newcomers was quickly drawn to genuine enemy farther west who deluged the area with mortar bombs from a wadi somewhere north of the cairn. This same wadi also harboured a tank, which threatened the survivors of B Company and which soon provided the gun K2 with its third victim this afternoon. Backing up to the edge, the 2-pounder fired from its W. R. A. Shakespear.portée and at short range blew off the turret. This broke the back of the enemy's resistance here and 16 Platoon of D Company crossed the wadi, which was strewn with wounded and dead of both sides, and pushed on along the rocky slopes against what turned out to be a very strong enemy counter-thrust supported by murderous fire. A private of 16 Platoon
Pte
McDonald then ‘stood up to size up the position’ Shakespear.
McDonald's death coincided with a thrust above the ridge by the four I tanks which Major Veale had managed to rally and make battle-worthy, and which drove the enemy there right back beyond the three Valentines which 15 Platoon of the 25th had followed to their doom on the escarpment north of the cairn. The tank commanders expected the infantry to follow and hold the recaptured
The shortage of officers in B Company was now acute and Machine Gun) Battalion, p. 133.
When he was hit the third time McNaught was on the point of going over to inspect the left flank, which had again come adrift; but he was taken instead to Brigade Headquarters and there saw
The second company of reinforcements, C Company of the 24th under Letter,
He therefore met his men on their way forward, sent the troopcarrying vehicles back, and told the platoon commanders to attack towards the cairn but not to incur heavy casualties; if this seemed likely they were to go to ground and hold on to give 25 Battalion time to reorganise. This was not a prescription for driving back the enemy and C Company halted some 300 yards short of the cairn, which the enemy now held strongly. But
Shuttleworth's first concern was to get his own D Company (now under the command of Captain
Rather less than half of Hill 175 remained in New Zealand hands, though more than two-thirds had been seized in the early stages with the invaluable help of the I tanks, so the enemy had regained a good deal of ground, including the cairn at the highest level of the feature. But neither side had enough troops forward to build up a firm front, and on the left in particular the demarcation between the two was vague and no-man's land an uncertain area in which carrying parties impartially attended friend and foe among the wounded. In at least one case Germans directed New Zealand wounded back to Tomlinson's lines. The ground to the north of the cairn was thickly strewn with wounded of both sides, some of them already suffering pitifully from exposure in the cold desert night. Even the men of 24 and 25 Battalions who were still in action had no greatcoats or blankets and were chilled to the bone, and Burton, seeing this, went back and got his men blankets and a hot stew. C Company of the 24th worked ceaselessly throughout the night bringing in wounded and taking them back to the rear, where the RAP of 25 Battalion overflowed with stretcher cases. But those who advanced farthest on the left before being hit almost all ended up in German hands. The paradox of tender care for the wounded regardless of nationality following the relentless fighting which caused their suffering was never more apparent than in the stretch of desert north of the cairn, where a wounded man bearing as best he could his lonely agonies had about an equal chance of being lifted up by German or New Zealand hands and all were treated with
Rev. C. E. Willis; England; born England,
The bare details available do little to illuminate this hard-fought action from the enemy's point of view, but the diary of 21 Panzer Division refers to ‘repeated attacks by enemy tanks from the south and east along the Trigh Capuzzo’ and goes on to say that
This is all mystifying, as I Battalion as well as the whole of II Battalion in defence of Point 175 and lost heavily in both units, withdrew all he had left during the night and reorganised in the Blockhouse area, leaving 175 to infantry of Africa Corps who came up from the south (and who were withdrawn at short notice next day for Rommel's dash to the frontier). Point 175 is frequently mentioned in reports of
At all events 361 Africa Regiment lost heavily and was badly disorganised by Barrowclough's attack; but casualties seem to have been about the same on each side. The 270 German prisoners sent back to the rear were more than twice the 100-odd of C and D Companies of the 25th who were captured (to say nothing of 80-odd wounded Germans brought in); but sixteen British tanks, mostly Valentines, were lost against a total of no more than eight assorted enemy tanks put out of action. In killed and wounded 6 Brigade probably lost more than 361 Regiment. Whether General Suemmermann accepted the latter after this action as ‘good Germans’ is not recorded; but they surely earned by their stout defence at least this recognition. The New Zealanders found them worthy opponents, as brave as any they met.
No New Zealand battalion in the Second World War lost more men killed in a single action than the 100 or thereabouts that the 25th lost between noon and dusk of this Sunday of the Dead. Of the prisoners, 11 died when the Jantzen was torpedoed on 9 Dec.
The ‘bag’ of 350-odd German prisoners in this attack was increased by another fifty taken by Major
The other troop (C) of 48 Battery opened fire in the late afternoon on five or six enemy tanks which approached from the east and sent them scuttling away. Then another group of tanks and what looked like lorried infantry was seen driving up from the south and Brigade Headquarters was alerted; but this enemy disappeared in a fold of the ground and was not seen again. Both were doubtless some stragglers from the main battle against the South Africans; but they served to distract the attention of 48 Battery at a time when its fire might have been very useful to the troops on Point 175. Then a third group of tanks caused anxious moments as it came on towards 24 Battalion just before dusk; but since they were flying the correct pennants they were given the benefit of the doubt, and they turned out to be twelve Stuarts which had run out of ammunition and were nearly out of petrol. (They stayed the night and were still there when 6 Brigade moved on next morning.)
These were minor concerns; but they added to Barrowclough's already immense burdens, and when he got warning from 30 Corps at 7.10 p.m. that he should consolidate and be prepared to repel tank attack next day he was worried about the large number of
By 11 p.m. Barrowclough laid his plans for the next day, expecting to have to hold his ground against tank attack probably from the south-west. He was determined to yield none of the ground then held by Shuttleworth and so had no choice but to close up from the east towards Point 175. In its present form the brigade group straggled for some miles along the plateau above the escarpment. Just before first light on the 24th he meant to move up the rest of 24 Battalion to reinforce Shuttleworth, who was to hold what he now possessed, while Page would hold the southern flank to link up with Shuttleworth's force and the eastern flank at about
Information received confirms most unlikely ARMSTRONG (OC SA BDE) still holding out. GOTT responsible deny enemy area between you and BRINK (S.A.'s remainder at GOBI).
This was evidently from 30 Corps; but it was too vague to justify weakening the southern flank in favour of any other. Later in the morning
HELP was closer than
This signal was sent from 13 Corps at 9.38 p.m. on the 23rd. Another from 30 Corps to
This might indicate that 30 Corps somehow remained hopeful of a favourable outcome to the present troubles. But Corps Headquarters had no clear reports of the fighting, and in particular had no idea of the size of the enemy armoured force involved. On the assumption that the German tank units had sunk to somewhere near the low level of strength of the British armour it was possible to remain
Ibid.
Somewhere in these discussions there emerged the alarming possibility that Eighth Army might have to break off the whole offensive, but neither Norrie nor Godwin-Austen would hear of this, the latter especially, since his corps had scarcely started fighting and, so far as he knew, his strong force of I tanks was still largely intact. (He had yet to learn of the loss of almost three squadrons at the Omars and Point 175.) But he could not fail to recognise that 30 Corps was gravely weakened and could no longer bear anything like the burden allotted to it in the crusader plan.
General Cunningham was evidently needed in person in the forward area to resolve these problems and dispel the obscurities which had crept into the discussions; but after he got back from seeing Godwin-Austen in the morning the news which came in was blacker than ever and he took the grave step of asking Auchinleck to fly up and see him at once. On current estimates the enemy had 100 tanks left, half of them Italian, and 30 Corps rather fewer tanks which now seemed inferior to those of the Germans. Perhaps Cunningham hoped that Auchinleck, when he saw for himself how
If the British armour had indeed failed as badly as these reports suggested, Cunningham could not see how he could carry on trying to destroy the enemy armour, because at the present rate of loss the time was not far off when he would have no tanks left at all. This raised the possibility not only of the defeat of Eighth Army but also of the invasion of Egypt. He had begun to see that the tempo of operations and the boldness of the German conceptions were beyond anything the British commanders could cope with. The British armoured brigades were quite outmatched in their fighting capabilities by the panzer divisions and there seemed nothing for it but to try to stand on the defensive on a line perhaps between
But Auchinleck found it hard to adjust his outlook to the sudden change from glowing reports of success to the present gloomy forecasts of disaster. He insisted that the offensive must go on, whatever the cost and even to the sacrifice of the very last British tank. His spirit was magnificent and greatly impressed Galloway and others who saw him at this time. With this encouragement the Eighth Army Commander therefore issued an order at 10.30 p.m. to both corps which was attuned to Auchinleck's attitude, and which was in its essentials utterly impractical unless some drastic change in the general situation took place. Godwin-Austen was to take command of all troops concerned with relieving sic] and exploit towards
Auchinleck says in his despatch that Cunningham received his decision to carry on the offensive ‘loyally’ and ‘at once issued his orders to give effect to it’; but the truth was that neither had any constructive ideas as to how the situation might be retrieved, and their determination to push the New Zealand Division westwards to the area then dominated by the undefeated enemy armour in the full knowledge that 30 Corps was powerless to intervene effectively was courting further disaster. That this did not in the event come about was not their doing but Rommel's. They could not predict the striking change in the general situation which Rommel was on the point of bringing about in defiance of his advisers and to his ultimate and serious disadvantage.
The Middle East Commander-in-Chief went on to consider carefully the chances that some such change in the situation might arise and put his opinion on paper next morning in the form of an order to General Cunningham. ‘I realise also that should, as a result of our continued offensive, the enemy be left with a superiority of fast moving tanks’, he wrote, ‘there is a risk that he may try to outflank our advanced formations in the Underlined by Auchinleck. Designed for gaining information rather than scalps.earliest possible moment’
What Godwin-Austen proposed in detail in the order of 9.38 p.m. to
HQ 13 CORPS
23 NOV 41.
PERSONAL. BY HAND OF AN OFFICER.
My Dear,Freyberg I have just returned from 30 Corps who are in a bad way. Briefly it seems that the enemy still had at 1100 hrs today, at least 100 German Tanks in being, plus an unknown number of ARIETE. With them they were repeatedly attacking our forces South of SIDI REZEGH. Our own losses have been extremely heavy and though it may be pessimistic to say so, it may well be that we have less tanks (excluding ‘I’ Tanks) running than the enemy.
An order was issued by Army to the effect that you and your troops were temporarily under command of 30 Corps. This was done with the intention of ensuring that any task on which they were employed in conjunction with troops of 1 SA Div was co-ordinated. This, NORRIE assured me, would NOT work. It is cancelled and all troops coming into the area North of the 390 Grid line will be under your command and you under mine.
There is no necessity whatever, I'm sure you will agree, to become disheartened over the situation of our 30 Corps. We will meet and destroy the enemy tanks with our guns and ‘I’ tanks. I am absolutely determined to relieve
TOBRUK when we shall automatically get at least 40 more ‘I’ Tanks.The sortie having made quite good progress with the capture of over 2,000 prisoners was halted owing to the check to our 30 Corps. I do not consider it has the reasonable chance of success we should offer it until we are ourselves firmly established on the ED DUDA position. I would ask you to let me know instantly when you are so disposed, using the code word
curate.I heard the question of withdrawal mentioned today but refuse to consider it while our prospects on the whole are so rosy by comparison with the enemy's whose mobile German forces are so small and of whom we have already garnered so much. Suffice it to say that like anyone of sense I have an outline plan in my mind for execution should the question arise. Its main features are that any withdrawal would be by our existing axis and that I would keep what we have gained by standing on the general line
MENASTIR - 5040 - Pt 217 502388 - Pt 201 497367 -BIR BU DEHEUA 490364 - LIBYAN SHEFERZEN 495359.It is good to feel that you and yours are with me in a situation of this kind.
With many many thanks for all you have already done.
4 Ind Div have been asked to send up all ‘I’ Tanks they can spare and the remaining Bty 8 Fd Regt.
Yours very sincerely,
Godwin-Austen.
The spirit of this was, like Auchinleck's, admirable; but the 13 Corps Commander was in effect asking Ariete too. And he would have to start fighting not with the concentrated strength of 1 Army Tank Brigade but with whatever I tanks he had at hand. He could not hope to succeed in this mission unless the remaining British armour gave all possible help, and this called for a fundamental change of policy to put the relief of crusader plan had not provided for this and the garrison was already, because of the prolonged break-out battle, facing a crisis in the supply of 25-pounder ammunition.
A revealing statement of the position as seen from the British side comes from a meeting at about 10 a.m. on the 24th between Letter from Historical Section Records, Cabinet Office,
The future of Eighth Army depended less on its own leaders than on what went on in Mellenthin, Comando Supremo in Rome to be given direct command of the Italian 20 Mobile Corps was immediately granted and left him free to issue orders and not merely requests to General Gambara, a privilege of which he was not slow to avail himself. He could now use Ariete Armoured and Trieste Motorised Divisions however he pleased to exploit the day's success. The extent of this success was no matter for careful calculation: it seemed complete and he was led to believe that not only the whole of the South African division but all the remaining British armour, including the Support Group, had been shattered, and with their defeat all likelihood vanished of a link-up with the Crusader battle’.Panzer Battles, 1939–1945, p. 73.
With the Panzer Group Battle Report says,
The essential result achieved on 23 November was the removal of the immediate threat to the forces investing
This was what Gause and Westphal at Panzer Group Headquarters thought, and Cruewell too. But Rommel disagreed, though he acted without consulting them, so that this difference of opinion did not immediately come to light. From his headquarters at 3 Reconnaissance Unit at 11.15 p.m. stating that next day ‘some elements of troops’ would ‘advance towards Fliegerfuebrer Afrika:
Own spearhead will advance tomorrow morning from area south-west of
Air reconnaissance in force and fighter sweeps astride Trigh el Abd east of El Gubi is requested.
Thus by 11.48 p.m. he had already decided to take a considerable force along the Trigh el-Abd to
The first report of the day's fighting from Africa Corps had been sent at 6.15 p.m. and said enough to confirm the impression Rommel gained with his own eyes:
Corps attack successful. Large enemy force destroyed. Forward line 21 Panzer; but it no doubt reached 15 Panzer Division, which was at that time, 4 a.m., out of touch with
23 November, 6 p.m.: Darkness fell. In this terrific engagement well over 15 PZ Div war diary.
Before leaving his own headquarters Kriebel. Africa Corps; Westphal was not in favour of taking the
Young, Rommel, p. 110
5 Panzer Regiment had glowing reports of the battle and had suffered a smaller proportionate loss than had the formations of 15 Panzer Division. Also Cruewell learned that Rommel proposed to meet the CO of 8
The ‘Appreciation’ in the DAK diary identifies these troops as NZ Div; but this is certainly an afterthought.
At the conference on the By-pass road Cruewell reported in this sense, stating that the battle just finished had resulted in ‘the destruction of the greater part of 1 SA Div and 7 Armd Div. 120 guns, many A Tk guns and trucks, and 80 tanks had been captured, and about 5000 PW. Some of the enemy had escaped south towards Gabr Saleh. Our losses were also heavy, particularly in the panzer regiments.’DAK diary. The estimate of prisoners was greatly exaggerated.155 Infantry and 361 Africa Regiments the task of salvaging the captured equipment and motorising their units with it. Africa Corps (and not merely elements of it) had to mount an ‘Attack on
If he was going to get back the same day or the following morning Rommel had to set off at the earliest possible moment and he urged all concerned to move as soon as they could. But the aftermath of the battle was by no means all joyous exuberance, and the intermingling of units in the final stages and the dislocation of services could not be rectified in a moment. For one thing all wireless transmitters in 15 Panzer had been lost in the course of the action and replacements were urgently needed. For another, 6 New Zealand Brigade and Divisional Headquarters Group at Esc-Sciomar and Bir el Chleta respectively were reported by 33 Reconnaissance Unit as ‘large enemy columns at Sciafsciuf advancing west’ and light British forces were thought to be south-east of 15 Panzer, so that the divisional staff had already begun to deploy 15 Infantry Brigade on the right and 8 Panzer Regiment on the left, facing east and south-east with supporting artillery, and had arranged for much-needed ammunition and petrol to be brought forward to replenish both formations. There was more evidence of British strength in the neighbourhood than Cruewell bargained for. The men's nerves may also have been still on edge from the tremendous struggle of the previous afternoon, because at 7.12 a.m. 33 Reconnaissance Unit reported as a heavy attack what was no more than light shellfire
15 Panzer was far from ready for the proposed move, and the sorting out of units and sub-units not only took up much time but disclosed that casualties had been far greater than at first appeared. Perhaps for this reason Cruewell ordered 21 Panzer to take the lead, followed by 15 Panzer, and he understood that the whole of Gambara's Mobile Corps would follow to the right rear.
The task Cruewell specified was to ‘pursue the enemy’ and this was enlarged in the order of 15 Panzer to include the route (‘via
There are various post facto versions of what Rommel really intended by this sudden move, but pursuit and the trapping of British forces supposed to be encircling the frontier line are the only motives which appear in contemporary documents. His quarter-master-general says he meant to capture the British supply dumps and by cutting off supplies force the British to break off the action; but he scarcely concerned himself with this Another sommernachtstraum was certainly not what he had in mind.
But the exorbitant demands Rommel made on his troops in order to achieve the degree of surprise he desired had by no means a favourable influence on the minds of his own men, who had already served him wonderfully well; and he was assuming, reasonably but wrongly, that the British would at once recognise the scope and power of the advance. Had the two panzer divisions moved off to schedule and had Ariete and Trieste done likewise this might well have been the case. The resultant mass of armour and mobile infantry racing along the Trigh el-Abd might have put an end to any hopes Cunningham and Auchinleck had of maintaining the offensive. But no such assembly of might took place and the ever-lengthening and thinning column which resulted from Rommel's urgings to von Ravenstein at the head of it to increase his pace made the arrival at the frontier look much less impressive than it might have appeared. It was the 18th of November in reverse, with the British this time refusing to take the enemy move seriously enough.
The defeat the British suffered the previous afternoon was complete enough so far as it went; but it did not go as far as the Germans thought, and it cost far more than Rommel realised. The tank strength of Africa Corps was in two or three hours almost halved, and in particular
Thus the corps on which Rommel's hopes mainly rested was now a blunter weapon than he thought, and the excessive haste of his dash to the frontier was to make it blunter still. This was a time to husband resources and ensure that the advantage gained in the Africa Corps. In so doing Rommel threw away the victory won by the skill and bravery of his panzer troops and granted Eighth Army a priceless reprieve.
‘You have the chance of ending this campaign tonigh!’, Rommel told von Ravenstein when he gave him his orders; Young, pp. 110–11.21 Panzer was to drive through the frontier ‘looking neither to right nor left’5 Panzer Regiment was told, and 104 Infantry Regiment bringing up the rear with the supply columns. Orders for Stephan to move off were supposed to come from Africa Corps war diary commented with a hint of
Battle report of 5 Pz Regt.
Neumann-Silkow had meanwhile strained every resource to get moving along an axis six or seven miles east of that followed by 21 Panzer, which meant threading his way from the Savona and the other from 3 Reconnaissance Unit, were jumbled together to read as follows: ‘On the Sollum Front a unit of heavy British tanks had broken through towards 15 Pz Div war diary.33 Reconnaissance Unit at 10.35 a.m. reported 21 NZ Battalion and the battered remnants of 22 Armoured Brigade farther south as enemy ‘moving SE and swinging ESE, covered by tanks, armoured cars and artillery’ while 350 vehicles remained at Bir Sciafsciuf. Who these were and where they came from were puzzles Neumann-Silkow had no time to solve. It was 12.30 before 15 Panzer moved off, with 8 Panzer Regiment and the troop of ‘88s’ leading and 15 Infantry Brigade to the right rear. By this time 21 Panzer was ‘in great depth’, as Neumann-Silkow's diary euphemistically describes it, the front and rear being more than 20 miles apart. At the best possible speed 15 Panzer could do no better than overtake a few supply detachments of von Ravenstein's and the heads of the two divisions were by 3 p.m. farther apart than ever, one at Bir Berraneb and the other nearly 30 miles away at 5 Panzer Regiment was still tied to Gabr Saleh and out of touch with Divisional Headquarters.
Stephan's own tank had been disabled by anti-tank fire, several other tanks were hit, ammunition was dwindling fast, and by 6 p.m. Battle report of Davv, pp. 177–9.5 Panzer Regiment was using up its last drops of petrol and could do no more than camp for the night where it was, having suffered ‘very heavy casualties’.5 Pz Regt.5 Panzer Regiment was well on the way to dissolution. Africa Corps Headquarters numbered only a very few vehicles and these got through to the frontier without check. There Rommel and Cruewell conferred at 5 p.m.
From scraps of information gathered on the way and his own earnest thinking on the subject, Ariete to make for Gabr Saleh and for Trieste to vacate
DAK war diary.
Cruewell thought the main enemy here would be found north-west of the frontier line and wanted 21 Panzer to attack 15 Panzer attacked from the south, a scheme which would have gravely threatened 5 New Zealand Brigade; but Rommel rejected it. Neither realised that an Indian brigade was ensconced inside the defences of Omar Nuovo, and
DAK war diary.
The order reached Ibid.15 Panzer 15 miles south-east of 8 Panzer Regiment at 5 a.m., with 200 Regiment following, to form up south of the Omars and attack northwards at the specified time, while 115 Regiment dug in facing north and covered by anti-tank mines along the Trigh el-Abd to Ariete would take over when it arrived. But 33 Reconnaissance Unit could not go on to Bir Habata, ‘as it had neither ammunition nor petrol’.
By looking to the north-east Rommel turned his back on far more tempting prizes and beguiled himself with what Kriebel called in retrospect an evil dream. But the full reward of his enterprise was also denied by the lingering misapprehensions in Eighth Army about his remaining armoured strength. It was impossible to rate the dash to the frontier at its full value if the German tank states had fallen as low as was believed, and this belief proved remarkably durable. A careful collation of the many reports on the subject might have confirmed the scope and power of the move; but since Norrie's headquarters was swept away in the flood of retreating vehicles and Cunningham's gravely threatened, no such calm staff work was possible. Reports of small details were therefore taken as whole panoramas and the impression gained ground at Army Headquarters and 13 Corps that the enemy was making his ‘last and final effort’
The two panzer divisions had formed up just beyond the horizon of the New Zealanders on Point 175, and to 24 Battalion on the left their ‘grey trucks seemed to pass in an unending stream’ three miles to the south. Shakespear (D Coy). Africa Corps in racing
Cunningham himself only narrowly escaped this ignominy when he called on Norrie in the morning. Norrie had already received first reports of the enemy move when the Army Commander arrived, and while the two were talking shells started to fall south of them. Fleeing lorries drove madly across the landing ground as Cunningham's Clifton, pp. 131–3.5 Panzer Regiment and knock out some of its tanks. At 65 FMC, the most northerly of the supply depots of 30 Corps, there were moments of acute anxiety as the enemy swept through the outskirts; but camouflage and dispersion of the vast stocks there deceived the enemy and he passed on unaware of the prize which was there for the taking. The Support Group and remnants of
Godwin-Austen's headquarters near Bir el-Hariga was not directly threatened by the enemy move and could take a more balanced view of it. The first impression was that the enemy had undertaken a ‘wide encircling move from south of Ariete was thought to be threatening the supply dumps of 30 Corps. Planning to link up with
Messervy's first task was to tidy up the position at the Omars and 4/16 Punjab fought all morning to overcome resistance in a large pocket in the northern half of the Libyan Omar strongpoint. By 2 p.m. on the 24th this was cleared and many more prisoners taken; a small but extremely stubborn pocket in the west was all that now remained and this showed no signs of weakening. As it contained the ‘88s’ which had done most of the damage to the I tanks in the original attack and most of 12 German Oasis Company, which had formed the backbone of the defence of the whole position, it had to be left for a later date. In the meantime it was a constant source of annoyance, as was the artillery in the Ghot Adhidiba strongpoint (‘Cova’).
These local troubles were dwarfed, as the day advanced, by the menace of the onrushing panzers, on which wireless interception of 30 Corps signals gave a running commentary soon confirmed by the front runners in the Matruh Stakes. Hundreds of lorries of all sorts raced through the area of 4 Indian Divisional Headquarters at Bir Sheferzen ‘in a great cloud of dust’, Bharucha, The North African Campaigns, 1940–43 (Indian official history), p. 240.
Dobree, ‘On the Libyan Border’, Royal Artillery Commemoration Book, 1939–1945, p. 191.
Ibid.
Aircraft of both sides operated this day chiefly in fighter sweeps, but with little effect because the situation on the ground was in a state of flux and friend and foe were in many cases intermingled. Me100s were the only German fighters with range enough to operate in the frontier area and the Advanced landing ground.
This unique offering and the FMCs of both British corps were among the prizes Rommel rejected when he gave his main attention to the
Cunningham flew north to see Godwin-Austen in the afternoon, landing at Journey among Warriors, p. 52.
Nobody had more reason than
Major
The wounded carried by A Section under Sergeant 21 Panzer swept through with machine guns at first blazing away in ignorance of the nature of the establishment. Then the Germans let part of the group through: three ambulance cars and some nine lorries with McNaught in charge and several Germans among the wounded. Other German tanks, however, came upon the scene, scattering the rest of the RMT lorries and driving them ahead at a breathless and bone-shaking pace, imposing an ordeal on the wounded, lying mostly on the flat steel trays, to match anything they had yet endured. The drivers whenever they gained
In the main body of 6 RMT Company under Major Hood the most unlucky were the prisoners packed under the canopies and aware of the violent and painful commotion but not of its cause. Hood, as he was ordered, made due south for the B Echelon area of 30 Corps, and had gone nearly 20 miles and then halted. Then he came under shellfire and was told by a Support Group officer to ‘get out as an armoured column was only two miles away.’ One driver carried on oblivious of it all until he saw that his canopy had been set on fire. Soon the desert was full of vehicles racing madly away and Hood saw one column to his right rear under enemy fire. By careful zigzags which gained for his lorries all the cover the ground offered, he got close to the frontier wire soon after 4 p.m. and there came upon Rear Headquarters of 30 Corps. Hood was told to report in person and was about to do so. when the whole mass of vehicles suddenly moved off in great haste. He had no choice but to follow. Sixteen empty lorries of the Divisional Petrol Company under Sergeant
Similar adventures befell most New Zealanders who on 24 November tried to supply the various units of the Division or went back for more ammunition, water, rations or petrol. The careful provisions of the crusader plan for maintaining these services had already been gravely strained when
Supplies did in fact reach both 4 and 6 Brigades, though in limited quantities and by means hazardous enough to satisfy the most insatiable desire for excitement. The composite supply company C Sec, Div Amn Coy, and D and H Secs, Div Supply Coln (all with ammunition), A Sec, Div Petrol Coy, and six lorries from B Sec, Moorehead, African Trilogy, p. 227.
The 6 Brigade Supply Officer, Captain
Comings and goings from Nza Ferigh reflected the progress of the enemy advance and those responsible were sorry to see part of the Water Section of the Supply Column, which had set out with wounded at 4 p.m. for a CCS near the frontier, return later with its passengers, having been blocked by German tanks. Another detachment of the Column, No. 2 Echelon under Second-Lieutenant Ariete came forward and more trouble was in the offing, as Colonel
On the other hand Africa Corps was even harder to supply than the New Zealand Division. Ammunition and other supplies from the dumps beside the
Westphal was aware that British forces were in the area but had little idea of their strength, and he ordered 3 Reconnaissance Unit to investigate ‘enemy south of Boettcher Group at 3 Reconnaissance Unit had already taken a hard knock in the morning and was by this time well on the way to Libyan Omar. The forces in question, not yet identified as the New Zealand Division, had in fact been forbidden to operate north of the Africa Corps west of
First thoughts in 6 Brigade on the 24th were to consolidate rather than to attack. Major Mantell-Harding, second-in-command of 24 Battalion, had gone forward at 4.30 a.m. with A Company, some badly-needed company vehicles, and probably 7 and 8 Platoons of 3 MG Company; but the blazing tank which had been pointed out to him as a signpost of the route had burned itself out and he fetched up in no-man's land south of Tomlinson's FDLs. The C Company pickets were not unduly nervous, however, and Mantell-Harding drove through without incident and came upon Shuttleworth as the sky was beginning to lighten. He found the CO ‘looking very weary after his hard task of the previous day’ but glad to have his battalion once more together, and A Company went into reserve behind C. At about 7 a.m. 26 Battalion moved up along the southern flank and dug in facing south to meet the expected attack, with the hard-hit 9 Platoon of 3 MG Company in support. Only six of the nine Stuart tanks which C Squadron of Army Artillery in the
Barrowclough was further reassured by the news that G. H. Logan, 7 Pl, 24 Bn.
With the enemy quiescent Barrowclough turned his attention to recapturing the top of the feature ahead, which gave fair observation over most of his position. The enemy had given early promise of opposition when B Company of the 24th moved forward above the escarpment soon after dawn and in so doing came under shell and mortar fire which killed two men and wounded a third. But the enemy infantry were not active and Shuttleworth was encouraged to think that a quick company attack might succeed. This task he gave to B Company, which formed up between 10 a.m. and 10.30 and then advanced with 10 Platoon on the right, 12 on the left and 11 in reserve, to capture the ground around the cairn which marked the trig point. All officers closely concerned with this have since died and post-war recollections of other ranks involved
We placed our greatcoats in a pile to be collected later and on we went with fixed bayonets. It seems that at the top of a slight rise … the Germans had established an OP so that they were able to direct fire upon our transport in the rear. As we moved forward one or two shots were fired at us, but as we came near the top of the rise the troops in the OP retreated, leaving their gear and what I took to be a radio set.
Another member of 12 Platoon says, ‘I remember Capt. Quotations are from accounts by Tappin.
B Company had done very well in gaining the cairn at small cost; but like 25 Battalion earlier it found the lure of the ground beyond irresistible.
All around us chaps were being killed and wounded and the attack was brought to a standstill. Wait until nightfall' was the next order—‘in the meantime, find whatever cover you can’.
He also remembers that a runner came up from Shuttleworth to say B Company had gone far enough. In the typescript of his report Barrowclough added in his own handwriting a note that 24 Battalion regained the ‘line originally occupied by Col McNaught & from which he had been driven back’, and adds a well-deserved compliment: ‘This was by a particularly well executed daylight
24 Battalion, p. 66.
The fortunes of B Company were followed anxiously by
The need to seize the Blockhouse area was immediate and pointed; but the decision was taken out of his hands when Barrowclough's report.
With so many officers lost it was a hard job to fill the key appointments in 25 Battalion; but
Major Veale and his men of
Divisional Headquarters Group had meanwhile had troubles of its own at Bir el Chleta, which began when shells started landing in the area soon after dawn and emphasised the poor dispersion of the group. This was quickly corrected and the Divisional staff gave their attention to a project of which 4 Brigade had been warned at 2 a.m. Flares by night had indicated a strong pocket of enemy around Point 172, on the escarpment overlooking With HQ 8 R Tks and A Sqn. War diary of 1 Army Tk Bde.
The enemy was evidently disposed in some strength in the area and bir, flanked to right and left by two 2-pounder portées, and with D Company 300 yards to their right rear and B Company the same distance left rear on a total frontage of some 1000 yards. A and C Companies were 600 yards farther back and with them a platoon of 2 MG Company. The infantry were carried in lorries of C Section, 4 RMT Company, and these were to return to the starting line when they dropped their loads. The Bren carriers already formed a screen in front and at least one was hit by mistake by one of the Valentines. The 26th Field Battery was still under
To gain more room for forming up, G. F. Clarke. J. A. Macpherson.
The momentum of the advance, however, was too great for the opposition and even Major
By 11.40 a.m. the enemy transport on the objective began to move quickly eastwards to escape the shellfire. Then, when he saw the I tanks halt and the infantry move up through them,
The losses of A Squadron,
German records disclose that the attention paid to the enemy at Point 172 was flattering. No more than a detachment of 3 Reconnaissance Unit was in occupation, the main body of the unit being farther east. The ‘88’ had annoyed 4 Brigade around the 200 Engineer Battalion, the bulk of which may have been the 61 men surprised by 15 Panzer Division north-west of
Some of
Duff mentions a troublesome ‘5·9’ gun which could not be pinpointed so that counter-battery action was ‘very sketchy’. Duff, report in 4 Bde diary. 15 Africa Corps, together with some tanks from the nearby workshops which came forward as soon as they were repaired and eventually numbered five. It was a useful weapon; but Briel credited it in his report with full responsibility for the many readjustments of position the various elements of 4 Brigade carried out in the course of the morning, so that the paragraph in question, telling of the effects of its fire, is an amusing fantasy:
The result was excellent. The British battery had to change position several times, the OP could not operate from the escarpment, and the British vehicles charged round the airfield in wild confusion.
Then Briel writes of a gesture he made which would have been mere bravado had 4 Brigade not already prepared to move westwards to come abreast of 6 Brigade. He ‘opened a vigorous fire with 5 tanks’ and attacked towards
The battle group had accomplished the task I had been given in spite of the enemy's great superiority in men and weapons. We had held our positions and enabled the supply services of
Africa Corps to escape and to ensure the Corps' supplies.
Briel had reason to be proud and his little force had done well; but the real saviour of the supplies of Africa Corps was someone in Corps or Army who laid it down that
The move by 4 Brigade and
Got in wireless comn with 6 Bde at last—B. sounds cheerful enough but has had pretty tough time and Sqn of Valentines knocked out except for 2 plus 120 casualties, including McNaught wounded and 3 coy comds killed. Germans suffered heavily. At present 6 Bde is being shelled by
105mm guns which, of course, outrange our 25 pr. 5 SA Bde reported over-run by enemy tanks and to have dispersed South. 6 Bde are ready for possible tank attack and hoping rest of Div is on way. Sent them message re our plans to clear up area here at 1100 hrs and move at about 1230 with 4 Inf Bde and 21 Bn to swing on to B's front.
But the Divisional staff remained hopeful that first reports of the disaster to the South African brigade were exaggerated and marked it on a sketch in an intelligence summary even next day as a formed body rather south of where it was previously expected to be, thinking it might have been driven southwards but not put right out of the battle.
With his two brigades in line about 12 miles from the nearest elements of 70 Division,
Barrowclough and Chronicler's Note—i.e., a note by Capt White, the GOC's PA, giving his personal opinion and not In
6 Bde hold crest of 175 without having observation on the Wadi. Barrowclough reported that 26 Bn had gone forward and been in contact with 5 SA Bde. The latter had been attacked by tanks and completely overrun. They had broken to the South. The 26 Bn were isolated but held their position splendidly and one troop of arty is reported to have knocked out 24 German tanks. They also killed a lot firing over open sights.
Question of points to take was discussed.
CRA: ‘If we strike any stiff opposition at all I think we are in a very insecure position if we do not have the top escarpment.’ Intelligence officer Corps says Boche did not have more than 100 tanks and that is not taking into account what happened yesterday.
GOC: ‘Consider Boche are going and that fires seen are destruction of material.’
It was agreed that going along the escarpment was a night show. i.e., that shortage of artillery ammunition and other considerations made it advisable to attack by night rather than by day along the top of the escarpment.
GOC: ‘The only thing that frightens me from going straight on are his guns.’
Finally decided that 6 Bde should enlarge their show without worrying about timing of attack while 4 Bde should advance to overlook country up to Bir Hamed [
In saying that he thought the ‘Boche are going’ Panzer Group Africa, and none of those present had any knowledge of what Africa Corps was doing this day. Barrowclough's immediate object of relieving an irksome situation by a short advance to the west was radically different from
Have now formed up as binary division without Div Cav. Large pockets enemy still in our rear. We are attacking westward and are now on a line running north and south through Pt 175…. If we had petrol and ammunition we might have been in tobruk early tomorrow. As it is we hope to get there tomorrow night but impossible to be definite.
This was just the sort of message Godwin-Austen expected from
The plan eventually agreed to in outline at the brigadiers' conference and later confirmed was that 4 Brigade should advance three miles at dawn on the 25th to a line running from
‘Hargest is happy’, the GOC noted in his diary, ‘and thinking of going into Salum. He sent me a cheerful letter. Reported that Army Comd is very pleased with what NZ Div has done’. Then sure that the Boche had gone’. Rommel was equally certain that the New Zealand Division lay at his mercy north of the frontier line.
104 Artillery Command, who commanded what was left of 155 Infantry and 361 Africa Regiments and 900 Engineer Battalion, all of them much weakened. Italian reinforcements were at hand, however, and Rommel had told Boettcher to be ready to attack Panzer Group Headquarters began to get worried about the British force approaching from Africa Division and between the road and the sea an Italian battalion. Linking with him, Boettcher now had to face eastwards on both sides of the Trigh Capuzzo and prevent a junction between the oncoming British and the 361 Regiment was to take up a line from the mouth of Rugbet en-Nbeidat northwards halfway to 155 Regiment was to extend this line to a point two miles north-east of
The German troops were thus leaving the Panzer Group Africa hoped to put Italian troops on these two vital features, but it was some time before 9 Bersaglieri Regiment of Trieste Division could get into position facing 6 Brigade. When the latter attacked in the morning, therefore, it came upon more troops of the regiment it had already met on 175, the former French Foreign Legionaries of the 361st. Elements of Pavia or Trieste were to take over the southern escarpment, but there were still Germans there late next day.
Sixth Brigade was to advance on a two-battalion front before dawn on the 25th. On the right 24 Battalion was to cross the Rugbet to capture the high ground around the Blockhouse and carry on westwards for some distance along the top of the escarpment. On the left 26 Battalion was to move on parallel lines a little to the south to about as far as the
Colonel Shuttleworth of the 24th gave out his orders about midnight at a rendezvous 1000 yards east of Point 175. His objective was to ‘capture feature “BLOCKHOUSE” and advance a maximum distance of 2 miles’. D Company would be forward on the right and C on the left, with B and A Companies respectively behind them. The starting line was the existing front of the two leading companies, about 400–500 yards west of the cairn, and the starting time 4.30 a.m. The Blockhouse itself was the centre of the initial objective, which allowed a frontage for each company of something like 300 yards. Headquarters Company was to bring forward essential vehicles and gear and with the carriers was to come in behind the leading companies starting at 6.30 a.m. Maj S. J. Hedge (HQ Coy) and Lts E. C. Laurie and M. L. Hill,
Anti-tank support was important, as the main enemy strength, including the panzers, was thought to be at
This applied only to 24 Battalion, which had by far the hardest task. The deep Rugbet was a difficult obstacle in the dark and the Blockhouse beyond was on commanding ground. There was a hope, however, that the enemy might have withdrawn from the forward area and the silent attack might then sweep up the slopes opposite and take the enemy in the Blockhouse area by surprise.
In the event the attackers had no such luck and met enemy soon after they started. This enemy was indeed taken unawares and in the Rugbet some men of 25 Battalion held prisoner in tents were released. But the firing which broke out soon gave the game away and the enemy at the Blockhouse was wide awake. Germans in the Rugbet were ‘pushed back by the use of the bayonet and by us spraying the ground in front with tommy guns and with rifles fired from the hip’ and casualties were ‘fairly slight’. Tomlinson. Shakespear.
C Company got through with little harm and ‘successfully dug themselves into position as dawn broke and we found ourselves on sloping ground just below the blockhouse’; Tomlinson. Cpls A. C. Opie and C. W. Buckeridge jointly; Buckeridge was wounded here, with ‘most of 18 Pl.’
The reserve companies of the 24th had meanwhile met opposition, not only from pockets by-passed in the dark but from machine guns in the Blockhouse area, and one of the casualties here was Captain Brown of B Company. ‘I remember Charlie singing out “Keep going boys, they're firing over our heads” ’, says Private Bott, ‘and the next thing we know he was smacked in the ankle.’ Then B Company dropped down into the Rugbet and carried on half-right up the far slope, ignoring the food, clothing and equipment strewn everywhere and intent only on helping D Company. One Bren-gunner was hit here and a friend heard the bullets ‘smacking into’ his chest and turned to see him lying ‘with his face pale and his eyes open’.
A Company had followed up behind C and found itself almost worse off than those ahead, coming under steady MG fire which hugged the ground in deadly fashion. The men had no choice but to lie low for some time. Later in the morning those who could see through the V-shaped mouth of the Rugbet watched 4 Brigade drive forward, halt, and send the infantry forward on foot in extended line with tanks leading and guns in support, a thrilling spectacle though somehow remote as if in a different world from that of the harassed spectators.
Farther back there were other troubles as Major
All this was in complete contrast to the experiences of 26 Battalion, the rifles companies of which trudged forward for four miles with C on the right and D on the left, crossing the upper part of the Rugbet where it was shallow and then traversing flat ground at such a pace that despite the cold of the night the men soon began to feel the weight of their greatcoats. Green flares rose from time to time some way off, but there was no other sign of enemy until after daybreak, when the leading companies still had some distance to go. As the horizon receded C Company came under MG fire from the right rear, near the Blockhouse, which wounded one man but was not nearly heavy or accurate enough to halt the advance. As B Company followed C, however, this fire thickened up with mortar bombs and anti-tank shot and it was evident that 24 Battalion had made much less progress than had been hoped. C and D Companies reached the edge of the airfield with ease and there started to dig in, and
By this time the Blockhouse was very much the centre of attention. Fire from 6 Field Regiment and 3 MG Company poured into the area, aided by the mortars of both battalions and by some fire from 4 Brigade on the flat below. Barrowclough himself went so far forward that it took heavy covering fire from A Company to extricate him. He came to the same conclusion as Shuttleworth: that the southern flank was the most promising. Thus Page's move was most opportune. It linked with one by 7 Platoon of 24 Battalion which was swinging wide to the south and attracting much fire in so doing. Major Hedge, seeing this, sent his carrier platoon to help and the carriers raced forward, passing 7 Platoon south of the Blockhouse and veering towards an extensive enemy position to the west. B Company of the 26th pushed forward with mortars in support and
The combined efforts of all, however, had a cumulative effect and the end when it came was sudden. When 7 Platoon of 24 Battalion reached a point very near the southernmost enemy posts, some Germans stood up as if to surrender and 7 Platoon, overjoyed, ran forward. But Lieutenant
Twenty-sixth Battalion had meanwhile watched enemy moving to the north and north-west and on the far side of the airfield (actually supply lorries of Africa Corps) and came under MG, mortar and artillery fire which wounded fourteen men. There was every evidence that enemy had left the airfield recently and in great haste, for their belongings were strewn among the wreckage which remained from the earlier fighting. Parties of the battalion went out to bury the dead still lying among the shattered tanks, guns, lorries and other equipment of 7 Armoured Division.
Barrowclough had meanwhile on
The companies dug in, 47 Battery began to return the enemy fire, and then a carrier patrol was sent forward. This soon came upon a dressing station guarded by seven Germans who were taken prisoner. The fifty patients included
New instructions from 6 Brigade put any further advance on the southern escarpment out of the question. In the afternoon of 25 November Brigade Headquarters closed up on 24 Battalion, Burton moved 25 Battalion up to the western slopes of the Rugbet en-Nbeidat, Weir sited Headquarters of 6 Field Regiment at its mouth and moved his batteries well forward, and 8 Field Company moved up to the western edge of Point 175.
Below the escarpment 4 Brigade had advanced three miles due west in box formation, with 19 Battalion on the northern flank, 44 Royal Tanks and 18 Battalion leading, and 20 Battalion on the southern side, all with instructions not to press on against heavy opposition. The whole move took little more than an hour and by 7.30 a.m. 18 Battalion was digging in on a frontage of Bassett.
The advance had been carried out with ease, but opposition now hardened. The leading tanks attracted anti-tank fire from the southwest and 18 Battalion was machine-gunned persistently from the same direction. A low ridge halfway between the Blockhouse and
Mortar fire also came down heavily at times on the front, and when an FOO of 4 Field Regiment went forward with two assistants to deal with this he was seriously wounded and his assistants killed. A Troop of 31 Anti-Tank Battery had gone forward in close support of the I tanks, and when these withdrew a short distance the portées carried on alone to deal with an enemy post. The gun A1 got to within 100 yards when an anti-tank gun opened fire on the portée and scored three direct hits, destroying the 2-pounder, killing the gun-sergeant,
Skirmishing on the 18 Battalion front was all over by about 9 a.m. and the only persistent fighting was that in which A Company of the 20th was involved at the mouth of the Rugbet. Fire from the Blockhouse area held up the advance here and 9 Platoon made a brave effort to overcome this on its own initiative, not knowing what 24 Battalion was doing to the same end. The battalion mortars gave support when they saw it was needed and B Company on the right tended to veer round to face the Blockhouse to help A, while C extended northwards to link with 18 Battalion. Lieutenant L-Cpl Clarke of the Sigs section.
It did not take
When
My dear
Freyberg ,I have just received your heartening message of 24 Nov. You have done splendidly—I quite realise that you cannot be definite yet as to entry into
TOBRUK but am most anxious that you should join forces at first light 26 Nov if humanly possible.SCOBIE says that the bit between his forces and ED DUDA is strongly covered by enemy artillery so that he might more profitably, from his point of view, make his main sortie through the North Eastern Sector
which has been thinned out by the enemy. He feels that this would also cause more confusion to the enemy who would be attacked from two directions and have his communications threatened. I have told him to make the plan he thinks best but that any plan he makes MUST INCLUDE A DEFINITE FIRM AND SECURE JUNCTION WITH YOU ON THE ED DUDA POSITION. I attach a copy of my signal to him. North-westen sector was meant, as the accompanying signal indicated.
I have to give him FIVE hours' notice for his sortie—This means I should have SEVEN hours' notice from you if possible. Moreover owing to the uncertainty of W/T after dark it will be of great value to me if I could receive notice from you by 1600 hrs today.
I would also like to know at earliest the area in which the Air Force can safely put down for you direct air support in the form of the biggest blitz the Hun has yet seen, and times between which you would like it put down. Let me know if I can, from the Corps point of view, do anything in regard to ammunition, petrol and supply. I would make any conceivable emergency arrangement possible.
The general situation is that the enemy has flung mobile columns with tanks and lorried infantry across the area lately occupied by 30 Corps and that some have reached the 4 Ind Div area. I do not think he will do much harm and am, of course, sticking to our primary objective—linking hands with SCOBIE. But it might conceivably arise that you had to join with him and be based on
TOBRUK and scrap the present L of C at any rate temporarily. 22 Armoured Bde has been placed under my command but I cannot at the moment gain touch with them. If by chance there is an L.O. or anyone from them in touch with you, please send him here. I shall use them for clearing and keeping open your L of C.Yours very sincerely,
0945 hrs.
Godwin.
The signal to Scobie cast doubt on the wisdom of a proposal to break out to the west and not along the direct route to Ed Duda though it did not forbid it.
Scobie's attitude was understandably cautious. He had already been badly let down by 30 Corps and had no wish to extend the existing bulge in his perimeter to Ed Duda if there was any likelihood that the New Zealand Division would also fail to keep the rendezvous there. There was no obvious reason why this division should succeed after the whole of 30 Corps had failed; and opposition in the
Have no intention order SCOBIE to advance on— Corrupt group as received by NZ Div.fullback followed by time giving hour's notice. I will pass it on to SCOBIE. SCOBIE will co-operate by engaging enemy batteries located west of ED DUDA. Subject to its NOT rpt NOT weakening SCOBIE'S power to join forces with
There followed a sharp and unexpected distraction. Apprehensions aroused by the constant air raids in Armoured Command Vehicle, then issued only to armoured formations (though Rommel and Cruewell each used one captured in the initial advance of DAK some months before).
Sixth Brigade was not bombed and had the best view of what developed into the greatest air encounter of the campaign. Two
Because the
With or without this support,
AS planning progressed it soon became clear that the programme to occupy all three escarpments at once was too ambitious and the southern one could not be included in the scheme. A daylight advance was out of the question, as the diarist of I Army Tank Brigade explains:
There was insufficient infantry to enable properly prepared day attacks with adequate supporting fire to be staged. Tanks alone could not attack in daylight without serious casualties and therefore new methods had to be tried.
The ‘new method’ chosen was to advance by night across up to eight miles of unknown ground, not knowing where or when opposition would be met and relying on New Zealand Bren and Tommy guns, bayonets and grenades to overcome it.
TOBRUCH garrison is making a sortie after NZ Div has captured the ED DUDA posn. This sortie will probably take place morning 26 Nov. INTENTION NZ Div will attack and capture BELHAMED ED DUDA SIDE REZEGH. METHOD Objectives 4 Inf Bde BELHAMED leaving one bn
How the I tanks might be used to support the night attack was discussed with
The various reports of enemy in front of 4 Brigade and the comparative absence of such reports from 6 Brigade seem to have built up the impression that
The German supply troops near Letter, Duff.
An operation order of 18 Battalion, signed at 6.25 p.m., gave details, many of which must also have applied to 20 Battalion. The two battalions were to assemble on a line then being marked out with tape along existing FDLs, with the 18th on the right and the 20th on the left, each on a frontage of 300 yards with two companies forward and two 300 yards behind. Essential transport and mortar platoons would come forward in the morning with the I tanks. The axis of advance was just north of due west and the speed of advance 100 yards every two minutes.
Letter, The moon set at 12 minutes past midnight.
For the men in the lead the approach march seemed endless. ‘I think most of us were pretty well done in when we actually got into the real thing’, a private of 18 Battalion writes.
Much the same occurred on the left, where the 20th found the enemy panicky and firing too high ‘as if they were head down in slit trenches, pulling the trigger plenty’, though light anti-tank guns were also in action until their crews were ‘dealt with very promptly with the bayonet’.
The 18th settled down on the eastern half of the feature and the 20th to the west. In the absence of
It was when he came upon the Tobruk By-pass that
All fighting had stopped [
The companies of the 20th had pushed on farther to the west across a shallow depression which did not appear on the map; but for the moment there was no sound of further fighting and
Position taken after some hard fighting. I became separated and am at present bivouacked with a party of Sappers & sundry & about 100 prisoners on objective just S of Peart.
After much wandering I think the position is that 18th are on the objective but haven't gone far enough & 20th have gone too far. I can't find them anyway.
There are a lot of casualties about & I think they must have passed through.
Tell Pikes
to be careful in morning, not to shoot up either 20th or my party. My party is identifiable by having 2–3 tonners & a mob of prisoners. i.e., the tanks and supporting arms (
Capt Pike of 44 R Tks was to lead this group).(Sgd)
H. K. Lt ColKippenberger
0110 hrs
This estimate of position is verified at the moment by sound of fighting ahead.
Captain
At Brigade Headquarters Bassett.
The 44th Royal Tanks and supporting arms set off at 6 a.m., 26 November, but did not get far before a message from 4 Brigade was passed on to Captain Pike which made him hold up the group for nearly an hour until he could get his orders clarified:
To 44 RTR
46 Bty NZA
LT COL KIPPENBERGER (1) 18 & 20 Bns on objective.
(2) 6 Bde NOT yet on ED DUDA & daylight attack necessary.
(3) DIV orders us to support this attack BOTH by guns & tanks—in absence of further orders from Div, independent action. You will act accordingly.
(4) Pockets of Boche on North under side of escarpment South of Trigh Capuzzo to be winkled out by tanks.
46 Bty will support 6 Bde & 4 Bde will be supported by guns from this posn.
26 Nov 41
(Sgd) B. I.BassettCapt0545
BM
The situation was not nearly as simple, however, as this made it sound. A daylight attack by 6 Brigade across to Ed Duda was out of the question, as 4 Bde diary.
Nor were 4 Brigade and
The heavy opposition expected by 4 Brigade had not been met; but even Barrowclough's stern view of the difficulties which faced 6 Brigade rated them far too low. He thought when he was given it that his task was ‘formidable’:
Sufficient was known of the enemy strength at Report in 6 Bde diary.
In strict truth nothing was known even of the enemy at
This seemed simple; but when the details were worked out it was in fact most complicated, particularly in the face of the opposition disclosed in the course of the advance. The lack of sufficient time to carry out the preliminaries was a severe handicap. Allen had to get back to 21 Battalion, embus, make an approach march in the dark over six miles of strange ground, and then form up with 26 Battalion, pass through the box, descend the escarpment near the Mosque, cover another three miles of desert not guaranteed to be free of enemy, then attack jointly with Page a feature which was almost sure to be strongly defended, and be in position there by first light to meet counter-attack.
Knowing there was no time to waste, Barrowclough when he got back to 6 Brigade at once called up the commanders of the various supporting arms and began to brief them, pending the arrival of the battalion commanders. With remarkable clarity and precision
Arty: EL DUDA garrison
12 2 pdrs and 8 25 pdrs
SIDI RESEGH—4 2 pdrs 16 25 pdrs 4 18 pdrs.
O.C.
AA. Arty 3 guns EL DUDA
5 guns SIDI RESEGH
M.M.G's one pl EL DUDA
two pls SIDI RESEGH
Weir and his assistants would evidently have to do some quick thinking and the various gun detachments some hasty and accurate navigation in the dark to assemble at various rendezvous and take their proper places in the order of march or attack.
It was dark and bitterly cold.
Col Shuttleworth (24 Bn) andCol Page (26 Bn) sat in the front seat of the car … and I perched in the back seat to try and keep warm. The wait was long and tiring.At last the Brig calls for inf comds and as we enter his command truck, he apologised for the delay in calling us. There was not much time to spare and very briefly we were told of the tasks which were ours for the night.
This must have been about 7 p.m., leaving very little time, and when
Before he left
west, which does not seem to make sense but corresponds better than the other two with what in fact took place.
An appointment even more temporary than
en masse with transport before daylight. There were fewer 2-pounders, however, than the brigade plan provided for, as all troops were not at full strength. The troop of 65 Anti-Tank Regt, RA, which came in during the day was put under
For the first three miles 24 Battalion went well with A Company leading, C following, B and D on a parallel route to the south and the transport between the two groups. At the appointed place they began to open out to form the box as planned. No enemy had been met and A and C Companies began their advance northwards in good order. This they mostly maintained despite heavy fire in places and the loss of a number of men. But defensive fire thickened up and mortars and artillery joined in as the troops began digging in stony ground. A Niue Islander with C Company, for example, says he did not come under fire until after digging in—‘picks and shovels sounding all over the desert’—but the fire carried on for the rest of the night. W. Japeth.
Captains
One casualty, however, was G. H. Logan.
The southern side of the box was formed almost exactly according to plan, with A Company of 25 Battalion on the right facing south and B on the left, each covering 800 yards of front, and Headquarters Company in the centre extended over 400 yards, though A was ‘considerably mixed up with troops of the 24 Bn’, according to Major Burton. He could hear enemy fire and could see the enemy anti-tank-gun bullets and tracer bullets from small arms flying through the air to the north and therefore stressed that his men should take up all-round defensive positions. In the centre the men struck clay and could dig deeply, but the flanks were stony and the trenches of A and B Companies therefore shallow. As the fighting to the north continued Burton began to worry about the transport
Back in the Blockhouse area 26 Battalion did its best to assemble the companies and supporting arms it had to take to Ed Duda, and unlike
The haste and the darkness bred other misapprehensions, too, and it is not surprising that when Alen went so conscientiously through the long procedure for identifying himself that contact was lost before Barrowclough had time to tell him what he wanted. He may also have spoken to Page; but R/T was a poor channel of communications at night and caused much misunderstanding.
This was certainly not what Barrowclough had intended. In the various expressions used to describe the objective of Shuttleworth's group—‘box’, ‘perimeter’, ‘garrison at
About 150 yards from where they dismounted the forward infantry of the 21st passed through the northern side of Shuttleworth's box, mainly in Tomlinson's area. Then a party including C Company, the pioneer platoon and Headquarters of 21 Battalion crossed the track near Point 162 and descended the escarpment to the flat below, south of the Trigh Capuzzo. This party then swung left and advanced parallel to the escarpment and ‘met MG fire—cleared up several posts’, according to the adjutant,
About 5 a.m. Page was in touch with Barrowclough and ‘with the approval of Div HQ’ cancelled Phase Two of the operation, though he had no way of passing this decision on to Allen. He now resumed direct command of his own battalion and put his C and D Companies into position on the right of 24 Battalion facing north and north-west, where the men dug down or built sangars as best they could. The transport was sent for safety to a large wadi north of the airfield. Report in the 6 Bde diary. 17
The Divisional staff had done its best to follow the fortunes of both brigade attacks during the night and by 3.30 a.m. understood that 6 Brigade had captured
Consolidate on SIDI REZEGH. Make a plan to attack ED DUDA but do NOT attack until ordered to do so.
In a situation report at 9 a.m. on the 26th, received at Division at 9.40, Barrowclough explained the situation as he knew it and disclosed that he meant to hold
At the present moment the situation is that the tps on
SIDI REZEGH are disorganised, and re-organisation is not easy, as they are being subjected to mortar and machine gun fire. All attempts to locate Col. ALLEN have so far failed and it is feared that he may be a casualty. At the present moment no serious enemy attack is developing against us, though he is sniping with rifle and MG fire very consistently.
This still did not make it clear to Division that 6 Brigade had by no means succeeded even in capturing Hence the signal from 4 Bde to
Though units were warned that supplies had been ‘temporarily interrupted’, there was every confidence that 22 Armoured Brigade would be able to deal with any threat from the south or rear, and when a message came in that ‘400 MET Mechanised enemy transport.
He is protecting our L of C with his 46 tanks out of 150 and Armd Cars. A patchwork quilt was how he described his force ‘but keen and in good heart—4 Yeomanry Regts’. Discussed posn of other Armd Bdes—4 and 7 Armd Bdes at Bir Gobi doing maintenance, about 100 strong altogether at present. 1 SA Bde is on the L of C. Talking of the use of tanks, the Brig said ‘I quite agree tanks can't go for A Tk guns unsupported’.
This statement, which had to be taken at its face value, was highly misleading and gave a false sense of security regarding the southern flank. Of the two armoured brigades thought to be at El Gubi, one was many miles away and the other had been withdrawn from the campaign. With this assurance, however,
As early as 6.20 a.m. Division had signalled Air Support Control asking for bombing of the enemy artillery in the Bu Amud area north of Boettcher Group of 10.30 p.m., 25 November, captured during the night, was translated and for the first time the Division had a reasonably reliable indication of the enemy it faced. Boettcher's 104 Artillery Command faced east with II Battalion, 155 Infantry Regiment, on its right, the southern escarpment, 9 Bersaglieri Regiment on the I Battalion, 155 Infantry Regiment, on its left, east of a line between Africa Division to the north. There was mention also of 2 Company of 900 Engineer Battalion standing by at
DAWN of 26 November was unwelcome on the bald top of 18 Bn diary. McPhail. Letter,
The I tanks and some of the supporting weapons and transport got through from D. J. C. Pringle, draft history of 20 Bn. There is some evidence that 44 R Tks meant to push right through to Ed Duda in response to the order of 5.45 a.m. (See p. 255) while 6 Bde mounted a daylight attack with guns and tanks and to winkle out Germans in pockets in the The Army Quarterly,
The other supporting arms had varying degrees of success in getting on to Maj P.B. Levy, m.i.d.; born Maj C.C. Johansen, m.i.d.; Plimmerton; born Norsewood, Duff, report. Ibid.
It was a difficult and strenuous morning for the field gunners, as Duff describes it:
At approx 0900 hrs, Bde reported 18 and 20 Bns were being heavily attacked and asked for ‘defensive fire’. The safe lines were decided on with the Brig. and all four btys engaged by predicted fire. This was reported as very successful and bears out that the 1/100000 map is very accurate. Some delay occurred as Arty boards had not sufficient scope to compete with the switches asked for.
At 1030 hrs, repetition of these concentrations was asked for and fired, the major opposition was apparently neutralised. The amn situation was acute, and orders were given for essential and emergency tasks only to be engaged. This naturally resulted in much enemy mortar fire being brought down on our infantry, but as guns were down to 30 r.p.g.
little could be done. Rounds per gun.
Communication with
BELHAMED was entirely by W/T as OP lines were continually being cut, and movement on the feature itself was practically impossible.
The ammunition stocks may be compared with the average expenditure per gun per day since the 22nd of just over 21 rounds and the average fired this day of 23.5 rounds per gun.
Another cause for grave concern was the loss this morning of three commanding officers in succession in 20 Battalion, an extraordinary piece of bad luck, particularly since the first of them was Maj G.A.T. Rhodes, m.i.d.; Taiko, Maj J.G. Mackay, ED;
Mortar bombs rained down in the area for half an hour after this and several more men were hit. Major Mitchell again assumed command of 20 Battalion; but he too was hit, as Maj J.F. Baker; Maj R.E. Agar, ED; WO II H.L. Grooby, m.i.d.; born Westport,
This rapid change of command was bewildering not only to Air support called for in support of
Talk of counter-attack on 4 Bde diary.
With no direct wireless link between the New Zealand Division and the Received at 8.45 a.m.
NZ DIV reports BEL HAMED and
But
While the New Zealanders were calling for bombing on Ed Duda, therefore,
The enemy was alert and shellfire damaged two tanks before they crossed the starting line, but the tanks crossed the four and a half miles to Ed Duda without further harm. Fire on the objective became very heavy indeed and in a haze of dust and smoke 4 Royal Tanks tried to settle down on the feature until the infantry arrived. Willison could see through the dust ‘rows of flashes’ from enemy guns below and judged that a whole panzer division must be facing him. Then the dust blew away and for a revealing moment he could see no more than a series of field-gun positions. To his tanks on the crest of the rise he then signalled ‘Cease 2-pdr all Besa’, getting them to concentrate the fire of their medium machine guns on the vulnerable enemy below. ‘This was too much for the enemy guns’, the Capt Jackman of 1 Royal Northumberland Fusiliers came forward with Z Coy and stationed some of his Vickers guns to the right of the tanks and then personally led the remainder between the tanks and the enemy guns on the left flank, adding such a volume of MMG fire that he did much to end resistance here. In so doing he was killed and gained a posthumous VC. This was the second gained in the course of the battleaxe.) Others who had already earned VCs were Brig ‘Jock’ Compbell, Lt-Col Keyes, 2 Lt G.W. Gunn (of 3 RHA), and Rifleman Beeley.
The carrier platoon led the way, then came D Company with an anti-tank troop and B Company echeloned back to the right, C to the left, then Headquarters, and at the rear A Company with the transport. Some 200 yards from the escarpment at Ed Duda the carriers and a platoon of D Company were heavily bombed, the company commander and carrier platoon commander were both killed and some thirty-five others killed or wounded. This was the bombing ordered by 4 Brigade in ignorance of Scobie's moves but, though it took away much of the glow of the success which was soon achieved, it did not halt the advance. As the Essex history says,
At this time the whole Tank Brigade had withdrawn to the left flank, and was formed up ready to support the Battalion if required.
As the remainder of the Battalion reached the escarpment, it came under heavy artillery fire at fairly short range, both from field and heavy artillery. Many of the guns could actually be seen and some of them were undoubtedly firing over open sights.
Martin,
The Essex Regiment,1928–1950 , pp. 79–80, quotingLt-Col Nichols .
Some of these guns were in a wadi to the north-west and the Vickers guns of 1 Northumberland Fusiliers gave their crews a lively time as the Essex advanced; but arrangements for supporting fire from 1 RHA fell through.
Ed Duda itself was not nearly as well prepared for defence as had been expected and its Italian ‘garrison’ quickly surrendered. A platoon commander Lt P.P.S. Brownless.
The feature itself was overlooked by higher ground to the west, while to the east the ground fell away slightly and provided an entry into the position, and it needed all the resources of 1 Essex to defend it. Nichols, quoted by Martin, p. 81.
Though 4 Brigade was no more than two miles away, it remained for some time unaware that Ed Duda had been seized. At 1.12 p.m.
Throughout the past two hours a tank battle has been taking place about three miles ahead on the right front, this must be the sortie being made by the
The first news at Division, however, was a signal from Scobie to
Everyone was greatly cheered at lunch time when sweeps of
RAF fighters drove enemy fighters out of the air, a fight taking place above the front. This was followed by a formation of 17 long nosed Blenheims dropping 17,000 lbs of explosives on the enemy. They flew over us and gaveGreece and Create conscious people a slit trench feeling until the fighters were identified! Further sweeps came and then 19 Marylands with 19 odd tons for the Boche. From all accounts both found their marks on German posns… 4 Bde's request for air support on theBelhamed posn was most effectively answered.
When news came that Scobie had reached Ed Duda
In the meantime
For a short time guns in the Ed Duda area and north of It was found later to be the skeleton of a larger aircraft wing.
Below the escarpment and in many wadis and recesses on its slopes most of 21 Battalion and Forder's company of the 24th and their supporting Vickers platoons were in serious trouble as soon as it got light enough to reveal these various detachments to the numerous enemy around. The plight of D Company of the 21st under Captain Trolove Capt F.J. Trolove; Te Mata; born Raglan, Two of them were detailed under German escort to pick up Hargrave.
Intense fire from the rim of the escarpment at the climax of the night advance had broken up the rest of Allen's command into smaller detachments, most of which clashed in the dark with enemy on the slopes or on the flat below, so that long before dawn Allen began to realise that he would have to withdraw. Elements of A and C Companies of the 24th and at least one detachment of 3 MG Company had also descended all or part of the way to the foot of the slopes and were mostly out of touch with each other when morning came. The resulting confusion still cannot be disentangled, and the essence distilled from the many accounts is of growing uncertainty and danger as the light increased and of sudden and violent clashes as the sun began to blaze on the scene. Allen had with him part of his headquarters and C Company and Forder's group of the 24th, perhaps 150 all told, and with him was the commander of C Company, Captain Tongue, Capt W.M. Tongue, ED, m.i.d.;
I sent two men towards them to see who they were. They were Jerries and dug in. They didn't waste time but opened fire straight away with machine guns and rifles as soon as they saw us. I told the men to fix bayonets and was pleased to see them drop to the ground as one to do this. They waited till I told them and then away we went up the hill. It was a bloody do with grenades and bayonets. When the area was cleared we went on but more slowly as we had wounded and some prisoners.
Smith headed eastwards along the ridge, making good use of cover offered by the broken ground, rather than risk his men on the open ground to the south, and in due course came upon the large wadi north of the airfield in the upper part of which some of 6 Brigade were established. With twenty-nine men, five of them wounded, and five prisoners, he staggered in and after a brief rest took up a defensive position in the area.
The night of the 25th-26th had played tricks on several detachments by letting them settle in what looked like dominating ground but which turned out to be overlooked on both sides by enemy. ‘Daylight showed us what a bad position we had taken’, says Private Logan Cpl G.H. Logan; born NZ Lt A ‘spandau’ no more than 15 yards off was silenced by Sgt J.M. O'Brien, who had to stand up and fire several shots to do this. See Kay, p. 140.
A party estimated at 150–200 strong gradually assembled under Allen in a large wadi and somehow he had to get them all away. The closeness of the enemy had one good result, however, in that they made no mistake about the wounded, and several accounts mention that firing eased as soon as stretcher bearers or walking wounded were seen. Forder goes on to say.
As the first groups moved off and came within view of the enemy a most remarkable thing happened. The German fire ceased abruptly and, when it became clear that the enemy… intended to allow the carrying parties to move unmolested, all the wounded were got under way followed by the remainder of the troops.
By degrees and with many adventures Allen's party got back to rejoin 6 Brigade, with Allen himself bringing up the rear and reporting at Brigade Headquarters about 4 p.m.
But others outside his control and left largely to their own resources were not all so fortunate. His B Company, for example, under Captain Yeoman, Capt A.A. Yeoman, m.i.d.; Katikati; born 2 Lt S.V. Lord, DCM; Frankton Junction; born Bersaglieri position until the three tanks came up and captured them. The other half of the company followed Sergeant Lord,
Others of 21 Battalion and of Forder's company made their way south through C Company of the 24th, and Japeth was hit between the eyes and the barrel of his massive rifle ‘bent like a fish-hook’; but he survived, spending a ghastly hour or so in a concrete cistern chock-a-block with badly wounded men until carriers could take them back. No. 7 Pl, 3 MG Coy, fired some 14,000 rounds this morning before withdrawing and came under fire not only from 26 Bn but from 8 MG Pl in so doing, though no one was hit.
Lt-Col E.J. Thomson, ED;
For all Tomlinson's valuable contribution, however, the chief bulwark of 6 Brigade this day was 25 Battalion, which had been meant to face south but now had to face north through its own transport area and do what it could to subdue the fire from
The 18-pounders of M Troop fought a useful supporting action from a little to the east, engaging and destroying four guns at 3500-4000 yards in the early morning, silencing more guns to the south-west, and finally scoring direct hits on two infantry guns Probably 75-mm howitzers.
Meanwhile 26 Battalion could no longer ignore a strongpoint to the right rear of D Company and in an elevated section of the escarpment rim, dominating the whole of Page's rear and causing much trouble. One platoon attacked but was driven back. Then this and another platoon made a determined effort to close in with heavy mortar support; but this, too, proved futile and nine men were wounded. These lay on exposed ground south of the strongpoint and it took three hours to bring them back under heavy fire, though the rescuers luckily escaped harm. The strongpoint was evidently far more extensive and well-equipped than had been thought and a third and even heavier attack was being prepared, only to be abandoned when word came that the battalion would mount another night attack on
Brigadier Barrowclough had toured as much as he could of the front soon after dawn and found the situation ‘disorganised and somewhat precarious’, as he wrote in his report. ‘Every effort was made to organise a defensive system but the difficulties of doing so were tremendous as the whole area was under observation and fire from strong enemy positions’, he added. Shuttleworth deserved every credit for the way he ‘restored a very grave situation’. But Barrowclough could see for himself that the troops were ‘extremely tired, having been continuously in action for several days’ and could still get no rest because of the ‘constant shelling and machine gun fire to which they were subjected’. At 4.30 p.m. 6 Brigade sent the situation report to Division which described what could be seen of the sortie to Ed Duda and also outlined the general situation, which at that time was ‘quiet with sporadic shooting by a hy inf gun in the valley below’. A ‘series of heavy counter attacks from the North and later from the West’ had been mounted against 24 Battalion; but by a slip of the pen it reported, ‘Casualties have been light’. The TQ's notes from which this sitrep was written say ‘Casualties not light,’ as indeed was the case.
It was hard even late in the day to get any reliable estimates of strengths and losses, though it was obvious enough that 21 Battalion
A Coy, 24 Bn, had a platoon away on PW escort duties; when this came back the company was reassembled as such. All were regained next day.
Even before he received the report of 4.30 p.m. from 6 Brigade, GOC's diary.
He also summoned Brigadiers He also noted that the ‘ GOC's diary.
From a wider viewpoint an LO from 13 Corps brought encouraging news. Corps Headquarters was moving ‘considerably nearer us’ and there was no suggestion that this was due to the enemy's encouragement. ‘They say NZ Div has been the only star in the firmament recently but now consider things much better—Armd Bdes recovering, tanks from See p. 316.
To 44 RTR 19 Bn
TOBRUK GARRISON IS ON ED DUDA
You will join them there SP ST
& AXIS as given Starting Point; Starting Time.
‘2200 hrs GRID 409’ is added in pencil, 409 grid being the axis of advance due westwards to Ed Duda.
You will fire green Verey flares on approaching & they will do likewise
ACK
The scheme Ibid. With Pennants Flying, p. 139) tells quite a different story, but there can be no doubting that the conception of this advance was
Time was short and 19 Battalion had to withdraw from its company areas on Leaving behind the 18-pdr troop, the Bofors guns, and the MMG platoon at D.S. Thomson, letter, Capt D.S. Thomson, MC; Stratford; born Stratford, Maj E.W.S. Williams, m.i.d.; born Thomson, loc. cit.portées of N Troop, 34 A-Tk Bty, from C Sqn, Div Cav.
At 9.30 p.m. the first wave of tanks drove off and a quarter of an hour later 19 Battalion set out. Despite
The second wave of tanks, with 19 Battalion, reported ‘No enemy fire … all guns having been silenced by 1st Echelon’ and this is confirmed by numerous post-war accounts, though it is contrary to a legend of gruesome slaughter which gained currency in the Division. The axis of advance passed just outside the strong position south of
A small Italian camp yielded a few sappers as prisoners and another which was at first fired at turned out to be a dressing station or field hospital, also Italian, which according to one account provided another fifty prisoners and also contained a few captive South Africans. On the way, too, the men passed ‘a group of big guns, whose barrels made grotesque outlines in the darkening sky’, D.W. Hodge, quoted by Sinclair, 19 Battalion, p. 210.
Hartnell went forward to obtain instructions and eventually found
Behind the battalion a line-laying party of J Section, Divisional Signals, under
NO such bloodless victory rewarded 6 Brigade in its night attack on
He needed no order from Barrowclough's report.
His own headquarters had to hide in a hollow no deeper than a dewpond and when he called up his commanding officers it was to ‘no secluded conference held in the security of deep dugout or steep ravine’. Seven or eight officers, Shuttleworth, Page, Allen, Burton, Weir and the Brigade Major, Barrington, among them, had to ‘lie flat on the open desert with maps spread out on the ground before them’, as Barrowclough says in his report. ‘The slightest raising of the head immediately drew fire from the snipers and machine guns … and shelling and mortar fire added to the discomforts.’ As Burton recalls it, ‘Shells were bursting nearby and pieces of flying metal and rock were whizzing by’. The telephone rang from a nearby trench and Barrington crawled over and slid gratefully below the level of the bullet-swept ground to answer it. ‘Well, gentlemen,’ Barrowclough announced, ‘the General insists that Sidi Resegh be taken.… 24 and 26 Battalions will attack and capture Sidi Resegh tonight.’ Burton.
Shuttleworth and Page both pointed out that their men were weary, that the leadership of the many officers and NCOs who had been lost was ‘sorely missed’, and one of them added that the 25th might be committed, as it was already in position less than The remnants of A Coy, 24 Bn, had already gone to reinforce C Coy (Tomlinson).
The plan which emerged, unlike that of the previous night, was simplicity itself: 26 Battalion was to attack westwards along the escarpment as far as the Mosque while the 24th attacked north-westwards to seize the stretch between the Mosque and the lattice observation mast. Shuttleworth's task was a ‘silent’ frontal assault over 1000–1300 yards of almost flat desert which tilted slightly to the north-west, and for this purpose he lined up all four of his companies near his C Company position on a front of perhaps 1000 yards. C Coy of 24 Bn was on the right, D centre and B on the left; where A Coy, 21 Bn, fitted into the line is a matter of dispute but it seems likely that it was on the right.
No written orders for the attack survive and accounts disagree as to the starting time; but it was probably about 11 p.m. that the men rose to their feet and began walking through the black night in fairly close order. Both battalions struck opposition almost at once, flares rose up in front of them, tracer bullets cut the intervening ground into jagged patterns of light and dark, the air was filled with a deadly rustling, whistling and shrieking, and then anti-tank guns and mortars joined in and the streaking gun-flashes and shattering explosions told their ominous tale of an enemy ready and waiting.
A and B Companies of the 26th came to grips with the enemy in the first wadi, getting showered with grenades as they mounted the far slopes, and charged all signs of movement. The crest gained, they rallied to the calls of their officers and NCOs and especially to Major Milliken's A rear HQ had been set up on the starting line to keep in touch with Brigade and with the companies by wireless, while Page and a small HQ travelled in the middle of his attacking force. M. A. Cameron.
D Company of the 26th, luckier than the others, pressed on against comparatively slight opposition and ended up on its objective, as near as Major
Shortly before first light all four companies of 26 Battalion were pretty near where they were supposed to be; but opposition was still heavy and to some officers as dawn approached it looked as though a heavy counter-attack was imminent. They therefore ordered
Sgt M. A. Camerson; Though their methods were not always admired. As Cameron of 26 Bn mortar platoon says, some of them were ‘screaming “Amigo, Amigo”, with one hand up and the other on the machine gun.’Bersaglieri, and closer examination showed them to be of the 9th Regiment. Many of those who went through this night and saw these dead foes in the morning had occasion sharply to revise their opinion of Italians as fighting men.
The advance of 24 Battalion across the flat was, if anything, a grimmer ordeal for some platoons than that of the 26th along the escarpment. The men came under fire almost at once and on the right, as Tomlinson says, had ‘hand-to-hand fighting practically all the way to our objective.’ The enemy fought their guns to the last. ‘Few prisoners were taken that night as all Coys were so below strength by this time that we simply had not got the men to look after them’, he adds. Ferguson of A Company of the 21st found himself under MG and mortar fire from three sides and he was urging his men through it when he received orders to ‘drop back a little and dig in till dawn’. D Company of the 24th, like its counterpart of the 26th, seems to have missed most of the shooting on the way and had begun to dig in on the escarpment south-west of the Mosque before it attracted much attention. Then on a ‘bare forward slope’, Private
The men put up piles of stones where the ground would not respond to their picks and Shakespear, who had managed to dig down a few inches, was hit through the elbow when he raised his arm to reach his pick. His account outlines a grim picture:
I lay quietly as the firing started again. Nothing could live above ground. It eased again, and Pte. G.
On the extreme left of the 24th, however, B Company had a charmed life and struck very little opposition. When dawn came it moved forward in extended order to the crest of the escarpment, passing on the way many Bersaglieri and ‘a number of our chaps’, according to Private Bott, ‘as well as two of our chaps sitting up wounded and groaning’. Captain
The rest of 24 Battalion, nearer the Mosque, had a much harder time when day broke. The Mosque itself was still in enemy hands and ‘as daylight improved one could see them … running round their built up dug-outs’, according to Lynn of D Company. This company was ordered to open rapid fire and did so, but was at once assailed by fire from three tanks which appeared as if from nowhere. To 17 Platoon on an exposed forward slope this was disastrous, as Corporal
as dawn came, enemy fire including cannon became more accurate. An enemy tank right in front of our Pl began to play havoc with the breast-works of rock etc put up by us and we suffered heavily. We had no A Tk weapon with us at the time.… As I could see that we would be slaughtered one by one if we stayed where we were, I ordered the Pl to withdraw, which we did, successfully, under cover of the smoke and dust which by this time enshrouded our positions. We later re-occupied these positions without resistance other than shelling, and buried the dead.
One or two 2-pounders, probably of 65 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA, eventually came forward and drove the tanks off. But the task of the tanks seems to have been to cover a withdrawal of the remaining enemy infantry and in this they succeeded. As Tomlinson says, under cover of these tanks the enemy ‘collected his transport on the road at the foot of the escarpment’—the Trigh Capuzzo. ‘The transport was packed tight and they were embussing their troops’, he adds. ‘It was a gunner's dream but out of range of our small-arms fire.’ Tomlinson sent back a runner with this information but before an FOO could get forward the enemy drove off.
The enemy's departure was expedited by A Company of 21 Battalion, operating somewhere on Tomlinson's right flank but without his knowledge. Captain Ferguson and his fifty men mounted an attack with artillery support and charged down the slopes towards the Mosque, where some Germans and Italians were to be seen. ‘They fought well’, he says, and his own company ‘suffered many more casualties … and was down to 30 or 40.’ This was probably part of the enemy thought by some of 26 Battalion to be preparing
At Brigade Headquarters only scraps of information came through during the night and Barrowclough learned that 4 Brigade had reached Ed Duda long before he could be sure his own troops had reached their objective. At 8.15 a.m. on the 27th the IO, Captain Moffatt, Maj W. Moffat;
Barrowclough had waited impatiently during the night for news of the attack and at first light went forward to see for himself. It was a heart-breaking scene which met his eyes, as he wrote a few days later:
The Bde Commander's recce at daylight of the SIDI RESEGH position revealed how stubborn had been the fighting there. The night attack brought our troops right forward to the positions selected as their objectives but necessarily left them in a much more confined area than it was advisable to occupy as daylight came. The kernel of the position had been captured in the darkness but still more heavy fighting was necessary in the expansion movement that was initiated when there was light enough.… It soon became apparent that both the night attack and the subsequent dawn expansion movement had met with the severest possible opposition. The enemy forces comprised a number of Germans and troops of the
After the first blessed relief from fire and danger, however, the battalions began to count the cost of their achievement and they found it tragically high. Officers were now few and far between. B Company of the 24th had only one,
Moved up again. Only 25 left at roll call. Settled down for first night's rest. Had hot meal—cooks doing good job.
Only four officers thus remained forward in the companies of 24 Battalion, though
The battalions suffered moreover the anguish of losing many men whose gallantry and self-sacrifice had won all hearts in the fighting of the preceding days, and it seemed to many of the survivors that the enemy, in losing his last foothold at
The comparative quiet of the morning served to emphasise the violence of the preceding days and the bitterness of these losses and, with time to think, the spirits of many of the men were depressed. A private by his own account saw Captain
A group of lads were sitting around a billy of tea. They asked me to join them.… These boys were just beginning to realise that most of their pals had gone forever. The realisation was hitting them hard … here today with no shells bursting around them and with a little time to gather their scattered wits, they were thinking and wondering why.…
19
Another group was ‘almost as pessimistic’ and
Though deeply affected himself by the sights he saw on the battlefield,
In the Blockhouse area 8 Field Company lifted about 100 mines which had been detected there and then moved to the eastern edge of the airfield. There was no suggestion that this company should lay mines in defence of the newly-gained positions above the Mosque, though three miles away at Ed Duda RE parties were busily preparing minefields in front of 1 Essex, who were strengthening their positions with barbed wire. The Tobruk garrison was ‘anti-tank mine conscious’ but the New Zealanders were not.
Your infantry are NOT repeat NOT on ED DUDA.… I am holding this strongly but require earliest relief.…
Scobie was naturally worried about the length of the perimeter he now held and expected the New Zealand Division to take over at least the Ed Duda sector. Godwin-Austen signalled at 1.07 p.m., however, that ‘Present situation makes it impossible [for the New Zealanders] to do more than hold the ground they have gained’ and made Scobie responsible for ‘establishing the corridor and for holding it open at all costs’. To this Scobie responded generously at 2.30 p.m.:
Corridor is open. Will do our best to maintain it so.
At 3.20 p.m. Scobie finally confirmed that 44 Royal Tanks and 19 Battalion were indeed with his own troops at Ed Duda and signalled
With misunderstandings on this scale about even the most elementary features of the situation, requiring hours of patient work among cipher clerks and signalmen or hazardous journeys by LOs or DRs, there was no hope of immediate and decisive result from the link-up between the two divisions. Before Scobie and
THE struggle to establish the 15 Panzer Division, which was still stronger than the British armour and able to stage a counter-attack against the Corridor of far greater weight than
The dash to the frontier, in the opinion of Rommel's closest associates, was a mistake; but on 25 November it was not an irretrievable one. Rommel could well exploit the panicky situation in the rear areas of Eighth Army by seizing huge stocks of military supplies and cutting supply routes, by crippling the crusader became submerged (as Cunningham feared it might) in anxieties for the safety of Egypt. But he chose instead to attack objectives which were either unprofitable or illusory.
With Cruewell and Gause, however, he first had to avoid capture by one of many British detachments near where he spent an uncomfortable night somewhere north of
In the light of the latest information, which was sparse, Rommel and Cruewell then conferred on their next step. Ariete had been delayed and was not at hand to help surround the British forces Rommel believed were besieging his frontier garrisons, and there was no news of Trieste Division, but he could not afford to wait. Through Cruewell he therefore ordered 15 Panzer to attack these British forces from the north-west and drive them on to the mine-fields, deploying for this purpose on a wide front between 21 Panzer was to attack from the south-east with its greatest force on the left at 33 Reconnaissance Unit, which he had ordered the previous night, had not yet started for lack of petrol and ammunition and Cruewell reported accordingly; but this evoked no comment from Rommel, whose interests were firmly fixed on a largely non-existent enemy to the north.
Rommel was accustomed to giving orders on broad lines, leaving the details for the Panzer Group or Africa Corps staffs to fill in; but in this case no staff worthy of the name was at hand and the nebulous nature of the enemy he proposed to attack, which would have been disclosed to trained staff officers by the lack of specific information as to units and locations, remained obscured. It did not even emerge in this discussion that both panzer divisions were badly situated to carry out their share of his new scheme. Having prepared to attack northwards,
Instead of striking thin air Rommel might have made it his business to get in touch with Major-General de Giorgis at 4/11 Sikh had formed up outside the minefields to escort supplies to 5 NZ Bde, and though this mission had been cancelled the unit was still outside the defences. 1 Fd Regt, RA, was poised to tackle the ‘raiding parties’ which had crossed into Egypt, in conjunction with CIH.Savona Division a course of action based on knowledge rather than intuition. By so doing Rommel would have learned that Omar Nuovo and all but
These two units were east of the Omars at first light, getting ready to move but not ready to fight where they were. When what looked like twenty-five German tanks At that time 5 Pz Regt had only 17 ‘runners’, including 15 Pzkw III and one Pzkw IV. B Sqn, 44 R Tks, also engaged this enemy south of
Meanwhile Cruewell had passed Rommel's orders on to von Ravenstein near 5 Panzer Regiment and told him to report at once with his regiment to Headquarters of 21 Panzer. This meant driving north-eastwards, either through or round the British force with which the tanks had already clashed, though Stephan may not have been fully aware of this. But the matter was soon afterwards taken out of Stephan's hands by the
Major Milderbrath of I Battalion assumed command of the regiment and, continuing the move, soon found himself at grips with a force he at first under-estimated. With his much-weakened tank force and practically no supporting weapons, he was in no position to press on against a regiment of 25-pounders firing over open sights; but he was given little choice, since the British gunners, in desperate defence of 4/11 Sikh, held their fire until the tanks were at almost point-blank range. The tanks came on against the eastern flank of the infantry and the gun area of 52 Field Battery, opening fire at
Quickly thinking things over, Mildebrath decided to swing to the right round the flank of the British force and then make his way to Fourth Indian Division, pp. 96–7.
The price the gunners paid for their success was sadly in evidence to Royal Artillery Commemoration Book, 1939–1945, p. 192.
The setback suffered here, however, was only the beginning of a series of misfortunes which beset Ibid.5 Panzer Regiment. The next was five miles north-east of Gasr el Abid, where Mildebrath finally reassembled his force, with only nine tanks fully battleworthy. The regiment had begun to refuel and stock up with ammunition when ‘two bombing raids in quick succession scattered the transport.’5 Pz Regt battle report.
The unlucky major could not argue with Rommel and had to do the best he could. If his orders entailed attacking Libyan Omar then he would attack; but it was quite impossible to do so on a ‘wide front’ as his regiment was now down to the strength of about ‘a reinforced company’5 Pz Regt battle report.
His determination may have deserved a change of luck but did not get it. After a brush with the five remaining tanks of 42 Royal Tanks, Mildebrath pushed on until he came upon what looked like a ‘position about 12 km wide along the frontier’ but was actually the two Omars, with which he was evidently unfamiliar. To the mystification of the defenders of Omar Nuovo (‘Frongia’), who expected the enemy to know where their own minefields were, 5 Panzer Regiment steadily closed in on them and seemed likely to try to charge through the minefields. To the infantry it was evident that the contest, when it started in earnest, would be between the German tanks and the defending guns, and they rose from their trenches to get a better view.
When the tanks reached a low ridge 1000 yards away the guns of 25 Field Regiment, RA, flashed and thundered into action and the heavier shells of 68 Medium Regiment, RA, were soon bursting among the attackers. Five tanks were knocked out, two of them blazing wrecks, and as Mildebrath swung west two more were set on fire. With his regiment dissolving in front of his eyes, he ordered the remnants to rally to the south; but Some 15 tanks all told had got into the western part of Libyan Omar and did not rejoin the regiment until some days later, minus eight lost in the meantime in other misadventures.II Battalion did not receive this order because wireless aerials had been shot away. It managed to gain the lee of the enemy pocket still holding out in the west of Libyan Omar and eventually entered there to recuperate. Mildebrath now had only ten tanks left, and only three in fighting order.15 Panzer to simulate an attack. Rommel had gained nothing by interfering here and for most practical purposes 5 Panzer Regiment had ceased to exist.
The operations of 15 Panzer Division this day were scarcely more successful. Heavy air attacks persisted for some time in the morning and caused many casualties. Before 9 a.m. Rommel ordered Neumann-Silkow to advance at once with his right flank level with Libyan Omar; on reaching there he was to deploy over a wide front stretching northwards to
15 Pz Div diary.
The German documents say ‘
All this took time, however, especially under air attack, and refuelling caused further delay. It was 1.45 p.m. before the division got properly under way, half an hour later it clashed briefly with British tanks, and at 3 p.m. 8 Panzer Regiment came up against what looked like a ‘strong enemy force’ but which was actually the Light Recovery Section of 1 Army Tank Brigade.
This was in a hollow near Part of C Sec, NZ Div Amn Coy, under 15 Pz Div. See Llewellyn, Journey Towards Christmas, pp. 136–9.
Some 45 men were lost in this action on the British side, all but two of them captured and most of them from 42 R Tks. See Masters, pp. 116–20.
General Neumann-Silkow had suffered all day from a shortage of petrol and at 12.30 p.m., when he reported ‘enemy in strength at 21 Panzer and this division, in the euphemistic words of the Africa Corps diary, ‘had not yet succeeded’ by midday ‘in assembling its forces and launching a unified attack’. General von Ravenstein with a small headquarters group was at ‘Faltenbacher’ strongpoint south-west of
Air attacks meanwhile continued and caused heavy loss to 33 Reconnaissance Unit, as well as destroying all wireless sets at Corps Headquarters except the one in the ACV. Late in the afternoon Rommel cancelled the Bir Habata operation, which had not yet started, and told 33 Unit instead to block a six-mile stretch of the frontier wire south of Gasr el Abid; but Neumann-Silkow, not knowing this unit had been removed from his command, ordered it to protect his rear near
Back at Gasr el Abid the small Corps Headquarters did its best to keep up the normal staff routine and by a roundabout way through 21 Panzer received a signal from Westphal at Boettcher Group, opening a gap between Trento and Pavia which he was plugging with elements of Trieste. Westphal feared a concurrent extension of the
Cruewell had feared that such a situation might arise at
The situation in front of
Thus he did not realise that the forces in question were fresh and independent of those he had defeated. In particular, he had not identified them as the New Zealand Division, though he strongly suspected that the garrison at 21 Panzer from the east with the main weight (as Rommel specified) at Libyan Omar, and to get ready the group destined for Jarabub. Ariete was known at 5.15 p.m. to be ‘attacking an enemy force but meeting heavy resistance’ and was therefore left out of these calculations.
Rommel was impatient with the lack of progress by Of hemming in the frontier forts from the south.21 Panzer and signalled his intention of supervising the operations of this division personally next morning, starting at 7.15 a.m. ‘Knabe is not to go on with his task15 Panzer in the morning with 3 Reconnaissance Unit from Bir el Chleta and in the afternoon Rommel sent him to Bir Sheferzen, which he reached at 9 p.m.; but Cruewell knew nothing of this.
With Rommel and Cruewell thus acting at cross purposes only confusion could result. No matter how much he exerted the force of his personality, Rommel could not create a significant fighting potential from the battered and weary remnants of 21 Panzer. At the same time Neumann-Silkow, who alone had the strength to produce effective action, had developed serious doubts about the whole scheme and was less hopeful than Cruewell of being able to maintain the frontier operations from Corps at 8.10 p.m., ‘but this will only be possible if contact is made with the Boettcher Group and Trieste Division were getting ready to stage a pursuit. Within a very short time 4 New Zealand Brigade, by seizing
If Rommel did in fact intend by the sudden move of his whole armoured forceDAK plus the Italian Mobile Corps, though Trieste did not join in as Rommel intended.
In his various statements on the subject Auchinleck gives three reasons for dismissing the Army Commander: defensive thinking due to heavy tank losses, undue concern about Rommel's dash to the frontier, and lack of confidence in his ability ‘to carry out my intentions’. Despatch, p. 339.crusader must continue, Auchinleck had achieved his purpose regarding the first and Cunningham obeyed him ‘loyally’, though there was in fact every justification for ‘defensive thinking’ by the evening of the 23rd. On the second score, both Auchinleck and Cunningham greatly under-estimated the scope and power of Rommel's move, which was on the face of it highly dangerous. On the morning of the 25th crusader was trembling on the brink; by evening the striking power of Africa Corps had declined by loss and other circumstance enough to allow Eighth Army a chance of survival and even, if Rommel failed to develop effective action quickly, a chance of victory (though the odds were still against this).
The third point was an afterthought. Auchinleck talked things over with Tedder, who was more than once critical of his Army colleagues, See, e.g., De Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 124, and Wilmot,
The Grand Alliance, p. 496.
The choice of a successor was an unfortunate one, as Auchinleck soon realised, and led in a very short time to a dangerous duality of command in which Auchinleck peered over the newcomer's shoulder and the new Army Commander, Ritchie, freshly promoted lieutenant-general, He had been Auchinleck's Deputy Chief of Staff and had never held an important command in the field. The Grand Alliance, pp. 509–11.
Ritchie's background and experience were inadequate for the task. As De Guingand says, ‘It was an incredible responsibility to throw on his shoulders’. Op. cit., p. 99. ‘Strategicus’, The news when it leaked out was astounding. ‘It didn't sound so good’, The War Moves East, p. 75.The Desert War, p. 84); ‘you don't usually change generals in the midst of a battle.’ Three Against Rommel, p. 157). ‘We argued about it until we went to sleep, and next day we drove back to Army Battle Headquarters to see what we could find out. There were rumours, but no one knew anything definite.’
The change was kept very quiet and it was several days before Godwin-Austen, Scobie, or Africa Corps had given
The area of 30 Corps by the morning of the 25th had been compressed south of the Trigh el-Abd except for Pienaar's 1 South African Brigade, which was astride it at El Esem. Norrie's current policy was to ‘reorganise his troops behind an armoured car screen thrown out to the north to protect 62 FMC on which the immediate supply of the Corps depended, and to guard his lines of communication eastwards through the Wire.’
Behind these, four Jock Columns formed up on a wide arc guarding the FMCs, each strong enough to rebuff curiosity but not to fight a pitched battle. They each consisted in the main of about two companies of infantry with field and anti-tank artillery, and were useful in the present circumstances in that they could cover a large area of ground against light enemy forces; but they needed some way of concentrating quickly under unified command against any major threat which might present itself, and no such way was provided. This was the persistent weakness of this Jock Column policy and much colourful publicity, sentimentally associated with the gallant ‘Jock’ Campbell after whom the columns were named, only served to hide it and present these columns as giant-killers, which they were not. Once the enemy concentrated, the Jock Columns could inflict scratches on him but no serious wounds. In this manner most of the remaining strength of the Support Group and much of 22 Guards Brigade was dissipated, the rest being committed in direct defence of the FMCs.
Outside this scheme there were only 1 South African Brigade and 4 Armoured Brigade, the latter with 37 tanks slowly picking its way southwards towards the FMCs.
All that had happened so far was that the artillery of Ariete and 7 Medium Regiment, RA, and 7 South African Field Regiment had exchanged fire, but little damage was done within the South African lines and there were no serious casualties. When the tanks of 4 Armoured Brigade interposed themselves between the Italians and South Africans and added the fire of 4 RHA to the current artillery duel, neither side cared seriously to challenge the other. An uneasy stalemate was thus maintained until dark. The Italian commander seems to have made just as much ado to his superiors about the fighting here as Pienaar did; but it was no part of his task to get heavily committed. Rommel badly wanted him in the frontier area and after dark that was where he headed.
Norrie was most anxious that Pienaar should stay where he was and several times questioned Brink on this point and was reassured. The messages between Brink and Pienaar, however, allowed some slight grounds for misunderstanding and in the evening Pienaar withdrew. Gatehouse opposed this move; but he had to follow in continuation of his task of protecting the South African brigade. Pienaar showed less reluctance on this occasion than on the night of the 22nd–23rd to undertake a move in the dark and reached 65 FMC in a most expeditious manner by 10.45 p.m. The ‘Battle of Taieb el-Esem’ was over and Brink was much embarrassed, expecting recriminations from Norrie, who had independent and more moderate reports of what had happened from 4 South African Armoured Car Regiment; but Norrie seemed unperturbed. His first thought was still to protect the FMCs against light enemy forces; but he had it in mind that 1 South African Brigade might be needed to help the New Zealanders and told Brink that Pienaar should be ready to move north at short notice for this purpose. Pienaar's withdrawal, however, had made it much harder for 30 Corps to help the New Zealand Division.
The presence of Ariete near Taieb el-Esem did serve a purpose, however, that was unintended and perhaps most important. Pienaar spoke of German tanks facing him and, when aerial reconnaissance reported this concentration, Eighth Army concluded, as the
Messervy then had his 7 Brigade and The Column policy also reached out towards Messervy and he was expected to form mobile columns from his 5 Bde; but he could not do so.II Battalion, 5 Panzer Regiment, but these could do little in the maze of mines and ditches. The Indians overcame one of the three remaining platoons of the original Axis garrison in an early-morning attack on the 27th, but the final mopping up of Libyan Omar had to be left until later, when ammunition became more plentiful.
The most pressing danger to 13 Corps was that the enemy would seize the huge stocks of supplies of all kinds which were dispersed over an area far too large to guard effectively at 50 FMC, south of Navy, Army, Air Force Institute/Expeditionary Force Institute—a mouthful to describe the body which organised British services canteens and provided entertainment for the forces.
There was nevertheless good reason for anxiety after the ‘Matruh Stakes’ field race through the previous evening and the panzers came
The other NZ FMC staff, ‘B’ NZ FMC under Maj F. W. Huggins, now realised that it could not open up 51 FMC as intended west of
New Zealanders also had a small part in the action of the morning outside the Omars. Major Hood of 6 RMT Company, who had halted a little to the south-east with his lorries (and Sergeant Plumtree's detachment of Divisional Petrol Company), was asked to provide twelve lorries to help move 4/11 Sikh at about 1 a.m. on the 25th. He was also told to move with that battalion to Point 203, south-west of 5 Panzer Regiment; but the new move was the parting of the ways. Hood was directed to
Supplying the New Zealand Division in its advanced position was becoming more and more difficult and this subject exercised many minds deeply. At 13 Corps Headquarters two possibilities were explored: air supply and replenishment from Though one detachment of nine lorries captured seven Germans on the way and handed them to 1 Army Tk Bde.
To attend to the needs of 5 Brigade, another composite supply company was formed, again under Captain Roberts of the Supply Column, with C Section of the Ammunition Company, B and H Sections of the Supply Column, and a few lorries of 4 RMT Company for water-carrying. There were no lorries for POL, but none were likely to be needed for some time. Roberts duly assembled his vehicles and left for 15 Panzer Division heading in the same direction and reported accordingly to Brigade Headquarters when he reached there at 5.30. He could not do much until one of the FMCs, preferably the 50th, was reported open and the route was clear. Meanwhile his lorries added greatly to the congestion at
FIFTH New Zealand Brigade had meanwhile spent two days in its blocking position outside
The time passed with little incident after this and Hargest was mainly troubled by the shortage of 25-pounder ammunition and also of long-range Mark VIIIZ ammunition for the Vickers guns, which caused splendid targets below
Be vigilant and aggressive without becoming involved in the fighting.… I want the 28th Battalion to get a patrol into
The Div. Cav. are still operating between the 23rd and 22nd. Get every MT [i.e. vehicle] in as serviceable a condition as possible so that if we are called upon to assist our Division we can move with speed.
I am sure everyone will be with me in a desire to render all the help we can.
Leckie was already conducting his operations in the spirit intended, sending out six patrols, one consisting of the whole of D Company, which clashed with ‘D'Avanca’ strongpoint. A patrol towards
It was not until 10.30 a.m. on the 25th that news came in of German mobile forces with perhaps thirty tanks in the frontier area and the battalions of 5 Brigade began to take further precautions against tank attack. Then news came in that the Indians had knocked out seven of the thirty tanks. The hesitant movement of about 200 vehicles from the top of 21 Panzer Division. In the evening 22 Battalion was ordered to send B Company to
From Corps Headquarters Hargest also wrote another of his cheerful letters to See p. 282.
Later reports, however, put the enemy armour at very much greater strength and fleeing vehicles confirmed this. Towards dusk Brigade Headquarters was startled to learn that the threat was not, as had been imagined, from enemy who had crossed the frontier and gone on to
Have a good number of guns. We will fight the position. NO one will leave his post until the signal to move is given. NO whistle signals will be given without the order of Bde Comd. Part of the B Echelon of Div Cav and the B Echelon of 34 A-Tk Bty (which was under
The night that followed was tense throughout the brigade area, with enemy flares rising and falling continually on all sides and many happenings which made nerves jumpy. A convoy of German vehicles carrying British prisoners blundered into the defences in the darkness before dawn on the 26th and was fiercely engaged for a few minutes by B Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, and the two attached anti-tank guns. A dozen Germans including a medical officer were captured, with all their vehicles, and some fifty RASC men released from captivity, one of whom had lost a foot in the brief action. The medical officer willingly and skilfully went to work at the dressing station at
Soon after first light a very large enemy movement was in progress from west and south of
At Bir el-Hariga, a few miles to the west, 13 Corps Headquarters was also in the firing line and two troops of 260 Anti-Tank Battery, RA, fought a sharp action at dawn. They claimed three tanks knocked out, one gun, and several other vehicles, at a cost of half a dozen casualties, and suffered the loss of two 2-pounder portées. Three vehicles and nine Germans were captured. For the rest of the day the enemy was plainly in view but there was no more fighting. There was every reason, however, to seek a safer place for Corps Headquarters and at 6 p.m., unbeknown to Hargest, it moved off westwards along the Trigh Capuzzo, ending up for the night at Bir el Chleta.
The new situation was somewhat bewildering to Captain
We moved south parallel to the line of the enemy column and had a great time driving up to within 2,000 yds. range, then dropping our trails and banging a few rounds into them, then hurriedly shifting out again, only to do the same thing further along. A. W. Cook.
Three such manoeuvres, however, sufficed to use up most of E Troop's ammunition, and when several Pzkw IIIs nosed out from the column Johnson's force retreated in haste. H Troop of 32 Anti-Tank Battery also engaged the enemy with its three 18-pounders, firing about twenty rounds per gun in the morning. At one stage the gunners waited as a half-tracked vehicle approached towing an anti-tank gun, intending to fire at point-blank range. Before they could do so, however, a Bofors of D Troop, 42 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, opened fire with alternate high-explosive and armourpiercing rounds and the tractor burst into flames, helped by the second round from one of the 18-pounders, which scored a direct
portées tried several times to get within range but each time were driven back by fire from heavier German guns, perhaps 75-millimetre guns of Pzkw IVs. A troop of three light tanks of Divisional Cavalry under Second-Lieutenant Farewell Campo 12, p. 12.
Hargest had at his disposal three powerful wireless sets, the Rear Link, the Air Support Control tentacle, and an
At Menastir, 28 Field Battery (less E Troop) was better supplied with ammunition than the guns at See Llewellyn, pp. 144–5.
To the gunners this was no more than a passing incident; but it had wide repercussions. The tanks were in fact exploring for the ubiquitous Captain Briel the possibility of sending supplies through to Africa Corps by the direct route from
The Maoris in their commanding positions at Upper Sollum gained a false sense of power, encouraged by a bombardment by 27 Field Battery of Lower Sollum and Pier Point in which guns of 11 Indian Brigade seemed to have joined. The Maoris entered heartily into the spirit of the thing and bombed buildings around the pier with their 3-inch mortars, while the MMG section in C Company area also fired long bursts at selected points below. Those who could look out over almost every inch of enemy territory below marvelled at the admirable precision of this fire and their admiration was scarcely diminished by the replies from the
That this might be something other than a response to the provocation offered by the New Zealand fire did not occur to the Maoris at Upper Sollum, though ten minutes earlier A Company had reported an enemy convoy coming from the direction of
At Musaid 23 and 28 Battalions under 23 Bn diary. Africa Corps was doing and the increasing evidence of enemy movement around him suggested that the garrisons of the other frontier strongpoints were trying to get through to
Soon after 4 p.m. this interpretation failed to fit the facts. There were far too many enemy in evidence and too much transport. The heavy shelling on the OP of the Maoris to the east looked ominous and became personal when part of it was switched to the neighbourhood of
The situation had got too ludicrous to worry about and everybody was quite cheerfully determined to do his best though our ultimate fate seemed to be certain. Quoted by Ross, 23 Battalion, p. 109.
At 4.45 p.m. the
The appearance of a unified operation against inside the defences of Omar Nuovo and possibly Libyan Omar. The urgent need of both panzer divisions to get ammunition, petrol and other supplies before they could exert their full strength, however, made no impression, and Rommel was unaware that both Neumann-Silkow and von Ravenstein looked to the
A further complication was that when he called at Cruewell's small headquarters Rommel learned for the first time of Westphal's pleas for help on the Africa Corps diary sets out Rommel's orders as follows:
The most urgent job is to clear the
Then it registers Cruewell's strong dissent.
Cruewell was half-convinced that the supposed ‘enemy’ was mythical, and in the afternoon he began to realise that the New Zealand Division was not north of the frontier line but facing Boettcher Group outside 21 Panzer (though he did not in fact meet von Ravenstein until next morning). In his absence Cruewell could not abandon the frontier operations and went ahead with them as best he could, trying at the same time to get together the force destined for Jarabub. Part of Knabe Group had reached Corps Battle Headquarters for this latter purpose by 12.10 p.m.; but 15 Panzer had so far sent none of its quota for the Jarabub force and Cruewell well knew that Neumann-Silkow, a strong-willed and at times ‘difficult’ subordinate, was unlikely to send it. To add to his worries, Cruewell found his small group at Gasr el Abid the subject of attention from British guns to the south and then under attack from what looked like ten tanks, which overran a troop of light German field guns guarding the southern flank and was held off from Battle Headquarters only by the arrival of an anti-tank gun from Knabe Group, which covered a hurried withdrawal of Headquarters northwards to join Knabe. This started at 4.30 p.m. and by 6 p.m. Headquarters was out of danger.
The British mobile troops in the area nevertheless remained bothersome and engaged most of the attention of the vestigial remains of 5 Panzer Regiment—now ten tanks in working order—and of 3 Reconnaissance Unit this day, to the detriment of the task again given by Rommel to Major Mildebrath of attacking the 21 Panzer, with only two small battle groups of infantry and MMGs with supporting artillery, was facing north on a wide front with its right flank on
Neumann-Silkow, who alone had the strength to achieve any real success, was left to his own resources on the 26th. Messages he sent Cruewell's headquarters gave the impression that he was making progress against heavy opposition, but he did no real fighting at all until a late hour, and even then only on a small scale and without conviction. His attitude at this stage is indeed something of a puzzle. Kriebel, who was his GSO I, gives a startling account of the way Neumann-Silkow's mind was working. He points out that it was by no means certain that A signal to Ariete, and order supplies from Ariete to relieve the situation on the 21 Pz Div at 7 a.m. says that 15 Pz Div was advancing to link with Ariete to ‘smash the enemy at Gabr Saleh’.15 Pz Div diary; D AK diary includes
The continued supply difficulties and the lack of ammunition, water and food compelled the division to move to
The order from Kriebel.Corps seems to have decided Neumann-Silkow against going to Gabr Saleh and he chose instead to ‘push on to 15 Panzer signalled Corps as follows:
Enemy SW of
Will continue our attack after filling up with petrol.
Ariete is 13 km NW of
The garrison of Corps envisaged—‘to draw the division off to attack Ariete, however, was closing on D AK diary.21 Panzer.
This seemed to 15 Panzer a simple task. ‘The only thing known of the enemy’, the divisional diary says, ‘was that he was occupying I Battalion of 115 Infantry Regiment was committed to drive from I Battalion started its advance, covered by fire from 33 Artillery Regiment.
By this plan 21 Panzer was supposed to wait south-west of 115 Regiment broke through and joined hands; but Ravenstein either misunderstood or had other ideas and ordered both of his battle groups to break through to 104 Infantry Regiment on the right between of 8 MG Battalion on the left at 23 Battalion was thus presented with a threat from both panzer divisions, which it naturally took to be two prongs of a single attack to take
The attack by 15 Panzer was the lighter and came against A Company of the 23rd under Captain
But 8 Platoon had more on its hands than Connolly thought. It faced what looked like a full battalion in extended order and halted it for a noisy hour and half until the smoke and dust folded into the night and the desert came alive with flares and flashes. It was this furious fire which made the mortars too hot to handle, and after dark 8 Platoon attracted troublesome crossfire from MGs which had worked round to about 20 yards behind Brittenden's forward posts. Then Brittenden received Connolly's order to withdraw and sent a runner to pass it on. Allowing time for the sections to fall back and seeing no sign of them in the blackness, Brittenden took his small headquarters back towards
The runner had not got through and in Brittenden's absence Sergeant push him back. Pending further instructions he decided on quick action to remedy increasing pressure on the left. Drawing the whole platoon up parallel to the road and facing west, he did a ‘parade-ground job’ of fixing bayonets and leading 8 Platoon with the utmost gallantry into the teeth of the opposition.
The resistance of his small band had already made a deep impression on the enemy, to the point that 15 Infantry Brigade had ordered the other battalion of 115 Regiment to attack on the left of I Battalion and east of the road. I Battalion,
115 Regiment confirms:
the enemy had apparently brought up reinforcements … and was counter-attacking to try to regain his positions where 1 Company had broken in. Under cover of darkness the enemy came right up to our positions, and bitter fighting with bayonets and hand grenades developed. In one spot the enemy even broke through our positions. The two light infantry guns of 5 Coy (2/Lt Lange) forced the counter-attack to halt only 50 meters from their positions. Those of the enemy who were not killed or wounded surrendered.
Minson carried on until hit in the thigh and forced to hand over to Lance-Corporal O'Connell, L-Cpl M. G. O'Connell; Oxford; born Rangiora,
The fortunes of 8 Platoon, however, were forgotten and its achievement unnoticed in a night of violent activity, most of which concerned not the ill-starred attack by 115 Regiment but the efforts of 21 Panzer to break through to 21 Panzer and the 33 Artillery Regiment in support of 115 Regiment.
The enemy column to the south divided into three, and one came straight at
Leading the direct approach to portées, which were quickly brought on the scene. The guns were ‘stopped’ and also two light tanks which drove boldly along the road towards portées, which engaged them on the flank at 1000 yards' range and scored more hits while the light was strong enough to take aim. At dusk the portées moved back inside the defences of the Customs House.
Captain Romans made his way to
The fighting for perhaps half an hour was very confused; but by the time it was properly dark the enemy seemed to have had enough. Vehicles were driving through the gap to the east, beyond the reach of Royal's company, four or five abreast and this movement continued for an hour, during which the defences were re-established and strengthened. Then the tail of the large enemy column, apparently unaware of what had gone before, rushed straight at Royal's defences, overrunning the outlying posts—the shallowest of
Just before 9 p.m. the 2-pounders had a final clash with a half-tracked vehicle which could barely be discerned in the dark and which they knocked out. Romans's mortars engaged enemy MGs which fired at E Troop's gun flashes and hit a small anti-tank gun and caused its crew to abandon it.
The morning revealed clearly the vigour of the defence, particularly in front of the Maoris, where seventy-six German dead were counted and seven prisoners, most of them wounded, were taken. Two Maoris had been killed and four wounded and two were missing. There was also an impressive array of equipment left behind by the enemy, including two half-tracked 20-millimetre gun carriers, eight cars and trucks, and one ambulance car, as well as the anti-tank gun which fired the last rounds of the action. To the north of
This was in fact what 115 Infantry Regiment had thought after Brittenden's platoon was overwhelmed and opposition seemed to have ceased, the Germans not realising that they were still some distance short of the main II Battalion east of the 15 Brigade, this was confirmed as correct and he had to obey it. Thus 23 Battalion was saved from very much heavier fighting than anything yet experienced here; and the saviour was none other than General Rommel himself, who had reached 15 Motor Cycle Battalion, which Menny had committed after 115 Regiment began fighting. Its task was the second part of that given to 115 Regiment: to
21 Panzer. On the way the battalion met 8 MG Battalion entering the southern defences of 21 Panzer, thereby discharging its main task and leaving the Maoris around 115 Regiment reluctantly withdrew, reaching its starting line by 12.30 a.m. and leaving a small rearguard in position for an hour or so.
Similar misunderstandings clouded Ravenstein's view of these events and the divisional report appended to the Africa Corps diary says that
Ravenstein expected to find the Indian Div closely investing the frontier strongpoints and mistook the Maoris for them.
Whatever happened, Africa Corps had to return to the
Rommel's habit of arriving in person and handing out orders on the spot to whoever appeared to be in charge often led to confusion; but usually the headquarters of Panzer Group and Africa Corps were able to reconcile the contradictions. The trouble in this case was that the headquarters scarcely existed and could exercise little or no control. At
Kriebel says Neumann-Silkow objected that such an operation would take up valuable time, would have little chance of success against widely dispersed British forces, and would entail heavy loss, as well as delaying the return to 21 Panzer was no longer strong enough to achieve any worth-while purpose in the frontier area and agreed that it should make for
Even Rommel's renowned personality failed to inspire confidence in these orders and Neumann-Silkow had no intention of embarking on another excursion along the frontier line, reversing the procedure of 25 November. Instead he ordered 15 Panzer to edge out from its present laagers towards
Westphal's confidence in the evening of the 25th that Boettcher had overcome the threat which faced him had long since been shattered and the Italian forces besieging Africa Corps at 9.25 a.m. Expecting his earlier appeals to have borne fruit, he looked for a panzer division to appear on the scene at any moment. When
THE signals from Africa Corps reached the neighbourhood and made no sense in the present circumstances. Only two aircraft remained on the landing ground, with orders to reconnoitre locally for as long as possible and then fly off; so the airfield was unimportant, especially after 13 Corps Headquarters moved westwards. Hargest had asked Corps on the 25th to relieve him of this commitment, but Corps refused.
How much was left to Hargest's discretion cannot now be decided. Few documents of the period survive and the main sources are the recollections of those who spent years together as prisoners of war. In his book Hargest is gloomy; Op. cit., p. 17.
About 1 a.m. on the 27th a detachment of Divisional Ammunition Company reached Shared by the Q staff of 13 Corps.
Brigade Headquarters and attached troops HQ Div Cav and two squadrons, HQ 5 Fd Regt and one troop (4 guns), HQ 32 A-Tk Bty and troop (3 18-pdrs), two half-troops of 34 A-Tk Bty (4 2-pdrs), HQ 42 Lt AA Bty and one section (3 Bofors), HQ F. G. Nixon.
Two platoons of B Company, 22 Battalion, had dug in on the western side of the perimeter in defence of E Troop, 5 Field Regiment, and the third platoon was in the south-east, covering one of the anti-tank 18-pounders. The Defence Platoon also faced west along the Trigh Capuzzo with another 18-pounder. The third
en portée within the perimeter, able to move as required but dangerously conspicuous in this flat desert.
These dispositions gave much more strength in the west than in the east and the mass of lorries in the area obscured observation so that the 25-pounders could not engage tanks by direct fire except to the west. Only one 18-pounder, one Bofors, and the four vulnerable portée 2-pounders covered the eastern perimeter, now the likeliest to be attacked. The group could therefore use no more than a fraction of its resources, small as these were, to meet attack from the east and no infantry faced that direction.
It appeared to Africa Corps that this small force meant ‘to prevent us from moving west’;
DAK diary.
The situation from the point of view of 15 Panzer was complicated by a tug-o'-war between Rommel and the Panzer Group staff at Panzer Group told him to ‘move immediately to relieve the 15 Panzer reported in this sense to Corps.
The fate of 5 Brigade Headquarters was thus decided almost by chance, since Neumann-Silkow was more likely to by-pass it if he acted on Westphal's instructions. But no formal orders were issued and the assault which actually took place was the result of co-operation on the spot by unit commanders and their subordinates, used to working together on the battlefield and able to improvise tactics as the situation demanded. When 15 Panzer began to move two hours before dawn it meant to gain a starting line along the
21 Panzer towards the
Shaking out from this mix-up, the head of The German accounts agree that the British opened fire first; but E Troop did not and the fire must have come from elswhere.15 Panzer came close to 8 Panzer Regiment to send his light tank troops forward. By degrees the whole of the regiment became involved and, as a matter of course, 33 Artillery Regiment too. A heavy concentration of guns of calibres up to 150-millimetre ranged on Hargest's sketchy defences and then brought down a crushing weight of fire from distances of no more than 2–3 miles. ‘Air bursts’ kept the heads of the defenders down, and with good observation and short-range fire the New Zealand field guns were soon silenced, so that Abteilung of
Slightly stronger than a British battery.
IIThere was no sign of enemy when the men of 5 Brigade Headquarters began to prepare breakfast, and fears of attack engendered by the previous day's experiences and the flares at night were allayed. The IO, Captain
Captain Johnson of B Company, 22 Battalion, reacted quickly, sending one of his two platoons to the eastern perimeter to be ready to repel infantry'; As Sandford overheard. They were still under Nicoll's command. 2 Lt A. W. Cook; portées, who had of their own accord elected to stay and fight when Divisional Cavalry departed,
With some forty tanks approaching and no vestige of cover for their high His leg was carried off by a solid anti-tank shot, the modern equivalent of a cannon ball. Op. cit. p. 20. Niven, through volunteering for medical duties when captive in portées, the anti-tank gunners saw no point in holding their fire and P4 opened up at about 1200 yards, quickly followed by the other three. The German tanks began to reply when still more than 1000 yards away, concentrating their machine guns and larger armament on the four portées and scoring direct hits on all of them. The gunners also scored hits, but the ranges were long and the tanks so numerous that the results could only be guessed. Knowing full well the odds were hopeless, the gunners nevertheless carried out their drill in parade-ground order and the No. 1 of P4, Bombardier portée back into action from a position roughly level with Hargest's trench. Hargest watched in wonder and admiration as Niven, single-handed, engaged the tanks, now much closer, with deliberate fire. He saw him, ‘load, aim, fire—load, aim, fire, time after time’, attracting an arc of German tank guns towards N4 as though it were magnetised. The portée was hit on the side and set on fire, then again behind the gun, and a third round ‘struck the shield and shot the muzzle straight upwards where it remained pointing to the sky’, Hargest writes. ‘Niven slid from the truck and disappeared unhurt.’
The nearest 18-pounder of H Troop, 32 Battery, opened fire at 1000 yards i.e., when the tanks were within about 700 yards of the anti-tank portées and all but N4 were out of action.
The platoon of B Company of the 22nd had to make its way through the acrid smoke of blazing lorries and bursting shells, with bullets fluffing up the sand around the men's feet, but they did not falter. Hargest saw them as they ‘moved steadily, not hurrying, indifferent to the ruin blazing around them’ until they drew nearly level with the line of portées and dropped down to await the German infantry. They saw none, but fired into the mass of transport ahead, and when they saw tanks coming they got their ‘sticky bombs’ ready. Behind them, according to Straker, ‘cooks, clerks, batmen and, worthy of mention, the
The 25-pounders of E Troop were soon hidden behind the smoke and for this reason lasted longer than the other guns, though in the end they received the undivided attention of the German artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel
The ammunition lorry was hit as soon as it halted and burst into flames and the ammunition began to explode. No more than two or three rounds remained at the gun and the explosions alongside were so violent that Grigg ordered the crew to take cover. But he took no heed of the fire himself and went over to the one gun which could still fire and found this, too, nearing the end of its ammunition. Scouting round, he soon found a few more rounds and brought them up. In the whole position only this one gun now flashed its defiance and, with crew members hit by the fire aimed at this solitary centre of opposition, Grigg took over as gun loader. Dust and smoke made the gun sights useless and Grigg slipped out to the side where he could see—and be seen. There he stood calmly directing the layer, undaunted by the blazing fury of fire which each round attracted as the tanks picked up the gun flash through the smoke, until he fell gravely wounded and E Troop's last gun ceased fire.
The tanks were already deep among the lorries, the infantry powerless to stop them, though they flung three ‘sticky bombs’ at them before they surrendered. Private
Hargest had been much concerned about what seemed to be a nest of German machine guns to one flank and ran round the partly destroyed Intelligence lorry to see Straker and find out if there was any way of counter-attacking them. Straker answered without words by pointing to tanks closing in less than a hundred yards away, ‘stretched across the camp with the extremities thrust forward like the horns of a crescent’. The tanks were not firing but Straker could see grenades being tossed out from some of them on the left, bursting to his left rear. An
This turned out to be
The best estimate of casulaties in this action is that 44 men were killed and 49 wounded, most of them gunners, while about 46 officers and 650 other ranks were captured and marched off to
The dressing station at
At Menastir 22 Battalion plainly saw the smoke at
But the enemy fared no better. All four 2-pounders and two of the three Bofors fired from the rim of the escarpment at ranges up to 3000 yards and with the MMGs they exploded the ammunition beside a German mortar, destroyed a staff car and several other vehicles, and gave the enemy much trouble. The best efforts of the
F Tp, 32 Bty, had previously engaged two tanks advancing from the west and knocked one out. It proved to be a captured Matilda, and over fifty direct hits were scored on it at ranges between 300 and 900 yards before a lucky shot passed through an aperture in the turret (where the grenade thrower had been knocked off) and wounded the crew. Another shot had jammed the turret and a third had removed a plate guarding the suspension, permitting a fourth to penetrate and damage the engine. The toughness of the armour was amply proved. The crew was captured and the other tank disappeared westwards. Again this affected the enemy's supply services. These tanks led a convoy of 33 lorries intended for Africa Corps; but, though there were three more tanks in the escort, they all turned back to
Casualties in 22 Battalion were remarkably light considering the weight and accuracy of the enemy fire; but
21 Panzer Division and in the end forced General von Ravenstein to draw back and swing south through
At Capuzzo and Upper Sollum, 23 and 28 Battalions started the day in good spirits, seeing for themselves the losses and damage they had caused the enemy in the night's fighting and not learning until much later that their brigade headquarters had been lost. A Company of 23 Battalion turned back fourteen lorries approaching from
Then at midday 105- and 150-millimetre guns shelled D Company and the fort itself and two hours later enemy were seen advancing from the south-west, estimated at 2.30 p.m. as about a battalion with light tanks, anti-tank guns, and armoured troop-carriers—a formidable force which 27 Field Battery engaged at once. The 25-pounders were extremely accurate and forced the enemy to dismount soon after they opened fire. They scored several direct hits and so did G Troop, 32 Anti-Tank Battery, the foremost 22portée of which, under Sergeant
C Company of the 23rd had been drawn into this action as the enemy veered northwards to avoid the well-aimed fire of D Company and, as the enemy worked in that direction, he came within range of a Bofors of E Troop, 42 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, about 300 yards west of Battalion Headquarters. This set fire to a troop-carrier which was driving through the transport area of 23 and 28 Battalions, but it could not stop infiltration by the enemy infantry through the mass of lorries which here formed a weak part of the battalion perimeter. The drivers of 309 General Transport Company, RASC, and men of 28 Maori Battalion B Echelon formed a makeshift ‘company’, but this was only lightly armed and some sixty men were captured by three light tanks and an armoured troop-carrier and marched off a short distance. They remained within view of 23 Battalion, however, and several efforts were made to rescue them.
The Bofors continued to fire and earned so much of the enemy's attention that the troop subaltern decided to ease the pressure by bringing up another gun. This drove forward until the driver was killed and then went into action and knocked out an enemy tank, silenced a machine gun, and drove back several clusters of infantry with its automatic fire. When four of the crew of this second gun had been killed and two wounded it was ordered to withdraw, its task achieved.
By about 4 p.m. the enemy had exploited the weakness in the transport area and counter-measures were restricted by the presence in the background of the sixty captive drivers and B Echelon men. A dashing sortie by six carriers of the 23rd got right up to this group about 1000 yards west of the transport area; but the captives were closely threatened by the MGs of their guards and could not get away, two of the carriers were disabled, and the remaining four had to withdraw. A counter-attack offered the only possibility of releasing these men, the bayonet being a more discriminating weapon than the machine gun or mortar. This responsibility fell on the adjutant, Captain
All these detachments had to advance in face of all kinds of fire and some of them were extremely embarrassed by their inability to give effective reply because of the prisoners in the background. The thrusts nevertheless made ground in the most determined fashion. Jeavons, for example, led his small band through a clamorous bedlam of sound ‘with shells, mortar bombs, bullets and shrapnel whizzing, whining, screaming and crackling everywhere’ until halted by a German anti-tank gun on the far side of a stretch of flat, open ground well covered by fire. ‘We could not stop them by firing from cover’, he says, ‘and if they came on we were sunk’. So he gathered his handful of men and rose to charge the gun. After fifty yards he was hit and his shoulder broken, but he carried on. Then two men were killed and shortly afterwards Jeavons was hit again, and after another fifty yards or so he was hit a third time, his helmet carried some yards away, and he was brought to his knees. He got up and, after a few more yards, was hit heavily in the chest, and though he rose again he could do no more than stagger a few paces and fall flat on his face. Ross, pp. 115–17.
Major Pugh Maj T. J. G. Pugh, ED; H. McG. Farrow.
The captive drivers must have been moved back at this stage and, once they were far enough away, mortars and machine guns could be used freely and the situation at once eased. The mortars got away more than 300 bombs and had much to do with this lessening of enemy pressure. But some enemy had got through to the buildings of the fort itself—no key point of the defence, but in enemy hands a considerable embarrassment. So 16 Platoon of D Company was detailed to deal with this infiltration. It came unexpectedly upon two anti-tank guns and an MG nest and these were ‘completely wiped out’. Ross, loc. cit.
The enemy gradually withdrew to the south-west, covering his move with fire in a manner which made pursuit costly and in the end discouraged it altogether. Though the enemy had driven a deep wedge into the
It is all the more remarkable that the Germans were not regular infantry but 33 Panzer Engineer Battalion, which was committed by Rommel personally to ‘clear the area south of the Trigh Capuzzo between 33 Artillery Regiment and two platoons of 33 Anti-Tank Battalion were under the engineers' command, and support was probably also forthcoming from the
This was the situation when 27 Field Battery opened fire and forced the Germans to dismount, some of their lorries already blazing from direct hits. The open terrain and hidden defences to the south and west of Report of 33 A-Tk Bn appended to 15 Pz Div diary.
Even this brave effort did not please Rommel and about 2.45 p.m. he sent orders by an LO to the commander of 33 Engineer Battalion to abandon the attack and disengage at once if 15 Panzer westwards, and after dark they did so, first collecting forty wounded from the battlefield—a task in which the aid of the prisoners was enlisted—and taking them to
The casualties are listed in the report of 33 Panzer Engineer Battalion as follows:
*Probably 2 killed and 2 wounded.
†Most of the missing men were probably killed or wounded and PW during the enemy counter-attacks.
To these must be added the losses of the anti-tank platoons, which are not stated in detail but which must have been heavy. At least two officers and about a dozen other ranks must have been killed,
This report ties in remarkably well with 23 Bn accounts and even mentions the destruction of Stewart's 15 Panzer diary.portée.
This action had nevertheless demonstrated serious weaknesses in the
Leckie still had no news of Brigade Headquarters and now had particular reason to establish contact. The afternoon's fighting had yielded some documents which seemed to be of the first importance and he was anxious to get them to Corps or Army Headquarters. Leckie therefore signalled on various frequencies throughout the night as follows: ‘New Zealanders holding out at
At Upper Sollum 27 November passed with no more than the normal exchanges of artillery fire and the capture of two Germans who had had the nerve to go swimming on the beach just below the cliff, and a 75-millimetre gun was hauled up and put to use in the area of A Company. As sounds of fighting at
With the departure of 15 Panzer from Africa Corps ended a three-day respite in which only a few units did any hard fighting.
5 Pz Regt at the Omars, I/115 Inf Regt and 33 Pz Engr Bn at 21 Pz Div briefly at 15 Pz Div at Schuette Gp of 21 Pz Div at
Rommel nevertheless signalled confidently to Corps at 10 a.m. that the British ‘at 21 Panzer had been strong enough on the 22nd to recapture
When Hence the order to 8 Panzer Regiment set out from 33 Reconnaissance Unit, part only of the divisional artillery, and elements of 200 Regiment with some anti-tank guns. In the late afternoon 115 Infantry Regiment followed, and after dark the battered 33 Engineer Battalion with its one remaining anti-tank gun. Cruewell stayed behind to tidy up and while so doing began to worry about opposition
21 Pz Div, rescinded at 2.25 p.m., to travel by the Schuette Group to disengage at 15 Panzer should move south of the Trigh Capuzzo after passing Gasr el Arid so as to avoid having to mount the escarpment at Bir el Chleta, perhaps against opposition. But here also he was too late: Neumann-Silkow had already allowed himself to get trapped by the lie of the land and by a British armoured force which for once took advantage of it.
FORCE ‘E’ of the Oases Group had meanwhile captured Aujila on the 22nd, Jikheira (a dozen miles north of Jalo Oasis) on the 23rd, and Jalo itself on the 24th, after enormous exertions to get through long stretches of soft, sandy going on the fringe of the Libyan Sand Sea and patches of ground so rough that it made a mockery of the
The British, South African and Indian troops concerned had achieved much with small forces hampered by truly formidable obstacles of terrain; but they could do no more. Together with Panzer Group Africa on the main battlefield, where the whole group might have been employed with greater profit.
On the map See Panzer Group had fallen back along the coast road and it was too late to interrupt its supply lines.
Ritchie was by nature cheerful and readily accepted Auchinleck's view that Rommel's dash to the frontier was a last desperate gamble. Intercepted signals passing between Westphal and Rommel and Cruewell on the 27th confirmed his ‘suspicions, which were already tantamount to certainty, that the enemy situation was critical’. Eighth Army Report, now written in the first person. Africa Corps interposed itself between the two.
In 30 Corps similar sanguine counsels prevailed. The first thought was not to oppose the enemy armour which had yet to be defeated, but to attack the positional troops facing the New Zealand Division and their defensive wing stretching south to Bir el-Gubi. Norrie meant to ‘assist the 13 Corps attack by threatening the enemy's flank and rear’; Norrie, ‘Narrative of Events’.
In front of the Columns were the armoured-car units, and early in the morning of the 27th patrols of these watched 13 Corps Headquarters move westwards along the Trigh Capuzzo, followed
Africa Corps. But the Columns could not do much because
Attested by the DAK diary and by the Italian Daily Report to Rome.
The main enemy tank force reached Bir el Chleta at noon, thwarting Gott's scheme for his two armoured brigades to meet just west of Gasr el Arid. As late as 1 p.m. 4 Armoured Brigade was still at Bir Berraneb, 20 miles away; but it raced northwards and in little over two hours was bearing down on the left rear of the enemy at El Chleta. C Battery, 4 RHA, meanwhile brought down telling fire and the Africa Corps Headquarters. By 3 p.m. 22 Armoured Brigade was under strong pressure but fighting back fiercely and the 4th was causing confusion in the German rear echelons. The diary of
Diary of 33 Arty Regt.
Only desperate defensive efforts beat off some of the British thrusts and tanks which came forward from the repair depot near 15 Panzer might very well have faced disaster. For the first time in crusader the British tank losses were not disproportionate to those of the Germans—about 14 tanks to at least 13 German tanks and possibly as many as 26. Gott felt that he had delivered a heavy blow against an enemy who was trying to escape and Norrie heard from Army at 6.45 p.m. that it was ‘of the utmost importance to prevent the enemy escaping westwards, south of the
In what General Norrie describes in his narrative as a ‘fierce and bloody action’ the enemy were ‘finally routed and dispersed in all directions, mostly going NORTH and a few escaping to the WEST’. By the doctrine of the ‘keep mobile’ school, the British tanks like the cavalry of old withdrew from the battlefield at dusk to attend to their domestic needs, and the night laagers of the two armoured brigades selected in this case were five miles to the south. Scarcely believing their eyes, the Germans watched them go and then pushed up the escarpment after dark and carried on six miles or so westwards before settling down for the night in positions they had almost ceased to hope they would reach. It was almost beyond belief that the British would freely yield the ground for which 15 Panzer had fought bitterly but to no avail throughout the afternoon. The way was now open for a counter-offensive against the
General Ritchie had meanwhile ordered Norrie to send 1 South African Brigade to join 13 Corps and help the New Zealand Division on 28 November, which is what Norrie in any case meant to do. But Pienaar was a good 60 miles from
Reports of the afternoon's tank action reached the New Zealand Division a few miles to the west by various means and the sound of the guns could clearly be heard at Divisional Headquarters. For
It was urgently necessary for
Godwin-Austen had signalled to Scobie, Africa Division and was far beyond Scobie's present powers. He was able from various sources to chart the return of the German armour from the frontier and, because of this, he substituted for the thrust to
The Ed Duda position was rocked all day by a heavy bombardment, much of it from medium or heavy guns beyond the reach of 1 RHA, a scene vividly recalled by
We divided our time … between cowering in the bottoms of our very inadequate holes, eating, and digging. A little more than a foot down you hit rock.… We were shelled with everything from small-bore high-velocity guns to nine-inch howitzers. Quite a few of the nine-inch shells
Quoted by Martin, p. 634.
The companies of 19 Battalion, about a mile north and north-east of 1 Essex, were also shelled heavily at times, though not nearly so persistently. To the immediate north, some of the
This was only a small part of the total haul, however. Patrols of 4 Royal Tanks and C Squadron KDG took 1000 prisoners between the By-pass road and
By newly-connected telephone in the morning of the 27th, GOC's diary.
The position of the Division nevertheless seemed strong and the GOC wanted 5 Brigade ‘for our future moves’. The attitude was anything but defensive, as
In this optimistic atmosphere Godwin-Austen was a welcome visitor to lunch. In the course of this
At a lower level the situation looked rather different. The guns of 4 Brigade were mainly in the wadi between
A lull in enemy fire soon after 9 a.m. coincided with a curious incident when two Germans advanced with what passed for a white flag to rescue a wounded German officer south of
Captain Agar, who then commanded 20 Battalion, had already been warned that he would have to attack this pocket and Letter,
A firm order that the attack must start at 11 a.m. reached Agar about 10.40 a.m. and from then onwards it was a mad rush to get ready. In an awkward conference in full view of the enemy, he quickly briefed the two company commanders concerned, Lieutenant 23
Under these circumstances Agar's and Quilter's worst fears were soon realised. Within 200–300 yards of the start the attack became a matter of short dashes, and lengthening pauses, until progress was barred altogether by deadly and sustained MG and mortar fire. Many men did not realise the hopelessness of their plight until they were hit and perceived for the first time how few men remained unwounded.
After about 1000 yards I realised something was wrong. It seemed plain that we could never hope to take the position over open country without very considerable support.… the enemy certainly seemed to be overdoing his ‘gesture’ before surrendering. Finally the uncomfortable realisation came that there was no intention of the enemy to surrender.
Wilson himself was wounded and the advance was finally checked when the nearest posts were still some 300–400 yards away and the main defences some distance farther. McPhail sent back a total of three runners, including his CSM, to ask for artillery support, and Agar and Quilter who watched from
From a distance of
Agar was out of touch with both his companies after about 1 p.m., when R/T failed, and he told Bassett about 2 p.m. that, since no more artillery support could be given, there was nothing more he could do either to resume the advance or extricate the survivors. In the end it was decided that 44 Royal Tanks must overcome the enemy, but it proved impossible to get the I tanks back from Ed Duda in time to revive the attack.
A wounded man J. A. Macpherson.
Quilter and Grooby decided on a bearing on which this detachment should march and at dusk Grooby led it forward. Enemy fire was scarcely diminished, the defences being thoroughly aroused and fearful of a resumption of the attack after dark. But MG fire on fixed lines was plainly evident and could be avoided. By circling round to dodge these streams of tracer bullets, however, Grooby lost his direction and passed through or round the enemy positions to the escarpment beyond. He could hear the enemy talking and moving about uncomfortably close but managed to make his way back without a clash, and it seemed to him that the enemy was as anxious as he to avoid a fight. A Company and the able-bodied survivors of the other two companies meanwhile worked into the early hours of next morning bringing in wounded. In 11 Platoon, Sergeant
B Company now numbered 32 and D Company 28. The attack cost 21 killed and 76 wounded, 14 of whom succumbed to their wounds. The high proportion of dead to wounded may be explained by the multiple nature of many of the wounds As disclosed by the Admission and Discharge Book of 4 Fd Amb.
The composite squadron of 44 Royal Tanks reached Brigade Headquarters from Ed Duda in the evening and Major Gibbon was asked by
In the course of the afternoon Ibid.
A firm junction and free exchange of information between the New Zealand Division and 70 Division were urgently needed before the German armour could intervene. Over-estimating the time available, GOC's diary.
Elsewhere in 4 Brigade the day was uneventful—if any day which provided such a jarring and persistent chorus of explosions could be so described. The eastern flank was consolidated under the command of a South African, Major Cochran, who had been acting CO of 1 South African Irish on The rest of which constructed and manned a cage for the prisoners the Div now held, on the escarpment alongside the MDS which had been set up near Esc-Sciomar.Totensonntag and had brought into the divisional area a mixed group of over 100 South Africans, all anxious to continue the fight. This was joined by other South Africans who had arrived independently (including Cochran's brother) and formed a composite company.
Patrols went out from 18 Battalion during the night towards the enemy position which Duff, report.
In 6 Brigade, Major Mantell-Harding of 24 Battalion replaced Major Walden in command of 26 Battalion, and one or the other of them ordered another attack in the afternoon on the enemy strongpoint still holding out on the escarpment east of the main position. This was another hasty action mounted without much knowledge of the enemy and it also failed.
The diary of 21 Bn gives the strength this day of 456, but this includes a guess (undoubtedly high) of the strength of A Coy, still with 24 Bn. The strength of 25 Bn next day was 318, made up as follows:
The experienced riflemen in each unit were barely enough for a normal rifle company.
but there were many complications, and without the benefit of Allen's leadership these were magnified.In the evening 6 Field Regiment shelled the neighbourhood of the strongpoint and Barrowclough ordered it to be patrolled after dark to find out if the enemy was still in occupation. He also proposed to relieve 24 and 26 Battalions in two phases with the amalgamated 21 and 25 Battalions; but he was shortly to learn that ‘front’ and ‘rear’ were no more than conventional figures of speech in this unpredictable battle, and there was no way of bringing relief from the pressure to which all would soon be subjected.
Though Barrowclough still believed he was covered in the east and south by British tank forces, 15 Panzer Division.
For the harassed supply services of the New Zealand Division this was the climax to a day of vexation in which the only bright moment was when
Rear Division moved north to join
THE panzers which scattered the NZASC companies were not, as Eighth Army and 30 Corps supposed, trying to get away. They meant to ‘clear up the situation south-east of DAK diary.Africa Division to attack the New Zealand Division from the north. Cruewell pointed out how difficult Neumann-Silkow had found it to make progress up an escarpment that was strongly held and was emphatic that the counter-attack should come from the south, descending the successive escarpments and driving the British back to the original perimeter of
Rommel was well aware of the tactical disadvantage of attacking uphill rather than down; but he could see no other way of cutting off the troops in the Corridor. To drive them into
Cruewell at once took steps to ensure that 15 Panzer was put into a position from which Rommel's scheme could not be carried out. He told General Neumann-Silkow to take up an all-round defensive position on and above the escarpment and next day expand it to gain a favourable jumping-off place for an attack later that day. Early on the 28th, however, he heard from Westphal that strong British armoured and infantry forces had reassembled in the desert to the south in the past day or two and these menaced the southern flank of Africa Corps seriously enough to require a much stronger flank guard than Cruewell intended to deploy, thereby weakening the counter-attack. He therefore decided that
In line with other divisions in
On the 28th, events took a turn which was ominous for the New Zealand Division. Attacks by the British armour towards Bir Sciafsciuf were easily beaten back by 15 Infantry Brigade without help from the German tanks (which were stranded without petrol). Then, when the latter, after refuelling, resumed the advance west-wards at 2 p.m., they covered five or six miles before being halted by shellfire and a wide screen of British tanks from south-west to south. The rear of the New Zealand Division and 13 Corps
15 Panzer swung more and more to the south to deal with these, though Neumann-Silkow's 45 tanks had no trouble in pushing the 100-odd tanks of the two armoured brigades back southwards.
Brigadier Pienaar's brigade, moving northwards to join the New Zealand Division, reached Hagfet en-Nadura in the afternoon, less than 15 miles from Point 175; but it could go no farther unless the British armour opened the route. Thus a tug-o'-war began between the New Zealanders and South Africans for the services of the armoured brigades as protectors against German tanks. At 1.30 p.m. General Gott ordered both armoured brigades to assemble five miles south of the southern escarpment and eight miles from
Though p. 210.15 Panzer was under orders from 15 Panzer diary bemoans this because it robbed the German gunners of the tempting targets they had located astride the Trigh Capuzzo and which they were anxious to engage.
To 30 Corps in the south it looked as though the Germans were on Point 175, which had been suggested as a rendezvous for the South African brigade, and more enemy were seen on the southern escarpment. There was no apparent way of getting through to the New Zealand Division, though Norrie noted in his narrative that he thought ‘it might have been possible for determined troops to have infiltrated through by moonlight’.
At New Zealand Divisional Headquarters eyes were turned westwards rather than eastwards through most of the day and the many vague reports of what the German armour was doing attracted little attention. GOC's diary.
The thrust from Ed Duda was a product of the poor communications between the two divisions. The object was to gain firm contact between the troops at Ed Duda and 6 Brigade, which was presumed to be at 19 Bn diary.
When the two companies got back they were told to take over positions just vacated by the other two companies of the battalion. B Squadron of 4 Royal Tanks (with ten Matildas) was despatched with the other two companies under Hartnell on an urgent mission to occupy the northern escarpment of the
The move attracted very little attention, the Matildas moving a short way ahead of the infantry on a frontage of 600 yards, and it was not until the escarpment loomed up on the right that any opposition was met, a brief gesture by machine guns which the tanks soon discouraged. Some 50 Italians and 12 Germans who were ‘occupying tents and caves in the slopes of the escarpment’ came down and surrendered and Hartnell settled down, unknown to
The 32nd Army Tank Brigade made a move in the afternoon of the 28th from Bir Belhamed against the strongpoint known as ‘Freddie’ (east of Tiger and north-east of Wolf), intended as the first of a series of thrusts to shatter the northern wall of the Corridor. Rain fell as the troops were forming up and, when A Company of 2 Queens got ready to advance with D Squadron, 7 Royal Tanks, enemy to the east provided a diversion which lasted an hour. Though 1 Royal Tanks brought in 200 prisoners as a result, the delay only served to warn the enemy at Freddie of what was in store. D Squadron, 7 Royal Tanks, lost two Matildas in the meantime and the remaining six set off with the infantry but met fierce opposition which drove some of A Company back behind the starting line. Two RHA regiments did their best to silence opposition and by 3.15 p.m. D Squadron burst into Freddie and took 300 prisoners, most of them German. But only two Matildas and two light tanks got through unscathed and A Company was still pinned down in the open by fire from farther afield. Further stages of this operation could therefore not be carried out and after dark A Company came back under cover of artillery fire with the loss of fourteen men. Opposition was not crumbling on this part of his front as Scobie thought, and a much heavier attack was required; but by this time he had no troops to spare. He had struck, if he only knew it, at the part of the front where General Suemmermann had concentrated his strength in a series of strongpoints covered by wire and mines, and the scheme of widening the Corridor here was impracticable. At the end of the day no ground had been gained and the prisoners taken had to be counted against the loss of valuable I tanks.
While these various moves were taking place 1 Essex was left to occupy the extensive Ed Duda position with very few tanks in support. Since 44 Royal Tanks, half of 19 Battalion, and for a short time B Squadron of 4 Royal Tanks would not be available for the defence of this important ground, Scobie realised he needed more troops there. He therefore transferred 2/13 Australian Battalion from the relatively stable and quiet sector of 16 Infantry Brigade to that of 32 Army Tank Brigade, ‘much against his wishes’. Ibid.Bayonets Abroad, which describes the Ed Duda fighting.
At 6 p.m. the Australians moved off. Scobie saw them pass through the gap in the original perimeter and told them, ‘Ed Duda must be held at all costs’. In the Corridor, however, they experienced a thrilling sensation as they drove forward in their lorries towards Ed Duda. For the first time in seven months they were moving freely across ground hitherto in their experience accessible only to stealthy night patrols, and they felt a wonderful freedom from the constrictions of the long siege. They were proud that they alone of those who were there in the beginning were there ‘to the end—to the very end of the end’. Clemençeau's words, quoted by Colvin at the head of his chapter.Boettcher Group.
Not only 4 Brigade Headquarters but 6 Brigade and V/AA Bty of 8 Fd Regt, RA, fired in place of 26 Bty, Diary of 27 MG Bn. GOC's diary.
Old Stumps [Gibbon], long, saturnine and fearfully doggy, cool as a cucumber, opened at 1405 hours with ‘O.K. Ai think we'll AD-vance now. Rito 2 would you mind looking at those wretched anti-tank guns on the left. Rito 4 d'you see that hill on the right—the one with the block-house and those square heads dancing about—do you eh? Well, those are mortars and more anti-tank. Do go and walk about it a bit. Rito 3 please don't keep shooting at my tank—you see mai head is sticking out of the turret’. (As indeed it was from start to finish.)
‘Rito 7, Rito 7 (petulantly as to a naughty child) you mustn't go so far ahead of the in-fant-ry.’
Answer from
‘Never mind Davie, you must keep with them—they haven't any shells like yours.’
Answer: ‘I'll put ‘em there all right.’
Complaint from Rito 5 that Stumps was off his direction.
‘It's quaite all right, I just thought I'd look at these field batteries, I don't think there's anyone left there, but I'll just tip these guns over. Rito 3 d'you see those derelict I tanks? Well they've got Jerry M/guns inside, just potter up and put a few shells through the gun barrels. Now I think we've come too far, we'll just tootle around and pot this stuff—has anyone got a match, I'd love a smoke while we're waiting for the infantry.’
‘Now we'll go north, come on Rito 4, don't worry about that pocket, the carriers are rounding them up.’ And finally, ‘I think all this crowd are prisoners, we'll just huddle them up till the infantry collect them.’
Resistance quickly collapsed, and at 2.45 p.m. F Troop OP reported to 4 Field Regiment as follows:
Tks well up into area. INF. well into area. Prisoners coming out in all directions. Firing practically stopped. Leading Tks are well up towards SIDI REZEGH. One vehicle on fire believed Bren Carrier.
Five minutes later another OP reported that there was ‘still a little opposition’ and that the original estimate of 150 prisoners was about a third of the actual total. At 3 p.m. carriers were still rounding up prisoners, but there was no more fighting, though 4 Field Regiment fired a few small tasks to help the mopping-up, which by 3.40 p.m. was complete.
This defensive position proved more extensive than most of the attackers expected and the columns of prisoners which were shepherded back by the infantry were astonishingly long. 44 R Tks and 19 Bn had luckily passed through this safely in their night advance to Ed Duda. Later it was to help protect 18 Bn from panzers which overran 155 Infantry Regiment was captured here and it seems likely that the bulk of what was left of his regiment was overrun. Gibbon's squadron lost neither men nor tanks and gave an admirable demonstration of what I tanks could achieve with proper handling and support. In C Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, an officer and a trooper were killed, and in a carrier of 18 Battalion a sergeant was killed and his Brengunner wounded: among the infantry no more than one or two men were hit and possibly none at all. To those who surveyed the ground afterwards this was all the more surprising; for they could see how closely and skilfully the defences were laid out and how amply they were supplied with weapons, including field and anti-tank guns, mortars, and a multitude of MGs. A section of 6 Field Company followed through to clear a gap in a German minefield running south from the western end of
Men could now move freely about
At
In the morning of the 28th there was so little sign of enemy that gunners in 6 Brigade found very few targets. Men of 26 Battalion had dug in at Cameron.
A Troop of 6 Field Regiment was finally free to give support about 3 p.m. and began to bombard the strongpoint as Nottle led his men forward, not knowing what to expect. Weir, watching from a derelict tank, saw the Germans go to ground, and when he judged that Nottle's men were close enough he lifted the fire. No opposition had yet been met and Nottle thought he still had some 400 yards to go when some Germans unexpectedly stood up to surrender no more than 50 yards away. The position took in far more of the escarpment than was realised and Weir was surprised to see enemy rising to give themselves up from numerous points he had not suspected were occupied. The total of prisoners was 182 according to Nottle, and twenty New Zealanders, mostly of 24 and 26 Battalions, who had been held in the strongpoint, were released. Shakespear of 24 Bn, who was one of the prisoners (with an arm broken early on the morning of the 27th), says he and the others were well treated, a doctor did what he could for him, and he was given water, of which the Germans were very short. The prisoners were held in a small wadi under frequent shellfire but none was hit.
In the strongpoint Nottle found an 88-millimetre gun, a far more powerful weapon than he expected to see, other anti-tank guns, several mortars, and small arms of all descriptions. The position stretched for 300 yards along the top of the escarpment to a depth of about 150, with concrete weapon pits and covered sleeping accommodation. It was sited to give command over the airfield, the Trigh Capuzzo below, and across to
It was at 4.50 p.m. that word got through to Brigade that ‘approx one company of enemy’ 6 Bde Log Diary. 24
In the interim disaster had struck the outlying companies of the 24th in the west, the result mainly of rumours and wishful thinking by troops who had had more than their share of fighting, losses, and lack of sleep and were less wary than they might have been. The chief trouble was the persistent rumour that the troops who were advancing towards them were friendly, and it was this above all which undermined the defence.
The 24th was disposed in a semicircle facing north, west and south from the lattice mast where
The platoons were separated from their neighbours by wide stretches of rocky plateau or by wadis and bluffs along the escarpment which limited their view and made contact difficult. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the fabric of command wore threadbare and threatened to tear apart. Captain Jones of D Company received a message by some means which asked if he was A Company and said ‘that the South Africans wanted to come through and to let them do so’. This was just after he had taken his men farther west in response to a Battalion request to take into his defences a wadi 200 yards away. The broken ground there narrowed the horizon, and when some of the men saw troops and ‘armoured equipment’ moving towards them these were not far away. A. H. Campbell, Cpl A. H. Cambell;
Corporal Opie's forward sections opened fire at troops who showed up to their front, but they held their fire when these troops raised their helmets on their rifles and continued ‘their leisurely approach’. This was, as Opie says, ‘somewhat confusing’. But he
Private Lynn remembers a ‘queer order’ to expect attack from a friendly quarter and to change front. From the west a large group of vehicles approached and ‘all thought the
With minor variations, these were also the experiences of men of A Companies of the 21st and 24th, who were overrun at the same time. There were the same rumours and ‘orders’ to cease fire, and in the case of Captain Ferguson's company the same last-minute change of position which left his men even more helpless than Jones's to meet the attack. Second-Lieutenant
A Company of the 24th saw a tank on each flank of the advancing enemy, and though these did not come close they gave deadly covering fire, added to the mortar and artillery fire which was bursting all through the defences. Orders shouted from post to post made men in Private Thomson's
Thus three companies were lost, perhaps 100 men all told. Some 20 were killed, 20 wounded, and 50–60 captured (many of these wounded), while about 20 escaped unwounded. The western flank of 6 Brigade was now held by only B and C Companies of 24 Battalion, with a wide gap between them. These companies were no longer in doubt as to the identity of their attackers; but they found it hard to select targets which did not endanger the captives, though in some cases they were forced to take the risk. B Company to the north was briefly threatened, but a mortar detachment fired sixty bombs in quick succession at ranges from 600 yards down to 100 and halted the enemy. The sustained fire of the Vickers gunners from farther back also daunted the attackers and greatly encouraged the defence.
For a critical half hour C Company suffered increasingly from a shortage of ammunition and the Germans managed to close in and throw their ‘potato masher’ grenades, calling on the defenders to surrender. Two carriers rushed up under anti-tank fire and hastily dumped some ammunition to tide the company over the crisis, then two more carriers replenished stocks of ·303 bullets in the outlying sections. From then onwards C Company was not seriously troubled, though fighting went on until dusk.
The carriers under Lieutenant Yeoman had swung round to take the attackers from the north—i.e., on their left flank—and from this direction they fired effectively into the enemy, greatly helped by Private
These events were followed closely at Brigade Headquarters and it soon became evident that the enemy effort was on a more massive scale than 6 Bde Log Diary.
Thus about 3 p.m.
The mentions of tanks in the various reports by the 26th were especially worrying. Seven were counted at 3.12 p.m. A few minutes later 6 Field Regiment stated that its 30 Battery was under heavy shellfire and two battalions were attacking it. When B Squadron,
This enemy column seemed ‘a most suitable target for the Sqn of Valentine Tanks’ and the thrust seemed to go well. ‘Major Sutton moved off rapidly and in a very few moments his guns were seen and heard in action in a brisk encounter with the enemy. The tanks were seen driving the enemy back up the escarpment.’ Ibid.
Then 24 Battalion reported that its reserve companies had halted the attack from the west and the time seemed ripe for a counter-attack. Sutton reappeared on the scene and Barrowclough committed him at once to a second sortie in much the same style. He was to go westwards to a point roughly south of the original FDLs of 24 Battalion and then drive due north, thereby taking from the flank and overrunning the enemy who was facing Shuttleworth's reserve companies. The Valentines were to go as far as the escarpment where D Company of the 24th had been overrun and then return by the same route, ‘shooting up the enemy wherever they were found’. Ibid.
Both thrusts, however, involved Sutton in harder fighting and heavier loss than Barrowclough realised. The Germans to the south and to the west were liberally equipped with antitank guns which could penetrate even the thick armour of I tanks. On its first sortie B Squadron, Boettcher Group at Bir Bu Creimisa. Schmeling had two anti-aircraft troops (including some ‘88s’), two troops of Italian field guns, some antitank guns and infantry, and with these he claimed to have driven off twenty-four British tanks with the loss of four or five tanks. ‘Our own losses are heavy’, it was reported to Panzer Group.
On the second sortie B Squadron passed closer to the outposts of 24 Battalion than was thought, these being no more than 400 yards from the line along which Sutton had been ordered to push
Of the nine more Valentines promised by
This time the I tanks did not go quite far enough and headed north through the lines of 24 Battalion. When they reached the RAP they opened fire on it and on troops nearby. A section of carriers was chased towards Battalion Headquarters and for a few moments there was a difficult situation until by various means the tank commanders were made to realise their mistake. Private
O'Neill managed, however, to bring back two more of Sutton's tanks and returned to find the I tanks were still much in demand. A request had meanwhile reached 6 Brigade Headquarters from Division to use them with two companies of infantry to ‘clean up the German Infantry above Div HQ.’ 6 Bde Log Diary, 7.15 p.m.
Three medium howitzers concentrated accurate fire on the field guns of 6 Brigade, and even in the gathering dusk it was impossible to flash-spot their positions accurately enough for effective reply. When they ceased fire an hour after dark, 6 Field Regiment still did not have all the information needed to silence them.
It was plain that the guns and vehicles would have to move out of sight below the escarpment. Barrowclough therefore suggested to Barrowclough's report.
In a few minutes Barrowclough made up his mind what to do. Shuttleworth with 26 Battalion and what was left of the 24th would hold on where they were, but now facing south and west, 8 Field Company with a platoon of MMGs would face south on a stretch of escarpment north of the airfield, 25 Battalion would do likewise in the Blockhouse area, and 21 Battalion would occupy Point 175, facing south and east. To help with this last task,
The whole brigade area was in a turmoil after dark as these far-reaching changes took place. In the Mosque area Shuttleworth pushed 26 Battalion eastwards to take in Point 162, which was essential since he now faced south, and he drew in the FDLs of the 24th towards the escarpment. An unexpected stroke of luck, not recognised until next morning, was that the enemy who had overrun the three companies of the 24th withdrew about midnight, ‘taking their wounded but leaving ours.’ Opie. Tomlinson.portée, the crew of which had been captured, was recovered and manned by a scratch crew and many wounded were brought in; but beyond this the 24th did not do much. The men were ‘terribly tired’
The mission of 25 Battalion was awkward, as it was not certain that the Blockhouse area was still free of enemy. Major Burton describes the preliminaries:
The air was cold and damp … men wearing their greatcoats were dotted here and there talking in undertones.… Some were bright, some a little depressed.…
At 2 a.m. on the 29th they moved off, wondering what was in store for them and seeing flares which they recognised as enemy. When Burton could see the squat shape of the Blockhouse through his field glasses, he sent Lieutenant Cathie forward with his platoon ready to stage an assault. Just when nerves were stretched taut Burton's driver jammed his motor horn and in a desperate move to quieten its penetrating blast he switched on the headlights, outlining the troops lined up to attack. But there was no enemy at hand and the Blockhouse and the escarpment on both sides of it were occupied without further trouble.
The new arrangements ended once and for all the scheme to amalgamate 21 and 25 Battalions and the former, under Major
Similar difficulties attended the move of the vast mass of transport and the guns down the escarpment to the flat below, the former to a new transport area south-east of
Though
Headquarters of 1 Army Tank Brigade Which learned later that its Rear HQ 12 miles south of Bir el Chleta had been disastrously bombed by the Pzkw IIIs passed within 500 yards of this rearguard just before first light, and soon afterwards an eighth was found abandoned without petrol and was towed in. The rest of the morning was quiet, but things became lively in the afternoon and W/X Field Battery engaged what was first thought to be B Echelons of the enemy armour but were later identified as ‘enemy lorried infantry moving WEST along TRIGH CAPUZZO.’ The field guns seemed to have the situation well in hand, however, and there was no sign of 15 Panzer, though this was only a mile or two to the south and south-east. At Divisional Headquarters the danger from the east or south-east continued to be discounted, and when the MDS near the
General Neumann-Silkow had ordered The figure of 960 prisoners in the cage seems the best estimate and there were about 1500 all told in the Division, indicating that some but not all of those taken by 4 Bde in the afternoon reached the Div cage. Others were taken into 200 Regiment to push northwards and gain the crest of the escarpment, which it did under shell, anti-tank and MG fire from the south. This thrust, led by 2 MG Battalion, came in the first instance against the New Zealand Main Dressing Station which had been set up in a large hollow between
The undefended MDS was a vast humanitarian enterprise caring impartially for New Zealanders, their allies, and their enemies, and the pressure of work was immense. Patients were coming in all the time and preparations were well advanced to send cases on to 155 Infantry Regiment among them; then 2 MG Battalion moved on to the edge of the escarpment, leaving the MDS in German hands to carry on its work. As the German machine-gunners reached the edge they attracted MG and 2-pounder fire, and 18-pounders of Q Troop, 34 Anti-Tank Battery, also fired into the area in ignorance of the whereabouts of the MDS. Thus the wounded began a further ordeal at the wrong end of guns and mortars of the New Zealand Division and later of the Jock Columns from the south, and some of them and a few of the staff were killed and more wounds were added to the hundreds already under treatment.
As another section of the
All that faced Lt-Col T. H. E. Oakes, MC and bar, m.i.d.; born England, 15 Panzer here in the first instance was ‘B Group’ of
This small force, including whatever the various unit headquarters in the neighbourhood could muster in the way of rough-and-ready infantry, faced eastwards along the Trigh Capuzzo with its right flank below the escarpment. The assumption that 22 Armoured Brigade was guarding this flank had yet to be disproved and, since portée badly damaged by MG fire and a gunner wounded, as well as ‘7 flat portée tyres’.
RSM Gilberd's
The NZASC companies and Ordnance Workshops which had scattered in front of the advancing German armour in the morning were reassembled by degrees south of
For similar reasons General Godwin-Austen decided to do the same with his own headquarters and attached elements of 30 Corps Headquarters, and he signalled accordingly to all concerned at 6.45 p.m.:
As enemy force advancing WESTWARDS astride TRIGH CAPUZZO attacked HQ 13 Corps and … am moving Corps HQ straight into
The second sentence rang loud in
It was a step in the right direction, however, to get rid of the unessential transport. After dark on the 28th the Corridor became a jostling bedlam of vehicles edging forward by degrees through 4 Brigade, through or round the A & Q diary. When 13 Corps HQ reached
The 42-lorry supply column somehow struggled upstream against the flow of vehicles into portées, and in the middle of the night it reached the escarpment two miles east of Point 175. The armoured cars, trying to find a way down, entered the captured MDS in the dark but quickly withdrew, and the long column descended to the Trigh Capuzzo and headed westwards. Though enemy flares had risen in all directions for the last ten miles not a shot was fired at these lorries, and they entered the lines of 8 Field
GENERAL Rommel could now, for the first time in five days, make use of the planning resources of his own headquarters at Africa Corps and
Meanwhile the battle drifted (or was guided by Cruewell) into a shape which made Rommel's plan to push southwards from the Report by Panzer Group that a choice between Rommel's scheme and his own still existed and asked urgently for orders. This was a stratagem he had used several times before when looking for an excuse to act on his own initiative, and by 8 p.m. he judged the time was ripe. He set out a plan to attack to the west and north-west at ten o'clock next morning with 21 Panzer on the right, 15 Panzer on the left, and Ariete covering the left rear. The starting line ran from Totensonntag attack; but the ground and the opposition were very different. Had Cruewell spent his time while awaiting Rommel's orders in amassing and weighing information about the forces he faced, he might have proposed something more practicable; but this was not his way.
33 Reconnaissance Unit to find out what lay ahead rather than for them to push, as they did, ineffectually against the ‘thick protective screen’33 Recce Unit in DAK diary.3 Reconnaissance Unit which was under Corps command could also have probed ahead; but it was committed again to defend the pass south of
Had Cruewell known more about his own troops he might have had second thoughts. But he had been out of personal touch with 21 Panzer for several days and did not realise how low it now was in strength and morale. This was evident in the person of its GOC, General von Ravenstein, who bore obvious signs of strain, as the Corps diarist noted, when he reported in at 8.30 p.m. and received his copy of the operation order. Ravenstein still had a fair complement of artillery, but only a handful of tanks, and his infantry battalion and machine-gun battalion were much the worse for wear. Yet by Cruewell's plan these remnants of the once-proud 21 Panzer Division would have to make their way through half the New Zealand Division just to reach the starting line for the counter-attack. It was a hopeless assignment, as both generals were soon to discover, and there was little that
The next stage of planning followed familiar lines. Rommel's order reached Corps at 9.20 p.m. on the 28th and differed from Cruewell's in that it proposed an encircling movement rather than a single sledgehammer blow. Rommel had at least partly given up the idea of attacking from the Africa Corps to mount a concentric attack from the east, south and south-west against the ‘Enemy in the area
DAK diary.
Cruewell had two objections. The attack from the south-west could not be carried out without first overcoming the enemy at And not with strict truth, for Cruewell's confirming order was not sent to 90 Light Division north of Corps diary added, not for the first time.15 Pz Div, the formation chiefly affected, until 10.20 p.m.
Belatedly realising how little he knew of the opposition, at 6.22 a.m. on the 29th Cruewell ordered both divisions to send out strong fighting-reconnaissance patrols. But little could have come of this, because as late as 8 a.m. When Cruewell gave out his final instructions at 15 Pz Div HQ. Gen Balotta of Ariete was present and also Maj Suesskind-Schwendi, representing Gen von Ravenstein.15 Panzer made the following note:
Little was known of the enemy. The divisional commander assumed that the last engagements had been with rearguards while the main enemy forces retreated towards
The diarist added that Africa Corps ‘would attack this force, cut its route to
Soon after 9 a.m. 15 Panzer moved off briskly through light shellfire which increased in weight as the New Zealand guns found its range, encouraging the vanguard to swing south of the southern escarpment. Though the British armour was some miles to the south, its guns also engaged the long German columns and British tanks harried the supply vehicles at the rear, causing much confusion
33 Anti-Tank Battalion took charge and drove them off. By 10.55 a.m. the leading elements of 15 Panzer suddenly and unexpectedly found themselves among friends, Boettcher Group at Bir Bu Creimisa.
Wireless interception had meanwhile introduced a fresh complication. Cruewell heard from Panzer Group that a ‘Strong enemy force with tanks and artillery’ was ‘advancing east of Ed Duda towards DAK diary, Messages In.
Ravenstein is lagging behind badly. Stop south of Rezegh and detail a force to open up the pass down from the escarpment. Messages Out.
Assuming that 15 Panzer would obey this order, Cruewell signalled at 11.10 a.m. to General Suemmermann that ‘Neumann is waiting at Rezegh’ and ‘Ravenstein is to move forward’. But Neumann-Silkow refused to be diverted and carried on past Boettcher Group towards Bir Salem, three miles west of Ed Duda, opening up a wide gap between the two panzer divisions, while 21 Panzer loitered as before. Its GOC, General von Ravenstein, had set out on an early-morning reconnaissance and had not returned. In his absence his GSO I, Major Suesskind-Schwendi, failed even to get the division started on its westward advance.
Cruewell reached Bir Bu Creimisa before he realised that his order to take Pavia Division. Cruewell again pleaded the case for pushing the attack through to the Africa Corps diary puts it, ‘an enormous pocket was to be formed in the
A much mis-spelt place-name.
And this too.
When von Ravenstein failed to return from his reconnaissance the divisional staff began to get upset. Not only was opposition ahead altogether too lively, but the Jock Columns of 30 Corps kept up troblesome 25-pounder fire from the east and south-east and Ariete, moving on westwards along the higher ground, left the southern flank open. Appeals for help from Corps and 15 Panzer fell on deaf ears, and in the end Cruewell reconciled himself to the fact that 21 Panzer had no hope of reaching
The southern flank of the New Zealand Division was now in great danger, increased by expectation of the arrival of 1 South African Brigade, since this led observers in 6 Brigade to view movement to the south with hope rather than suspicion. When 25 Battalion reported at 7 a.m. on the 29th the approach from the east of a large column, there was some doubt about whether or not it was friendly until its course carried it westwards above the southern escarpment. Then it was identified as enemy ‘escaping westwards’ and shelled both by 6 Field Regiment and by guns of 30 Corps far to the south. There was no suspicion that this was practically the whole of 15 Panzer Division.
Since first light 21 Battalion had been busily disposing its two companies in trenches and sangars prepared by 361 Africa Regiment to defend the derelict-strewn slopes of Point 175. The CO, Major Fitzpatrick, set up his headquarters in a large bir which had evidently been used for the same purpose by the Germans. Captain Turtill's
Though the position was weak in infantry, it therefore had solid support and the men were in good heart. They soon had an excellent tonic, moreover, when a German general fell into their hands. The ‘I’ Section had been stationed on Turtill's left, and from it Second-Lieutenant Nein! Nein! General! General!’ But it took some time to discover that the prisoner was Major-General von Ravenstein. At 6 Brigade Headquarters he gave his name as Mueller and Barrowclough sent him on to
This was at five past ten, and at 11.15 a.m. 15 Panzer Division, was already miles west of
See photographic copy of map following p. 358.
Meanwhile the close-packed columns of 15 Panzer Division attracted most of the gunners' attentions and an attack on 21 Battalion started up from the south-east in such inconspicuous fashion that its menace was not immediately apparent. A small
In this tufted desert it was the vehicles which attracted most attention. While they advanced under light shellfire, the leading machine-gunners drew as close as they could to the FDLs before the defenders perceived what was afoot. Twenty-first Battalion opened fire with Brens and mortars, and the German heavy mortars and MMGs quickly replied. Some machine-gunners reached the shelter of derelict vehicles (including tanks) and directed heavy and accurate fire into the eastern end of Turtill's thinly-held position. This damage, however, was localised and with patience could easily have been overcome by the field artillery. But Majors Fitzpatrick and O'Neill agreed that the I tanks should make yet another unsupported sortie of the kind which had already caused
The main body of the enemy was well over 500 yards away when O'Neill counter-attacked with four tanks of 3 Troop on the right, while Second-Lieutenant Sugden led the remaining three tanks on the left. The Valentines presented a formidable threat to the machine-gunners and for a few minutes it looked as though G. H. Sugden, report in the war diary of 8 R Tks, 3 Company of the German unit would be overwhelmed. Then the German anti-tank guns opened fire and all four of O'Neill's tanks were hit. ‘Major O'Neill's tank came back out of action very fast with the turret on fire’, Sugden wrote later: ‘it is reported that the driver was pulled out by N.Z. infantry, but I am practically certain no one got out of the turret’. Sugden lost one tank to a Teller mine and was more careful with his remaining two, making two sorties and engaging the enemy each time from the crest of the escarpment until the anti-tank guns ‘started to hit us’ at about 700 yards' range, when the two Valentines withdrew. After the second sortie Sugden's tank was found to be hit through the radiator and from then onwards had to be towed.
The Germans then pushed on through ‘violent’ defensive fire to seize the easternmost of Turtill's posts and take ‘about 30’ prisoners. Report by Ibid. Three MMGs of 7 Pl, 3 MG Coy, had arrived (on Barrowclough's orders) from 24 Bn in the early afternoon and added to the volume of defensive fire.2 MG Bn on action 29 Nov, appended to 15 Pz Div diary.1 Company, which was soon forced to dismount when its vehicles were swept with fire. The reinforcements nevertheless pressed on and pushed back some of Tongue's posts, the remaining Valentine got ready to counter-attack, and the whole front was ablze when Busch received orders to break off at once and follow 15 Panzer westwards. Like 33 Panzer Engineers at 200 Regiment insisted and 2 MG Battalion disengaged bit by bit ‘under terrific fire all the time’.
By mid-afternoon men of 21 Battalion were able once more to move freely about their positions. Then the three Vickers guns which had done much to hold off the final attack were moved back to the edge of the escarpment so as to cover the Trigh Capuzzo. They were soon engaging ‘with good effect’, Fitzpatrick says, ‘the enemy column … on the flat below us’—21 Panzer pushing towards
At the other end of the long 6 Brigade position the morning also brought good news. Carriers found the enemy had departed from the ground overrun the previous afternoon, Barrowclough thought this ‘an extraordinary event’ when he heard of it at 10.10 a.m.
Until 8.30 a.m. there were lingering doubts as to whether or not the troops seen in the Bir Bu Creimisa area were friendly; but the landing of an enemy transport aircraft there at that time settled this issue. Then came news of the impending arrival of the South Africans, with its consequent train of false hopes and disillusionments. The march of 15 Panzer was watched with great interest, seldom tinged with apprehension, by Shuttleworth's group, by 8 Field Company occupying some 1000 yards of the escarpment north of the airfield, and by 25 Battalion holding 1500 yards on both sides of the Blockhouse, as well as by 21 Battalion during lulls in its contest with 2 MG Battalion. At 10.08 a.m. 25 Battalion reported a large column of unidentified lorries and tanks moving west and the Intelligence Officer noted that these were ‘Probably enemy who have made a break from NORTH for
The field guns, their ammunition replenished by Clifton's convoy and the consignment from The British armour thought Weir, op. cit.15 Panzer was massing at
At about 12.40 p.m. the supply column escort ventured into noman's land to the south on its way back to 4 Armoured Brigade, carrying with it the unjustified hopes of Brigade Headquarters and 25 Battalion (through which it passed) that it would help to ‘destroy some enemy convoys to the south east’. Burton. 6 Bde Log Diary. 6 Bde Log Diary.8 Panzer Regiment disappearing towards Bir Salem it concluded
Everything depended, in Barrowclough's view, on getting the South Africans up to help hold his over-stretched line and thicken the defences against armoured counter-attack. His position was otherwise untenable. There was nothing to suggest that Pienaar might have serious trouble in getting forward. When at 3.15 p.m. a solitary armoured car came through the lines of the 25th bearing Lieutenant Bayley ‘to announce arrival of 1 SA Bde’, Ibid.
In the light of what was actually happening in the south this was a recipe for trouble; but in mid-afternoon there was a deceptive lull. A report came through that the tank attack on Ed Duda had been driven off, the attack on Point 175 had died down and the enemy there was decamping, and throughout 6 Brigade there was only intermittent shellfire to contend with.
Lieutenant Sugden of Capt Turtill had been killed in the attack by Fitzpatrick, report. Ibid.2 MG Bn and Dutton took over his company.
Relief changed to horror and dismay when Fitzpatrick saw Dutton and the leading infantry among the vehicles, now identified as tanks, and under fire from them. The brigade Log Diary has the following terse entry for 5.10 p.m.:
21 Bn. Bn Comd sends urgent message for Arty support. ‘They are into my lines with three tanks and are taking prisoners. Arty support at once for Gods sake.’
Two Italian tanks were quickly disabled by Fitzpatrick.portées of 259 Anti-Tank Battery, skilfully firing over the heads of the New Zealand infantry; but other enemy tanks were obscured by their prisoners. Brigade asked Lieutenant-Colonel Weir to help, but it was already too late for the field guns to reverse the situation. Many of Dutton's men had gone forward and were caught in the open, the tanks opened fire, and the Italian infantry (for it was part of Ariete) debussed and were soon among them and disarming them. Some of Tongue's sections slipped down the escarpment to safety; but most were quickly rounded up by ‘flying columns of Italians with LMGs’.Ariete on Point 175 in the gathering gloom.
Various other parties also got back safely to Brigade Headquarters, including one consisting of wounded, a carrying party of about a dozen German prisoners (from According to the unit diary – a high estimate.2 MG Battalion), and an escort. After a hot meal the survivors were allotted places in a new position near the Trigh Capuzzo facing Point 175, where they had to dig in on rocky ground. Twenty-first Battalion now numbered 5 officers and 179 other ranks,
Once again the enemy held the much-contested Point 175 and in the morning would undoubtedly exploit the splendid observation it gave over much of the Divisional area. Many stories were told of how this disaster came about, and some survivors, not recognising their assailants, attributed to the Germans a deliberate and disarming pretence of friendliness towards 21 Battalion. But the truth was that the vanguard of Ariete, like Ravenstein earlier, thought the Germans held Point 175 and was as much surprised as the New Zealanders when it realised its mistake.
To 1 SA Bde report.
On the eastern flank of the Division the main weight of the fighting below the escarpment on the 29th was borne by 8 Field Regiment, RA, (less V/AA Battery) under Lieutenant-Colonel Walton, by ad hoc crews from C Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, as well as by some of the old Mark VIBs. These tanks struck soon after dawn and to better effect than they realised. The German infantry retreated in ‘wild disorder’ (according to 5 Panzer Regiment) until the twelve remaining German tanks and the anti-tank guns intervened, knocking out two New Zealand tanks and no fewer than ten tanks of
The two small battle groups of 21 Panzer nevertheless suffered a severe setback which considerably delayed the assembly for the main attack, though Walton's rearguard endured a blistering bombardment by the German guns. The German infantry came on again in mid-morning, backed by tanks, and the remaining Valentines and light tanks of
The eastern flank of the Division then stretched from Point 175 to 21 Panzer, could set against them. The Ravenstein papers suggested otherwise, however, and encouraged
The defences between
GOC's diary.15 Panzer had reached that area and
There was still some hope that the
German tanks were seen approaching Ed Duda from the west at 1 p.m. and lorried infantry from the south. After a brief delay 1 RHA and then a battery of 104 RHA engaged the enemy, but the rest of the garrison artillery was too far away. The four batteries of 6 Field Regiment could have thickened up the defensive fire very considerably had the groundwork for such co-operation been laid in the past two days; but 1 Essex had to do without this help. Even the I tanks at Ed Duda did not seem to the infantry to be doing much, and B Company of 1 Essex soon found itself facing fifteen German tanks about 300 yards to the west. A and D Companies watched a brief duel at 900 yards' range between an anti-tank troop and thirty tanks to the south which the tanks won. The next phase was a systematic destruction by the tanks of the rocky sangars of 1 Essex, an ominous development which
The attack on Ed Duda might have been even heavier; but it was carried out with breathless haste which robbed 8 Panzer Regiment of much support. A boggy stretch of ground below Bir Bu Creimisa held up most of II Battalion of 115 Infantry Regiment and many of the supporting guns. Only three companies of infantry therefore took part in the final assault. This was nevertheless successful as far as it went and the tanks and infantry collected 150 prisoners. Only
115 Regiment, some 300 men all told, split into two battle groups, one on each side of the By-pass road, and dug in at once. It was after 5 p.m. and already too late to carry the attack through to
At about this time
When the light began to fail, some of the British tanks edged forward and the air was filled with tracers as the enemy engaged them. The Pzkw IIs came into their own in this twilight clash and their 20-millimetre automatic cannon blazed in deadly fashion at the Matildas, knocking out two them. The Matildas in the end gave ground and the panzers followed them slowly, ending up in brilliant moonlight at 6.35 p.m. on the edge of the Australian position. German infantry also spread out and some began digging in 200 yards from the headquarters of 1 Essex. To
Lieutenant-Colonel Burrows of the Australian battalion prepared to counter-attack; but the moonlight was too bright, the German tanks still very much in evidence, and he decided to hold his hand until the moon was lower. His B Company on the right and C on the left formed up on either side of Nichols's headquarters, A Company covered 1 RHA, whose gun positions were now very close to the German tanks, and D stayed in reserve ‘along the western approaches to Ed Duda’.
Then the Australian B Company suffered a tragic blow. As it moved forward a heavy shell landed directly on 10 Platoon, killing eight and wounding ten of its total of twenty-six men. The other two platoons, ‘displaying exemplary battle discipline, moved past the stricken platoon, disregarding the pathetic cries of the wounded and the dying’. An unscheduled inspection was also carried out by a patrol of 18 Bn from Bayonets Abroad, p. 150.
When the I tanks counter-attacked, late at night, they ran all through the German lines, creating panic. Then the Australians fell with great vigour upon the two bewildered battle groups of 115 Regiment, ‘slew an undetermined number’,Bayonets Abroad, p. 152.
On the enemy side six officers and about fifty other ranks, the remnants of those elements of The signal came from Gen Gause, who wanted 115 Regiment which took part in the action, fell back 1000 yards to the west and formed a new position alongside 15 Motor Cycle Battalion. This unit of 200 Regiment had been brought forward to continue the attack through to 8 Panzer Regiment. A second attack on Ed Duda was briefly considered, but there were too few German infantry at hand to undertake it. Then Panzer Group, signalling to 33 Reconnaissance Unit to come under its command and report at once to 15 Panzer, which therefore withdrew at once and reached Bir Salem before the mistake was discovered.33 Recce Unit to operate with de Meo Recce Gp under the command of Trieste on the southern flank, ready to exploit any weakening of the pressure by the British armour in that area.
There was some talk at Panzer Group Headquarters of closing the gap between 15 Panzer and 90 Light by artillery fire, but in an appreciation of 10.30 p.m. on the 29th Cruewell stated without beating about the bush that ‘The enemy at Sic.15 Panzer was back at Panzer Group identified a fresh British rifle brigade with 100 tanks to the south and was puzzled that this force (actually the two armoured brigades plus 1 South African Brigade) did so little. In an intelligence report to Panzer Group attributed this charitably to supply difficulties. The British Jock Columns harassing the rear of 21 Panzer were thought to be about equal in strength to the force in the south, which was anything but flattering to the latter—the main strength of 30 Corps.
On this day, the 29th, the main German striking force, Crisp, p. 143.15 Panzer, was able to travel 20 miles westwards from Bir Sciafsciuf, tuck itself in behind Boettcher Group at Bir Bu Creimisa, and then attack Ed Duda without any effective intervention by the British armour. Ariete, too, moved up and seized Point 175 simultaneously with the attack on Ed Duda and under the very noses of the British armoured brigades, also without hindrance by them. While these grave threats to 13 Corps were developing the British armour was curiously passive, and a member of
Thus the two armoured brigades with at least eighty-four tanks between them and the South African brigade had even less influence on the battle than the Jock Columns. Early in the morning the armoured brigades took over two of the South African field batteries and 7 Medium Regiment, RA, was used for long-range fire against Richie, Eighth Army Report, Sec. 57. 26Ariete and Boettcher Group, leaving Pienaar very few guns to protect his brigade. General Ritchie signalled his approval of the policy of dispersion by ordering General Norrie to continue the ‘excellent work with “Jock” columns’ and to direct ‘armoured cars to harass enemy supply columns’. He also wanted Pienaar to ‘join up with N.Z. Div. as soon as the situation permitted’,
General Gott signalled to As intercepted by the Germans. 4 Armd Bde war diary. 5 R Tks war diary. Ibid.open up) the way to the New Zealanders and to ‘Follow 1 S.A. Bde and keep a look out.’following the traffic which used it is hard to understand; but the question soon became academic. All the armoured brigades did was to deploy again in the 15 Panzer as these drove westwards, though they failed to identify them as such despite accurate reports from 4 South African Armoured Car Regiment. Another westward movement, probably of Ariete, then engaged Ariete to slip past to the north. There followed two or three hours of comparative inaction and then 4 Armoured Brigade set off once again northwards, only to halt after a short distance while 2 MG Battalion on 21 Battalion was then in full swing, 4 Armoured Brigade was admirably placed to intervene decisively. and when Gatehouse reached the appointed grid line he was ordered to do so. He had 22 Armoured Brigade on his right and there was nothing to stop him driving straight on to Point 175. But at the last moment 5 Royal Tanks reported a large column about two miles to the west and sent out a patrol to investigate it before moving on, while the whole brigade waited. Some 40 to 50 enemy tanks were believed to be advancing on the left flank, supported by 88- and 105-millimetre guns; but ‘dust and sun’Ariete—while the rest of 4 Armoured Brigade and the whole of 22 Armoured Brigade awaited the outcome. Each side lost one tank.
While this was happening the German Ritchie, Eighth Army Report. ‘Narrative of Events’. Eighth Army Report.2 MG Battalion moved westwards to rejoin 15 Panzer, driving without trouble past the British armour, and Ariete recaptured Point 175. General Gott had been ordered to ‘do everything possible to prevent’Ariete was most vulnerable, being short of ammunition and other supplies; but it was able to carry out its operations with very little interference by the British armour. At dusk the armoured brigades drew southwards to their previous night laager. Neither Ritchie nor Norrie read bad omens in the situation, chiefly because wireless interception provided faulty insights into the enemy's situation. Norrie learned that both panzer divisions were ‘asking for assistance’ and the 21st found things ‘intolerable’ because of artillery fire from the Jock Columns,
Rommel's forces were not strong enough to pursue this aim with advantage if Eighth Army concentrated to prevent him. He hoped to form a Cauldron, though it could mean a basin-like hollow in the ground.KesselKessel. But this was highly fanciful. The circumference of the cauldron would be 30 miles long, passing round Ed Duda, Ariete in the south, the shaky remants of 21 Panzer in the east extending round (with some slight help from 90 Light) to 15 Panzer linking up the two through Ed Duda. The Kessel would at best be leaky and its thin walls in constant danger of collapse. A determined blow from the outside would demolish it once and for all, and with it
Yet Kessel,
This was as ordered by Norrie at 6 a.m. on the 29th and received by 1 SA Bde report.
Will you come with all speed under adv guard AFV protecting yourself East flank with arty of all classes to point 175 .… Operate with confidence against these people. If you do you will get on top of coln moving East to West trying to escape on escarpment. They are Germans—force of troops in motor lorries and few AFV. Repeat take normal precautions for your front and flanks. Troops at 175 and to East [West?] at SIDI RESEGH. Shoot at these lorries East to West. Use Armd Cs right to East. As intercepted by 4 NZ Bde.
This was reasonable enough, except that it viewed the enemy as an ‘escaping prey’; but it was a task for armour rather than infantry. That 2 MG Battalion was trying to escape fitted the facts as Ariete and every reason to be sceptical about help from the British armour. He nevertheless decided to move and at ‘
Am despatching strong forces forthwith to rendezvous moving remainder tonight. Is that right? 4 Bde war diary.
At 4.50 p.m. Norrie had again urged Pienaar to move, but to the southern escarpment, not to Point 175. He, too, spoke of an escaping enemy and not of a crisis in the New Zealand Division. But Pienaar nevertheless decided to make for 175 and set the starting time at 7 p.m. Then he received Barrowclough's message that Point 175 was lost. At 6.25 he was told he was under 1 SA Bde report. 4 Bde war diary. 6 Bde war diary.
This was the end of the Bayley to Bayley link until after dawn on the 30th, and so Pienaar failed to explain ‘why such a move was not feasible until first light’. He did, however, get another optimistic message from Ritchie through 30 Corps at 8.30 p.m. that the ‘Huns and Macaronis’ were ‘squealing for help’, that 21 Panzer found its situation ‘unberable’ and that Eighth Army should ‘stick to them like hell’. Ariete was indeed short of ammunition and supplies and 21 Panzer was sandwiched uncomfortably between the New Zealand and Jock Column guns; but an infantry brigade was not the force to tackle enemy armour.
Ritchie spoke to Gott in the same vein and with even more emphasis. He was certain 21 Panzer and Ariete were trying to get away and told Gott to ‘Stick to them tonight’. Gott was to do all he could to cut the L of C of the enemy armour and to use the South African armoured cars to ‘chivy’ the supply echelons of 15 Panzer. But no words of Ritchie's could change the time-honoured cavalry custom of withdrawing from the battlefield at dusk, and the armoured brigades continued their leisurely journey southwards. Gott was unimpressed with other messages suggesting some sort of crisis, though both he and his superiors knew that Ed Duda had been heavily attacked. Further details of this attack which trickled through during the night, however, introduced an element of alarm at Army Headquarters.
THE assault on Ed Duda gave the New Zealand Division a day's reprieve from attack by Formerly 15 Panzer; but the failure of this assault made the isolation and destruction of the New Zealand Division a matter of the utmost urgency. From the Axis viewpoint the passivity of 30 Corps in the past two days was too good to last. Panzer Group Headquarters thought the British armour was held up by lack of supplies and was certain it would soon resume the offensive on a grand scale. An early-morning aerial reconnaissance on the 30th seemed to confirm this opinion. When British tanks started moving towards the German strongpoint at Bir Bu Creimisa, defended by what was now called Mickl Group,Boettcher Gp. Boettcher was now in command of 21 Pz Div.15 Panzer and Trieste to be ready to help
The consternation which followed the discovery at Panzer Group Headquarters that 15 Panzer had withdrawn from Ed Duda was followed by a decision to leave this position outside the Kessel and cut the Corridor instead between Africa Corps and the dwindling margin of time before 30 Corps was expected to attack again in full strength. But the British armoured thrust towards Bir Bu Creimisa evidently ‘suffered from the lack of a strong unified leadership’
Battle Report of Pz Army Africa,
Ariete was to push westwards along the escarpment from Point 175 to link up with Mickl Group at 15 Panzer was to counter-attack to clear its flank and rear; if not, Neumann-Silkow was to attack straight through from Bir Bu Creimisa to Mickl Group on
This was the plan at the start, but it was soon modified. At Neumann-Silkow's headquarters there was some doubt whether ‘the destruction of Kriebel.15 Panzer made its way from Bir Salem to Bir Bu Creimisa the 90 Light would attack 15 Panzer to attack from the south-west; but he wanted Mickl Group and Ariete to move off at 3 p.m. with strong artillery support to which Trieste, Pavia, and the
While this grave threat was developing against 6 Brigade, the New Zealand Division continued to operate with little or no help from either 13 or 30 Corps, and the better co-ordination with the
ED DUDA attacked by 55 tanks and inf bn was captured by enemy. Now taken back but situation in area precarious. Most strongly urge you create diversion by advancing on enemy WEST of NZ DIV as quickly as possible to-day.
For
From the command point of view, formations in Eighth Army were worse off than ever. Although only a few miles apart, each brigade acted largely in ignorance of what the others were doing.
Thus the signal from Both armoured brigades had been amalgamated during the night under Brig Gatehouse's command, giving him a tank strength of about 120, though this amalgamation does not seem to have become fully effective until late on 1 Dec.
What the South Africans were doing was a vexed question to the New Zealanders in more ways than one. Dawn had revealed a great mass of transport on Point 175, and in the New Zealand Division there was much doubt as to whether it was South African or enemy. Even after G Branch diary.
At the appointed time the whole feature began to erupt with smoke and flame as the NZA fired its heaviest concentration of the campaign. When the scene cleared only a few tanks and lorries remained in sight, most of them on fire, and when tanks reappeared a little to the west, 6 Field Regiment fired a regimental concentration on them at 8.45. Then the regiment turned its attention to tanks reported just south-east of
From then onwards the elements of Ariete on Point 175 preferred to keep out of sight; but their presence there constituted a threat to 6 Brigade and gave the enemy observation over most of the Divisional area. It made
Any hopes of help from that quarter, however, were doomed to disappointment. The British armour spent another wasted day in indecisive skirmishing with Ariete and what were wrongly thought to be groups of German tanks at various points. When
An Italian M13 tank damaged in the morning's clash drove into the lines of 8 Field Company at 1.12 p.m. flying a white flag. One of its crew was dead, another wounded, and the remaining two surrendered. These said the bombardment of Point 175 had caused many casualties and much damage.
This was, however, a rare bright spot in a dismal scene. Everything depended on getting help to hold the long brigade front and to oust the Italians from Point 175. The battalions of 6 Brigade now had the following fighting strengths As reported to 6 Bde HQ; experienced riflemen were very few indeed.
These figures revealed, as Barrowclough says, ‘the extraordinary losses we had sustained’, and it was evident that the brigade was ‘far outnumberd by the enemy colns now assembling on the escarpment to the SOUTH and WEST of us.’ Report in 6 Bde war diary.
To the infantry of 6 Brigade it seemed that ‘the usual afternoon attack is developing’, as the Brigade IO noted at 3.45 p.m. ‘Can our thin red line hold out?’, he asked. 6 Bde Log Diary.
There was therefore no relief from this fierce shelling for the infantry and supporting arms and these suffered ‘a real hammering with heavies’ Mantell-Harding.
At this stage shellfire increased greatly throughout the brigade area, telephone lines were cut, and the situation soon became confused. The infantry and Vickers gunners nevertheless offered fierce opposition to enemy infantry attacking from the south and halted their advance. The two-pounders were then systematically eliminated from the defence, chiefly by mortar fire, and there was nothing to stop the tanks.
Weaknesses in the anti-tank layout were now exposed, too late to remedy them. There were six or eight 2-pounders in direct support of 24 and 26 Battalions, but the 18-pounders, Bofors, and 25-pounders were all below the escarpment, which in this sense handicapped the defence. The Matildas of 44 Royal Tanks might have been even more valuable, but the Ravenstein papers had labelled the eastern flank as the likeliest source of danger and the I tanks stayed there, together with anti-tank guns not strictly needed.
‘The two anti-tank 2-pdrs were the first to go’, says a private of C Company of the 24th, ‘and part of the shield of one landed on the side of my slit trench.’ L. M. Nelley. See Llewellyn, p. 172.portées drove up rapidly; but they came under concentrated fire from tanks as they breasted the escarpment and were shot to pieces. Then, at a critical moment, the field guns ceased fire. Mantell-Harding at once complained to Brigade, to be told a little later that the 25-pounders had used up their ammunition. The guns were quickly replenished and resumed firing; but the end was already in sight.
So much metal was screaming through the air at this stage that few men cared to keep their heads up for very long; but those who did saw what looked like a well-planned manoeuvre executed with great precision. In reality it was not at all what General Cruewell ordered. He had given the saddle west of 8 Panzer Regiment ‘across into the area of Mickl Group and to attack 15 Pz Div diary.I Battalion under Captain Kuemmel, with 88-millimetre guns in close support, made straight for the II Battalion under Captain Wahl and the field and medium guns, echeloned to the right rear, came under heavy fire from 6 Brigade and Wahl turned toface this. I Battalion carried on eastwards along the foot of the escarpment towards the Mosque, meeting little opposition; but II Battalion met fierce resistance and 2 MG Battalion joined in on the left of Mickl Group, making up a force roughly equal to three infantry battalions; but, hevily though this outnumbered the defenders, it could make little progress until the tanks broke the back of the defence. About 5.15 p.m. the tanks drove in close and began to take prisoners, but this process lasted until dusk and made Neumann-Silkow postpone the
For the remnants of 24 Battalion the situation looked hopeless as soon as the anti-tank guns were lost. The tanks ‘deployed in groups of threes … and came on in this formation across our whole front’, Tomlinson says. ‘Their fire power was terrific.’ He sent a message to his platoons to ‘lie flat in their slit trenches and to allow the tanks to pass over them and when they had gone through to engage their infantry.’ But 8 Panzer Regiment was too cautious and the trenches too shallow for this stratagem to succeed. The tanks
A and B Companies of 26 Battalion were astride the track which led past the Mosque to the airfield and on the flat desert to the south and, like the companies of the 24th, they could do nothing to stop the tanks (though the mortar platoon kep on firing). They, too, were overrun, though a pause when the attack reached the Mosque raised slight hope that they might be saved. Captain Tolerton had asked Brigade for permission to withdraw while it was still possible, but this was refused. ‘The din at this time was terrific’, Mantell-Harding says, and ‘dust and smoke blinded everything’. Cloaked by the flying sand and smoke, most of 8 Platoon managed to get away; but the rest of A and B Companies were captured. Then it was the turn of the two unit headquarters, Shuttleworth's and Mantell-Harding's. Shuttleworth gave Brigade a running commentary by telephone and about 5.20 p.m. he reported tanks within 50 yards. ‘When I rose from my trench what a sight met my eyes in the growing darkness’, Mantell-Harding says. ‘We were ringed in by Hun tanks and their infantry were collecting the prisoners.’ The last few carriers had put up a gallant resistance and were now in flames.
A solitary anti-tank portée near the Trigh Capuzzo engaged a tank coming down the escarpment and knocked it out. This greatly cheered those at Brigade Headqurters who saw it, but it was evident that this gun could not stop the panzer force if it chose to carry on. Nor could C and D Companies of the 26th, on the crest of the escarpment, resist for long if the enemy pushed eastwards, though their positions were not so accessible to tanks. Major Walden of D Company therefore talked the matter over with Captain Thomson of C, and they decided to draw back eastwards to link up if possible with 8 Field Company and form some sort of line covering Brigade Headquarters. They had only eighty men between them and these withdrew out of sight of
Brigadier Barrowclough had meanwhile ordered Major Burton of 25 Battalion to send his four 2-pounders to help Shuttleworth, a
Ariete were a constant menace from the other side of the Rugbet en-Nbeidat. Then, when things grew worse, Barrowclough ordered the whole battalion to move at once to the Mosque, and Burton was extricating his three companies from their positions around the Blockhouse when the threat from Ariete suddenly materialised. About 5 p.m. enemy tanks attacked from the mouth of the Rugbet, Burton advised Brigade, and he was told to stay and fight them. The four leading tanks were engaged by the gun L2, which set two on fire in quick succession, damaged the third, and caused the fourth to disappear quickly. The other three portées of L Troop backed over a rise to help and the Italians were soon discouraged. The infantry had meanwhile reoccupied their former positions and were told that the move was ‘off’ for the time being. At 10.40 p.m. Burton was warned once more to be ready to move to portées, half of O Troop, 34 Battery, sent up to reinforce his position. ‘Around us we could hear the rattling of tanks as they moved into position ready to strike at dawn’, he says. ‘Coloured flares lit the sky’ and the night, as he adds, was ‘full of anxiety.’
Just west of 25 Battalion was 8 Field Company under Major 33 Reconnaissance Unit on their way to Currie and were captured. The Germans, carrying on eastwards in the darkness, were then suddenly engaged by the four Vickers guns of 9 MG Platoon and a section of 8 Field Company made a most successful bayonet charge. The Engineers rescued the three prisoners and captured several useful vehicles and much equipment, including some welcome antitank guns. The German unit fled. Later in the night the other half of O Troop with two 2-pounder portées joined 8 Field Company. Half a loaf was better than no bread and Currie was duly grateful, though the situation remained precarious.
Below the escarpment and facing generally towards Point 175, the small remnant of 21 Battalion had spent most of the day in shallow trenches under continual artillery fire. Then at 4.40 p.m. Major Fitzpatrick was ordered to deploy west of the brigade MT park and facing portées of 65 Regiment, RA. The transport was all assembled ready for an expected move during the night; but no such move took place. Before dawn on 1 December the vehicles therefore had to open out once more to daylight formation.
After dark on the 30th Barrowclough ordered the remnants of his brigade to stand by in readiness to move into Barrowclough, report,
Even this move was much discussed before it was authorised.
It is a measure of the inexperience of the Division in its first desert campaign that throughout the ordeal of 6 Brigade in the afternoon of 30 November tanks, guns, and other defensive resources which were well within reach lay idle, awaiting the onslaught from the east predicted in the Ravenstein papers. This attack was expected from minute to minute, but it did not come, though at 5 p.m., when the panzers were closing in on the Mosque, there was a threatening movement of tanks and infantry to the east which attracted much attention and caused needless apprehension. Not only 4 and 8 Field Regiments, which had covered the eastern flank all day, but 47 Field Battery as well were told to stand by to meet the long-awaited attack along the Trigh Capuzzo. But 26 Field Battery and the Vickers guns at the Sciuearat strongpoint, with some help from the Matildas of 44 Royal Tanks, quickly discouraged what was in fact a half-hearted move by remnants of 21 Panzer. The field guns set one tank on fire, four other tanks were immobilised, and the rest of the enemy withdrew.
Fourth Brigade Headquarters was not far from the main gun group of 4 Field Regiment, between
27
On Belhamed shellfire was comparatively light and 18 and 20 Battalions were in the main isolated from uncertainties in the east and disaster in the south. The war diary of the 20th has the following entry for 30 November:
Quiet day. Position apparently stable. Troops in good spirits.
There seemed ample strength on Allison. It was a garbled version of an 18 Bn patrol report.
Brigade Headquarters was still more concerned about the eastern flank and when Major Gibbon of 44 Royal Tanks called later in the night he and the BM talked about this to the exclusion of dangers elsewhere. On his way back this night, Maj Gibbon was taken prisoner. He had given splendid support to 4 Bde and was very well liked by the New Zealanders. Later he renewed the acquaintance when he escaped in Capt B.S. Smyth; 4 Bde diary. Ibid.
The Divisional staff had strong personal reasons for over-estimating the threat from the east, for it was chiefly from that quarter that they had been shelled throughout the day. The open spaces to the west on the way to Ed Duda seemed thrice blessed by comparison with the battered and shuddering slopes of the wadi which housed but failed to shelter
Thus darkness came with the problem of where to set up 15 Panzer would probably attack 21 Panzer Africa Division was in the west. The German intention, the note stated, was to ‘stop you withdrawing’; but this was ambiguous.
Action of some sort was clearly essential, however, to remedy the serious deterioration of the Division's situation; but it was hard to know what to do. The Corps orders, as GOC's diary.
This was carried by Major
Still no touch with 1 SA Bde. Orders sent to them by LO but possibly NOT delivered. Germans digging in SIDI REZEGH. Unlikely that 1 SA Bde have captured pt 175.
Somehow might swing the scales in
Whatever was decided, however, had to be decided soon, and Attack by 1 SA Bde on Pt 175 439404 and then on Comd NZ Div to use own discretion about withdrawing dets from XXX Corps being asked urgently to conc 7 Armd Div's efforts on the destruction of enemy tks.
The alternatives in the first section were more apparent than real.
In Godwin-Austen's spoken orders or in the way Miles presented them there must have been some talk, too, of holding the Corridor whatever happened. In his report
One important move was nevertheless made while there was still time: all unessential vehicles first of Consisting of the GOC, the CRA (minus his HQ), the GSO I, GSO III (Ops), the AA & QMG, an ‘I’ staff of two, the OC Div Sigs and 45 men, two LOs, and the GOC's ADC and PA.
Tanks and guns had helped German infantry to reach the Mosque and 7 Armoured Division might similarly have taken the South Africans to Point 175 in the afternoon of the 30th. But 1 South African Brigade had been directed instead to Bir Sciafsciuf and was left unaided to fight its way westwards along the escarpment to its objective. Meanwhile 3 Reconnaissance Unit and part of 21
Panzer began to take up positions between Sciafsciuf and Point 175, making the task all the harder, so that little ground was gained, despite much urging from General Norrie.
Norrie had boldly led the advance and reached Sciafsciuf about 4 p.m. and the guns hastened to register targets to the west before dark. At the same time South African patrols pushed eastwards to make contact with Mayfield Column, which was overlooking the rear of 21 Panzer from above Bir el Chleta. At dusk 4 Armoured Brigade withdrew to night laager (rather closer than usual to the scene of the fighting), communications with the New Zealand Division faded as the ‘air’ filled with ‘static’ (after
Pienaar knew of enemy only on the objective and he committed for his attack on Point 175 a modest force of two companies of the Royal Natal Carbineers with an anti-tank troop, with flank protection provided by a company of the Duke of Edinburgh's Own Rifles. The two companies were to meet the third company a mile south-east of Point 175 and expected no opposition on the way and only slight resistance on their objective. At 6.30 p.m. they set out, expecting to reach Point 175 soon after 8 p.m. Within three miles they halted, having come upon 3 Reconnaissance Unit moving up into
The two New Zealand Cavalry officers reached Pienaar's head-quarters at 1.40 a.m. on 1 December with
I received your above quoted order at a.m. 0140 hrs not Rept Not possible to reach that point in time. I am trying to isolate point 175 tonight if I cannot succeed to capture it.
With this cold comfort Bonifant and Wilder in their two carriers set out on their return journey; but the hazards had now increased and they had to make a long detour southwards which took up much precious time. They lost a carrier on the way, and it was after dawn when they reached the lines of 25 Battalion. Pienaar's message by the time it reached
Only the British armour could now save the situation and it was strongly urged to do so by
Enemy captured SIDI REZEGH. Bernard [the New Zealand Division] being attacked from EAST and WEST by tanks. Southern boys [South Africans] SW [sic] of Pt 175. You will recce
This seemed clear enough; but it could allow confusion between the panzers at 7 Armd Div ‘I’ Summary No. 42 of 11.30 a.m., 1 Dec (from information received up to 9 p.m. on 30 Nov).21 Panzer ‘from a bad position’ Africa Corps could concentrate at
THE sky in the east was lightening when
Had this issue been settled earlier much might have been done to improve dispositions; but it was now too late even for this. The weakened elements of the Division therefore remained disposed over a large area with little co-ordination between them and huge gaps in the defences. A night patrol from 18 Battalion had failed to make contact with Ed Duda, where half of 19 Battalion was stationed, and
With the cold a mist had settled in the shallow basin between
The night and then the mist, however, hid widespread enemy activity designed to take 15 Panzer another step forward, this time to 90 Light and the Army Artillery to the north, from Italian artillery to the south-west, from two batteries of 33 Artillery Regiment at Ariete and 21 Panzer to the south-east and east. Silently during the night the men of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion and 2 Machine Gun Battalion had descended the slopes by the Mosque and spread out over the flat to form a long line north of the Trigh Capuzzo facing 8 Panzer Regiment assembled with I Battalion forward, then Regimental Headquarters, followed to the right by II Battalion, anti-aircraft/anti-tank batteries with the tanks, and I Battery of 33 Artillery Regiment bringing up the rear. The tanks were to pass through the infantry on the lower slopes of Africa Corps had only reluctantly yielded its original view that the force astride the Trigh Capuzzo was merely supply lorries, and it was not until 30 November that it was realised that ‘a large force the artillery was in the Duda-
Note by DAK orderly officer in Messages Out file.
In the New Zealand lines there was much uncertainty. Men of 6 Brigade mostly did not know what to expect and the two units of 4 Brigade on Not enough to cover the whole front; but all the same a useful quantity. 18 Bn diary. Henderson, crusader planners, the leading tank was a captured Matilda.) Next came the prolonged rumble, rising in pitch, and the thunderous concussion of heavyweight 210-millimetre shells in salvoes of three, compressing men in slit trenches, sucking them upwards, and dropping them back, a shocking train of sensations. These huge explosions were marked by angry clouds of smoke and dust which spread in each case over nearly an acre of desert. Medium and lighter guns thickened up this formidable fire and countless MGs joined in, soon replacing the mist with smoke and flying sand. In Gunner Inglorious, pp. 17–23.
The nearest batteries to the enemy were 30 Field Battery on the right and 47 Battery on the left, supported by a few 2-pounders, Bofors, and Bren guns. The field gunners fought in emergency anti-tank positions, unlimbering the guns under fire, and serving them in a thickening fog of smoke and dust which gave the action the character of a bad nightmare. Bombardier
The gun was brought into position [he says], sights clear and prepared; but no ammunition ready. Two of the others were trying to get the armour-piercing shot off the limber.… Next I was peering through the open sights at the tanks; they were far too close by now. Their light machine-gun bullets were penetrating the shield and shot was flying in all directions.
Geoff
Oliver , the gun-sergeant, swung the trail around and we fired the first shot—with what effect I do not know. After each shot we had to wait several seconds for the dust to clear.
Bdr M. G. Oliver ; born NZ27 Nov 1914 ; photo-engraver; killed in action1 Dec 1941 .
The section commander, Second-Lieutenant Masefield, 2 Lt
The tanks were no more than 200 yards from 47 Battery when the telephone rang at C Troop command post and Weir at the other end of the line announced to the bombardier on duty, ‘I think those tanks are hostile’. Some of them seemed near enough ‘to throw stones at’
Just before this there was a slight lull and
In 29 Battery B Troop blazed away vigorously at several tanks glimpsed through the smoke and dust until they were disabled or disappeared, then the gunners paused. A Troop, however, was blinded by ‘clouds of dust and columns of black, sickening smoke’ Sgt Wait.
The tanks hesitated or sought other avenues of approach; but the German infantry came on through the smoke, taking cover behind burning lorries and bringing the gun crews under MG and mortar fire which it was impossible to subdue. As Miles arrived, B Troop resumed firing, but three guns were quickly put out of action, their crews dead or wounded around them, and the troop was overrun except for one gun which withdrew in the nick of time. Miles saw it all thus:
I reached the nearest gun—no. 4—as most of the crews of the others were casualtied by m.g. fire; though we could see nothing for smoke. Then figures appeared which I saw were German infantry, and I told 2/Lt Bevin 2 Lt R. O. Bevin; Letter to Maj-Gen E. Puttick,
Miles and the others at the gun position were taken prisoner. Weir had in the meantime ordered A Troop to withdraw when the position became untenable, but his own interpretation of ‘untenable’ was stoical; for he was at the gun A4 when ‘bullets were beating a tattoo on the gun and trailer’ and the crew was huddled on the other side. ‘How about a drink of water?’ he asked, ‘my oath I'm dry’ and after a quick gulp from a bottle he moved away. Wait.
C Troop of 48 Battery also failed to find targets in the swirling smoke and did not fire; but D Troop carried on under violent MG and mortar fire until the guns were overrun. C Troop and the survivors of D then withdrew, on the initiative of
The last clash between 6 Field Regiment and the German tanks took place on the By-pass road north-west of
Losses in 6 Field Regiment on 1 December were the heaviest sustained by any NZA unit in a single day throughout the war: about 14 officers and 170-odd other ranks, to which must be added 60–70 of 47 Battery (5 Field Regiment), which was under Latham to 8 Panzer Regiment, which had already seen much hard fighting, describes this as ‘one of its hardest battles’.
The guns of 4 Field Regiment, all of which were within reach and only too anxious to help, could not fire because the smoke curtained off all of 6 Field Regiment and most of 20 Battalion, a state of affairs which unhappily continued as 8 Panzer Regiment and its supporting infantry carried their attack on to the eastern half of
If 20 Battalion on the eastern half of
All were in good spirits when the action started and took the approaching panzers to be the I tanks they expected from
So long as the tanks concentrated on the New Zealand field guns the position was not insecure; but Captain Quilter of the 20th realised that this could not last long and reported accordingly to Brigade. Captain Bassett told him to hold on for half an hour, by which time I tanks would counter-attack, and Quilter passed this information on to Major Orr Maj R. S. Orr, ED; Dunedin; born Dunedin,
The 29th and 48th Batteries were still engaged in their last desperate struggle with the German infantry when the tanks turned their attention to 20 Battalion, approaching B Company obliquely from its left front. As they did so, several men made gallant gestures of defiance. Sergeant Lochhead, for example, fired a Bren at the slits of a tank no more than 60 yards away until it gave his sangar a long return burst with its MGs. Private A .55-inch calibre anti-tank rifle, of little use against any but the thinnest of armour.Pzkw IV angrily swung its turret and killed him with a 75-millimetre shell at a range of 50 yards, crumpling up his ‘elephant gun’ with the same blow. Then, post by post, B Company was overrun, the tanks acting very warily and a few of the German infantry following up closely, the rest held at bay by small-arms fire. Most sections fired until the last and were so engrossed with infantry to their front that they were taken unawares by the tanks, the crews of which were surprisingly considerate and caused few needless casualties by their fire.
C Company and Battalion Headquarters were next and the ‘I’ Sergeant just had time to destroy his ‘maps, messages and code’ before the tanks closed in. The action was a bitter disappointment to C Company, which heard the fire but could see nothing through the smoke until three or four tanks suddenly appeared in the east. ‘It was then only a matter of the tank commanders saying up and out’, a private sadly remarks.
The last shots of all seem to have been fired by the gun A2, operated by Bombardier
The crew of the gun B4 slipped over the escarpment to safety when the infantry in front of them were captured; but very few others escaped the German dragnet. The only sizable body of 20 Battalion, other than the B Echelon in 28
Eighteenth Battalion was sited with B and D Companies on the southern flank and A and C on the northern. Of these, C and D were the ones immediately threatened when the remnants of the 20th were overrun, and the situation at the junction of the two units was highly confused. One section of the mortar platoon, nearer to the 20th than to the 18th, was lost, and the crew of the gun
The enemy did not immediately carry the attack into the 18 Battalion area, having enough to do collecting and assembling the prisoners from the 20th and reorganising after the severe fighting of the past two and a half hours. In the pause which followed, Snadden.
No more than half a mile to the west there was a German anti-tank minefield running southwards from the escarpment and, though two carriers were blown up on this (with a loss of two men killed and two wounded), it proved a great boon. The withdrawing companies crossed the Tobruk By-pass road and the leading sections
Joyes.
Tanks meanwhile nosed up to the minefield but did not try to cross it, and after a pause they disappeared. Then some of the
The main remaining worry was that there was no way of advising 4 Brigade what had happened; but this was unexpectedly overcome when a Stuart tank of C Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, which had somehow became isolated in the Corridor area, came forward and Peart spoke to Captain Bassett by R/T. Bassett, who had been called to Major Bonifant's tank to receive the message, put on the earphones and to this surprise and delight heard Peart's voice: ‘Hullo Brian, it's Jan here, I've withdrawn my Battalion complete, West into the Bassett, letter,
Divisional Battle Headquarters had settled down for the night just east of 6 Field Regiment and it was not long after the start of the morning's action that the cluster of vehicles around G Branch office were right in the firing line. A photograph of the scene to the south-west shows bushy tufts of scrub in the foreground, long
The South African armoured car, which through its wireless set provided the only means of communication with 30 Corps, was near at hand, and when German tanks were very close and men ahead were seen putting up their hands
By now the machine-gun fire coming into the area had reached a crescendo of fury, and bullets clanged on the side of the armoured car as the General imperturbably continued his wireless conversation. Sergeant Borman, Divisional Signals, p. 200.
This was just before 7.45 a.m.
Decision taken out of our hands. Being heavily attacked from S and W. 1 SA Bde failed to take point 175 last night but are going to try again this morning. Am in touch with NORRIE.
At the same time
The withdrawal of Battle Headquarters had already been left perilously late and some of the staff were becoming understandably concerned. When By an odd coincidence, 15 Pz Div, also had his vehicle hit at this stage and had to find other transport.
To the rear the scrub thickened as the ground fell away to form a wadi between
These seven I tanks had been sent to the east at first light and therefore took some time to respond to the order to help 20 Battalion and arrived too late to intervene. They were nevertheless led west-wards by Captain Ling and climbed a steep slope at the eastern edge of
The whole of
There the seven Matildas stayed for most of the day, precariously perched along a narrow track with their backs on the edge of a 150-foot escarpment. A second tank was damaged and with some difficulty returned to 4 Brigade, but two Valentines of
Standing beside his car ad hoc infantry, to carry the main weight of the defence.
The most vulnerable sector of the defence had seemed to be that of 6 Brigade Headquarters covered by the remanants of 21, 24 and 26 Battalions in positions most of which had been hastily chosen in the dark, and which were found in the morning to be facing across a mass of brigade transport. It was some
In an arc facing mainly south-west, 24 Battalion (about 100 strong, mostly B Echelon men with two Valentines in support) was on the right with lorries scattered through the area and had no contact either with 47 Field Battery farther north or 21 Battalion to the south-east. The 21st was in the centre and behind it were three Valentines of
Barrowclough looked eagerly for evidence of South Africans on Point 175 when it grew light enough and found none. Nor was there any evidence of friendly troops near
Most of the rank and file of the brigade, however, knowing little of the larger situation, took the unfolding day as just another in a series which had no discernible pattern but ups and downs of violence and quietness, of action and rare spells of rest, of bitter
When the panzers drove past on their way towards 6 Field Regiment, the Valentines engaged them with flanking fire at long range, the three Bofors depressed their barrels and shot away their 40-millimetre ammunition in batches strung together with tracers, and M Troop soon had to send for more 18-pounder rounds. One of the Valentines had to cease fire three times to let its 2-pounder barrel cool enough to take further rounds. It was a brief period of extreme violence in the course of which the tanks, artillery of all calibres, and the German motor-cycle machine-gunners and mortarmen returned the fire vigorously, though the tanks soon disappeared into the smoke to the north, leaving one or two behind to watch this flank. Most of the 2-pounder portées, conspicuous against the sombre background, were put out of action. On two occasions 21 Battalion men were seen with their hands up, about to surrender, and both times they were ‘cried down’. They could see in the distance a long line of men being marched from
Brigadier Gatehouse had meanwhile moved his composite brigade with 115 tanks from its night laager south of Point 175 in response to the order of 4 a.m. from General Gott to reconnoitre the Actually Mickl Gp, DAK and 15 Pz Div HQs and administrative elements, merging into Trieste Div on the southern escarpment and Pavia Div to the west.
As the leading tanks got nearer they could easily identify the New Zealand area from the ‘huge pall of smoke and dust about a mile and a half to the North of Diary of 5 R Tks. Ibid.
This took the impressive array of British tanks and armoured cars towards the lines of 8 Field Company and 25 Battalion in their isolated positions above the escarpment west of the Rugbet en-Nbeidat and these units, unhappily aware of the tragedy that was being enacted below them to the north, feared the worst until they joyfully identified 4 Armoured Brigade. The newcomers entered the area of the sappers and the tanks began to descend the escarpment in single file while Major Currie told Gatehouse what he knew, painting an even blacker picture than the facts warranted, because he thought 6 Brigade Headquarters had already been overrun.
‘As we got to the escarpment we could see the New Zealand leaguer with practically every vehicle ablaze, a terrible sight’, the dairy of
The 8th Hussars was the weakest of Gatehouse's regiments, however, and had been ordered only to draw the enemy's fire and then retire. Major Sandbach in the leading tank pushed on northwards and the rest followed. Then his tank was hit—by a captured Matilda tank, ironically—and he was killed. Another tank was damaged shortly afterwards, and the regiment withdrew eastwards. Barrowclough had expected the tanks to carry on towards Barrowclough, report.
This was only a local and pre-arranged withdrawal, however, and not a general retreat as Barrowclough imagined. He was not looking merely for salvation for the remnants of his brigade; the intervention of the British tanks seemed to him to constitute an almost magical reversal of the situation. Now the hunters and the hunted would change roles, his heavy losses would be avenged, and the countless acts of courage and self-sacrifice at
In this vengeful mood he came upon
there were about 40 German tanks supported by A.T. guns who were in ‘Hull-down’ positions about 1000 yds to the North of his leaguer and who were keeping him under constant gun and M.G. fire whilst he was being heavily shelled by the German Col. [umn] to the West. There was also an Italian Col. to the East at Pt. 175 about 5 miles away but at the moment they were silent. Most of his own 25 pdr and A.T. guns were out of action. His 3 Comd Os were casualties. He asked that an attack should be made against the enemy tanks to the North.
Drew agreed to do this, though ‘it would involve very heavy casualties in view of the extremely difficult position’, and said he would get in touch with the CO of In a post-war account (
Gatehouse had meanwhile set up a small headquarters on the escarpment below 8 Field Company, where he could see as much of the battlefield as the smoke and the bursting shells would allow and at the same time keep in touch with Gott on the ‘blower’. He had heard Major Currie's gloomy account of events and still did not realise that
We are in NZ leaguer, it is almost finished certain number of lorries have withdrawn E[ast] still men on ground on their feet vehicles burning everywhere impossible to tell what is happening. Have got NZ major [Currie?] who tells me they were attacked by lorried inf. Very heavy shelling. Have made ring of tanks and very few people can now get out. Will stay and do what we can but arty fire very heavy, strong enemy posn. NW of here, this place is overlooked on all sides. Do not know what is happening at The messages passed at this stage between Gott and Gatehouse are recorded in the log of 7 Armd Div appended to the war diary.
He had no thought of counter-attack, since the remnants of the New Zealand Division he could see were very few and in no condition, so far as he could judge, for anything but a retreat from the ghastly shambles below. In this he was mistaken; but the rear link wireless sets of both 3 and 5 Royal Tanks had broken down and he was out of touch with them.
Gott's conception of the situation, however, was wider of the mark and he signalled back as follows:
Would you be able to get to Bir el Chleta and thence to Sóuth?
Gatehouse replied, ‘Yes, I think so. I have no information but don't see why not.’ Neither of them knew that 21 Panzer lay astride the Trigh Capuzzo to the east, and Gott had in mind the withdrawal of whatever elements of the New Zealand Division Gatehouse could save along this track to Chleta and thence south to the 30 Corps area. His next communication at 10 a.m., however, only confused the issue:
Your first task is to assit NZ that you are doing, secondly destroy any enemy tanks you can find, thirdly to get back S to posn S of SA Bde. In order to do task (1) it is necessary to go to Bir el Chleta.
As a guide to action this was not helpful. Gatehouse could not counter-attack the German tanks by moving away from them, nor could he very well bring his reserve tanks, his guns and administrative ‘tail’ down the escarpment into the Kessel and then march eastwards under the noses of the Italians on Point 175. He therefore rejected the scheme:
No. NZ have left in formed body moving fast E, there are only a few stragglers left here in this leaguer. Am in a very nasty position and cannot possibly tell what is happening to anyone else.
Like the other British armoured commanders, Gatehouse preferred open desert and freedom of manoeuvre, and in the past fortnight he had seen enough of panzer tactics not to want to ‘mix it’ with Africa Corps unless the circumstances looked favourable. In this case it appeared that the bulk of the New Zealand Division had either been overrun or had made its escape eastwards and he saw no point in risking heavy losses in a lost cause. He was nevertheless ready to do anything within reason to help, and when Gott asked, ‘If you wait 10 mins will it endanger your command, then I can get orders from above?’, Gatehouse replied stoutly:
I will wait here as long as you like and do anything you like. But I have no information and can get none here.
Reasonable though this was from the point of view of an armoured commander who had seen British tank forces dissolve in front of his eyes when they came to grips with German armour, it was radically different from Barrowclough's attitude. As an infantry-man the 6 Brigade Commander attached more importance to vital ground than to mobility, and the plain facts of this case seemed to him to argue unanswerably in favour of counter-attack. He was surprised that there was any hesitation.
The viewpoints of the two brigadiers, when they met at the escarpment, therefore remained poles apart. Gatehouse does not recall meeting Barrowclough at all this day; so there is no account from his side of what passed between him and the Commander of 6 Bde. Crisp, pp. 152–3.
I urged him [Gatehouse] to make some effort to recover the prisoners from 4 NZ Bde and my own 6 Fd Regiment. I explained the weakness of my own forces, but undertook to attack with him and informed him that, from my own observations, the enemy tanks on our front were much fewer than those he commanded. I promised that my infantry would move forward with him and endeavour to cope with enemy anti-tank guns which I knew to be fairly numerous. From the top of the escarpment, there was exceptionally good observation of the enemy positions on the lower ground in the vicinity of the Trigh Capuzzo.
To this Gatehouse replied that he had been sent forward only to cover a withdrawal and ‘he did not consider his instructions authorised him to rescue those who had been taken prisoner.’ Barrowclough then pointed out that he had not received any orders to withdraw and saw no reason to do so while 4 Armoured Brigade was at hand. Its arrival had ‘obviously led the enemy to abandon the attack he had been about to launch.’ The answer to this was that Gatehouse's instructions did not allow him to stay in this position and he would therefore have to withdraw whatever the New Zealanders chose to do. This left Barrowclough ‘no option but to elect to withdraw to
Had Gatehouse known of the guns below 15 Panzer, or of the gallant rearguard of 44 Royal Tanks fighting from its ledge on the eastern end of
We have arranged with Brig. Borroclough [sic]. He has said he was going to withdraw at once E. Have warned him of the danger of attack, have heard of 14 M13 coming from W. Am ready for this. Place is being very heavily shelled with very large stuff.
Gatehouse had hitherto operated mainly beyond the range of the German ‘Of all the many actions in the Army Artillery and had not previously seen anything like the gun fire then falling on 6 Brigade, particularly the 210-millimetre shellbursts.
Contact Bernard 2000x [yards] S of
This was puzzling and it is doubtful if Gatehouse understood it, though he replied, ‘OK am in the picture’. Gott added a moment later, ‘Rally S of Pt 175 when you have done this’, which, in conjunction with the previous message, would have meant making a move of many miles eastwards along the Trigh Capuzzo, ‘dealing with’ Ariete at Point 175 on the way, ascending the escarpment where 1 South African Brigade was, and then carrying on westwards to where 4 Armoured Brigade had laagered the night before. All Gatehouse meant to do, however, was to render what help he could to the New Zealand remants and then withdraw the whole armoured brigade right away from the treacherous escarpments to some point in the south where it would be free to manoeuvre without restraint of terrain.
While these talks were going on the captive ranks of 20 Battalion were being assembled near the Mosque. Captain Quilter, looking back and hoping like the others for some favourable turn of events which would free him or allow him to escape, saw the British armour descend the escarpment no more than two miles away. ‘I anticipated a counter attack by these tanks on
Patrols from
Further misunderstandings were therefore brewing and they soon became apparent. Drew met Captain Weston, who asked him for instructions ‘regarding direction of withdrawal’, Diary of 5 R Tks.Ariete. The result was that Weston began to head up the Rugbet en-Nbeidat in obedience to what he thought Drew meant, though with grave misgivings about the Italians he felt certain covered this route.
Thus a three-sided tug-o'-war began, Drew wanting to move south, Gott expecting 6 Brigade and 4 Armoured Brigade to move eastwards along the Trigh Capuzzo, and Barrowclough having no thought of withdrawing completely from the battlefield and meaning only to rejoin the rest of the Division at
The column of vehicles raced over bumpy scrubland at high speed and halfway up the Rugbet came under fire exactly as had been predicted. With one accord the transport turned tail and fled back to the bottom with remarkably little damage and only one casualty. The column then headed north-eastwards and in due course reached
Above the escarpment 25 Battalion and 8 Field Company, ordered to withdraw, were assembling for this purpose when Weston made his spectacular ascent of the Rugbet; they watched it breathlessly, and were greatly relieved when nothing worse came of it. When these vehicles fled towards
The threat against which Gatehouse guarded seems to have been inferred from various movements of M13 tanks of Ariete south of Point 175, and German tanks were also reported to be attacking from the south. The British tank regiments therefore went through the familiar routine of adopting hull-down positions and Gatehouse reported back to Gott. One such report at 11.45 a.m. read in part as follows:
Starting evacuating leaguer as arranged. After 2 miles on a point just E of aerodrome, we were attacked by Italian tanks from in front, German tanks on right flank. Coln we were protecting disappeared NE could not protect them as had no contact. Consider responsibility over towards coln. In good posn now hull down, will shoot it out with them if they come on. Will try to rally in area ordered but must deal with tanks first as they are between us and area we want.
There were actually no German tanks to the south and the Italian tanks stayed out of range; but Diary of 5 R Tks.I Battalion, 8 Panzer Regiment, perhaps a dozen tanks all told, was withdrawn in great haste from the western part of 15 Panzer in a defensive role, supported by a battery of 105-millimetre guns south of
To the men of 6 Brigade the whole episode was puzzling. They were thankful for the timely help of the Stuart tanks when capture had seemed inevitable and full of admiration for the tank crews who lingered under heavy fire to escort them to safety. But they were mildly surprised that the British armour disappeared so quickly from the scene and disappointed that such a strong force made such a small impression on the battle as a whole. They had expected the tide to turn, but it continued to flow against them.
They would have been even more surprised had they known that 4 Armoured Brigade was under orders to counter-attack the enemy tanks at all costs, which it evidently did not do. In this connection Ariete, though this division showed no signs of wanting to come to grips with the British armour. He had less to fear than he thought, and it is not flattering to his brigade that the remnants of a German tank battalion could turn about from a very severe action and appear to drive away a fresh British force which outnumbered it in tanks by about nine to one.
Because it was vital to retain firm control of the guns,
With a handful of staff
These forty-odd 25-pounders with their dwindling stocks of ammunition were the kingpin of the defence and the confidence reposed in them, as so often in the desert war, was not misplaced. They lacked the range of many of the German guns, their rate of fire was comparatively slow, and as anti-tank guns they were conspicuous and vulnerable; but they were versatile, accurate if well served, and as a final sanction able to fire crushing broadsides of solid shot at tanks which came close. Here the 3000-odd remaining members of the New Zealand Division clustered on
The strength of the guns, however, resided as much in the organisation behind them as in their physical characteristics. Though the guns were ‘shot’ in the main by FOOs who observed the effect on the ground and made corrections, there was not nearly enough ammunition to engage all targets offering, nor could the FOOs on the spot always correctly assess the main danger. All ‘shoots’ therefore had to be authorised by Duff or his assistants, who plotted targets on the map, logged information, and studied with growing apprehension the ammunition states. It was 1 p.m. by the time RHQ was linked by telephone with 4 Brigade Headquarters in the latter's new site, and until then the artillery network was all that linked the various sectors of the defence. Co-operation between 4 Field Regiment and 8 Field Regiment, RA, was excellent and Major 29
Besides these field guns,
In the early afternoon W/X Battery fired a few rounds per gun at a group of large lorries approaching the eastern flank. Some of the lorries kept on coming, however, and were found to contain many hundreds of Italians of Ariete who had lost heart and wanted to surrender. Their reception was cool; 4 Brigade had no water or rations to spare and did not want them. Some were persuaded to look elsewhere for relief from hunger, thirst, and the anxieties of battle; but others remained in the offing intent on becoming prisoners. Beyond Ariete were the guns of 1 South African Brigade and the Jock Columns, and these and the New Zealand guns had been unwittingly playing a kind of table tennis with these Italians, driving them first one side and then the other of the high ground.
The South Africans had resumed their efforts to seize Point 175 at 5 a.m. and with heavy artillery support drove off elements of Report of 1 SA Bde.21 Panzer and 3 Reconnaissance Unit and reached the eastern edge of
A confusing signal of uncertain origin but probably from Eighth Army was received at New Zealand Battle Headquarters at 9.45 a.m. and reached
We hung on in hope SA would attack and recapture pt 175 and
Thirtieth Corps did not have the requisite cipher keys, however, Norrie did not receive this message, and he therefore did not learn that
This was before Norrie, ‘Narrative of Events’.Pz Gp Intelligence diary.crusader adventures ten days before, and the New Zealanders would replenish there.
No times were settled and it was left open to
Requests had already been made through the Air Support Control tentacle to obtain
Co-operation between air and ground troops on the enemy side was less effective. Bombing was called for on 90 Light Division recorded seeing the British positions there bombed by Stukas at 4.10 p.m. But 4 Brigade was not bombed and an FOO of 7 Medium Regiment, RA, ‘reported with glee’ according to the regimental history (page 44) ‘that he had just seen an enemy column bombed by both our bombers and German Stukas.’ The diary of 15 Panzer reports heavy air raids ‘causing casualties to men and MT’.
General Cruewell had gone to General Neumann-Silkow's headquarters soon after midday and ordered 15 Panzer to carry the attack eastwards over 21 Panzer and ‘close in the ring round the enemy’, but 8 Panzer Regiment had to refuel and replenish its ammunition, 200 Regiment had to be withdrawn from 2 MG Battalion was digging in facing 18 Battalion, and 33 Artillery Regiment had to be redisposed to support the renewed attack. Neumann-Silkow therefore fixed 4.30 p.m. as the starting time and the
Duff had been called to a conference at 4 Brigade Headquarters at 3.35 p.m. and there told to be ready to move eastwards at 5.30. An hour later he had gathered his battery commanders together at his own headquarters to issue orders for this move; but the discussion, as his report says, was ‘continually interrupted by very heavy and very close 5.9 fire’ and all realised they would have to make a fighting withdrawal. There would therefore be no hope of assembling the whole group as an entity before moving off, and Duff merely explained where he wanted the batteries to travel in the brigade group columns and told them to find their own ways to their allotted stations.
The gun lines, however, were too vulnerable for even this simple programme and the attack by 15 Panzer when it came caused an immediate crisis along almost the whole length of the wadi, though the superb battle discipline of the RA gunners did not betray this. Most guns reverted to Gun Control and their crews engaged tanks and infantry over open sights, firing AP (so long as it lasted) at the tanks and HE (if there was time to choose) at the infantry. Tanks appeared at the mouth of the wadi and tried to drive up it, to be met by withering fire from 46 Battery and Q Troop's 18-pounders which turned them back amid clouds of dust and smoke. Other tanks appeared almost at once on the south-eastern slopes of
One cause of this inaccuracy was the fire of the five Matildas of 44 Royal Tanks which remained in working order. These had withdrawn to the wadi to replenish ammunition and while there
Volunteers were never lacking to take over when members of gun crews were hit and two guns of C Troop, 25 Battery, were manned at the height of the action by scratch crews, one under Lieutenant
In this turmoil two guns, one each of A and C Troops, 25 Battery, kept firing over open sights, manned by the survivors of four gun crews, until there was almost no hope of withdrawing the guns. The setting sun glared for a few painful minutes in the gunners' eyes and then sank below the horizon. Behind them the shell-torn wadi was the scene of much activity as the last vehicles hastened to get away eastwards, speeded by enemy fire. Then an A Troop officer came forward, told his crew to ‘leave the gun and get out’, and
Nearer the mouth of the wadi three more guns, the 18-pounders of Q Troop, continued to speak out firmly, their flashes streaking out farther and farther into the twilight, and ceased fire only when it was ‘too dark to pick out targets’.
The attack halted at nightfall and the diary of 15 Panzer blames this, as often before, on an ‘erroneous order from Pz Gp’. Cruewell when he heard of it was angry and signalled to Neumann-Silkow at 11.30 p.m. in these words:
I have always named
The report of 8 Panzer Regiment also states that a halt was called when the division was still three kilometres short of 2 MG Battalion talks of ‘continuous shell and anti-tank fire until dusk’ and took up all-round defensive positions after dark, having succeeded, as it thought, in an attack against ‘an enemy far superior in numbers and possessing every topographical advantage.’ The report of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion merely says that ‘it was no use going on any farther in the dark’. Those in the van of the attack were only too ready to settle down for the night; they had had enough.
At the Sciuearat strongpoint 26 Battery and some guns of 65 Anti-Tank Regiment, RA, assisted by one or two damaged Valentines of 21 Panzer which kept the 25-pounders busy until dark and made them late for their rendezvous at the Divisional assembly area. Things might
General Boettcher, the new GOC of 21 Panzer, had been ordered to attack westwards in conjunction with the attack on 15 Panzer; but his division was in poor shape and made no attempt to attack the main New Zealand concentration. Instead II Battalion of 104 Infantry Regiment advanced westwards above the escarpment, brushing past Ariete, while 8 MG Battalion pushed along the foot of the escarpment, taking cover frequently and making little progress until after dark. Ahead of the machine-gunners the twelve remaining German tanks and one captured Stuart of 5 Panzer Regiment showed slightly more enterprise. The six Valentines attacked from Sciafsciuf, disabling the Stuart and another German tank, and the rest of the panzers quickly disappeared over the escarpment, reappearing farther west and working their way at high speed round to the western side of the Sciuearat strongpoint so that the setting sun was behind them. None of the six Valentines, however, returned from this skirmish. For a few minutes there was a lively exchange of fire between 26 Battery and the German tanks, but the latter came no closer than 1100 yards and 26 Battery was able to disengage at 6 p.m. and move off three-quarters of an hour later, catching up with the Divisional columns a few miles eastwards on the Trigh Capuzzo.
Vehicles had started moving to the New Zealand assembly area before dark, but the first of them, elements of 6 Brigade, were shelled and had to disperse again for a short time. They reassembled with the rest of the Division soon afterwards, however, and the whole force formed up for the night march in nine columns with C Squadron, Divisional Cavalry (in lieu of the I tanks), leading 4 Brigade, followed by Divisional Battle Headquarters and then 6 Brigade, with 25 Battalion at the rear. The I tanks and the last of the guns later took up position on the right flank.
The starting line had been chosen by
The plotted course ran for three miles almost due east and then south to Bir Sciafsciuf. Flares rising straight ahead, however, were evidently enemy and there were more of the same kind to the south, so that columns had to drive between them. Back on the correct compass bearing the same flares were seen along the right flank and it was well past the appointed end of the ‘first leg’ that the Division headed south across the Trigh Capuzzo. Red flares fired above the escarpment (on General Norrie's instructions) guided the leaders in and contact was soon established with the Transvaal Scottish of 1 South African Brigade, not at Sciafsciuf but south of Bir el Chleta. Mayfield Column and A Squadron, ‘Narrative of Events’.
It was a momentous meeting and brought to an end the main operations of the New Zealand Division in crusader campaign, as well as coinciding with other moves by 30 Corps which in effect conceded victory to the enemy in the second phase of the campaign. The main body of 1 South African Brigade had already moved back to Taieb el-Esem and at midnight the Transvaal Scottish followed. With 4 Armoured Brigade at Bir Berraneb, 30 Corps thus moved beyond striking distance of the main enemy forces, though by withdrawing southwards towards the FMCs rather than towards the frontier Norrie would be, as he says, ‘in a position to resume the offensive at the shortest possible moment.’ There seemed little likelihood of renewing the attack in the near future; but a message from Gott asked him to return to 30 Corps Headquarters south of the Trigh el-Abd by 9 a.m. next day at the latest as there were fresh instructions from General Ritchie. Some new development had
Before the New Zealand Division moved on, Captain Ling of 44 Royal Tanks asked for permission to stay behind, as his few tanks were badly in need of overhaul. This was granted and his little party with a few essential vehicles went into close laager for the rest of the night. They were the last (except for two Valentines which stayed with the Division and about sixteen damaged tanks in
Not a shot had been fired at the Division in the course of the withdrawal from The following units and detachments were represented in whole or part among the 3500 men and 700 vehicles in this force: Battle HQ HQ 4 and 6 Bdes C Sqn, Div Cav 8 R Tks (two tanks) 44 R Tks (admin. transport) 4 and 6 Fd Regts, 8 Fd Regt, RA, and 47 Fd Bty 31, 33 and 34 Btys, 7 A-Tk Regt 41 and 43 Btys, 14 LAA Regt 65 A-Tk Regt, RA (less one bty) 1 Survey Tp 5 Fd Park Coy 6 and 8 Fd Coys Battle HQ Sigs and E, J and L Sections Div Sigs, and two tentacles of T Air Support Control Sigs 19 Bn (Zaaforce) 20 Bn (admin. transport) 21, 24, 25 and 26 Bns 2 and 3 Coys, 27 MG Bn 4 Fd Amb (ADS)
THE retreat from crusader. More than 1000 New Zealanders remained in the Corridor (18 Battalion, half of the 19th, and many gunners), another 3500 (apart from wounded) were within
The main fighting strength was in 5 Brigade, which had spent three uneventful days after Africa Corps left the frontier area and now prepared, as the rest of the Division withdrew, for a new phase of operations. Enemy armour had departed on 27 November and on the 28th it was evident to 23 and 28 Battalions at
This the battalion group did, assembling its 220-odd vehicles Including the following: 22 Bn 28 Fd Bty, less E Tp F A-Tk Tp Half D LAA Tp 3 Sec, 4 MG Coy Part of Div Amn Coy and 309 Gen Transport Coy, RASC B Echelons of Div Cav and 34 A-Tk Bty ‘
This was as General Ritchie had stipulated, in the mistaken belief that Africa Corps was still being supplied mainly from
Eighth Army Report.
Unexpectedly stubborn resistance to a final attack on the enemy pocket in the western part of Libyan Omar on 30 November delayed this redeployment, as one of the battalions involved, 3/1 Punjab, was from 5 Indian Brigade. The Punjabis suffered 105 casualties in the course of bitter fighting in which all but one stubborn centre of resistance fell by the end of the day and 170 prisoners were taken. The remainder of the enemy, some 80–100 men, slipped away in the night and were rounded up by armoured cars next day. The hard core of Germans, 12 Oasis Company, had kept the main strength of Africa Corps left the area, serving Rommel well.
On 1 and 2 December 5 New Zealand Brigade With a small HQ in which the main appointments were:
The heavy losses, particularly in I tanks, which had been incurred in attacking the Omars, had made further efforts to reduce the frontier strongpoints out of the question for some time and it became apparent to Eighth Army and A matter on which
Defence of the rear areas, the
The main battle, however, had first to be won. After visiting Eighth Army Report. UK Narrative, Chap. G, Phase 3, ‘The Relief of
Ritchie thought that the panzers might be persuaded to sally forth without these guns—an eventuality of the kind rudely remarked on in Shaw's Pygmalion—and he proposed to draw them out by changing the Schwerpunkt of his attack from
Leaving his fresh instructions and a letter for General Norrie, Ritchie flew back to Army Headquarters, where he met General Auchinleck, who, sensing a crisis, had flown up from Auchinleck's despatch. See See Connell, p. 393, for a most revealing statement of Auchinleck's views.
From all this it emerges clearly that the continued policy of Eighth Army, even with the firm hand of Auchinleck behind it, was to disperse its efforts and break up its divisions into brigade groups, and even battalion groups, operating independently and offering Africa Corps repeated opportunities to defeat them in detail as it had been doing for the past fortnight. If General Rommel concentrated his shrinking resources and timed his blows well he could continue to deal with Eighth Army a brigade or a battalion at a time and it was important not to give him the chance. The essential tactical situation remained so obscure to those on the British side who were concerned with the higher conduct of the battle, however, that they acquiesced in a move—to give up what was left of the
To Rommel it seemed that with the departure of the New Zealand remnants from Ariete, Mickl Group (formerly Boettcher Group), and 90 Light Division, with some support from other Italian formations and the Army Artillery (and relentless pressure from Rommel). After his headquarters was overrun by 6 Brigade on 23 November, however, Cruewell had too few resources to conduct operations on this scale effectively and the success was actually gained largely by 15 Panzer.
This magnificent fighting machine was now threatening to break down and 21 Panzer and 90 Light both needed a complete overhaul. Thus Rommel would have to make more use than hitherto of his Italian troops. Of these only Ariete and Trieste were mobile, and the former therefore reverted to the command of
Rommel's insistent worries about the supply of the frontier garrisons, which had already clouded his judgment and led him into a chapter of errors, prompted him even before 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions to prepare strong columns to travel along the Ariete and Trieste to the
This would not leave him much strength on the Trento and 90 Light in the morning of 1 December to break right through the Corridor from opposite sides had turned out to be ineffective on the German side, and on the Italian side came to nothing at all. To forestall a rupture of the siege front Rommel knew he had to force the garrison back from Ed Duda to the original perimeter; and this, too, he felt could not wait and would have to be done at once.
A third urgent task was to withdraw and overhaul practically all the tanks of Africa Corps, which he ordered to be done as soon as
Meanwhile 70 Division faced another crisis. General Scobie had been much concerned at the deterioration of the situation on 30 November which threatened to leave him holding a 17-mile-long appendix to his original perimeter against the full weight of Panzer Group Africa with little or no help from 30 Corps or the remnants of the New Zealand Division. His fruitless effort to open up the north-eastern shoulder of the Corridor, unluckily directed at stubborn strongpoints of 90 Light, had indicated that the enemy siege troops were not as near to collapse as he had thought. In the circumstances it was easy to forget that the defences of Ed Duda had been greatly strengthened, so that few anti-tank guns remained guarding any other part of the perimeter, and the garrison artillery could now give that key position far better cover than before. A renewal of
1st South African Bde failed to reach Pt 175 and corridor defences may be threatened. Consider it may be necessary to withdraw to original perimeter. Estimate ‘I’ tanks number 20. Further offensive action 70th Div would dangerously weaken garrison. Request staff officer be sent to decide.
Godwin-Austen and Scobie certainly did not realise that in giving up this vital ground and allowing the enemy once again to use the By-pass road and the Trigh Capuzzo at the Ed Duda bottleneck they would in effect be bringing the crusader offensive to an end. Nor, when they considered this signal in the evening, did this point strike Ritchie and Auchinleck. But it was obvious that if Ed Duda were given up Ritchie's difficulties would increase, and Eighth Army replied to 13 Corps at 7.55 p.m. (twelve hours later) as follows:
To continue to hold Ed Duda appendix will materially assist future ops for relief of
Long before this reached 13 Corps plans had been outlined to withdraw from Ed Duda, and it was not until word of this reached the ears of Lieutenant-Colonel Nichols of 1 Essex that the scheme met with its just desserts. The acting second-in-command of the battalion, Major J. F. Higson, received a message from 70 Division ‘to the effect that it was considered that Ed Duda would shortly become untenable and that we were to make plans for withdrawal back within the
Take a message—
Ed Duda growing stronger every hour, feel confident we can resist attack from any quarter. Strongly deplore any suggestion of withdrawal.
Scobie therefore gave up all thought of yielding Ed Duda and replied: ‘Greatly admire your spirit’, and Higson concludes that ‘whether the main forces would have ever linked up with Quoted by Martin, pp. 88–9. Rommel would doubtless have concurred. Higson gives the date as 29 Nov but it must have been 1 Dec. Nichols's immediate superior, Lt-Col O'Carroll of 4 R Tks, warmly supported him.
The day proved uneventful apart from shelling and our troops took the opportunity of improving and consolidating their positions. In the evening they laid mines and put wire outside their defences.
Thus Ed Duda was not given up; but shellfire on this feature was heavy and remained so for two or three days. On the saddle between there and Kolbeck Battalion, an ad hoc unit of 90 Light) after dark on 1 December and helped to defeat a much heavier attack next morning. This came mainly against 1 Bedfords and Herts to the left rear, and this unit drove the enemy northwards in considerable disorder. In the course of this fighting it became apparent that the morale of General Suemmermann's troops had deteriorated and their offensive potential was now negligible. Kolbeck Battalion suffered crippling loss in men and equipment, and 605 Anti-Tank Battalion, 900 Engineer Battalion, and III Battalion of 347 Infantry Regiment met with some loss, particularly in anti-tank weapons. To 18 Battalion, on the other hand, the action was salutary; it cost only seven casualties against many times that number of Germans killed, wounded or captured and helped to restore any confidence that had been shaken by the fighting on
More than 3500 officers and men of the New Zealand Division remained within the fortress and 850 New Zealand vehicles, and they did all they could to help. The NZASC companies provided working parties at the ammunition depot and the docks, Workshops and Ordnance Field Park overhauled vehicles, and the Salvage Unit for the first time found plenty of work to do. The NZA elements found there were more guns in
Most of the New Zealand administrative troops in the fortress, however, were not really needed there. When Ritchie's new plan to relieve
As early as 8.30 a.m. on 1 December Rommel called at Cruewell's headquarters, pointed out that the British were ‘trying to starve out the Africa Corps diary, and the orderly officer completed the record of Rommel's remarks as follows:
Otherwise the enemy will bring up every negro from South Africa and clean up our people.
At 5.40 p.m. Rommel added a few further details. After emptying the Kessel Cruewell was to
Take food to
This was the mixture very much as before except that Gambara Corps was to take the route followed on 24 November by Africa Corps, which would now travel by way of the Trigh Capuzzo and the
The advance guard along the 15 Panzer and that along the Trigh Capuzzo by 21 Panzer. The troops selected by Neumann-Silkow were Headquarters of 200 Regiment, 15 Motor Cycle Battalion, a company and a half of anti-tank guns, and a troop and a half of 33 Artillery Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Geissler of 200 Regiment—hence the title Geissler Advance Guard. Knabe Advance Guard was similarly constituted under Lieutenant-Colonel Knabe with II Battalion of 104 Infantry Regiment, an anti-tank company, artillery, and three tanks, to push eastwards along the Trigh Capuzzo.
Geissler returned to his headquarters in the early afternoon of 2 December with orders to ‘push forward along the I Battalion, 104 Infantry Regiment] at Briel Group at Africa Corps had visited the area five days before.
Divisional Cavalry and 5 New Zealand Brigade were stationed on the
Next morning A Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, and A Company of 28 Battalion on their way to Bir el Baheira caught sight of an enemy force with artillery and about a hundred vehicles. The patrol hastily withdrew to 5 Brigade Headquarters at Bir ez-Zemla and gave the alarm, all other patrols were recalled, the defences were
Geissler Advance Guard came on cautiously and halted two miles west of 28 (Maori) Battalion, infantry dismounted and seemed to be preparing to attack, and the Maoris waited tensely for the next development. D Company (less one platoon patrolling to the north) was astride the
A few shells landed on the escarpment near the Maoris at 11.30 a.m. and the 25-pounders replied, then at midday the areas of A Company and Battalion Headquarters came under heavy MG fire. There was a scurry in the rear when 22 Battalion called all its vehicles down from the higher ground to gain shelter from the shellfire; but D Company of 28 Battalion kept out of sight and with admirable discipline held its fire until enemy vehicles were well past the FDLs and the nearest of them were no more than 60 yards from Maori Bren guns. The enemy had their eyes glued on the escarpment, expecting trouble from there and not from the seemingly empty desert around them. It was a situation of a kind the Maoris delighted in, and they kept the enemy in entire ignorance of their proximity until the commander of the section astride the road gave the order to open fire about 1 p.m. The first rounds were followed in an instant by murderous fire from every weapon within reach, including the Bofors guns. At short range this caused very heavy casualties, the front was soon strewn with blazing vehicles, and Geissler Advance Guard reeled back.
The enemy then split into two groups and bravely resumed the advance, two or three companies attacking D Company frontally and the others trying to work round the right flank, with support from guns and mortars. But the Maori position was far too strong. D Company and the artillery had no trouble holding the attack. Within an hour the enemy facing D Company were in full retreat, leaving behind many killed and wounded as well as unwounded prisoners, and abandoning most of their vehicles and even personal weapons.
A Company of the Maoris had a harder task, as the ground in front was undulating and there were many covered avenues of approach. The enemy there refused to be easily dislodged and kept the Maoris under continual MG and mortar fire which remained troublesome throughout the afternoon. During a lull the battalion commander, Captain Love, therefore consulted with his company commanders and decided on a counter-attack to clear this front before dark. Only one section of A Company was committed to this and attacked northwards at 5 p.m. from the area of D Company, the carriers of B Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, and the 1 Company of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion which did not receive Geissler's order to withdraw).
Geissler Advance Guard thus suffered a heavy defeat and its leading elements were almost annihilated at a cost to the defence of two killed and nine wounded. Enemy losses were estimated at Brigade Headquarters to be 239 killed, 129 wounded and 100 prisoners, a veritable massacre. Even in Geissler's report the German losses are listed as 8 wounded and 231 missing, a high proportion of the total force. The remnants of 15 Motor Cycle Battalion were formed into a headquarters and one company and took up positions at
Knabe Advance Guard to the south fared slightly better, partly because it had tank support. Goldforce had no infantry and could not therefore set an ambush on the Maori pattern, nor did the open ground encourage this. The action was therefore fought at longer range, chiefly by the field guns, with anti-tank support when the enemy came close enough. At least one tank was knocked out and the enemy drew back at dusk.
In the evening of 2 December Cruewell had recommended to Rommel that the area south-east of repeating ‘the error of giving up … a battlefield on which Africa Corps except the tanks, which all needed overhaul. His prediction about the advance guards was to be fulfilled in dramatic and costly fashion; but Rommel insisted on trying again to relieve the frontier forts, not with the whole of
These moves caused a reaction in Eighth Army Headquarters exactly opposite to the reaction to Rommel's dash to the frontier on 24 November. Instead of ‘writing off’ this new threat as a last desperate fling, Army was alarmed and at 11 a.m. on 4 December ordered 30 Corps to withdraw 4 Armoured Brigade. Then an even
Africa Corps lingered on. This change of policy threatened grave danger to 11 Indian Brigade, which was then attacking north-west of Bir el-Gubi, and also to the troops defending the
The 11th Indian Brigade had halted south-east of El Esem on the Trigh el-Abd to await the arrival of supporting arms. Duly reinforced with a makeshift squadron of sixteen Valentines, a battery each of field and anti-tank guns, and two troops of Bofors, and followed by 7 Medium Regiment, RA, this brigade moved off at 10 p.m. on the 3rd and after a long and difficult approach march attacked an enemy position north-west of Bir el-Gubi at 7.10 a.m. on the 4th. This was meant as a preliminary to the attack on
It was at the height of this fighting that Ritchie asked Norrie to send 4 Armoured Brigade 50 miles eastwards to deal with the enemy advances along the
No such threat then seemed likely; but in fact Rommel had once again concentrated to strike at the vital point. After renewed but unsuccessful attacks by 11 Indian Brigade on Point 174 on 5 December, Africa Corps suddenly intervened just before dusk. With
The first was 7 Armd, then came 5 SA Bde, 22 Armd, and 4 and 6 NZ Bdes.
Meanwhile another unsuccessful attack was mounted on Ed Duda, concurrently with the attempts by Knabe and Geissler to get through to Diary of 90 Light early on 3 December; but General Suemmermann's troops were incapable of any such effort. The rout of Kolbeck Battalion (by 1 Bedfords and Herts and 18 Battalion) early on the 2nd indicated a low level of spirits, and even a message from Rommel himself on the 3rd that the ‘fighting in North Africa has been decided in the meantime’,90 Lt Div. The message was issued by Rommel on 2 Dec and proclaimed a great victory, though the troops were exhorted to maintain their efforts ‘until the enemy is trampled into the dust.’ Africa Corps perceived this and agreed that all
The troops selected came from various quarters and were all tired and dispirited. The 21st Panzer provided 8 MG Battalion to attack from the south-east and elements of 200 and 900 Engineer
Battalions were to strike from the south, while what was left of Mickl Group (500 German infantry and Italian sappers with two ‘88s’, eight LAA guns, and four Italian ‘105s’) advanced on Ed Duda from the west.
The defences were now manned by 14 Infantry Brigade with 1 Essex (two companies plus A and B Companies of 19 Battalion) at Ed Duda, 4 Border to the north-east (in place of 2/13 Australian Battalion), and 18 New Zealand Battalion on the saddle west of Mickl Group with ease, and then the other Essex company dealt with the German sappers attacking from the south. A quick thrust by 8 MG Battalion reached the By-pass road where this lay outside the defences between 18 Battalion and 4 Border, and the latter counter-attacked vigorously with tank support, gaining 1000 yards of ground but failing to dislodge some German posts. The ‘88s’, firing at long range, picked off the I tanks one after the other and by the end of the afternoon disabled fifteen of them. This loss was more than counter-balanced, however, by a sudden raid on the rear of the enemy at Bir Bu Creimisa and
Dudaforce of 19 Battalion was heavily shelled, but not otherwise engaged, and the southern flank of 18 Battalion was mortared intensely, fourteen men being wounded. Then two enemy tanks tried to drive across the German minefield which covered the front of 18 Battalion and one of them struck a mine. Anti-tank fire destroyed this tank and the other one withdrew. When 4 Border failed in a final counter-attack and some of them withdrew through the lines of 18 Battalion,
Because the troops at Ed Duda beat off these attacks without help, the plans 70 Division was making for a thrust towards Africa Corps therefore assembled its scattered elements and was able to make its sudden reappearance on the 5th against 11 Indian Brigade.
Africa Corps, after disentangling itself in the morning of the 6th from various elements of 30 Corps, was nevertheless well placed to strike again heavily and perhaps decisively; the British armour was still marking time and 22 Guards Brigade and the remnants of 11 Indian Brigade were open to panzer attack. The
On the 6th 15 Panzer lost its GOC,
A few miles to the east another event occurred on 6 December which had little influence on the battle as a whole but was highly gratifying to the New Zealanders and others who were in the captured New Zealand MDS near Point 175. This day Wilson Column edged forward gingerly, not wanting to start a fight and perhaps harm the patients, and occupied the MDS without opposition, bringing to an end a nine-day ordeal for patients and staff. The Italian guards had flown. The walking wounded were soon despatched southwards to waiting lorries and the more serious cases were evacuated by ambulance car later in the day. More than sixty patients and staff had already escaped, including Colonels See McKinney, Medical Units, pp. 168–76.
Rommel had been warned on 5 December by a special emissary from Comando Supremo that no marked improvement could be expected in the transport of supplies and reinforcements to North Africa until Luft flotte 2 began operating from Panzer Group could not achieve a major success at El Gubi that day it would have to withdraw to 90 Light and most of its Italian neighbours had moved back behind Africa Corps Headquarters at such a difficult time was enough to bring it about. Cruewell was only human and he was now faced with the imposing mass of 4 Armoured Brigade, which this day clashed with
Though twice postponed, the attack on
Had Rommel's orders been obeyed the garrison would have punched thin air when it attacked on the appointed night. Rommel had ordered all troops east of Pavia was about to comply when General Gambara arrived and, in his capacity as Chief of Staff to Bastico, counter-manded the order. The plan was that 2/13 Australian Battalion on the right would seize ‘Snow White’ (formerly ‘Plonk’), 2 Queen's (appropriately) would take ‘Queen’, 2 Pavia at Point 157 but with tank support took the position and 130 prisoners at a cost of 11 killed and 25 wounded. Finally 4 Border, aided by a patrol from 19 Battalion, passed through the DLI and occupied Point 162 unopposed. In the morning the Australians found their objective unoccupied and gladly took it over and 2 Queen's had the same experience; both agreed that it was far easier to move by day than by night through the intricate
Though over-anxious about the thrusts towards
Thus the tactical problems confronting Eighth Army were not really solved: they merely disappeared in clouds of dust raised by the RASC lorries at the final stage of a gigantic administrative effort. When Africa Corps committed four Italian guns to the Ed Duda attack it carefully noted the ammunition they possessed; but 30 Corps took it for granted that its 25-pounders would carry on punching at the enemy until they wore him down, that the fighting vehicles would continue as before in prodigal disregard of the petrol they consumed, and that units and formations which suffered heavy loss would be withdrawn and replaced. By
Rommel was provisioned from a much smaller barrel and he had long since scraped its bottom. Those which survived of the units which had met the first crusader onslaught were still fighting. The men were weary, in the main unshaven (for lack of water), and bedraggled in a way, for example, that astonished the Maoris at crusader would seldom be halted by lack of the sinews of war.
THE receding tide of battle left 5 New Zealand Brigade stranded from 4 December onwards at Other appointments were:
Lt-Col Andrew resumed command of 22 Bn and
Divisional Cavalry, rejoined on the 5th by C Squadron and reinforced with artillery and MMGs, sent mobile columns in conjunction with the South Africans to comb the country north of the A patrol of 15 Panzer. Next day B Squadron attacked this with two South African companies and supporting artillery, while A Squadron covered the right flank. Half-
Divisional Cavalry was now under the command of
General Godwin-Austen had asked for 5 Brigade (or other ‘fresh’ troops) to push through to
Next day disclosed, however, that the enemy had withdrawn altogether from the
Various other small New Zealand parties had already left A further similar sequel was the torpedoing of the Chakdina on 5 December, in company with smaller New Zealand contingents in the destroyer Farndale and the corvette Thorgrim. There were 600 aboard the Chakdina including 120 New Zealanders, 97 of them wounded, when the little ship put to sea at 5 p.m. bound for Farndale and Thorgrim; eighty of the New Zealanders were lost, most of them men who had been wounded in the fighting at Jantzen on 9 Dec while carrying 2100 PW from Jantzen was beached in southern Prisoners of War, pp. 110–12.
The depleted 5 Field Regiment was detached at 31
The plan was to advance along the escarpment south of the
The armour now passed to Godwin-Austen's command and General Norrie's headquarters was to conduct the siege of the frontier forts. The technical layout of the two corps headquarters, however, was very different, that of 30 Corps having excellent wireless links and being designed for mobile operations while 13 Corps had the telephone facilities required for more static operations. General Ritchie perhaps felt that Godwin-Austen might do better than Norrie in co-ordinating the operations of the armour with those of the infantry; but the technical deficiencies of Godwin-Austen's organisation were serious and it soon appeared that he, too, was unable to get the British armour to come to close grips with the diminishing enemy armour.
The Gazala defences were of long standing and their general layout well known. They swung south and then south-west from Ain el- 10 Corps on the coast and
In the first instance 5 New Zealand Brigade advanced westwards as a brigade group, starting at 3 a.m. on the 11th and driving through
From
The enemy air forces were now active and both E Troop of 42 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery with 23 Battalion and D Troop with the Maoris were soon in action. Fourteen Stukas escorted by Me109Fs on their way to
Reconnaissance in front of 5 Brigade disclosed that the enemy was holding a triangular ridge south of the road with its eastern apex at Mingar el-Hosci, a name soon to be replaced in the jargon of the 23rd by ‘Thomson's Ridge’, since it was C Company under
Brescia here. Those Italians who had not already fled promptly surrendered, 9 officers and 252 other ranks all told. Much equipment was also seized, and C Company turned several
Thomson's Ridge now came under concentrated fire and it was soon evident that a counter-attack was impending. C Company, though ably supported by Chestnut Troop, was very much on its own, but the men were quickly organised to meet the threat and gave the Italians a very hot reception. The enemy in obviously superior numbers came within 50–60 yards of the New Zealand positions, but there they halted, and after some hesitation they broke and ran, leaving many of their weapons behind and some vehicles. D Company arrived at the critical moment and together with C held the ridge until dark. C Company had lost two killed, two missing and 26 wounded, modest figures for dislodging two enemy battalions from a commanding feature. At dusk C Company and then D withdrew as instructed and the enemy at the same time moved several miles westwards to the
The Maoris had meanwhile seized Point 209 with ease and with it 200 prisoners at very small cost. A platoon of A Company, widely extended and supported by field guns and MMGs, exploited to the west and kept up the pressure on the enemy until dark, at which time the latter, elements of Trento Division, withdrew like Brescia to the main
Next day 5 New Zealand Brigade advanced on a three-battalion front, with 22 Battalion on the left of the Maoris. Carrier patrols from the 23rd on the right soon brought in thirty Italians from Trento. When the battalion was halted by shellfire later in the morning, Chestnut Troop silenced this fire and scored a direct hit on a 75-millimetre gun. The battalion was obviously approaching a strongly-held position and was ordered not to incur heavy casualties; so it halted a little to the west when shelling again became heavy.
In the centre the Maoris were dive-bombed and lost two killed and one wounded, but came through much shellfire unscathed. They occupied Point 182, above the escarpment south-west of Thomson's Ridge, without opposition, digging in there with B, C and D Companies forward and A Company in reserve.
On the left the 22nd, after passing through an area littered with dangerous ‘thermos’ bombs (which exploded when moved), reached first Bir et-Tammet and then a depression in the ground a few miles short of its final objective,
By dusk the brigade had reached a line running roughly north-south some three to six miles east of the
Further progress by 23 Battalion next day, 13 December, was difficult and the main activity was by carrier patrols and by Chestnut Troop of 1 RHA, which was heavily bombarded and lost one man killed and five wounded. A carrier patrol nevertheless reached one of the In accordance with instructions
From this area the Maoris saw something of an attack mounted by 22 Battalion on Point 194 to the south-west. D Company of the 22nd had already taken an outpost with twenty-four prisoners, and the main attack went in at 2 p.m. with twelve I tanks in support and the attached troop of 1 RHA providing covering fire. The position was soon overrun and 100 prisoners taken, together with several anti-tank guns and mortars, and the attackers suffered no loss at all, a remarkable feat. Further advance was barred, however, by at least ten troops of artillery, which kept up heavy defensive fire, and the battalion therefore consolidated its gains. The whole brigade had come up against strong defences which the enemy gave every indication of wanting to hold indefinitely.
To the south, 5 Indian Brigade tried to swing in round the southern flank of the enemy defences, but met strong opposition and failed to reach
The opposition was even stronger than it looked. Once again Africa Corps had been able to concentrate without hindrance by the British armour and was now counter-attacking with the 51 tanks of
‘Early destruction enemy's armour is imperative’, Godwin-Austen signalled to Gott at 10.20 p.m. on the 13th; ‘… we may miss great opportunity for destruction of his [the enemy's] armour’, he added, unless 4 Armoured Brigade were moved to a central position, ready to strike round either flank. Early next morning Gott replied that he was moving his armour to the north-west and thought this would ‘affect enemy on 4 Ind Div front’ about 4 p.m. This was a slower tempo of operations than Godwin-Austen required and he urged Gott to get the armour into ‘immediate readiness to attack’. Later in the morning the two met and agreed on a left hook by 4 Armoured Brigade towards
A remarkable change had meanwhile taken place in the minds of Gott, Gatehouse, and other senior armoured commanders, unperceived by their superiors. The main objective was still to seek out and destroy the enemy armour, but these commanders had given up hope of achieving this by direct means, though they now knew they outnumbered the enemy in tanks by at least two to one. ‘In every action the enemy showed his skill in effecting co-operation between tanks and field and anti-tank artillery’, Gott wrote shortly afterwards. ‘No attack by our more lightly armoured tanks was possible’, he added, ‘except by making a very wide detour and coming in on his soft-skinned vehicles.’ An official report, quoted in UK Narrative Phase 4, ‘The Advance to
Fifth New Zealand Brigade was now reinforced by the newly reconstituted 5 Field Regiment under Major Sprosen. On arrival 27 Battery (which had three troops) came under the command of 22 Battalion and 28 Battery (with only two troops) supported the Maoris. The troop of 1 RHA with the Maoris now joined Chestnut Troop of the same regiment in support of 23 Battalion. The Maoris had moved towards Point 181 with A Company on the right, B in the centre, and C followed by D on the left. At 3 a.m. on 14 December the guns opened a 15-minute concentration and the Maoris closed in with bayonets fixed, meeting mortar, MG and anti-tank fire and using grenades freely to overcome it. In little more than an hour resistance ended and C and D Companies began to dig in just west of the foremost defences, while A Company extended the position on lower ground to the east-north-east. B Company, which had advanced farthest, struck trouble, however, from another enemy position on the escarpment to the west and was twice counter-attacked. Pavia Division contributed another 382 prisoners (including 18 officers) in this action to the swelling total taken by 5 Brigade and many guns were also captured. The Maoris lost only three killed and 27 wounded, remarkably few in view of the thorough and skilfully laid-out defences which daylight revealed.
The other two battalions made no further move forward this day. Opposition had hardened and it was not possible to strike deeper into the
Twice on the 14th 5 Brigade Headquarters was subjected to dive-bombing, which killed a total of four men and set an ammunition lorry on fire. One Stuka, however, was shot down by small-arms fire. Though the enemy was posted in considerable strength not far ahead of the Maoris, there were indications elsewhere on the 5 Brigade front of a deterioration in the morale of the Italians, one small band of whom surrendered this day to 23 Battalion and claimed to have shot their officer. The Maoris were therefore given the ambitious task of taking in daylight on the 15th all but one of the strongpoints on their immediate front, and of closing in to within a very short distance of the enemy on the escarpment to the west. The Poles were to push north-westwards between the Maoris and the 22nd, if possible right through the
Zero hour was 3 p.m. on 15 December, an unlikely time which caught the enemy napping. A Company of the Maoris reached within 100 yards of its objective to the north-west before attracting fire and soon took the position at the point of the bayonet. C Company, advancing due north, took the first line of trenches in similar fashion, but was then held up by heavy mortar and MG fire and could gain no more ground until two platoons of B Company edged round to the west of the strongpoint. When a section of carriers also came forward opposition began to crumble and C Company swarmed through the defences. Another 101 prisoners were taken, this time from Brescia, at a cost of 10 killed and 37 wounded, most of them in A Company. With a vengeance the Maoris were making up for the time they had spent cooling their heels at Upper Sollum: first at
The Poles also attacked with great dash and reached the escarpment west of the Maoris, linking up with D Company of the latter. This company was now able to withdraw into reserve, together with a company of the 22nd. Resistance stiffened, however, and the Poles could not carry their attack right through the
The addition of the Polish brigade thickened up what had been a rather thinly-covered front facing the Africa Corps had struck again a few miles to the west.
After the setback to Ariete.Ariete then had 30 tanks, 18 field guns, 10 anti-tank guns, and 700 Bersaglieri infantry. Trieste was reduced to 12 field and 15 anti-tank guns and three or four weak infantry battalions.
The Germans did little on 14 December and General Cruewell was chiefly concerned with contradicting what he thought was Rommel's unduly gloomy view of the general situation. The Panzer Group staff had produced a map of the British situation which the DAK diary describes as ‘extraordinarily pessimistic’, pointing out that the British formations marked on it ‘had taken a lot of punishment, to say the least.’ Thus Cruewell echoed about Eighth Army the words Auchinleck and then Ritchie were using about Panzer Group Africa. In this Cruewell aligned himself with General Bastico and the chief of Comando Supremo, General Cavallero, who were urging much the same opinion on Rommel. But Rommel, who was acutely sensitive to the weaknesses of the
After false reports of success at Point 204 (held by Africa Corps attacking the Buffs from the north-west.
For two days Ariete made another dab at this group in the morning of the 15th and was again repulsed. Then, after much uncertainty about where the Italians and British were in this region, Menny Battle Group of 15 Panzer attacked Bir Temrad, six miles north-west of Point 204 and well outside the point of the wedge 13 Corps had driven into the Axis positions between Africa Corps and the
From enemy documents it would seem that
Diary of 15 Pz Div.
The Germans were naturally elated and 115 Infantry Regiment pushed forward as he repeatedly urged to take over the captured position; but this battalion arrived too late and consolidated instead in a defensive arc covering Menny Battle Group, which bedded down for the night. Thus 3/1 Punjab and 4/6 Rajput Rifles, facing
General Cruewell was well satisfied with the outcome. He felt he could now turn and tackel the British armour, which was trying to outflank him, without having to look over his shoulder to see how the Italians were faring, and he was confident of success. At 6.55 p.m. on the 15th the Chief of Staff of Africa Corps,
Dear Kriebel,
Send us some of your loot, including cigarettes.
The panzer strength had fallen to a desperately low level, however, and after further fighting next day the division had only eight Pzkw IIIs and three Pzkw IIs, though Ariete still had thirty tanks.
Which lost its GOC, crusader had already achieved an unsought but enduring success by undermining the confidence in each other of the German and Italian African commands. The Italians found their feet heavy as they began to retrace their weary steps back along the route of defeat they had trodden the previous winter. The last thing they wanted was another such humiliation and they saw no need yet for retreat. To Rommel the need was glaring and he had been furious when General Gambara countermanded his order to Pavia to withdraw from 90 Light
And also of Italian suspicions that a British landing near Italian Mobile Corps, General Piazzoni, was in high spirits. Hearing of a move of 4 Armoured Brigade towards
On the 16th Cavallero and Kesselring joined Bastico and Gambara in a weighty inquiry into Rommel's intentions. Kesselring was more than half convinced that the Italians were right in wanting to hold on at Panzer Group Africa were expected at the end of the month, the Luftwaffe was already being strengthened, and from a wider viewpoint the entry of
Though such a long retreat was a difficult operation, every mile on the way back would ease Axis supply problems and increase those of the British, thus tipping the scales another degree in Rommel's favour. Two companies of German tanks and a battalion of Italian tanks had been sunk on their way to
Godwin-Austen had signalled to both Gott and Gatehouse at 7.50 p.m. on 14 December that the British armour would next day have ‘such a chance of destroying enemy forces as seldom arises in war’. His orders were therefore simple: ‘Smash them relentlessly.’ By 3 p.m. on the 15th 4 Armoured Brigade reached Bir Halegh el-Eleba, south-west of UK Narrative 4.
But Gott had already thrown a spanner in the works by authorising 4 Armoured Brigade to move south early next day, away from the enemy. The B Echelons had been held up by bad going and the brigade would ‘facilitate replenishment’ by going back to meet its supply lorries. The panzer troops could have told Gott that running out of petrol on the battlefield need not be so disastrous as he feared; they had done it several times already without dire consequences. There was, moreover, no shortage of ammunition, for most of the 85 to 95 tanks had done little or no fighting for some days.
On the 16th Gatehouse turned about and headed southwards; but before doing so he despatched two detachments to raid the enemy's rear. C Squadron, Africa Corps near Bir Temrad,
See Crisp, pp. 203–14, and Joly, Take These Men, pp. 249–61. Crisp commanded C Sqn, 3 R Tks, until he was wounded, when Joly took over.
In the afternoon 15 Panzer Division cut across the rear of 4 Armoured Brigade and stood at Der Bu Sciahra, covered by swampy ground to the south. After replenishing, the British armour headed north-eastwards towards Sidi Breghisc to guard the exposed flank of 4 Indian Division and Godwin-Austen and Ritchie understood that it duly arrived there. But Gatehouse in fact met stern opposition, first from
Meanwhile 5 New Zealand Brigade and the Polish Carpathian Brigade continued their efforts to break through the
At the same time A Company of 22 Battalion attacked but failed to seize enemy posts east of Bir en-Naghia. No men were lost, however, and the field guns then concentrated on these posts and kept them quiet. C Company of the 22nd gave long-range supporting fire to the Poles as they continued their advance, gradually gaining ground until by evening they had reached Gabr er-Reghem, some three miles westwards along the escarpment. What looked like an
The battalions of 5 Brigade soon found they had nothing to fear but mines and the carriers of 23 Battalion reached Kilo 80 on the road to
Later the whole of the brigade was ordered to concentrate at Bir el-Geff, east of
When the troops learned this on 18 December they were disappointed. They had looked forward to seeing the campaign through to its end and this unexpected news was bitterly unwelcome. There could be no appeal against this decision, however; Eighth Army could not commit for the pursuit more troops than it could supply across the huge tracts of desert between
After four days of salvage work and maintenance 5 Brigade handed in (to an Ordnance depot at
The New Zealand troops left in See Scoullar, Chaps. 1 and 2.
Both RMT companies remained in the field, the 6th serving the troops besieging the frontier forts and the 4th acting as general carrier, chiefly for 22 Guards Brigade. With attached tanks, reconnaissance troops, and artillery this force, called Bencol, set out on 20 December with memories of Beda Fomm, intending to cut off the enemy's retreat between 90 Light Division had been preparing defences for the past ten days.
‘Hope your colns are relentlessly pressing on’, Godwin-Austen signalled to 22 Guards Brigade in the evening of 24 December; ‘You have unique chance. Hustle everyone.’ Then an LO brought disappointing news and half an hour later another and firmer signal was sent: ‘.… Get round everything you hesitate to face. Order everyone who has failed to progress by day to regain progress by
The balance of strength by the time Eighth Army reached Ajedabia was not nearly so unfavourable to the enemy as Ritchie and Godwin-Austen supposed. All enemy formations had successfully withdrawn with comparatively small loss. A weak attack by 2 Scots Guards on 27 December was easily repulsed. Then Africa Corps, with 70 tanks and strong artillery, struck at 22 Armoured Brigade (which had 90 tanks) and drove it back 30 miles with heavy loss of tanks as well as of dignity. The enemy ‘had a/tk guns right up with their tanks’, the diarist of 4 CLY complained (after further fighting on 30 December) as though this were a novelty. The anti-tank guns ‘seemed to appear from nowhere.’ By the end of that day the brigade had lost 68 tanks and was left with only 30 in fighting order. Thus 22 Armoured Brigade, which had been withdrawn to refit after the first ten days of
Despite this success, Rommel was careful not to overplay his hand at this stage and between the 1st and the 6th he withdrew to a line from Marsa el Brega to acrobat, an offensive to follow crusader and occupy
At Agheila Such reductance did not fit the popular view and even so experienced a judge as the Middle East Director of Military Intelligence remarked in his ‘Weekly Military News-letter’ that Rommel had ‘proved once more his inability to sit still’. In one of which a detachment of Panzer Group meanwhile received some seventy-odd more tanks (mostly of an improved design) from RMT, pp. 154–65.)
crusader was a victory nevertheless, and Eighth Army had been granted in its first campaign the hard-earned pleasures of a pursuit over mile after mile of road or desert track littered with equipment and stores, the local triumphs of entering as conqueror one Italian settlement after another, and the collecting of many a bedraggled cluster of prisoners. The crusader sorties (including those from
The frontier garrisons were supplied on a most meagre scale by submarine and aircraft and a very occasional surface craft. They had fair stocks of ammunition but little water, except at Panzer Group was assembling for its counter-stroke from
This long delay in opening up the coast road for supplies, releasing I tanks and artillery for the fighting in the west, and carrying the desert railway on from Panzer Group. But troops committed elsewhere could not simultaneously attack
Meanwhile General Norrie, who on 12 December was given the task of opening up the coast road, had to make do with the inexperienced
Attention then centered on Oasis Companies and a few tanks which comprised the garrison as then estimated. An attack, intended to be exploratory, was therefore mounted on the 16th—Dingaan's Day—by 3 South African Brigade, with the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry and a medium artillery battery under its command. Resistance proved to be extremely lively, however, and the attacking force lost some sixty men before the operation was called off on the 17th.
In Divisional Cavalry, south of Henderson, RMT, p. 157.
A second and heavier attack on Div Cav diary.
These were only side-shows, however, to distract attention from the main attack, which followed its methodical course. Aerial bombing and fire from medium and field guns had helped to soften the defences and the main break-in operation was mounted east of the road to
The fighting on 31 December was heavier than expected. The South African infantry gained most of their first objective with the help of two I-tank squadrons, but a battalion headquarters was overrun in a counter-attack and there were several local withdrawals. The next step was after dark on
Dawn on 2 January was strangely quiet and B Squadron, Divisional Cavalry, could get no response to the bursts of fire it directed at various points along its eight miles of front, though there was much
East Sector announced, and he went on to say that they had tried to do so during the night but ‘the English did not understand.’
Kerr was now asked to go to the southern sector and explain that the garrison had ceased to resist. He was a young officer in a novel situation and unversed in protocol and he accepted this commission. After driving a short distance, however, he came upon Lieutenant-Colonel Butler-Porter, CO of 1 Royal Durban Light Infantry, who was bound for Schmitt's headquarters with orders to bring Schmitt to surrender unconditionally to General de Villiers by 10 a.m. Kerr soon realised that his prior dealings with Schmitt were unwelcome and that he was not needed, so he returned to B Squadron.
B Squadron had meanwhile been most anxious to enter As described by the Rev. C. G. Palmer, the only officer who remained with the prisoners, to the ubiquitous Brig Clifton ( The Happy Hunted, p. 160).
Only one bomb burst near enough to cause casualties, however, and one man was killed and four were wounded by it.
The total captured (including wounded and sick), far greater than expected, was 7982, including Panzer Group had suggested.
General de Villiers no longer had to stretch his troops along the extensive See Scoullar, pp. 20–1. The non-divisional NZ entities—‘T’ Air Support Control Sigs, ‘A’ a ‘B’ FMCs, and ‘X’ Water Issue Sec—remained in 13 Corps until March or later.crusader had long since ended.
In the meantime the remaining frontier posts were overcome. The seizure of I Battalion, 104 Infantry Regiment, a German pastor, who had held the
In all 13,842 prisoners were taken in the frontier area in December and January, apart from those captured by 5 New Zealand Brigade from Geissler Column at crusader thus ended in a minor anti-climax, though a welcome one.
When There was no certainty that the patients and staff of the MDS near Pt 175 and the prisoners in
In asking for 5 Brigade, Godwin-Austen had in mind a hard fight (at
Comd 5 NZ Bde has personal instructions from
Ritchie referred this to Auchinleck (who was still with him) and the C-in-C saw
All the tact in the world was needed and crusader was an overriding consideration. An immediate and fleeting opportunity was presented at
The matter of losses already incurred was at the heart of this dispute. It seems that Ritchie and Auchinleck, though aware that 5 Brigade Headquarters had been overrun, had no idea how large this was and how numerous the men involved; they knew little of the fighting at
Then he sent a letter to Auchinleck next day, 12 December, stating his case:
I have now had time to go into the facts as I promised on the 11th and in doing so I have tried as far as I can, to see if the criticism levelled against me was merited. I have tried to find points of agreement with your charge rather than concentrate on points of obvious disagreement which I shall not refer to.
The only controversial point that arises is the question of the employment of the 5 NZ Bde Gp. I know that you think I placed restrictions on the use of the 5 Bde Gp without reference to higher authority. If that had been the case I agree that I would have been entirely in the wrong. I am fully aware, however, of the normal channels of command and have always adhered to them.
I did not attempt to answer the charge brought against me at our interview because I did not know the facts, and as you passed judgement upon me without asking me for my side of the case, I felt that it would be better to do so in writing.
I think, if you will carry your mind back to the evening of 3rd December, you may recall the following facts. You, the Army Commander and I met in the office truck after tea at Adv 8 Army [Headquarters] to discuss the lessons of the fighting. It was just before I left for the rear area. At the end of the meeting, and in your presence, the Army Commander said, ‘I shall need the 5 NZ Bde and I am going to ask you to leave them behind.’ I agreed to this, but said that in view of the heavy casualties we had suffered, I would be relieved if he could see that the 5 Bde was not used in further offensive operations. He said he would want them for ‘columns’, and this was also agreed to. I further said that I should be glad if he would see that the 18 Bn and part of the 19 Bn of the 4 Inf Bde, who were in
Tobruk , were not committed to any attack, and I understood that he would send a telegram to that effect. My GSO 1, to whom I communicated these facts after the discussion, bears me out as to time and place and as to the results of the meeting as understood by me and passed on to him.I cannot pass any comment about my Brigadier's attitude, because I have not yet had any touch with him. My instructions, however, when he went forward to take over command, were precise. I told him that in view of our heavy casualties it had been agreed between the Army Commander and myself that he was not going to be used for offensive action. I told him that he would have plenty of activity as he would have to send out columns to harass and mop up enemy pockets West of
Bardia . I also warned him against attempting any attack by daylight without a full quota of supporting arms.These are the facts to the best of my recollection, and I think you will find them substantially accurate. Under the circumstances I cannot say that I am conscious of being in the wrong.
Now that you have defined the position to me, I shall in future refer all questions affecting our employment to you. I trust that this action will not be misunderstood by my immediate chiefs.
Other disputes occurred at the same time regarding the use of the part of the Divisional Petrol Company which was in
On the 14th
I would like to thank you for your very straight-forward and soldierly letter.
This was merely one of a series of disagreements large and small about detaching parts of See Scoullar, pp. 11–14.
After several cables about details of See p. 29, note 4. See p. 41.crusader campaign and its repercussions in
The [crusader] plan … was a very good one & up to a point it had been brilliantly carried out. The move by night … was well done and the attack started as a surprise.… When the true facts of the Armoured battle were known to us close to
This hastily written letter was followed in due course by a fuller account and then by a fifty-page report which was printed (with deletions stipulated by Auchinleck See Scoullar, p. 5.
So ended the New Zealand part of the battle to keep the
Tobruk Corridor open. This battle in theWestern Desert was not primarily however a battle to hold positions, but a battle to destroy the German forces. I believe we went some distance towards achieving this in our attacks atSidi Rezegh ,Belhamed , and Ed Duda. I think the German Afrika Korps will bear me out in this!
Some months afterwards he wrote more critically of Report on NZ Division in crusader. The enemy at
The British artillery was the best-trained and best-commanded part of the British Army. They could move and fight. They were being wasted [in the Brigade Group Battle]. Comments on my narrative,
Mistakes and failures arising from inexperience occurred as much within the New Zealand Division as in other formations which had to get used to desert conditions and the fast tempo of operations the panzer troops imposed. Even the Germans had been bewildered by the breathless pace of events in the first few days. But Auchinleck's refusal to let See Scoullar, Chap. 1.
Address to officers of NZ Div at the assembly area, 14 Nov (See p. 69). In the end it was a manoeuvre—the move of 4 Armd Bde towards crusader fighting. He had emphasised before and during the battle the need to concentrate on relieving
The catastrophic tank losses in the opening phase of In the crisis after the defeat of the British armour the personal example of Auchinleck was admirable. But Rommel's capricious mishandling of his mobile forces on 24–27 Nov flattered Auchinleck's judgment.crusader had caused the guns and infantry of Eighth Army, usually with I-tank support, to bear the brunt of the offensive in later phases. The complex struggle that developed, with its bewildering fluctuations of fortune, reflected no great credit at the command level on either side and it was not by and large a generals' battle. The general who showed up best of all was perhaps Neumann-Silkow of 15 Panzer, the pacemaker in one of the fastest-moving battles in history until he was struck down on 6 December. His calm eye, viewing the fighting mostly at close quarters, saw it as whole and the vigour of his leadership was exemplary. In Eighth Army none did better than
The merit of crusader believing that a third costly failure after
Eighth Army in its first campaign, like the French early in the First World War, fought with superb élan. The spirit of the British cruiser tank units in the opening clashes, unavailing though all too often it was for tactical and technical reasons, was magnificent. At the same time a battle designed around armour was adorned with some of the finest infantry assaults in the annals of the British Army. The attacks of the Black Watch on ‘Tiger’ in the break-out from
The New Zealand Division, in the opinion of one well-qualified observer (supported by many others), entered Gentry, letter of crusader ‘at the peak of its fighting form’. Later it became more skilful, ‘especially in the higher ranks, and was probably more effective’, but it is doubtful that ‘it ever fought again with the same fury and determination as it did in that short and confused campaign’.
Despite this, many New Zealanders concluded from the conduct of the desert war that, as they often put it, ‘Jerry’ was a ‘good joker’. Their fury and determination nevertheless found a just cause, though the Allies were not to know the full horror of what they faced until the end of the war. Here as much as on the Continent of
It was an honour to serve such a cause and in such company. There were men in Eighth Army from the
More than a quarter of these came from New Zealand; 4620 men, nearly a thousand of them killed. For details of casualties see Appendix I. Battle for Egypt, were they surpassed, and then only in numbers of wounded. More New Zealanders died and more were taken prisoner in
This loss, however, was not the only spectre at the feast of victory. In February Eighth Army was back at crusader had failed. The enemy armour, though badly battered, had not been destroyed, and the fertile slopes of the Green Mountain and most of the empty wastes of
But Eighth Army did not fight alone and Another 150 New Zealanders were lost when the crusader was not mounted purely for Army purposes. The crusader were 120 miles nearer Barham and Ark Royal in November, which made December a black month indeed for the Neptune went down (after striking four mines) in a heavy sea off the Libyan coast on 19 Dec, with a total loss of more than 750 lives. This was the heaviest loss of life in the history of the Chakdina and Jantzen, brought to 274 the total of New Zealanders lost at sea as a result of crusader. See Waters, The Royal New Zealand Navy, pp. 191–4.
Black December was followed by blacker January in which the desert situation was as uncertain as that at sea; but things settled down in February and for four vital months, while the British Commonwealth and its allies (now including the crusader had gained. The desert front was well over a hundred miles farther west, it was stocked by sea
The relief of crusader thus turned out to be defensive rather than offensive in its outcome; but if, instead of conquering half of
Casualties in
crusader
Campaign
THE figures arrived at by Major-General Playfair and his associates ( The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Volume III, p. 97) are as follows:
The New Zealand figures were:
Minutes of Conference between General Freyberg and his Senior Officers at Baggush,
BRIGS CONFERENCE 17th OCT
1. SECURITY.
Not possible to conceal that an attack is pending. Must prevent leakage of Date, and direction or method of attack.
certain officers must be told full details.
G.O.C.
Brigadier Miles.
Brigadier Hargest.
Brigadier Barrowclough.
Colonel Gentry.
Colonel Maxwell.
Nobody else knows any of the main plan.
No service is to be told.
Although IO here has been told to prepare maps he does not know the general scope of plan or the role of Division. List to be kept and no mention outside this list. Study of maps and air photographs can be carried out here and IO will get any special material you want. he does not know the plan. No orders or instructions issued—just minutes of conference.
2. OBJECT OF OPERATIONS.
CAPTURE OF CYRENAICA.
Object Divided into Phases.
First Phase is to destroy enemy's armed Thus in typed copy of the original, but ‘armd’ (armoured) was probably intended.
This will in its turn be accomplished by threatening the forces investing
FACTORS.
Tank Strength. Reported in our favour 5 to 4. However German Mk III and M 13 (Iti) better than our Cruiser (132) (?)
Our Armed Div slightly stronger than both German Armd Divs.
One Armd Bde slightly stronger than one enemy Armoured Div.
Air Strength. They have decided superiority 3 to 2.
Role present:
Interfere with enemy recce.
Attack supply system.
After D1.
Maximum protection of our columns.
Maximum interference with enemy supply system.
3. OUTLINE PLAN.
Must be elastic since enemy dispositions may alter before we attack.
Northern Force. 13th Corps.
1 NZ Div. The correct designation was simply the New Zealand Division, changed in
4 Ind Div.
1 Army Tk Bde + few Arty units.
Role:
To adv on N & S axis to isolate Enemy's fwd def area & pin enemy to ground E & S. To drive westward join with S Force clear enemy out of intervening area. Subsequently to reduce S.O. [
Southern Force.
Armd Corps.
7 Armd Div.
22 Gds Brigade.
1 SA Div.
This force will be directed on
Centre Force.
22 Armd Bde Gp (Incl KDG less one sqn). [Later changed to 4 Armd Bde Gp.]
Role. To protect left flank of 13 Corps from an attack by enemy armd forces.
To draw off Armd forces in fwd area towards the Armd Div. If enemy is met in inferior strength to attack him.
Oasis Gp. In order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of main attack, a composite column of ACs Lorried Inf and Arty will move from G [Giarabub (Jarabub)] prob D–1 object capturing JALO.
4. TIMING.
13 Corps will not be committed until Armd Corps get level on E & W axis. NZ Div position of forming up will decide place Armd Corps cross wire. Approach march will be a surprise so that it will have to be carried out without moon.
Admn. Three Fd Bases
S of
Giarabub
RCHO [?]
Water HQ
Water Tk Coy
Res MT Coys until
TRAINING EXERCISES.
Plans must be flexible so must training.
Protection on move first importance. Command of Arty Units not to be decentralised unless necessary.
A-T. Arty.
Fd Arty (not forgetting C.B.).
AA Arty.
Mines carried and put out and covered with fire.
In Bde Battle AA problem.
Gun Area.
Wagon lines, and B Echelon area.
Bn during attack.
Bde HQ.
Stella attack [i.e. one like the training exercises at ‘Bir Stella’]. Div Cav?
Night marching long distances followed by
Attack by bayonet in dark.
Attack under arty.
SUM UP.
We have your views on movement. What is now wanted is a proper appreciation and plan for
Grouping and protection of Col on move from an attack if no flank protection.
Protection of Col moving along an escarpment.
NOTE: importance of knowing every enemy minefield is obvious from a defensive point of view.
Recce of Forward Area.
Routes leading forward from
Assembly area S.E. of
Periodic awards are listed only if mainly for this campaign.
knight commander of the order of the british empire
bar to distinguished service order
distinguished service order
member of the order of the british empire
bar to military cross
military cross
distinguished conduct medal
bar to military medal
military medal
british empire medal
The primary sources for the New Zealand operations are the
On the enemy side there is a serious imbalance. Photographic copies or translations of almost all relevant German war diaries except those of Panzer Group Africa from 19 November onwards (which are missing) heavily outweigh the few Italian contemporary documents which have come to hand and published sources do little to rectify this. Kriebel's unpublished Feldzug in Nordafrika, however, is helpful and there are some excellent and well-documented appreciations prepared by the Enemy Documents Section of the Historical Branch of the Cabinet Office (though these, too, inevitably lack adequate Italian sources).
For details which seemed critical to New Zealand operations the
Units or appointments against personal names are those relevant to this campaign. Numbers in parentheses after place names refer to page numbers (or facing page numbers) of maps in which they appear. Normal units or formations are listed under Australian, British, German, Indian, Italian, New Zealand or South African Forces, in this order: corps, divisions, brigades, units. Units are in the order armour, artillery, engineers, signals, infantry and services (ASC, ordnance, medical). Special groupings are listed independently (Boettcher Gp, Meythaler Bn, Force E, Oases Gp). Commanders named in the text are listed in parentheses after units or higher commands.
Aikenhead, Brig D. F., BRA 30 Corps,
Air Support Control, see also ‘T’ NZ Air Support Control Sigs Sec (NZ Forces)
Allen, Lt-Col J. M., CO 21 Bn: attacks
Andrew, Brig L. W., CO 22 Bn: relieves 20 Bn,
Armstrong, Brig B. F., Comd 5 SA Bde: attacks Pt 178, Totensonntag,
Armstrong, Maj J. D., BM 5 Bde (from 7 Dec),
Ashton, 2 Lt H. B., 24 Bn,
Auchinleck, Fd Mshl Sir Claude, C-in-C MEF: on crusader plan,
Auchinleck, Fd Mshl Sir Claude—contd. reprimands
Aurora, HMS,
Australian Forces—
Awatere, Lt A., IO 5 Bde (from 7 Dec),
Bach Bn–See 104 Inf Regt (German Forces)
Bach, Maj the Rev. W., CO I Bn, 104 Inf Regt,
Baird, S-Sgt J. D., 6 RMT Coy,
Baker, Maj G., 20 Bn,
Baker, Maj J. F., 20 Bn,
DAK, 24/27 Nov, DAK supplies,
Barrowclough, Maj-Gen Rt Hon Sir Harold, Comd 6 Bde: character and experience, DAK HQ,
Bassett, Maj B. I., BM 4 Bde: capture of
Bastico, Mshl Ettore, C-in-C Axis Forces in North Africa: extent of command,
battleaxe,
Batty, WO I W.,
Bean, Maj L., 6 Bde HQ,
Beckingham, Pte G. G., 27 MG Bn,
Totensonntag, Kessel,
Bell, Pte K. C., 24 Bn,
Bell, Lt-Col R. M., GSO III (I), NZ Div,
Bencol – See 22 Guards Bde (British Forces)
Beresford-Peirse, Lt-Gen Sir Noel, GOC Western Desert Force,
Berry, Capt G., 309 Gen Tpt Coy, RASC,
Bevan, Maj T. H.,
Bharucha, Maj P. C.,
Bir Belhamed – See
Bir Bu Creimisa (367),
Birch, Capt J. H., 25 Bn,
Bir el Chleta (353): advance to, DAK HQ at,
Bir el-Gubi (479),
Bir Sciafsciuf (146): and Matruh Stakes
Bishop, R. T., 18 Bn,
Blamey, Fd Mshl Sir Thomas, Deputy C-in-C, MEF, and GOC, 2 AIF,
Blennerhassett, J. G., 25 Bn,
Blockhouse: and attack on Pt 175,
Boettcher Gp (renamed Mickl Gp on 1 Dec),
Boettcher, Lt-Gen Karl, Comd 104 Artillery Comd, from 30 Nov GOC 21 Pz Div,
Bolwell, Lt E. W., 20 Bn,
Borman, Maj C. A.,
Breen, Lt J. R., 24 Bn,
Brennan, Capt P. J., Div Sigs,
Bretherton, Maj J. A., 14 Lt AA Regt,
Briel, Capt, CO 606 AA Bn,
Bright, Joan,
Brink, Lt-Gen G. E., GOC 1 SA Div,
British Forces
Army
Western Desert Force (HQ – later 13 Corps HQ),
8 Army (Cunningham; Ritchie): formed, crusader plan, Kessel,
13 Corps (Godwin-Austen): in crusader plan,
30 Corps (Norrie): in crusader plan, Totensonntag,
7 Armd Div (Gott): returns to desert, crusader plan, DAK, Totensonntag action,
70 Div (Scobie): relieves 9 Aust Div, See also Tobruk Garrison
2 Armd Bde (1 Armd Div),
4 Armd Bde (Gatehouse) (7 Armd Div): in battleaxe, crusader plan, Totensonntag attack, DAK,
7 Armd Bde (Davy) (7 Armd Div): in battleaxe, crusader plan, DAK,
22 Armd Bde (Scott-Cockburn) (7 Armd Div): promised for crusader, DAK, 21 Pz Div, Totensonntag attack,
Support Group (Campbell) (7 Armd Div): in crusader plan, Totensonntag,
1 Army Tk Bde (Watkins) (in NZ Div, 22/30 Nov): in 13 Corps,
32 Army Tk Bde (Willison) (70 Div): in
16 Inf Bde (70 Div),
150 Inf Bde (50 Div),
161 Inf Bde,
22 Guards Bde (7 Armd Div): in 30 Corps,
Royal Armoured Corps,
KDG (recce unit, 7 Armd Div): in opening moves, DAK,
12 Royal Lancers (recce unit, 1 Armd Div),
Royal Tank Regiment (Royal Tanks),
3 Bn (4 Armd Bde),
4 Bn (O'Carroll) (32 Army Tk Bde),
5 Bn (Drew) (4 Armd Bde),
8 Bn (Brooke) (1 Army Tk Bde): joins NZ Div,
42 Bn (1 Army Tk Bde): with 4 Ind Div,
44 Bn (Yeo) (1 Army Tk Bde): allotted to 6 Bde,
Royal Horse Artillery
Royal Artillery
65 A-Tk Regt (258, 259 and 260 Btys and 257 Bty from 63 A-Tk Regt, RA) (1 Army Tk Bde),
1 Fd Regt (Dobree) (11 and 52 Btys) (4 Ind Div),
8 Fd Regt (Walton) (V/AA and W/X Btys) (1 Army Tk Bde): to join NZ Div,
60 Fd Regt (Hely) (Support Gp),
7 Med Regt (1 SA Div, then 4 Ind Div),
Infantry
2 Bn, Camerons (11 Ind Bde),
2 Bn, DLI (70 Div),
1 Bn, Essex Regt (Nichols) (70 Div): in push to Ed Duda,
2 Bn, King's Own Regt (70 Div),
1 Bn, KRRC (de Salis) (‘60th Rifles’) (Support Gp),
‘60th Rifles’– See 1 KRRC
2 Bn, Y and L (70 Div),
RASC
Brown, Pte S. W., 25 Bn,
Buckeridge, Cpl C. W., 24 Bn,
Burden, Pte R. O., 25 Bn,
Burdon, R. M.,
Burge, Capt A. E. B., 5 Bde HQ (from 7 Dec),
Burgess, Pte G., 24 Bn,
Burrows, Lt-Col F. A., CO 2/13 Aust Bn,
Burton, Lt-Col H. G., CO 25 Bn from 23 Nov: and capture of DAK HQ, Ariete,
Busch, Capt, CO 2 MG Bn,
Butler-Porter, Lt-Col J., CO 1 R. Durban Lt Inf,
Butt, Capt F. G., Div Amn Coy,
Cade, Brig G. P., 5 Fd Regt,
Cains, Pte E. W., 24 Bn,
Campbell, Cpl A. H., 24 Bn,
Campbell, Brig J. C., (‘Jock’), Comd Support Gp,
crusader plan, DAK, 25/27 Nov,
Carnachan, Capt J. L. G., 24 Bn,
Cavallero, Mshl of Italy Count Ugo, Chief of Italian General Staff,
Cherry, Sgt H. R., 23 Bn,
Churchill, Rt Hon. Sir Winston: consults Smuts about crusader,
Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Italian Foreign Minister,
Clifford, Alexander,
Clifton, Brig G. H., CE 30 Corps,
Closey, Lt-Col R. V., ‘A’ NZ FMC,
Cochran, Maj C. McN., CO 1 SA Irish,
Cockburn, Brig J. S.–See Scott-Cockburn
Cody, J. F.,
Colvin, Lt-Col G. E., 2/13 Aust Bn,
Combined Operations School,
Coningham, Air Mshl Sir Arthur, AOC Western Desert,
Connolly, Lt-Col J. R. J., 23 Bn,
Constable, Sgt F. H., 24 Bn,
Conway, Brig A. E., NZ Adjutant-General,
Cook, A. L.,
Cooper, Sgt J. H., 5 Fd Regt,
Cooper, Lt T. L., 6 Bde HQ,
Copeland, Lt-Col A. D., 4 Bde HQ,
Coutts, Maj P. E., 1 Amn Coy,
‘Cova’–See Ghot Adhidiba
Cramer, Lt-Col Hans, Comd 8 Pz Regt,
Crawford-Smith (Crawford), Maj H. O., 5 Fd Regt,
Cruewell, Lt-Gen Ludwig, DAK Comd, crusader, Totensonntag attack,
Crump, Capt S. N. S., 18 Bn.,
Cunningham, Adm of Fleet Viscount (elder brother of Gen Cunningham),
Cunningham, Lt-Gen Sir Alan, 8 Army Comd: Appointed,
Curie, Eve,
Currie Coln,
Cutler, 2 Lt J. G., 24 Bn,
Davin, D. M.,
de Giorgis, Maj-Gen Fedele, GOC Savona Div and West Sector,
de Meo Recce Gp, RECAM (Italian Forces)
de Salis, Lt-Col S. C. F., CO 1 KRRC (‘60th Rifles’),
di Nisio, Brig-Gen, 2 i/c Ariete Div,
Director of Military Intelligence, MEF,
Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War,
Donald, Lt-Col H. V., 22 Bn,
Duff, Brig C. S. J., CO
Duffus, Louis,
Dyer, Maj H. G., CO 28 Maori Bn (from 7 Dec),
Ed Duda (291): in DAK counter-attack, Kessel, DAK,
Trieste,
See
El Chleta–See Bir el Chleta
El Cuasc (210),
El Gubi–See Bir el-Gubi
Fairbrother, Brig M. C.
Farndale, HMS,
Farrow, Pte H. McG., 23 Bn,
Fenski, Maj, CO I Bn, 8 Pz Regt,
Ferguson, Capt C. A., 21 Bn,
Fergusson, Bernard,
Fisher, Maj F. M.,
Fitzpatrick, Maj T. V., CO 21 Bn (from 27 Nov),
Fleming, Maj Y. K., 19 Bn,
Fliegerfuehrer Afrika–See Froehlich
Franceschini, Gen, GOC Pavia Div,
Fraser, Lt-Col K. W., CQ 5 Fd Regt,
Fraser, Rt Hon Peter, NZ Prime Minister: on morale of crusader,
Freeman, Air Chf Mshl, Vice-Chief of Air Staff,
battleaxe, crusader prospects, crusader, DAK and Ariete, Kessel,
Friday, Sgt W. D., 24 Bn,
Froehlich, Lt-Gen Stephan, Flieger-fuehrer Afrika,
‘Frongia’–See
Gabr Saleh (19),
Gale, B. E., 26 Bn,
Galloway, Lt-Gen Sir Alexander, BGS 8 Army,
Gambara, Gen Gastone, GOS 20 Italian Mobile Corps and Chief of Staff, Italian High Command in North Africa,
sommer-nachtstraum, Pz Gp HQ, Ariete, DAK counter-attack, Geissler Coln,
Gamlin, Pte H. B., 25 Bn,
Gapes, Lt B., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Garaet en-Nbeidat (158),
Gardner, Capt P. J., 4 R Tks,
Gasr el Abid (318),
Gatehouse, Maj-Gen A. H., Comd 4 Armd Bde: in first phase,
Gatenby, Capt C., 26 Bn,
Gause, Lt-Gen Alfred, Chief of Staff, Pz Gp Africa,
Gay, L-Bdr K.,
Geissler Adv Guard (Column)–See 200 Regt (German Forces)
Geissler, Gen Hans, GOC X Flying Corps,
Gentry, Maj-Gen Sir William, GSO I, NZ Div: discussions with
German Forces
Pz Army Africa (formerly Pz Gp Africa),
Pz Gp Africa (Rommel): prepares attack on crusader, Totensonntag,
German Africa Corps (DAK) (Cruewell): in sommernachtstraum, Totensonntag,
Africa Div (renamed on 28 Nov 90 Lt Div) (Suemmermann): formed, Totensonntag,
Division z.b.V. Afrika–See Africa Div
5 Lt Div – See 21 Pz Div
90 Lt Div – See Africa Div
15 Pz Div (Neumann-Silkow; Kriebel): in battleaxe, Totensonntag, Geissler Coln,
21 Pz Div (von Ravenstein; Boettcher): in sommernachtstraum, Pz Gp, Knabe Coln,
5 Pz Regt (Stephan; Mildebrath) (21 Pz Div): in sommernachtstraum, Totensonntag,
8 Pz Regt (Cramer) (15 Pz Div): in battleaxe, Totensonntag,
115 Inf Regt (Zincke) (15 Inf Bde),
361 Africa Regt (Grund),
115 Inf Regt (Zincke) (15 Inf Bde),
155 Inf Regt (Mickl) (Africa Div), Boettcher Gp
200 Regt (Geissler) (15 Inf Bde),
3 Recce Unit (von Wechmar) (21 Pz Div): 20,
33 Recce Unit (15 Pz Div),
Artillery
Engineers
Signals
56 Signals Unit,
Infantry
Ghot Adhidiba (‘Cova’) (125),
Gilberd, Capt J. G., (7 A-Tk Regt),
Gilmour, Capt W. L. M., RMO 20 Bn,
Goad, Pte G. H., 21 Bn,
Godwin-Austen, Gen Sir Alfred, GOC 13 Corps: in crusader planning,
Goettman, Maj, CO II Bn, 115 Inf Regt,
Goodland, Cpl H. E., 25 Bn,
Gott, Lt-Gen W. H. E., GOC 7 Armd Div: assessment of, Totensonntag, DAK,
Goulder, Lt-Col, CO 31 Fd Regt, RA,
Greaves, Gnr S. R., 5 Fd Regt,
Greenless, P. D., 25 Bn,
Greville, Maj A. W., CO 22 Bn (from 29 Nov),
Griffin, Brig E. H. L Lysaght, DA and QMG, 30 Corps,
Grolmann, Maj von, CO I Bn, 115 Inf Regt,
‘Grumpy’ – See ‘Wolf’
Guderian, Gen Heinz,
Gunn, 2 Lt G. W., 3 RHA,
Guthrey, Lt A. R., 20 Bn,
Hanson, Brig F. M. H., CRE NZ Div,
Harder, Lt-Col, CO I Bn, 361 Africa Regt,
Harding, Maj A. F., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Hargest, Brig J., Comd 5 Bde: criticises
Harper, Capt J., 5 Fd Regt,
Harris, Mshl of the RAF Sir Arthur,
Hartnell, Brig S. F., CO 19 Bn,
Harvey, Maj H. D., 28 Maori Bn,
Herd, Sgt J. A., 24 Bn,
Higson, Maj J. F., 1 Essex,
Hill, 2 Lt M. C., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Hill, Russell,
Hinton, Sgt J. D., 20 Bn,
History of the 7th Medium Regiment Royal Artillery, 1939–1945,
Hodge, D. W., 19 Bn,
Hulme, Sgt A. C., 23 Bn,
Indian Forces–See also British Forces
4 Div (Messervy): in preliminaries,
5 Bde (4 Ind Div): in planning,
7 Bde (4 Ind Div): in planning,
11 Bde (4 Ind Div): in preliminaries,
29 Bde (Reid), See also Force E, Oases Gp
38 Bde (independent),
Infantry
Italian Forces
10 Corps,
20 Mobile Corps (Gambara; Piazzoni),
Gambara Corps – See 20 Mobile Corps
132 Ariete Armd Div (Balotta) (Mobile Corps): in preliminaries, Totensonntag,
17 Pavia Div (Franceschini) (21 Corps),
55 Savona Div (de Giorgis),
102 Trento ‘Motorised’ Div (21 Corps),
101 Trieste Motorised Div (Mobile Corps): in preliminaries,
8 Bersaglieri Regt (Ariete Div),
9 Bersaglieri Regt (Trieste Div),
16 Inf Regt (Savona Div),
RECAM (Mobile Corps), de Meo Recce Gp
5 Air Fleet,
Jack, Capt J. R. G., 25 Bn,
Jackman, Capt J. J. B., 1 RNF,
Jock Colns, See also Currie Colon, Mayfield Coln, Vic Coln, Wilson Coln
Joly, Cyril, 3 R Tks,
Jordan, Rt Hon W. J., NZ High Commissioner to
Kabrit (Suez Canal Zone),
Kennedy, Maj-Gen Sir John,
Kerr, Maj E. W., Div Cav,
Keyes, Elizabeth,
Kinder, WO II J. B., 25 Bn,
King, Lt-Col,
Kirby, Lt-Col W. H., CO 3 Transvaal Scottish,
Knabe Battle Gp (Advance Guard, Coln) 87, 104 Inf Regt (German Forces)
Knabe, Lt-Col, Comd 104 Inf Regt,
Kolbeck Bn (Africa Div),
Kriebel, Lt-Col Rainer, GSO I, 15 Pz Div,
Laird, F. J., 20 Bn,
Latham, Brig H. B., BRA, 13 Corps (head of Historical Sec, UK Cabinet Office),
Laurie, Lt. E. C., 24 Bn,
Leckie, Col D. F., CO 23 Bn,
Leckie, Pte G., 20 Bn,
Lee, Captain, 44 R Tks,
Libyan Omar (often ‘
Liddell Hart, B. H.,
Lindsay, WO II H. C.,
Long, Gavin,
Longmore, Air Chief Mshl Sir Arthur, AOC-in-C MEF (to
Lord, 2 Lt S. V., 21 Bn,
Loughnan, Bdr I. H., Div Cav,
Love, Lt-Col E. T. W., CO 28 Maori Bn (23 Nov),
Lysaght-Griffin, Brig E. H. L., DA and QMG, 30 Corps,
Mack, WO II R. J. G., 27 MG Bn,
Maffey, Sgt H. G. E., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Mansel, G. R., 24 Bn,
Mantell-Harding, Maj A. C. W., 24 Bn, then CO 26 Bn,
Manzetti, Brig-Gen Ferruccio,
Marchesi, Gen, GOC 5 Air Fleet,
Marshall, Maj E. L. J., Div Sigs,
Marshall, Cpl F., 24 Bn,
Marshall, Bdr F. S., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Masefield, 2 Lt J. V.,
See Mersa Matruh
Mayfield Coln, See also Jock Colns
Medley, Brig E. J., BRA 8 Army,
Mellenthin, Maj-Gen Baron von, HQ Pz Gp Africa,
Menny Battle Gp,
Menny, Col. Comd German 15 Inf Bde,
Menzies, Rt Hon R. G., PM of
Messervy, Maj-Gen F. W., GOC 4 Ind Div: after sommernachtstraum,
Meythaler, Maj, CO I Bn, 155 Inf Regt,
Meythaler Bn (Africa Div),
Mickl Gp – See Boettcher Gp
Miles, Brig R., CRA NZ Div: in preliminaries, Ariete,
Millsteed, Pte J. F., 24 Bn,
Minson, Sgt R. D., 23 Bn,
Mitchell, Brig J. M.,
Money, Capt J. H., 21 Bn,
Moorehead, Allan,
Morgan, Cpl G. M., 24 Bn,
Morris, C. A., 25 Bn,
Morshead, Lt-Gen Sir Leslie, GOC 9 Aust Div,
Mosque (tomb of S. Rezegh),
Mottram, Pte B., 24 Bn,
Muir, Pte M., 24 Bn,
Murchison, Capt I. L., Div Cav,
MacAulay, L-Cpl A. A., 25 Bn,
Naafi/efi,
Nathan, Maj E. C. W.,
Nelley, Pte L. M., 24 Bn,
Nellmapius, Lt G. S., 5 SA Fd Coy,
Neptune, HMS,
Neumann-Silkow, Maj-Gen Walther, GOC 15 Pz Div: in tank battle, Totensonntag, Geissler Coln,
Nevins, Gnr G. F., 5 Fd Regt,
Newth, Cpl K. L., 20 Bn,
Newton-King, Lt-Col D. S., CO 4 SA Armd Car Regt,
New Zealand Forces
NZ Div (crusader planning, DAK, Kessel,
Div HQ (Gp, G Branch),
4 Bde (Inglis) (18, 19 and 20 Bns, 2 MG Coy): after
5 Bde (Hargest) (21, 22, 23 and 28 Bns, 1 and 4 MG Coys): after DAK, Geissler Coln,
6 Bde (Barrowclough) (24, 25 and 26 Bns, 3 MG Coy): after Totensonntag attack, DAK,
Div Cav Regt (Nicoll): in training, crusader,
Artillery (Miles),
7 A-Tk Regt (Oakes) (31, 32, 33 and 34 Byts): cross-country to
5 Fd Regt (Fraser; Sprosen) (27, 28 and 47 Btys): at
14 Lt AA Regt (41, 42, 43 and ‘X’ Btys): in Canal Zone, Geissler Coln,
Engineers (Hanson)
Infantry
18 Bn (Peart): outside
19 Bn (Hartnell): CO's experience,
20 Bn (
21 Bn (Allen; Fitzpatrick): attacks DAK,
22 Bn (Andrew; Greville): morale, Geissler Coln,
23 Bn (Leckie): seizes
24 Bn (Shuttleworth): in Canal area, DAK,
25 Bn (McNaugh; Burton): in Canal area, DAK,
26 Bn (Page; Walden; Mantell-Harding): in Canal area,
27 MG Bn: in training,
28 (Maori) Bn (Dittmer; Sutton; Love; Dyer): morale,
Medical
Non-divisional entities
DAK,
Nza Ferigh – See
Oases Gp – See Force E
See Libyan, Sidi
Organisation Plan 36 of Field Force Committee (FFC36),
Palmer, Rev C. G., 5 Bde HQ,
DAK HQ, Totensonntag attack,
Penelope, HMS,
Phillips, Capt J. F., 20 Bn,
Piazzoni, Maj-Gen, GOC Trieste Div, later GOC Ital. Mobile Corps,
Pienaar, Maj-Gen D. H., Comd 1 SA Bde: training, Totensonntag,
Pike, Capt, 44 R Tks,
Playfair, Maj-Gen I. S. O.,
Pt 137 (494),
Pt 154 (
Pt 154 (494),
Pt 162 (north of
Pt 167 (S. Rezegh),
Pt 174 (north-west of B. el Gubi),
Pt 175 (Hill 175): in opening phase,
Pt 182 (north-west of B. el Gubi),
Pt 182 (491),
Pt 194 (494),
Pt 208 (476),
Pt 209 (491),
1 Polish Carpathian Inf Bde: at
Pool, Lt-Col J., 6 RMT Coy,
Pope, Lt-Gen V. V., Comd-designate of K Corps (30 Corps),
Postan, Prof. M. M.,
Pringle, D. J. G., 23 Bn,
Qattara Depression (19),
Railway, Desert,
Ravenstein, Lt-Gen Johann von, GOC 21 Pz Div: in opening phase,
Reed, Maj C. K.,
Reeves, Lt J. W., Div Cav Regt,
Reid, Capt I. D., 25 Bn,
Rhodes, Maj G. A. T., 20 Bn,
Ritchie, Gen Sir Neil: as Deputy CGS, MEF, DAK supplies,
Robb, B. H., 25 Bn,
Romans, Lt-Col R. E., 23 Bn,
Rommel, Fd-Mshl Erwin, C-in-C Pz Gp Africa: and battleaxe, sommernachtstraum, Totensonntag, Kessel,
Ropp, Theodore,
Ross, Lt-Col A. B., DAQMG, NZ Div,
Royal, Maj R., 28 Maori Bn,
42nd Royal Tank Regiment, 1938–1944,
Rugbet en-Nbeidat (by Pt 175),
Russell, Cpl A., 23 Bn,
Rutherford, 2 Lt F. D., 26 Bn,
Ryan, Capt E. L., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Saddleton, Pte R. H., 24 Bn,
Salum – See
Sandbach, Maj. P., CO
Sandford, Capt H. S., 5 Bde IO,
Schmeling, Maj, 33 Arty Regt,
Schmidt, Capt H. W., 115 Inf Regt,
Schuette Gp (Lt-Col Schuette) – See 8 Mg Bn (German Forces)
Sciuearat – See
Scobie, Lt-Gen Sir Ronald, GOC 70 Div and Comd, Tobruk Fortress: in planning,
Scott, 2 Lt F. D., 7 A-Tk Regt,
Scott-Cockburn, Brig J., Comd 22 Armd Bde: in opening phase,
Scoullar, Lt-Col J. L.,
Shakespear, Pte W. R. A., 24 Bn,
See Libyan Sheferzen
Shuttleworth, Lt-Col C., CO 24 Bn: experience, DAK,
See also Mosque
‘Silver John’ (2/3 A-Tk Regt AIF),
See also Upper Sollum (Barracks)
South African Forces
1 Div (Brink): and relief of
1 Bde (Pienaar): training,
5 Bde (Armstrong): in sommernachtstraum, DAK,
4 Armd Car Regt (Newton-King) (7 Armd Div),
3 Recce Bn (1 Div),
2 A-Tk Regt (4 Ind Div),
7 Fd Regt (1 Bde),
1 Bn, DEOR (1 Bde) 429,
Transvaal Scottish
SA Air Force,
Special Air Service,
Staveley, Maj J. M., 6 Fd Amb,
Stephan Battle Gp – See 5 Pz Regt
Stephan, Lt-Col, Comd 5 Pz Regt,
Stevens, Maj-Gen W. G., Officer-in-charge of Admin,
Stewart, Col H.,
Stewart, Maj-Gen Sir Keith, former GSO I, NZ Div,
Stone, C. H. B., 5 Fd Regt,
Straker, Maj T. W., BM 5 Bde,
‘Strategicus’,
Struckmann, Lt, 115 Inf Regt,
Stubbs, Maj C. L., 23 Bn,
Suemmermann, Maj-Gen, GOC Africa Div (later 90 Lt): in opening phase,
Tappin, R. S., 24 Bn,
Tedder, Mshl of the RAF Lord, AOC-in-C MEF,
Thompson, Wing-Cdr H. L.,
Thomson, Pte D. R., 24 Bn,
Thomson, Capt D. S., 19 Bn,
Thorgrim, HMS,
tiger,
Till, Pte R. E., 24 Bn,
Fortress: in brevity and battleaxe, crusader planning, crusader,
Garrison:
Corridor: counter-attack on,
Tomlinson, Maj E. K., 24 Bn,
Tredray, Lt J. P., 25 Bn,
Trolove, Capt F. J., 21 Bn,
Tureia, Capt P., 28 Maori Bn,
Turner, D. H., 24 Bn,
Tyerman, Capt J., 18 Bn,
U-Boats,
Upper Sollum (Barracks) (128),
Upton, 2 Lt J. R., 26 Bn,
Vause, Pte C., 21 Bn,
Veale, Lt-Col P. N., 8 R Tks,
Vic Coln,
Wadi esc-Sciomar,
Wahl, Capt, CO II Bn, 8 Pz Regt,
Wake, Mai-Gen Sir Hereward, and Maj W. F. Deedes – See Swift and Bold
Walton, Lt-Col W. F., CO 8 Fd Regt, RA,
Waters, S. D.,
Watkins, Brig H. R. B., Comd 1 Army Tk Bde,
Wavell, Fd Mshl Lord, C-in-C MEF: and battleaxe,
Wechmar Gp – See 3 Recce Unit (German Forces)
Wechmar, Col Freiherr von, CO 3 Recce Unit,
Weir, Maj-Gen Sir Stephen, CO
Wesney, Capt A. W., 26 Bn,
Westenra, Lt W. D., 26 Bn,
Weston, Maj G. C., 6 Bde HQ,
Westphal, Gen Siegfried, GSO I, Pz Gp Africa, and acting-comd, Tobruk Front, 24/28 Nov,
West Sector (de Giorgis),
Whitehead, Sgt B. P. K.,
Whitley, Wing-Cdr E. W., Comd Whitforce,
Whyte, Pte J., 24 Bn,
Wilder, Maj-Gen A. S., Comd 5 Bde (from 7 Dec),
Williams, Lt-Gen Sir Guy, Mil. Adviser to NZ Govt,
Williamson, Capt, 44 R Tks,
Willis, Rev C. E., attached 25 Bn,
Willison, Brig A. C., Comd 32 Army Tk Bde,
Wilson Coln,
Wilson, Capt D. A., 25 Bn,
Wilson, Maj H. S.,
Wilson, Fd Mshl Lord, GOC-in-C BTE,
Wilson, Maj R. N., 5 R Tks,
Winter, Sgt T. P., 25 Bn,
Winters, S. G., 18 Bn,
Wood, Capt W. N.,
Yeoman, Capt A. A., 24 Bn (B Coy),
Young, Capt J. H., 5 Fd Regt,
Zaafran,
Zincke, Lt-Col, Comd 115 Inf Regt,
Professor N. C. Phillips, MA, University of Canterbury
Professor J. Rutherford, MA (
Professor F. L. W. Wood, MA (Oxon), Victoria University of Wellington
This volume was produced and published by the
The Department gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given in the production of this volume by Professor N. C. Phillips.
the author: crusader Campaign he was a gun-layer in 34 Anti-Tank Battery until he entered the New Zealand Medical Dressing Station as a patient the day it fell into enemy hands and became a prisoner for nine days. After the war he graduated BA from
He joined the staff of
r. e. owen, government printer, wellington, new zealand— 1961