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THIS volume deals with the formation of
Every effort has been made by the
The officers and men who answered questions and checked
sections of this narrative are so numerous that I cannot name them
all. I am, however, very grateful for the most generous manner in
which they assisted me. I wish, particularly, to acknowledge the
help I have received from
I must also acknowledge how much I owe to the patience and
co-operation of the Editor-in-Chief,
Chapters 1–5 owe much to the researches of
I am also indebted to
Overseas there are many to whom thanks must be expressed for
their always willing assistance. In
The photographs in the
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The
ranks are those held on discharge or at the date of death.
AT dawn on Luftwaffe attacked the
Polish airfields and the
This was a necessary procedure. In New Zealand declared war on
Some precautionary measures had already been taken. On 30
August No. 1 Platoon, A Company, a small detachment of two
officers and thirty other ranks from the Ex-Regulars and returned soldiers, aged 35 to 55.Leander to garrison
When no reply was received from New Zealand Gazette Extraordinary that ‘a state of war …
existed from 9.30 p.m. New Zealand Standard Time on the third
day of
There is no copy of this note, which is the first declaration of war made by New Zealand
as an independent member of the Commonwealth. The greater part of the archives of
the United States Embassy in
The despatch to The Governor-General of New Zealand to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
So far as land forces were concerned, the first step was the
decision by Cabinet on 6 September to mobilise 6600 men, a Special
Force for service within and without New Zealand. This was the
first echelon of what from
The forces from which these recruits could be drawn were not
relatively as strong as those which were available in The Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, the
Quartermaster-General, the Army Secretary. Up to
There was one other training cadre, the
These groups with their different standards of training were
allowed for when more detailed plans were prepared. Army Headquarters gave preference to single men in the following order:
serving members of the Men with not less than two years' Territorial training.
At 9 a.m. on Tuesday 12 September the recruiting offices were
opened, and when the doors closed that night 5419 men had
enlisted. Thereafter the figures were rather disappointing, no doubt
because of uncertainty as to the role of the Special Force, but by
5 October, when the
To prevent these enlistments from upsetting the economic
structure of the Dominion, the National Service Department was
established with a Manpower Committee of the Department of
Industries and Commerce. It drew up a Schedule of Reserved
Occupations, which was afterwards replaced by the Schedule of
Important Occupations. The Social Security Department compiled
Meanwhile, throughout September, the British and New Zealand
Governments had been discussing the best means by which the land
forces of the Dominion could co-operate in the common cause.
They decided that New Zealand should raise a division, The The term ‘echelon’ was first used by Army Headquarters on Gazette of
Any action by New Zealand was, moreover, governed by the
attitude of
In the meantime the Division would be organised and trained
for service overseas. The first echelon would consist of some staff
for an overseas base, part of
The
The nomenclature of these units had presented an unexpected
problem of army organisation and regimental tradition. The major
formations had not been difficult to number. First New Zealand
Division with its three infantry brigades was for home defence.
The formation to go overseas would, therefore, be 2 New Zealand
Division with 4, 5 and 6 Brigades. 2 NZ Division did not become the official title in
With the smaller units it was not so simple. The Adjutant-
General, Colonel
At this stage, in addition to the
Those New Zealanders who enlisted in
In New Zealand, by this time, the
The majority of the senior officers in camp, those with the First
Echelon and those waiting for appointments with the Second
Echelon, were civilians who had served in 1914–18 and had been
members of the Territorial Army during that depressing period
between the wars when it was fashionable to decry any interest in
military affairs. They may have lacked some of the qualifications
of the trained professional soldier, but they had actually held
commands, which few Regulars had done, and they were still young
enough to train the raw recruits and to command the battalions in
the field. In some cases their civilian occupations had indirectly
prepared them for this new adventure. To quote Army Quarterly,
The brigade commander, Colonel Puttick, DSO, Lt-Gen Sir Edward Puttick, KCB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit
(US);
His brigade major at this stage was Major
Fourth Field Regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Under the command of these officers the units of the First
Echelon began their elementary training. In November 18 Battalion
moved from its bell tents at
In Though this was the first section of the reinforcements to go overseas, it was, in succession to the three echelons, always known as the
These decisions had not been easy to make, nor had they been
just a matter for discussion between the representatives of Great
There was a difference of opinion between the two Dominions
as to the date on which the forces should be sent to the Middle
East. The Australian Government could see no reason why Dominion
troops should be transferred to the unruffled battle front in Documents relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War, Vol. I, p. 44.
The following day the Australian Government suggested that
‘we should watch developments of the next three or four weeks
before committing ourselves to the despatch of our division overseas.’ The New Zealand Government, having assumed that the
question was one of ‘common arrangement’ with their respective
ministers in Mr Curtin, Leader of the Opposition in the Australian Federal Parliament, had stated
publicly that he was opposed to the despatch of a force overseas. See Documents, Vol. I,
pp. 48–9.Documents, Vol. I, Appx III, pp. 338–9.
An equally important subject was the appointment of a commander for the Expeditionary Force. So much depended upon this
decision that Mr Fraser had been considering the subject ever since
he landed in Colonel H. Stewart, The New Zealand Division in 1916–19, p. 614.
But Gallipoli and the long campaigns in Although the Statute of Westminster was passed in
At any other time it might have been difficult to find such a
commander, but fortunately there was a New Zealander with all
these qualifications. He was Maj-Gen Sir John Duigan, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d.; born NZ
The soldier who won such respect from the prudent Mr Fraser
was born in
In Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War: Gallipoli, pp. 164–5.
He had won the Victoria Cross for most gallant conduct at
Beaucourt in
Having found the profession to which he was perfectly
adapted, it was natural that he should join the Regular Army, this
time as an officer in the Grenadier Guards. He rose to command
1 Battalion, The Manchester Regiment, from 1929 to 1931, to be
Assistant Quartermaster-General, Southern Command, 1931–33, and
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, at the War Office, 1933–34. In
But in spite of this record he was no conventional soldier. As the
friend of Denis Mackail, The Story of J. M. B.; Courage.
In this manual the author showed that he had common sense,
an interest in administration and the ability to write a readable
treatise on what could have been a dull subject. He argued that ‘The
running of an army unit is really the same as carrying on any
business. There is a definite objective in business, i.e., to make
money. In the Army administration it is to feed, clothe and keep
the man fit and as happy as possible. And to hand over to him
at the pay table each week his pay intact.’ With due care this could
be done. Mess accounts for a complete year should be studied to
ensure a uniform standard of living, irrespective of fluctuations in
the cost of food and the expense of extra meals during training
periods. The Navy, Army and Air Force Institute: ‘an Army institution and the only monopoly I
know of that works.’—
In
During my year as a civilian I had been working as a director of a large
combine of companies in the Midlands which had expanded very quickly
and built a large number of new factories. I had worked on these in a
minor way with business men and had learned what was the cheapest and
best method of excavating and moving large quantities of earth and building
in ferro concrete. I also learned the value of machine power tools and how
they should be used—bulldozers, angle dozers, steam navvys, Decauville
railways and the like. My feelings at seeing the British Army trying to
build an area of ferro concrete pill-boxes, involving the handling of hundreds
of tons of material, without light railways and power-driven concrete mixers
must be experienced to be understood. It made me unhappy to see the men
trying in many cases to do with shovels and wheelbarrows what was plainly
a job for machinery…. The trouble about military engineering is that in
this class of work we are all amateurs in the Army, and there is a rooted
objection to being taught by civilians.
In his own case this was not correct. His foray into the industrial world of the Midlands had left him with the greatest respect for the civilian experience of his engineers, signallers and medical officers.
He had, moreover, been observing, learning and readjusting his
life ever since he left New Zealand in
Shortly after this appointment the Army Board selected the staff
of Divisional Headquarters. The majority of them were Regular
officers with records that usually began with training at Duntroon
Military College in Maj-Gen Sir Keith Stewart, KBE, CB, DSO, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US);
Maj-Gen Sir William Gentry, KBE, CB, DSO and bar, m.i.d., MC (Gk), Bronze Star
(US);
The Commander Royal Artillery was Colonel Miles, DSO,
MC,
Another problem of this period was the sailing date of the First
Echelon. It was to have been
The only escort for the convoy would have been HMS Leander
had not Mr Fraser persuaded Mr Churchill to provide more substantial protection. The first addition was HMAS Canberra, and
when Fraser suggested that the Admiralty could do better still,
HMS
If all went according to plan the troops would be taken to a
training area in Egypt, the theatre of operations would be in western
Then, after a short visit to
In Australia there was time for him to discuss past problems with
General Sir Brudenell White, The officer who had played ‘the outstanding part’ in building 1 AIF. ‘No one more
learned in the problems that faced the leaders of a Dominion expeditionary force could
have been found’.—Long, To Benghazi, p. 84.
His first duty was to meet the Minister for Defence, the Hon.
F. Jones, and describe the work that had already been done in
He suggested that the Government should always have direct access to his opinion, that the administration, discipline, promotion and pay of officers should be completely under its control, that the force must be adequately equipped and always employed as a complete formation, never split up and used piecemeal. He agreed that whenever possible it should be built up with New Zealand officers and emphasised the necessity of its having a permanent base in England.
The final decision could not be given at this stage. For the next
few days there were public receptions and a visit to the Prime
Minister, Mr Savage, staff conferences and the inspection of troops
of the
The fundamental fact was that the Dominion had come of age.
The Expeditionary Force was not an integral part of the British
Army. In time it would be ‘a citizen force with its own complete
freedom of administration, its own training establishment, its own
hospitals and medical services staffed by New Zealand doctors,
dentists, sisters and VADs and its own welfare workers.’ Army Quarterly,
No common policy to meet such a situation had been drawn up
by the Dominions, but it was understood that their respective forces
would operate as national units. Nevertheless, there were to be
interesting variations in procedure. Canadian troops operated under
British command in Based on that drawn up in 1914–18.
The New Zealand Government was of much the same opinion.
The conditions of service were therefore based upon an agreement
between the British and New Zealand Governments. All major
decisions, such as the employment of the force, were to be made by
the New Zealand War Cabinet, and the force would be under
the command of an Allied Commander-in-Chief for operational
purposes only, but not for training, organisation, administration or
discipline. In other words,
The situation was not without precedent in military history; when
commenting on the problems of the American Army in
The attitude that the French assumed toward us in the World War was
in marked contrast with the views held by them when their troops so
generously came to
‘It is His Majesty's desire and He hereby commands that, so far as
circumstances will permit, the Count de Rochambeau shall maintain the
integrity of the French troops which His Majesty has placed under his
command, and that at the proper time he shall express to General
John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, p. 386.
The British commanders, French and Haig, Plumer and Milne,
when serving under Allied commanders-in-chief had been in the
same position. The last-named, in Cyril Falls, Military Operations, Macedonia, p. 256.
The special powers desired by and granted without limitation to
The General Officer for the time being
Commanding the 2nd New Zealand
Expeditionary Force Overseas
The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. He will, in addition to powers appearing in any relevant Statute or Regulations, be vested with the following powers:
In the case of sufficiently grave emergency or in special circumstances,
of which he must be the sole judge, to make decisions as to the
employment of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and
to communicate such decisions directly to the New Zealand
Government, notwithstanding that in the absence of that extraordinary cause such communication would not be in accordance
with the normal channels of communication indicated in the
following paragraphs and which for greater clearness are also
indicated in an attached diagram. Not reproduced.
To communicate directly with the
To communicate directly either with the
In all matters pertaining to equipment, to communicate with the War
Office through normal channels, and through the liaison officer
of the High Commissioner's office in
In matters of command, to adhere to the normal military channels between the War Office and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force overseas.
To establish such administrative headquarters and base and line of communication units as are necessary for the functions of command, organisation [including training], and administration with which he has been invested.
To organise, [train], The references to training in square brackets in paragraphs (f) and (g) have been added at
To fix and alter the establishment and composition of units and formations as the exigencies of service may in his opinion require from time to time.
After the This provision had the unforeseen result of making
M. J. Savage,
Prime Minister
The General Officer Commanding is hereby vested with the following powers:
Authority to increase the scale of ration, if necessary.
Authority to procure equipment (shown on equipment tables) that cannot be supplied through official channels. Such equipment to be bought through Ordnance channels where possible.
Authority to incur expenditures which cannot be foreseen at present, and which the General Officer Commanding considers necessary, for protection of the health of the Force.
Authority to incur expenditure, not exceeding £500 for any one transaction, for the recreation or other amenities of the Force.
Authority to disburse, at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding, from an entertainment fund which will be provided, to an amount not exceeding £1000 per annum.
F. Jones,
Minister of Defence
On the same day as this Cabinet meeting, the Dunera (1355 all ranks, including
The next few weeks passed by without the strain and the sense
of urgency felt by those who sailed in later convoys. Dunera was an army transport with all
the simplicity and most of the discomforts of such ships, but the
others, being converted passenger liners, provided superb quarters
with many of the amenities expected by peacetime tourists. There
may have been parades and inspections, fatigues and anti-aircraft
duties, but there were also cabin quarters, large dining saloons and
an amazing area of deck space.
The convoy, with ships from On 10 January the Empress of Canada escorted by HMS
The first ship to anchor at Empress of Canada. There was an official welcome
by Mr Anthony Eden on behalf of the King and the British
Parliament;
By 15 February the disembarkation was complete and the units
were establishing themselves in
Here the New Zealanders were eight miles from This holy of holies was known to the irreverent soldiery as ‘Bludger's Hill’.
The Tactical exercises without troops.
Equally important were the questions of ration allowances and
well-trained cooks. For a short time the ration scale was larger than
that allowed for in the field and considerably better than that of
other British units. So before long
The success of the changeover was probably due to the improved
standards of cooking. The graduates from the School of Cookery
in See p. 40.Oronsay was attacked
At the same time the medical and dental units were taking over
their duties. Fourth Field Hygiene Section became responsible for
the sanitation of Matron Miss D. I. Brown, RRC, m.i.d.; now Mrs R. G. Milne,
The next step was to arrange for the movement from See p. 35.
The dental officers were fully occupied attempting to solve the
problems of a temporary dental hospital and insufficient equipment
when the echelon provided as many dental cases in one month as
did the two British divisions in Egypt in three months. They had
to persevere until the Mobile Dental Section arrived in September
with the
Outside the camp there was, within a fortnight of the echelon's
arrival, that wonderful institution, the The
Such were the conditions for training and recreation at the end
of Devonshire to Egypt.
ON
Brigadier James Hargest, DSO, MC,
The specialist units had several of those civilian authorities of
whom See p. 7.
In a month's time the battalions were joined by forestry and
railway experts who had been called up to meet an urgent request
from
The same day 16 officers and 371 other ranks from the thousand
volunteers of the Public Works and Railway Departments entered
Both groups, railway and forestry, were immediately instructed in the elementary grammar of military training.
The battalions, having endured similar instruction, were now
graduating to more technical exercises.
At the same time there was always that atmosphere of haste
and improvisation which suggests an early departure. The original
plan had been for the second convoy to leave towards the end of
March, with the divisional troops landing in Egypt and the railway
and forestry companies going straight to
The only New Zealand unit sent with the first or slow convoy
was an advance party Five officers and 29 other ranks from the Railway Construction and Maintenance Group;
one officer and 15 other ranks from the Forestry Company. Orcades for
The rest of the echelon continued its training throughout April,
with more vaccinations and such diversions as recruiting parades
through the cities of the Dominion. There was, by then, a greater
sense of urgency; the storm had broken and changed overnight the
character of the war.
In these circumstances the Admiralty insisted upon a concentration of naval forces in the
The Australian Government thereupon suggested that the troops
should not embark until the situation had been clarified. The New
Zealand Government did not think that the departure of the convoy
New Zealand agreed to this proposal but the Australian Government asked for a full appreciation of the situation from the Chiefs
of Staff. The Australians wanted to know their part in ‘the scheme
of things’, and they reminded the Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs that such a possibility had ‘long been referred to in Committee of Imperial Defence documents.’ They also pointed out that
their
At this stage there was no time for any answer to reach New
Zealand before the departure of the fast convoy. The Government
adhered to the programme but appreciated the Australian point
of view and the embarrassment that would result were ‘
In the meantime the fast convoy had already left New Zealand
with the Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir Harold Barrowclough, PC, KCMG, CB, DSO and bar, MC, ED,
m.i.d., MC (Gk), Legion of Merit (US), Croix de Guerre (Fr);
The troops had embarked, those at Andes, those
at
Andes:
Empress of Britain: HQ
Aquitania:
The war situation was still serious but no worse than it had been
when the convoy left New Zealand. On 4 May, when the Second
Echelon was steaming across the
On the basis of this appreciation the convoys left
From
The fast convoy swung round from its course on the night of 15 May. The men, whose paybooks had been made out for a day in Colombo, learned of this change by observing that the morning sun was shining from another angle. The slow convoy went through to Colombo, left there and was diverted south on 19 May. Instead of being the advance party it was now four days behind the other convoy. In this order the ships moved south, with the Governments of two Dominions very apprehensive about the presence of German raiders in the South Atlantic and the Admiralty calling together for that portion of the voyage the most formidable escort it could assemble.
On the morning of 26 May the fast convoy and its escort were
seen like another Armada by the surprised inhabitants of The Queen Mary and the
Next day the fast convoy put out to sea, calling at
The men of the
The railway and forestry companies went to
This concentration in the On 14 June HQ
These plans had been made when the convoys were moving up
the African coast and when the policy of the British Government
was to give overseas troops every facility to complete their training.
They were changed when the succession of disasters in Brigadier Miles, who had been sent over from Egypt, commanded
In the meantime
Until then his policy had always been that his force should not
go into action unless it was adequately equipped and thoroughly
trained. But after a visit to the War Office he informed the New
Zealand Government that ‘There is a desperate shortage of equipment and for some time to come we shall be short of many of
our weapons. This is the common lot of most troops here; nevertheless in spite of this I feel, and I am sure that Cabinet will agree
with me, that New Zealand troops must be prepared to accept battle
upon uneven terms in defence of Great Britain.’ He knew that
should there be an invasion the first question the people of New
Zealand would ask would be, ‘What part did our men take?’ After
this correspondence all questions concerning the role of 5 Brigade war diary,
There was no suggestion that the
Shortly after this decision the Convalescent Depot and Railway
Construction and Maintenance Group were warned to prepare for
a move overseas. The former had to hand over its hospital to 1
Franconia and the medical staffs at Andes.
This convoy, taking the route via
The rest of the echelon spent their time training for their role
in the defence of
At this stage the battalions and detachments of reinforcements
with the From 7 August known as 7 Infantry Brigade.
There was still an acute shortage of arms, vehicles and equipment. Fifth Field Regiment had only one battery: a collection of
18-pounder guns and 4.5-inch howitzers. The anti-tank companies
had been given the Bedford 30-cwt trucks, sheeted with ⅝ inch steel
plate and equipped with Bren guns and anti-tank rifles. C Squadron
On 17 July, when the force was finally organised, it came under
the control of the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces and with
As this landing was thought likely to take place at any moment
the training of
The first large-scale exercise took place on 18–22 July. Three
convoys of buses moved off in drizzling rain for Ashdown Forest
to the south-west of Tunbridge Wells. The brigades then had to
cover the southern approaches to Crowborough and to counter-attack any landings on the south coast east of the River Ouse. With
wind and rain to encourage them, they dug in and learnt by
unpleasant experience how to bivouac in the open. They repelled
hypothetical assaults on the beaches or overwhelmed imaginary
parachutists landing on the South Downs. The exercise ended with
a solid route march, a night embussing and a move back to
It was repeated on 28–31 July with the Mixed Brigade (7 Brigade)
as an enemy who was advancing towards
The infantry then marched through the area they were to hold
should the invasion take place. For another week of that sunlit
August they marched over the Downs and across the Weald. Those
who remembered the distance from New Zealand, the youth of the
Dominion and the past history of the counties they were detailed
to defend realised that they were taking part in a great romance.
The General thought that, as a spectacle, nothing equalled this
méthode naturelle’ the
battalions had become magnificent instruments of war. He afterwards could say: ‘Perhaps the most extraordinary part of this
English adventure was the rapid and successful training of the New
Zealand Expeditionary Force…. I am certain that in two months
they had become a fully trained fighting force, capable of taking
their part in any offensive. This is a tribute to their excellent
qualities and their natural adaptability. In any case … although
the times were hard, and the move of our men interfered with the
concentration of the Division, I am very glad they went to Great
Britain. They saw the people at a time of crisis, and in their small
way inspired confidence in England at a time when the Homeland
had few friends, if any, other than her people from overseas.’
At the same time the force was steadily acquiring greater fire
power. Seventh Anti-Tank Regiment had two-pounders; 5 Field
Regiment had the new 25-pounders and some French 75-millimetre
guns; the
They did not know that the relative importance of the HQ 6 Brigade had travelled with the
But to everyone's surprise, on 4 September all preparations for
departure were abruptly halted. Late that night Luftwaffe had been attempting to eliminate the
In this emergency the
The order from GHQ Home Forces ran as follows: ‘Emergency
Move. NZ Force and 8 R Tanks under command
The brigades left
Their instructions were specific and detailed. Seventh Brigade
would deal with airborne landings in the Chatham-
The week passed by with the air battle increasing in intensity,
but the echelon still expected that it would be withdrawn in time
to leave for the Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II, p. 293.
Ibid., p. 410.
This decision forced Tenth Army had crossed the Egyptian border on 14
September and was advancing towards
See Chapter 3.
In his cables to the
The units left in 28 (Maori) Battalion went to
Even so, 5 Brigade's war diary records that 23 Battalion was informed through Routine Orders that the right to kill rabbits in Milgate
Park had been sold to a man who earned his livelihood as a trapper. There was to be
no more snaring, ferreting or shooting of rabbits in the battalion area.
There was no suggestion of any major move to the Oronsay being hit by bombs and escorted
back to Greenock. The 363 New Zealanders on board, none of
whom was hurt, had a week's survivors leave and then by leisurely
stages in different camps appeared again at
The next convoy was due to leave in November, but there were
100,000 competitors and capacity for only 30,000 men. In any case,
priority was being given to armoured regiments, artillery and anti-aircraft units. Everything was based on the precise requirements in
the
But there was some suggestion of the move. October was now
drawing to a close, winter was approaching and the Germans could
not attempt an invasion until the summer of
No one left in November, but the artillery and the advance parties
from the battalions were selected for the December convoy. Guns
and equipment, trucks and Bren carriers were taken to the transports
Rangitiki;
5 Field Regiment in the City of London and advance parties in the
In the
The Duchess of Bedford took 2781 all ranks from Newport on
7 January and steamed up the Irish Sea and into Belfast Lough off
Bangor the next day. The Athlone Castle, with 1480 all ranks, left
Liverpool on 7 January but remained anchored off the coast of
North Wales until the 11th, when she joined the convoy that was
assembling in Belfast Lough. In several other ships 112 other ranks
sailed as anti-aircraft defence parties and 10 officers and 404 other
ranks sailed in the ships carrying the transport vehicles. The only
troops left in
On
With a strong air and naval escort the convoy of over twenty
ships left on 12 January, calling at Athlone Castle entered
By then the other battalions had endured their first route march,
even though many of them did not have such tropical equipment as
shorts, hose-tops and sun helmets. They were being reorganised.
Twenty-ninth Battalion As late as
Still more important, on 7 March Brigadier Hargest told all ranks
that their stay in Egypt would be short. In fact, some of the transport
vehicles had not yet come up from the ships at
IN May–July 1940, when the
With Brigadier Barrowclough and his staff in
The medical officers were, as usual, a strong group with military
experience and impressive civilian qualifications. Lieutenant-Colonel
For them and for the men they were to command there were more
comfortable quarters and better facilities for training than there
had been for the other echelons, but the greatest difference was the
sense of urgency aroused by the disastrous course of the war in
The general public was sensitive in its turn. People were now
expressing their opinions about the war effort in greater volume
and with more asperity. The newspapers, public bodies and the
Returned Soldiers' Association called for drastic measures; on 23
May news was received of the British Emergency Powers Bill which
placed all persons and property at the disposal of the state. The
following day Mr Fraser Prime Minister since 1 April after the death of Mr Savage on
These statements restored public confidence, even when the
ensuing week saw the surrender of the Belgian Army and the
evacuation of On 16 July Mr Fraser announced the agreement to form a War Cabinet of five members,
three from the Labour Government, two from the Opposition. This body would decide
and direct the war effort; the general Cabinet would continue to function in the normal
way.
Provision will be made for the compulsory system right away. The question of when it will be applied will depend upon the conditions in regard to the Forces; it will depend entirely on the conditions in regard to the number at present volunteering, and the number that will be available during the next few months. Apart from everything else, however, the country feels at the present time in this crisis that the voluntary system, even if completely successful, does not apply fairly and does not embody that spirit of service that the country demands. There is that feeling—a feeling that must be shared by all, including even some of us who were strong anti-conscriptionists under ordinary conditions, for it is the life of the Commonwealth for which we are fighting at the present time. If I am aboard a sinking ship and I am asked to go to the pumps, and if another chap does not want to go to the pumps I will certainly compel him to do his best at least to save the ship. That is how I look upon the matter and that is how the Government looks upon it. If the house is on fire, we cannot start arguing about whether the other chap will help or not, but we can do our best to induce him to help. I am not going to reflect upon those who have conscientious objections to killing and would rather be killed than kill … but … it is quite impossible to carry on efficiently without compulsion; I say that quite definitely.
The
Another result of the collapse of 11 Forestry Company and the Railway Construction and Maintenance Group had sailed
with the There was to have been 12 Railway Survey Company but there was no immediate need
for it in the 8 Field Company, when re-formed, went to Documents, Vol. I, pp. 227–8.)
To command these specialist units there were again civilians with
invaluable technical experience. Major Lt-Col A. H. Sage, OBE, MM, m.i.d.;
The movement and ultimate destination of these companies was
not decided for some weeks. The railwaymen, being required in
the
By July, however, there were serious doubts about the wisdom
of sending any troops away from New Zealand. In the original plan
the New Zealand Division was to operate from a base in
This cautious attitude was due to the rapid deterioration of the
situation in the Foreign Secretary Matsuoka to
Her policy Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to High Commissioner for the
This meant that the Division would assemble in the
After carefully weighing all the known factors the Government
decided to send the troops to the
The Government realised that the situation in the
On the other hand, the collapse of
For these reasons, the Government ‘fully accepted the fact that
a large view must be taken, that in the last resort this Dominion
must stand or fall according to the decision in the main theatres of
war, and that as a corollary it would be wise to have all possible
forces at decisive points rather than to disperse them in reserves all
over the world.’ The
To this decision there was, on 9 August, a characteristic response
from Churchill: ‘I read the Governor-General's telegram … with
the greatest interest and sympathy. I appreciate fully the great
responsibility which you and your colleagues cannot but feel in
taking the decisions which you have reached as to the disposition
of the available New Zealand forces. For our part we are greatly
heartened as ever by New Zealand's readiness to meet the needs
of the situation both in the Documents, Vol. I, p. 175.
Having made this decision, the Government arranged for the
concentration of See p. 37, note 2.
The Middle East to which they were going had been the scene
of much activity since the arrival of the
The really serious problems of the period were the detachment of
units and the gradual dispersion of the brigade. Faced with a
dangerous shortage of guns and transport, of signallers and railway
operators, General Headquarters Middle East had asked
The first to leave were 7 officers and 122 other ranks who, on
9 June, became Advanced Corps Signals,
Two days later On 13–29 June a platoon of B Company 18 Battalion went from
In the
The understanding was that the force would not take part in
any active operations until the arrival of the Second and Third
Echelons. But the General had agreed to the employment of the
battalions in the rear areas and of the transport units in the desert.
The battalions then continued their training or improved the
local defences. A new landing ground was required at Telegram, Puttick to Prime Minister, Documents, Vol. I, pp.
228–31, for correspondence leading to the formation of 21 Mechanical Equipment
Company.
Fourth RMT Company remained in the desert at Smugglers'
Cove, attached to
This work along the coast road and inland to the desert outposts
was most exacting. The drivers were enduring their first Egyptian
summer, the hours were long and roads dangerous because of air
raids by day and blackouts at night, but there were no serious
injuries until 12 July when Corporal
For those who remained in the R. J. Collins, Lord Wavell, p. 268: ‘By means of dummy tanks … it was made as difficult
as possible for the whereabouts and, what was more, the somewhat diminished strength
of the
At the same time this practice of detaching units for service with
other formations could easily have been abused, especially when
Wavell on 3 July suggested that the units in the In August General Blamey had to state the case for
Have just received your proposals for reorganisation with its repercussions
upon the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in Egypt. As no such change
can be made without the approval of the Documents, Vol. I, pp. 187–8.
This decided the question; Egypt Corps was organised but the Australian and New Zealand groups were included as self-contained formations.
There had, of course, been some very good reasons for the
suggested reorganisation. In
If the Italians entered Egypt he proposed to retire to his defences
about
The guards at the
The move began on 27 August and the units, after much shuffling
and reshuffling, were dug in and camouflaged by the end of
September. Headquarters New Zealand Division, with 5 Field
Park Company and 4 Field Ambulance, was at
The work to be done in the
The units which had been attached to the
The trucks of 4 RMT Company were usually far to the west of
The Italian answer to this increased volume of transport was
more air activity. There were showers of shaving sticks and pencils,
tooth-paste, innocent lumps of wood and thermos-flask bombs which
With 4 RMT Company so occupied in the
This historic resort, being of some strategic importance, was now
a military outpost to which supplies were taken from
Along the line of communication between
To bring about such a change the non-divisional troops from
New Zealand were available. The first to arrive were 9 Survey
Company and 10 Railway Construction Company, who had sailed
with the
Meanwhile the companies had left for the
These two surveys were not the only tasks for the Survey
Company. As they were, until the arrival of Australian and South
African companies, the only survey experts in the
In Reinforcement, Reception and Discharge Depots to replace the General Base Depot
formed in New Zealand; a Composite ASC Company; Base Signals and Provost Companies; Base Kit Store; Base Hygiene Section; Port Detachment at
The first troops to enter this newly organised base were the units
of the Carrying Empress of Japan
As the Orcades was going on to
This small detachment remained in Felix Roussel. In the Kimberley, one of the escort vessels, put
an Italian destroyer out of action, engaged the shore batteries and
ended the day as a disabled vessel towed astern of the convoy. In
Port
The main body of the echelon had a less exciting voyage from
Mauretania went to the
Within a few days Headquarters See p. 45, note 3.
The non-divisional units were absorbed without any waste of
time. On 8 October 2 General Hospital, with Colonel F. M. Spencer
as CO and Miss D. I. Brown as matron, took over the hospital at
Matron-in-Chief Miss E. C. Mackay, OBE, RRC, m.i.d.;
The railway companies were required so urgently that the Director
of Transportation,
Their immediate task was to eliminate the delays in the movement
of wagons and to increase the daily number of trains without completely taking over from the Egyptians. ‘The Company had to make
10 trains run where a couple ambled along in a maleesh fashion
before.’ The Director of Transportation had been very careful to
explain the delicacy of the situation and the necessity of avoiding
any friction whatsoever. The solution was to have men at each
station along the line and spare engine crews at danger points or
regular target areas. The engines were run without headlights and
But there was another side to this swift absorption of the Third
Echelon. It was very evident that GHQ Middle East was making
no effort to assemble the scattered units of the Division. Divisional
Headquarters and 6 Brigade Group were at
In September, soon after his arrival from
These unsympathetic replies forced
The New Zealand Forces are not an integral part of the British Army—they are a distinct New Zealand force, proud of their own identity. They cannot be split up and used piecemeal, except with the consent of the New Zealand Government. The past I know has been unfortunate, and for that I must take my share of the blame. We came over here in February, keen and willing to help everybody, and have never refused a request of any sort. It has been a mistake, and the efficiency of the Division has suffered grievously. Now, because we are insisting on concentrating as a force, we are most unpopular. I feel I let our force in for this by not saying ‘No’ right at the beginning, as I believe did the AIF.
For your information I send you a copy of the special powers See pp. 19–20. A few weeks earlier the Australian charter was produced when Wilson,
Wavell, and finally Churchill ordered the movement of a brigade without the authority
of Blamey and contrary to the information he had given his Government. See Long,
To Benghazi, p. 109.
The position is quite clear; in an emergency we will all work under
anybody's command, and do any job for which we are trained and equipped.
The Division meanwhile cannot be used piecemeal.Documents, Vol. I, p. 190.
This cleared the air and the future concentration of In October 6 Field Company, 5 Field Park Company and the
This still meant that the New Zealand forces in the This was prepared after the fighting in It was not until
The greatest problem was that of reinforcements. The decision
to garrison
This, however, was still in the realms of possibility. The problems of the moment were those of the units at
This life in the desert was monotonous and often Spartan in its
simplicity. The hot, clear days and sharp, brilliant nights followed
in endless succession. Meals seemed to consist of tinned food and
chlorinated tea. Self-control was needed when the water allowance
was one and a half gallons per man per day and resignation when
sandstorms paralysed all movements. Milder days did come with
the approach of winter but they meant colder nights and heavy
showers, such as those of 26–27 November when water rushed
down the wadis, flooding dugouts and anti tank ditches. As compensation there were fewer flies and less dysentery, football matches
and leave to
IN December, three months after they had crossed the Egyptian
frontier, the Italians were still only a few miles past
The British were also building up their defences and planning a
big attack. General Wavell proposed to exploit a gap between
In the plan there was no task for 4 New Zealand Brigade Group.
Wavell had hoped to use it during the initial stages of the
attack, but the
In view of this decision it is surprising how many New Zealand
units or detachments from units took part in the campaign. The
signallers who had been with
Equally essential to the success of the campaign were the
companies of railwaymen. The 80 miles of permanent way between
The engineers were also needed to deal with the water problems
of the desert army. In October 6 Field Company had been brought
out from
Then, in the last week before the attack was launched, the acute
shortage of vehicles and drivers brought all the New Zealand transport units into the forward areas. Fourth RMT Company had been
there for months but the others had been with 4 Brigade Group at
Fourth RMT Company was given a more exciting task: the transportation of 5 Indian Brigade, which as part of 4 Indian Division
was to strike through the Bir Enba gap. B Section was recalled from
Next morning 4 Indian Division drove off along the
Along the coast a British force, assisted by the
The first stage was another 50-mile move across the open desert
on 8 December, a clear day perfect for ground navigation but
disturbing for those who feared Italian air attacks. The Royal Air
Force, however, kept the skies clear and the long columns halted
about 15 miles south-east of the
Before first light on 9 December 4 Indian Division was edging
through the gap, hundreds of vehicles in orderly confusion steering
through the haze of a rising sandstorm. Before 9 a.m.
Fifth Indian Brigade in the trucks of 4 RMT Company was being
driven through the now swirling sand to a point west of Tummar
West. But at 10 a.m., when the stage was set for the assault, the
sandstorm made it impossible to find that objective. There was a
pause until 1 p.m., when the barrage opened up and tanks, Bren
carriers and then lorry-borne infantry moved off towards Tummar
West. The dust and the smoke from burning dumps limited visibility,
but before long the armoured vehicles were lumbering through the
outer lines. ‘The infantry followed up in lorries to within 150
yards of the walls. The drivers of these lorries were New Zealanders
who showed great bravery under fire in bringing their vehicles so
close to the enemy position; many of them accompanied the infantry
in the assault after debussing.’Tbe Tiger Strikes, p. 27—a history of 4 Indian Division.
First Royal Fusiliers (A Section 4 RMT Company) began the mopping up and 3/1 Punjab Regiment (C Section) carried on, methodically capturing strongpoints, dugouts and over 3000 Italians.
At the same time
To the rear the Advanced Dressing Station with 5 Indian Brigade
was receiving hundreds of cases—Indian, British and Italian—
casualties from the Tummar camps and casualties sent over from
the
The following day, 10 December, the Italian defences began to
crack. The great encampment of
All that day, 11 December, mopping-up went on in the forward
areas. Whole divisions were surrendering in the coastal sector while
others, pursued by the armoured units, retired in disorder towards
That evening, 11–12 December, preparations were made to attack
‘This last manoeuvre was probably the most brilliant performance
of the [4 Indian] Division; without a single written order, after
three days continuous fighting and moving in a thick duststorm,
the units disengaged themselves from the aftermath of a battle,
replenished with petrol, food and water, and moved through the
dark for 25 miles over previously unreconnoitred country.’ The Tiger Strikes, p. 34.
Fourth Indian Division took no further part in the campaign.
Some of the units returned next day to the
By this time the Italians had organised a rearguard and were
holding the escarpment that runs inland from the coast at
The Supply Column, the Petrol Company, and the Ammunition
Company (A Section) became links in the endless chain that ran
out with supplies and came back loaded with Italian prisoners. The
transport vehicles from 4 Brigade came up from the
The salvaging of enemy vehicles was another way of relieving
the shortage of transport. The Italians had abandoned a large
At this stage the railway line and the New Zealand railway
companies waiting to extend it westwards from
In the meantime the British had prepared to attack the rearguard
at
In these preparations the New Zealand transport units had many
different roles to play. Fourth RMT Company on 17 December
transported 16 Australian Brigade from
The essential item for transport at this stage of the advance was
the water brought up by sea from
On the morning of 24 December there was no air raid, but the hours dragged on and the atmosphere had that intensity which suggests the approach of violent action. The barge crews were filling the water drums and a mixed group of British, Australian, Cypriot and New Zealand troops was unloading two other barges which had come in with oranges and tinned beer for Christmas Day, when suddenly about midday Italian aircraft came over to bomb with unusual and devastating accuracy.
The bomb which hit one of the supply barges and those which
burst on the wharf caused the most serious loss yet experienced by
the Division. Six men from 4 RMT Company and one from 19
Army Troops Company were killed and six from 4 RMT Company
wounded. Corporal O. T. Pussell, the first New Zealand soldier to be wounded, was one of those
who were killed.
There was, however, no pause in the work. The great problem
of the moment was the shortage of transport for the creation of
forward supply depots and the conveyance of troops to attack
The majority of the units, including 4 Brigade in the
This meant that the conveyance of the Australian infantry to the
outskirts of
In other words, the pieces upon the chessboard were now so
placed that General O'Connor could make a full-scale attack upon
The New Zealand units took no part in these swift thrusts, but
they were called forward when On
In
That town was twice the size of
This was not the prelude to any headlong attack. The Italians in
In this phase the more forward of the New Zealand units were
those in and about
The other New Zealanders at
The other units were farther back along the highway to
The last group of New Zealanders were 4 Brigade and the
attached units who were still working and training in the
note for the new zealand division from general wavell
I feel that I owe an explanation to the New Zealand Division, and
especially to the 4th Infantry Brigade, regarding the recent operations in
the
I therefore give you the reasons which influenced the decision not to use
them in the advance. It was my original intention to do so. But the New
Zealand Government, quite naturally and quite rightly, has always wished
As regards the use of the Australian Division for the second stage of the
operations, I required a whole division, and if I had sent forward the New
Zealand Brigade it would have been necessary to form a composite division
of Australian and New Zealand troops, which I had been given to understand was contrary to the wishes of the
As you know, however, the assistance that has been given by the New
Zealand Division to the operations in the
I take this opportunity of thanking the New Zealand Division for all the
assistance they have so willingly provided during the very difficult period
when the defence of Egypt was dangerously weak, and I very much regret
that it was not possible for them to take an even greater share in the advance
from
A. P. Wavell
For units other than 4 Brigade, the period between the capture
of
For some days the only threats to Italian security were the patrols
from the armoured division. The greater part of
The first New Zealanders into the captured town were engineers.
On 22 January Lieutenant
Using the harbour and water supply of
The main thrust against the Italian rearguards was not, however,
at
Plans were then made for a mobile force to strike westwards
along the desert track from near
In this dash across the desert, the most dramatic movement in
the whole campaign, the only New Zealanders to take any active
part were the signalmen with Advanced Headquarters
The final stage began with the Italians on 30 January pulling
back from Tenth Army as it fell back before the
Australians. The margin of error was rather fine: the strength of
The columns moved off on 4 February, bumping over the desert
all that day and on throughout the moonlit night to reach
On 6 February the issue was decided. The Australians who had
been driving the Italians through the Vale of
Advanced Headquarters
No other New Zealand unit had taken part in this last drive across
The only other New Zealand unit to enjoy these conditions were
the engineers of 5 Field Park Company, who had come up close on
the heels of the forward troops, repairing roads, lifting mines and
re-establishing water supplies. They had erected a water tank at
This pleasant interlude did not last very long. The Italians who
had built excellent highways before the war were now equally efficient
with their demolitions, for over 100 miles away on the road to
There were very good reasons for this haste to repair the main
highway. The naval authorities at
This harbour, which had been cleared for shipping immediately
after its capture on 22 January, now received a greater tonnage of
shipping than did
Some ships ran straight through from
On the morning of 3 February, however, No. 2 water barge,
manned by men from 19 Army Troops Company, exploded a mine
and disintegrated with the loss of all the crew and many Italian
No. 1 barge had been more fortunate. The previous night, with
one of the tugs in tow, it had set out for Ladybird and five of the Ladybird through the minefields. A third tug and
still more men came up from
For these New Zealanders this was the beginning of an exacting
but exciting period of the war. The work was no different from
that at Luftwaffe was
now supporting the less aggressive
In other parts of
IN
The immediate problem, however, was the assembly of the
scattered Division. There were even doubts about the arrival of
reinforcements, though they were essential if the Division was ever
to go into action. In August the reinforcements who were to have
sailed with the
To make way for these reinforcements, 6 Brigade and those units
of the Division already in
The first to enter atory and Maunganui and
after an uneventful voyage arrived at
As the Italian army in North Africa was then in full retreat, there
was no reason why several of the units which had been attached
to There were two exceptions to this policy of withdrawal. From 4 January to 1 February
For the rank and file of 4 Brigade the important fact was that,
during their absence in the desert, efforts had been made to introduce
some of the amenities of civilisation to the tented camps at See p. 23. Col the Hon. F. Waite, CMG, DSO, OBE, VD, m.i.d.; MLC; farmer; born Dunedin,
The other side to the story is one of training and organisation.
Training schemes were drawn up and warnings issued about divisional exercises in February and active operations in March. By
then it was hoped that 5 Brigade would have arrived from
In
At the same time much was done to perfect the organisation and
administration of the Division. Groupings for the three brigades With 4 Inf Bde:
There was, however, less shortage of the more regular items of
clothing and equipment. The authorities were making every effort
to issue the troops with the full G1098 The synopsis of the complete equipment of a unit, itemised and enumerated.
The task for the brigades was to complete the basic training of
the men and then, by intensive day and night marches, to have
them so fit that they could cover 40 miles in twenty-four hours.
By February this was possible and the monotony of the work was
then broken by more advanced exercises. The battalions attacked
behind the supporting fire of machine guns and mortars or advanced
in extended line behind smoke screens to capture imaginary defences
in the sandhills; on the route marches they were harried by the
The actual role which the Division was to play had not been
defined, but
All this time reinforcements had been arriving from New Zealand
and units returning from the desert. The second section of the 4th
Reinforcements, 2301 all ranks, which had left Dominion Monarch, Empress of Russia and
The next to appear was 19 Army Troops Company, whose sections
had been working between
The rest of the company, however, was at Sollum with 500 Italian prisoners ran aground on an outer reef.
The railway construction companies, lacking mechanical equipment and dependent upon unreliable native labour, had lost touch
with the advancing forces, but the limitations of the railway system
had by now been balanced by the capture of
The next moves in the assembly of the divisional troops now
began to take place in swift succession. On 16 February 5 Field
Regiment, 7 Anti-Tank Regiment (31 and 32 Batteries) and the
advance parties from the other units of 5 Brigade arrived from
See p. 99.
As if further proof was required to support this verbal order, the
units which had been advancing to
The transport companies were also on the move. The Petrol
Company, the Supply Column and A Section of the Ammunition
Company came in to
For the New Zealand Division this was the end of the Libyan
campaign, the last paragraph of a brief introduction. It had not
gone into action as a complete formation, for neither the infantry
nor the artillery had been engaged. But the signals, engineer and
transport companies had gained invaluable experience. The work
of all these units was acknowledged and praised in farewell messages from Lieutenant-General O'Connor and the heads of services
in
But the men from the desert had little time to appreciate these
messages or to enjoy the now well-organised camps at See p. 42.
The third section of the
These units and the mass of unattached reinforcements had left
New Zealand on 1 February in HMT Nieuw Amsterdam as part
of a large convoy that reached Nevassa and reached Port
Empress of
Australia, Windsor Castle, Nieuw Zeeland and
By then the movement See Chapter 7.
IN Churchill, Vol. I, p. 274. On
Once war was declared Churchill was able to enlarge upon the
strategic importance of the See From a paper prepared for the War Cabinet in Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–41, documents from the archives of the German Foreign
Office, and Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 27–9, for evidence of the distrust with which Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, Volume V, edited E. L.
Woodward and Rohan Butler, show that the Russian proposals for a mutual assistance
pact in
After the collapse of In the secret protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact of
In August Mussolini, without consulting At the Supreme War Council in
But no close understanding developed between The Greek White Book, p. 64, diplomatic documents relating to
As it was, the Italian invasion of
In his efforts to arrange this he now had several months of
delicate negotiations, sometimes brilliantly successful, sometimes
rather frustrating. After the Tripartite Pact between Ciano's Diary, 1939–1943, p. 291.
At this point Mussolini became impatient and reminded the
Germans that there was still the problem of Mussolini to N.D., Vol. X, p. 287.fait accompli, he decided to make his own decisions.
So, without mentioning any fixed date, he informed The Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol.
IX, p. 334. Hereafter this source will be referred to as N.D., Nuremberg Documents.
The position of Speech, The Greek White Book, pp. 8–9.
On the other hand it was doubtful just what Sir Michael Palairet, KCMG. Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. I, p. 230.
Churchill considered this move to be both wise and bold. In
his opinion, every effort must be made to assist the Greeks. They
were determined to resist the Italians; prolonged fighting in the
Churchill, Vol. II, p. 476.
Such being the case, the Government decided, as a long-term
investment, to send still more assistance to the Greeks. On 4
November General Wavell was instructed to give Barbarity
Force—five squadrons of the
Documents, Vol. I, p. 193.
Consequently, the 2
At the same time every care was taken to give the Greeks no
reason to hope for immediate relief. The staff officer sent over
as an observer was warned that he must not make any promises
or give any undertakings to the Greek General Staff. No. 27
Military Mission to Rich, Vol. I, Ch. I, p. 16, para. 26.
After 11 November there was some improvement in the situation, for the naval aircraft which attacked the Italian warships in
Nevertheless the British Government, unwilling to open another
front and anxious to respect the wishes of the Greeks, still acted
very cautiously. The base for Barbarity Force had to be capable
of expansion to accommodate two divisions, but the Greeks were
on no account to be informed of this possibility. The best site for
it, strategically, was the flat country near
In Barbarity Force there were about 4000 men, half of whom
came from the Sydney and SS
The section worked about
By this time The Italians did not accept this proposal.
Unfortunately for N.D., Vol. III, p. 137. See also p. 93, note 1.
To meet the situation he now decided that every possible effort
must be made ‘to turn
With Greece, on the other hand, there was no suggestion of
negotiations. The Mediterranean situation had to be liquidated
‘that winter’, so In a proclamation issued on 6 April, the day Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I,
p. 787.
The British victories in North Africa during December 1940–February 1941, the bombardment of Genoa by the HMS Illustrious
through the Twelfth Army supported by 8 Air Corps was to take north
The British throughout these months, November–December
Churchill, Vol. II, p. 483.
Within a few weeks Churchill could be more definite, for in
The destruction of the Italian forces in Ibid., Vol. III, p. 9.
So on 8 January the Defence Committee of Cabinet agreed that,
from ‘the political point of view’, all possible support must be
given to
The commanders-in-chief in the
On 10 January Mr Churchill replied—and wasted no words
when he did so. The available information contradicted any
possibility of ‘bluff’; a thrust towards
‘Nothing must hamper capture of Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 16–17.
There was no suggestion, as yet, of a complete army being sent
to
The decision having been made, Churchill sent an explanation
to General Smuts. ‘Naturally Wavell and Co. heart-set on chase
but Wavell is going … to concert reinforcements with Greeks.
Churchill, Vol. III, p. 19.
The discussion in Rich, Ch. 1, p. 35. para. 64. Memorandum, Koryzis-Eden, These staff talks began immediately and continued until
This refusal was accepted with relief by General Wavell, who
returned to Luftwaffe
was operating in the
The Chiefs of Staff accordingly modified their policy for the
near future. On 17 January Wavell was warned that British aid
must not be forced upon the Greeks. If the Germans made a
serious attack upon COS 14 (O), The attempt was never made but the ‘Glen’ liners converted for use as assault landing
ships were afterwards used in the evacuation of
At the moment any information coming in to the Foreign Office
suggested that it was The report from this mission was received in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 32.
Within a week this was all too clear. On 6 February, three
weeks earlier than expected, The landing of the Afrika Korps at
General Metaxas had died on
Defence plans had been discussed; No. 27 Military Mission had studied harbours and
possible bases (not the
The British Government was thus forced to make a major
decision—should the desert army which had just taken Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 83–4.
All that the Government could appreciate was the importance of
arresting the movement of German forces into south and south-east See p. 86.
These instructions forced General Wavell to search his rather
bare cupboard to find a force to go to Because of Rommel's counter-attack in North Africa the
On 17 February he told See also F. L. W. Wood, As The New Zealand People at War, Chap. 14.
With General Blamey it was somewhat different. On being given
his instructions on 18 February he suggested that the matter should
be referred to the Australian Government. He was told that the
proposal had already been discussed with Mr Menzies, the Prime
Minister of Churchill, Vol. III, p. 59.
By then Mr Eden and General Dill were on their way to Ibid., p. 61.
The delegates arrived in Ibid., p. 63.
The replies from Eden on 20–21 February stated that after discussions in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 65. Long, p. 9; Rich, Vol. I, p. 45. Cf. Churchill, Vol. III, p. 65, which says ‘to play trump
cards’.
The forces available were not strong; at the very most The code-name given to the proposed British force during the negotiations.Lustre
Force
Mr Eden, Generals Dill and Wavell, Air Chief Marshal Longmore and Captain R. M. Dick, RN, representing Admiral Cunningham, then went on 22 February to Two documents had been given to the British Minister earlier in the month; the third
is summarised in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 66.
In the discussions which followed the British explained that
their victories in North Africa had made it possible for them to
offer considerable assistance. Major-General Sir F. de Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 57, gives an account of how
this assistance was described in the best possible light.
Metaxas line: forts from Mt Beles near the junction of the Greek, Yugoslav and
Bulgarian frontiers to the
The political appreciation at this stage was that
In that case the best policy for the Allies was to hold the
Aliakmon line, which lay to the west of
Time was all important, but General Papagos had already asked
the In future discussions General Papagos stated that it had been permission to withdraw
his troops ‘if necessary’. See p. 105.
The question then arose as to when the Greeks in
The authorities in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 63. British Historical Section, Cabinet Office. Churchill, Vol. III, p. 69.
In New Zealand there was a certain amount of confusion. On
three previous occasions Conferences with Major-General Sir John Duigan, Chief of the New Zealand General
Staff, who was in the Ibid., pp. 206–7. Ibid., pp. 241–2.Documents, Vol. I, pp. 200–1. Cable to Chief of the General Staff, Documents, Vol. I, pp. 204–5.
After the receipt of another cable Ibid., pp. 245–6, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, See p. 151. Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 85–6: Eden to Prime Minister, Documents, Vol. I, pp. 242–3. Cables No. 335 and 336 had been sent to New Zealand on
25 February but the consent of the
The Government in Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 15.
Ibid.
The War Cabinet in See Documents, Vol. I, p. 243, note 1, cable of 28 February sent to the British Government, repeated to the
At this point the difficulties of Mr Eden were increasing. Having
failed to persuade the Turks to enter the war he had now, on the
instructions of Mr Churchill, to make his main appeal to Churchill, Vol. III, p. 86.
On 1 March this question was answered. The crossing began,
there were no protests from
Still more disturbing was the fact that General Papagos had not
withdrawn to the Aliakmon line any units from General Alexander Papagos, The German Attack on Greece: ‘It is natural that General
Papagos should desire it to be quite clear to British readers that the said change of plan was
due not to any obscure political reasons, but to the delay in receiving an answer from the
Yugoslav Government clarifying their intentions.’ (from Preface)
Eden, Dill and Wavell had understood that there would be an immediate withdrawal;
de Guingand, who was present, thought that the move would be made ‘as early as
possible’ (
To General Dill it appeared hopeless for the Greeks to attempt
to hold the Metaxas line with three divisions when they knew
that it would require nine. Nor was he any more confident when
Papagos thought that four divisions might be found for the task.
The transportation of British troops to
If risks had to be taken in the See p. 102.
After further study another conference was held, this time in
the presence of the King, for the attitude of Papagos had hitherto
been ‘unaccommodating and defeatist.’Documents, Vol. I, pp. 247–9: Eden and Dill to Churchill,
The British now had to make one of three decisions. They could
accept the Greek plans for the Metaxas line, which were hopeless;
they could leave the Greeks to their fate, but that was politically
impossible and dangerous to the safety of the
So far as the army was concerned the Aliakmon line was not
altogether hopeless; at the worst there could always be a fighting
withdrawal ‘through country eminently suitable for rearguard
action.’ Churchill, Vol. III, p. 88.
The expedition was thus hazardous from every angle, but those
on the spot were certain that the abandonment of Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 125.
‘I was sure at the time, and I am sure still, in spite of what
resulted, that the decision we took at our Embassy in Field Marshal Earl Wavell, ‘The British Expedition to Army Quarterly,
The authorities outside the
The two Dominions concerned, particularly Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 17.
The accepted version in French of the discussions of 4 March was signed by Generals Dill and Papagos.
This forced Mr Churchill to reconsider the whole enterprise. On
6 March he sent Mr Eden, who was now back in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 90.
In the next cable Eden received an admirable analysisDocuments, Vol. I, pp. 253–5.
These two statements, the first from the once hopeful Mr
Churchill and the second from the ever cautious Chiefs of Staff,
mark a new stage in the negotiations. In future there were to be
fewer references to a
The British Minister in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 91: Palairet to Eden,
At 5 p.m. on 6 March Mr Eden, Sir John Dill and the three
commanders-in-chief met in Actually British Historical Section, Cabinet Office.
In any case, the Foreign Secretary and the three commanders-in-
chief still thought that an expedition must be sent to Luftwaffe in
The military authorities were more confident. Sir John Dill
admitted that the situation was worse than they had originally considered it but thought that if the British reached the Aliakmon line
before the Germans there was a reasonable chance of holding it.
Should the Germans get there first, he thought it possible to withdraw without great loss. General Wavell was convinced that the
expedition should be sent; success offered such chances that the
course of the war could be changed. Major-General R. J. Collins, Lord Wavell, Appx VII: The Pros and Cons of Intervention
in
Their firm attitude impressed Mr Churchill but he made it quite
clear that he was not going to support any hazardous scheme just
because it was his moral duty to do so. They were reminded Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 92–3.
In
General Wavell then reported that since the meeting at 5 p.m.
he had seen General Blamey and told him of the increased risks
which might now have to be taken. He, like See p. 99.
On 7 March the decisions of this second conference were received
by Churchill. The envoys had seen no reason to reverse their
previous judgment. They pointed out that there had been no attempt
to persuade Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 93–4.
In this statement Mr Churchill was not given that military
appreciation which he had described as indispensable. Time may
have prevented its preparation but, even so, it was most unusual for
the War Cabinet to be left without a joint and detailed appreciation from the three services. Nor was anything said about a Admiral of the Fleet Viscoun Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey, p. 315.Brassey's Naval Annual, Hitler's Strategy.
The urgency of the situation had, as it happened, forced the War
Cabinet to make its decision before the receipt of this last appreciation. With Menzies present, it had decided that because of the
consistent attitude of General Dill, the commanders-in-chief on the
spot, and ‘the commanders of the forces to be employed’, Two cables had been sent to
The exact orders for the departure of the first flight of This refers to troops. Supplies and motor transport had been in earlier convoys. For most
units, transport was at Lustre
Force cannot be found but the fact is that the ships were already
on their way to
The reply from New Zealand was sent on 9 March after a long
sitting of the War Cabinet in Documents, Vol. I, pp. 257–8.
After listing all possible dangers, the Government made this memorable statement:
Nevertheless, having regard to all these considerations, His Majesty's
Government in New Zealand look upon the first and last of the alternatives set out in the fifth paragraph of the Secretary of State's telegram as
completely unacceptable. In particular they cannot contemplate the possibility
of abandoning the Greeks to their fate, especially after the heroic resistance
with which they have met the Italian invader. To do so would be to
destroy the moral basis of our cause and invite results greater in their
potential damage to us than any failure of the contemplated operation.
Therefore, in the circumstances, they find themselves in agreement with the
conclusions arrived at by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as now approved by His Majesty's
Government in the
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand, with a full knowledge of
the hazards to be run, align themselves with His Majesty's Government
in the Ibid., p. 258.
There had been no differences of opinion. ‘This conclusion was
arrived at unanimously by all the members of the War Cabinet
and all the members of the ordinary Cabinet and was approved as
the only possible course in the difficult circumstances by the Leader
of the Opposition, Mr S. G. Holland. Evening Post,
It could be suggested that the Government had not been fully
briefed, that it had attached too much weight to the opinion of
Mr Menzies, that it had received no report from
The Australian Government was not so easily convinced. From
London Mr Menzies had been giving it a more critical appreciation
of the situation than the one the The Australian War Cabinet concurred on 28 February and again on 11 March.
On 5 March in a letter to Mr Menzies he had said: ‘The plan is,
of course, what I feared: piecemeal dispatch to See p. 111.
As it was, the Allied cause was not without its supporters in
the When the news was received in
For Mr Churchill this was proof that his policy could get results.
coup
d'état, would attack
The importance of the coup d'état in
When a month ago we decided upon sending an army to Churchill, Vol. III, p. 152.noblesse oblige. Thursday's
events in Belgrade show far-reaching effects of this and other measures we
have taken on whole Lustre
in its true setting, not as an isolated military act, but as a prime mover
in a large design. Whatever the outcome may be, everything that has
happened since our decision was taken justifies it. Delay will also enable
full concentration to be made on the Greek front instead of piecemeal
engagement of our forces. Result unknowable, but prize has increased and
risks have somewhat lessened.
To reduce these risks still further the Dominion Governments had
already made it quite clear that, if the expedition was fraught with
so many dangers, every care must be taken to prevent a complete
disaster. On 24 March Admiral Cunningham was advised that both
Dominions when agreeing to the plan had asked that arrangements
be prepared for the possible evacuation of the troops. To reassure
them he was asked to state that he already had such preparations
under way. His reply was that ever since the decision to despatch
the expedition the problem of evacuation had never been far from
his thoughts. Cunningham, p. 315. ‘Indeed, when the decision to send troops was finally taken, we
started at once to think of how we should bring them out.’
ON 24 February These unmanageable helmets were issued in anticipation of the
The movement orders which were issued by GHQ Middle East This system of direct control by GHQ Middle East may have been a measure of security
but it led to protests from Lustre Force had been divided into flights within which units,
and sometimes sections of units, would travel with similar detachments from the British and Australian divisions. On 3 March the
assembly commenced, the first flight moving by road or by rail to
In the
Lustre Force. Lustre Force would have to face.
The immediate problem was that of transport. The Naval Command had always realised that the Eastern Mediterranean could
never be safe from the Axis forces that were operating from southern York, Bonaventure, Orion, Ajax
Breconshire, and the motor vessel
The first flight embarked about midday on 6 March. HMS York (
The General had hoped to reveal the secret to his senior officers
in Egypt but events had moved so rapidly that he had to be satisfied with a Special Order of the Day In some cases this order was not read to the troops; several commanding officers did
not receive it until after their arrival in
On 7 March, less than twenty-four hours after it had left Alexandria, the flight had its first sight of
The Greeks, who had not expected the arrival of a British expeditionary force, were wildly excited. The seamen on the ships within
the arbour cheered as the cruisers drew in; the excited people along
the highway and the crowds in the streets of
In the city itself Advanced 2 Echelon and Base Pay Office were
established; Major
The other flights did not always find it so easy to reach this new
world. Some units enjoyed the comparative luxury of travel on the
fast cruisers, but others had to endure a slow crossing on small cargo
J. B. McKinney, Medical Units of 2 NZEF in Middle East and Italy, p. 65.
Moreover, at this season of the year there was always the danger
of severe storms. On 13–15 March the transit camp at HMS York (Div Pro Coy,
With the third HMS Ajax (
The fifth MV Cameronia (nurses
The major portion of the New Zealand Division was then in
After that date it would have been foolish for General Wavell
to send any other troops to the
At the Lustre Force, henceforth to be known as
After the conference General Wilson made a swift reconnaissance of the Aliakmon line, a natural but as yet unprepared defence
system that extended from the Gulf of This river is known in
As the forcing of any one of these passes would be long and
costly, it was quite possible that the Germans might attempt to turn
the left or northern end of the Aliakmon line by way of
To cover the concentration of
While movement orders were being prepared,
On 9 March he received his orders from
To make the situation still more difficult there were serious
problems of time and transport. As a result of the dispersal of
the units throughout the different flights, men who should have
been among the first to reach
The first group to move north—Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Clifton, 6 Field Company and This section was soon afterwards withdrawn to join 1 Armoured Brigade; A Company
4 Field Ambulance, which had an ADS for that brigade in the
On the route itself, whether the units went by road or by railway, there was a succession of plains or river valleys separated by ridges that were often high and always formidable. There was little choice of movement. The passes that had once been forced by Persians and Macedonians were the passes through which engineers had constructed railways and through which the battalions of the Commonwealth were to advance and retreat within the next few weeks.
The first stage of the journey was along the Sacred Way from
Next day they moved on, with Mount Parnassus dominating
the landscape to the west and great ridges rising to the north. In
another age the company would then have turned north-east to
the gap between the ridges and the sea which is known as the
Pass of
The railway and modern highway do not use the Pass of
See p. 472. Capt M. S. Carrie, Adjutant NZE, extracts from personal diary.
The Othris Range beyond
The chief town, On
The route for 6 Field Company lay across the plain and up
through the forested foothills to the crest of the pass. Mount
M. S. Carrie, diary.
Company Headquarters and No. 2 Section then continued on
their way across some 12 miles of undulating country on which
shepherds watched flocks of long-tailed sheep and farmers
ploughed the open fields for crops of maize and tobacco. A straight
stretch of road lined with poplar trees took them into No troops were billeted after 15 April. The prices for a room in a village had not to
exceed 18s. 3d., in a town 18s. 9d., a month. The bills were paid direct to the householders by the unit pay officers.
The next unit to leave
The journey was one that no soldier ever forgot. Sometimes
there were old-fashioned carriages, but for the most part the troops
were in goods wagons, horse vans and cattle trucks. ‘Dry rations,
tins of bully beef and stew and some bread were carried on the
Draft narrative 18 Battalion, pp. 51–2.
In
By this time
For 18 Battalion this meant the end of its pleasant sojourn in
Brigade Headquarters was at
There was one serious weakness in this Aliakmon line; it could
be turned from See p. 102.
Arrangements
On 17 March Brigadier R. Charrington, the commander of 1
Armoured Brigade, was warned that the Germans, if they reached
the Charrington to Wilson, 18 March.
On 20 March General Wilson was still apprehensive about the
chances of an attack from the direction of Wilson to sic]
and will probably send a good proportion there.’
This explains why on 21 March 27 New Zealand (Machine Gun)
Battalion, less one company, received orders to move to Amindaion. Next day Brigadier E. A. Lee, Lee was a British officer commanding the medium artillery of 64 Medium Regiment, RA, was supporting 12 Greek Division about
The advance party from 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion, led by
Lieutenant-Colonel
From the wide ridge or plateau about
The arrival of the machine-gunners came as a surprise to the commander of 3 Royal Tank Regiment, for he had received no warning orders and knew nothing about Brigadier Lee to whom the New Zealanders had to report. Somewhat baffled, Lieutenant- Colonel Gwilliam waited for the Brigadier, who did not arrive until 26 March.
Until then he spent his time inspecting the area. In the ridges
to the north was
The two commanders eventually decided that two machine-gun
companies would be forward of the ridge covering the approaches
to the pass, one company to the east in the
The convoy had left See p. 139.
At last on 28 March the battalion reached Major P. W. Wright, 2 i/c 27 Battalion.
The uncertainty of those in command at See p. 102.
But events in Wilson, p. 79.coup d'état of 27 March which changed the government in Belgrade was definite proof, so far as he was concerned,
of the wisdom of his policy. He now hoped that if his divisions
remained on the borders of
The British were inclined to agree with him. The expedition
was now ‘in its true setting, not as an isolated military act, but as
a prime mover in a large design.’ Churchill, Vol. III, p. 152, See p. 115.
At the end of March Dill paid a secret visit to Belgrade, but the
Yugoslav leaders had no definite plans and no desire to take steps
which might irritate
That evening [2 April] I received a mysterious telegram to meet certain important people who were arriving by train at This was an error: the Aliakmon line was meant. Report on New Zealand Division in
This was soon equally clear to the British commanders. They
had gone forward to
In the discussion which then developed the Allied representatives had to explain that such an ambitious plan was impossible.
Moreover it was quite obvious that Jankovitch had not the authority
to make any important decisions. The best they could do was to
make suggestions and thereafter hope for the best. ‘General
Papagos urged General J. to persuade his Government to send two
more divisions into southern Wilson, p. 83.
On the other hand, it was now quite clear that there had been
a tendency to overestimate the contribution which Ibid.
This hesitancy on the part of This river is called the Strimon in
In the opinion of General Papagos, however, the
If the British resources had been greater and the support of
Neither Blamey nor Brigadier A. Galloway, BGS
On the strength of this statement HQ NZ Division ‘G’ diary, p. 25A.
The reply from Two companies from 27 MG Battalion, not one, were switched from the Milgreece to NZ Division, O. 143, 24 March.
The same day General Blamey returned to
The defence of the passes on the British front is of paramount importance. Work on these defences should be given priority. Notes on interview Wilson-Blamey.
In other words, the New Zealand Division was to remain behind
the anti-tank ditch to the north of Galloway to
The necessary operation orders NZ Division Operation Order No. 2, 27 March. Ayios, usually abbreviated Ay, means Saint.
In the sector on the left flank which had been the responsibility
of 4 Brigade for the past two weeks, 18 Battalion now held the
ridges about the villages of
The divided interest of the two brigades—along the Aliakmon
line and about
In the area behind the line there were equally serious problems
arising from limited time and inadequate resources. The different
companies of engineers had not only to improve the system of
communications but they had also to assist in the preparation of
defensive positions. No. 1 Section 6 Field Company had therefore
been brought forward from The detachment of this unit from the Division without prior consultation raised some
objections from
So far as possible the engineers, and not the infantry, did the
more specialised work along the front. Demolition charges were
laid on the bridges, railway embankments and anti-tank crossing
in the 6 Brigade area. The allocation of mines and the selection
of sites for them are mentioned in official instructions but there
is no record of their having been laid in any area. With the
anti-tank ditch there was more progress. The Greek plans for a
continuous line across the front had to be dropped but every effort
was made to complete a series of defended localities. The only
trouble was that the half-completed positions were not always
suitable for all-round defence. The battalions had therefore to
dig, wire and camouflage positions; the engineers had to construct
a concrete pillbox in each company area. The local Greeks gave
At the same time the CRA, Brigadier Miles, and his Brigade Major, Major R. C. Queree, had been preparing for the arrival of the Divisional Artillery. As the extended front, particularly on the left flank, made it impossible for the infantry to hold a complete line, the German advance would have to be checked by artillery fire and counter-attack. The gun positions had therefore to be in places which the enemy could not observe either from his own territory or from the gaps between the defended localities. This necessity, together with the south-easterly slope of the ridges, the steep gullies and the lack of tracks connecting them made the selection of positions difficult, but, in the end, these requirements were met, at the expense, however, of anti-tank fields of fire. No serious consequences came from this decision, but events were soon to show that too much reliance had been placed on the supposedly anti-tank nature of the country.
It was decided that 6 Brigade, astride the main highway, should
be covered by 4 and 5 Field Regiments (less E Troop) and that
4 Brigade should be supported by 6 Field Regiment. Fourth Field
Regiment, which had reached
There were no anti-tank guns until 7 Anti-Tank Regiment
arrived at See map on p. 143.
The only other supporting weapons were those of 3 and 4 Companies 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion which had reached
The field ambulance with each brigade provided advanced and
main dressing stations. Thus 4 Field Ambulance, which was in the
rough country with 4 Brigade, had its ADS in dugouts cut into the
hillsides and its MDS 13 miles away at
At this stage of the war there was ‘a very general opinion that
the German Army would not respect the T. D. M. Stout, New Zealand Medical Services in Middle East and Italy, p. 146.
The structure of the divisional defence system was now complete. No additional troops were ever brought forward but some
slight changes were made on 2 April after
The Divisional Reserve in the Tranos area was still of limited
strength. Twenty-second Battalion, with 4 Company 27 (Machine
Gun) Battalion under command, was deployed along the ridge,
while Headquarters 7 Anti-Tank Regiment with 34 Battery (less O
Troop) covered the anti-tank obstacles between Pal Elevtherokhorion and
Nearly 15 miles north of the anti-tank ditch was the muddy
To assist the regiment in its delaying role two troops of artillery
were sent up. E Troop 28 Battery 5 Field Regiment (Captain
No. 3 Section 6 Field Company was responsible for the demolitions in the area, particularly those on the bridges across the Aliakmon River. The charges were not, however, to be placed in position until orders had been received from Divisional Headquarters.
On 4 April there was one change in the strength of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment. First Armoured Brigade on the Macedonian Plain was seriously handicapped by a shortage of reconnaissance vehicles so, in exchange for seven cruiser tanks, two
troops of Marmon Harrington armoured cars were sent over under
the command of Lieutenant
At the same time new positions were being prepared about
Nineteenth Battalion was brought back on 28 March to the north
side of the pass; a guard was placed on that rocky feature called
Gibraltar; and positions were prepared on the north bank of the
Mavroneri River. Twenty-sixth Battalion, which had moved to the
reserve area for 6 Brigade on 27 March, received its orders and
Report by Brigadier Hargest.
The orders for 5 Brigade had already been issued. It had to prepare and occupy defensive positions astride the pass on Mount
The first unit to arrive was 23 Battalion, which moved into the
Sanatorium area on 31 March, thereby making it possible for 26
Battalion to return to the 6 Brigade sector. The following day 28
(Maori) Battalion went to the north side of the pass and 19 Battalion returned to 4 Brigade. The other units of 5 Brigade were
not as yet sent to the pass. On 1 April 22 Battalion See p. 140.
The defences were along the eastern slopes of First supplement to NZ Division Operation Order No. 2, 30 March.
Twenty-three Battalion occupied a ridge that ran almost parallel
to the main range. D Company, somewhat isolated on the extreme
right, covered the approaches from the east; C Company had the
section which included
There were admittedly some unpleasant hours of mist and rain,
but it was springtime and the woods were ‘carpeted with vast
banks of polyanthus, primroses, hyacinths and violets’; 23 Battalion war diary. Angus Ross, 23 Battalion, p. 31.
The greatest problem was that of communications. The only
vehicle access from the main highway was by the road to the
Sanatorium which 26 Battalion had extended along the ridge. The
junction, however, being at a lower level, was too far forward
of the positions for the route to be a safe supply line. It was
therefore decided that a serviceable track must be cut round the
shoulder of
Until 22 Battalion was released from the Divisional Reserve, the defence of the entrance of the pass was the responsibility of B Company 28 (Maori) Battalion. At first the Maoris had one platoon south of the highway ‘on the Gibraltar outcrop’ and the others north of it. Later the whole company went forward another 1000 yards to cover the junction of the highway and the road to 23 Battalion.
The other Maori companies held the left flank or northern side
of the pass, first A Company, then C Company behind the village
of Kariai and D Company still farther north overlooking Haduladhika. If all went well, the line was to be extended still farther
north to link up with 16 Australian Brigade in the
The Maoris hastened to prepare their positions among the
heavily wooded spurs half parallel to the main range. They had a
clear view of the highway, but the foreground was thick with
bracken and wild pears and cut by many high-banked streams. In
The other units of the brigade group were not so widely dispersed. All B Echelon transport was assembled forward of the
pass at
No guns were yet in the area, for all regiments were needed behind 4 and 6 Brigades. The best that Brigadiers Miles and Hargest could do was to select positions and arrange for the construction of the necessary roads and tracks.
The engineers, however, were able to give more attention to the pass. The sections of 6 Field Company had been called forward to the Aliakmon line, but after 24 March their work at Ay Dhimitrios was continued by No. 2 Section 19 Army Troops Company. The main demolition was initially prepared in the narrow gorge below the village, with a sapper permanently on guard to protect it from enemy or fifth-column interference and, if necessary, to explode it on orders from the officer in command of the covering party. That officer had very definite instructions:
He will receive his orders either in writing signed by Div Comd or verbally from a senior staff officer who will be in possession of written orders from Div Comd. The OC covering party will satisfy himself that these written orders are genuine. Under no circumstances whatever will OC Covering Party fire the charge.
After 5 Brigade took over, the demolition was shifted to the
area held in the first stages by 28 (Maori) Battalion. Other demolitions were prepared on the bridges covering the approaches to
the pass and three additional charges were placed on the main
The pass to the east of
On 27 March D Company 26 Battalion was, accordingly, instructed to move by train from
At the seaward end was a castle, In 1204 the Franks under the banner of Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat, Crusader par
excellence, invaded
‘The men were impressed with the urgency and importance of
the job and worked very intelligently and with a will throughout.’ Capt Huggins's report. Ibid.
The demolitions in the tunnel were the responsibility of the
CRE. The orders for firing them were just as carefully worded as
those for 5 Brigade in
Throughout this period the remaining units of the Division were
steadily coming up from
As there was always the possibility of the civil lines being tapped,
the Field Security Section, after its appearance on 27 March,
checked civilians and watched for any fifth-column activities. In all
calls to
The units of the New Zealand On 6 April it went to Gannokhora.
The
The servicing of divisional transport was done by 1 Field Workshops from a point six miles west of
The last day of March saw the medical service of the Division
more or less complete with main and advanced dressing stations in
each brigade area. First General Hospital (Colonel A. C. McKillop) which would normally have been a base institution had, on
The new site was charming. On the north side of the valley and alongside the small creek were the ruins of an old mill; at the head were groves of poplar trees and well turfed slopes already carpeted with spring flowers. In New Zealand it would have been classed as good sheep country; in fact, bearded shepherds did wander about the hillsides to the amazement of the troops, who had never seen sheep and goats with bells on their necks or savage dogs whose chief virtue was their ability to protect a flock.
The Allies were also adjusting their positions. In the Greek-
British Agreement See p. 106. Charrington to Wilson, 18 March.
Behind this light screen the British forces had moved up from
See p. 129.
The Australians were the last to arrive. In Wavell's original
plan
The movement, however, was not complete. The cavalry regiment had not embarked, no Corps Engineers had arrived and 64
Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery, at
Barbarity Force and one with the Armoured Brigade, only Headquarters 2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, 16 Heavy Anti-Aircraft
Battery and 155 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery had arrived. Barbarity Force. But only one other
unit, 111 Workshop and Park Company of the
There was also the question of supplies. The DA & QMG for
The Greek Army was … already using its railways almost to maximum
capacity, the country had been denuded of every animal, cart and motor
vehicle which was fit for use, the Army had taken control of all small
ships and practically all caiques; the available civilian labour (men, women
and children) was all employed, largely on road maintenance. The civil
population, moreover, was already badly off for food; there was no meat
and flour was short and they had even to feed wheat to their pack transport owing to a shortage of barley. The British Military Mission in Brigadier G. S. Brunskill, ‘The Campaign in Army Quarterly,
As the greatest needs of the Greeks were supplies and transport
vehicles, an embarrassing situation developed when the convoys
brought over hundreds of MT vehicles and the stores which were
to be the ninety days' reserve. The obvious deduction was that
the British should do more to support their allies. The military
mission pleaded with
The initial task was therefore limited to the formation of an
organisation which could, within the next few weeks, maintain the
units about the Aliakmon line—1 Armoured Brigade, 2 New Zealand and 6 Australian Divisions. After that the authorities had to
prepare for the arrival of two more divisions and the possibility
In making such preparations the Allied Command had to accept
several very unpleasant facts.
The maintenance of the right flank of the Greek Army in
The main highway was typical of a country with limited finances
and considerable coastal shipping. Some stretches were not tar
sealed, others could not take two lanes of traffic. In the mountains there were formidable hairpin bends and sections which could
be badly iced and often blocked with snow. Several of the bridges
were limited to one-way traffic; all of them could easily be damaged
by enemy bombers; and because the distance between
The only advantage in the system was that the highway ran
north-west to On 9 April 21 Battalion took over the defence of this area.
These mountain roads were usually well graded, but they were
narrow and in bad weather not always suitable for heavy motor
traffic. The tracks branching off from them may have been good
enough in summer, but in March and April the frequent showers
CRME 1514, Engineer Report No. 2,
To make the problem still more difficult, the units which had
been trained to handle supplies were not sent over to
First Armoured Brigade which went into the Macedonian Plain
was supplied from the field supply depots at The FSD at
The last and most serious problem was that of air cover. At the
Air Vice-Marshal J. H. D'Albiac's report, para. 15.Barbarity Force could by 15 April be
increased from four to fourteen squadrons. Luftwaffe and the
Air Marshal Sir A. Longmore's despatch, para. 19.
The result was that on 6 April, when The only order of battle for Memorandum on Air Policy, VIII Corps available for
The Ibid., Appendix B, para. 19.
The Eastern Wing, whose activities were of more immediate
interest to
‘Unfortunately, however, this squadron rarely had more than one
Hurricane serviceable at a time and, since the remainder of its
Memorandum on Air Policy,
‘As this squadron had three Hurricanes and ten Lysanders,
nobody was enthused, as we all, especially the pilots, knew that
the “Lizzies” would be death-traps even as communication aircraft,
and this proved to be the case.’ Air Vice-Marshal A. S. G. Lee, Special Duties, p. 71.
Over and above these problems of air cover and supply there
were the last-minute changes which had to be made in the defence
lines, especially after Wilson and Papagos had decided See p. 134.
The same day General Kotulas suggested that 12 Greek Division should be relieved immediately by 6 Australian Division and
sent to assist 20 Greek Division in the defence of 16 Brigade Group arrived by 22 March; 19 Brigade Group by 3 April; 17 Brigade Group
was in transit with the seventh flight when
Later that day, 5 April, General Wilson officially took over the
command of the Allied forces in central
The same day General I. G. Mackay, GOC 6 Australian Division, received his orders. One brigade would relieve the Greeks
in
IN
The overthrow of the Yugoslav Government by a military
See p. 115. See p. 134.coup d'état on 27 March was therefore a threat to German security
in the
To Churchill, Vol. III, p. 144. Ibid. Quotation from minutes of the meeting of the coup came
suddenly out of the blue. When the news was brought to me on
the morning of the 27th I thought it was a joke.’
To bring this about he decided to use ten more divisions in the
N.D.
That night, 27–28 March, the orders for the campaign in Second Army
could at least cover the border of Second
Army (Field Marshal Weichs) would strike south from
Two panzer, one motorised, one mountain and six infantry divisions. 164 Inf Div, 50 Inf Div.Twelfth ArmyThirtieth CorpsEighteenth Corps2 Pz Div, 2 Mtn Div, 6 Mtn Div, 72 Inf Div, 125 Inf Div, 12 Army flak, artillery and
engineer formations.
The other three formations of 12 Army would strike westwards
into
SS Div Reich, Inf Regt ‘Grossdeutschland’, Brigade ‘Hermann Goering’.
HQ Staff, XI and XIV Corps, 5 Pz Div, 11 Pz Div, 60 Mot Div, 4 Mtn Div, 198 Inf Div.
9 Pz Div, SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Div, 73 Inf Div.
At first light on 6 April the German armies invaded Luftwaffe began an intensive bombardment of
Belgrade. In the north
The efforts of 12 Army in northern
The central sector of the Metaxas line was assaulted by XVIII
Corps. In the Panzer Division turned the line by making a wide circling movement westwards through the
In the north-west XXXX Corps had sent two groups into 9 Panzer Division and the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division, went through the pass at Kriva Palanka and in the evening
of 7 April were at Skoplje, some 60 miles beyond the border. The
second, 73 Division, had crossed the border farther south by way
of the pass at Carevo-Selo and was at Veles, another town in the
upper Vardar valley. Next day, 8 April, the group to the north
occupied important centres about Skoplje; the other, swinging south
and maintaining the attack, sent its motorised advanced guard into
the key town of Prilep. From here the force could turn west again
to link up with the Italians or, more important still, it could continue on its southern course towards the
The rapidity of the German advance gave General Wilson only
four days, 6–9 April, to adjust his defences. Moreover, it was
difficult for him to make the swift decisions which the situation
demanded. He had always to consider the wishes of General
Papagos and, until the worst was known, to allow for the stubborn
resistance which the Yugoslavs were confidently expected to provide. Consequently, when General Blamey sent his senior staff
officer to press for ‘an immediate withdrawal of the New Zealand
division to the passes’ in accordance with the agreement
In the See p. 254.
The records of the conference also suggest that the chances of
a forced withdrawal were already beginning to worry General Wilson. He spoke of orders for the withdrawal of Greek troops from
eastern
The discussion ended with General Wilson obviously and naturally waiting for more detailed intelligence reports. Late that night
he learnt that the Greeks still held the
To complete the disturbing survey, news had just been received
that 7 Australian Division and the
For the units in the Luftwaffe began a two hours' bombardment
of the crowded harbour of
Several small New Zealand units were in Clan Fraser. Until
other flights came over and the men were ordered into air-raid shelters, wounded seamen were assisted off the ship and efforts made
to control the fires about the docks. In the morning when the ship
exploded the men were under cover in the air-raid shelters so there
were only two minor casualties, perhaps the Division's first in
Major Roach.
Another unit was No. 3 Section 9 Railway Survey Company Passive Air Defence.
The following day, 7 April, was wet, with difficult flying conditions which prevented systematic reconnaissance by the Royal Air
Force. The reports from the fighting line could have been more
detailed, but as the hours passed it became clear that the Germans
were about to stage another dramatic success. In the extreme east
they were forcing their way to the
In
In the eastern sector the Allied commanders were now convinced
that a shorter front must be prepared. During the morning Generals Blamey and Mackay visited See p. 135. NZ Division ‘G’ diary.
No other decision was possible but it was going to be a costly
withdrawal. The New Zealanders, after wasting a month preparing the line, would have to leave a large proportion of their
wire and mines alongside the anti-tank ditch. By evacuating
That evening, 7–8 April, General Wilson had an interview with
General Papagos. Just what the latest information was at this time
it is now impossible to decide, but it is reasonable to assume that
Wilson was told that, although some of the Greek forts in the
Second Panzer Division, supported by a motorised Mountain Rifle Battalion, had taken Strumica and then turned south down
the Vardar valley to the Greek border at Devdelija and Lake
Doiran. Advanced Headquarters
In any case the Greeks, well aware of the weakness of their
position in eastern Report on supply and transport services,
There were few other movements forward that day, 7 April,
from the lines of
Farther north 16 Australian Brigade was beginning to move into
the
Still farther north on the plain to the east of the
On the other side of the mountains in the
The intelligence reports received on the morning of 8 April
were most discouraging. The Metaxas line, in parts, was still
intact but German regiments were almost clear of the
This would have been a desperate and ineffective change of
plans. The information coming in throughout the day made it
quite clear that Yugoslav resistance had cracked on all fronts and
that the British forces along the line of the passes were now likely
to be encircled. A patrol from General Headquarters Liaison
Squadron reported that Yugoslav resistance to the north of
General Wilson discussed This discussion led to the following operation orders: 1 Aust Corps Op Instr No. 4, issued
at 1 p.m., 8 April; instructions to 1 Armoured Brigade were telephoned between 1.35 p.m.
and 2.35 p.m.;
At the southern edge of the gap was See 1 Aust Corps Op Instr No. 4.
In the Vermion Range to the east and south of General Wilson met General Kotulas that afternoon at
No date could as yet be given for the withdrawal from this
intermediate line, but it had to be held long enough for the
creation of a more permanent one which would run north from
the
The pivot on which the eventual withdrawal from the north
could be based would be 4 New Zealand Brigade, which was
placed under the command of
At the same time Headquarters New Zealand Division was told
that its 6 Brigade would also be withdrawn from the anti-tank
ditch north of
The curious feature of all these decisions is that the urgency
of the situation had forced Wilson to act without consulting
Papagos, whose orders were not received until 7.50 p.m. on 8 April.
His instructions, however, were almost the same as those issued
by General Wilson. There would be a co-ordinated front running
north from British Military Mission to Advanced HQ,
In any case his plans were already under way. The orders for
Later in the day General Papagos informed General Wilson that
the Yugoslavs in Veles had surrendered and that the highway from
there to
To counter such a threat Papagos had already, on the night of
7–8 April, moved his
If this line could be held even for a few days the British in their
valley could prepare the defences about
The withdrawal of the
This was made quite clear in the second and more detailed set
of orders W Group Force Instruction No. 10, 9 April.
The information received by Headquarters
The units in greatest danger were those of 1 Armoured Brigade
north of the
Fourth Hussars, to which was attached Lieutenant Cole's troop
of New Zealand
The main body of 1 Armoured Brigade had a more exciting
withdrawal. The bad weather of the last two days had made the
roads on the eastern side of Lake Vegorritis so difficult for motor
transport that the convoys were sent along the road to the north
and west of the lake, a route that was unpleasantly close to the
The troop from the Lt Atchison.
On the south side of the A commando party controlled by the British Military Mission.
The orders from Headquarters New Zealand Division had been
for its immediate destruction but Major See p. 141.
The decision to withdraw 4 and 6 Brigades to the slopes of
See p. 163.
The sector vacated by the battalion was now held by two platoons
from 24 Battalion, one platoon from 25 Battalion and 26 Battalion carrier platoon, all under the command of Major This company remained in the 22 Battalion area.
In the same period between the decision to withdraw to the passes and the receipt of instructions from General Blamey, there had been tentative plans for the withdrawal of 4 Brigade and 6 Field Regiment to a line below the pass, through which 6 Brigade with 4 and 5 Field Regiments could retire after making contact with the advancing Germans.
On 8 April, however, very different orders were received from
General Blamey. The New Zealand Division which See p. 166.
That night, 8–9 April, the artillery with the 4 Brigade Group
began its withdrawal, 6 Field Regiment pulling out over the rain-soaked tracks and roads to the western side of the pass, where it
camped for the night. Next morning it moved north to the
southern end of
Eighteenth, 19 and 20 Battalions had the night of 8–9 April
in which to make their preparations before marching to an assembly area just north of
Once there the brigade group
The other unit on the move during the night of 8–9 April was
21 Battalion, now released from guard duties about See p. 160.
By then the decision had been made to withdraw the New
Zealand brigades from the
In that stretch the train stopped three times: twice in sidings
to allow trains bearing Greek troops to come south and once because the engine crew took to the hills, until they were certain
that an air battle overhead was not the prelude to an attack by
dive-bombers. Naturally enough it was late afternoon when the
companies detrained just south of the tunnel. No definite orders
had as yet come through, but Captain Huggins, who was already
there with his company from 26 Battalion, had certainly been
preparing the position for a battalion. Colonel Macky therefore
decided that he was expected to take over the defences. A Company was sent to
Later in the night a section of engineers from 19 Army Troops
Company (
Next morning, 10 April, a message came through from See p. 146. See p. 135.
Later in the day more detailed instructions were received from
Brigadier Hargest. The battalion would complete the defences
according to the prepared plan; it had to deny the approaches
to the gap, watch for landings along the coast to the south and
defend
The ridge certainly had many advantages. Any Germans advancing south from
In the meantime the companies after a wet night in the open
had occupied the ridge from the sea cliffs to the lower slopes of
B Company (Captain Le
To the left again, some 1500 feet above the sea, was C Company
(Captain
Behind this line and to the south of
The supporting arms under command remained near the coast.
The troop from 5 Field Regiment sited its 25-pounders about 500
yards to the south of the
D Company 26 Battalion left the pass for
By then the defences about the
The refugees were just another proof of the collapse of the
Allied defences along the border of
In the north towards the border of
The next two days, 9–10 April, were therefore free for the withdrawal and adjustment of those units of
To the rear of the
To prepare the way for 4 and 5 Field Regiments the Survey
Troop had left that morning, 9 April, to establish bearing pickets
in the
The reconnaissances for gun positions in the pass had already
been made. Fifth Field Regiment to cover the right flank and
centre had to place one battery on the west side of the pass opposite
Headquarters 5 Brigade and the other on the same side of the
road but farther up the pass. Fourth Field Regiment, covering the
left flank, had to place one battery beyond that again and the other
still higher up the pass, almost at the village of
Movement began during the late afternoon of 6 April when
RHQ 4 Field Regiment with 25 Battery and RHQ 5 Field Regiment with 28 Battery (less E Troop with the
Thirty-second Anti-Tank Battery and 4 Company 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion also withdrew to the pass on 10 April, both units coming under command of 5 Brigade.
The group most heavily employed during this period of withdrawal—if such distinctions are possible when all units were working their hardest—was that of the No. 1 Echelon (Captain G. A. Hook) had its Supply Details (Captain H. M. Jacobs)
stocking 1 Field Supply Depot, RASC, some 25 miles from the railhead at
The orders for the evacuation of the depot were received on 9
April, so once the normal issue for the day was sent out Lieutenant
Two operation sections were absent at
The work continued that night and throughout 10 April until
4 p.m., when heavy rain made it impossible to use the sidings. By
that time the hands of many men were skinned or blistered, but
when the rain ceased during the night work recommenced and continued until midday on 11 April. Then, after dealing with such
minor problems as the despatch of four lorries to collect tents left
in the lines of 4 Brigade and to provide stores for the Divisional
Cavalry on the
The other unit of the New Zealand See p. 81, note 3. See p. 183.
Next day, 12 April, the company had still another urgent task
in the withdrawal. The lorries were sent from the base at
With all this movement on the roads the Divisional Engineers
had still more work to do. Headquarters, after checking the
demolitions and arranging for the withdrawal of supplies, withdrew during the night, 9–10 April, to
In the pass itself the road, sodden with melting snow and
jammed with trucks, guns, refugees and farm stock, was now
crumbling and demanding constant attention. Its maintenance became the responsibility of 19 Army Troops Company. No. 1
See p. 173.
The removal of any vehicles that were likely to hold up the
endless stream of traffic was the responsibility of the recovery team
from the Divisional Workshops. The main body of that unit, after
closing on 8 April and sending any vehicles that could not be
immediately repaired to the railhead at
The servicing arrangements for the Division were then reorganised. In addition to a British ordnance field park which had
been attached at 1 NZ Fd Wkshops, with B Sec Br Ord Fd Pk attached, served 6 Inf Bde, HQ NZE,
2 Br Ind Bde Wkshops, with C Sec Br Ord Fd Pk attached, served 5 Inf Bde Gp,
HQ NZA, 1 Svy Tp, 4 and 5 Fd Regts, 7 A-Tk Regt, and coys of 27 MG Bn. 5 Br Ind Bde Wkshops, with A Sec Br Ord Fd Pk attached in
The medical units also moved during the night of 9–10 April,
4 Field Ambulance withdrawing from the plain and taking over
next morning from 5 Field Ambulance, which moved forward to
support
The withdrawal of 4 Brigade had taken place during the night
of 8–9 April, but the movement orders for 6 Brigade were not
issued by 6 Brigade Group Instruction No. 1, 11.45 a.m., 9 April.
In the late afternoon, however, Brigadier Barrowclough was at
last given a definite date for the withdrawal of his brigade group.
That evening or the following day his units would withdraw to
The withdrawal of the 6 Brigade Group, instead of being a
separate movement, thus became part of the general withdrawal
which had been going on for the last forty-eight hours. The guns
of 4 and 5 Field Regiments NZ Divisional Artillery Operation Order No. 3, 8 April.
So by 1 a.m. on 10 April the battalions were coming out along
the tracks with orders to reach the area about Gannokhora before
daylight and there lie up until the afternoon, when they would
embus in the trucks of 4 RMT Company. Time being the essential
factor, the 17-mile march had been undertaken at very short
notice; in fact there was no meal before starting and nothing to eat
during the night. ‘That march would be remembered by most,
Report by Capt D. G. Morrison.
Notwithstanding these disadvantages the march was performed
in magnificent style, fully justifying the attention the Brigadier
had given to long route marches during the training period in
Egypt. The following afternoon the vehicles of 4 RMT Company
appeared and the battalions were conveyed across the plain and
into the pass, where the road twisted and turned, covering some
ten miles and climbing over 3000 feet before it reached the crest
and the village of
Twenty-fifth Battalion and 33 Anti-Tank Battery were then
taken across the pass to the divisional area at See p. 171.
The last unit of the brigade group to come over the pass was
6 Field Ambulance. A and B Companies, leaving an ambulance
car with
The screen along the anti-tank ditch had been provided by Duff
Force. Headquarters, which had been organised just after midnight on 9–10 April, was formed from members of Headquarters
7 Anti-Tank Regiment and set up at Pal O Troup 34 Battery withdrew that day from its position with the
Thus by 4 p.m. the only New Zealand unit left on the plain was
the
In the
The crest of the escarpment was to be held with 18 Battalion
on the right flank above
At 8.30 a.m. 18 Battalion picked up some of its equipment
from the vehicles in Lava and began the first of several weary
climbs up rain-soaked gullies and round steep rock faces to the
company positions. The troops' one relief was the low mist that
hung heavily about the hillsides and kept away the flights of German bombers. D Company (Captain
Lieutenant-Colonel Gray left a rear headquarters in Lava and
had his main headquarters in
There was, however, one serious disadvantage. The country between rear headquarters at Lava and the FDLs along the crest
of the escarpment was incredibly eroded, with winding gullies
and yellow-brown ridges, patches of scrub or, in the direction of Lava, groves of oak and pine. In New Zealand it
would have been an area of abandoned sluicing claims. To reach
their respective areas the companies had therefore to spend many
hours following long circuitous tracks; and in the withdrawal which
The escarpment to the left up to and beyond the main highway
through See p. 272.
On the western side of the road the ridge continued with steep
cliffs to the north and the village of
In the open country between the foot of the escarpment and the
Twentieth Battalion was to the rear, in reserve and actually
quite close to the crest of the pass, with D Company (Major
To the rear again, on the southern side of the watershed, Brigade Headquarters was established. J Section
In support of the brigade were several units of artillery under
the overall command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Weir. The anti-tank defence about the pass was the responsibility of 31 Anti-Tank
Battery (Major
Sixth Field Regiment, with lines laid out across most difficult
country, was in position by the night of 10–11 April in the valley
south and west of Lava. Twenty-ninth Battery on the right was to
support 18 Battalion; 30 Battery, less B Troop, to support 19 Battalion. B Troop had been placed farther forward, just south of
the Borsana ridge to the east of the pass, to cover the bridge across
the
Next day, 11 April, a battery of 7 Medium Regiment, Royal
Artillery, came under command to provide counter-battery fire and
to cover the Aliakmon bridge. Both troops were placed well back
at the southern end of the pass, the engineers plotting a 400-yard
branch road and a Palestinian Labour Company, fresh from
The section of 6 Field Company (Lieutenant
The medical unit with 4 Brigade Group was 5 Field Ambulance
(Lieutenant-Colonel
IN the extreme north about
The pass itself was not steep, but it was narrow and, except
for the cultivated patches in a few re-entrants, was covered with
thick scrub. The ridges on either side were nearly 3000 feet high,
with a most extensive view across the bare, windswept plain. The
road from
The machine-gun companies moved into position that night,
8–9 April. No. 2 Company (Captain
The British units adjusted their positions according to the new
orders. A Squadron 3 Royal Tank Regiment moved to the
Just before midnight General Mackay came up to the pass and
immediately took over the organisation of its defence. The reinforcements which were moving into the area would be under
the command of Brigadier G. A. Vasey of 19 Australian Infantry
Brigade, two 2/11 Battalion did not land in
The same night General Mackay had a conference with General
Karassos He had that night taken over the Whether any such move was made is now uncertain.
At first light next morning, 9 April, the units of
The 2/4 Australian Battalion (less one company), On duty at the port of
The 2/8 Australian Battalion after two equally tiring days of
travel arrived later in the morning and temporarily took up positions in the
The Allied front was then complete but no one could confidently
say that it was strong. There were Greek units on either flank
but little was known of their fighting strength. The ridges were
high and the field of fire, except for an area behind the ridge near
The only arm in any strength was the artillery. The 2/3 Australian Field Regiment had come into position to support 2/8 Battalion and
In an anti-tank role and mostly on the forward slopes were a
troop from
The forces in reserve were, for the most part, along the highway to the south. On the
The Germans in their turn were now interested in the advantages to be gained by an advance across the south-east corner of
XXXX
Corps was so spectacularly winning in southern 5 Panzer Division, then moving with
His battle orders for the next two days, 9–10 April, made it quite
clear that 12 Army would be entering
The task for XVIII Corps was the crossing of the Axios River
and the passage through the mountains to 2 Panzer Division would move
through the passes behind
The two corps, XVIII and XXXX, were not able to attack
simultaneously. The former, having just spread out across the
plain of XXXX Corps was
left to make the first move, even though its infantry regiments
were still crossing the mountains and its motorised advanced guard
in the
The advanced guard, relieved of any responsibility to the south,
was sent westwards towards Struga, at the north end of Lake
Ochrida, where on 10 April it met the Italians advancing from
9 Panzer Division, with the
SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division as an advanced guard, was diverted
south to force the gap.
On 9 April the reconnaissance unit of the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’
Division entered
Next day the main body of the Division rushed through Monastir, having been ordered to reach 1 Bn, 2 pls light inf guns, 1 pl heavy inf guns, 1 pl 50-mm a-tk guns, 2 pls 3 Engrs Coy,
1 tp light field hows, 2 pls 37-mm a-tk guns, 1 pl 88-mm AA guns. See p. 195.Witt Battle Group,
According to the German diaries the column was strafed repeatedly by Hurricanes and Bristol Blenheims, the British in the
early stages of the advance having ‘absolute air superiority.’ Nevertheless, in spite of demolitions and air raids the Group by nightfall was outside See p. 196.
The first engagement with the enemy in this sector and the first
involving the New Zealand Division in
Shortly afterwards a German motor-cycle patrol came down
the north road followed by a column of ‘limousines, motor-cycles
and side cars, light trucks and armoured cars.’ Corporal King A troop from
The next bridge, a wooden one, was wrecked, soaked in petrol
and set on fire. Another one beyond it was similarly dealt with and
the detachment raced off towards the lines of
Thereafter the front was relatively quiet, the Germans waiting
for their artillery to come up and the British busily digging in.
Their artillery, both field and medium, relentlessly shelled any
visible concentrations of enemy troops and vehicles. A German
bomber came over in the evening and a reconnaissance aircraft was
driven away by anti-aircraft fire shortly afterwards, but the sky for
the greater part of the day belonged to the
The infantry had still to complete their defences. The 2/8 Battalion, after its unpleasant night in the snow to the west of the
pass, spent the day moving east across the pass and over the wet
ridges to the right flank of
That night, 10–11 April, was more restless. The Germans
were now edging forward behind a screen of infantry patrols
and 2/4 Battalion reported that at least one battalion was closing
up on the left flank. Several tanks were disabled on the minefields
but the majority of the Germans had no great trouble assembling
about
While this move was taking place the battalions of Mackay
Force south and east of the village were constantly under pressure.
Heavy mortar fire had to be endured and probing infantry had to
be checked, but all went well until about midnight when the Germans made a successful raid near the junction of 2/8 Battalion
and
This irritating pressure from German patrols continued throughout the night until at 3 a.m. the Rangers withdrew for some distance the company on the extreme right flank. No. 1 Section 6 MG Platoon, having been left in an exposed position, was then withdrawn behind the Rangers to positions on the eastern side of the pass, and 2/8 Australian Battalion, already tired after its exhausting march from the western side of the pass, had to adjust its left flank to conform with that of the Rangers.
This pause in the German advance gave the Allied Command
the necessary time to organise the controlled withdrawal of the
Greek and Australian divisions from the north-eastern flank. Otherwise there could easily have been that confusion which so often
develops during the strain of a retreat. In the morning General
Papagos made a definite statement about his future policy. He
confirmed in general the instructions
The movement to the
The western sector of the line might be held either permanently
or as a covering position which could at some later date be swung
back to Mount Grammos. Papagos's ultimate intention was to
withdraw the Greek armies to a line running westwards from the
That afternoon Wilson. Mackay and General Karassos met at
As the Greeks were short of motor transport the move would
occupy three nights. That night, 10–11 April, three battalions
would move out, on 11–12 April three more, and on 12–13 April
the rearguard, including the
Sixteenth Australian Brigade in the
No time was lost in beginning these withdrawals. Two battalions from 20 Greek Division left shortly after the conference
on a 25-mile march from positions south of Lake Vegorritis to the
Klisoura and Vlasti areas. The same afternoon and night 2/3
Australian Battalion marched to the south end of the
A serious difficulty was the fact that the main highway had to
be used by both mechanised forces and ‘Greek divisions with
bullocks.’ To simplify matters it was agreed, next day, that the
The overall situation was most disturbing. During the day the
Germans had occupied See p. 231.
Shortly after midnight Papagos met Wilson and discussed the
situation which would develop after the cessation of his campaign
in
The following day, 11 April and Good Friday, was bitterly cold
with intermittent snowfalls making life wretched for the defenders,
the majority of whom had just come over from the Luftwaffe, but when the sky did, on occasions, become clear the
defenders could see German reinforcements
7 Coy, 8 Coy less one platoon, tp 9 heavy howitzers, tp of tanks, coy of 47-mm a-tk guns.
Battle report of Leibstandarte SS ‘Adolf Hitler’.
The mortars with the Group had been brought up during the
night and were harassing the anti-tank units on the forward slopes;
artillery was getting into position and bringing the whole front
under steadily increasing shellfire but there were, as yet; no serious
The more serious threats were from the infantry who, in spite
of harassing fire from the artillery and the machine-gun companies,
were probing forward across the whole front. Late in the afternoon
Point 852 was attacked; in the evening it was the high ground east
of
They had actually hoped to get through that day, but Major Witt had postponed the assault because some of his heavy weapons had been held up by the demolitions on the road. Besides this, the snowstorms which had lasted until 6 p.m. had made it impossible for the artillery to give effective support.
The threats of an attack wide out on either flank seemed, for
the moment, to be less serious. In the mountains to the east 20
Greek Division had settled into position; 21 Greek Division was
coming into line to the west; and west again in the Pisodherion
Pass behind
At the same time the opening moves of the withdrawal were
under way. Units of 12 Greek Division had begun a long march
to Kteni, where the new Greek line was to link up with the left
flank of
In the rear 1 Armoured Brigade had sent its B Echelon and
other non-essential transport to
At a still higher level General Papagos had been preparing
to withdraw his armies from British Military Mission to HQ British Troops in Typed note added to the above message.
The following day, 12 April, Papagos issued the necessary orders.
He may have waited too long, especially when the limitations of
his antiquated transport system are considered. But it must always
be remembered that ‘Few commanders have been faced with a
greater dilemma than was General Papagos.’ Report by the Inter-Services Committee on Ibid.
As the first move his
The latter would probably be able to check any Italian approach
from
In General Wilson's opinion such a smooth withdrawal was now
impossible. Although the
General Papagos also defined the responsibilities of
To simplify their withdrawal the Greeks made many requests
for British motor transport and, whenever possible, this was given.
Another request was for anti-tank guns to cover the Klisoura,
Vlasti and Siatista passes. They were difficult to supply for there
were only three anti-tank regiments in
It was impossible, in spite of repeated requests from the Greeks,
to provide anti-tank guns for the Vlasti and Klisoura passes still
farther north in the central range. First Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, after taking part in the initial defence of
Another problem, one always associated with withdrawals, was that of demolitions. The subject had been discussed as early as 9 April but there seem to have been no direct orders from General Papagos. Both 1 Armoured Brigade and 6 Australian Division had been made responsible at different times for a series of demolitions, but the work had evidently been held up for on 11 April Brigadier Charrington informed General Wilson that, in spite of previous agreements, demolitions were now essential.
The Greeks had certainly prepared demolitions in the Klisoura
Pass and along the road Lt Atchison, NZ
After this date the desire of the Greeks to keep the roads clear
for the withdrawal of their armies from On 13 April General Wilson decided to withdraw Wilson's report, Part III, para. 4b.
The orders 1 Armoured Brigade Operation Order No. 5,
South of that line on the ridge beyond the village of
The timing of this withdrawal did not go according to plan, for
Headquarters
The object of these orders was obviously the clearance of the
highway before the withdrawal of Six companies from 12 Greek Division were afterwards reported to be with 16 Australian
Brigade in the Titarion area.
Nineteenth Australian Brigade had to move to the Kerasia area
and occupy the ground north of the
In view of the impending attack and the nature of the weather
this was a sensible decision. The night of 11–12 April had been
bitterly cold, with blizzard conditions developing in the hills. The
New Zealand machine-gunners on either side of the pass had been
firing effectively along fixed lines, but at first light many of them
were in no fit condition to work the guns. East of the pass No.
6 Platoon, after sending out three men with frostbite, sought shelter
Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 58.
The only reassuring fact was the appearance of the orders for
the movement of the Force to the Aliakmon line. The Australian
battalions, the artillery and finally
After 8.30 a.m. the chances of this withdrawal very soon declined. The German infantry, supported by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, attacked the ridges east of the pass at the junction of the Rangers and 2/8 Australian Battalion. The two Australian companies on the left flank were forced to withdraw up the slopes, but early in the afternoon the Australians counter-attacked and regained the crest of the ridge. The Germans, however, retained part of the western slopes of Point 997 and were able, in the area below it, to assemble guns, troop-carriers and tanks for yet another attack.
Meanwhile the Rangers, observing all this movement about Point 997 and thinking that the Australians were withdrawing, pulled back into the pass, hoping that they could form a new line about two miles to the rear. The supporting units were left to shift for themselves. No. 1 New Zealand Machine Gun Company, through whom the Rangers withdrew, remained in position and gave covering fire until the afternoon, but the six guns from 2/1 Australian Anti-Tank Regiment were left unprotected and five had to be abandoned.
In the afternoon the German infantry supported by tanks attacked
for the second time and 2/8 Australian Battalion was soon in difficulties. The signals communications to Headquarters 19 Brigade
had been cut; the left flank was under fire from the Germans
moving through the pass; and, most important of all, there were
no anti-tank guns. The end came about 5.30 p.m. when the tanks
broke through and forced the Australians to begin an exhausting
march across country to
The New Zealanders with 2/8 Battalion, a section from each of
5 and 6 MG Platoons under the command of Lieutenant W. F.
Liley, had a correspondingly difficult day. In the morning when
the Australians moved back the section from 6 Platoon joined 5
Platoon in the pass and supported the Australians with overhead
fire. When 2/8 Battalion counter-attacked, 5 Platoon, with an
Australian ammunition party, had moved forward in close support.
Thereafter the platoons provided harassing fire until the approach
of the tanks had forced the Australians to withdraw. No. 6 Platoon then gave covering fire but the Germans pressed forward;
their artillery came into action and machine guns opened up in
the pass from the area once occupied by the Rangers. The sections,
taking the only course open to them, carried their guns across
five or six miles of open country and were eventually transported
to the
In the centre the Rangers after their morning withdrawal had
not been able to build up a sound line in the
Their appearance in that area surprised the gunners of 2/3
Australian Field Regiment and 64 Medium Regiment. Communications were immediately established with Headquarters 19 Brigade whose staff, confident that all infantry units were still in position, was astonished to hear that the Rangers ‘were already in
rear of the guns and that in a very short time the medium battery would be under direct small arms fire from the enemy.’ However, about 3 p.m. Headquarters 6 Australian Division ordered
the artillery to pull out, 64 Medium Regiment to
At this stage, about 3 p.m., the engagement was not going
according to plan. In fact, when the reconnaissance party returned
from
The other problem was the withdrawal of 2/4 Australian Battalion from the sector to the west of the pass. Once the eastern and central sectors had collapsed there had been every likelihood of this unit and its supporting troops being unable to reach the main highway. The company overlooking the pass had fallen back when the Rangers withdrew and the central company on Point 1001 had afterwards been ordered to thin out, leaving on the feature one platoon of infantry and a section from 4 Platoon of the New Zealand machine-gunners. Then about 5 p.m. Brigadier Vasey ordered the battalion to retire to the embussing point south of Rodhonas as ‘the front had lost all cohesion.’
Captain Robbie with 2 Machine Gun Company was advised of the withdrawal and placed under command of 2/4 Battalion. He had already arranged for trucks to bring out the section of 4 Platoon from Point 1001 and had sent a runner to advise Lieutenant Newland, who was with 4 and 5 Platoons on the extreme left flank, that he must prepare to come out with the Australians. About 5.30 p.m., however, Robbie overheard a discussion on the telephone circuit which suggested that the overall situation was now very serious. Headquarters 2/4 Battalion confirmed the fact, explaining that the general withdrawal was already under way. The section on Point 1001 therefore began its withdrawal and Newland was advised to move out as soon as possible.
By this time Lieutenant-Colonel Gwilliam, who had been with
the reconnaissance party, had returned and been informed of the
plans for the withdrawal of his machine-gunners. With such
vehicles as were available he returned to prepare for their arrival
in the
The first group to arrive came from the immediate west of the
pass. The section from Point 1001, after bringing out its guns,
had joined up with Headquarters 2 Company and the remaining
vehicles of Battalion Headquarters. When their route southwards
was blocked by a demolished bridge, they followed a track and
ended up hopelessly bogged only forty yards from the main highway. Only three of the eleven vehicles could be extricated; the
rest were set alight and the men crowded into the other vehicles
or were brought away by the passing Australian transport and
taken to the
On the extreme left of the 2/4 Battalion area the sections from
4 and 5 Platoons of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion were with Australian infantry and anti-tank gunners. Lieutenant Newland, on
receiving the withdrawal orders about 6 p.m., discussed the situation with the respective commanders. They decided that the anti-tank guns would have to be destroyed: the retirement of the
machine-gunners would be covered by two platoons of Australian
infantry. Leaving much of their personal gear, the gunners loaded
their trucks with guns and ammunition and left about 7.10 p.m.
for
The Australian withdrawal went less smoothly. The company
on the extreme left, after covering the withdrawal of the New
Zealand machine-gunners, moved back to
According to the German war diaries Battle report of 1 Company SS ‘Adolf
Hitler’ had at 5 p.m. forced its way through the Witt Battle Group were at the south-eastern exit. ‘As
far as the eye could see were enemy motorised columns of infantry
and artillery retreating towards Leibstandarte SS ‘Adolf Hitler’,
Thus by nightfall the Allies were away from the See p. 204. Papagos, p. 372.
One company was on duty at
The New Zealand losses were difficult to estimate but twenty
men were missing, of whom twelve One man was killed, 11 were captured and 8 later rejoined their unit.
The German losses are difficult to estimate but they were relatively low. The assault unit, Battle report I Battalion SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division,
had 37 killed, 98 wounded, and 2 missing, a small price to pay
for what was described as a bold attack which opened the door
‘to the heart of Leibstandarte SS ‘Adolf Hitler’,
Once through the Appendix 256, SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division would send a
force south-westwards towards the Klisoura Pass and Kastoria with
the intention of destroying 3 Greek Corps headquarters at Koritza
and forcing the surrender of the northern section of the Greek
army in Ninth Panzer Division would continue the advance southwards towards SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division,
following hard on the heels of the British and giving him ‘no time
to prepare any organised resistance.’9 Panzer Division war diary.
At dawn, however, the forward units beyond the 9 Panzer
Division were over the ridge and following the now retreating
British, who were described in air reports as ‘large motorised
columns and an English armoured division’, withdrawing towards
Thirty-third Panzer Regiment was hurriedly
brought forward and at
The enemy had approached the ridge the previous evening but
had been content to send out patrols and to harass the front with
The position was well suited for a delaying action. To the south-west were miles of swamp and lake from which the ridge rose
abruptly and extended north-eastwards towards Lake Vegorritis.
The road which squeezed its way through between swamp and ridge
bridged the stream below the ridge and ran northwards across the
plain to the
The Australian companies held the three miles to the east overlooking the stream and the approach from
At dawn the men, if they had binoculars, could see the enemy moving about their lorries and half-tracked vehicles and unconcernedly preparing for another day's work. The whole front opened up and the Germans were ordered to take cover, having as yet no support other than 37-millimetre anti-tank guns. Very soon, however, the infantry, supported by machine-gun fire and then by artillery, crossed the stream below the Rangers and crept forward until they were halted by B Squadron 3 Royal Tank Regiment, which had moved up to hull-down positions along the ridge.
The withdrawal then began. The 2/4 Australian Battalion was
away by 9 a.m., travelling by truck through
Lieutenant
The operation was over by 10 a.m., by which time the Germans
were preparing an attack from the
In the afternoon the Germans approached
The rearguard was already in position, having used the night
and the time gained that morning during the engagement at
In the original orders 1 Armoured Brigade was to have been
south of the
Meanwhile the units on the ridge had been watching the Germans advance swiftly and methodically from the Lt-Col R. P. Waller, ‘With the Journal of the Royal
Artillery,
That decided, the Germans made every effort to force their way through before nightfall. The weather had at last cleared, so dive-bombers for the first time in the campaign were sent over in large numbers. On the ground the pressure was maintained across the whole front, but the main effort was an encircling movement behind the left flank of the British position. All through the afternoon a steady stream of armoured vehicles moved through Asvestopetra and swung back towards Mavropiyi, a village near the main highway and the headquarters of Brigadier Charrington.
Towards dusk about thirty tanks were through the swamp and
threatening Mavropiyi. A troop from 102 Anti-Tank Regiment
and Waller, op. cit., p. 169.
At this point the New Zealand machine-gun platoons were
brought more prominently into the engagement. Up till then they
had been well forward, enduring air and artillery attacks but seeing
very little of the fighting on the left flank. At dusk, however,
‘everything seemed to happen at once.’ Capt H. A. Purcell, 27 MG Battalion.
No. 4 Platoon 2 Machine Gun Company came out shortly afterwards, having received its orders to withdraw when the other
machine-gunners were in action west of the road. It was almost
Waller, pp. 169–70.
At 7.30 p.m. Charrington decided to withdraw behind the third
rearguard position at Mavrodhendhri; the main body of his force
could go to
The third rearguard position, at Mavrodhendhri, was occupied
by a small force but the Germans made no effort to go beyond
9 Panzer and SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ divisions in their haste to get forward
had entered the
The overall position now was that
IN March, when Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory, pp. 71–6.
The General, who had for the last few days been worried by
Rommel's spectacular advance through
Wavell thereupon returned to
No decisions had been made with General Wilson about evacuation plans. ‘The first time I mentioned evacuation to Wavell was in a signal I sent after my meeting
with Papagos at Commanders-in-Chief Committee, ‘Inter-Service Lessons learnt in Campaign in
In Maj-Gen R. J. Collins, Lord Wavell, p. 374, states that ‘… it was becoming obvious that
The reports which came in that night and throughout the next
day, 13 April, changed the whole programme. The road about
The other facts which influenced Wilson were the hesitation
of Papagos before deciding to withdraw and the relatively slow
withdrawal of his armies after that decision had been made. In
his opinion ‘the Greek C-in-C …. could never really bring himself
to give up his successful campaign against the Italians.’Operations in Greece, report by Lt-Gen Wilson, para. 54d.
The
Rich, quoting narrative of Metropolitan Bishop of Ioannina.
That night, 13–14 April, Wilson discussed the situation with
Blamey and, without consulting Papagos, decided to withdraw to
At first thought too much seems to have been abandoned at too
early a date: all Luftwaffe, to withdraw along the highway through
On the other hand, many of the British commanders had never
been confident of the ability of the Greeks to face the highly
mechanised units of the German Army. They argued that courage
and primitive equipment were no match for a modern army
supported by an aggressive air force. To complicate matters, the
collapse of
The orders See p. 237 (
While these decisions were being made, Field Marshal List had
hastened to adjust his plans according to the changes along the
front. On 12 April, when one force had entered Eighteenth Corps would advance upon Second Panzer Division was therefore
preparing to approach
Fortieth Corps on its way south from 73 Division was to force
its way through towards Kastoria, but the major diversion was to
be made farther to the south. The SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division, with
5 Panzer Division ‘following up with all speed’, had to fight its
way through the Klisoura Pass towards Kastoria and to send from
The threat was soon apparent. On the morning of 14 April W
Force learnt that 20 Greek Division in the Klisoura area urgently
needed armour and anti-tank guns. Nothing was done to assist it,
in fact nothing could be done, and before midday signals were
coming through to say that the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division had
occupied Klisoura and was striking westwards through the pass.
The Greeks drew up orders for an immediate counter-attack but
the available reinforcements were so limited that the plan had to
be dropped. All that could be done was to order the Cavalry
Division to block the Kastoria-
In the
The day will always be remembered by those who were there
for the many devastating attacks delivered by the Luftwaffe. Near
Atchison,
The brigade had been led to expect another stubborn rearguard
action, but as the hours passed Brigadier Charrington decided that
the retreat of the Greeks from the passes to the north and the
German attack upon See Chapter 13.
The defence plans of
Nevertheless, General Wilson had always expected Marshal List
to order an encircling movement through 2/5, 2/6, 2/7 Battalions; 2/11 Battalion of
The orders for the assembly of See pp. 170–1. On 9 April they had left 1 Armoured Brigade, crossed the Aliakmon
River, joined 2 NZ
On the other sectors of the front there was more confidence.
Emphasis was now being given to the fact that Australians and
New Zealanders were once again fighting together. A suggestion
that the two Dominions should provide a corps had already been
made in Acting PM, Documents, Vol. II, p. 7.
The announcement to the divisions had been made on 12 April by General Blamey:
As from
The message with this information had been taken to Headquarters New Zealand Division by Captain
There had been, so far, relatively little fighting for the new
Anzacs but every effort was being made to complete the defences
before the storm broke. The New Zealand See p. 270. See p. 238.
The following day, 15 April, was one of disaster. Away to the
north, the request of the Yugoslav Government for an armistice
was to lead two days later to the official capitulation of that ally
from whom so much resistance had been expected. The Army of
Epirus was withdrawing with only slight interference from the
Italians, but the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division had
broken through to the Kastoria-
The day was also notable for a sudden increase in the number
of air attacks. After the raid on the night of 6–7 April the bombing
of Cunningham, p. 340.
The
The result was particularly noticeable in the Greek sector. First
Armoured Brigade had left Waller, Journal of the Royal Artillery,
Atchison,
By 5 p.m., when the worst was over, 102 Anti-Tank Regiment
and
Meanwhile, to the rear, in the
In the afternoon of 15 April General Wilson had appeared,
hoping to discuss the situation with General Tsolakoglou, the
commander of See p. 227.
He also warned the Brigadier that his force must have on hand
the necessary transport for a swift withdrawal. So it was arranged
At the request of HQ They were probably part of 11 Greek Infantry Division, a reserve formation of the
Brigadier Savige, in Long, p. 103.
In the eastern sector on 15 April the British units had been in
close contact with the enemy. Above the See p. 227.
At the different headquarters there was a corresponding sense
of urgency that was intensified after 9.5 a.m. when Headquarters
Accordingly, at 6 p.m. that same day, 15 April, Headquarters
The orders as outlined here include the operation instructions issued on 16 April. The
decision to withdraw had been made on 13 April (see pp. 216–17). In some cases, e.g.,
the movement of 6 NZ Brigade to
Nineteenth Australian Brigade and 26 New Zealand Battalion
would withdraw from the
Sixteenth Australian Brigade, which had been moving
If these moves were complete by 8 a.m. on 16 April the second
phase of the withdrawal could begin, with
The following night, 18–19 April, 6 New Zealand Brigade from
the ‘Report on Operations
All marching personnel would be carried in motor transport,
the New Zealand Division following the road to
The Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport, Brigadier
Collings, had already been warned that
Among the units which made this early withdrawal was 1 New
Zealand General Hospital, which had been at Eight Australian sisters who had been sent back from the north travelled with them.
Once daylight came, those aboard had their exciting moments.
There were air raids and the Greek engine-driver did not want to
work, but a New Zealander and an Australian kept him to his
task and in the afternoon of 16 April the train reached Captains A. N. Slater and G. R. Kirk, Lieutenants H. M. Foreman, J. Borrie and
P. N. R. McDonald.
On 16 April the Higher Command was at last certain of the
order in which the enemy now proposed to play his much superior
cards. The encirclement which General Wilson had expected from
the west via See p. 280.9 Panzer Division had madeXXXX Corps that any frontal attack upon the
escarpment above 59 Motor Cycle Battalion had linked up with the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’
Division, it had been decided to rush 5 Panzer Division through
the
SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division because of rain and demolitions, did not complete this
move. On 19 April, when the forward battalions were beyond
It was suddenly apparent, however, that the more dangerous
Eighteenth Corps, with 2 Panzer
Division along the coast and 6 Mountain Division on the slopes
of
The moment General Blamey had clear evidence of this threat
he realised that 21 Battalion must be reinforced. 21 Battalion was under the command of
Variations in the plans of Less 2/1 Battalion in divisional reserve.
In the withdrawal General Mackay of 6 Australian Division
would be responsible for protecting the right and left flanks In the event
The more detailed orders for the New Zealand Division had
already been issued by
The
In the Greek sector the roads were still clogged with traffic. On
the night of 15–16 April a British transport company had crossed
the Pindhos Mountains for another load of Greek troops. Lieutenant
Pool, whose truck had broken down, had not gone with the convoy,
but next morning he was sent forward through the mass of refugees
with written instructions from Brigadier Savige for the company
to disregard the Greeks and to return to
At last light 1 Armoured Brigade, now the rearguard, was preparing to hold positions on the south bank of the Venetikos River.
But at 11 p.m. its commander, Brigadier Charrington, announced
that next day all units would continue southwards through The bridge over the Venetikos River was left undemolished. Brigadier Savige sent back
a British engineer from 292 Field Company, RE, who fired the charges. The Germans
by that time were through
The route was therefore south through Velemisti and Waller, op. cit., p. 172.
Movement was necessarily very slow. The leading vehicles passed
through CRME file. Major P. W. Wright, 27 MG Battalion.
Next morning, 17 April, as the brigade was continuing its withdrawal through
The rest of the brigade group went on to the See p. 312.
By then the Greeks had ceased to make any serious efforts
to halt the German columns. On 15 April, after his failure
to find the Greek commander at Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940–41, pp. 379–80: ‘On the morning of April 16th I
met Gen Wilson outside
The same morning Brigadier Savige was able to meet General
Tsolakoglou in Long, p. 92. These were the words used by Savige.
That army, not greatly harassed by the Italians, had been steadily
withdrawing but the senior commanders had shown no desire to
make any heroic stands, particularly against the German columns.
Convinced that their cause was hopeless, they had already on 14
April petitioned the High Command and the
Elsewhere the situation was even worse. In North Africa the
advanced guard of Rommel's army was approaching the border of
Egypt while the main body was probing the outer defences of
On 13 April, the day that Wavell returned to Egypt, the Germans
entered Belgrade. The armies of The capitulation was complete by 17 April.
ON 9 April See p. 159. See Chapter 10.XVIII Corps (General Böhme) reached XXXX Corps (General Stumme)
from XVIII Corps was then diverted south towards Sixth Mountain Division advancing from 2 Panzer Division would cross the
In the original plans the New Zealand Lt-Col H. G. Carruth, ED, m.i.d.;
On 12 April the observers on the hillsides reported sunlight
flashing from the windscreens and then long columns of motor
vehicles ‘across the front to our left.’ A Squadron from its position
on the river bank opposite the ruins of the road and railway bridges
opened fire about 2 p.m. on the motor-cyclists who were confidently
leading the way. The troop hastily dispersed, leaving one man and
two motor-cycles lying on the road. After that the Germans
advanced more cautiously, but it was impossible to prevent them
The gun was commanded by Sgt W. F. McCarthy, who died of wounds on
Their attack was launched next morning, 13 April, about 9 a.m.
when concentrations of shells and mortar bombs fell upon the
areas opposite the demolished bridges. A Squadron, well protected
by the high floodbanks, suffered no losses and withheld its fire
until the Germans attempted to cross near the ruins of the traffic
bridge. Then, with the support of E Troop 5 Field Regiment, the
crews opened fire with all they had—rifles, anti-tank rifles and
machine guns—and scattered the groups attempting to launch
kapok floats. One enemy gun received a direct hit as it was being
loaded on to a float, several men were wounded, some ammunition
was hit, ‘the detonations adding to the dangers of the crossing
place.’ Report by 2/38 Anti-Tank Unit on operations, 12–14 April 1941.
Long before then the New Zealanders had withdrawn. About midday B Squadron had come out from its position up-stream and moved back with the artillery to the anti-tank ditch some six miles away. A Squadron shifted east to watch the railway bridge, where the volume of fire suggested an attempt to cross in that sector. When no attack developed, the squadron withdrew through C Squadron to join the others behind the anti-tank ditch. Thus by nightfall C Squadron was astride the main road overlooking the ditch, B Squadron was along a ridge to the west and A Squadron near Stavros. E Troop 5 Field Regiment was close to Regimental Headquarters, but 3 Section 6 Field Company, having fired all prepared demolitions, was well to the rear.
The night was undisturbed but at first light, 14 April, the
Germans again moved forward. The Luftwaffe was no great menace,
the few aircraft that came over being content to observe rather
than to strafe, but the artillery which had been brought across the
river shelled C Squadron in the central sector and covered the
infantry when they left their trucks and scrambled across the anti-tank ditch. The tanks concentrated along the coast, groping their
way through the minefield and eventually encircling the ditch. No
further delaying action being possible, the force withdrew through
The carriers of B Squadron were then withdrawn, leaving the
armoured cars astride the road. The orders for their withdrawal
came over in clear from Colonel Stewart, GSO I. He asked the
adjutant, Captain Haeremai. That failing,
he suggested Talahena as a code-word; it was understood and the
instruction was ‘Put it into effect immediately.’ Consequently at
5 p.m., when the artillery observers in the mountains were reporting
the appearance of German vehicles along the road from
That night Lieutenant-Colonel Carruth received orders to move
the regiment to the
In the meantime there had been further movements from the
The withdrawal of See p. 222. See p. 259.
In the
After the fighting in the
As there was still a great gap between the Australians and 4 New
Zealand Brigade at
The battalion was to come under the command of 19 Australian
Brigade, but as it was still impossible to communicate with Brigade
Headquarters the companies were sent to temporary positions overlooking the See p. 176. Luftwaffe was busy strafing the
road through
Meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel Page had received instructions by
using the 11-mile-long telephone system between the Australian
artillery and Headquarters
The night, 14–15 April, had consequently to be spent shuffling
down the five miles of slippery clay track to the ferry in which the
battalion crossed, three men at a time. As the movement was not
complete by first light D Company remained on the south bank,
the other three companies going into line on the right of the
Australians. Next day, to the sound of the guns about
The same night, 14–15 April, the left flank of 4 Brigade had
been extended westwards, 20 Battalion leaving one company in its
reserve position south of
At the moment the problem for 26 Battalion was one of supply.
The unit vehicles, long since dispersed along the ridge to the south,
could not be brought down to the river. To get them to Rimnion
it would have been necessary to rush through the pass into The available signal wire was only sufficient to reach from Rear Heaquarters to the
foot of the clay track.
On the way he overtook an Australian officer who had been
wandering for hours in search of Brigadier Vasey's headquarters.
The operation orders from
The orders eventually given to Page were that his battalion must
cover the withdrawal of the sick and the wounded, the medical
units and, finally, that of
Meanwhile, because of the shortage of signal wire and the
difficulties and slowness of other methods of liaison, there was
much confusion at Rear Battalion Headquarters. Nothing had
come through from Lieutenant-Colonel Page to countermand his
orders that the urgently needed supplies must be sent forward at
After leaving their prepared positions about 11 p.m. the companies had reached the river about 1 a.m. on 16 April. As Australian and British engineers had completed a bridge by 10 p.m., just as the leading companies of Australians were assembling on the northern bank, the crossing of the river presented no difficulties. With the exception of one Australian company which missed the bridge and had to use a small boat, the forces, Australian and New Zealand, crossed without any loss of time. But the Bren carriers, the lorries and the Australians' anti-tank guns had all to be abandoned.
The climb The Australian stretcher-bearers, much to the admiration of the New Zealanders, still
managed to bring out the wounded.
But as F. D. Norton, 26 Battalion, p. 41.
At 19 Brigade Headquarters Lieutenant-Colonel Page had been
told that his battalion would move east to
The transport followed muddy roads south-west to Karperon
and then sharply east over the pass to
This made the withdrawal as arduous as any undertaken during
the campaign. The men had dug in at
In the afternoon of 16 April the weary files were given some
encouragement when they marched through the forward detachments of the
The day had also been an uncertain one for B Echelon. In the
morning Captain Wilson, the quartermaster, had left
The late arrival of the relief transport takes more explanation.
Apparently the wireless signals from the
The Australian battalions, after they had reached the road above
the river, were taken in unit transport to Long, p. 102.
In this period 14–16 April, when the rearguards were assembling
at
That towards
About 3 p.m.
Later that afternoon when the battalion was preparing to standto, Macky called a conference of his senior officers.
The main charge in the tunnel had no noticeable effect but
another fifty pounds of gelignite blocked the track and left a
shattered roof, from which debris was falling at least a week later.
The charges along the saddle track over the ridge were also fired
and considered effective. The engineers were then sent back to
prepare demolitions in the
At the same time Lieutenant Williams had hastened to bring his
guns into action, their ‘heavy accurate shell-fire’ Report by 2/38 Anti-Tank Unit on operations, 12–14 April 1941.
Nevertheless, the German patrol leader decided that the pass was
lightly held; the British were holding the castle area but not the
country behind it or on either side of it. His report, coupled with
the sound of the demolitions which seemed to get farther and
farther away, led the Germans to decide that only Report by 2 MC Battalion on capture of Poli Kastelli. This was the German name for the
castle at 2 Motor Cycle Battalion thereupon
determined that an attack with heavy artillery support could be
made next morning.
The divisional commander in his turn decided that two battle
groups must be organised: Battle Group 1 to enter Battle Group 2 to force the 6 Mountain
Division was diverted southwards to
This explains the unexpectedly heavy stream of traffic which
assembled that night on the plain below 21 Battalion. The observers
had early reported that there were many tanks, The German war diaries record no tanks in the area until the following afternoon,
15 April. Compare 2 Panzer Division war diary, 12 April: ‘There seems to be two New Zealand
divisions in position behind the Aliakmon with about 200 tanks.’
Whatever they were it was an incredible number of vehicles to
be approaching a pass across which there was a saddle track but
certainly no well-defined roadway. The higher commands were
inclined to question the messages: Headquarters New Zealand
Division at first doubted if they were genuine; Headquarters Anzac
Corps asked
Next morning, 15 April, the Germans soon learnt that the
2 Motor Cycle Battalion was just beginning to climb
The accounts from 21 Battalion confirm this story. The German
advance through the dense undergrowth towards A Company on
the ridge had faded out. Few of the enemy reached the clearing
on the crest and those who did withdrew hastily, Lieutenant W. J.
Southworth of 7 Platoon using grenades made by the engineers
from sticks of explosive, detonators and safety fuses. B Company,
higher up the ridge, had produced its disconcerting flanking fire
and the Germans had gone to ground below the companies, leaving
patrols to test the strength of the battalion front. Thereafter the
New Zealand artillery concentrated on the neutralisation of the
In the late afternoon the Germans made a second attempt to
crash their way through. The Arabic figures are used to denote companies and regiments, roman figures for battalions.I/3 Panzer Regiment,
At the same time the infantry, War diary 2 Motor Cycle Battalion, had
attempted an encircling movement, two companies making a direct
attack on the New Zealand left flank while another, after climbing
still higher, outflanked the defences. The frontal attack had, however, been launched before the third company was in position.
The fading light and the thick scrub added to their difficulties,
so the attack eventually faded out owing to ‘very fierce resistance
and terrible country.’ 2 Panzer Division.
For 21 Battalion this evening attack was more exacting than the first. Above the tunnel the advancing tanks had been harassed by every available weapon: 25-pounders, mortars, anti-tank rifles and even machine guns, but it was the rough track rather than the weight of fire that had halted the advance.
Up the ridge outside Capt M. C. O'Neill, ED;
Long before then night had fallen and the attack had faded away across the whole front, but there continued to be a disturbing restlessness that promised greater trouble on the morrow. Very lights were going up, guns were searching for targets, and on the lower slopes German patrols were groping through the scrub. A Troop 5 Field Regiment was still operating but its weight of fire had been seriously reduced. The enemy had located one of the gunpits, a shell killing the sergeant and wounding four of the crew. In any case, with only eighty rounds left for each gun, the targets for harassing fire had to be selected with the greatest care.
Away from the fighting line any large-scale moves made that
night, 15–16 April, were on the German side. The Battle Group
was reinforced, I/304 Infantry Regiment coming forward and
6 Mountain Division moving high up round the eastern slopes of
8/800
Brandenburg Regiment to outflank 21 Battalion by sea and sail
up the Pinios River to the
To the rear there was less uneasiness, although at the different
headquarters everyone was now coming to realise that a major
attack which could possibly lead to the encirclement of the force
was already under way. Lieutenant-Colonel Macky in his last signal
for the day had still been confident in tone: ‘tanks have withdrawn
in face of our harassing fire. Present position quiet except for
infiltration left flank. Casualties slight but finding it difficult to
prevent entry of tanks.’ But there was a shortage of reserves and
an overall uncertainty that was disquietening. Macky had suggested,
with no result, that the demolitions to the rear in the
At dawn, 16 April, there was the inevitable attack. Above the
tunnel behind a barrage of smoke and explosive shell the tanks
edged forward, forcing the withdrawal of 12 Platoon to the south
side of Point 266. A Company above the tunnel was undisturbed,
but D Company to the rear was soon under fire from the high
country to the west about
Here They were afterwards employed digging out the rubble from the railway tunnel and
carrying in telegraph poles as pit props.2 Motor Cycle Battalion supported by I/304 Infantry
Regiment was threatening to encircle C Company. The full weight
of their attack fell upon 15 Platoon on the extreme left flank.
Lieutenant
The reply to this attack had been a fighting patrol from 13
Platoon led by Lieutenant O'Neill, but it had soon been pinned
down by small-arms fire and when it did get forward, mainly
through the efforts of Sergeant
The company commander, Captain Tongue, who had also attempted to reach 15 Platoon, had by then returned to his headquarters, to which 14 Platoon had fallen back after giving covering fire to the remnants of 15 Platoon. Once again there was danger of encirclement. The best that Tongue could do was to order 14 Platoon to withdraw down the ridge, covered by that part of O'Neill's platoon which had not gone out on patrol. Consequently, when O'Neill returned through the scrub with his party he found an orderly withdrawal already under way.
The move had not been unexpected by Battalion Headquarters.
The telephone wire had remained intact until 9 a.m. when Captain
There was little hope of any improvement in the situation. The
infantry who had enveloped C Company were almost certain to
come down the ridge from
At last about 10 a.m. the tanks, supported by engineers to select
a route, were pressing forward along the saddle track towards the
crest of the ridge. ‘Many of them shed their tracks on the boulders,
or split their track assemblies, and finally the leading troops ran
on to mines.’ As every tank of the advancing troop became a casualty
the path was soon blocked. When a detour was attempted two more
stuck in soft ground and another was ‘blown on a mine and completely burnt out.’ In the thick scrub visibility was very restricted
and hardly a trace was seen of the New Zealanders ‘except of
occasional infantrymen running back.’ Report by 3 Panzer Regiment.
The decision came as a shock to
The order of withdrawal was A Company, then two platoons of
D Company and finally, when the last of B Company was coming
out, the hitherto missing platoons of C Company appeared from
the upper slopes. They fell back through 18 Platoon D Company
(Lieutenant
To their infinite relief this stage of the withdrawal was quite
undisturbed. The enemy's tanks had reached the crest of the ridge,
his engineers had begun to clear away the mines and the more
romantic had hastened to hoist the Nazi flag from the castle tower.
But the blown tunnel and the wretched surface of the track, which
made it necessary for the tracked vehicles to be towed over, prevented any immediate exploitation of the situation. It was not until
To the See p. 273.Battle Group 1 to the
north of XXXX Corps had found it ‘impossible to
build a bridge north of XVIII Corps was signalling 2 Panzer
Division: ‘Please push on with all possible speed to Elason and
2 Panzer Division war diary, 10–21 April 1941.
By then 21 Battalion had formed another line. The first choice,
a narrow gap between the hills and the sea about a mile south of
CCRA,
Brigadier Clowes' instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Macky were that it was ‘essential to deny the gorge to the enemy till 19th April even if it meant extinction.’ Support would arrive within twenty-four hours. When all the battalion had crossed, the ferry boat was to be sunk. Special attention had to be paid to the country on the north side of the river through which he expected the enemy to develop an outflanking movement and, if the Germans did force their way through the gorge, the battalion would withdraw to the road and railway crossing some seven miles south of the western exit.
The guns were then uncoupled, manhandled down the steep
slope and taken across in the ferry to the south bank, along which
they were hauled by trucks which had been brought up from B
Echelon. The heavy gun tractors, ammunition limbers and Bren
carriers went back along the track, through the tunnel and over
the railway bridge at
By this time the disturbing reports which had been sent back
that morning by 21 Battalion had convinced General Blamey that
reinforcements must be sent to the See p. 227. 22/3 Battalion reached the highway at midnight 16–17 April; 2/1 Battalion struggled out
along the Fteri-
Here they had embussed and were about to move to the Zarkos
area See p. 228. Long, p. 97.
Chilton then hastened southwards. Outside
Before then General Blamey, still worried about the situation,
had decided to strengthen the force still further and to place it
under the command of Brigadier Allen. So when that officer
reported to Headquarters Report on operations in
IN the weeks preceding the invasion of
The importance of these positions had then increased with the
changing fortunes of the Allies. On 7 April, when the defeat of
The first steps were taken during the morning of 8 April: 22
Battalion Major Hart and the 200 men at
At 11 a.m., however, the overall plan had been changed; General
Wilson had decided that
That night, 8–9 April, a report was received at Divisional Headquarters that the Germans were expected in General Blamey had already suggested that 21 Battalion be sent up from
The situation was still too indefinite for the brigade to be other
than divisional reserve, but the swiftly crumbling front and the
decision to withdraw See p. 239.
They had already done much to perfect their defences. In spite
of the wind, rain and snow they had been wiring, digging and
roadmaking, growing still fitter and becoming more and more conscious of the impending engagement. On 9 April those on the
higher slopes saw the smoke of fires in
On the right flank 23 Battalion, on the lower slopes of Mount
The position was naturally strong but it had one great weakness.
The demolitions which would be blown above the junction of the
main highway and the ‘Back Road’ would prevent any withdrawal
of the battalion through
Barbed wire, rations and ammunition for ten days had come up
on 9 April; the B Echelon transport had been withdrawn over the
pass to the
The central sector of the brigade front covering the entrance to
the pass was held by 22 Battalion. A Company (Captain On 10 April the staff, mostly Germans, disappeared. Next day HQ 5 Brigade arranged for
the patients to be evacuated by the Divisional Ammunition Company.
The battalion sector was roughly four miles in breadth. Lateral communications were therefore important, but after 14 April, when the demolitions on the main highway were blown, it was impossible to use the road that branched off to the Sanatorium and to the lines of 23 Battalion. A track had therefore been cut from the main highway through the forest and across the gorge of the Elikon stream to give A and B Companies some connection with the highway and the right flank of D Company.
On the left flank 28 (Maori) Battalion had been digging two- men pits and preparing barbed-wire entanglements, but for a long time there had been no certainty as to its final position. Adjustments were made on several occasions; in fact B Company prepared three different positions, D Company had two days to prepare its final position and C Company had only one. As a result the battalion was now strung out across four miles of country, of which only two had any prepared defence system.
A Company (Captain
Beyond it facing north-west across the Mavroneri stream were
two platoons of B Company (Captain After the Germans attacked, 2 Lt G. A. Te Kuru, second-in-command D Company,
was detached with twenty men along the ridge towards
In support of 5 Brigade there were at first 32 Battery 7 Anti-Tank
Regiment, 4 Company 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion and 4 and 5 Field
Regiments. The anti-tank guns were not well forward covering the
approaches to the infantry, but were more to the rear in counterpenetration positions according to theories developed ‘after the
French and Belgian campaigns.’ Six were on the right of the main
highway and three along the highway itself in front of and behind
the Gibraltar position of 22 Battalion. The machine-gunners were
dispersed, 10 Platoon with 23 Battalion behind
Fourth and 5th Field Regiments had withdrawn from the plain
on 10 April and had been grouped under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson of 4 Field Regiment. The former,
after much hard work on the steep tracks, was in position near the
crest of the pass, with A and B Troops 25 Battery on the eastern
side of the highway and C Troop up a precipitous muddy track
on the western side. Twenty-sixth Battery was to have gone into
position near
On the night of 14–15 April after all this labour the regiment
was suddenly withdrawn. At dusk 25 Battery
This left 5 Field Regiment in support of 5 Brigade. B and C
Troops 27 Battery A Troop 27 Battery was with 21 Battalion in the
After 4 Field Regiment had gone there was some discussion as to whether the gun positions should be changed, but a reconnaissance showed that the left flank hitherto covered by 4 Field Regiment was too rough for any large-scale attack by armoured units. In any case, on the morning of 15 April Brigadier Hargest advised Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser that as there would be a general withdrawal that night no changes need be made by his regiment.
The ammunition dumps left in the 4 Field Regiment area were
moved, however, by parties from 5 Field Regiment to the end of
the straight stretch of highway south of Report on operations, HQ NZ Divisional Artillery.
After such preparations and with such natural advantages the
battalions all hoped that the
The withdrawal from the river was complete by the evening of
14 April when the carrier platoons and the
Before then enemy reconnaissance aircraft had been flying over
the entrance to the pass ‘without hindrance other than ineffective
2 Panzer Division had reached
Within the New Zealand Division there was a sudden decision
for an earlier withdrawal. There is nothing in
In any case, 15 April had not been the day for serious attacks
about Battle Group 2 of the enemy had attacked
21 Battalion above the Battle Group 1, having
a more formidable task, took longer to assemble and 5 Brigade had
a relatively quiet day. The mortar section with D Company 23
Battalion opened up on a patrol that was probing about the right
flank; in the pass itself 22 Battalion considered that it had a quiet
day, apart from some slight activity in the morning. This is somewhat surprising for the Germans sent forward a fighting patrol
from 2/304 Infantry Regiment with supporting mortars, machine
guns and anti-tank guns to enter the pass, discover positions and
take prisoners. Apparently it did not get far enough forward to
worry 22 Battalion. A Company 28 (Maori) Battalion, on the north
side of the pass, saw the vehicles coming up the road from 2/304 Infantry
Regiment, however, continued to reconnoitre, but no serious attempt
was made that day to approach the pass. The Germans preferred
to bring up their artillery and, in the late afternoon, to shell the
brigade front. They were probably searching for the guns of 5
Field Regiment, whose positions were well camouflaged and too
far back to justify any useless counter-fire.
Darkness brought no direct attacks but the Germans were obviously patrolling, particularly across the front of D Company 22
Battalion. They were also, it is now known, replacing 2/304 Infantry
Regiment with I/2 Infantry Regiment and preparing to attack up
the highway towards the pass. At the same time a patrol from
8/800 Brandenburg Regiment by coming in to the south of the
Sanatorium would attempt an indirect approach to the head of the
pass.
At first light on 16 April A Company of the Battle Group 1,2 Inf Regt, II/74 Arty Regt, II/3 Pz Regt, 3/38 A-Tk Unit, 1/38 Engr Bn, 8/800 Brandenburg Regt, 2/76 Lt AA Regt. Later III/74 Arty Regt (less one troop) and 3/70 Engr Bn
were added.2 and 3 Companies I/2 Infantry Regiment east and west of the
road to clean out machine-gun posts and screen the main body
advancing straight down the highway. The flanking companies
moved forward very slowly and afterwards complained of machine
guns set in excellent positions and giving ‘murderous fire’; apparently the observers for the German artillery had not been able to
locate the New Zealanders in the thick scrub. As 5 Field Regiment
was also shelling heavily and accurately, the Germans had ‘fairly
heavy casualties’2 Infantry Regiment diary.
The main body moved up the road with 1 Company I/2 Infantry
Regiment in front and the motorised troops well forward to exploit
the possible break-through. They were stopped by ‘heavy A Tk,
HMG, LMG and shellfire’; nine vehicles were severely damaged
and another destroyed.
The tanks of 5 Company and a platoon from 6 Company 3 Panzer
Regiment then pushed forward, but the blown bridge could not be
by-passed and the engineers could not repair it because of the volume
No. 1 Company I/2 Infantry Regiment fared no better
when it was sent forward to clear out the machine-gun posts across
the hillside. The platoon to the west of the road and the one which
crossed the bridge both made little progress, the line being ‘heavily
wired and mined’ and the machine-gun fire too harassing. A battle
group of infantry, anti-tank guns and tanks was therefore ordered
to push through to the Sanatorium and attempt to silence them
from that angle.
As seen by 22 Battalion, the Germans had first been halted by
the fire from the unit mortar platoon (Lieutenant
The Germans, at last convinced that the road could not be forced, were now developing encircling movements through the scrub and forest on either flank. With 23 and 28 (Maori) Battalions both holding very wide fronts, this was difficult to check; the scrub was too dense and visibility too limited now that a heavy mist was enveloping the ridges and isolating the already widely separated posts.
On the right flank the pressure was greatest about
At last D Company called up support for 17 Platoon (Lieutenant
The others were already to the rear making an unsuccessful attempt to cross the uncompleted track to
This activity on the right flank was due to variations in the
German plan of attack. Once it was clear that Report on action by Battle Group 1 could
not force its way into the pass the advanced guardIII (Cycle)/124 Inf Regt less 1 Company, plus a platoon of light infantry guns; the reinforced
72 Cycle Squadron plus a platoon of anti-tank guns; 2/72 A-Tk Unit plus a platoon of
50-mm anti-tank guns; 3/72 Mot Engr Bn, 5/59 AA Unit, wireless troop of 72 Sigs Unit.72 Infantry
Division had been given two tasks: to advance through 9 and 11 Cycle Companies had
approached 3 Motor Engineer Company and 12
Machine Gun Company came up, a frontal attack was ordered and
at dusk the New Zealanders withdrew from their ‘well sited and
fortified hill positions.’72 Division advanced guard at 3 Engineer Company and 12
Machine Gun Company followed 23 Battalion as it withdrew
On the left flank the experience of 28 (Maori) Battalion was
similar to that of 23 Battalion, the morning being relatively quiet
with mist and rain cloaking the movements of the enemy. Once
the clouds lifted, about 3 p.m., the Germans who could be seen
The Germans then appeared to edge still farther westwards
seeking for a gap in the sector held by D Company. To prevent that
unit being outflanked, 11 Platoon B Company (Second-Lieutenant
Pene) had been placed beyond it opposite the village of
In the fading light they scrambled out below 16 Platoon D Company and close to the junction with B Company to deliver the most determined attack in the fighting about Lt J. T. Gilory; born NZ 8 Mar 19056; clerk.
Three companies of II/2 Infantry Regiment had been sent up to
relieve I Battalion and to capture Point 917 by this encircling movement from the west. They had reached the stream bed north-west of
the steep slopes of Point 917, but 8 Company to the east had been
pinned down by machine-gun and mortar fire; 7 and 9 Companies
had rushed across the Mavroneri stream, coming under heavy fire
and losing three officers wounded, including the commander and
adjutant. No. 7 Company and then 8 Company, When it was clear,
both failed to make any impression. ‘The knocking out of several
enemy MGs in the thrust through the first belt of wire had also
2 Infantry Regiment battle report on
Fifth Brigade could therefore claim that it had repulsed attacks on all three fronts. And it has also recorded that the day's success was due in no small measure to the swift and effective support of 5 Field Regiment, which fired more than 3000 rounds and ‘won the highest praise of all ranks of the Infantry.’ In the German reports there are constant references to the New Zealand shelling of tanks and troops and many complaints about the absence of Stuka support and the difficulty of spotting the New Zealand artillery.
Once night fell German activity faded away on all sectors
of the front. Having realised that a direct assault was unlikely to
succeed, they were waiting for the advanced guard of 72 Infantry
Division to complete its encircling move through the wild country
to the south of the pass. Fifth Brigade was therefore able to
complete the first stage of what was to be an unexpectedly smooth
withdrawal.
On the right flank 23 Battalion had to climb across the range to
Headquarters Company came out at dusk; B Company followed
about 8 p.m., then A Company and Battalion Headquarters. They
waited along the Back Road for C Company, which had some
difficulty in disengaging and did not appear until 9 p.m. In case
some German mountaineers had climbed round
In the seven miles from there to
Elements of some supporting units had moved with the battalion.
The observation post party from 5 Field Regiment had been able
to join the unit transport on the
The F Troop guns were taken to the Poros stream but they could
not be taken across. They were therefore stripped of their telescopes
and rolled into the gorge. The three guns south of the road with
22 Battalion were dismantled where they stood, the two G Troop
guns with 23 Battalion were wrecked, the crews under Second-
Lieutenant
The companies of 22 Battalion were astride the main highway,
but even so their withdrawal was not simple. The precipitous ridges
and the dense undergrowth, the muddy tracks and the pitch-black
night made it so difficult to get clear that C Company, the nearest,
took three hours to reach the highway. However, by 8.30 p.m. the
files were trudging past the check point, carrying practically all
their arms, ammunition and equipment. Two miles back waited
the motor transport which took them to
The demolitions to the rear were blown by the pioneer platoon
(Lieutenant
On the left flank, to the north of the pass, 28 (Maori) Battalion
had to withdraw across country not so high as that traversed by
23 Battalion but much more heavily timbred. The dusk attack on
D Company had also taken some time to fade out, so it was not
until 10.30 p.m. that the Maoris could begin their withdrawal
along a mule track that ran from Battalion Headquarters to the
main highway east of
The march out from Battalion Headquarters with B Company
as rearguard has been described as a ‘terrible nightmare’ which made ‘perhaps, a more lasting impression on the minds of those
who faced the ordeal than any subsequent experience of war. In
single file and for hours and hours the men of the battalion trudged
across these miles of rugged, mountainous countryside with their
backs bent under the heavy loads that they were asked to carry.’ 28 Battalion narrative, pp. 155–6.
Eighteen men were lost during this withdrawal. The detachment
under Lieutenant Te Kuru 2 Lt G. A. Te Kuru; born NZ
Fifth Field Regiment had been withdrawing ever since the late
afternoon, although a report that the enemy had broken into the
lines of B Company 28 (Maori) Battalion sent F Troop 28 Battery
hurrying back to cover the left flank from positions at the head
of the pass. Twenty-seventh Battery withdrew about 8 p.m., the
guns being roped down the wet clay tracks. D and E Troops 28
Battery came out last after twenty hours' continuous action and
the whole regiment was in position south of
The demolitions to the rear of the brigade were the responsibility
of 3 Section 7 Field Company (Lieutenant
At 12.15 a.m., 17 April, the charge near the forward positions
was fired, but instead of the road and retaining wall being cut
away there was only a series of easily negotiable craters. The second
and third demolitions had no better results. The fourth, the one
prepared near the head of the pass by 3 Section 7 Field Company,
was fired at 7 a.m. after the withdrawal of 28 Battalion. Once
again the cliff face did not fall away but the crater was much
deeper and a more effective obstacle. Even so, to the advancing
Germans it was no great barrier—a most disappointing fact when
it is remembered that the Division had had five weeks in the area
to prepare for just such an event. As it is opinions still differ as to
what would have been the best method of demolition. Charges
along the outside of the road to supplement the inner charges might
have sliced away the road. But that method needed additional
charges, and explosives in
In the One other company was with
For the next few days the weather was severe, with heavy rain
in the pass and snow on the higher levels, but the battalions
managed to improve the defences. The Germans were moving south
and there was a steady stream of pathetic refugees, detachments of
Greek soldiers and, on 12 April, a Yugoslav battery The battery fired on enemy aircraft on 13–14 April, ran out of ammunition and withdrew
south to an unknown destination on the afternoon of 14 April. A Greek battery, probably
75-mm, was also in the area but does not seem to have taken part in the action.
The night, 12–13 April, was one of great activity about the pass.
The battalions had been warned that the German columns then
approaching The main body of the company moved south on 13 April.
By this time the Australian brigades from the north were
assembling on the flanks. On 13 April 16 Brigade completed its
gruelling march through the hills from See p. 252. See p. 238.
The expected appearance of the German advanced guard had
not taken place. Away to the north beyond 9 Panzer Division, and
now that darkness had fallen over
In the
Nor had the engineers been prevented from completing their
demolitions. At 3.30 p.m. Australian units assisted by the detachment left by 580 British Army Troops Company had fired the
demolitions on the Aliakmon bridge. The three spans had collapsed
into the relatively shallow riverbed, leaving the bridge unusable
by motor transport but serviceable for active infantrymen. The
temporary bridge a short distance downstream was no problem,
the pontoons being sunk and the superstructure left to float down
the gorge. The demolitions in and south of the pass were the
concern of Lieutenant Kelsall and his section from 6 Field Company.
Ever since their arrival at
Next day, 14 April, the defenders, knowing that 1 Armoured
See p. 214.
Overhead the Luftwaffe, doing its best to support the ground
troops, was paying particular attention to the guns and any vehicles
along the highway. The enemy's artillery came into action about
7 p.m., its airbursts ranging over the road junctions and its shellfire
continuing throughout the night, the gunners searching for the
Allied batteries and for any traffic on the roads.
As it happened, 20 Battalion was then moving up to new positions.
C Company had been left in reserve but the others had been
instructed to fill the gap above the cliffs between 19 Battalion and
the
Finally that night, 14–15 April, on orders from Brigade Headquarters, the charges to complete the anti-tank ditches across the road in the 19 Battalion area were fired by the sub-section from 6 Field Company which had been standing by.
The enemy had also been very active. After the engagement
at 9 Panzer Division had been
organised into groups and the forward one11 Inf Regt less 7 Coy, two coys 59 MC Bn, HQ 102 Arty Unit with part of the observation
battery, III/102 Arty Unit less 7 Coy, III/102 Lt Arty Coln, HQ and 2 Coy 86 AA Unit
less 1 pl, 3/50 A-Tk Unit, 1 pl 33 Pz Regt, HQ and 1/86 Engr Unit, 1 bty AA guns,
2/60 MDS Sec.9 Panzer Division war diary: Corps orders, 11.30 p.m., No. 8 Company
11 Infantry Regiment had then been sent to take the Aliakmon
bridge before it was demolished. The attempt was unsuccessfu
but the commander reported that there was little activity on the
south side of the river. The shellfire was accurate but by 7.30 p.m.
the company, supported by machine-gun and mortar sections, had
clambered over the ruins of the bridge and was advancing warily
along the few miles of straight road towards
No serious opposition was expected. The general situation indicated that the British were withdrawing and according to an air
report ‘there was not a single enemy soldier between the river and
the heights S.W. of 9 Panzer Division war diary, 14 April.8 Company, now
supported by 6 Company, was approaching 1 and 3 Companies 59 Motor Cycle Battalion.
Two artillery regiments were brought up during the night to
give their support and the road south from
This setback did not delay the two companies of infantry, for they continued unsupported and by first light were approaching the pass. The fact that they had captured two Greeks who were escaping on horseback had strengthened their belief that the Allies were making a hurried withdrawal and were not likely to offer any serious resistance. But when the greater part of the force was just through or in the deep cutting between the first two anti-tank ditches the New Zealanders opened fire and by 8 a.m. the two companies had been destroyed, only a few stragglers getting back to report the disaster.
This neat and spectacular success was the work, for the most
part, of A Company 19 Battalion. In the stretch between the eastern
and central anti-tank ditches, 7 Platoon had been on the south side
and 8 Platoon on the north side of a deep cutting through the
projecting ridge. South of them on the rising ground between the
road and the base of the escarpment the sections of 9 Platoon were
About 5.30 a.m. the German companies were casually walking
towards the pass, and having no apparent order they had not been
any different from the normal groups of straggling refugees. The two Greek captives with their horses may have created this false impression.
Actually a legend developed that the Germans were disguised as Greeks. In the first
reports of HQ 4 Brigade there was no suggestion of this; but within twenty-four hours
the Germans had been led by Greek civilians, one of whom ‘was killed in the action.’
He was probably one of the two unlucky escapees. According to Graf von Sponeck,
‘the enemy had used a military device which our troops were not prepared for … be
allowed the companies to run into a trap.’
In a few minutes there was action all along the highway. Grenades
tossed into the cutting soon silenced that section and left the Germans
in two groups. Those through the cutting and strung out towards
the crest of the pass were under fire from 16 Platoon D Company
to the east and from C Company and the Australian machine-gunners to the west. And when they turned on their tracks there
were 7 and 8 Platoons of A Company waiting on either side of the
cutting. The north side of the road was somewhat broken so the
more serious German attack was across the southern slope between
the road and the base of the escarpment in the sector held by
7 Platoon. As the defences of this platoon had been designed to
meet an attack from
On the north side where the slope dropped more sharply into
the gully the Germans found it difficult to withdraw. They did
attempt to clamber up the ridge above the cutting but Private
Thus when daylight came those Germans west of the cutting were in an impossible position. Overlooked and harassed by 9 Platoon and the 3-inch mortar detachment, they could find no security in the central anti-tank ditch. Their only shelter was in its extreme northern end, and from there a mortar continued to be a nuisance until silenced by the 2-inch mortar with 8 Platoon. After that there was no further opposition and by 7.15 a.m. some seventy Germans from the west of the cutting were being marched back over the pass.
To the east of the cutting the Germans who had endeavoured to
move up to support the forward sections had quickly been forced
Lieutenant Hoffman, report on action of 8 Company 11 Infantry
Regiment who escaped reported that ‘the enemy was firing accurately at every individual man who emerged from cover anywhere.’8 Company on 14 and 15 April 1941.11 Infantry Regiment gave its losses as 21 killed, 37 wounded and 168 missing.
Once the front was secure the wounded were evacuated and the
German weapons and equipment examined. It was remarkable how
much the enemy had been carrying: drum magazines for the light
machine guns, range-finders for the mortars, a wireless set which
had, fortunately, been wrecked very early in the engagement and
a surprising number of stick bombs. Many of them had been used
but they had not been so destructive as the Mills grenades. The
only one to do any damage had severely injured the feet and legs
of Private
Neither side had called for the support of its artillery. In the
early stages Headquarters 19 Battalion had thought that it had to
deal with nothing stronger than a German patrol; the Germans
had expected such support to be unnecessary. When Brigadier Puttick asked one prisoner why the companies had advanced so carelessly the Austrian infantryman explained that some German officers were not very good
at tactics!
The rest of the day saw only one other attempt to approach the
pass. In the morning shortly after the advanced guard had been
overwhelmed another group of Germans, some seventy strong, had
moved along the road from A Company report.
It is now known that a machine-gun platoon and a mortar section
from Report on events on 9 Company 11 Infantry Regiment had been ordered to cross
the river and support the units detailed to capture the pass. At first
9 (MG) Coy 11 Inf Regt, 16
Two companies from 18 Battalion.59 Motor Cycle Battalion came over about
the same time with the intention of forcing the steep escarpment
immediately south of
Unaware both of this opposition and of the disaster in the pass,
von Sponeck shortly after 9 a.m. sent two companies from I Battalion
11 Infantry Regiment to support the forward units. In the clear
light of that hour no movement about the bridge and along the
road from it into No. 2 Company, which attempted
to cross above the demolished road bridge, suffered so heavily that
the attempt was abandoned. No. 1 Company crossed downstream
but lost several pontoons and left equipment on a sandbank in the
middle of the river.
By then von Sponeck had learnt of the disaster in the pass but
he knew nothing about the motor-cycle companies in the No. 2 Company I/11 Infantry Regiment was therefore ordered
to get across the river in spite of the shelling. He led the way himself but it meant a swim before they could get to the other side.
Once over he spent an uneasy day, always disturbed by the shellfire
from the southern ridges and increasingly worried about the chances
of a counter-attack. As every movement was now ‘visible from the
craggy hills nearby’,11 Infantry Regiment operational report,
The day had thus been a triumph for 19 Battalion and its commander, Lt-Col C. A. D'A. Blackburn, ED, m.i.d.;
The day had been equally exciting for the New Zealand units
along the ridges overlooking the valley. On the extreme right flank
18 Battalion had seen German vehicles drawing up under the trees
on the north side of the river and troops assembling near the ruins
of the bridges. The German artillery had been shelling all possible
positions and their aircraft had been roaring backwards and forwards
across the front. Those men who stayed still were reasonably safe
but anyone moving across country was likely to be strafed. For
his courage and endurance as runner between headquarters and
the forward platoon, Private
Conditions were no easier for the signallers. Lines were always
being broken but, strafing or no strafing, they had to maintain them,
particularly in the 19 Battalion sector at the crest of the pass. For
such hazardous work Lance-Corporal
In its turn 6 Field Regiment was hard at work, particularly
between air raids, when the enemy were shelled as they attempted
to cross the river in pontoon boats or to clamber across the demolished bridge. In the German reports this very accurate shellfire
restricted all serious movements about the bridge and along the
road towards 9 Panzer Division war diary, 15 April.
And over the crest of the pass the Advanced Dressing Station
As a result of this unexpected resistance the German commanders now adjusted their plans. That night, 15–16 April,
General Stumme of XXXX Corps ordered 9 Panzer Division to
spend the next day preparing to attack on 17 April. But the divisional
commander, General Hubicki, knowing the country and realising
that he needed still greater artillery support, met Stumme and
convinced him that another attack would be both pointless and
expensive. Instead XXXX Corps would ‘tie the enemy down in
the
The British in their turn had been completing their plans and
conducting the first stages of their withdrawal to See p. 252.
The first withdrawal from the pass itself took place on the morning
of 16 April when 2/2 Australian Field Regiment, having been warned of the heavy shelling of the crossroads, chose to move back
through Karperon and
For the units about the pass it was a wet, misty day with no
enemy air raids but much heavy shelling about the road junction
behind the pass in the 19 Battalion area. In the hills above
At 8 p.m. the battalion transport withdrew without headlights
along the narrow, slippery road. No losses were suffered at the
still heavily shelled crossroads where there was already ‘a smell
of death’, but two trucks, one Bren carrier and two motor-cycles
were lost over the crumbling banks. The companies marched back,
avoiding the dangerous crossroads but spending a wretched night
in the wind and rain. They were not in position until 5 a.m. 17
April; ‘they were plastered from head to foot with mud, and were
grey with fatigue, but they reported no stragglers.’ Infantry Brigadier, p. 24.
Several of the artillery units withdrew the same night, 2/3
Australian Field Regiment and one troop of 64 Medium Regiment
to
By then it had been decided that 4 Brigade would be withdrawing
that night, 17–18 April. Twentieth Battalion would be the rearguard, with
Once the two battalions had embussed, the covering companies of 20 Battalion would move out through a screen of Bren carriers
with which
A fog which shrouded the front on 17 April limited visibility to no more than 500 yards. Any movement by the Germans could not be clearly observed, but that weakness was more than balanced by the chances there now were of making an unobserved and undisturbed withdrawal. The artillery, instead of thinning out at 7 p.m., began to move at 1 p.m., the arrangement being that A Troop 6 Field Regiment, having the advantages of a reasonably sound track, would come out last.
The guns of 7 Medium Regiment were out by 5 p.m. E Troop
6 Field Regiment had also reached the highway, but it had taken
three tractors and a team of men to move each gun across the
rain-soaked slopes. The others were being brought out with less
difficulty when the mist lifted and left the two guns of A Troop
out of the pits and in full view of the enemy. The shellfire which
soon came over was heavy but two drivers, Gunners
Once darkness came the infantry were on the move. Nineteenth
Battalion, having brought in its outlying platoons the previous
night, lost no time before it started the gruelling ten-mile march
from the pass to the embussing point. The demolitions The delayed action mines were successful. According to stories learnt in the prisoner-of-
war cage in
The withdrawal of 18 Battalion from the high country east of
Battalion Headquarters, A, B and D Companies withdrew by
the ‘back’ route, which was safer but longer, the track circling
above Lava and then joining the highway much lower in the gorge.
The mountain village, Cpl E. A. Howard.
The first company reached the road about 2 a.m. and reported
to
In the meantime the companies of 20 Battalion had withdrawn.
B Company had come in after covering the withdrawal of 19
Battalion. Some of 18 Battalion had passed through Lava, but now
That over, 2 Lt S. J. Green; born
At 5 a.m., long after the rearguard should have been clear of
the pass, small groups from 18 Battalion were still appearing out
of the darkness.
As it was possible for the demolition charges to be blown too
soon, Lieutenant
The same night German patrols sought to find out why the New Zealand shellfire had now ceased. At 6 a.m. they reported that ‘the strongly constructed positions’ were unoccupied, but the units which hastened to advance were held up by the blown bridges, the minefields and the demolitions.
IN the initial stages of the campaign General Wilson had thought
that the weakest sector of the Allied front was to the south
and west of
The first step—a temporary one for the night of 16–17 April—
was the assembly at See p. 231. HQ 7 A-Tk Regt, 34 A-Tk Bty less one troop, 3 Coy 27 MG Bn and the three
carrier platoons of 6 Brigade. When the withdrawal from this area was complete the carriers were to join the rest of the
squadron with
The two squadrons of the Less the two troops with 1 Armoured Brigade.
The day was also one of movement for the battalions of 5 Brigade,
who since their withdrawal to the crest of the
The brigade orders, issued before midday, explained that the
German columns threatened to encircle
In the
The immediate problem was the actual disengagement of the
battalions. Had the enemy been able to follow up during the night
On the wet morning of 17 April the companies, after their
exhausting march
The end of this stalemate came late that morning when Lieutenant- Colonel Falconer, acting on verbal instructions from Brigade Headquarters, ordered the battalion to withdraw immediately to the highway some six miles to the south-west. The companies were deployed to meet any German advance and their withdrawal might have been difficult, but the mist was now to their advantage and they withdrew successfully with C Company as rearguard and the four machine guns of 10 Platoon 27 Battalion giving covering fire.
The German force, 3 Engineer Company and 12 Machine Gun
Company of 72 Infantry Division, afterwards reported that ‘The
terrain was extraordinarily difficult. The mountain track to
German time was one hour earlier than GMT, British two hours earlier. Thus 4 a.m. German time was 5 a.m. British time.
Report by Captain Baacke on action by 72 Division advanced guard.
The enemy, exhausted and without food, left 23 Battalion free
to reach the village of The three troops of 32 Anti-Tank Battery attached to the battalion were taken by trucks
from the Ammunition Company to RHQ 7 Anti-Tank Regiment at
Fourth Field Ambulance was already away from the
The rearguard (A Company 22 Battalion, C Company 28 (Maori)
Battalion and F Troop 5 Field Regiment) had a relatively undisturbed withdrawal about 6 p.m. The Germans made no effort to
follow up. There had been some movement about No. 1 Company 2 Infantry Regiment of 2
Panzer Division recorded that it reached the village about 11 a.m.,
capturing ‘an English rearguard one section strong’, which was
probably the unfortunate Maori group that had lost touch with the
battalion during the withdrawal on the night of 16–17 April. Then,
hearing that the armoured units of the division would be able to
get through the demolitions, the advanced guard had rested in the
village.
The units of 5 Brigade had therefore been free to move south
towards See p. 231. No time is given on this message but Blamey did not receive it until 10 p.m. Long, p. 109.
Twenty-third Battalion, the first to move, stopped north of
Luftwaffe and of the battalion's good fortune to be either just ahead or just behind the successive raids.
The transport officer had hitherto understood that the battalion
would at some point move due east across the hills to Lt-Col A. S. Falconer, diary 17–18 April.
Twenty-second Battalion, less A Company in the rearguard, had
a more hazardous and more broken withdrawal. The column
reached Two liaison officers from Brigade Headquarters were left at the
But it was impossible to direct the long column already strung
out for miles along the crowded highway. Second-Lieutenant
D Company and C Company (less 14 Platoon), in all about 250
men, were however stopped at
During the day Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew learnt from Headquarters 5 Brigade that the battalion was to move to
The Maori Battalion had much the same problem. About 4.30
p.m. on 17 April the main body had withdrawn from
The rearguard companies A Company 22 Battalion and A Company 28 Battalion.
While waiting near the landing ground at
The brigade was now complete—and with remarkably few
casualties considering the bombing that took place on 18 April
when visibility had improved. On 17 April 4 Machine Gun Company
(less 10 Platoon with 23 Battalion) had been bombed near
The unfortunate changes in the original plan for the withdrawal
of 5 Brigade, caused by rain which rendered the route to
It is now clear that the trouble started when Force Headquarters
listed the road from
On 18 April, when 5 Brigade was approaching
The approaches to this town had to be held until the night of
18–19 April. Twenty-fourth Battalion was to the east, astride the
road and about five miles south of L Troop was withdrawn on 16 April to join
Twenty-fifth Battalion had a somewhat different task. Its position
was two to three miles north-east of
Twenty-sixth Battalion, after its arduous withdrawal from the
west of 6 Brigade report. See map on p. 304.
The strength of the supporting artillery changed with the fluctuating fortunes of See p. 259. See Chapter 14.
It had also been intended that 7 Medium Regiment, 6 New
Zealand and 2/3 Australian Field Regiments should join 6 Brigade,
but the situation at The composite battery from 64 Medium Regiment was already with
On 17 April when Brigadiers Miles and Barrowclough had again
discussed the strength of the artillery support, they had both been
‘apprehensive of an encircling movement by enemy AFVs round
open country on the left or western flank and rear.’ They had
decided that the greater proportion of the guns arriving that day
must support 25 Battalion; the eastern flank would have no anti-tank guns and certain areas on its front would not be covered by
the heavier artillery. ‘In the light of future events this decision was
unfortunate, as the enemy did in fact attack by the Eastern route
and not by the left flank. Guns on the eastern route would have
been very effective ….’
As it was, 2/3 Australian Field Regiment when it arrived that
morning from With 21 Battalion.
The supporting arms from See p. 285.
The demolitions in the area had been prepared by 6 and 7
Field Companies. In the eastern sector 7 Field Company had placed
charges in the steep road leading up to the 24 Battalion positions
and these, with artillery support from the west, would, it was
hoped, provide adequate protection. The western approaches had
been the biggest problem, the gradient being easier and the countryside more suitable for tanks, but Lieutenant
But in spite of all this work and the assembly of so many units,
the overall situation was not reassuring. Brigadier Barrowclough
had been told little about the fighting on the other fronts, but what
information there was suggested that his force at
Nevertheless, the withdrawal had up to date been reasonably
successful. In the afternoon and evening of 17 April 5 Brigade
had withdrawn from
At first light on the morning of 18 April 4 Brigade was completing its withdrawal from
The rearguard, on the other hand, was to be less fortunate. At
5.40 a.m.
The last four demolitions were then blown and the rearguard
moved off at 8.5 a.m., Lieutenant Kelsall leading with the 6 Field
Company vehicles, then
When the leading vehicles were some 400 yards away from the
bridge below the pass a shell whistled down the road, hitting one
truck but causing no casualties. The anti-tank gunners, who had
already observed a German force approaching from the Mount
The rest of the little convoy found it more difficult to get clear.
Two or three aircraft dived down to bomb and machine-gun the
open stretch of road, some of the vehicles were hit by shells from
the tanks, and the engineers had to seek shelter along the roadside.
It was impossible for Infantry Brigadier, p. 31.
With a small group of six the Colonel left the road for the
western hills and tramped south all that day Away to the left they
saw on one occasion the narrow road ‘packed solid with German
transport, head to tail, tanks and guns, lorry-loads of infantry’;
on another ‘a group of German officers in long greatcoats …. standing beside a house, looking at maps and southwards through their
glasses.’ Ibid., p. 32.
In the meantime the 4 Brigade convoy had been moving smoothly
through
Yet the journey was more nerve-racking. The weather of
18 April was very different from that of the 17th. The drizzling
rain and mist which had screened 5 Brigade during the early part
of its withdrawal had now cleared away. The Luftwaffe was out
in strength, dive-bombing and machine-gunning, almost unopposed,
It was therefore inevitable that there should be much stopping
and starting along the highway. The prescribed distance between
vehicles was no longer kept and traffic often jammed the more
narrow stretches, especially the cuttings south of Luftwaffe lookouts would drum heavily on the roofs
of the cabs, drivers would clamp on their brakes and passengers
scurry into the fields for safety. Then when the sky was clear there
would be an irritating waste of time when nervous individuals
hesitated to come back and wrecked trucks had to be pushed off
the highway.
The longest halt began about 9.30 a.m. with the hitting of a
truckload of explosives and the wrecking of the embankment leading up to the bridge over the Mavrolongos River to the north of
Luftwaffe. The embankment was eventually repaired by Australian
engineers, but it was 1.30 p.m. before the trucks were once again
moving towards
The raid at 9.30 a.m. had been followed by intermittent attacks
throughout the morning and by 2.30 p.m. a continuous attack was
being made.
As a result of these unpleasant conditions 4 Brigade Group did
not reach
The British and Australian convoys had more trouble than this
but it was the resulting loss of time that at this stage gave the
Higher Command cause for concern. Early in the afternoon Anzac
Corps Headquarters sent an officer forward to see if Generals
Mackay and See Chapter 14.
The day was equally tense for the rearguards which had been
detailed to cover the withdrawal. The forward platoon of
5 Company II/3 Panzer Regiment—motor-cycles with sidecars,
followed by tanks—had left
The enemy had meanwhile advanced not only along the road from
The next position held by the rearguard was a ridge on the south
side of the See p. 297.
The only German account is brief and somewhat exaggerated.
No. 5 Company 3 Panzer Regiment had ‘a brush with 2 enemy
tanks, destroying one. It pushed on and came up with a retreating
column of enemy tanks and wheeled vehicles. The company opened
fire from hull down positions on both sides of the road, while the
leading platoon pushed on at full speed to the bridge 1 Km N W
of Elefserokori [3 Panzer Regiment battle report, 15–19 April 1941.
They had for some time been under fire from P Troop:
Bombardier
During the engagement the small force covering the road from
Luftwaffe chose this moment to stage a raid
and at the cost of one aircraft caused casualties in both the anti-tank and
After the attack the columns moved on, the
At 6 Brigade Headquarters the day had opened with the receipt
of disturbing information from the south-east. About 6 a.m. a
liaison officer reported that the enemy was in the village of Gonnos
and probing southwards towards the Pinios River. Brigadier Allen
expected to be closely engaged and to have difficulty in withdrawing.
The position of 6 Brigade was now less secure. If the Germans
thrust westwards across the foothills of
Brigadiers Barrowclough and Miles acted swiftly. Headquarters
5 Field Regiment and 28 Battery 5 Field Regiment, then in Divisional
Reserve, were sent forward, F Troop to join the 26 Battalion carrier
platoon and protect the eastern approaches from Gonnos towards
Then about 8 a.m., after Brigadier Puttick had reported that
4 Brigade had almost completed its withdrawal from See p. 269.
The necessary delay was imposed by the artillery. The 4·5-inch
guns of the troop from 64 Medium Regiment immediately opened
fire and continued until the late afternoon to harass the more distant
targets. Then when its ammunition was exhausted it withdrew to
NZA report, Part III. 6 Brigade report. See p. 260. This regiment afterwards supported the New Zealand Division most efficiently at
The Germans, however, showed considerable enterprise and
determination. Undeterred by the demolitions and the shellfire, they
turned eastwards across very rough country and concentrated just
off the secondary road between
The preparations for the withdrawal that night had, however,
been going on very smoothly. The Bren-carrier platoon of 26
Battalion had been sent to support F Troop 5 Field Regiment by
patrolling the open country east of
Later in the morning
Fourth Reserve Mechanical Transport Company, which was to
bring out 24 and 25 Battalions, had meanwhile assembled to the
rear of these units with instructions that the convoy must go south
to
The more direct threat to 6 Brigade was the armoured force which
had, ever since 5.30 p.m., been assembling below 24 Battalion. Its
supporting artillery was now shelling more heavily and the attack
was expected at any moment. But the day dragged on and at
7.30 p.m., when the withdrawal began, there had still been no
movement by the tanks. A Company and 14 Platoon C Company
had no difficulties but 13 and 15 Platoons were very close to trouble
when the German armour moved forward about 8 p.m. The guns
of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment away to the west in the 25
Battalion area forced the lorried infantry to take cover, but the
thirty tanks continued to lumber forward, firing steadily and supported by colourful tracer fire curving over from all angles. They
passed the forward section of 15 Platoon, forcing it to withdraw
hurriedly over the ridges, but at the first demolitions the commanders hesitated, probably because the obstacles in the fading
light appeared more formidable than they actually were. The
attack gradually lost momentum and by 9 p.m. 13 and 15 Platoons
were hurrying through the darkness to the lorries. Away out on
the left flank 17 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant
There were no casualties but it was a close call. Had the artillery
not delayed the tank attack until last light the battalion would
probably have been overwhelmed. Instead, it had slipped away.
The engineers blew another set of demolitions and at
The 24 Battalion convoy continued on its way, passing through
There was less urgency about the withdrawal of 25 Battalion.
The machine and anti-tank gunners had engaged odd targets at
long range and 2/3 Australian Field Regiment had been shelling
continuously, but no enemy force seriously threatened the battalion.
Small detachments had consequently been free to make an early
withdrawal. One battery of 2/3 Australian Field Regiment left
shortly after 26 Battalion. B Troop 5 Field Regiment left at
7 p.m. and with F Troop from the eastern road moved for the
The main body, with B Company 24 Battalion and other units,
embussed about 8.30 p.m. and passed through
The rearguard C Coy Less B Squadron with
At 7 p.m. the carrier platoon had taken over the company areas,
the remaining guns of 2/3 Field Regiment were firing intermittently
and C Company, still astride the highway, had been detailed to put
up flares and tracers until the time of withdrawal. Then at 8.30 p.m.
C Troop 5 Field Regiment, south of
At
Two isolated units had to solve their own particular problems.
Headquarters 5 Field Regiment and 28 Battery (less F Troop)
had gone south that morning to cover
Late that afternoon, 18 April, the 26 Battalion convoy See p. 306. For an account of a similar train journey see Peter Fleming, The Listener,
Luftwaffe had successfully
bombed the area, leaving twisted lines, wrecked carriages and a
At 8 p.m. the battalion moved off, Lieutenant-Colonel Page with
the transport column by the main highway and Major Samson
with the companies on the train. The former travelled through the
night but bomb craters so delayed all traffic that the trucks were
not over
The train pulled out with Sappers
At first all went well, a derelict engine at Doxara station providing much-needed coal and water, but the absence of lights and the number of abandoned trucks on the line cost much time Each bridge and tunnel had to be checked. While the line was thus being cleared more and more refugees clambered aboard the roofs, the couplings and the footboards. As a result the engine stopped near the crest of the range and desperate measures had to be taken. The last five carriages, full of Greeks, were uncoupled, all possible pressure was built up and the train at last reached the crest, where more coal and water were obtained.
As two of the abandoned cars had been brake vans the descent
was made at a most dangerous speed, the train lurching round
curves and racing through tunnels and across bridges. There was
one mishap with obstacles on the permanent way which set the
engine wheels out of alignment, but the descent was completed
and the train switched off the main line towards
Here there was some delay, the engine-drivers stressing the need
for a new engine and brake vans, the Greek officials insisting that
there must be a Greek crew to interpret Greek signals. The solution
was to attach the carriages to a train already assembled for Cypriots
and Australians. This had just been done when the Luftwaffe came
After a near collision with an up-train in the valley south of
Meanwhile at
‘It consisted of a dead straight earth embankment, flanked by deep ditches, in process of being metalled … with care and in daylight it was passable ….’ Beyond it there was a washed-out stretch ‘where the muddy ruts seemed bottomless.’ The rest of the road was reasonably good.
All available engineers were sent over and under the direction
of Lieutenant
At 6 p.m. Headquarters New Zealand Division attempted to
move north to
The few vehicles which did get north from See p. 306.
Behind 6 Brigade was Major Williams with the rearguard, which
went through
Still near See Chapter 15.
The diversion of 6 Brigade along the Long, pp. 109–10. Ibid., p. 110.
The destruction of the bridge had been quite unintentional. On
16 April the engineers of 6 Field Company had decided what
explosives were necessary to blow the bridge at the appointed time,
but next morning two officers from 7 Field Company appeared on
the bridge and suggested that a different amount should be used.
To settle the argument a ten-pound charge was exploded on what
was considered a relatively unimportant girder. It proved the
effectiveness of both charge and girder for one entire span dropped
into the river. As General Wilson afterwards noted, ‘The middle
of a withdrawal is not the time for experiments of this sort.’ Wilson's report, Part III, para. 4.
The position of Brigadier Savige was seriously threatened by this
miscalculation. ‘The road behind him was packed with vehicles, a
Long, p. 110.
At 1.30 a.m. on 18 April, however, orders arrived for an
immediate withdrawal, otherwise the force would not be able to
get through the bottleneck at
The engineers of 6 Australian Division had fortunately been able
to find alternative crossings of the Pinios River. By going a few
miles north of the wrecked bridge the units could cross by another
near Sin Thomai or, by making a long detour along a secondary
road, they could reach
The withdrawal was therefore possible and 2/11 Battalion went back before dawn to its rearguard position at Zarkos, getting into position by 10 a.m. A company from 2/5 Battalion and 5 New Zealand Machine Gun Platoon, covered by C Troop 25 Battery 5 New Zealand Field Regiment, pulled back at 11 a.m. on 18 April, leaving 2/2 Australian Field Company, which brought up the rear to blow sections of the road.
Seven cruiser tanks and two troops of C Squadron Divisional
Cavalry Regiment had been detailed as part of the rearguard, but
both groups went back through See p. 195.
At 11.30 a.m. the Pinios River once more became a problem for
those organising the withdrawal. A German bomb exploded the
demolition charges on the bridge north of Sin Thomai. Some troops
on the west bank were then ferried over but their trucks had to
Arrangements had also been made by General Mackay for the next rearguard, 2/11 Battalion at Zarkos, to move back to the west of the river and cover the left flank until 3 a.m. on the night of 18–19 April. As the bridges had now been wrecked and because the flank could be covered just as well from the east bank, Brigadier Savige preferred to have his companies ferried over that evening.
The 2/11 Battalion had been taken over by 8 p.m. and 2/5
Battalion then left for the See p. 342.
Those who were clear of Luftwaffe
was still bombing and strafing the highway. Twenty-fifth Battery
5 New Zealand Field Regiment, after suffering casualties as it
crossed the range to
ON the afternoon of 16 April 21 Battalion had withdrawn
from the
By then reinforcements
The earlier arrivals had already been hastening to select and
prepare a line. See map facing p. 253.
To the west there lay the level open country south of the Pinios
River. In the centre the road and railway from
Beyond it in the steep valley between the second and third
ridges were vineyards and terraces of olive groves. And above them
among oaks, elms and chestnut trees, Ambelakia overlooked the
Pinios River and the lower slopes of
At the foot of the third ridge the gorge proper began and the
road, cut from the mountainside and shaded by tall trees, was
almost too narrow for wheeled traffic. But it had always been the
natural avenue for the invader; the ruins of old fortresses and
old chapels were proof of that. The river was no longer ‘clear as
crystall glass over the gravelly stones’ but it was still ‘pleasant to
behold for the grasse upon the bankes, and resounding again with
the melodious concert of the birds.’ Pliny, translated by Philemon Holland.
On 17 April it was more important to consider the possible
movement of the enemy from the
The same weaknesses had been apparent to the Greeks when
Xerxes moved south towards Herodotus: Book VII, Chapters 173–5 (Rawlinson's translation).
Unlike the Greeks the British could not make a sudden withdrawal.
The position of the anti-tank guns caused some discussion. Macky wanted them so deployed as to threaten the tanks when they emerged from the gorge, but in the end three of them were on the flats between the ridges of Mount Ossa. From there they could direct enfilade fire upon the tanks before they ever left the gorge. The fourth gun was placed in the area of C Company 2/2 Battalion to cover any possible movement from the gorge.
Chilton also decided that 2/2 Battalion would send a patrol back
into the gorge to discover whether the crossing place at the north-east end had been seized. A picket would be sent to the high
country east of Evangelismos and, once a ford could be found,
a patrol would go over to the north side of the river. Twenty-first
Battalion had left all its telephone cable at
By nightfall the units were in position. On the sharply defined
ridges above and beyond
D Company (Captain A. C. Trousdale) in the high country
east of Ambelakia overlooked the gorge and covered the right flank,
round which mountain troops could possibly infiltrate. C Company
(Captain W. M. Tongue) held the central sector, with 13 Platoon
(Lieutenant M. C. O'Neill) on the flat across the road and 14 and
15 Platoons up the rocky ridge towards Ambelakia. A Company
(Captain R. B. McClymont) was in reserve behind the third or
western ridge, ready to meet an attack across the river or from
the rear. No. 9 Platoon (Second-Lieutenant W. J. G. Roach) was
on the lower slopes of the ridge looking into the gorge; 8 Platoon
(Lieutenant
In Tempe village itself was the RAP covered by details from
Headquarters Company under Lieutenant
The battalion was overlooked from the high country north of
the river and its position was hazardous if enemy tanks pushed
through into
The four guns of L Troop 33 Anti-Tank Battery had been placed
in position very carefully. In the early stages L1 was well forward
covering the road block but too far in front of the infantry. At
6 p.m. it was, with Brigadier Allen's consent, brought back towards
See p. 323.
At 1 p.m. Brigadier Allen
The final arrangement saw C Company 2/2 Battalion with one
New Zealand anti-tank gun astride the road on the flat just west
of One platoon was withdrawn when it was evident that the Germans were attacking across
the river on the Australian front.
On the extreme left flank, at the suggestion of the Brigadier,
D Company was sent to Point 156, the hill feature overlooking
the river between
Finally, three guns from 2/1 Australian Anti-Tank Regiment were sited in the area, one with A Company, one in Evangelismos and another with B Company to the south of that village. The guns might have been more useful in the restricted area of the gorge but they had arrived late and some depth in the defence was thought necessary.
In the afternoon 2/3 Battalion arrived. C Company was sent to the left flank to an area west of and overlooking D Company 2/2 Battalion. B and D Companies were placed in reserve astride the highway north and south of Makrikhorion, about four miles south of the rear company of 2/2 Battalion. A Company was sent to patrol the mountain tracks from the east and south-east through Sikourion and Ayia.
A Troop 5 Field Regiment, which had supported 21 Battalion
in the tunnel area, was now under the command of Major G. J. O.
Stewart, who had arrived from the
On 15 April when See p. 245.Battle Group 2 of XVIII Corps was approaching the 6 Mountain Division which had been
preparingBattle
Group 2 was already in the gorge and 6 Mountain Division was
descending the mountain tracks towards Gonnos.
In the gorge the enemy was approaching by way of the railway
line on the north bank. The cycle squadron of 112 Reconnaissance
Unit—on foot—led the way, but about 5 p.m. it was halted at the
second tunnel—‘even the engineers could do no good, so thoroughly
had the English carried out their demolitions.’ Thereafter the men
attempted to clamber round the steep, exposed hillsides. That was
not without its dangers for 10 Platoon B Company at the forward
road block immediately opened fire. The Germans set up a mortar
and a machine gun, but after Privates McCabe1
At this stage the leading tank of Battle report by 1/3 Panzer Regiment appeared
and the battalion commander ‘took this squadron under his
command’ because of the ‘determined resistance in the gorge.’1/3 Panzer Regiment, 15–19 April 1941.
The reports are confused, but the Germans seem to have opened fire not only on the New Zealanders but upon the platoon from 2/2 Battalion which was moving in to report upon German movements through the gorge. Unaware of the enemy about the tunnel, the Australians suffered severe casualties before they could take cover and conduct, simultaneously with 10 Platoon, a small-arms engagement which lasted until they withdrew after dusk.
Shortly afterwards 10 Platoon was recalled by Lieutenant-Colonel
The important point, however, is whether a stronger force should not have been sent to cover the road block. The gorge was narrow, cliffs overlooked the road and any additional troops in the area would have been just as vulnerable as the two platoons. Even so, the road opposite 10 Platoon was the best position for an effective road block and determined soldiers in prepared positions and supported by artillery fire might have delayed the clearing of the track and the dramatic approach next morning of the German tanks.
But farther back in the gorge the Germans had been incredibly
successful. Unobserved by any New Zealanders, they had discovered
a ford by which tanks could cross to the south bank. ‘A Mk II
tank drove determinedly down the high steep embankment into the
water. It struggled through the river like a walrus, with nothing
showing except its turret; it appeared to be swimming. But the
driver carried on calmly, although he was sitting up to his middle
in water and the waves completely prevented him from seeing
anything. Finally the tank climbed out on the other side amid loud
cheers from the spectators and pushed on forward.’ Other tanks
followed, two missing the exact crossing and sinking helplessly
with no possibility of salvage. But five Battle report of Battle report by I/3 Panzer Regiment says 1 Company had ‘about 4 tanks across’.3 tanks stuck in a bog trying to
bypass this in the water.’I/3 Panzer Regiment, 15–19 April 1941.
North of the gorge 6 6 Mountain Division, using the high mountain
tracks through Mountain Division war diary.
The advanced guard from 143 Mountain Regiment and 1/118
Artillery Regiment reached Gonnos about noon on 17 April. Some
what to their surprise they had approached the village without any
opposition. From there the force had to make the first moves to
break the defences, occupy
Across the river See p. 319.
The Germans with their pack animals were already descending
the ridges south of
The gunners were active all through the night. They opened fire
when lights were seen moving on the hills above Gonnos and, at
regular intervals between 11 p.m. and 2 a.m., they shelled the areas
about the tunnel and the road block. In the narrow gorge
the detonations echoed viciously, the Germans afterwards reporting
that the shells ‘crashed in quick succession in the tank laager.
Branches and stones fell from the hillsides. Everybody jumped for
cover behind, under and in the tanks to escape the splinters. Here
and there a man who had not escaped cried for help …. The MO
had a lot of work to do, for there were dead and wounded on both
sides of the Pinios.’ Report by 3 Panzer Division.
Report by I/3 Panzer Division.
Next morning, 18 April, was bright and clear. Across the river
parties of Germans could be seen moving down the tracks towards
Gonnos and Itia. In the gorge detachments from 112 Reconnaissance
Unit were making another attempt to scramble round the often
precipitous north bank. There was aimed rifle fire, but otherwise
there was ‘less opposition than the day before’ until opposite the
valley between B and C Companies 21 Battalion. Here the Germans
halted for some hours, worried by ‘heavy enfilade fire from MGs,
mortars and artillery’112 Reconnaissance Unit report.
The result was that both the artillery and 21 Battalion gave their undivided attention to these troops and to the groups moving in and about Gonnos. The armoured detachment already on the south bank was unseen and undisturbed. The view of the men of 10 Platoon and Headquarters B Company, the closest to the gorge, was blocked by high ridges; 11 Platoon was too high up the mountain face to report any crossing; no artillery OP covered the road block; and no patrol from 21 Battalion had been sent forward to observe the tunnel area.
Possibly one—the records are ambiguous.No. 7 Company 304 Regiment was therefore free to cross
the river on kapok floats. Two platoons hastened to repair the
demolitions which were blocking the tanks; the third prepared to
meet counter-attacks, an unnecessary task as the unit report duly
recorded. Then about midday when the road was clear, six tanks
moved forward supported by two7/304 Regiment
and two patrols from 8/800 Brandenburg Regiment.
The fact that the enemy had been able to clear the road block
unobserved by the infantry and undisturbed by 26 Battery is one
of the main causes of failure in this action. If the shellfire of the
previous night had been repeated the clearance of the road block
would have been delayed and the advance of the tanks towards
Macky afterwards said: ‘The major mistake at Pinios was the siting of the road block
in the gorge. The defending platoon became defiladed. The block was rendered unobserved when this platoon had to be withdrawn …. The effort to put the block under
observation was the reason for the Australian engineers’ effort to blow at the end of the
spur near
The tanks were first seen by 12 Platoon, the forward element of
B Company, which had throughout the morning been engaging the
enemy across the river. About 12.15 p.m., when enemy fire from
across the river had been intensified, ‘at least 6 enemy tanks came
through the mouth of the gorge’ Lt Finlayson, 21 Battalion.
He was acting on instructions. The movement of the enemy
towards the river bank in the Australian sector had already convinced Lieutenant-Colonel Macky that a serious attack was developing to the left rear of his battalion. Late that morning he had
called a conference of his company commanders, explained the
situation and told them that ‘if completely cut off and overwhelmed
those left would make out in small parties to Lt-Col Macky, report on 21 Battalion in Cody, p. 61.
As it was, 11 Platoon in the high country to the north-east never received the orders to withdraw. All through the morning the men watched the tanks moving through the gorge below them, and when the force appeared to be approaching Tempe Second- Lieutenant Yeoman made inquiries at Headquarters B Company. Astonished to find that it had already withdrawn, he collected his forward sections which were resisting the screen of German infantry and, after some anxious moments, withdrew to the hills above Ambelakia.
By that time C Company (Captain Tongue), on the ridge
running up to Ambelakia, had been dispersed by the advancing
tanks. No. 13 Platoon (Lieutenant O'Neill) on the flat between
the road and the river had learnt of their approach when Captain
Nolan, the artillery observer, called down, ‘Infanteers, the
Lt O'Neill, 21 Battalion.
The tanks then moved very cautiously round the butt of the C Company ridge and into the area covered by the guns of L Troop
33 Anti-Tank Battery. Much depended upon them and their history
must be studied gun by gun. L1, which had been placed to cover
the demolition at the foot of the ridge, was probably silenced by
machine-gun fire. The battle report of 1/3 Panzer Regiment states
that the anti-tank gun 50 metres beyond the road block had been
kept quiet by machine-gun fire from the north-east of Itia.
The second gun (Sergeant Cavanagh and crew) was not brought into action too hastily. The first tank crossed the demolition but Cavanagh, only 100 yards away and wanting as many targets as possible, waited until the second had got through. The tank crews, surprisingly confident, got out and waited for the third tank to appear. When it came up they returned to their tanks. L4 was then brought into action. Twenty-eight shells were fired in quick succession, setting two tanks on fire and, it was thought, crippling the third.
The German account, however, states that ‘The two leading
tanks … now advanced to attack the village of Reports of 7/304 Regiment….’3 Panzer Regiment, 1/3 Panzer Regiment, II/304 Infantry Regiment.
This was probably correct for the men from that unit and the
patrols from They were unfortunate enough to be captured that night, probably at the road block
outside 8/800 Brandenburg Regiment had been advancing
over the ridges, supported by fire from the tanks and from 112
Reconnaissance Regiment across the river. They sent in no reports
of any opposition but they did mention that ‘about 80 PW were
winkled out from the hills.’ So it was probably they who appeared
over the ridge once held by C Company and called upon the anti-tank gunners to surrender. Preferring to risk an attempt to get to
2/2 Battalion.
The other two guns, L3 and L2, have no tanks to their credit;
in fact little is known of their crews and their work. The gunners
with L3 may have put up a stout resistance for the citation for a
Knight's Cross won by an officer of Perhaps this refers to Cavanagh's anti-tank gun. See p. 332.7/304 Infantry Regiment who
was working with the tanks states that ‘he personally destroyed
with hand grenades an A Tk position which fought to the last….’
The artillery observers who had seen a good deal of the engagement both managed to get back to their unit. Captain Bliss on the
A Company ridge was back in the gun lines by 4 p.m. Captain
Nolan, farther forward on the C Company ridge, had spent the
early afternoon directing fire on the tanks. He had seen Sergeant
Cavanagh's gun crew halt the tanks and then about 2 p.m., when
members of 21 Battalion were withdrawing up the ridge, he had
crawled to his vehicle and driven back under fire to the outskirts of
At this stage, about 2 p.m., the future movements of 21 Battalion
seem to have been decided. The German infantry could be seen
across the river and approaching the Australian positions; the tanks,
now unopposed, would soon be able to fan out into the open country
west of 2/2 Battalion, a thrust south-west-
wards towards
The Germans took some time, however, to get clear of the gorge
and the task commander, cautious after his losses, did not occupy
112 Reconnaissance Unit, which was
scrambling along the north side of the river—as well as troubling
21 Battalion—did not reach the village until 3.30 p.m. and the
blown railway bridge until 4.45 p.m.
A Company and the detachment in See p. 344.2/2 Battalion. Those with
Lieutenant Roach went up the ridge, joined the battalion and were
eventually evacuated; others joined Lieutenant Smith and with him,
‘by foot, boat, truck and train’, reached the toe of
The fact that trucks were there at all justifies some explanation
for the incident is typical of the swiftly changing front. At an
See p. 343.2/3 Australian
Battalion.
The rest of the battalion was scattered along the ridges about
Ambelakia. Two B Company platoons had come back through D
Company; the other with Lieutenant Yeoman was coming in from
On the night of 17–18 April the German force assembling
across the river—143 2 Mountain Regiment, less II Battalion, and
supported by twelve 7·5-centimetre artillery guns from I/118 Mountain Artillery Regiment—had received its orders. The English
‘apparently 2 Companies strong’ and ‘without artillery’ seemed to
‘intend to resist’, so at 7 a.m. 1/143 Mountain Regiment would make
a feint attack, mainly by fire, on the ‘III/143 Mountain Regiment would cross the river and encircle the Australian left flank,
west of Parapotamos. And to complete the encirclement of Allen
Force 2 CompanyCompany I/143 Mountain Regiment and the engineer platoon of 5 Company. See pp. 340–3.
At 9 a.m. I/143 Regiment made the first move—the feint attack
into the river bend east of Parapotamos—which brought heavy fire
from the Australian machine guns and mortars and several concen
trations from the New Zealand artillery. Nevertheless, by 12.30
p.m. the Germans were assembling opposite Evangelismos and
under fire from D Company 2/2 Battalion about Point 156.
To the west of Parapotamos a dawn patrol from III/143 Regiment had found a boat and crossed without any opposition. All
through the morning the battalion progressed, advancing south-eastwards and forcing ‘the English (who were in the act of taking
up positions immediately S.E. of Parapotamos) to withdraw.’III/143 Mountain Regiment report on crossing of Pinios River,
As it happened, D Company 2/2 Battalion had watched the
German files moving down from Gonnos but had not been able
to observe their river-crossing. At 9 a.m., however, when grey-clad
figures were seen moving out of the village, a patrol was sent to
investigate, but outside the village it came under fire and withdrew.
Bren carriers were then sent out to check the movement, but they
too came under fire from German mortars and there were several
casualties.
The artillerymen were able, however, to give some supporting
fire. The infantry officers over their line circuit sent back directions
to the guns until Lieutenant D Troop was also shelling targets for Captain Nolan, whose OP was above C Company
21 Battalion.III/143 Mountain
Regiment was content to complete its crossing and to develop an
encircling movement round the left flank, where D Company 2/2
Battalion about Point 156 and C Company 2/3 Battalion to the
south were attempting, with little or no equipment, to create a line.
The right flank, adjoining 2/2 Battalion had observed
and engaged at long range the many groups approaching the river.
The 21 Battalion carriers (Lieutenant 2/2
Battalion had been harassing any parties moving from Gonnos
towards the river bank, and the 3-inch mortar platoon by using
exceptionally heavy charges was engaging the enemy at 2/2 Battalion. It never
developed, but because Macky had no means of communicating
with his carriers they were, for the remainder of the action, under
Australian command.
In the afternoon the situation along the Australian front rapidly
changed for the worse. On the extreme left, D Company 2/2
Battalion about Point 156 maintained its position but by 4 p.m.,
the last time the telephone line was usable, the report to headquarters was that the enemy was relentlessly moving round and
digging in south-west of Parapotamos. The patrolling platoon was
therefore withdrawn from the river bank and orders were issued
for a counter-attack supported by Bren carriers.
But this did not eventuate. Written orders were received stating
that B Company 2/3 Battalion in the rear was ‘now withdrawing’
and that C Company of the same unit should co-ordinate its withdrawal with that of the adjoining D Company 2/2 Battalion. The
order was unexpected but by 4.45 p.m. the two companies, covered
by the Bren carriers, were marching back to 2/3 Battalion.
Neither the orders nor the withdrawal had been known to
Lieutenant-Colonel Chilton of See p. 333.2/2 Battalion. When the noise of
firing had ceased on his left flank he concluded that the companies
had been overrun. Actually there had been a misunderstanding.
After the visit2/3 Battalion to prepare a rearguard position astride the
road about two miles south of Makrikhorion. And Lamb's intention
had been that his C Company should move out whenever D
Company 2/2 Battalion had withdrawn. As it was, the company
commanders, misinterpreting the order, had decided that their units
were to move back together—and immediately.
The left flank was now wide open but the companies, if they had
remained any longer, would soon have been encircled. In the central
sector the German commander, anxious because of the slow movement through the gorge, had become more aggressive. About
midday Ibid.1/143 Mountain Regiment, hitherto staging the feint attack
upon Evangelismos, was ordered to ‘cross with all available means
at 21/143 Mountain Regiment report on attack over Pinios,
They had been harassed by the Bren-gunners of A and B
Companies HQ NZ Divisional Artillery report, Appx E.2/2 Battalion; the two 3-inch mortars with A Company
had dropped 350 bombs among the rafts and along the mud banks;
and the guns of E and F Troops 4 New Zealand Field Regiment
had given their support. As seen by Captain Bliss, who was directing
the fire of E Troop, the Germans had ‘formed up in what seemed
like platoons in line and three or four platoons advanced … with
thirty to forty yard intervals. Rds of gun fire were falling among
By then it was 3 p.m. and See p. 327.Battle Group 2 was emerging from
the gorge. The supporting infantry had appeared over the ridges
once occupied by 21 Battalion and the tanks, cautiously moving out
of 2/2
Battalion. The New Zealand anti-tank crew in that area had already
departed,
The Bren carriers of 2/7 and 2/11 Battalions, together with
several from 21 Battalion, did their best from hull-down positions
astride the road and railway to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.
In one 21 Battalion carrier WO II
The stage was thus set for a fighting withdrawal to prevent the
Germans from entering
In the original orders See p. 228. Macky's copy of this order had an uncorrected error, giving the time of
withdrawal for 21 Battalion as the night 17–18 April instead of night 18–19 April.
The first instructions from Headquarters New Zealand Division
were given in a signal NZ Division to
The orders were taken forward to Headquarters Report on the operations of 2/2 Battalion had line communication with
Brigade Headquarters so he was swiftly given an outline plan of
the withdrawal. Movement would not begin until 3 a.m., 19 April,
though ‘it was hoped to get the time put forward.’2/2 Australian Infantry Battalion at
Soon afterwards
The necessary orders were prepared, confirming the general plan
of withdrawal but ordering the forward units to break contact at
dusk. As line communications had broken down shortly after the
General's departure, an officer was sent forward in a Bren carrier
to deliver the orders to Chilton and Parkinson. Moving up against
the stream of men and vehicles, he reached the forward artillery
area only to be told, incorrectly, that Chilton's headquarters had
been overrun by the German tanks. He left the orders for Parkinson
with Captain 2/2 Battalion were still in action about Evangelismos—and were
so until about 6.45 p.m.
Finally, about 6 p.m. Headquarters 16 Brigade moved back from
Makrikhorion to the crossroads where Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb
and 2/3 Battalion were endeavouring to build up another line.
The artillery units with 26 Battery 4 NZ Field Regiment and A Troop 5 Field Regiment.
In the early afternoon the artillerymen were well aware of the
changing front. Stragglers had reported that 21 Battalion was
pulling back, in the central sector Germans could be seen to have
crossed the river and from the west reports had come in of the
enemy about Parapotamos. Every effort had been made to halt these
movements but the targets had been too numerous for the limited
number of guns, and now that the front was disintegrating it was
difficult to get accurate information. By 2 p.m. the only observation
post functioning was that of Captain Bliss on the ridge of A
Company 21 Battalion and the signals from him were becoming
increasingly faint. The shelling of the river crossings was then
directed by Lieutenant
Shortly afterwards, however, probably because of Hanna's representations, D Troop 4 Field Regiment was recalled by Lieutenant
Carson, Maj W. N. Carson, MC, m.i.d.; born NZ Lieutenant Clark, the troop commander, returned from the left flank just as the troop
was moving out. See p. 330.
The other troops, E and F, remained in their original positions to oppose the German advance towards Evangelismos and to cover the inevitable withdrawal.
After the occupation of 2/2 Battalion, the commander of 3 Panzer Regiment
had swung his attack southwards towards Evangelismos, on the
road to 2 Company 1/3 Panzer Regiment, with 7/304
Infantry Regiment in support, was now breaking the way.
At the same time three other units were on the move. I/143
Mountain Regiment was coming south-eastwards towards the
village. On its right flank II/141 Mountain Regiment which had
just been rushed over the river was advancing towards Makrikhorion and III/143 Mountain Regiment which had all day been enveloping
the left flank of the Australians.
To delay the tanks north of Evangelismos and the infantry who
had been crossing the river to the east were A Company 2/2 Battalion, supported by eleven Bren carriers (some from 2/5 and
2/11 Battalions and others from 21 New Zealand Battalion), an
Australian anti-tank gun and two New Zealand 25-pounders.
The gun from A Troop 5 Field Regiment (Sergeant 2 Lt J. C. Brown;
The second gun, that from F Troop 4 Field Regiment (Sergeant
In the country between the tanks and the guns there had meanwhile been confused and exciting activity. The supporting tanks
had rolled south from
The tanks had then advanced cautiously through the village
towards Headquarters 2/2 Battalion. The Australian anti-tank gun
in the area had left ‘without orders’. Long, p. 118. See p. 328.
The gully in which Headquarters 26 Battery had been established
was soon untenable, so Major Stewart, who had been observing
for E and F Troops, made off to the hills and attempted to rejoin
his guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Parkinson drove off eastwards, nearly
reaching the hill village of Sikourion before he and some Australians
turned south to the
Astride the highway there were now the tanks from 3 Panzer
Regiment, supported by units from
Late that afternoon they had occupied the village of 3 Panzer Regiment battle report, 18–19 April 1941.
Such was their opinion of a most gallant and successful delaying
action, in the early stages of which the dominant units were E and
F Troops of 26 Battery 4 New Zealand Field Regiment. Left with
no forward screen after the withdrawal of 2/2 Battalion and with
only seven guns between them, they covered the movement of
E Troop had then moved back, the sections leapfrogging through each other. Guns hooked to tractors would be brought back and halted at intervals along the road. The trails would then be swung round and the approaching tanks engaged from the roadside. In this way, over open sights, two tanks were definitely destroyed and several others put out of action. As seen by an Australian infantryman it had been an inspiring sight:
The officer stood out in the open directing the fire, the crews crouched
behind the shields and fed and fired the guns while everything the enemy
had was being pelted at them …. They looked like a drawing by someone
who had never been to a war, but the whole thing was unreal. They got
Long, p. 120.
When E Troop was clear, F Troop engaged the enemy and disabled at least one tank. But the German advance was irresistible
and the guns had to be withdrawn, one section remaining to support
B Squadron New Zealand
The rearguard by then was in position about the road and railway
crossing of Makrikhorion. If the line could be held until dark the
movement of the tanks would be more limited; if yet another
withdrawal was necessary, there were several possible defence lines
between there and See p. 333. Lt-Col J.T. Russel, DSO, m.i.d.; born Hastings,
The force had little hope of halting the approaching tanks and,
to make the task still more difficult, German aircraft were screaming
across the front, strafing and dive-bombing the slightest sign of
movement. Even so, the troops fought back when twelve to fifteen
tanks broke into the area. Major Stewart, then working across the
ridges above the plain, saw Russell ‘magnificently handling his
squadron.’ One armoured car troop (Lt H. B. Capamagian), which had been sent by Brigadier Allen
to cover the road from Sikourion, reported that the enemy was not encircling the right
flank.
The Australian infantry were even worse off. ‘At one stage … a
group of fifteen to twenty men were round a tank firing rifles
and L. M. G.s to no apparent effect. This tank crushed two men….
The feeling of helplessness against the tanks overcame the troops
and they began to move back in small parties to the trucks.’ Long, p. 120.
There had been all possible support from D Troop 26 Field
Battery; in fact Captain Thornton, at the observation post on
Point 214, had been delighted with the accuracy of the concentrations. But after 8.30 p.m. the light had faded and about 9 p.m.,
when the section from E Troop with the
The whole front was now hopelessly indefinite, but in unprepared positions about 1000 yards to the south of Point 214 a mixed force of infantrymen and Bren carriers had collected to make yet another stand. It served the purpose. The observer in the leading tank was shot, the column halted and a scene of colourful confusion developed across the front, with tanks milling aimlessly about and carriers pulling back in a world of Very lights, tracer bullets and blazing vehicles.
At this stage Brigadier Allen ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb
of 2/3 Battalion to withdraw. So, covered by the Ibid., p. 121.
The enemy made no serious attempt to follow up. The darkness
and the danger of supporting units firing on each other forced them
Battle report by I/3 Panzer Regiment had
been low, only 4 killed and 37 wounded, but its tank losses had
been high: ‘2 MK IV, 4 MK III and 13 MK II either total losses
or out of action for a very long time (including 4 lost in crossing
the river) 2 MK IV, 12 MK III and MK II slightly damaged.’1/3 Panzer Regiment, 15–19 April 1941.
More important still, they had not been able to reach
To complete the day's disasters the company See p. 329. Report of action by I/143
Mountain Regiment, with a machine-gun platoon under command,
had at last reached the road to the north of 2 Company 143 Mountain Regiment at
The company had then turned to the railway embankment,
following it for about two miles and observing only a few hundred
yards away to the east the transport moving up to relieve Allen
Force. The road crossing some two and a half miles north-east of
The Germans state that some nine or ten fully loaded English
ammunition trucks were the next to be captured, but it has been
impossible to decide what unit they came from. The earliest detachment of which there is any record seems to have been two Australian
Bren carriers, followed by 9 Light Aid Detachment Attached to 26 Battery 4 Field Regiment. See p. 344.
Immediately after this disaster vehicles from the forward areas
were coming through almost continuously. At the head there seems
to have been a mixed group which included perhaps seven of the
4 RMT lorries bringing out Australians and members of 21
Battalion. Led by Lieutenant J. Pool, who was familiar with the
route, the convoy turned east before the road block and crossed the
open country to the
It is now impossible to give an exact and detailed description of the fighting which developed but the general outline is clear enough. At 10.30 p.m. when the leading vehicle, an Australian one, had pulled up before some obstacle on the highway, the Germans had opened fire, killing or wounding every occupant. In a few minutes other groups of vehicles were jamming up head to tail along the narrow road above the sodden countryside. No large-scale operation was possible. Some men got out of the way, others took cover and opened fire on the crossing, and others, in small groups, organised counter-attacks. Several New Zealand Bren carriers came forward, a volunteer crew was collected for one of them and an attempt was made to smash through the road block.
With Private Report of action of 2 Company 143 Mountain Regiment at
Attempts were then made by mixed groups of Australians and
New Zealanders to subdue the post, one party afterwards claiming
to have killed The German losses were 2 killed, 2 wounded.
The long column of vehicles strung out along the road to the
rear had by then dispersed, the troops having been warned by the
streams of tracer fire, the glowing flares and, above all, by the
excited reports that came back from the crossing. ‘Our carriers
returned hot foot with the news that Jerry had taken M. Uren, Kiwi Saga.
Some actually encircled the Germans and continued south through
By the night of 20–21 April it was possible to estimate, provisionally, the losses suffered by Cody, p. 73.
By then the enemy had occupied Report by On 3 Panzer
Regiment had then appeared and before midday infantry and tanks
had entered the town together. ‘As in 3 Panzer Regiment.
The position was very different for those members of
Thus Major Harding, who had been following the last two trucks
of 21 Battalion, turned eastwards from the ambush and, like many
others, followed a road which proved to be blind. When forced to
leave his bogged pick-up he trudged south down the eastern side
of Lake Voiviis, collecting as he went eight Australians and twenty-two men from 21 Battalion. Late on 20 April when the almost
exhausted party was about ten miles from Cody, p. 75: ‘However, two boats were taken across the bay by engineers to pick up
the rest of Harding's party.’
A smaller party, Lance-Sergeant
Other parties had more difficulty in getting through to the coast
and in finding shipping to take them behind the lines at
See p. 328.
Sergeant See p. 443.
The larger groups took much longer to rejoin 21 Battalion.
Captain Rev. Fr. W. Sheely, m.i.d.;
At this stage Lieutenant-Colonel Macky appeared with eight
officers and thirty-five men. His original intention had been to
march from the
Three days later another group arrived in Report from Captain Trousdale.
The group with Captain Tongue, as with all the leaders, changed
from time to time, the men being free to make their own choice
when they thought they saw better chances to escape. Those who
remained with him eventually reached the coast south of In
ON the morning of 19 April the Germans entered 2 Panzer
Division which had forced the Luftwaffe
ground staff. Consequently, it was not until late on 20 April that
the advance was once more under way.
On the western flank, however, there had been swifter movement. After its repulse at XXXX Corps had sent
detachments from 9 Panzer Division to make an outflanking
movement through Fifth Panzer
Division then took over; the river was bridged, and by 18 April
the advanced guard had followed 2 Panzer Division.
This success decided Marshal List. The double thrust was
abandoned and the pursuit of 5 Panzer Division, whose forward units entered
By then There is no record of this instruction nor of the means by which it was given; see p. 311. See Chapter 14. Luftwaffe had made no reconnaissance, remnants
of
Twenty-fifth Battalion, still having the lorries of 4 RMT
Company, was able to make an immediate and undisturbed withdrawal, but for 24 Battalion it was not so simple. The vehicles in
which its companies had been withdrawn from
The brigade rearguard, See p. 307, note 1.
On the main highway the rearguard was about Long, p. 135.
On 19 April there were heavy and persistent air attacks
An hour later several trucks came south towards
As Lee had already made certain that 6 New Zealand Brigade
would soon be through
No air attacks were made that morning, Sunday 20 April, but
about 11 a.m. a large German troop-carrying aircraft landed on the
flat country near Xinia, a village some three miles in front of the
line. Some Australians started out to capture it but their failure to
8 Panzer
Reconnaissance Unit, the leading formation of 5 Panzer Division,
did not seem to realise that the ridge was held for early that
afternoon motor-cycles with side-cars came down the road and were
badly shot up. ‘One of our patrols had fallen into an ambush at
the northern end of the Furka pass and lost 6 killed ….’
2 Panzer Division war diary, 21 April, with note about events of 20 April.
Von Serbien bis Kreta (From Serbia to Crete), prepared by a German publicity unit in
The fighting then died down, heavy rain fell and the Germans
hastened to bring up their mortars. Half an hour later when the
weather cleared they opened fire, but before long the crews and
any infantrymen moving below the pass were taking cover from
the Australian machine-gun fire. At this stage Lee, having decided
that the last of the Australian and New Zealand troops must be
through
The movement of the infantry from their camouflaged positions
soon attracted the attention of the German mortars and light
artillery. Some haste and confusion developed and one of the
armoured cars when it reached the highway was destroyed by
shellfire, but before long the force was clear. Two tanks had held
the road, Sergeant 2 Lt M. C. Hill, MC; born
After the engineers, covered by machine-gun fire, had blown
their demolitions along the highway the last of the rearguard
withdrew, the armoured cars of the
Actually
The same day engineers from 7 Field Company had gone back
to
Finally, there was the recovery of survivors from
South of the rearguards,
The Australians held the range which runs westwards into the
interior. It was high and remarkable for its pinnacles and precipices,
for the dense undergrowth on the hillsides, for the stunted oaks in
the gullies, the world of pines about See p. 472.
In 480 BC Xerxes, the Persian, unable to force the coastal gap,
had sent his Immortals into the Asopos Gorge. Thence, after a
short distance, they had turned eastwards up the ridges and through
the groves of oak to surprise the Phocian sentries and outflank the
forces of Leonidas, the Spartan king. In
The task for the moment, however, was the preparation of new
defences. The orders received verbally from
In the narrow strip between the sea and the hot springs at
Late that afternoon, 19 April,
Next morning, 20 April,
That afternoon and night, 20–21 April, adjustments were made.
Twenty-fourth Battalion moved up to the
Still farther west, 23 Battalion had been in the area overlooking
the bridge across the Sperkhios River, but it now had to make
several laborious adjustments to cover the gap which had been left
between the left flank of the New Zealand Division and the right
Very little time would have been needed to repair it. The following night, 21–22 April,
four of the brigade Bren carriers covered the bridge while Lt Hector with a small party
from 7 Field Company completed the demolition. See map on p. 385.
The same day the artillery plan was prepared by Brigadier Miles.
Unable to use the marshland near the coast, the regiments were
to be on the edge of the high ground west and south of
The sector was then divided into two zones, anti-tank and field.
In the first or western zone to the front of the ridge held by 23
Battalion, K Troop 33 Anti-Tank Battery had one gun looking
directly north to the Alamanas bridge and the other three along
the road past the baths towards
Fifth Field Regiment, which had occupied emergency positions
since its arrival on 19 April, now moved to new positions on 21
April. One troop with another 25-pounder under command and
E Troop 32 Anti-Tank Battery went to the area between the baths
at
The anti-tank zone was strengthened about
The field and medium artillery had already fixed and camouflaged
their gun positions. On 19 April 4 Field Regiment had hastily
occupied positions at Kammena Vourla, but it was now farther
forward in a dry stream bed nearer
Second Royal Horse Artillery Regiment had been moving back
with the rest of the 1 Armoured Brigade group from
In the
Another problem for
On 21 April the threat became more serious, particularly when
the Greeks informed Headquarters
The last and most obvious problem was the almost complete
absence of air cover. Using the landing grounds about Luftwaffe had been ruthlessly bombing and machine-gunning the
convoys along the highway and the more important assembly areas
to the rear. The headquarters of both
The outstanding effort of the day was probably that of Driver
To check these raids there was little that the
The fighter squadrons which had done their best to protect the
columns as they came south from
In the New Zealand sector on 21 April the troops were hastily digging in, camouflaging and preparing barbed-wire entanglements across the front. Changes were still being made to adjust the line so that each brigade should have two battalions forward and one in reserve, but this meant further movement for several units.
On the right flank 24 Battalion, which had already moved
forward, was now well established about
Twenty-sixth Battalion, which had just come through See p. 310.
Farther west in the 5 Brigade sector there was similar haste in
the preparation of the line and in the movement of units. Twenty-second Battalion had moved forward for the third time and was
now between 25 and 28 (Maori) Battalions. The Maoris, assisted
by a company from 18 Battalion, were wiring and preparing slit
trenches and enjoying the bath houses alongside the upper reaches
of the
As 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion had reassembled after the withdrawal from the north, companies were allocated to support all
units: 3 Company with 6 Brigade; 4 Company with 5 Brigade;
1 Company, less a platoon, with 4 Brigade; and 2 Company, less
a platoon, in Divisional Reserve. The detached platoons were about
the
In the forward areas the situation throughout the day gradually
became more tense. German vehicles could be seen entering
About the same time two motor-cyclists rode confidently up to
the demolished bridge which was picketed by the carrier platoon.
One German was killed, the other captured. They were from
8 Potsdam Reconnaissance Unit ( 5 Panzer Division), of which one
company had entered
There was also much movement behind the New Zealand lines,
where 4 Brigade was preparing to take over its task of coast-watching and anti-parachute defence in the rear areas. At dusk
20 Battalion moved to the stretch between Karia and
IN the period of the withdrawal to
As it happened Wavell, when in See p. 116; Cunningham, p. 352.
The following day General Papagos made the first move when
he suggested
When informed of the Greek proposal Mr Churchill on 17 April had replied:
We cannot remain in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 200.
In The Prime Minister, Balkan Journal, pp. 180–3; Wilson, p. 93.
Cable, 19 April, Dominions Office to Prime Ministers of
At the same time General Wilson, owing to the frequent changes
in location of his headquarters and the unreliability of the wireless
communications in the mountains, was not always able to supply
the information required by the authorities in both Wilson, p. 92.
The problems of Air Chief Marshal Longmore were just as
formidable; his resources were quite inadequate for the demands
now being made upon them. So that day in Churchill, Vol. III, p. 201.
Evacuation now seemed inevitable but there was as yet no suggestion of haste. Wavell advised Wilson that if
Nevertheless, much organisation was necessary. Small craft had
to be chartered and fitted out to ferry the troops from the beaches
to the ships; to provide the beach parties the ship's company from
York abandoned its salvage work in
Meanwhile in Wilson, p. 93. J. Hetherington, Blamey, p. 104, gives a note from Wilson to Blamey
dated 19 April. ‘I found things in
The results of this discussion were given to General Wavell,
who arrived in Wilson, pp. 93–4. Report of meeting held on 18 April.
The same day another conference was held at Tatoi Palace
outside Wavell's despatch covering the period 7 February–15 July 1941.
The discussion was opened by General Wavell, who said that
the British Army would fight as long as the Greek Army fought.
However, if the Palairet cabled his opinion to Wilson, p. 95.
In London Mr Churchill was still confident:
I am increasingly of the opinion that if the generals on the spot think
they can hold on in the Churchill, Vol. III, p. 202.
Unfortunately the situation in SS ‘Adolf
Hitler’ Division had been diverted from 12 Army and to isolate the Greeks on the western side of the
Pindhos Mountains. The appearance of this force to the rear of the
As the Italians demanded a formal surrender from the Greeks the negotiations were
reopened, and on 23 April at
Meanwhile, on the night of 20–21 April Wavell had driven
north to Blamey's headquarters in the
He then returned to
The same day, 21 April, Wavell, in confirmation of verbal
instructions, sent his written orders to Wilson. He was free to select
the date for the beginning of the evacuation and he must take
Generals Blamey and
Should part of the original scheme fail or should portions of the force
become cut off, they must not surrender but should endeavour to make their
way into the
Almost immediately the plans had to be changed. News came
through that day of the surrender of the Greek armies in Epirus.
The western flank of the
In
No time was wasted; in fact some of the New Zealand base units
had already moved out. On 19 April 1 General HospitalRawnsley.
The vessel left that evening with some 600 British base troops
and the medical group: Colonel McKillop, with 14 officers and 69
other ranks. But it missed the convoy and next morning, when
standing by for instructions, was bombed and machine-gunned. The
British had several casualties but they were transferred to the
hospital ship Aba, and the Rawnsley carried on to reach
The nurses, accompanied by Captains See p. 404.Aba, but it had
already put out from
On the night of 21–22 April the New Zealand liaison officer
at Headquarters British Troops in
Shortly after midnight the authorities in the camp, Major
The convoy left under the command of Captain
Here they waited for further orders from 80 Base Sub-Area and
in peacetime would have remarked upon the sound of sheep bells
and the enchanting countryside. On the outskirts of
As it was, the Luftwaffe dominated the scene, patrolling the
highway and making all movement by day extremely dangerous.
That night, 22–23 April, a train came through from
Unknown to
Each night there was an almost continuous stream of trucks
moving through the village, but the expected orders for the New
Zealand units never appeared. Finally, on the evening of 24–25
April Lieutenant H. M. Foreman
Another small detachment under Lieutenant HMAS Perth on the
night of 26–27 April.
At Voula there still remained the front-line reinforcements who
had assembled there after the arrival of the different convoys or
after the movement of the brigades to the
After the Convalescent Hospital and attached units had made
their sudden exodus on the night of 21–22 April there were four
From the camp itself there was still some movement. An officer
from the remnants See p. 376. See p. 372.
The same day, 23 April, movement orders were received. The
battalion became part of Force troops and was ordered to proceed
to
The withdrawal of the divisions from the forward areas demanded
more time and more carefully prepared timetables. Blamey had
received his orders from Wavell on the night of 21–22 April, but
Long, p. 143.
The first warning to
The brigade commanders were immediately called to headquarters
and given warning orders. Hargest was told that 5 Brigade, the
forward formation, would be withdrawn from the line that night;
Barrowclough learnt that 6 Brigade with all the artillery would
remain at
That afternoon Blamey and his divisional commanders, Mackay
and
The orders actually stated ‘one NZ Div’ but one brigade was meant and there was no
confusion.
The orders also gave detailed instructions about the method of
withdrawal. The convoys would move by night and to ensure
maximum practical speed side-lights could be used; towing was
forbidden and all breakdowns were to be hauled aside and their
passengers transferred to other vehicles. As the Greek authorities
See pp. 471–2. The Germans used the Greek railway system throughout the war and
during their own withdrawal destroyed bridges and viaducts.
In the
With the New Zealand orders there were other variations. Fourth
Brigade Group would embark on the night 25–26 April as stated
in the orders from Corps, not on 26–27 April as suggested in W
Force orders. Fifth Brigade Group which would, according to Force
and Corps, withdraw to ‘C’ and ‘D’ beaches on the night 23–24
April and embark on the night 24–25 April, would withdraw on
the night 22–23 April and embark from beaches east of
The orders for the divisional rearguard were quite definite. The
But there were other irritating differences. The orders from
The distances between the different headquarters, the broken communications and the constantly changing plans had been responsible for these conflicting orders. They were in most cases swiftly adjusted but there was nevertheless a certain amount of confusion. The beach officers, for example, followed Force orders and this led to fierce arguments when New Zealanders were asked to dump certain equipment on the embarkation beaches.
Next morning, 22 April, saw the enemy building up his strength.
His heavy guns opened up from the east and south of
At the same time there was the ever-increasing fear of German
forces encircling either flank of
On the extreme left the threat was more serious. The enemy
were in Ioannina, and although they had not apparently reached
Arta or Preveza the former town had been bombed heavily and
was now in flames. To meet the expected attack demolitions were
prepared in the Delphi Pass and the Greek headquarters sent
infantry and anti-tank guns to come under British command and
hold the approaches from Mesolongion to Amfissa. South of the
Gulf of
The only sharp action during the day was on the Australian front.
Two 25-pounders below Long, p. 146.
The New Zealand sector was comparatively quiet, apart from the
ever recurring air raids and some artillery fire at night. The only
casualty came with the last raid before nightfall when trucks moving
forward for the withdrawal were attacked and one man killed. The
night, 22–23 April, in the forward areas was equally undisturbed.
The covering platoons from 22 and 23 Battalions were not attacked
and the brigade Bren carriers which went forward to patrol the
river bank were never challenged, except by the frogs whose croaking was greater than even Aristophanes could have imagined. To
the rear, however, there was great activity. Fourth Brigade Group
moved out first. Nineteenth Battalion, See p. 361.
The withdrawal of 5 Brigade from the left flank began about
9 p.m. The units—22 and 28 (Maori) Battalions, 4 Machine Gun
Company and finally 23 Battalion—moved to the highway and then
marched three miles to embus, after which the convoy moved
south to the
After the convoys moved back A, B, C and F Troops of 6 Field
Regiment withdrew to the west of
To cover the gap which now existed between the left of 6 Brigade
and the right flank of 6 Australian Division a covering force was
left by 5 Brigade. Forward of the bridge were the Bren carriers
from the battalions; south of the road in the 22 and 28 (Maori)
Battalions' areas were Major Hart, Second-Lieutenants
Finally, to check any attempt to scramble through the high
country on the western flank of 6 Brigade, 25 Battalion moved its
C Company on to the ridge from which 22 Battalion had withdrawn. This feature was an effective tank obstacle, and if it could
be held against infantry attacks the Germans would be forced to
traverse the very rough country south of the road before they could
encircle the defence line and block the withdrawal through
On the following day, 23 April, the insecurity of the Actually the German advance had not begun; they were probably Greek vehicles.
On the eastern flank there were now signs of German activity.
The patrol from the New Zealand See p. 344.
The wrecking of the bridge had been due to a change in the
plan of withdrawal.
The day was also notable for the increased severity of the air
attacks along the south coast. The columns of vehicles moving
along the historic road between
The Air Vice-Marshal Arthur S. Gould Lee, Special Duties, pp. 93–5.
With no air support from the mainland, Rear-Admiral Baillie-
Grohman then decided that if the embarkations were to be kept
secret the convoys must not approach the beaches until one hour
after dark and that all ships must leave by 3 a.m. This would give
them some chance of clearing the coast without being observed and
of coming within the area covered during daylight by the fighters
operating from
In the
More direct action came about 4 p.m. when Germans on bicycles and motor-cycles rode up to the Sperkhios River and crossed the demolished bridge. To deal with this group the 23 Battalion detachment was ordered to send out patrols to the right and to the left of the bridge. But the platoon commanders, after receiving their orders, were unable to reach their sections because of the enemy's steady machine-gun fire. Lieutenant McPhail thereupon set out to do alone what he had been ordered to accomplish with a patrol. Armed with a tommy gun, this determined officer went forward and shot two of ten Germans who were clambering over the bridge. On his way back he met two other Germans, one of whom he shot. After this resistance, and no doubt because of the harassing fire from 6 Field Regiment, there were no further attempts by the enemy to patrol beyond the river.
When darkness fell over the Anzac area there began another
series of withdrawals and adjustments. Fourth Brigade Group, which
had been encamped in the
In the Australian sector 19 Brigade withdrew to the
In the New Zealand sector there was similar activity. Brigadier
Barrowclough had decided that
To the rear of the FDLs there was corresponding activity. At
The move began immediately after dark and the road was soon
The main body—22 Battalion, 23 Battalion, 28 (Maori) Battalion,
19 Army Troops Company and 106 Anti-Aircraft Battery—came
through in that order, moving swiftly and with very few mishaps.
There was one break in the
East of
The many other units which had been on the road that night
were equally successful. Twenty-first Battalion, which had been
encamped at Restos near
ON 21 April the forward elements of 5 Mountain Division had
approached the Australian positions about 55 Motor Cycle Battalion, crossing the Sperkhios River well
up-stream from the Allied positions, had begun an arduous march
round the left flank of the Australian lines to Kato Dhio Vouna
and Dhelfinon. No. 3 Company 8 Panzer Reconnaissance Unit, which
moved from Vardnatais to the foot of
The situation for the enemy was no better on 23 April. Sixth
Mountain Division was now coming in from the east through 5 Panzer Division had not been able to advance beyond
The change came on the morning of 23 April when General
Stumme reached To the Germans XXXX Corps. The British were ‘holding the 5 Panzer Division would attack
astride the
The attack began about 7.30 a.m. on 24 April. The Luftwaffe
came over searching for gun positions and the main points of
resistance; the volume of shellfire increased and the infantry began
to move forward.
Nineteenth Australian Brigade had, fortunately, improved its
position during the night. The 2/11 Battalion, with a small detach-
ment from 2/8 Battalion under command, covered the highway
immediately north of
To the immediate west of the pass the Germans were unsuccessful.
Fifty-fifth Motor Cycle Battalion moved from the Dhelfinon area
across the Asopos River, but with almost no artillery support could
do little; the companies were pinned down in a ravine west of
Still farther west, Jais Group had been assembling in the Kato
Dhio Vouna area, but about 10.20 a.m. Colonel Jais was informed
of the Allied withdrawals the previous night. No time was wasted.
In the Appendix to report by 1/31 Panzer Regiment, reinforced with four Mark IV tanks from
3 Company, the 88-millimetre guns from 1/61 Anti-Aircraft
Regiment, engineers, motor-cyclists and assault guns. The greater
part of the force was to attack the prepared positions commanding
the tortuous highway; one platoon would ‘turn off from the pass
road … push through alone to I/31 Panzer Regiment.
After a preliminary attack by Stukas the tanks set off along the
straight road from XXXX Corps commander, General Stumme, then came forward
to study the situation. In the meantime the selected platoon from
1/31 Panzer Regiment turned off at the foot of the pass and
In this area forward of
The first sign of any change in the general plan was the appearance of the platoon of tanks from the foot of Diary and report of I/31 Panzer Regiment.
This led to some confusion for at 10 a.m. the advanced guard
of 9 and 11 Coys (Cycle) and 12 (MG) from 72 Infantry Division (Baacke Group),III/124 Regt, Cycle Sqn 72 Inf Div, Cycle and
Cavalry Sqns 112 Recce Unit.112 Reconnaissance Unit under command, had already
been ordered to advance through 1/31 Panzer Regiment
which had a short time before been checked by the New Zealand
artillery. A warning was then flashed back to Headquarters 6
Mountain Division informing it that 5 Panzer Division was also
using the highway because the ‘new
The move was soon under way, but about 4.15 p.m. the infantry came under fire from 25 Battalion. One company went into position near the highway and the other was ordered to make an encircling movement across the scrub-covered ridges on the left flank of the New Zealand position. But after advancing some 300 yards the attack faded away. The infantry asked for the support of the heavy weapons; mortars and machine guns were hurried forward; and orders were prepared for a more formidable attack.
As seen by 25 Battalion, there had been a lull after the morning
engagement with the tanks, though German aircraft had been
harassing all areas and the artillery of both forces had been searching
all possible assembly areas. Then at 2 p.m. there had been even
heavier air attacks, after which tanks, lorried infantry and motorcyclists had been observed along the road to the west. They had
been engaged by B and C Troops 6 Field Regiment and the heavy
vehicles had been stopped, but the cyclists had raced forward until
they came under fire from 14 Platoon C Company 25 Battalion on
the extreme left flank. Nos. 15 and 13 Platoons, using small-arms
and mortar fire, kept many of them pinned to the road and the
nearby scrub, but others took to the ridges and began to climb
upwards and forward until they overlooked the lines of C Company.
Two sections of 14 Platoon were forced back but they were used
The next attack began about 6 p.m. with the Germans still
underestimating the strength of the defence; in fact, the operation
order stated that ‘a small enemy force is offering opposition to us.’ Appendix to report by Advance Guard 72 Infantry Division at
By this time A Company had been threatened with encirclement. One section of 9 Platoon had opened fire on the tanks with its anti-tank rifle but the return fire had been too punishing. Soon afterwards the New Zealand artillery had once again shortened its range; the whole platoon came under fire and was finally withdrawn to positions below Company Headquarters. At the same time the Germans on the left flank, still supported by machine-gun fire, had been steadily coming over the ridges once occupied by C Company. To counter this Bren-gunners from 7 Platoon were sent up the ridges and a section from 8 Platoon was moved to cover the left flank and rear of the company.
The situation continued to deteriorate, more German infantry
pressing forward and the machine-gun fire increasing. At 6.30 p.m.
it was decided that the front must be adjusted. The platoons of
B Company (Captain Armstrong) were swung round very neatly
to form a line facing west rather than north, with 10 Platoon near
the road, 11 Platoon above it and 12 Platoon still farther south.
The platoons of A Company, reorganised approximately along the
spur from Headquarters A Company and also facing west, were in
front of and out of touch with the left of B Company. To the rear
was D Company, on the ridge above it the battalion Bren carriers
and above them a group from A and C Companies collected by
The weight of the attack then fell upon A Company. Some sections
were forced to withdraw and some Germans did get through to
Company Headquarters, but they were dispersed by hand grenades
and a short impromptu bayonet charge. Another group which had
come in high up and behind A and B Companies approached the
Bren-carrier group (Second-Lieutenant
The surprising feature—to the Germans—had been the complete
failure of 1/31 Panzer Regiment to break through to
19 tanks in file charged along the yellowish country road …. Ahead of
us the first shells burst on the road. White clouds of dust shot up, mixed
with black powder smoke, and were carried away swiftly by the wind. We
could not deploy. On our right the hills rose 800 metres, and on our left
stretched the dreaded Appendix to I/31 Panzer Regiment report.
Before long there was ‘not a single heavy tank, 37, 50 or 75 mm
in going order; some had brewed up, others severe track or
mechanical damage, only two able to shoot.’I/31 Panzer Regiment report.1/61 Anti-Aircraft Regiment which had advanced with the tanks
could do little: one troop, two 88-millimetre guns, in the rear
attempted to silence the New Zealand artillery ‘which could be seen
by muzzle flashes’; the other moved with the tanks, but the smoke
from those which were hit and the uncertainty of the whereabouts
of the men clambering round the hillsides above 25 Battalion
checked their supporting fire. A Stuka raid in the late afternoon
seemed to quieten the New Zealand artillery and as the light faded
the rest of I/31 Panzer Regiment moved forward from
This dramatic check to the German advance was almost wholly
the work of the artillery. Twenty-fifth Battalion had certainly
covered the left flank and adjusted its front under fire, but the
other battalions of 6 Brigade had heard much but seen little of the
action. B Company 24 Battalion had occasionally seen tanks and
lorried infantry but the battalion had not been seriously attacked.
Its task when the Germans began to encircle the left flank was to
bring A Company over from the coast to protect the area between
it and 26 Battalion. That unit to the rear heard the action but was
not involved until late afternoon, when its C Company was sent
forward on the left flank to cover the long re-entrant into
Fifth Field Regiment, used in an anti-tank role, and the defensive
fire of 4 and 6 Field Regiments and
The guns of 5 Field Regiment had been on both sides of the
road. To the north, C Troop was in the 24 Battalion area from the
coast to
In the morning and early afternoon they had remained silent
under their camouflage nets, leaving the strafing aircraft to harass the
regiments about
Then, when the Germans made their first approach, the fire of all guns, and particularly those of B and C Troops 6 Field Regiment, had forced the tanks and motor transport to halt before they reached the forward platoon of 25 Battalion. The tanks seemed to withdraw or, at least, to take cover; the infantry began their encircling movement below the cliffs and forced the withdrawal of C Company 25 Battalion.
Indirectly this meant trouble for the artillery. Its forward observation posts had to be vacated in a hurry to avoid encirclement.
One was surrounded but Captain
The second attack developed about 6 p.m. with the tanks
advancing in single file at intervals of about 50 yards. When they
came forward the guns in the 2 Lt C. C. Pipson, F Troop 5 Field Regiment.
There it was ruthlessly dealt with by E Troop firing in enfilade
at very short range from the south side of the road. With one gun
was Bombardier Lt Cade, the GPO.
While this was taking place the units on the north side of the
road were being rewarded for their hours of dive-bombing and
machine-gunning, small-arms and mortar fire. One gun, that of
Sergeant
In all some twenty tanks were claimed to have been hit. The
artillery report states that the column was brought to a halt with
the loss of fifteen tanks, most of them in flames: the brigade reported
that the artillery had accounted for thirteen tanks and suggested
that there could be ‘no question that any enemy movement along the
road must have been seriously discouraged by the prospect of these
gutted tanks and the dead bodies of their crews.’ 6 Brigade report.
In addition, the other artillery regiments, 4 and 6 New Zealand
and Appendix to report of On I/31 Panzer Regiment.
To be so successful the artillerymen had overcome several difficulties. In the morning, when it was expected that heavy fire would be needed to cover the withdrawal, the policy had been to conserve fire, but after midday the supplies of ammunition had been increased. The dump and the four-mile stretch of road between it and the guns were often attacked from the air, but supplies had been hastened forward and gun numbers had assisted in carrying supplies from lorries to the guns.
Later in the day, when it was evident that no attack was to be
expected across the low-lying country between the road and the
coast, there were some slight changes in position. B Troop 5 Field
In the Australian sector the right flank was not threatened and
2/1 Battalion had, by the late afternoon, been withdrawn to the
main highway. West of 55 Motor Cycle Battalion had been held up in the gorge west
of II/141 Mountain
Regiment had completed a left hook across the rough country west
and south of the defences about Fifty-fifth Motor Cycle
Battalion renewed its advance and with mortar fire and subsequent
attack forced the withdrawal southwards of the forward companies
to another line at which there was the reserve company, and from
which the machine-gunners could cover the vacated territory. A
second and wider move to the west by two companies of II/141
Mountain Regiment was apparent about 6 p.m. and until dusk the
company from 2/1 Battalion about Gravia was under fire.
With these threats of encirclement and the possibility of 2/11 Battalion being in serious difficulty, Brigadier Vasey decided about 6 p.m. that the withdrawal of 19 Brigade must be advanced by half an hour: 2/1 and 2/4 Battalions and attached troops to 8 p.m. and 2/11 Battalion to 8.30 p.m.
Meanwhile the Germans were struggling to cut off the withdrawal of 2/11 Battalion. Nos. 6 and 7 Companies from 141
Mountain Regiment appeared to the south-west of No. 7 Company and
1 Company, which had been following it, were then ordered to
cut the main road by moving through the scrub and over the ridges
to Paliokhori, but by the time they reached it the Australians had
withdrawn. And away to the south 8 and 9 Companies approached
Gravia but had to halt just short of Evangelistria.
At 9 p.m. 2/11 Battalion and the company from 2/1 Battalion
had moved back to the embussing area near
The German attempt to turn the left flank of Jais Battle Group had 3 killed and 23 wounded; no casualty return for 55 MC Battalion
is available.
From the
The plan of withdrawal was for the main body to leave the lines
at 9 p.m. and march to the embussing area, a field east of One tp 102 A-Tk Regt, one tp Fd Arty, Carrier Pl
This doubt about the movements of the Ammunition Company
had been due to a misunderstanding. The Brigade Major and the
company commander, Major W. A. T. McGuire, had inspected the
collecting point east of Luftwaffe vacated
the skies at last light, when Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry successfully
moved down the road and found McGuire. By then Barrowclough
and Miles had decided that as many infantry as possible must be
taken back on the artillery vehicles; the rest would have to march.
At 9.15 p.m., however, just when they were on their way to the
control point to issue these orders, they received a message from
Gentry saying that the vehicles were arriving and that the withdrawal could take place as arranged. Apparently they had been
held up by the craters on the road and by the stream of first-line
transport withdrawing with the artillery regiments.
About 9.30 p.m. the majority of 24 Battalion embussed in the
South of the road it was more difficult to get clear. There was
still machine-gun fire from the Germans high up on the left flank
and A Company 25 Battalion had several wounded to bring out.
However, with B Company and the remnants of C Company, it
moved back through D Company, the covering company, reached
the highway and set off down the road to
At this stage two unfortunate mistakes were made. Some drivers
of C Company, in spite of warnings, carried on up the road beyond
the bridge with the intention of shortening the march for the weary
infantry. But they went forward into the lines of Appendix to report of I/31 Panzer
Regiment, whose diarist reported that ‘suddenly 4 English lorries,
completely ignorant of the situation, came round the bend. At the
sight of our tanks they jammed on their brakes and stopped a few
yards away. Our machine guns shattered their windscreens. Some
of their occupants fled into the darkness, falling over themselves
in their haste. What did our men care that the Tommies were still
all around? By the greatest of good luck they found in the lorries
canned fruit, beautiful juicy pears.’I/31 Panzer Regiment.
The carrier platoon was even more unfortunate. The orders had been to return in two carriers and the platoon truck; all other transport was to be destroyed. The three vehicles had been taken down the ridge to the highway beyond that German tank which had penetrated most deeply into the battalion lines. To reach the bridge the little group had to rush past the still blazing tank and in doing so were naturally enough mistaken for a German force. The anti-tank gunners and machine-gunners opened up so the carrier crews, thinking that the Germans held the bridge, returned the fire. All the vehicles were hit by two-pounder shells and the casualties were three killed, seven wounded—all eventually being taken prisoner of war—and one missing.
From then on there was no further trouble for 25 Battalion, and D Company, the rearguard, moved back about 10.30 p.m.
Twenty-sixth Battalion, less B Company, which had been detailed
as part of the brigade rearguard, embussed in the
The anti-tank gunners in the forward area had wrecked their guns and moved back in their own vehicles; only the guns of 33 Battery and possibly some of 31 and 32 Batteries were taken back.
The regiments of artillery had also been withdrawing. Fourth
Field Regiment was to have moved out about 7.30 p.m., but because
there were both ammunition and targets Lieutenant-Colonel
Parkinson had kept his guns firing until about 9.30 p.m. The crews
had then emptied recuperators, removed breech blocks and hastened
to their trucks, which were now in the stream of traffic moving
south. About 9.15 p.m. 5 Field Regiment had wrecked its guns,
the men then marching back to the vehicles and all being clear by
10.30 p.m. C Troop (Captain
The brigade rearguard waited until 12.15 a.m., 25 April, and then, still undisturbed, hurried after the battalions.
Some eight miles east of Div Cav, Carrier Pls Luftwaffe and
Major
To add to the excitement, about 11 p.m. a small boat was seen approaching the cape but there was no threat of a German landing. The new arrivals were a Greek and a member of 21 Battalion, who was hastily sent south in one of the passing trucks. After midnight the intervals between the convoys increased; Brigadier Barrowclough came through, and about an hour later Lieutenant-Colonel Page with his rearguard.
The engineers then began their work,
Almost all Luftwaffe. Suffering casualties and losing vehicles, they
had not reached
At that time—about midnight 24–25 April—the Germans at
I/31
Panzer Regiment had been rushed forward to relieve it. The
commander, who had received no other orders, was not eager to
risk the dangers of a night attack but Baacke, the infantry captain,
was still aggressive. He sent his companies forward and they reported
that
When the campaign was over the German commanders began
a paper war in which infantry and armour competed for the battle
honours. Baacke, the infantry captain, was awarded the Knight's
Ibid.6 Mtn Div to XVIII Corps, 5 Panzer Regiment declared that I/31 Panzer
Regiment had broken through ‘the foremost enemy gun positions
and fought the second line of guns to a standstill so that the
enemy lost many killed, wounded and PW and fled from the
position after nightfall. Not until nightfall when the fighting was
over, did the advance guard of the mountain division (cyclists)
appear and clear 5 Pz Div Comd to XXXX Corps Comd, 1/61 Anti-Aircraft Regiment
and 704 Heavy Infantry Gun Company had between them four
killed and seven wounded. Baacke Group had lost 15 killed and
48 wounded, mainly from shellfire.
ON 23 April Headquarters
The activity of the Luftwaffe over the coast of southern
On 24 April the new timetable was produced. No troops would
leave from
These changes necessitated many new orders. Sixth Brigade was
instructed that it must maintain a rearguard covering the road north
of Tatoi until 6 p.m. on 26–27 April, the night of its embarkation
from
The embarkation would be as follows:
The 24th was also notable for several other incidents and decisions. The capitulation of the Greek Army was now definite; General
Papagos resigned his command; and King George with some of his
Ministers left in a flying boat for
The explanation for this surprising statement is that when the
instructions for the evacuation of Mackay and
Even so, the closing of Headquarters Long, p. 151.
The first On the nights 22–23 and 23–24 April about 1300 base troops, British civilians and the
150 Germans captured at Three ‘Glen’ liners had been converted for use as assault landing ships; they had special
landing craft: LCT (tanks), LCA (assault personnel) and LCM (mechanised vehicles).
At Unit records often use the title CalcuttaPerth Glengyle with the landing craft. Fifth Brigade Group had already
come in from its widespread distribution area, so the transport
vehicles were then destroyed and the men covered the last two miles
under careful control from collecting area to assembly area, and
finally to the point of embarkation. With them they took small
packs, respirators, steel helmets, rifles, 100 rounds of ammunition,
groundsheets and one blanket per man. The entrenching tools
which had been brought by many had to be left behind.
Brigadier Hargest went aboard early and so impressed upon
Captain Petrie of HMS Glengyle the urgency of the embarkation
5700 is the number given in Cunningham's despatch.
The evacuation had not, unfortunately, been complete. Some 500
men had been left on the beach, about half of them from the
Supply Column, the rest from about ten other units, including 28
(Maori) Battalion, 19 Army Troops Company and 5 Field
Ambulance. The See p. 428.
Another group from 28 (Maori) Battalion had also been left on
the beach. In the withdrawal the Regimental Sergeant-Major,
Warrant Officer
From Ulster Prince had
run aground in the channel, limiting the evacuation for that night
and denying the use of the wharves to the destroyers on succeeding
nights. However, ten caiques, operated by the
To explain the presence of the New Zealand nurses it is necessary
to review the fortunes of 1 General Hospital. The majority of the
officers and staff had left for Egypt on 19 April, but thirty orderlies
were still attached to 26 British General Hospital and over fifty
nurses had been leftAba made its
hurried departure from Voyager, one of the destroyers protecting the convoy, which
reached
On 29 April the nurses left Ionic and reached
The thirty orderlies from 1 General Hospital who were attached
to
Earlier in the day, 24 April, an effort to embark from Hellas had appeared unexpectedly and, according to reports, could steam 18 knots and take
1000 passengers. As she was ready to sail after dark, loading had
begun late that afternoon. Some 500 British civilians, mostly Maltese
and Cypriots, went aboard and about 400 wounded and sick from
26 British and 2/5 Australian General Hospitals. With them was
Hellas.
About 7 p.m., when the Merchant Navy officers from vessels
sunk by enemy aircraft were deciding how to get the ship to
Staff-Sergeants Stuart, from which they were transferred to HMS
On the morning of 25 April
He afterwards wrote:
What I saw on the comparatively short drive through to GOC's report on the New Zealand Division in
In Luftwaffe was
continuing to exploit its mastery of the air. Drastic changes had
therefore to be made.
At
On the night of 25–26 April
On the night of 26–27 April, after the departure of Wilson for
The subsequent withdrawal of the New Zealand troops and those
under command would be directed ‘with all possible speed’ and in
‘approximately equal proportions’ to the beaches at
The movements of 4 and 6 Brigades were immediately adjusted
according to these changes in the plan of evacuation. From the
north, where 4 Brigade
With 6 Brigade the withdrawal was one of successive adjustments
and changes of plan. At daylight the rear of the convoy was still
north of
The battalion commanders and the Brigade Major then went
south to select positions in the canal area. The route over the hills
to
That afternoon the brigade's role was changed once again. The
battalions would hasten some 70 miles south of the canal to
The same night Advanced Headquarters New Zealand Division
moved south, going through
On the morning of 24 April
As there were several groups already in that area, among them
the New Zealanders from
For those troops who had been several days in the area, 25 April
was a difficult day. German aircraft were over in still greater
strength and in the New Zealand Convalescent Hospital group
some patients were inclined to be hysterical. However, the long-expected orders came through for embarkation, vehicles were
wrecked and at 9 p.m. the men in groups of fifty walked out to
join the British and Australian columns assembling on the two
beaches. The convoy waited half a mile off shore, boats glided in
to the beaches and the long columns slowly shuffled forward.
Nineteenth Australian Brigade Group embarked successfully from
one beach but the sick, the wounded and the miscellaneous
companies from the other beach were less fortunate. On the orders
of Brigadier Vasey all fit soldiers had been taken off first. The
worst cases of the wounded had then been moved but the breakdown
of an LCT so delayed operations that by 2.30 a.m., when the last
boat moved out, some 500 men, including the majority of the New
Zealand group, were still on the beach. As all subsequent embarkation would be from the
Using twelve vehicles, including some of 4 Light Field
Ambulance, RAMC, Captain A. N. Slater sent on some 200 of his
patients. They were over the
The walking wounded, hospital staff, dental group and base
unit personnel—some 300 all told—left about 4.30 a.m., walking
towards Staff-Sergeant J. Russell of the Mobile Dental Section and 13 others got away to the
The more advanced of the walking wounded and those who were
driving through from Capt H. C. Neale;
After the walking party had moved off that morning the medical
group under Captain Slater and the embarkation staff, under
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Marnham, had been preparing to follow it
up. But the news of the parachute landings brought in by Kirk and
also by Lieutenant
In the meantime Marnham and Captain Baker took possession of
a truck, drove north and reached Headquarters 4 Brigade about
2 p.m. After describing the situation, so far as they knew it, they
were sent back by Brigadier Puttick to investigate still further, to
collect all the troops about
At
Those who remained to leave by sea were more fortunate. Because
of a report that parachutists had landed near the beach, the caique
sailed before dark and after five days sailing from island to island
reached
Another group, Lieutenants C. A. Morton and
At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Marnham and Captain Baker
had been attempting to carry out the task allotted to them by 4
Brigade Headquarters. On their way back to
Other groups of which no record exists escaped, Two officers and 18 men, including Driver J. B. Morice of 1 Ammunition Company
and Private W. T. Phillips of the Field Security Section, left in a motor boat with no
rudder and a useless diesel engine. They were blown to Skaramanga, where the party
broke up, Morice and Phillips taking to the hills and reaching She was later awarded the George Medal.
TO defend the
That night, at the request of Brigadier Steel (CRE Sapper L. D. Mumford, 6 Field Company.
The same day, as a result of the absence of air cover, a revised
embarkation programme
The Brigadier hastened to the canal area. That night (24–25
April) when Long, p. 161.
On the same night Major Rattray had brought up to Brigadier
Puttick from Headquarters C Squadron
At 4 a.m. on 25 April Major R. K. Gordon was ordered to take
B Company 19 Battalion to the canal area. There he would command
In his instructions Gordon had not been told about this defence
system being arranged by
The platoons were on high ground about three miles north of the village and Gordon was satisfied with their positions until he was on his way back to establish headquarters near the canal. The country on either side of it was so suitable for parachute landings that he returned to his company and, in spite of the late hour, transferred two platoons to an area some 700–800 yards north of the canal.
That night, 25–26 April, several other units entered the canal
area. The Australian company which had been detached to join 4
Hussars had finally been ordered by
Sixth Field Company, whose bivouac area east of
Finally, about 2.30 a.m. on 26 April, C Squadron New Zealand
Now, on 24 April Marshal List had decided that the narrowness
of the front and the state of the roads made it necessary for
General Stumme (XXXX Corps) to control the advance, with
XVIII Corps under command. He had to break through to
To accomplish the latter objective it was decided to use the
parachute troops which had originally been assembled to take the
island of Lemnos. The occupation of Lemnos had been part of the move of Lustre Force to 164 Division, transported on a German steamer, Greek fishing
craft and two Italian destroyers.Parachute Regiment 2 (Colonel Sturm), using five groups of Ju52s
and
The Luftwaffe had hitherto been content to bomb
The reason for the explosion is still a mystery. Sapper
But there are other possibilities. Two British officers—Lieutenant
J. T. Tyson, ‘The Events at the Wilson, p. 98: ‘The possibility of this method of setting off the charge has been disputed
but on the advice of experts I gave the officers a M.C.’
Such an explosion was possible, for early in the campaign curious
engineers had placed some TNT in a bank and found that it could
be exploded by rifle fire. But several who worked on the bridge
think that the only explosive strapped in packets on the outside of
the girders was wet gun-cotton, which could not be exploded by
rifle fire. ‘I am very sorry that the story of the Sapper officer blowing up the bridge by firing at
the charges is untrue, but it never seemed likely to me!!’—Latham to H. E. Smith,
The Germans, however, make no reference to any spectacular rush to light the fuse; in fact one account states that British resistance had ‘decreased almost to the vanishing point’, and another that a war correspondent was actually standing on the bridge ‘making a film for the weekly newsreel.’ Moreover, their signals sent back during the action give three different explanations for the explosion. The first, which was despatched at 9.45 a.m., stated that the bridge was blown; others stated that it was blown by a remotely controlled or delayed charge; and finally at 11.20 a.m. Colonel Meister signalled, ‘Bridge over canal not blown but destroyed by shellfire.’
Those who had been ordered to capture the bridge intact were
very disappointed and exceedingly curious, and after the fighting was
over any captured officer who might have some information was
carefully cross-examined. Lieutenant Heiford was even asked if
there had been a line from the bridge to his position over four
miles away. The opinion of senior German officers after the war
was that, ‘The bridge itself was blown up, not however by blasting
by the British according to plan but by a mere accident. The
parachute officer commissioned to remove the explosive charges
Supplement to the essay, ‘The Balkan Campaign’, by prisoners of war in Allendorf Camp,
The two platoons of B Company 19 Battalion in the shelter of
the olive groves had not apparently been observed by the enemy,
for Gordon had time to organise an attack in support of the
Australians. But the small force was soon driven to ground and
facing counter-attacks on both flanks. The bridge had been
demolished by that time so Gordon decided that the platoons,
already short of ammunition, must attempt to join 4 Brigade at
4 Brigade embarked from
The third platoon from B Company in the Loutraki area had seen
the paratroopers come down but was too far away to take any part
in the action. After midday Greeks warned Lieutenant Heiford that
the enemy was in the village and at dusk the platoon hastened to
the coast, capturing on the way a drunken paratroop officer who was
using a captured motor-cycle. But by the time they had found two
rowing boats it was too late to cross the Gulf of
Units on the south bank had more chances to escape. The
Australian company was outside the area in which the paratroops
landed, but ‘before long paratroops supported by machine-gun fire
were advancing towards its position.’ Long, p. 167.
Headquarters
The advance parties from 4 Brigade were less fortunate. The
brigade intelligence officer got away with two men, met A Company
26 Battalion and reported to See p. 424.
Sixth Field Company (less the section at the bridge and the two
sub-sections on the Chapman arrived in
Kelsall and some fifteen other ranks crawled through the low
vines, came unexpectedly upon a farmhouse occupied by Germans
and then scattered. Kelsall and another sapper escaped, joined two
Australians and two English soldiers from the anti-aircraft batteries
and with them went over the hills hoping to reach See p. 441, note 3. German reports state that ‘19 Officers and 105 English OR’ were captured.
Other men of 6 Field Company were more fortunate. Sapper
The only other New Zealand units in the See p. 429.
The Germans were not able to interfere with this operation nor
had they captured the bridge intact, but they had split the British
Thus it was natural that in all German reports the action was
described as yet another triumph. At the cost of only one or two
aircraft, 63 killed, 158 wounded and 16 missing, they had captured
the canal area; the Allied casualties were not stated but the Germans
claimed to have 921 British and 1450 Greek prisoners of war. Later
they argued that the attack had been excellent training for the
airborne troops who were soon to make the landing on
More important, however, was the Germans' failure to appreciate
the strength of the force now isolated on the ridges south of
The security of 4 Brigade and the successful embarkation that
night of the units assembled about 6 Brigade to Lt-Col Page, 26 April.
Soon afterwards the first stragglers came through from
A and D Companies 26 Battalion had already moved off to assist
the troops in the canal area ‘to retain possession of the bridge’. 6 Brigade to Lt-Col Page, 26 April.
The troops were eventually forced by enemy aircraft to take cover
just north of Golomos, a village five miles south of
The problem was solved for them by the appearance of Lieutenant
After further delays due to air attacks and damaged transport the
companies moved south, assisting wherever possible the British and
Australian stragglers
The rest of the battalion had moved forward during the afternoon
to Ano Fikhtia, a village about 20 miles north of
The day had also been very tense and exciting for the Divisional
Headquarters staff at
Operation Priority. Send LO and tell Puttick that
To the intense relief of
Wilson and The source of this statement is the Division's ‘G’ Branch war diary; it probably refers
to the troops to be evacuated that night from
The withdrawal of
Other units were more fortunate. After suffering some casualties
from air attacks 24 Battalion had moved south that afternoon,
26 April, to the
There had been more strafing en route but the widely dispersed
trucks and efficient lookouts had prevented any serious damage.
The only mishap was the loss of one and a half platoons from
At nightfall, 26–27 April, the main withdrawal began,
Headquarters 6 Brigade followed about midnight to the high
country east of
The night was also notable for the number of successful
embarkations. At Havock arrived and in her
the party hastened down the coast, enemy air superiority making it
essential to reach the port before daylight. Outside the port they
unexpectedly came upon the ten LCAs
See p. 428.
At
On the coast east of Glengyle arrived off shore with the destroyers
Owing to the heavy swell the Glengyle had to remain a mile and
a half out to sea; this meant that if the convoy was to sail at 3 a.m.
the last boat had to leave the beach by 2.15 a.m. The result was
that, although men
3503 all ranks—according to naval reports.
There were 800 of 1 Armoured Brigade, 250 of
At 4720 all ranks—according to naval reports.Salween, the cruiser
Carlisle and the destroyers
The night was also notable for the reappearance of the 500 men See p. 403.Salween, but the others eventually
got aboard the Carlisle. In the meantime the destroyer
The convoy sailed at 3 a.m., 27 April; the destination of the troops was to be decided later that night.
In the They were practically the only means of embarkation from Glenearn was to have gone to Stuart to assist the ships already at
At Ulster Prince made it impossible
for the destroyers to get alongside the quays and the choppy sea
made it dangerous to use small boats; in fact one report has it that
100 men were drowned. And there was only one motor caique
transporting men to the
To complicate matters word was received during the embarkation
that the Stuart at
Long, p. 170.
The cruisers, destroyers and the troopship Slamat took away from
Ibid., p. 171.
The LCT which had been operating at See p. 444.
The troops evacuated had been for the most part from Base and
See p. 451. See p. 404. See p. 405.
At Dilwarra, City of
London and
Next morning all three convoys were still within range of German
aircraft. The ships from Slamat was exposed to too great a risk. At 7 a.m.
bombers came over; the transport was hit and began to sink. The
destroyer
By then the convoys were approaching Glengyle, Salween, Khedive Ismail,
Dilwarra, City of London and
The result was that by 29 April the New Zealand Artillery group
was divided: 6 Field Regiment and the greater part of 7 Anti-Tank
Regiment had reached Glengyle but 4 and 5 Field
Regiments were hopelessly dispersed, some men having arrived in
the
The last embarkation of any importance that night was not
arranged by the
AT 2.30 a.m. on 25 April the advanced guard of the German
forces had entered Baacke Group
hastened along the coast road, reaching
Next day, 26 April, there were clear-cut orders from General
Stumme. Commander of XXXX Corps and, temporarily, of XVIII Corps. See p. 417.Fifth Panzer Division was to advance beyond XVIII
Corps were to occupy the country north of SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division
were to advance to the Gulf of
The forward elements of From I/31 Panzer Regiment, a unit of XXXX
Corps, thereupon advanced beyond I/31 Panzer Regiment turned eastwards along the
8 Reconnaissance Unit and the
motor-cycle platoon of 47 Anti-Tank Unit,6 Mountain Division.2 Motor Cycle Battalion and elements of 8/800
Brandenburg Regiment. After landing on the northern shores of
Euboea they had moved south to XVIII Corps had disregarded
its orders
The main rearguard for See p. 376.
From the ridges above the village of
The chances of immediate encirclement were not great. By
following the road through
To hold the pass there was 4 Brigade Group, a mixed force, with the Australians providing, in addition to artillery and anti-tank guns, 2/8 Field Company, 2/1 Field Ambulance and twelve men from the Australian Corps Signals. Eighteenth Battalion on the right flank and 20 Battalion on the left flank, each with a two-mile front and each supported by machine-gunners from D Company 2/1 Australian Machine Gun Battalion, formed the line, with 19 Battalion in reserve. The Bren carriers from 20 Battalion patrolled beyond the left flank while the carriers from the other battalions, with two platoons from 1 Machine Gun Company, were detailed to resist parachute attacks or encircling movements about either flank. In support of each forward battalion there was a battery from 2/3 Australian Field Regiment, with the most advanced troop in a good position for anti-tank defence. The seven two-pounders of 3 Australian Anti-Tank Battery covered all entrances to the position and seven Bredas from 106 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, Royal Artillery, were well forward, four covering the gun positions and three in a dual anti-tank and anti-aircraft role.
All units were in position by the morning of 24 April and every
effort was made to prevent the enemy discovering the presence of
such a large force. In daylight the majority of the troops were to
the rear of the forward slopes, under cover but ready to move at
short notice; after dark they occupied the forward slopes and
patrolled actively. Strong formations of enemy aircraft passed over
the area on several occasions to and from the
That night 6 New Zealand and 19 Australian Brigades and Clifton
Force, the rearguard, came through from the
In the afternoon Brigadier Puttick had been ordered See p. 406.
On 26 April, after the screening detachments had moved out on
the flanks, the troops patiently prepared for another day of
concealment. After 7 a.m., however, there were explosions in
Thereafter the Germans made no effort to force the pass. Some
artillery came forward to engage 2/3 Field Regiment but the shelling
was neither heavy nor systematic. The Australians, on the other
hand, continued to be aggressive, firing freely at any Germans
probing south from
In other ways, however, the enemy had been very active. His
army intelligence authorities were now certain that at least two
New Zealand battalions with strong artillery support were holding
the area. Reconnaissance aircraft had been taking off from a landing
ground near
The other and more important problem for Brigadier Puttick had
been the activity of the Luftwaffe about
See p. 410.
About 6 p.m. more information was received. Paratroops had
definitely landed, and to confirm that fact Marnham and Baker
returned after being captured by and then escaping See p. 411.
Action was taken immediately. Marnham and Baker were sent
with four carriers along the
The withdrawal began at 9 p.m. and proceeded very smoothly,
with no stragglers and no interference from the enemy. The men
came in past the check point, marched to the transport area and
climbed aboard the vehicles of B Section 4 RMT Company. The
convoy, with lights on, raced back through
Thereafter the withdrawal towards See p. 428.
At daylight on 27 April the brigade group was under cover of
the olive trees which flourish on the small plain to the north-west
of
The change of embarkation beach only two and a half hours
before the withdrawal commenced and the possibility of evacuation
that night, 26–27 April, had prevented the preparation of any
defence scheme. The embarkation staff, thinking of concealment
and ease of embarkation, had dispersed the battalions along some
15 miles of road in no tactical formation whatsoever. As the
The brigade would go into position east of
About 9 a.m. the Brigadier, disregarding the policy of concealment hitherto in force, ordered the immediate occupation of these
positions. The troops had enjoyed a quiet breakfast, but the pleasant
Sunday morning with the Greeks preparing for devotions or offering
their simple hospitality now became one of intense activity. All went
smoothly until about 11 a.m., when some twenty aircraft made a
sudden and very destructive attack. Machine-gun fire exploded a
25-pound shell, which in its turn produced other explosions until
trucks, fields and pine plantations were ablaze. ‘Nine guns of the
2/3rd [Field Regiment] or the anti-tank battery attached to it were
destroyed, and six artillerymen … killed ….’ Long, p. 176.
The reconnaissance units of XVIII and XXXX Corps had meanwhile been hastening southwards. At a demolition south of Malakasa
they were held up until it was partially repaired, but the motorcyclists had then, very unsportingly, raced ahead, leaving the
armoured car groups to complete the task. The motor-cycle platoon
of 47 Anti-Tank Unit and elements of 8/800 Brandenburg Regiment
entered 5 Panzer Division was still protesting that the work
of his unit had been disregarded. As it was, the armoured car group
had arrived shortly after the motor-cyclists and the city had been
officially surrendered to its commander. The leading elements of
That afternoon, 27 April, 12 Army issued further orders and
cleared the situation:
The day was therefore notable for the occupation of Fifth Panzer Division reached
III Battalion SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division crossed the Gulf of
5 Panzer Division alread
established.
Second Motor Cycle Battalion, the German force detailed to
occupy Lavrion, left XXXX Corps for a Stuka attack
and ordered his own troops not to advance east of the village.
Fortunately for 4 Brigade it was then too late for this attack to
be arranged and too late when the adjutant returned for the battalion
to move forward. The brigade group was therefore able to make
its undisturbed withdrawal, a German patrol reporting next morning
that all the British troops had gone.
As seen by the men of 4 Brigade, the engagement was naturally
more tense and more dramatic. About 3.30 p.m. the long German
column had come into sight, armoured fighting vehicles had
approached the village and the artillery with 4 Brigade had opened
up. Some reports say that the guns and mortars dealt with the
Germans only when they emerged from the village; other observers
saw ‘shell after shell land ámong the homes of the peaceful friendly
folk of D. W. Sinclair, 19 Battalion and Armoured Regiment, p. 100.
At last when the light had faded the final stage of the withdrawal
began. The field guns were wrecked about 8.45 p.m., the anti-aircraft
guns thereafter covering the road from Ajax and the destroyers
With this group were six very fortunate soldiers who had gone to Nubian had left. The
following afternoon, however, two caiques had appeared, on one of which there were
some fifteen New Zealand sappers and a naval crew disguised as Greeks. In it they were
taken off and eventually transferred to the destroyer
The group at
The information was taken across to Puttick's headquarters,
probably by Major Oakes Maj T. H. E. Oakes, 2 i/c 7 NZ Anti-Tank Regiment, had arrived after a difficult journey
during which he lost his vehicle. Other reports state that officers from HQ 1 Armoured
Brigade made similar journeys. Havock to be diverted to that port and Oakes
returned to warn the group of the change of plans.
Brigadier Charrington and about 600 men had in the meantime
set out after dark to march the 15 miles to There were others who had more exhausting and more romantic escapes. Two parties,
each of twelve men, under Lieutenant D. B. Patterson and Second-Lieutenant A. F.
Harding respectively, set out on the march to Ajax
about 2.30 a.m. Her crew could give no assistance, but it was suggested that the
On 27 April, when 4 Brigade was waiting to embark from Porto
Rafti, 6 Brigade was in the
About midday the companies were strung out along the highway
and enemy aircraft were soon active. However, a working party
went ahead to fill in bomb craters, orders about dispersal were
strictly enforced and the Divisional Supply Column drivers maintained a high average speed, driving south-east across the plain and
over the mountains to the
The withdrawal that night of 24 and 25 Battalions was not
delayed by the approach of any German force. The Divisional
Supply Column moved forward up the narrow, winding one-way
road to the defences on the northern hills. After turning round at
the crest of the pass—no other suitable point could be found—
the Column collected 25 Battalion and hastened south through
For other units in
In the The confusion which developed in the 5 Panzer
Division. Even so, many parties escaped, some finding boats along the beach, others
hastening south until they found seaworthy caiques. Among them were Lieutenant
Staveley and the eight men from 4 Field Regiment who had already escaped by caique
from
At See p. 446.
Farther south at See p. 451.
The following day, 28 April, 6 Brigade remained in its dispersal
area between the villages of Sikea and
Another problem was that of defence should the Germans come
through from the
With these slight resources the brigade group prepared to cover
its embarkation on the night of 28–29 April. Using the depth-charges, the engineers demolished a bridge some 16 miles out from
Major M. De R. Petrie;
The scenery which the majority of the brigade did not see to
appreciate when they embarked that night was magnificent.
The chief anxiety of the day for
The arrangements for embarkation were most carefully prepared
by Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry and other members of the divisional
staff and once darkness fell the move to the beaches began. Fourth
About 9 p.m. the first troops arrived and looked anxiously for
the ships. ‘I feel sure that those last hours of waiting on the beach
were the most anxious that we had had.’ GOC's report.
The embarkation which began at 11.50 p.m. was mainly from
the two piers and the causeway connecting Ajax and the destroyers
Cunningham's despatch, Enclosure I, para. 47.
The only delay was in the embarkation of the wounded. They
had been sent off first, but the boats had returned with them because
only destroyers were then in the bay and they could not accommodate wounded men. The Ajax which had yet to appear would
take them all. In the meantime they had to remain on the pier
with the anxious controlling staff regretting the delay. However,
as more ships and landing craft drew in the speed of embarkation
increased. The
The same night the destroyers Auckland, Salvia and
The troops of these two convoys were not landed in Ajax were immediately transferred to the
ON 28 April there had been two German forces moving south
into the III Battalion SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division
from Patrai and 5 Panzer Division from
No unit records describing the movements of 5 Panzer Division
on 28 April are now available but one brief report
Appendix 118 to XXXX Corps diary,
See p. 444.
Among them there were many New Zealanders. At 7.10 p.m. on
25 April the hastily organised Reinforcement Battalion had left
Luftwaffe was not operating at night so, although
there were the abandoned trucks on the cliff road beyond
At this stage the evacuation plans had been changed;
From this junction town 6 Brigade, when its turn came, was to
withdraw south-east to
In the town itself there were other detachments of New
Zealanders. Lieutenants
In addition there were many New Zealanders who had, in the
general confusion of the withdrawal, lost contact with their units.
Some had moved south with the hospital cases after the bombing
of the Hellas in
As yet there had been no official embarkation from this port,
but the See p. 446 for their evacuation, together with the groups which had reached there from
the port of
The military units directed south by Army Movement Control
had been collecting in the olive groves all through 25 and 26 April
and now, under the command of Brigadier L. P. Parrington, MC,
there were about 16,000 men:
That night, 26–27 April, 8000 of them, including the majority of
the Australians, were evacuated in the transports Dilwarra, City of
London and
Left behind were 8000 men, mostly from base units except for
380 Australians under Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. F. Harlock, 50
men from 3 Royal Tank Regiment who had been manning Royal
Air Force trucks and helping stragglers to the beaches south of
After dark on 27 April the groups were on the move, the Reinforcement Battalion taking its vehicles through the town to the
assembly area near the junction of the Beach road and that lane
from the north which the authorities called the Link road. Link road ran north-south and connected the
The patient columns waited until midnight, when they were told that there would be no embarkation. Many of the men returned to their unit areas, but those who had wrecked their trucks and those who were weary because of long journeys and the strain of air raids took refuge in the nearby olive groves. The majority of the Reinforcement Battalion seem to have returned to their area beside the road and to the north of the town.
The next day, 28 April, saw more air raids and more casualties,
until by nightfall there were 200 military wounded in the Greek
hospital. The rumours of the parachute landings about the
The plan was never put into operation. The outer screen of 4
Hussars had already been overwhelmed by the advanced guard of
5 Panzer Division, which was now hurrying south from the canal
area. No warning could be given to the New Zealand Reinforcement
Battalion; in any case, the majority of that unit had already moved
into
Just how much time they had to establish themselves before darkness came down it is now impossible to estimate. The important fact was that there had been no serious opposition. The majority of the Allied troops were already to the east of the town; the rest were drifting along the tracks and side roads to the assembly areas. There had certainly been some intermittent rifle fire, but that had been common enough during the day and caused no inquiry. The result was that still more men were surprised and captured.
The greatest misfortune of all was the capture of Captain Clark-
Hall, who, with his signalman, had been about to go down to the
waterfront. Thereafter the difficulty of communicating with the
Two New Zealand officers, Lieutenant
The Germans had by then realised that they were in great danger. They questioned prisoners about the arrival of the convoy; they wanted to know how many men were at the other end of the waterfront and when there were signs of a counter-attack they became very disturbed. The prisoners were then marched back towards the town, across the bridge and along the highway to the waiting vehicles of the main body.
While this was taking place, the arrival of the enemy force had become known to the thousands assembled in the olive groves.
When the first reports reached the different headquarters the
senior officers had been inclined to doubt the nerve of their
informants. But a liaison officer ordered back to
The next stage of the action cannot be told in exact detail but the first serious opposition seems to have come from Major B. Carey, 3 Royal Tank Regiment, who with Major Pemberton, Royal Signals, had been walking towards the harbour when excited men had rushed back along the waterfront. Pemberton went back to warn Brigadier Parrington. Carey, collecting a Bren gun, spent the next two hours on the seaward side of the Beach road firing at the German guns on the quay and encouraging those among the Allied soldiers who wished to fight.
About the same time Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. E. Geddes, Royal
The small Australian force, though short of weapons, was equally active. Lieutenant-Colonel Harlock organised parties while Captain A. W. Gray sent one platoon with the New Zealand groups and led another along the waterfront.
The other source of resistance—probably the major one—was the
New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion, whose headquarters had
been established by Major MacDuff at the junction of the Link and
Beach roads. Before the fighting actually started, Lieutenants O'Rorke Lt F. O'Rorke; born England,
Meanwhile O'Rorke and Rhind, when moving towards the centre of the town, had heard bursts of fire and seen Germans in the area to the west where A Company was to have been placed. They had returned to the road junction, collected about twenty New Zealanders and Australians, and moved towards the enemy, Rhind along the waterfront, O'Rorke one street inland.
By then the light was fading and there was hopeless confusion
in the thickly packed olive groves. If a soldier wished to fight he
could do so—if he hesitated it was simple enough to remain among
the excited thousands. Nevertheless, through the efforts of Geddes,
Harlock and MacDuff, several parties had already moved off or
were about to do so. The officers and men did not always know
each other so it is impossible to record the names of many who
took part in the actual fighting. But it is known that from this area
patrols went in led by Lieutenants Canavan, Capt W. A. O'N. Canavan, m.i.d.; born Capt J. A. O'L. Fay;
Ahead of these parties, however, was another collected and led
by Sergeant
At this stage there seems to have been a pause in the advance.
The parties organised by MacDuff were coming in from the side
streets to give their support but the scene was incredibly confusing.
All was dark except for the streams of tracer bullets and the sudden
clarity after a flare went up; mortar bombs were exploding; stray
Germans hidden in the doorways opened fire, wounding several men,
including O'Rorke and Sergeant
Meanwhile Rhind, with the supporting fire from Carey's group
along the Beach road, had led his party from block to block
along the waterfront until it met those coming in from the side
streets. They were reorganising when ‘a truck went up the road
towards the German positions, loaded with N.Z. and Australian
troops.’ Information from Captain Rhind to D. J. C. Pringle (co-author 20 Battalion history);
Major F. B. Topham; notes from Gourlick, Lewis, Snooks and Turner.
This truck, driven by Sapper
Thereafter the fighting was along the waterfront, from one block
of buildings to another, the Germans withdrawing and leaving to
the British the RAP set up by their captive, Major Thomson. Hinton,
Jones and other members of the advance parties were wounded but
reserves were hastening forward from the olive groves. They may
have approached according to plan for Captain G. A. F. Kennard This officer, who had been captured outside the town, had ‘filed off’ when the fighting
began and taken cover until he met a New Zealand officer, with whom he ‘doubled
back’ to MacDuff's headquarters.
No account of the initial stages of the surrender was prepared
by the British. Members of the different groups very often did
not know each other and within a few hours they themselves were
to be taken prisoners of war. In a German propaganda publicationFrom Serbia to Crete, translated by the
According to him one of the British had called upon the Germans
to surrender. A lieutenant had replied, ‘Fire stopping—finished’,
and had then been sent over with instructions not to surrender but
to make a parley: ‘We haven't a shot left. Gain time.’ He had been
forced to call over his company commander, but the ‘Australians’
had threatened to shoot both Germans ‘unless within five minutes
all encircled in the harbour laid down their arms.’ At this stage
an ‘English Colonel’ Just who this was it is now impossible to say.
Their casualties had been heavy, particularly about the more
forward of the two heavy guns and in one of the side streets where
‘somebody must have caught them with a bren.’ It has not been possible to find out who was responsible for these casualties. Major Thomson.
The chances of evacuation now seemed to be good. Barriers were
erected to control the roads, parties were detailed to hold them and
efforts were made to signal the
The cruisers Perth and
Captain Sir Philip Bowyer-Smith, RN.
Troops collecting on beach south-east of town. All firing ceased in town. Consider evacuation possible from beach. Brigadier is reporting.
By then Bowyer-Smith, acting on the earlier signals and observing
fires and explosions ashore, had at 9.29 p.m. abandoned the operation and was moving south with all ships except the Hero. He did
not alter his decision.
As the Hero had only two whalers the chances of embarkation
were very limited. But the naval authorities in Kandahar, Kingston and
The Brigadier then had the unpleasant task of calling his senior
officers together and informing them of their hopeless situation.
Any further resistance was considered impossible and unnecessary.
Calls were made for any officer who could speak German and
Captain Kennard was sent back with his German officer to say that
the force would surrender before daybreak. Next morning swastikas
were spread out on the beaches as a warning to the Luftwaffe to
cease its bombing; the troops were assembled by the now exultant
Germans; and for several days trainloads of prisoners were taken
north to
The only official German report of the action, the propaganda
publication already quoted, gives few details: there had been a
‘violent engagement’ and 7000 British troops had surrendered.
According to this booklet, one company from 5 Panzer Division
had approached
On the waterfront two machine guns and three PAK gunsPanzerabwehrkanone: anti-tank gun.
The enemy prisoners were marched back to the beach where
British officers ‘wrapped in their greatcoats’ were waiting for the
expected convoy. It did not appear, and about 4 a.m. on 29 April
a British officer asked the captured company commander to take
him as envoy to the highest-ranking German officer outside the
town. So back they went to the battalion commander and the 450
men who were ‘waiting with unspeakable impatience for the dawn.’
The surrender was soon negotiated, the Luftwaffe was warned not
to bomb the area and at dawn the British became prisoners of war.
Nevertheless, many officers and men had already escaped or were
attempting to escape. Some RAF personnel had already been evacuated from Special Duties, pp. 95–105. After the
surrender of the main body many British officers and men rushed off by truck or on
foot towards this village or the nearby coast, from which on succeeding nights some were
collected by the
Second-Lieutenant J. Rose and nine other ranks, including ‘the skipper [Sgt C. West,
The boat which failed to cross the bay on the first night had
finished up some ten miles down the coast from
The rear party of the
Other parties did their best to escape from the town itself after
Brigadier Parrington announced that they would not be taken off
by the Sergeant A. V. D. Flett and Private D. W. Donald of 24 Battalion were at large in
Those who found small boats were usually more successful. Private Isis.
The more fortunate groups were able to find seaworthy vessels.
Sergeant R. M. Burdon, 24 Battalion, p. 48.
Another caique was taken out by the men See p. 450.
The Isis, Hero
and
Thereafter, until the airborne attack on 20 May, small parties
made their way to War diary of ADDS, NZ Dental Corps,
THE month of May was notable for movements to and from
Egypt. On 2 May 6 Brigade Group returned from
At the same time there was movement away from Egypt. The
Dunera.
The other New Zealanders in Egypt were the railway construction
and operating units that had been withdrawn in February from the
In this work 10 Company did not take a very active part; it
suffered from a most exasperating series of orders and counter-orders about service in For a time 2 Australian Railway Construction Company came under the command of
Group Headquarters so far as work was concerned.
Thirteenth Railway Construction Company had a much less disturbed existence. There had been no suggestion that the company
should go to
There were equally few changes for the railway operating companies. Sixteenth Company spent February and March controlling
the line to
But there were several small detachments that travelled a very
long way from the Canal Zone. In February 1 officer and 72 other
ranks were selected from the two operating companies for work
at
Some detachments travelled 2400 miles to
The other detachment, 1 officer and 49 other ranks, came from
10 Railway Construction Company. They left the Canal Zone on
6 March to travel the same long route by railway, steamer, and
motor lorry to
Still more interesting was the work of another detachment selected
from 16 Railway Operating Company for duties at
The detachment left
The same week a small detachment, Sergeant Rinaldi 2 Lt J. R. Rinaldi;
This peacetime regularity lasted only a few weeks. The German
High Command had already decided that the crumbling Italian
defences in North Africa must be buttressed by the Afrika Korps
and screened by the
Rommel made the first move on 31 March when he crossed the
border at
The only centre of resistance in their rear was
In the retreat across
The Derna detachment, with orders to stay so long as there
were vehicles requiring petrol, watched the main stream of vehicles
go east and then destroyed all the remaining petrol. After that it was
every man for himself. In their case they kept together, hitch-hiking
their way back to the units in
About the same time a small detachment from 21 Mechanical
Equipment Company was moving in the other direction. It was
being hurried out from Egypt to Afrika Korps. The machines were
hurriedly assembled and handed over to an Australian unit for the
excavation of tank traps about the perimeter. The New Zealanders
then waited for a ship to
The largest detachment of New Zealanders in the
In this work New Zealanders operated four tugs that brought in
the lighters; others unloaded these stores or were concerned with
the transportation of the wounded from the shore to the hospital
ships. One man was killed in April but otherwise they were very
fortunate. The only available diary kept by anyone in the unit is
very brief but its plain matter-of-fact entries become very impressive. The tugs had to race out to pick up the survivors from
sunken ships; a blazing oil tanker had to be towed to a disused jetty;
lighters were towed alongside the wreckage of sunken ships to
escape observation during an air raid; inland, German dive-bombers
could on occasion be seen peeling off to attack gun positions. And
so the saga went on until June, when the writer with other railwaymen was recalled to
To the east of
Nevertheless on 10 April, when the situation was even more threatening—Documents, Vol. I, pp. 264–5, 267.
The same April crisis brought back into the
The newcomers to the desert were 18 Army Troops Company,
which had arrived in Egypt with the third section of the 4th Reinforcements. Within a few days of its arrival the company was
warned that it was to be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the desert water supply. In mid-April the company left
There were two men on each ship manning the anti-aircraft guns and attending to the
ship-to-shore connections. The Eocene was sunk outside Myriel carried on
and the detached engineers served on her for over two years.Myriel and
Eocene that ran between
Thus, by the end of
THE weakness On
But there were, during the campaign itself, many unexpected
problems. The Greeks had been unwilling to have their roads, ports
and railway facilities wrecked beyond repair. Of the demolitions
effected, those in the SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division, when it crossed to 5 Panzer Division,
using the undamaged highway south of
See p. 453.
Immediately after the campaign the results of this policy were
still more evident. In the preparations for the attack upon Luftwaffe, but divers with special equipment
Just as important was the failure to demolish See Special Service in Greece (Episodes and Studies series),
Despite the lessons of the campaign in Luftwaffe but its
difficulties had been accentuated by the inability of the Greeks to
provide more airfields. Limited in number, they had been so vulnerable that losses on the ground had been serious. Wireless communications had been another problem: staffs had not always been
thoroughly trained; the wireless silence before operations had
prevented the checking of faults; and the great mountain ranges
had interfered with reception.
The actual fighting had, however, brought out much that was
satisfactory, ‘Notes on English Methods of Fighting’, by 2 Panzer Division.
The Germans did suggest that their own policy of counter-attacks,
if applied by the British, would have seriously disorganised the
long strung-out panzer divisions. But the withdrawal, which was
based upon an intricate timetable, did not allow for such variations
The division of the Force into brigade groups and their evacuation
from widely separated beaches has been criticised. Some would have
preferred the creation of a defensive screen behind which the
embarkation could, possibly, have been better controlled and more
complete. By such methods the evacuation from One feature is common to both evacuations: the pessimistic statements by the senior
officers.
So far as Admiral Cunningham's Despatch, Transportation of the Army to Greece and Evacuation of
the Army from Greece, . (Supplement to
Lack of air cover was another reason for the choice of several
evacuation points. To avoid the concentrated efforts of the Luftwaffe
the
See p. 430.
The other problem of the evacuation was the bottleneck likely to arise from a shortage of small craft for ferrying men from the beaches to the ships. Caiques, motor-boats and local craft were used, but the last named could not be relied upon unless commanded by British officers, and they were not always available. The situation was saved by the presence of the ‘Glen’ ships with their special landing craft, without which it would have been impossible, in the time available, to evacuate so large a force.
The really serious weakness in the overall plan was the early
closing of Long, p. 151.
The despatch of the expedition to
In Australia the question of the AIF operating outside the
In the Long, p. 553. Had See p. 52.The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914–1919 (ed. Robert Blake),
The two generals were in a difficult position. In one sense they
were subordinate commanders who were not expected to air their
opinions about the major strategy of the war, but they were
also independent commanders responsible to governments which
were quite determined to make their own decisions. So far as
After the campaign Mr Fraser, who was then in Fraser to acting Prime Minister,
This was the only occasion in the six years of the war when there
was any such misunderstanding between the Government and
With General Blamey it was much the same. On 18 February,
when he received his first warning of the move to See p. 99.
There was also the constitutional side to the problem. On 11
March Mr Fadden, acting Prime Minister in Fadden to PM NZ,
Nevertheless, the campaign had made it clear to the Dominions
that the problems of Commonwealth relations were not always
understood by the British Government or by the Higher Command
in the As the questions, and the answers to them, are of some constitutional importance, they
are reproduced as Appendix III to this volume.Documents, Vol. II, p. 127.
There is, however, another aspect of the problem which must
be recognised. In war unity of command is essential and Dominion
commanders with special powers could possibly be as selfish and
unimaginative as the Dutch deputies who almost wrecked the plans
of
The decision to send the Imperial force to ‘The British Expedition to Army Quarterly,
Cunningham, pp. 310–11.
On the other hand, it is difficult to accept his statement that the
service chiefs recognised the dangers of the Greek expedition but
thought that there was a reasonable chance of defending Despatch covering period 7 February to 15 July 1941.
Some authorities have been more downright. Papagos believed
that ‘For Greece to be crushed without a single British officer striking
a blow in her defence would have meant a flagrant breach of the
promises so repeatedly given. Such a defection might well have
provoked an outcry against the British Government on the part of
the British people and Press. Also it would certainly have had an
unfortunate effect on American public opinion ….’ But he still
thought that the movement of General Alexandros Papagos, The Battle of Greece, 1940–41,
Cyril Falls, The Second World War, p. 91.
Long, p. 193.
Lt-Gen Sir Giffard Martel, Our Armoured Forces, p. 93.
See Churchill's cable, p. 99.
Playing with Strife, p. 268.
Sir Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 248.
To Mr Churchill the less tactful, more outspoken experts were
‘officers occupying subordinate positions’ and not possessing ‘the
knowledge to consider sufficiently what … the opposite policy’ Churchill, Vol III, pp. 26–7. The opinion of certain officers is given in B. H. Liddell
Hart, The Other Side of the Hill.
The extra 200 miles from
Criticism has also been made of naval policy at this critical period.
On 21 April, just before the evacuation of Churchill, Vol. III, p. 215.
This being the case, it is easy to understand why Wavell thought
that the final reasons for the Greek campaign were political and
psychological. It also explains the advice given by Dill to General
Auchinleck on J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II (September 1939–June 1941), p. 531,
If studied from this angle the expedition to
In any case, democracies do not always act on purely military
considerations, otherwise they would not be democracies. Hence
the statement by Admiral Cunningham: ‘we had encouraged the
Greeks in their resistance to the Italians, and it seemed all wrong
to desert them now.’ Cunningham, p. 320.
Another factor of political importance was the strategic situation
in the spring of Churchill, Vol. III, p. 111.
But this was not sufficient, for the great majority of the American
people, though sympathetic towards Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 282. On 8 December, the day after the bombing of Pearl
Harbour, Churchill was no longer cautious. ‘Oh, that is the way we talked to her while
we were wooing her; now that she is in the harem, we talk to her quite differently.’
See p. 112 for references to
The desperate isolation of
All the same, it was a distinctly intricate mosaic and the chances
of its arrangement according to the British pattern were not very
great. The best that could be done was to prevent Churchill, Vol. III, p. 148. Restricted independence was maintained until the German
occupation in coup d'état and refused to become a German
satellite,
The reaction of
In any case, it was not what Stalin thought of Barbarossa; the origins and development of Churchill, Vol. III, p. 318. In Churchill, Vol. III, pp. 319–20.coup d'état in coup seem to reveal magnitude
of design both towards south-east and east. This is the clearest
indication we have had so far. Let me know in guarded terms
whether you and Dill agree with my impressions.’
The wording of this message suggests that Russo-German enmity was definitely one of the ‘broad political considerations’ for which risks had to be taken.
This must not be forgotten, for the expedition, quite apart from
the battle casualties, was most costly. After making every effort
to build up supply bases for a long campaign the British brought
Diamond and Wryneck; the transports
The evacuation of the Force from House of Commons Debates, 6 and 7 May 1941.
His reward came long afterwards when it was learnt that the
aggressive policy of the Government had made it impossible for
Halder's Diary.
Their refusal to permit the peaceful occupation of the Ibid.Marita (the Greek campaign) must give him air supremacy over the Eastern Mediterranean.
This meant the occupation not only of northern Barbarossa (the Russian
campaign).
The resistance of Goering afterwards talked of Russian influence and extensive financial backing ‘on the
part of England’. See N.D., Vol. IX, p. 33. See p. 158.coup d'état—for which British
diplomacy and the expedition to Marita was revised; and Barbarossa was postponed for four
weeks.Barbarossa were complete, the date was altered
to ‘about 22 June’, a postponement of over five weeks.
It has been suggested that F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff; G. Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the Churchill, Vol. III, p. 316.Fourth Army
in
Another result of
This fact afterwards led General Wilson to point out the similarity of the Corunna campaign of Wilson, Eight Years Overseas, p. 102.
It could be argued that these results were unpredictable; that
those who use them to justify the expedition are simply being wise
after the event. But it would be unjust to Churchill, Eden, Smuts
and the senior commanders in the
THE German losses in the ‘The Balkan Campaign of 12 Army’, p. 45.
As the records of the campaign are incomplete, it is now impossible to state exactly how many British, Australian or New Zealand troops took part. Nor is it known for certain just how many were evacuated or how many were casualties and prisoners of war. So far as can be determined by the Historical Section of the United Kingdom Cabinet Office, the strengths and casualties of the forces were:
The embarkation figures in the naval reports do not always agree with these totals, but the differences are understandable if it is remembered that the embarkations took place at night and in great haste and that among those evacuated there were Greeks and refugees.
The number of New Zealanders who missed evacuation but eventually
escaped from
The New Zealand casualties by units were as follows:
The Australian losses were 320 killed, 494 wounded and
The British infantry, armoured and mobile artillery units had the following casualties:
And, quite apart from those in the Palestinian, Cypriot and Royal Air
Force units, there were the 4960 casualties in the base, line-of-communication
and other non-fighting units. This high total is yet another proof that
AFTER the campaign in See p. 406.
The second question was directed to the divisional command. The
Committee heard evidence from
It is shown in Chapter 13
The Committee discussed the ‘usual criticism’ levelled against a divisional
commander, that he is too often away from his headquarters, or that he
does not leave it enough. It was ‘strongly of the opinion that provided he
does not tire himself unduly, the fault of going forward too often is the
better of the two.’ In this particular case there was ‘ample evidence to
prove … that
Mr Fraser, in the circumstances, was bound to seek the guidance of
outside opinion to settle in his own mind doubts concerning
most secret and personal
Question 1
What were the grounds for believing that three Divisions and an Armoured
Brigade, plus the Greeks, could hold an unlimited number of German
divisions, fully mechanised and armoured—plus the Italians?
Question 2
Was an attack against us through the Monastir gap contemplated as a
possibility, a probability or a certainty?
Question 3
If so, what confidence could have been placed in the Aliakhmon line
on which our plan was based and which, in effect, was never fought?
Note: The above questions are asked not by way of criticism, for the
operation was necessary (unless militarily quite impossible) for non-military, political and moral reasons, and the New Zealand Government,
as they have already stated more than once, would take the same course
again in the same circumstances.
Answers to Questions 1, 2 and 3
Early in
Operations in
Accordingly, a telegram was sent on the
General Wavell and Air Marshal Longmore went to
General Metaxas did not accept this view. He thought that the despatch
of these troops, while not sufficient to ensure the safety of
In view of the Greek attitude, the Commanders-in-Chief were instructed on the 21st January that our future policy should be:
To complete the capture of
To capture the
To form a strong reserve in Egypt, with particular reference to the
rendering of assistance to
His Majesty's Government were still very much impressed with the urgent need of taking action—
To stiffen the attitude of the
To threaten
Accordingly, on
The situation in the
In order to examine thoroughly the possibilities, and to try and bind
together the
This was the background of the situation which confronted the Foreign
Secretary, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the three Commanders-in-Chief when the former arrived in
On the 20th February a brief appreciation of the German threat
through
On the 21st February the Foreign Secretary telegraphed from
‘Do not consider yourselves obligated to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. If no good plan can be made, please say so. But, of course, you know how valuable success would be.’
On the same day the Foreign Secretary telegraphed again as follows:
‘It is, of course, a gamble to send forces to the mainland of
Full discussions were then held with the Greeks. These were recorded by the Foreign Secretary in a telegram, of which the following is an extract:
‘3. …. The President of Council, after reaffirming the determination
of
‘4. From the ensuing discussion between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Commander-in-Chief,
‘5. In full agreement with the
In view of the importance of the Yugoslav attitude as affecting
the deployment of troops in
That the Greeks should at once make, and begin the execution of, preparations to withdraw the advanced troops to the line which we should have to hold if the Yugoslavs were not willing to come in.
That work should immediately be started on improving communications in
That the movement of British troops should begin forthwith, time being the main essence of the problem. The utmost secrecy to be preserved and deceptive stratagem devised.’
These proposals were approved by the War Cabinet on the 24th February, Mr Menzies being present.
The Foreign Secretary and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff
then visited
The Greek army will leave in
The Greek army will concentrate with all possible speed on the
position
12th Division from Western Thrace.
20th Division from
19th Motorised Division from
7 battalions from Western Thrace.
The British forces will be despatched as rapidly as shipping will
permit to
The view taken in these discussions of the Military problem is shown by the following telegram which was sent home by the Foreign Secretary on the 5th March:
Military problem is essentially one of time and space.
Reports from
Resistance which Greek divisions can be expected to put up in prepared positions on Nestos-Rupel line should delay the Germans for some days. There will then be further advance of 100 miles from Rupel Pass before contact is made on Aliakhmon position. Time required for this advance should be considerably increased by demolitions which Wilson will prepare as rapidly as possible.
Concentration of three Greek divisions on Aliakhmon position should
be complete within five days. The seven battalions from
Concentration of British forces on Aliakhmon position will be as follows:
Bulk of one armoured brigade and one New Zealand infantry brigade between the 16th and 19th March. Bulk of a second New Zealand infantry brigade about the 26th March. New Zealand infantry division should be complete in essential men and weapons by the end of March. Subsequent programme is not yet arranged.
All possible measures are being examined to speed up the programme, including the use of Greek ships for transport of British forces from Egypt.
The question of bombing German communications in
Thus the margin is narrow and the risk is considerable. Nevertheless, as we stated in our telegram No. 313 of the 4th March, this risk
appears to us the least dangerous of the three possibilities with which
we were faced.’ The other two possibilities referred to were: To dribble forces up to the Eastern Macedonian frontier, which
Papagos suggested should be done. To withdraw our offer of military support altogether.
Anxious consideration was given to these telegrams when they were
received in
‘The following appear to us to be the principal changes in the situation since the decision was taken to go full speed ahead with the Greek enterprise:
Our envoys, at their first interview with the King of
The Greeks undertook on the 21st February to begin withdrawing
their advance troops to the line which we should have to hold if the
Yugoslavs were not willing to come in, and to start work immediately
on improving communications in
We were to have had 35 Greek Battalions to help us to hold the line. We are now told that we are to have three Greek divisions and seven battalions from Western Thrace, but that these only amount to 23 battalions at most. With the exception of the 12th Division these are all newly formed and have not yet fought. One of the divisions can hardly have any guns, while the remainder can only have captured Italian material. But, in addition to the 35 battalions for which we had hoped, we had contemplated that the Greeks would be able to withdraw some divisions from their Albanian front. General Papagos now says that this cannot be done as they are “exhausted and outnumbered.”
We have always contemplated that Mandibles This was the code-name for an operation to capture Rhodes and certain other islands of
the
The mining of the
‘The Time Factor.
We have estimated that one armoured and three motorised divisions could reach the Bulgar-Greek frontier on the 5th March, and, in addition, an infantry division by the 11th March. We further estimate that, assuming weak delaying action by the Greeks in the Rupel area, the Germans could have two divisions on the Aliakhmon line by about the 15th March, and concentrate the whole five divisions there by the 22nd March.
We are now told that General Papagos intends to fight in the Rupel
area with three divisions. Until we receive an answer to our telegram
No. 64 A telegram asking whether Commanders-in-Chief agreed with the estimate
time table given in paragraph 6, and for information about Greek positions
and intentions and whether Allied forces would arrive on the Aliakhmon
line in time to hold it.
‘Conclusion.
Our conclusion is that the hazards of the enterprise have considerably increased. Nevertheless, despite our misgivings and our recognition of a worsening of the general situation, we are not as yet in a position to question the military advice of those on the spot, who, in their latest telegram, describe the enterprise as not by any means hopeless.’
The above commentary was telegraphed out to the
‘The Chief of the Imperial General Staff and I, in consultation with
three Commanders-in-Chief, have this afternoon re-examined the question.
We are unanimously agreed that, despite the heavy commitments and
great risks which are undoubtedly involved, especially in view of our
limited naval and air resources, the right decision was taken in
Later the same day the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed:
‘General Wavell has explained to Generals Blamey and
On the following day the matter was reviewed again by the Foreign
Secretary, the Commanders-in-Chief and General Smuts, who was in
‘While we are all conscious of the gravity of the decision, we can find
no reason to vary our proposed judgment…. The collapse of
In the light of these telegrams, the Prime Minister telegraphed on the 7th March to the Foreign Secretary that the Cabinet had considered the projects in the light of the above telegrams. He said that the Chiefs of Staff advised that, in view of the steadfastly expressed opinion of Commanders-in-Chief on the spot, of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Commanders of the forces to be employed, it would be right to go on. The Cabinet accordingly had decided to authorise the operation to proceed.
The above summary of the events leading up to the arrival of British and
Imperial forces in
The situation was somewhat changed by the coup d'Etat which took
place in
It is worth remembering that, owing to the necessity for meeting the
German advance in
Question 4
Was sufficient consideration given to the adequacy of our Air Force in
Greece?
Answer
Much anxious consideration was given to the question of air support
for the operations in
We were not, of course, in a position to send forces at will. It was
rather a case of considering how much must be retained for the protection
of the
As it turned out, by the middle of April we had in
1 Heavy Bomber Squadron,
5 Medium Bomber Squadrons,
3 Fighter Squadrons, and
1 Army Co-operation Squadron.
Total, 10 Squadrons.
Our air forces in Egypt at that time consisted of only 12 Squadrons, including 2 Sunderland Flying Boat Squadrons. It will be seen, therefore, that to
all intents and purposes our air forces in the Eastern Mediterranean were
equally divided between
We had been much hampered in preparing for air operations in
Taking into account all these factors, it was clear that the air situation
in
Viewing the campaign in retrospect, it must be remembered that the
German advance through the
Question 5
Could not and should not aerodromes in Greece have been destroyed prior
to evacuation?
Answer
At the time of the German attack, the Royal Air Force were using six
main aerodromes in
An aerodrome cannot be prepared for demolition while it is still in use;
A large number of technical troops, complete with equipment and explosives, are required to deal with one aerodrome, and the work takes considerable time;
The results of even a carefully planned and thoroughly executed demolition of the aerodrome surface are purely temporary;
The available Engineers were fully occupied on the vital work of delaying the advance of the German forces—a matter of much more immediate importance than the doing of what, in the circumstances, could only be comparatively ineffective damage to aerodromes.
In actual fact, the aerodromes in
Question 1
When was it decided that Crete must be held?
Question 2
After that decision, what steps were taken, and when, to render the
Island defensible?
Question 3
What consideration was given, and
What steps were taken—
for providing the troops charged with the defence of Crete with
the necessary equipment—
Artillery;
Anti-aircraft artillery;
Ammunition of all types;
Rifles and automatic rifles;
Transport;
Tanks;
Medical supplies and equipment;
Picks and shovels for digging in self-defence?
Annex to C.O.S. (41) 405.Note: To some extent no doubt these questions are answered by a
reporton the matter supplied to me in the Middle East.
Answers to Questions 1, 2 and 3.
The importance of
While the evacuation of
A full account of the steps taken to make the Island defensible can
only be given in the
The situation in en route or in
Little or nothing could be done from home to assist. The pipeline of
aircraft, guns and equipment of all kinds flowing from the
When weighing up the results of an operation such as the defence of
In the case of
Question 4
In particular, was the question of air support adequately studied and what
conclusions were come to?
Note: It seems to be generally accepted now in the Middle East that
infantry and artillery exposed to unrestricted air attack are in an impossible
position; if this is an accepted fact now, it is difficult to understand (and
the New Zealand Government and people would wish to understand it)
why, in the light of operations in Poland, France and Greece, it was not
an accepted fact before the decision to defend Crete was taken?
Answer
The question of air support for
The Commanders in the
Question 5
Was the scale of attack sufficiently appreciated—
in the United Kingdom;
in the Middle East?
Answer
The scale of attack on
‘German attack
‘Scale of airborne attack estimated 3,000/4,000 parachutists or airborne
troops in first sortie. Two or three sorties per day possible from
‘Heavy bombing attacks to be expected immediately prior to arrival of
air and seaborne troops. Main fighter and dive-bombing support probably
based Rhodes. Following is our estimate based on establishment of operational aircraft available in
‘Estimated that both troops and shipping ample for seaborne operation,
and lighters for transport of tanks also believed available, hence scale
of seaborne attack dependent on extent to which enemy can evade our
naval forces. Reinforcements enemy naval forces and shipping from
The Commanders-in-Chief were under no illusions as to the difficulty
of meeting this scale of attack, though they questioned whether it could, in
fact, be achieved with the forces the Germans, according to their information,
had in the
Question 6
Was the anticipated scale of attack achieved or exceeded?
Answer
The scale of attack which actually took place was approximately equal to that which had been foreseen. The Germans showed, however, an ability to keep it going for a longer period than was expected.
Question 7
What were the views on the possibility of defending Crete of—
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom;
The United Kingdom's Chiefs of Staff individually;
General Wavell;
Admiral Cunningham;
Air-Marshal Longmore;
Air-Marshal Tedder;
General Freyberg?
Answer
A true appreciation of the chances of defending
The views expressed and the attitude of the various authorities concerned are best shown in the telegrams exchanged between the United
Kingdom and the Not reproduced.
Question 8
Did the responsible officers of the Air Force at any time call attention
to the fact that they would be unable to provide air protection?
Question 9
If so, did they then call attention to the risks involved in undertaking
the operations without such protection?
Question 10
Could not and should not the aerodromes in Crete (two out of three of
which, including Maleme, we ourselves apparently constructed) have
been rendered unusable prior to the German invasion and after we had
flown off our aeroplanes and apparently decided we would not use the
landing grounds?
Question 11
Was it sufficiently appreciated that the bulk of the troops available for
the defence of Crete were—
to some degree exhausted after the Greek campaign;
to some extent disorganised;
inadequately supplied with practically everything but rifles, i.e.,
transport, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, means of communication, and even tools for digging;
embarrassed by considerable numbers of refugees?
Answers to Questions 8, 9, 10 and 11
As explained in the answer to Question 4, the air situation was fully
appreciated, both at home and in the
It was also thought that the army would be able to cope with an airborne landing about which ample warning had been obtained. The island
was known to be very mountainous with only one good aerodrome and two
It still seems reasonable to suppose that troops well dug in and provided with mobile reserves and adequate artillery would not have been dislodged by parachutists and dive bombers.
As to the ‘destruction’ of the aerodromes, it should be realised that they were in use by our own forces right up to the day before the attack took place. This was most necessary as great efforts were being made to protect the harbours on the North coast at which equipment, transport, stores, &c., were being unloaded for the garrison. It was only when it was known with certainty that the attack was imminent that the remnants of the Air Force were withdrawn.
The significance of this fact will appear from consideration of what is involved in making an aerodrome unserviceable. It should be made quite clear that to ‘destroy’ an aerodrome is virtually impossible. All that can be done is to render it unusable for a limited period. How difficult a task this is can be shown from our own experiences in South-east England last autumn. For example, 280 bombs were dropped on Biggin Hill Aerodrome on one day, including a number of delayed-action bombs. In spite of this, the fighter squadrons continued to operate, without interruption, from the aerodrome.
Blocking expedients with surface obstacles are generally ineffective. The maximum delay that can be imposed on the use of the aerodrome is by the production of a large number of craters over nearly all the surface. Trenching with mechanical diggers is effective but rarely possible in the field.
The speed of production of craters depends upon the nature of the
subsoil. For example, a possible landing ground at
The preparation of a large number of charges, ready in position beneath
the surface of the aerodrome in anticipation of demolition, has been suggested, and the question was fully investigated in the case of Manston
Aerodrome in Kent. The R.A.F., however, are quite definite that they
cannot conduct operations from an aerodrome in which charges have been
laid. There is not only the risk of contact detonation in a crash landing,
but also the more serious one of the destruction of the whole surface due
to sympathetic detonation of all the charges initiated perhaps by one bomb.
To take the case of Maleme Aerodrome, which had a clay surface from which a quantity of large stones had been removed. The subsoil is believed to have been clay mixed with large stones and boulders. The only methods of immobilising the aerodrome were by trenching or by the production of craters, using camouflet equipment. Mechanical equipment for trenching was not available, and, in any case, is a slow process.
If the Field Companies on sic]. At the end of this task they would be exhausted. Enemy interference
would probably restrict the work to the hours of darkness, and, if this were
so, the work would have taken 5 nights to complete. The dilution of the
Company with unskilled labour would not materially assist.
The quantity of explosive required would be approximately 7½ tons of Ammonol or Gelignite with corresponding accessories, such as fuze, primers, detonators, &c.
It remains to consider what would be the resulting delay caused by
this great work. The evidence of Biggin Hill shows how small a part of an
aerodrome is required to maintain operations from it. Unless all the debris
from the craters were removed from the field—a colossal task without
mechanical equipment—there would be very little work required to provide
a usable landing strip for troop-carriers. Something in the nature of 100
men working 6–10 hours with shovels could prepare a 700-yard strip on
which the landing and taking off of troop-carriers could proceed.
Question 12
Was there any difference of opinion amongst the responsible officers as
to the feasibility of the operation or the adequacy of the steps taken; if
so, what were those differences?
Answer
An answer to this question could only be given by a detailed enquiry
in the
Question 13
What was the degree of co-operation between those responsible for the
three armed Services in the Middle East—
before and
during
the Crete operations?
Answer
The detailed plans made in the
Question 14
Is a system of co-operation satisfactory under which two of the three
responsible officers concerned are located at Cairo and the third at
Alexandria—150 miles away?
Answer
It has always been recognised that the arrangement referred to is not
entirely satisfactory, and from time to time there have been discussions as
to how to improve matters. It goes without saying that the Commander-in-
Chief,
The matter is, however, now under investigation, and it is hoped that a better arrangement will be found practicable.
Question 15
What steps are being taken to avoid a recurrence of a situation under
which well-trained and courageous troops find thdmselves battered to
pieces from the air without means of defence or retaliation?
Answer
As explained in the answer to Question 4, the giving of adequate air
support to the army is very largely a question of geography. The side which
has its air bases nearer the scene of land operations is placed at a great
advantage. The only places in the
Question 16
What are considered to be the net results of the Crete operation—
the disadvantages to us by the loss of the Island;
the advantages to us in losses by the enemy of men and equipment
and the delay imposed upon him?
Note: This is of academic interest only, as the operation was not
entered upon as a desperate adventure in order to obtain a corresponding
advantage, but was apparently conceived as an ordinary operation of
war with the probability of successful defence.
Answer
Disadvantages to us by the loss of Crete.
The loss of
The next and by far the most important disadvantage of losing
The same situation could not have been produced by the enemy using
the southern
Now that they are established in
Although the aerodromes in
Advantages to us in losses by the enemy of men and equipment and
the delay imposed upon him.
It is estimated that the Germans lost 250 aircraft, including 150 troop carriers, in the operations over Crete. This figure does not include aircraft which were damaged. His losses in men amounted to between 10 and 15 thousand. This figure is trifling when compared with the great numbers of the German Army, but it includes a large number of highly-trained parachute troops.
The battle in
The attack on Habbanyia started on the 30th April. The advance party
of the relieving force from Palestine reached Habbanyia on the 15th May
There is no doubt that if the Germans had not been fully occupied
with the battle in
Furthermore, if the Germans had been free to reinforce
Question 17
What effect have the operations in Crete had upon the possibility
of defending Malta, Cyprus, &c.?
Answer
The geographical situation of
As soon as we have completed the occupation of
The situation in
It is hoped, before the end of this month, to increase the number of anti-aircraft guns to—
A good system of R.D.F. has been installed.
Nevertheless, the lessons of
If, therefore, the Germans decide to attempt to capture
Question 18
Should arrangements not be made to place certain adequate Air Forces
under direct Army control?
Answer
It has always been recognised that a proportion of the air forces operating in an overseas theatre of war must be under the direct control of the Army. This proportion consists of the Army Co-operation Squadrons whose primary task is reconnaissance and whose personnel are specially trained for the purpose. In addition to the Army Co-operation Squadrons, an Expeditionary Force is accompanied by an air component which contains a proportion of fighter and bomber squadrons for the immediate support of the Army. When important operations are impending, the action of the whole of the air forces in the theatre of war is closely co-ordinated by the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief with the General Officer Commanding-in- Chief, so that the whole of the combined resources of the Army and the Air Force will be used to the best advantage at the time.
Recent operations in the
It should not be thought, however, either that the Germans employ
a different system to our own or that the control of air forces in the Middle
East by the Army would have led to any different results in Crete. Apart
from the Army Co-operation Squadrons, which are similar to our own, the
Germans employ their air force in accordance with their general strategical
plan, either on independent means or in support of the Army, as the case
may be. A great deal of the apparently superior results which they have
achieved have been due to the enormous superiority in numbers which they
have been able to employ at the decisive point and this, in turn, has been
due to their central position on the Continent, which has enabled them to
transfer air forces rapidly from one theatre to another. The reasons for the
lack of air support at
Question 19
Has the possibility (or probability) of a similar air-borne attack on
other parts of the Middle East (including the Canal and Egypt itself)
been considered and are the necessary steps being taken?
Answer
Except at
There is, of course, the obvious possibility that, when he has built up his forces, he may attempt large-scale operations against Egypt and the Canal zone, as part of which he may attempt to drop air-borne troops, and everyone is fully alive to this possibility. If, however, he attains the complete air superiority necessary to give him freedom of action in daytime over our back areas, the situation will indeed be serious. All our efforts must, therefore, be directed to ensuring that such a state of affairs cannot occur.
Question 20
Is the vital importance of air and armoured reinforcement of the Middle
East fully recognised and are the necessary steps being taken?
Answer
The vital importance of air and armoured reinforcement of the Middle East has always been fully recognised and the only limits placed on what is sent by every available route are:
the transport facilities available;
in the case of tanks, the maintenance of bare security in the United
Kingdom. Annex II Not reproduced.
[The abbreviations in italics indicate German units.]
As many unit papers were lost and many engagements never officially recorded, personal diaries, letters and narratives are an important source. They are, however, too numerous to list.
No reports have been found to cover the fighting about the
Except for the first named, all the above are published by the
Achilles, HMS, 57
Aickin, Maj F. W., 46
Alanbrooke, Fd Mshl Lord, 479
Aliakmon line, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 121, 122, 127, 128, 131, 134, 135, 136, 145, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, 180, 204, 205, 208, 214, 215, 235, 244, 280
Aliakmon R., 123, 127, 129, 140, 141, 147, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 176, 177, 179, 184, 186, 187, 188, 197, 204, 212, 218, 223, 224, 235, 237, 238, 240, 243, 254, 260, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 280, 284
Allen, Brig A. S., 230, 253, 280, 303, 318, 319, 331, 332, 334, 339, 402,
Allen, Brig S. F., 15
Allen, Col Sir Stephen, 15
Allen Force, 230, 231, 285, 303, 306, 307, 308, 311, 312, 314, 317, 321, 323, 328, 329, 332, 333, 334, 336, 337, 340, 347, 348, 350, 352, 354, 378
Ames, Sgt K. S., 393
Anderson, Lt H. R., 318
Anderson, L-Sgt F. J., 344
Andrews, Maj A. A., 445
SeeAustralian Forces
Auchinleck, Fd Mshi Sir C., 480
Auckland, HMS, 446
Australia, HMAS, 30
Australian Forces—
2/1 Anti-Tank Regt, 129, 155, 165, 190, 192, 202, 205, 208, 209, 222, 253, 320, 434, 438
16 Bde, 54, 68, 144, 150, 160, 164, 166, 167, 177, 197, 198, 223, 226, 227, 228, 230, 235, 238, 252, 270, 280, 334, 358, 381, 400, 402, 407, 408, 430
17 Bde, 70, 74, 150, 221, 252, 259, 314, 358, 381, 400, 402, 407, 408, 430
18 Bde, 161
19 Bde, 70, 71, 74, 150, 156, 190, 204, 205, 206, 214, 223, 225, 226, 227, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 270, 280, 281, 349, 357, 381, 386, 394, 395, 406, 408, 409, 435
2/2 Bn, 252, 253, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335, 336, 337, 338, 346, 357, 386
2/3 Bn, 197, 252, 253, 315, 319, 320, 328, 330, 331, 334, 336, 338, 339, 357
2/4 Bn, 190, 192, 196, 207, 208, 209, 211, 238, 244, 270, 349, 357, 386, 394
2/5 Bn, 222, 225, 227, 230, 313, 314, 335, 338, 349, 357, 395
2/8 Bn, 190, 192, 196, 199, 205, 206, 209, 238, 244, 270, 349, 357, 386
2/11 Bn, 221–2, 225, 230, 253, 313, 314, 332, 335, 338, 386, 394,
6 Division, 29, 47, 68, 71, 74, 75, 78, 80, 98, 104, 122, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 166, 169, 180, 192, 198, 202, 206, 222, 230, 270, 280, 286, 312, 313, 352, 356, 377, 403
frac23; Fd Regt, 192, 206, 209, 227, 231, 238, 240, 244, 260, 272, 281, 294, 295, 304, 306, 307, 308, 374, 434, 435, 436, 438, 439,
Awatea, HMT, 82
Axios R., 121, 122, 131, 132, 133–4, 150, 164, 165, 169, 177, 193
Baillie-Grohman, Rear Adm H. T., 362, 367, 380, 406, 426, 445, 446, 447, 473, 474
Balck, Col, 247
Barpeta, SS, 120
Barrie, Sir James, 13
Barrowclough, Maj-Gen Rt. Hon. Sir H., 29, 35, 43, 49, 181, 182, 183, 237, 294, 295, 303, 308, 372, 381, 396, 398, 422, 446
Barter, Lt-Col A. R., 370
Bassett, Maj B. I., 257
Batory, HMT, 80
Bauer, Dr, 412
Beale, Maj J. H., 424
Bedding, Maj T. G., 186
Bell, Capt L. J., 258
Bellringer, Bdr T. C., 302
Bergonzoli, Gen, 76
Bethell, Capt R., 244
Bevan, Maj T. H., 141
Birdwood, Gen Sir W., 17
Bishop, Capt C. H. B., 466
Black, Pte G. R. A., 341
Blackburn, Lt-Col C. A. D'A., 279
Blake, Lt-Col H. W. D., 187
Blamey, Fd Mshl Sir T., 99, 109, 111, 114, 134, 135, 150, 155, 160, 162, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 215, 217, 218, 222, 227, 230, 232, 251, 252, 253, 280, 288, 289, 366, 367, 371, 372, 377, 378, 400, 401, 402, 474, 475, 476, 478
Boag, Lt-Col N. F., 26
Böhme, Gen, 235
Boileau, Maj D. R. C., 206
Bonaventure, HMS, 118
Bond, Capt R. L., 263
Bond, Pte G. R., 341
Borman, Maj C. A., 187
Bosworth, Pte C. J., 247
Bowyer-Smith, Capt Sir P., RN, 459
Breconshire, 118
British Forces—
102 Anti-Tank Regt, 150, 190, 199, 202, 207, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 225, 233, 357, 391, 393, 394, 427
1 Armoured Bde, 122, 128, 133, 141, 150, 151, 153, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 171, 190, 192, 193, 199, 200, 202, 204, 212, 214, 215, 216, 222, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232, 233, 237, 271–2, 295, 312, 313, 357, 358, 372, 375, 378, 398, 406, 422, 424, 425, 427, 434, 435, 437, 474
1 Armoured Division, 36
7 Armoured Division, 23, 54, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 415
16 Bde, 68
7 Corps, 35
12 Corps, 38
50 Division, 25
2/10 Gen Hosp, 23
122 Light AA Bty, 415
211 Med Bty, 190
64 Medium Regt, 150, 155, 164, 166, 187, 190, 192, 206, 210, 222, 281, 294, 299, 303, 357, 380, 394, 403, 428
Royal Corps of Signals, 62
Brook, Pte J. E., 287
Brooke, Gen Sir A. (Fd Mshl Lord Alanbrooke), 37
Brown, 2 Lt J. C., 335
Brown, WO I R., 390
Brunskill, Brig G. S., 368
Bryant, Capt K. A., 467
Bryson, Capt C. D., 453
Buckleton, Capt J. G., 456
Budd, Capt F. M. S., 419
Bull, Brig W. H. B., 44
Bullock-Douglas, Capt G. A. H., 318
Bunton, Gnr R. W., 282
Button, Col E. L., 23
Cairo, 55, 72, 80, 96, 98, 99, 100, 108,
109, 110, 120, 233, 363, 447
Canadian Forces—
Canavan, Capt W. A. O'N., 456
Carlisle, HMS, 428
Carnachan, Capt J. L. G., 348
Carrie, Maj M. S., 138
Carroll, Capt K. A., 444
Carson, Maj W N., 334
Carson, Spr S. E., 421
Carter, Capt T. G. N., 377
Casey, Rt. Hon. R. G., 17
Charrington, Brig R., 128, 170, 202, 207, 208, 212, 213, 214, 221, 232, 424, 427, 441
Chilton, Brig F. O., 252, 253, 315, 317, 330, 331, 333, 336, 346
Churchill, Sir W., 16, 18, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 60, 86, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 157, 362, 363, 365, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485
Clan Fraser, 161
Clark, L-Cpl C. W., 321
Clifton, Brig G. H., 15, 25, 123, 137, 146, 237, 310, 352, 374, 398, 444
Coatsworth, Pte F. J. C., 162
Cohen, Maj, 345
Collings, Brig, 228
Comliebank, 447
Common, Pte R. W., 389
Connolly, Lt-Col J. R. J., 264
Cooke, Cpl G. C., 275
Cookson, Sgt T. N., 83
Cooney, WO II D. L., 405
Courage, Col J. H., 443
Craig, Dvr J. C., 463
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 482
Cropper, Capt J. W., 392
Crowley, Sgt B. J., 344
Cunningham, Adm of the Fleet Viscount, 100, 107, 110, 111, 112, 115, 216, 363, 401, 402, 447, 479, 480
Currie, Lt-Col A. R., 84
Curtin, Rt. Hon. J., 474
Cutbush, Sgt W. J., 302
Daniel, Capt M. E., 454
Davies, Capt R., 456
Dawson, Lt T. E., 284
Dee, Capt K. G., 330
Delaney, Sgt F. O., 423
Devonshire, HMT, 24
Dick, Capt R. M., RN, 100
Dill, Fd Mshl Sir J., 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 131, 132, 158, 476, 479, 480, 482
Dodecanese Is., 149
Dodgshun, Capt J. T., 412
Dominion Monarch, HMT, 82
Donald, Lt-Col H. V., 291
Douglas, Capt L., 430
Drinkwater, Dvr H. R., 337
Duigan, Maj-Gen Sir J., 12
Dyer, Lt-Col H. G., 258
Dyson, Maj R. H., 337
Eagle, HMS, 21
Eastgate, Spr F. T., 417
Easton, Dvr J., 463
Echelon, First, 3, 4, 6–7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 24, 27, 33, 39, 46, 49
Echelon, Second, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 35, 38, 39, 43, 46, 47, 49, 50, 55, 117
Echelon, Third, 4, 24, 37, 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 56, 59, 60, 61, 79, 84, 474
Eden, Sir A., 21, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 115, 131, 158, 482, 485
Eliott, Lt-Col J. G., 27
Elizabethville, 41
Empress of Australia, 85
Empress of Russia, 82
Ensor, Capt J. H., 257
Eocene, 469
Euboea I., 344, 346, 352, 354, 358, 371, 372, 375, 378, 397, 432
Evans, Maj W. H., 184
Fanning I., 1
Fay, Capt J. A. O'L., 456
Fehn, Gen, 439
Felix Roussel, 57
Fenton, Sgt F. T., 462
Ferguson, Capt C. A. L., 419
Ferris, Dvr W. W., 463
Finlayson, Capt R. C. B., 318
Fisher, Col W. B., 188
Flamingo, HMS, 451
Foley, Maj W. C. T., 241
Foot, Lt S. E., 411
Fowler, Sgt A. C., 302
Frain, Pte P. J. R., 275
Franco, Gen, 93
Franconia, 35
Franklin, Lt J. H., 335
Fraser, Rt. Hon. P., 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 44, 114, 222, 292, 468, 475, 476, 477
Fulton, Col J. B., 369
Fyfe, Maj T., 264
George VI, HM King, 88
George, Lt-Col C. D. A., 171
Gerard, Rt. Rev. G. V., 26
German Forces—
Luftwaffe, 1, 37, 39, 78, 93, 96, 120,
153, 159, 161, 198, 217, 219, 225,
236, 240, 272, 290, 297, 298, 302,
308, 309, 314, 347, 348, 358, 369,
385, 396, 397, 398, 400, 406, 417,
436, 448, 449, 459, 460, 466, 471,
472, 473
38 Anti-Tank Unit, 261
2 Army, 159
18 Corps, 158, 159, 193, 198, 218, 230, 235, 251, 320, 385, 417, 432, 433, 439
31 Corps, 158
40 Corps, 158, 159, 193, 218, 229, 235, 251, 280, 347, 384, 386, 417, 432, 439, 440
50 Division, 159
164 Division, 159
5 Mountain Division, 384
6 Mountain Division, 230, 235, 245, 248, 320, 321, 322, 337, 384, 385, 387
9 Panzer Division, 159, 194, 210, 214, 218, 229, 271, 272, 280, 347
8 Panzer Reconnaissance Unit, 384
3 Panzer Regt, 247, 262, 299, 302, 321, 323, 326, 335, 336–7, 340
33 Panzer Regt, 210
2 Parachute Regt, 417
8 Reconnaissance Unit, 432
SS ‘Adolf Hitler’ Division, 159, 194, 208, 210, 214, 218, 219, 229, 365, 432, 439, 440, 448, 471
Gilroy, Lt J. T., 265
Godley, Lt-Gen Sir A., 11
Good, Maj G. G., 64
Gordon, Spr, 315
Gourlick, Spr W. P., 457
Gower, Brig G. W., 85
Gray, Capt A. W., 455
Greek Forces—
11 Division, 219
12 Division, 122, 127, 137, 149, 155, 160, 166, 167, 168, 197, 199, 201, 202, 204, 209, 212, 216, 224
20 Division, 122, 149, 152, 155, 166, 167, 168, 170, 190, 192, 197, 199, 201, 202, 204, 209, 212, 216, 219, 221, 223
21 Division, 199
Griffin, HMS, 446
Grigg, Maj A. N., 40
Grimmond, Sgt A. J., 462
Hanna, Lt-Col G. P., 334
Hanson, Brig F. M. H., 26
Hanton, Maj S., 257
Harbott, Maj H. S., 368
Harding, Maj A. F., 299
Hargest, Brig J., 25, 35, 39, 42, 118, 142, 145, 146, 175, 260, 261, 268, 290, 291, 292, 372, 382, 402
Harper, Sgt C. H., 351
Harris, Capt H. R., 456
Harrison, Sgt G. R., 265
Hatton, Capt O. J., 189
Hawthorn, Capt T. R., 291
Hesson, Sgt J., 456
Hetherington, Capt O. S., 328
Heywood, Maj-Gen T. G. G., 427
Hill, 2 Lt M. C., 351
Hodgetts, Gnr W. G., 462
Hollis, Maj R. A. C., 344
Hopkins, Mr H. L., 480
Hore-Belisha, Lord, 13
Hubicki, Gen, 280
Hunt, Brig F. L., 7
Hutchison, Capt O. J., 370
Indian Forces—
Indrapoera, 85
Ionia, 120
Ironside, Fd Mshl Lord, 11
Irwin, Maj B. T. Wyn, 9
Italian Forces—
Jacobs, Capt H. M., 179
Jais, Col, 386
Jenkins, Maj A. V., 397
Jones, WO II E. O., 412
Jones, WO II J. M. C., 419
Jones, Pte A. M., 457
Kellec, Pte V. H., 430
Kelleway, Capt C. T., 184
Kelly, Lt-Col S. J., 257
Kelly, Gnr J., 336
Kelsey, Col J. O., 181
Kibblewhite, Sgt F. A., 249
Killalea, Sgt H., 359
King, Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, 18
King, Brig R. D., 367
Klisouri Pass, 201, 202, 204, 210, 216, 218, 219, 221, 223, 233
Ladybird, HMS, 78
Large, Brig D. T. M., 149
Leckie, Col D. F., 264
Lee, Brig. E. A., 129, 130, 150, 155, 164, 189, 244, 299, 349, 350, 351, 415, 423, 444, 446
Lee, Pte A. V., 276
Leeks, Maj L., 377
Levy, Capt P. B., 392
Lewis, Pte O. R., 457
Lindell, Maj G. A., 352
Lomas, Maj A. L., 66
Longmore, Air Chf Mshl Sir A., 89, 95, 100, 110, 111, 362, 363
Love, Lt-Col E. Te W., 403
Luftwaffe. See
German Forces
Luxford, Lt M. B., 428
Lydster, Sgt N. R., 462
Lynch, Lt-Col R. J., 184
Lyon, Capt W. J., 283
McAlpine, Capt J. A., 64
McAra, Lt E. J., 263
McCabe, Sgt C. A., 321
MacCormick, Brig K., 15
MacDonald, Capt H. J., 211
McElroy, Lt-Col H. M., 249
McIndoe, Capt J. L., 179
Mackay Force, 167, 168, 180, 189, 190, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 204, 207, 209, 270
Mackay, Maj-Gen I. G., 70, 156, 162, 166, 190, 197, 199, 204, 230, 231, 244, 280, 288, 292, 299, 313, 314, 349, 371, 372, 474
Mackay, Matron-in-Chief E. C., 58
McKay, Pte R., 275
McKenzie, L-Bdr N. G., 462
McNaught, Lt-Col G. J., 35
McNaughton, Maj-Gen A. G. L., 36
Macky, Lt-Col N. L., 25, 173, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 315, 317, 321–2, 325, 329, 330, 344, 345
Manson, Maj I. O., 255
Marit Maersk, 120
Marshall, Bdr F. S., 421
Marshall-Inman, Maj R. A., 341
Martel, Lt-Gen Sir G., 478
Massautti, Miss A., 412
Maunganui, HMT, 80
Mazarakis, Gen, 365
Mead, Maj-Gen O. H., 5
Meister, Col, 418
Menzies, Rt. Hon. R. G., 10, 99, 103, 104, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 476
Mersa Matruh, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 72, 82, 83, 465, 467, 468, 469
Metaxas line, 101, 106, 107, 121, 131, 133, 134, 152, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 168, 177
Miles, Brig R., 15, 35, 38, 39, 40, 138, 145, 178, 294, 303, 354, 356, 393, 396, 407, 437
Milliken, Maj T., 423
Molotov, V., 92
Moor, Maj R. J., 267
Moors, Pte H., 279
Morris, Capt W. C., 368
Morrison, Maj R., 223
Morrison, L-Cpl A. R., 423
Mulhern, Sgt H. D., 287
Muller, Capt F. H., 64
Mumford, Spr L. D., 417
Myriel, 469
Neale, Lt J. W., 267
Neame, Lt-Gen Sir P., 479
Nevassa, HMT, 85
Newlands, Lt J. W., 430
2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force—
NZ Forces—
NZ Division, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 56, 67, 72, 79–85, 90, 98, 100, 128, 135, 136, 151, 152, 153, 155, 159, 160, 164, 166, 167, 170, 172, 176, 177, 182, 194, 222, 223, 228, 230, 231, 246, 248, 261, 297, 310, 311, 332, 352, 354, 355, 357, 358, 374, 375, 393, 403, 406, 408, 422, 472
Army Service Corps, 35, 37, 40, 50, 119, 148, 178, 179
Ammunition Coy, 22, 58, 59, 63, 67, 72, 80, 84, 148, 179–80, 361, 395, 464
4 RMT Coy, 22, 51, 54, 55, 59, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 84, 148, 153, 182, 183, 226, 228, 239, 286, 306, 328, 341, 344, 348, 376, 405, 429, 437
Supply Column, 22, 51, 55, 63, 67, 69, 72, 84, 148, 172, 178–9, 358, 403, 428, 442, 464
31 Anti-Tank Bty, 26, 172, 187, 272, 279, 299, 349, 356, 381, 392, 397
33 Anti-Tank Bty, 58, 183, 293, 294, 318, 326, 356, 381, 397
34 Anti-Tank Bty, 6, 24, 171, 182, 183, 285, 286, 299, 301, 308, 374, 397, 398, 427
6 Anti-Tank Coy, 57
7 Anti-Tank Regt, 6, 24, 26, 35, 37, 41, 58, 83, 123, 135, 138, 140, 141, 183, 202, 230, 237, 240, 253, 259, 267, 282, 296, 316, 377, 392, 421, 427, 431, 441
5 Fd Regt, 26, 35, 37, 41, 83, 141, 166, 171, 173, 176, 178, 182, 184, 236, 248, 250, 254, 255, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 269, 286, 288, 294, 303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 313, 314, 316, 320, 330, 334, 335, 348, 354, 356, 357, 377, 381, 391, 392, 393–4, 397, 428, 431
14 Lt AA Regt, 464
Dental—
Divisional Cavalry, 8, 9, 22, 35, 52, 53, 59, 81, 135, 140, 141, 147, 164, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 192, 194, 195, 219, 221, 222, 223, 225, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 243, 244, 260, 285, 286, 296, 297, 299, 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 311, 313, 333, 338, 339, 348, 350, 351, 355, 358, 368, 372, 374, 375, 378, 383, 398, 416, 421, 427, 429, 435, 444
Divisional Signals, 22, 41, 50, 59, 62, 63, 147, 176, 187, 403, 445
19 Army Troops Coy, 45, 46, 58, 61, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 77, 81, 82, 120, 137, 145, 164, 173, 176, 180, 269, 305, 308, 315, 382, 402, 403
6 Fd Coy, 8, 24, 54, 59, 63, 80, 123, 125, 126, 127, 137, 141, 145, 172, 187, 236, 237, 271, 272, 295, 296, 311, 312, 352, 413, 415, 416, 418, 420, 421, 444, 464
7 Fd Coy, 26, 121, 137, 164, 257, 269, 295, 303, 312, 352, 356, 378, 382, 428, 430
5 Fd Pk Coy, 5, 8, 53, 54, 59, 63, 67, 70, 74, 76, 83, 137, 180, 237, 269, 382, 428
Infantry—
4 Bde, 5, 22, 25, 39, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 80, 84, 90, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 147, 162, 166, 171, 172, 179, 180, 182, 188, 197, 202, 204, 206, 223, 226, 228, 231, 239, 240, 244, 248, 254, 255, 270, 271, 272, 276, 280, 281, 286, 288, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299, 301, 303, 347, 354, 355, 360, 372, 373, 374, 376, 381, 395, 398, 403, 406, 407, 410, 411, 413, 415, 416, 419, 420, 422, 424, 428, 432, 433, 434, 435, 437, 440, 441, 442, 446, 464, 468, 469, 470, 474
5 Bde, 5, 25, 31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 81, 83, 84, 90, 103, 120, 123, 135, 140, 141, 142, 145, 147, 164, 166, 171, 173, 178, 179, 182, 183, 188, 218, 223, 226, 227, 228, 231, 235, 237, 244, 246, 248, 251, 254, 255, 259, 261, 266, 271, 285, 286, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293, 297, 343, 354, 355, 359, 360, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 377, 381, 402, 403, 446, 464, 469, 470
6 Bde, 5, 30, 37, 39, 43, 58, 59, 61, 79, 81, 84, 90, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 162, 166, 171, 172, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 223, 227, 228, 231, 232, 237, 238, 244, 252, 254, 255, 259, 261, 281, 285, 286, 288, 289, 293, 294, 295, 297, 299, 302, 303, 305, 306, 310, 311, 312, 314, 317, 332, 333, 340, 342, 347, 348, 350, 354, 355, 359, 360, 372, 373, 374, 377, 378, 381, 398, 399, 401, 406, 407, 408, 420, 422, 423, 425, 427, 428, 432, 435, 444, 447, 448, 449, 464, 469, 474
9 Bde, 81
18 Bn, 5, 7, 9, 49, 51, 53, 55, 126, 127, 136, 141, 172, 184, 186, 187, 270, 277, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 296, 299, 360, 376, 433, 434, 436, 438, 439, 445
19 Bn, 5, 7–8, 9, 49, 51, 53, 120, 127, 136, 140, 141, 142, 172, 184, 186, 187, 240, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 279, 281, 282, 283, 299, 360, 361, 372, 376, 411, 415, 419, 433, 434, 438, 441
20 Bn, 5, 8, 9, 49, 51, 53, 127, 136, 162, 172, 184, 186, 187, 240, 243, 270, 271, 272, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 299, 352, 360, 376, 433, 434, 438, 439, 456, 462
21 Bn, 25, 32, 42, 120, 142, 160, 161, 173, 176, 179, 181, 218, 226, 228, 230, 231, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 261, 295, 311, 315, 317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 327, 330, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 340, 341, 343, 344, 352, 354, 355, 371, 376, 382, 398, 402
22 Bn, 25, 120, 139, 140, 142, 144, 160, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 267, 286, 288, 290, 292, 354, 355, 358, 359, 360, 376, 377, 381, 382, 402, 416, 426
23 Bn, 26, 118, 120, 142, 144, 164, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 286, 287, 288, 289, 354, 355, 356, 360, 376, 377, 380, 381, 382, 402, 426
24 Bn, 43, 136, 140, 171, 180, 182, 183, 237, 238, 244, 254, 255, 293, 294, 295, 305, 306, 307, 308, 348, 355, 359, 360, 387, 391, 395, 396, 423, 425, 426, 442, 444, 445, 446, 450, 462
25 Bn, 43, 136, 140, 171, 180, 182, 183, 223, 237, 238, 244, 254, 255, 257, 293, 294, 295, 297, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 348, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 377, 388, 390, 391, 392, 395, 396, 423, 426, 442, 444, 446
26 Bn, 43, 57, 136, 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 152, 171, 173, 176, 182, 183, 226, 227, 231, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 254, 255, 280, 281, 293, 295, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 355, 360, 391, 397, 419, 420, 422, 423, 426, 442, 445, 446
27 (MG) Bn, 8, 9, 53, 59, 81, 129, 131, 132, 139, 140, 148, 150, 164, 166, 171, 178, 182, 189, 196, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 219, 232, 233, 259, 262, 267, 285, 287, 288, 292, 295, 313, 314, 360, 376, 428, 434, 435
28 (Maori) Bn, 6, 35, 118, 120, 142, 144, 145, 254, 255, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 268, 269, 286, 288, 291, 354, 355, 360, 370, 376, 377, 382, 402, 403, 416, 421, 423, 450
Reinforcement Bn, 427, 430, 431, 443, 448, 449, 450, 451, 453, 455, 462
Medical—
Ordnence—
Nicholson, Lt-Col S. W., 342
Nieuw Amsterdam, HMT, 85
Noakes, Capt P., 412
Ormonde, 57
Osborn, Dvr G. R., 55
Packwood, Col R. H., 27
Page, Brig J. R., 43, 240, 241, 242, 309, 395, 398, 422, 423
Page, Capt P. G., 195
Palestine, 56
Panckhurst, Maj G. H., 249
Papagos, Fd Mshl A., 95, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 121, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 155, 156, 157, 160, 163, 165, 167, 168, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209, 216, 217, 233, 362, 364, 365, 478
Parkinson, Maj-Gen G. B., 8, 259, 294, 315, 320, 328, 333, 334, 336, 397
Paterson, Maj R. D. B., 186
Patterson, Lt-Col D. B., 141
Patterson, Pte D. D., 462
Peart, Lt-Col J. N., 310
Pemberton, Maj, 454
Penney, Capt R., 340
Pennland, 483
Pétain, Mshl, 32
Petrie, Maj M. De R., 445
Petrie, Capt, 402
Pierce, Lt-Col C. J., 8
Pigou, Lt-Col W. R., 237
Platis, Gen, 217
Pleasants, Brig C. L., 186
Pollock, Maj G. D., 74
Poole, Maj G. T., 46
Poolman, Maj F. H., 461
Porter, L-Cpl W., 279
Potter, Lt-Col J. F., 170
Pridham-Wippell, Admiral Sir H., 428
Pussell, Cpl O. T., 51
Puttick, Lt-Gen Sir E., 7, 33, 50, 52, 172, 280, 283, 296, 297, 303, 354, 372, 410, 411, 413, 415, 424, 436, 437, 438, 439, 441
Queen Mary, 30
Quinn, Sgt A., 319
Rabone, Lt-Col T. C. V., 27
Rangitata, 21
Rangitiki, 41
Rawle, Maj F. C., 84
Rawnsley, MV, 367
Regia Aeronautica. See
Italian Forces
5th Reinforcements, 464
Reynaud, M., 32
Reynolds, Maj J. W., 306
Rice, Capt M. C., 186
Rinaldi, 2 Lt J. R., 466
Rix-Trott, Maj K., 295
Robinson, Lt-Col H. A., 301
Robinson, Lt-Col J. P., 454
Rommel, Fd Mshl E., 25, 78, 121, 161, 215, 234, 466, 467, 468, 469
Rose, Capt H. G., 315
Ross, Lt-Col A. B., 305
Royal Air Force, 65, 82, 89, 91, 107, 109, 110, 111, 118, 154, 162, 195, 215, 224, 298, 359, 373, 378, 380, 403, 430, 450, 461, 468, 471, 472, 473, 478, 483
Royal Navy, 215, 234, 364, 404, 415, 422, 425, 436, 443, 461, 462, 463, 466, 471, 473, 478, 483
Royal, Maj R., 258
Russell, Maj-Gen Sir A., 11
Russell, Lt-Col J., 85
Russell, Lt-Col J. T., 339
Sadler, Maj F. A., 328
Sage, Lt-Col. A. H., 46
Salvia, HMS, 446
Sanders, Col G. P., 8
Santi, Bdr E. W., 392
Savery, Pte W. C. T., 412
Savige Force, 221, 225, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233, 252, 285, 295, 299, 303, 312, 313, 317, 333, 340, 347, 354, 357
Sayers, Col E. G., 367
Schultz, Sgt C. N., 302
Scott, L-Cpl A. G., 279
Seccombe, Capt G. T., 421
Sheely, Rev Fr. W., 344
Sherlock, Lt R. F., 390
Simmonds, Capt K., 455
Sinclair, Capt R. S., 184
Smith, Lt-Col R. T., 46
Snadden, Maj J. P., 397
Snell, Dvr J. A., 341
Snooks, Pte C., 457
Sobieski, 21
Sollum, SS, 82
Spencer, Capt R. D., 412
Spilman, Capt A. K., 279
Steel, Brig, 413
Stobie, WO II R., 301
Strathaird, 21
Struthers, Pte H. E., 423
Stuart, Spr J. B., 421
Sturm, Col, 417
Sutherland, Capt W. C., 195
Sweetzer, Maj D. J., 349
Sydney, HMAS, 91
Tainui, Sgt J., 265
Taituha, Cpl H. P., 265
Tasker, WO II N. C., 336
Te Kuru, 2 Lt G. A., 268
Thomas, Capt G. I. B., 303
Thomason, Maj H. H., 257
Thomson, WO I R. H., 66
Thurland Castle, 447
Tiffen, Maj J. H., 84
Titley, Bdr K., 301
Tito, Mshl J., 484
Tombleson, Gnr T. W. J., 282
Trippear, Lt A. W., 213
Tsouderos, M., 366
Turle, Rear-Adm C. E., 364
Turner, Pte W. G., 457
Twhigg, Brig J. M., 188
Vale of Tempe.
Voyager, HMS, 404
W Force, 121, 122, 123, 128, 130, 137,
149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 159, 160,
162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,
169, 177, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202,
204, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219,
221, 224, 226, 228, 229, 230, 233,
235, 238, 244, 246, 254, 255, 286,
293, 298, 347, 349, 352, 355, 358,
362, 363, 364, 366, 367, 372, 373,
374, 381, 395, 398, 400, 401, 402,
405, 414, 416, 422, 425, 429, 433,
471, 473, 478, 479, 483
Wadey, Capt M. G., 268
Waite, Col Hon. F., 81
Warren, Capt J. Le B., 412
Washbourn, Maj G. W., 186
Watson, Lt-Col C. N., 287
Wavell, Fd Mshl Earl, 50, 52, 53, 60, 62, 72, 83, 89, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 118, 121, 150, 161, 215, 216, 233, 234, 362, 363, 364, 365, 371, 447, 467, 468, 475, 476, 477, 480
Webster, Maj C. E., 186
Weichs, Fd Mshl, 158
Wellman, Pte R. C., 275
Wheeler, Lt C. M., 413
White, Gen Sir B., 17
Whyte, Lt-Col G. H., 64
Wilder, Lt-Col N. P., 449
Wilkinson, Capt H. W., 370
Will, Lt-Col J. H., 8
Willis, Capt H. F., 454
Wilson, Fd Mshl Lord, 59, 83, 100, 107, 109, 121, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 155, 156, 160, 163, 165, 167, 173, 174, 190, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 215, 216, 217, 218, 221, 225, 227, 229, 230, 233, 254, 285, 312, 362, 363, 364, 366, 367, 372, 400, 405, 406, 408, 413, 425, 427, 472, 473, 474, 485
Wilson, Maj C., 187
Wilson, Capt F. E., 346
Wilson, WO II P. G., 405
Windsor Castle, 85
Witt, Maj, 199
Wood, Capt A. C., 403
Woolcott, Maj H. C. S., 352
Worsnop, Lt-Col J. A., 377
Yeoman, Capt A. C., 387
Zarkos Force, 230
Editorial Advisory Panel
Professor N. C. Phillips, MA, University of Canterbury
Professor J. Rutherford, MA (
Professor F. L. W. Wood, MA (Oxon), Victoria University of
Wellington
This volume was produced and published by the
The Department gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance given in the production of this volume by Professor N. C. Phillips.
the author:
Lieutenant McClymont compiled the official narrative for the history
of the campaign in The Exploration
of New Zealand, one of the series of volumes published by the New
Zealand Government to mark the Dominion's centennial in
r. e. owen, government printer, wellington, new zealand— 1959