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BETWEEN September 1939 and August 1945 rather more than
55,000 New Zealanders joined the Royal New Zealand Air Force.
Of these, over 10,000 were transferred and served with the Royal Air
Force, in whose ranks, along with airmen from the other members of
the Commonwealth, they were to be found in every theatre of war
and in almost every unit. Their story is being told by Wing Commander
H. L. Thompson in his history of New Zealanders with the Royal Air
Force. Of the other 45,000, nearly 15,000 served overseas at some
time or other in the
The object of this volume is twofold: to record the development
of the Royal New Zealand Air Force in New Zealand from the time
of its earliest beginnings; and to give an account of the part New
Zealand airmen played, first in the unsuccessful defence of
In the eyes of the world the
Much of the material used has been taken from official documents
and files; but such sources rarely tell a complete story. I have been
fortunate in being able to fill in many gaps with first-hand information,
not only on the
My thanks are due also to the staffs of the
Unless otherwise credited, the photographs come from the Royal New
Zealand Air Force official collection, the photographers' names being
stated where they are known.
The occupations given in the biographical footnotes are those on enlistment. The ranks are the highest held.
THE Royal New Zealand Air Force in its present form dates
from
The history of service aviation in New Zealand, though, goes
back to the early nineteen-twenties, while the idea of an air force
began before the First World War. The passing of the
One of the first New Zealanders to appreciate the possibilities
of aircraft was the Hon. Henry Wigram. Sir Henry F. Wigram, Kt; born England,
Speaking in the Legislative Council in Gen Sir Alexander J. Godley, GCB, KCMG, Legion of Honour (Fr); born
Later in the same year Lieutenant Burn, NZSC,
By
In Britain a group of business men formed a committee known
as the Imperial Air Fleet Committee, ‘to strengthen the resources
of the Empire in aerial craft, in view of the great advances made
in this direction by foreign powers.’ A subscription list was
opened by the Evening Standard for the purchase of aircraft for
the Dominions, and the first one bought was presented to the New
Zealand Government.
The machine was a two-seater monoplane Specification: ‘Bleriot Monoplane -X1–2 type; 2 seats for pilot and passenger arranged tandem fashion. The motor is the latest 80 hp Gnome Engine. The length of the machine is 28 feet and the span 30 feet. The weight about 860 lb. when empty, and it is guaranteed to fly at a speed of over 70 miles an hour in calm air.’
Meanwhile it had been announced that New Zealand would use
the aircraft as the nucleus of an Aviation Corps. Its arrival,
however, raised some problems for the Government. Lieutenant
Burn was still in England, and no member of the Military Forces
in New Zealand was competent either to fly it or to service it.
The Government apparently was a little awed by the modern
marvel which it had acquired. The Minister of Defence,
Mr J. Allen, wrote to the Aviation School at
Instructions were received from the Aviation School, together
with the discomforting advice that ‘this machine is a highly
There were claims from various parts of the country for the
location of the first aerodrome.
‘Britannia’ was put on show at the Auckland Exhibition at the
end of
When war broke out in
If war had not broken out in
General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had visited New Zealand as
Inspector-General of Overseas Forces early in
Towards the end of
In
Two years later, in The Royal Flying Corps and the
Practical work in the training of pilots during the war years was
done by private enterprise in two flying schools, one the New
Zealand Flying School at Kohimarama on the Auckland Harbour,
and the other the
The Walsh brothers had at first tried to build a land plane, but
after a series of unhappy experiences had decided to try their hand
at a flying boat. It was still under construction when war broke out
and was finally launched at Bastion Point,
The negotiations with the Imperial Government occupied most
of the year
The first course of three pilots, K. L. Caldwell,
The Flying Training School at
The first course, which lasted five weeks, consisted of six pupils,
all of whom qualified for their pilots’ certificates on
Flying training consisted of taxi-ing, ‘straights’ —taking off and landing in a straight line within the boundary of the aerodrome— circuits and, finally, figure-of-eight turns. The average amount of dual instruction before a pupil did his first solo was from three to four hours, and after another three hours' flying he was ready for his passing-out test.
Ground training was cut to a minimum to save time, as the RFC wanted pilots to be trained and sent overseas as quickly as possible; but whenever the weather was too bad for flying, pupils had practical experience in the workshops helping the engineers to build new aircraft and repairing damage caused by their own errors of judgment.
Besides the men who were trained at Kohimarama and
The first air VC ever to be awarded was won by a New
Zealander, Second-Lieutenant W. B. Rhodes-Moorhouse, RFC, the
son of Edward Moorhouse, an early pioneer. During a bombing
raid at Courtrai, he came down to 300 feet to hit his objective and
was severely wounded by rifle and machine-gun fire. He flew back
over 35 miles to his base to make his report, but died the next
day in hospital. His posthumous VC was awarded in
BY the end of the war New Zealand realised the importance of aircraft as a means of defence. The work of the private flying schools had shown that pilots could be successfully trained locally, and this, combined with the recent advances in aviation in other countries, encouraged the Government to take a more active interest. General opinion at the time was that civil rather than military flying should be fostered as it would be cheaper and would still provide potential reserves for wartime use; but the return of hundreds of trained men from overseas seemed to provide a perfect opportunity for the formation of at least the nucleus of an Air Force.
The British Government was asked to send out an officer to advise
on aviation policy, and in response to the request Colonel Bettington,
While he was in New Zealand three officers with Maj A. de Bathe Brandon, DSO, MC, m.i.d.; Heretaunga; born 2 Lt E. T. Shand; born
After examining the country's air defence needs, Bettington made
a report to the Government in
He recommended that the Government should immediately start
to form an
The minimum units required to form an efficient operational
1 Corps reconnaissance and fighter squadron
1 large day-bombing squadron
1 large night-bombing squadron
1 scout fighter squadron
1 squadron of torpedo planes and ship bombers
2 squadrons of large flying boats
1 aircraft depot
2 aircraft parks
All these should be formed immediately in cadre and should be
capable of rapid expansion into fully mobilised units. In addition,
it would be necessary to provide large reserves of men and material
to meet wastage in time of war. A headquarters staff should be
established to administer the force, and a liaison officer should be
appointed to
His final report, presented in July, envisaged a permanent establishment of 70 officers and 299 airmen being attained in four years, while a Territorial force of 174 officers and 1060 airmen was to be built up within eight years. The estimated expenditure on aerodromes, buildings, and equipment in the first four years was £701,250, and the total cost for the same period £1,294,000.
While Colonel Bettington was formulating his recommendations,
the British Government offered New Zealand a hundred aircraft
as a free gift ‘to assist the Dominion to establish an The following types were offered:
DH9 (BHP engine) DH9A (Liberty engine) Bristol Fighter (Arab engine) SE5 (Hispano Suiza engine) Dolphin (Hispano Suiza engine) Avro (Clerget, le Rhone or Mono engine) Salamander (BR2 engine).
No immediate reply was made to the British Government, and in
the meantime Bettington was asked to prepare a less ambitious
scheme. He did so, eliminating three of the squadrons he had
originally planned, and concentrating all land planes at
The appointment of an Air Adviser.
Subsidising the civil flying schools at
Refresher training for ex-
The transfer of a number of Territorial personnel for air training.
The acceptance of some, at least, of the gift aircraft.
The allotment of £25,000 for expenditure on the above.
Experiments with an airmail service.
Thereafter, he returned to England feeling that he had not been
able to accomplish much in New Zealand. The measure of enthusiasm which Bettington's report aroused in New Zealand military circles can be gauged from the fact that by
The aircraft he had brought with him were retained at AVM Sir Leonard M. Isitt, KBE, Legion of Merit (US);
Having disposed of its expert adviser, the Government set up an advisory committee of its own to bring down recommendations concerning aviation generally, and the British offer of aircraft in particular.
After lengthy discussion it was decided to ask for twenty Avros
and nine DH9As, and for six flying boats instead of the balance
of the 100 aircraft originally offered. The request was signalled to
New Zealand then took prompt steps to reserve what aircraft
were then still available, and some months later 33 machines were
shipped out, comprising 20 Avros, 9 DH9s, 2 Bristol Fighters, and
2 DH4s. Of these, when they arrived, six were retained by the
Government and stationed at
It was now generally agreed that, in view of the probable
development of aviation, the problem of defence would involve the
use of land, sea and air forces, and a
The Board consisted of representatives of the various Government
agencies which might have an interest in the subject: the Defence,
Post and Telegraph, Public Works, and Lands and Survey
Departments. Maj-Gen Sir E. W. Chaytor, KCMG, KCVO, CB, ADC, GOC NZ Forces (President);
Brig-Gen G. S. Richardson, CB, CMG, CBE (Brigadier i/c of Administration); Commander T. A. Williams, CBE, RN (Naval Adviser); T. N. Brodrick, OBE, ISO (Lands
and Survey Department); A. Markman and G. McNamara (Post and Telegraph Department); and F. W. Furkert (Public Works Department).
To rectify this oversight Captain Wilkes, NZSC,
On
Policy
The Government to make provision for the development of Aviation along lines which will enable the Dominion to possess civil aviation for commercial and other needs and at the same time provide for the necessities of aerial defence in case of emergency.
Establish an Air Board (already constituted) which will act as an Advisory Body to the Government on:
Matters of Defence
Commercial Undertakings
Aviation Generally
Defence
To advise the Government with respect to:
Purchase, rent and preparation of key aerodromes.
Purchase and maintenance of war aeroplanes, inspection of all Aviation Schools and their equipment by Defence Staff.
Refresher courses for ex R.A.F. fighters.
Defence machines which may be allotted to civil companies.
Survey of routes to be undertaken by officers of the Aviation Branch of the Defence Department, or any competent Aviator deputed by the Air Board.
Commercial
As Defence Aviation owing to the great cost involved, cannot be developed without the development of the commercial side, the Air Board will advise the Government with respect to:
Companies or private individuals that may be subsidised for the conveyance of mails, passengers, etc., on approved routes.
The allotment by way of loan or otherwise of Government machines.
Inspection of privately owned machines.
Regarding the reservation of rights of particular companies or
individuals to fly for hire within prescribed areas.
The Board to make recommendations as to contracts to be entered into for the carriage of mails, passengers, etc. All contracts to be submitted for approval to the Minister in charge and the Postmaster-General and to be confirmed by both.
General
Attention to be paid to meteorological conditions and the Board to recommend in what direction assistance should be given to the Meteorological Department with a view to equipment to meet the needs of Aviation.
All reports and recommendations of the Board to be submitted to the Minister in charge and the Postmaster-General for their joint consideration.
The Board to administer the details of the policy as defined by the Government.
To advise on the necessity for legislation and regulations regarding aviation generally.
In Cabinet.
Recommendations of Hons. Coates and Rhodes
approved.
(Signed) F. W. Thomson,
Secretary.
From the above it can be seen that the policy of the time was to foster civil aviation in the expectation that it could be turned to advantage for defence in time of need. Considering how little was known about flying generally, and the limitations imposed on defence developments by lack of finance, it was quite sensible.
The Air Board met frequently during the latter part of
Their dissatisfaction was not altogether justified. The Government was, admittedly, slow to act on their recommendations, but no more so than most Governments when embarking on an entirely new venture. The mere fact that a statement of policy was issued showed that it was taking an active interest in the matter, and was partly the result of early recommendations by the Board; and a number of other more detailed recommendations were later acted upon.
Concrete proposals which later bore fruit were made early in
In
While policy was being formulated in
His recommendations were not immediately acted upon. As an interim measure, the schools were both subsidised by grants of £150 a month to keep them going until future policy could be decided, and in addition they made a certain amount of revenue from charter flights and joy rides.
In the two years immediately following the war both schools
were employed on experimental airmail services. The first such
flight was made on
Air mails were not a paying proposition, and after trying them the Government reverted to paying straight subsidies to the schools.
In
Captain Isitt, who had been posted to
In
The duties of the embryonic
In
The New Zealand Permanent Air Force (to be part of the Permanent Forces)
The New Zealand Air Force (to be part of the Territorial Forces)
The Permanent Air Force was to be composed of regular officers
and other ranks, and its primary responsibility was to be the training
and administration of the ab initio trainees could be enlisted.
To accommodate the new The total price paid to the company was £31,012 15s 3d, made up as follows:
By the end of Sgt W. S. Simpson, Sgt F. W. Sorrell, and Cadet H. H. Smith.
The
Refresher training for the
Servicing and maintenance during the courses would have been
completely beyond the capabilities of the small permanent staff,
and there were no ground crews among the Territorials. Great
assistance was given by squads of cadets from the Technical College
in
The refresher courses were repeated each summer, but every year it became more difficult to keep the aircraft serviceable, while the number of officers attending steadily dwindled.
At the same time, despite its difficulties, the Permanent Air Force
enlarged the scope of its activities. During 1924 and 1925, aircraft
from
While the newborn
Finally, in
It was intended that Captain Isitt should command the new base
when it was built, and in
Up to the middle of The amounts voted and expended on aviation during the years 1920–30 were:YearVotedExpendedab initio pilots and mechanics to provide an efficient
The serviceable aircraft held by the New Zealand Permanent Air
Force at that time numbered fourteen. Five of them (two DH4s,
two DH9s, and a Bristol Fighter) were some of the original gift
machines presented by the British Government after the war, and
were practically at the end of their useful lives. Six were Avro
504Ks, dual-control training machines, which had been acquired in
In the years 1927–28 some progress was made. Two aircraft
hands were enlisted into the NZPAF, of which the strength was now
five officers and fourteen other ranks. Aircraft co-operated with
Territorial Army units in the
Of the original
Applications for training as pilots had been invited by
advertising in the press, and three hundred were received. The ten
applicants selected, who included a number of university students,
were commissioned second-lieutenants on probation. They were
posted to
The aerodrome site at
Towards the end of Marshal of the RAF Sir John M. Salmond, GCB, CMG, CVO, DSO; born
At the time the New Zealand Permanent Air Force consisted
of five officers and seventeen other ranks, stationed at Defence
Headquarters in
In his report Salmond recommended that the NZPAF should be
built up to an ultimate strength of nine permanent units, Major Wilkes, who was continually trying to obtain increased recognition for the
UnitBase
If the foregoing recommendations were adopted, Salmond
considered that the Air Board constituted in
Although a number of factors, notably the financial depression
of the early thirties, prevented Salmond's major proposals from
taking effect, a number of his other suggestions bore fruit. The
appointment of the Hon. Thomas Wilford as Minister of Defence,
following the general election of
Towards the end of
While he was away his place as Director of Air Services was
taken by Wing Commander
In
Army uniforms continued to be worn for some time longer. The
first issue of
At the beginning of
In the years 1929 and 1930 there was a considerable increase in
the military uses of the
In Dunedin was sent from New Zealand
to restore order. She carried on board a Moth seaplane, with Flight
Lieutenant
During the same year, Fairey III and Moth seaplanes from
Achilles and
At the time of the Murchison earthquake in
Between 1928 and 1930 plans were laid for the formation of a
properly constituted OC Territorial Wing NZAF, Wg Cdr K. L. Caldwell, MC, DFC.
Officers not allotted to units were posted to the nearest flight to their place of residence.(Army Co-operation) Squadron: Headquarters:
(Bomber) Squadron: Headquarters:
(Bomber) Squadron: Headquarters:
(Army Co-operation) Squadron: Otago and SouthlandHeadquarters: Dunedin
OC, Sqn Ldr P. K. Fowler
An officer of the Permanent Air Force was posted to each
squadron as adjutant, and the initial strength of the wing was
sixty-six officers. Of these, sixty were members of the old Territorial
Pilots were expected to do a fortnight's refresher course each year
at
During the depression the development of the
Shortages of aircraft and personnel were serious. Machines were
deteriorating to the point of unserviceability, and the staff was
insufficient to maintain them. An increase in the number of airmen
at both
Nevertheless, some progress was made during the period. In
At the end of At 1 Fairey IIIF (equipped with floats and undercarriage) 1 Saunders Roe ‘Cutty Sark’ flying boat. 3 DH Moths (including 1 seaplane) At Wigram— 3 Gloster Grebes (obsolete) 5 Bristol Fighters (obsolete) 4 Hawker Tomtits (trainers) 3 DH Moths (trainers) 1 Puss Moth (trainer) 1 DH50 (4-seater passenger aircraft)
Early in
The middle thirties saw the end of the depression and the end of
disarmament in
In
The march of events overseas, coupled with improved economic conditions, resulted in considerably more attention being given to the Royal New Zealand Air Force. In the year 1934–35 the sum of £197,934 was voted for military aviation, exclusive of the cost of land and works which came out of the Public Works vote. Of this, £132,230 was actually spent, compared with £38,548 in the previous year.
Early in
At Wigram, which was to be developed as a Flying Training School, considerable expansion took place also during the period. New buildings included two concrete hangars, a concrete workshop block, two large concrete stores, barracks and married quarters.
Personnel strength was increased, and by
In
The next year four Avro 626 training aircraft arrived and were
put into use at Wigram. They were a type used by the
By
Under the pressure of world events New Zealand was becoming
more alive to the need for air power, and the change of Government
which occurred in
IN
Early in the year the Government decided to establish the Air
Force as a separate service removed from Army control, and
Squadron Leader Wilkes, as Director of Air Services, was instructed
to prepare a scheme and work out the costs. This was the fulfilment
of the aim for which Wilkes had been working for many years;
but he declined to tackle the job, saying that any worthwhile scheme
would be extremely expensive, and that if he or any other New
Zealand officer produced one, it would be turned down on that
account. He advised that, if the Government was serious in its
proposal, it should once again ask for the loan of an adviser from
the
As a result Air Chf Mshl the Hon Sir Ralph Cochrane, GBE, KCB, AFC;
In his initial report which he presented in
Local defence.
The defence of shipping routes.
The security of the
He suggested that the
Taking all factors into consideration, he recommended that the
New Zealand Air Force should maintain two medium bomber
squadrons capable of locating and attacking enemy raiders before
they reached the New Zealand coast, and which would have
sufficient range to reach bases in the South Pacific or, if necessary,
to fly to
He recommended:
That the Royal New Zealand Air Force should be constituted as a separate service controlled by an Air Board under the direction of the Minister of Defence.
That it should consist initially of two permanent squadrons equipped with medium bomber aircraft with a total first-line strength of twenty-four, and the necessary repair facilities and reserves of aircraft.
That a reserve of personnel should be instituted which might at present be based on the numbers required to maintain two medium bomber and one army co-operation squadrons in the conditions of a major war. These personnel were to be trained to a standard which would enable them to take their places in squadrons on active service. The question of the formation of Territorial squadrons was to await consideration on a future occasion.
That civil air transport should continue to be encouraged with the object of enabling it to take its place in the transport system of the country and thus provide a valuable backing to the regular air force. The aero club movement should also be supported.
That the Government of the
He further recommended that the provision of the resources referred to above, and the facilities necessary for their operation, should be spread over a period of three years.
To put these recommendations into effect, he suggested that all
aircraft and personnel should be concentrated at
He estimated that the capital cost of the scheme would be
£1,124,000 sterling. From this the value of aerodromes and
buildings already in existence could be deducted, but the net cost was
still £1,100,000. This included the building of a permanent station
for two bomber squadrons, the cost of the aircraft and reserves, the
provision of bombs and bomb storage, additional construction at
The recommendation concerning the establishment of the Royal
New Zealand Air Force as a separate service was put into effect on
The strength of the
Wing Commander Cochrane was asked to stay in New Zealand
and develop the
The new Air Department was modelled in miniature on the lines
of the British Air Ministry. The Air Board consisted of the Minister
of Defence, the Hon. F. Jones, chairman; the Chief of Air Staff,
Group Captain Cochrane; the Air Force Member for Personnel,
AVM Sir Arthur de T. Nevill, KBE, CB, Legion of Merit (US);
A separate branch was formed within the Department, under the direction of Wing Commander Wilkes as Controller of Civil Aviation, to deal with civil flying. Where matters were under discussion involving co-ordination between civil and service aviation, the Controller of Civil Aviation sat as a member of the Air Board. This organisation enabled a pooling of such resources as were required by both branches of the Department—civil meteorological service, wireless and navigation aids, aerodromes and emergency landing fields, etc.
To provide a core of experienced officers in building up the new
In addition, a number of New Zealanders serving with the
Early in
A survey was made of possible sites for the location of an
aerodrome to accommodate the bomber squadrons. Eventually it
Twin-engined bombers, of geodetic construction, made by Vickers-Armstrong, with a
maximum speed of 250 m.p.h. and a cruising range of 2500 miles.
It was anticipated that, under the programme approved, the
strength of the Regular Air Force would be 100 officers and 900
airmen, compared with the total personnel of just over one hundred
which existed at the end of
During the next two years three supplementary expansion programmes were approved. Later in
Early in
Five months before war broke out Group Captain H. W. L.
Saunders, Air Chf Mshl Sir Hugh Saunders, KCB, KBE, MC, DFC, MM, Legion of Merit (US);
born Johannesburg,
The development of flying training in the years immediately
preceding the outbreak of war had two main objectives: to train
Since
During the late twenties considerably more New Zealanders
arrived in England and applied for entry into the
In
Flying training started in earnest at
The flying training course comprised ab initio, intermediate and
advanced training, covering a period of nine months. The school
was organised into two flights. Squadron Leader
In
Between
In
It was estimated that there were in New Zealand at that time
approximately fifty pilots who either were instructors or could
be classed as such after a short course, and it was considered that at
least half of the pupils completing the full pilots' training course
at
The Pacific Defence Conference attended by representatives of the
The most important point in the South Pacific from New
Zealand's point of view was
As far as the
As a result of discussions at the conference, New Zealand's
original plan to give wartime training to 1000 pilots annually was
changed. An amended proposal was adopted which was to provide
instead approximately 650 pilots, 300 observers, and 350 air-gunners.
The change was due to the impossibility of providing facilities for
training so large a number of pilots within the proposed expansion
of the
In addition to supplying aircrew to the
While the preliminary work was being done for the setting up
of the organisation, the Chief of Air Staff proposed to carry out an
immediate expansion to increase New Zealand's contribution to the
Another development in
The New Zealand Government asked the British Government if
it was prepared to contribute to the cost of the extra aircraft
required to enable the expansion to take place. The Home Government replied that it could not make a direct contribution, but agreed
With the expansion of the Regular Air Force proceeding, the
The four squadrons which had been established in
The demands of the regular force's expansion programme limited the finance and training facilities available for a Territorial Air Force; but it was considered that properly constituted and equipped Territorial squadrons could play an important part in home defence and coastal patrol work, and that their formation would be justified. As their role would not involve them in continued contact with the enemy, they could be manned by older and less highly trained men than the regular squadrons, and equipped with older and less expensive aircraft. Furthermore, their employment would release the regular squadrons for duty elsewhere.
Consequently, it was decided to form squadrons in each of the
four main centres, and equip them with obsolescent aircraft which
could be bought cheaply from the
In
It was to be organised as three flights. No. 1, a reconnaissance
flight, was to be equipped with twin-engined civil aircraft which
would be taken over on the outbreak of war. It was to be manned,
as far as possible, by the personnel normally operating the aircraft.
Nos. 2 and 3 flights were to be equipped with six Baffins each. One
aircraft per flight was to be kept at
By
The squadron's aircraft arrived in March and flying training was
begun. In May the Chief of Air Staff ordered a public display by
the Achilles, and at the end of the
year exercises were carried out with HMS
Recruiting for the Christchurch Territorial Squadron began in
Starting in October, a number of refresher courses were held at
In
The Auckland Territorial Squadron was formed in
At the end of
In addition a further twenty-one Territorial officers had been
appointed, but were not attached to any particular squadrons. The
Dunedin Squadron, although it had been authorised, had not been
formed when war broke out. In June and July, on account of the
imminence of war, all available
A useful part, supplementary to the activities of the
The basic training given by the clubs was potentially of great
value in preparing pilots for the
In addition a Civil Reserve of Pilots was instituted; it was open
to candidates who reached the required standard of education and
physical fitness and who volunteered to serve in the
The numbers to be trained by the clubs under these schemes were
limited to fifty
The scheme was under the general supervision of the Air Member
for Personnel, Group Captain Isitt. Flight Lieutenant
The scheme was reviewed in
In
Men between the ages of 22 and 55 were invited to enrol, and by
doing so were required, in the event of war, to join the
Enrolment forms were distributed to all post offices by 20
December, and three weeks later a total of 3845 applications had
been received, comprising 655 Group I (professional men),
During the following year as many of the reservists as possible
were interviewed by investigating officers appointed for the purpose,
The expansion of the
The two schemes were combined, and technical training centres
were opened in each of the railway workshops. The first to begin
training was at Hutt, in
When war broke out, although the projected peacetime expansion
of the
The Vickers Wellington aircraft which had been ordered for the
two permanent bomber squadrons were being collected at Marham
in England, where a number of
The Territorial squadrons at
The aircraft available comprised the obsolescent service-type
machines of the Territorial squadrons, and others in use at the
Flying Training School at
The strength of the
The Headquarters organisation which had been developed over
the past two and a half years comprised the Chief of Air Staff, Group
Captain Saunders, who had succeeded Group Captain Cochrane in
DURING the last week in
On the 27th all personnel in the Armed Forces were recalled from
leave and naval control of shipping was instituted. The next day
the first mobilisation instruction was issued, ordering that in the
event of general mobilisation the
On 1 September the Governor-General issued a proclamation of
emergency, a proclamation transferring the Reserve to the Regular
On the 2nd the British Government signalled that the
‘Precautionary’ stage had been adopted against
The Territorial squadrons were immediately called up for
mobilisation. The Christchurch Squadron reported for duty at
The Auckland Territorial Squadron mobilised at
Three days after war was declared the Wellington Squadron
moved from
Although the war training organisation was incomplete, enough
personnel and equipment were available to put it partially into
action. It was decided, therefore, to proceed at once with a modified
war training scheme, using what aircraft and instructors there were,
and to expand the organisation as quickly as possible. The
programme called for the immediate establishment of a recruit
training school and a flying instructors' school. Elementary flying
training schools were to be formed at
On 11 September Air Department issued a call for volunteers,
both for aircrew and for ground staff. The response was excellent,
although applications from the Civil Reserve of Ground Staff were
not as many as expected. Volunteers were required to serve for the
duration of the war, either in the The insistence on educational standards evoked a number of letters to Air Department
and to the Minister of Defence on the subject of class distinction, and complaints to the
effect that it was not fair that only those who could afford a higher education should be
able to volunteer for aircrew.
It soon became apparent, however, that if conditions of enlistment were not changed the supply of men with the necessary educational qualifications would be exhausted fairly soon, while many potentially good men would be lost to aircrew because they just failed to come up to the educational requirements. In November, therefore, the requirements were modified as follows:
Pilots had to be educated to approximately University Entrance standard;
Air observers must have had two years' secondary education; and
Air-gunners must be able to be taught to send and receive Morse.
Conditions of enlistment for non-flying personnel were that they
should be physically fit, up to
Two selection committees were set up in Air Department, one for aircrew and the other for ground crew. The committees toured New Zealand interviewing candidates in the different centres.
The first necessity for carrying out the training plan was a
flying instructors' school. This was formed at the Auckland Aero
Club's aerodrome at
Trainees did approximately a hundred hours' flying in their course, of which ten hours were dual instruction with a staff instructor. For the remainder of the time pupils flew in pairs practising their ‘patter’ upon one another. All phases of flying were practised, including aerobatics, instrument flying and night flying. After the third or fourth course lectures were introduced covering airmanship, the art of instructing, etc.
The first Elementary Flying Training School to open was No. 1
EFTS at
Squadron Leader Stedman was appointed Commanding Officer
with Flying Officer
The first course of sixteen acting pilot officers arrived on the
opening day, and at the last minute a further sixteen Civil Reserve
pilots were posted to the school for a short refresher course before
going to Wigram. The majority of them were partially trained
aero club pilots who, but for the outbreak of war, would have gone
direct to
No. 2 Elementary Flying Training School was formed at Bell
Block,
The last flying training school to begin operations before the end
of the year was No. 2 FTS at
The operational station at
In order to man the flying training schools a large increase in
technical and administrative staff was necessary. A number of
tradesmen registered in the Civil Reserve were enlisted and posted to
stations after a short disciplinary course. It was also necessary to
form a second Technical Training Depot in addition to the one
already operating at Two classes of wireless operators had been trained at Training on a wartime basis started in Initial numbers under training were 60 (two classes of wireless operators and one of
wireless electrical mechanics). In December two more classes of wireless operators started
training, making the total strength 100. In
An
An Initial Training School was formed at
Early in November it was decided to delay the development of
Recruits for aircrew were posted on enlistment to the Ground
Training School, or the Initial Training Wing as it later became
known. There they were formally attested, kitted, and given a four
weeks' course of basic service training and drill. They attended
lectures in subjects which would help them in their future careers,
including elementary navigation, mathematics, airmanship,
The pilots then did an eight-weeks' course at an EFTS. There
they divided their time equally between learning to fly elementary
aircraft and continuing their ground studies. Besides learning to
fly light aircraft, they were also trained in elementary map reading
and pilot navigation. The basic training given at elementary schools
varied little throughout the war, although by
Flying instruction was the responsibility of the Chief Flying Instructor, and the instructing staff was organised into flights of from six to nine instructors. Ground instruction and the general discipline of pupils were the responsibility of the Chief Ground Instructor, who had under him a number of officers and NCOs who instructed the pupils in their various subjects. The pupils were divided into squads, each squad spending half the day on lectures and the other half flying.
From EFTS those pupils who had passed their tests successfully graduated to an SFTS. There they spent eight weeks in the Intermediate Training Squadron learning to fly service-type aircraft, and then passed on to the Advanced Training Squadron for another eight weeks and learnt how to apply their flying training in air gunnery, bombing, and navigational exercises. As at EFTS, they spent half their time at lectures, under the control of the Chief Ground Instructor, and half in flying.
The Chief Flying Instructor, who was also Officer Commanding
Intermediate Training Squadron, was responsible for pure flying
training and also for airfield discipline for the whole station. The
Officer Commanding Advanced Training Squadron was responsible
for all the applied flying training. New Zealand was the only
country operating under the Commonwealth Air Training Plan in
which the SFTSs retained the two-squadron organisation with a
distinct break between intermediate and advanced training. In the
latter part of the war at No. 1 SFTS,
Those pupils who successfully passed out of ATS were posted to
the
Observers and air-gunners went to
Observers, whose first four weeks' ground training was the same as that of the air-gunners, remained at the school for a further eight weeks, specialising in navigation. Their flying training comprised navigational exercises and bombing.
When it was decided to reduce the educational requirements for
aircrew recruits, it was clear that a system of pre-entry training would
be necessary to bring those who had not had sufficient secondary
education up to a standard high enough to enable them to cope
Prospective aircrew trainees who did not appear to measure up to educational requirements were obliged to complete the course after being accepted by the selection committee and before being called up for service training. At first those who already had sufficient educational qualifications did not have to do the pre-entry course. After a few weeks, however, it was found that men who were nominally up to standard were at a disadvantage on entering their service training in comparison with those who had done the pre-entry course. It was therefore decided that all except those with very high qualifications should take the course.
In towns where there were twenty or more applicants, instruction was given in evening classes, in most cases in secondary schools or technical colleges. Where there were not sufficient numbers to warrant the formation of a class, and also for men living in the country, correspondence courses were conducted from Air Department.
As the peacetime expansion of the
Supplies of uniforms and clothing were also difficult to obtain, largely because of the heavy Army contracts which were being filled.
Large orders for all types of equipment were placed in the United
Kingdom through the New Zealand Liaison Officer in
The very rapid expansion of the
In the branch of the Chief of Air Staff, which was responsible for training, the following appointments were made. Squadron Leader E. M. F. Grundy became Air I, responsible for operations and operational training and for liaison with Army and Navy. Flight Lieutenant J. D. Canning was appointed Air II, responsible for intelligence and internal security. Squadron Leader Olson was appointed TF I (Training Flying I), and was responsible for the training carried out at all FTSs, the training of flying instructors, of air-gunners and observers, and of recruits. Flight Lieutenant J. Buckeridge was designated TF II, and was responsible for flying training at EFTSs, and for training at all ground training schools. Flight Lieutenant P. E. Hudson became T Nav, responsible for navigation training and photographic training. Squadron Leader L. Crocker was appointed T Tech, in charge of technical training of all personnel at schools of technical training. Flight Lieutenant I. A. Scott became T Sigs, in charge of the training of signals personnel and also responsible for communications and the maintenance of electrical and wireless equipment.
The Equipment Branch, which at the beginning of September had a strength of two officers, one NCO and two civilian clerks, expanded in two months to seven officers and thirty clerks.
Other sections of Headquarters grew likewise. All new personnel had to be initiated into the workings of the service and had to learn their various duties as they did them. The lack of experienced staff was a serious obstacle to the efficient administration of the service, and gave rise to problems which became apparent later; but, considering the difficulties of the time, the organisation worked well.
THE German successes in
It was therefore proposed to form fifty flying training schools, of
which twenty-five would be for advanced training, in other parts of
the Empire. The obvious country for the location of the main part
of the training scheme was Pre-war planning had provided for a large expansion of training throughout the Empire,
and after the
Towards the end of September the scheme was proposed to the
When the New Zealand mission arrived in This represented five-ninths of the total of 20,000 pilots and 30,000 aircrew required
The remaining four-ninths were to be trained in the
The suggested allotment of trainees to the three Dominions
worked out at a ratio of 12, 10 and 3 for
The delegation also pointed out that if all advanced training was
carried out in
The agreement finally reached between the
After finishing their training in
Altogether seven squadrons with New Zealand identity were later
formed in the
New Zealand's contribution to the cost of training in
Under this agreement New Zealand's commitments had increased
considerably beyond the 650 fully trained pilots and 650 observers
and air-gunners which the
To do this the flying training schools already in existence or
planned had to be expanded and a fourth EFTS was necessary. The
Air Gunners' and Observers' School at
The first draft of 72 wireless operator/air-gunners was scheduled
to leave for
Throughout Air Mshl Sir Robert Clark-Hall, KBE, CMG, DSO; Ark Royal at Dardanelles, 1915–16; commanded No. 1
Wing,
The training of observers and air-gunners at
In
In September the New Zealand War Cabinet approved proposals
made by the British Government for the speeding up of training
still further. These comprised a reduction in the length of each
stage of flying training from eight weeks to six, and an increase of
25 per cent in the number of pupils in the flying schools without
increasing the numbers of instructors or aircraft. These measures
had already been adopted in the training organisation in
To provide for the greater number of pupils going through, accommodation at the Initial Training Wing had to be more than doubled and a slight increase in accommodation was necessary at the flying schools.
The intake into the Initial Training Wing was increased in
November. It had been proposed to form a second ITW at
To take some of the load of ground training off the flying
schools the pilots' course at ITW was lengthened from four weeks
to six, beginning with the course starting in December. At the same
time, the ITW course for observers was lengthened to eight weeks
to raise the standard of their initial training before they went to
As a result of these changes the output of fully trained pilots was
increased to a total of approximately 1480 a year, while that of
partially trained pilots to be sent to
In
Training was carried on throughout
A request in October that New Zealand should increase the
number of pilots sent to
Commitments for observers, which had remained unchanged since
the beginning of the Commonwealth Plan, were increased in
September when the RCAF, at the request of
At the end of
New Zealand agreed that courses should be extended, and in
The rapid expansion of the flying training organisation in 1940–41
had necessitated a corresponding increase in the training of technical
personnel. At the beginning of the war No. 1 Technical Training
School had been formed at
In
The Recruit Training Depot for airmen in ground trades was
moved in July from
Early enlistments into technical trades had included many men,
some of them members of the Civil Reserve, who were already well
qualified and required little training to adapt them to the needs of
their respective
In
By the end of
From
The name of the organisation was finally standardised as the
The Corps contained three types of units—town units, school
units and country units. In
The spread of the war to the
Up to
An extensive reorganisation of the flying training schools was
necessary to meet the Japanese threat. It was decided to concentrate
training as far as possible in the
The reorganisation did not affect the output of aircrew to
No major changes had taken place since the beginning of the
war in the conditions of enlistment for aircrew beyond some
Aircrew and non-flying reserves for the
In view of this it was decided that the Army should call up
attested recruits and applicants for the
By the end of
Volunteering by civilians with no military obligations.
Volunteering by civilians drawn in Armed Forces' ballots.
Volunteering by soldiers.
Withdrawals from the
This method gave a complete coverage, and every man, whether in
civilian life or in the Army, was given an opportunity to volunteer
for the
In
The system of pre-entry instruction by classes or correspondence,
which had been begun in the early months of the war, continued
until
Between the end of May and the beginning of October, Aerodrome Defence Units were formed on some nineteen stations with established strengths of 100, 150 or 200, according to the size of the station. The trainees spent about half their time in general service training, which was a prerequisite of their subsequent aircrew training and at the same time helped to fit them for defending aerodromes against possible attack. The other half was spent in educational training to bring them up to the standard necessary for entry into the Initial Training Wing—or, in the case of electrical and wireless personnel, into the Electrical and Wireless School.
Conditions in ADUs varied considerably according to the
geographical layout of the stations and their particular defence
needs. The units were housed in hutted camps, in some cases a
mile or more from the parent station, as at
In order to standardise educational training recruits for different
categories were, as far as possible, grouped on different stations.
Electrical and wireless trainees were posted to the ADUs at
By the end of
In order to make the pre-flying training as progressive as possible, and also to provide employment for the large numbers of men who were thrown up by the Aerodrome Defence Units and awaiting absorption into the flying training organisation proper, the Ground Training Squadrons were classified as Elementary and Advanced squadrons. A trainee normally went through EGTS and AGTS.
It was intended that recruits who had satisfactorily completed
their course in the
The sequence of pre-flying training at the end of
As all the pre-flying training schools were at different stations,
trainees spent much of their time travelling. In some cases they
had to cross Cook Strait four times during this stage of their career.
In addition to the loss of time involved, this further taxed the
country's already overburdened transport system. It therefore
became desirable to group the whole of pre-flying training in one
area, preferably, in accordance with general training policy, in the
In
A statistical survey taken at this period showed that the number
of men in New Zealand educationally suited for aircrew training
was 5800 of whom 4000 had volunteered for pilot training. On
the basis of the figures quoted above, only 1200 were likely to be
called up within the next year. Taking into account the new
potential aircrew in the ATC, there were likely to be 3400 potential
pilots awaiting training by
Operational requirements in the latter part of
By the end of
By
To cope with the surplus of trained and partially trained pilots
in New Zealand who were not required for
It was estimated that by December some 800 New Zealand pilots
would have completed training, including the backlog in
In
The rapid reduction in overseas commitments and the prospect of
the repatriation of many trained and partially trained pilots from
Thus by the end of the year flying training was carried out on a
reduced scale sufficient to meet the requirements of operational
squadrons in the
With the closing down of the British Commonwealth Air
Training Plan and the cessation of the demand for pilots in the
There were already enough single-engine pilots under training
to provide the required output without further recruiting until
Between October 1944 and April 1945 approximately 1100 men
returned from
In
During the war some 2743 pilots were fully trained in New
Zealand and sent overseas to serve with the
In addition some 2910 pilots were trained to elementary standard
and sent to
Of the 131,000 trainees who graduated in
THE responsibility for directing New Zealand's war effort lay
with the Cabinet—or rather, after
In
In
In
By
After the war started the original function of the ONS, that of
preparation, was at an end; but the committees continued to act
as consultative and deliberative bodies and the organisation, within
the Prime Minister's Department, was responsible for co-ordination
of the country's total war effort. The secretary (Major Stevens was
succeeded in Foss Shanahan;
Early in
In
The link between the services and the
Although the
There were no long-range military aircraft in the country, and no modern ones at all. For defence against attack there were only the Territorial squadrons armed with Baffins and Vildebeestes, and a number of Fairey Gordons in the training organisation which could be used in an emergency. Of the Territorial units, only the Wellington Squadron had made much progress with its training.
In the early months of the war the three squadrons concentrated
on operational training, and by early in
A number of their pilots were withdrawn to form, with ex-aero
club instructors, a nucleus of instructors and staff pilots in the
training organisation. This, coupled with the fact that some of
their aircraft were needed to meet training requirements, resulted
in the units being large flights rather than fully manned and
equipped squadrons. Two of the flights, those at Awarua and
Early in the war
New Zealand then asked for twenty-four Hudsons to be sent instead of the Vincents, but this request had to be refused owing to the general shortage.
The first air operation of the war carried out in New Zealand
waters was a search by aircraft of the Auckland GR Squadron in the
latter part of
Early in Ramillies and the cruisers
Operations of the German raider Orion and her attendant ships in
New Zealand waters in the second half of Niagara, bound from
In August the Orion sank the Turakina some 400 miles west of
Cape Egmont. Patrols of the area were made by TEA flying boats,
and by De Havilland Dragon aircraft from the Observers' School at
Holmwood and the Rangitane. Again both sinkings
occurred outside the effective range of any service aircraft. A flight
of Vincents was sent to operate from
Although these incidents showed how weak the
Besides giving what protection it could to shipping in New
Zealand waters, the
By
The Kaiwarra on 1 November and arrived at
The advance party carried with it most of the detachment's equipment: transport vehicles, timber, building materials, petrol, oil, and miscellaneous stores, as well as its aircraft. These comprised four DH89 Dragon Rapides, modified and equipped for operational flying, and one DH60 Moth for communications. Fuselages were carried on deck with engines and undercarriages attached, and the mainplanes and tail assemblies were crated and stowed between decks.
The morning after the ship arrived unloading began. The aircraft
were lowered into lighters and towed the four or five miles round
the coast to
The men lived in tents at Namaka, two miles from the aerodrome,
where the New Zealand Army had built a camp. For some months,
while they were quartered there, they were attached to the Army
for rations, canteen, postal and medical services, and all supplies
not peculiar to the
Progress with the building programme at
The party which went to
The party on the west coast, consisting of six officers and forty-two
other ranks, was designated the Detached Flight,
On 17 November, eleven days after the advance party had landed,
the first of the DH89s had been assembled and was flown at Rangatira and
Monowai which were bringing troops and supplies to
Regular operations included periodic reconnaissance of outlying
islands where enemy shipping might be sheltering, particularly in the
Lau Group; escorts for shipping entering and leaving
Flying activities were severely curtailed early in
They could not easily be spared from New Zealand as there were
only three others of the same type in the country, but the only other
operational aircraft available were single-engined Vincents and
Vildebeestes, which were not considered suitable for reconnaissance
work round
It was intended that eventually the unit should be equipped with
flying boats and Hudsons. As neither of these types was available
it carried on as best it could with the De Havillands. In August,
however, the
On 8 October the unit was formally constituted a squadron and became known as No. 4 (General Reconnaissance) Squadron.
At the same time as aerodromes were planned in
Both the
In April an RAAF Empire-type flying boat landed on the harbour,
and the captain reported that although
Work was begun on the construction of shore facilities at Lauthala
Bay in September and temporary moorings were installed. It was
apparent, however, that before it could be made into a satisfactory
operational base a breakwater would have to be built. In the
meantime such aircraft as could would have to operate from
On 18 November the Wing Commander Baird, with aircrews and a small servicing party, had been sent to
They flew to The servicing party, under Sergeants J. W. Cook and I. Walthers, had to be left behind
and was attached to No. 205 Squadron RAF. The men, in company with other
The flying boats and their crews were formed into a unit and
called No. 5 (GR) Squadron. They started operations in January
A new urgency was given to all defensive preparations in the
See map facing p. 115.
Shortly before American help did not materialise.
No. 2 Aerodrome Construction Squadron
By the end of 800,000 cubic yards of earth was moved, and 20,000 tons of cement and 3 ½ million super
feet of timber were used in the construction.
While the defences of
No. 1 Squadron continued to be responsible for patrolling the
approaches to
In
The squadron at
When the new squadrons were first formed, they contained a
nucleus of experienced officers who were posted as commanding
The Baffins of No. 3 Squadron were two-seater machines and were not fitted with dual control. The method of instructing a new pilot to fly them was simple. An experienced pilot flew the aircraft while the trainee stood in the gunner's cockpit and looked over into the front cockpit to see how it was done. After a flight the new pilot climbed over into the front seat and tried his hand at a solo flight. Then followed one hour's solo flying practice, a solo cross-country flight, and a flight with full war load, and then the pilot was considered ‘O.K.’ for operations. Thereafter he carried out exercises in formation flying, navigation, and W/T (wireless telegraphy) tests. As the crew consisted only of pilot and air-gunner, the pilot had also to act as navigator. As flying the aircraft was itself a full-time job, the navigation consisted mainly of dead reckoning.
The following is a description by one of the pilots of the aircraft in operational condition:
The ground crew would put a lot of time into the aircraft selected. Riggers, whose job was a difficult one owing to the rotting fabric etc., were most painstaking. The fitters clustered around to tell the pilot little points to watch. Armourers loaded the underside with two 250 lb. general purpose bombs, four 25 lb. anti-personnel bombs, one parachute flare, two wing-tip flares, two smoke floats and anything else they could think of. Within the aircraft were spare drums of ammunition for the rear gunner, a long belt of ammunition for the front gun, flame floats, sea markers, a Verey pistol and Verey cartridges in every colour possible. A dinghy was supposed to be concealed in the centre section of the main plane and was operated by the pilot pulling a string. As no one knew how to put it back, no one tried to operate it, so we do not know to this day if the dinghy was there or not.
In due course the aircrew arrived in full flying kit, plus an amazing array
of books, charts, food and so on. The gunner, on entering the aircraft,
stowed his parachute and fastened on his safety harness. The pilot had a
somewhat more complicated ritual for he was navigator too. Having stepped
in he proceeded to dispose of his tools of trade. Each pilot had his own
method, but mine was something like this. My gloves were jammed behind
the throttle, a Navy code book jammed down my left hip, my flying log
was attached to my right knee, my pencil in my mouth, spare pencil in my
flying boot, my photographically produced chart on its cardboard backing
The Vincents and Vildebeestes with which No. 2 Squadron was equipped, and which also eventually replaced the Baffins of No. 3 Squadron, involved rather less trouble for the pilot as they were three-seater machines and carried a navigator as well as an air-gunner.
Operations normally comprised patrols of anything up to a
hundred miles out to sea, although occasionally they extended
further. Flying obsolescent machines without modern navigation
aids, often in extremely bad weather, pilots had an arduous task.
The fact that they never had the opportunity of attacking an enemy
ship did nothing to lighten the work. An aircraft of No. 3 Squadron
operating on one occasion from
After operating for more than two years with obsolescent aircraft,
the PBO Hudson; made by Lockheed,
The first six aircraft arrived in September and were assembled at
By the end of the year all three squadrons were partially equipped with them.
When Japan entered the war in December, New Zealand had the three squadrons equipped with Hudsons and Vincents. In Fiji No. 4 Squadron was armed with four De Havilland aircraft and six Vincents, and an Army Co-operation Squadron had recently been formed with a strength of two aircraft. Immediately war broke out, six of the few Hudsons available in New Zealand were sent to reinforce No. 4 Squadron.
THE keystone of British strategy in the
This meant that the forces in
New Zealand had always been aware of the importance of
The strengthening of the
In the middle of
The aerodrome construction squadron was formed in July, and the
advance party reached
The fighter squadron assembled at
The first party, consisting of ninety-six officers and men, arrived
at Tasman
after a peaceful voyage via
The Tasman party was met at the
The pilots had come straight from the flying training schools in
New Zealand, and their only experience of modern aircraft had been
a short conversion course on Harvards. They were sent to an
operational training unit which had been formed in Kluang, in
Johore, to do a conversion course on Buffalos, F2A-3 Buffalo; made by Brewster,
The ground staff, meanwhile, was established at
The aircraft were in various states of disrepair and needed a lot
of work to make them serviceable for operational flying. No. 67
Squadron when it left had taken with it all its tools, spare parts and
accessories, and No. 488 Squadron found that the total equipment
left to it comprised six trestles, six chocks, one damaged ladder and
six oil-draining drums. No preparation for the squadron's arrival
had been made by the equipment section at
The equipment organisation at
As equipment came to hand—tools, spare parts, etc.—the main tenance crews set about modifying and repairing the aircraft. By hard work and considerable ingenuity they had machines ready to fly by the time the pilots came back from their conversion course at Kluang towards the end of the month.
Clouston had been ordered to make his squadron operational in
the shortest possible time, and throughout November training
proceeded at high pressure in the face of many difficulties. The
pilots, who should have been converted to Buffalos at Kluang, had
had only a few hours' refresher flying there on Wirraways.
Consequently, at
In the early stages training was hampered by the lack of any radio equipment, which meant that briefing on the ground had to be more than usually detailed and that no instructions, other than by visual signals, could be given in the air. Even when R/T (radio telephony) became available towards the end of November, the sets, obsolete TR9D type, were unsatisfactory and gave poor results.
Clouston was busy much of the time with administrative work,
so most of the burden of training the squadron fell on the shoulders
of the two flight commanders. Their load was lightened at the
beginning of December when two more New Zealanders, Pilot
Officers
Two factors over which the squadron had no control helped to
limit flying hours. The first was the weather. Nearly every day,
flying was interrupted by heavy thunder showers which reduced
visibility to zero and grounded all aircraft till they had passed. The
second was the apparent indifference of the Higher Command in
During the training period the aircraft, old and decrepit in the first place, suffered all the wear and tear that might be expected in a squadron manned by inexperienced pilots. Besides this, they had to be fitted for operations. As already mentioned, R/T sets had to be installed; armour plate had also to be fitted behind the pilot's seat.
The ground crews, who had been brought from New Zealand in
accordance with the establishment laid down by
Under Flight Sergeant Chandler, Fit Lt W. A. Chandler, BEM;
Towards the end of November tension in
On 1 December General Headquarters,
Bad weather prevented reconnaissance from aerodromes in
northern
When the news was received at General Headquarters,
Throughout 7 December the weather continued to be bad, with almost continuous rain and low cloud. Reconnaissance was limited and the only sightings reported by aircraft were of single merchant ships. Thus, for thirty hours after the first sighting, no contact was made with the main Japanese invasion force.
At two o'clock in the morning on 8 December, Hutcheson, who
was duty officer at
Shortly after four o'clock Japanese bombers flew over
In the first two days of the war the Japanese established bases
in northern
As a result of the efforts to strengthen the defences of
The fighter squadrons had all been formed in
All squadrons except No. 488 had been passed as ‘trained to
operational standards’ by the time war broke out, but experience
was to show that their training had been based on an underestimate
of the
Early on the morning of 10 December, No. 488 Squadron was
told that it might be required to provide air cover for two warships:
no names were given. Two aircraft were to take off every half hour,
fly to a given patrol area, remain there for half an hour, and then
return. Later in the morning news was received that the battleships
Prince of Wales and Repulse were being attacked by enemy aircraft
some 170 miles from
The weather off southern
At half past two in the afternoon Flight Lieutenant MacKenzie
and Sergeant
During December the Japanese air force directed its activities
mainly towards supporting the enemy ground forces in northern
This would have been satisfactory had the Japanese machines been as poor in their performance as the Allied pilots had been led to believe. In fact the Japanese proved to have good aircraft and well-trained pilots. Against these the Buffalo was almost useless.
While training was going on the more experienced pilots of the
squadron took part in a number of patrols in attempts to intercept
Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. On 15 December four members
of the squadron, led by MacKenzie, unsuccessfully chased a
Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. The next day, sixteen of the
squadron's aircraft took off to intercept another one. Flight
Lieutenant Hutcheson and Sergeant Clow Flt Lt D.L. Clow, DFC, m.i.d.;
Towards the end of the month arrangements for the reception
of convoys bringing reinforcements from
The first convoy arrived safely on 3 January. It was first sighted
by Flight Lieutenant MacKenzie, who was patrolling 130 miles
south of the island. During the day No. 488 Squadron flew five
patrols, totalling over sixty-four hours, escorting the ships to port.
The weather was bad all the time, with low cloud and frequent
rainstorms which, while hiding the force from the prying eyes
of the enemy, added to the difficulties of locating and escorting
it. The aircraft had to fly at 1000 feet or lower to keep below
It was the first major operation in which the squadron had taken
part. The pilots proved the value of their training by their
excellent flying under adverse conditions, while on the aerodrome
at
A second convoy arrived on 13 January bringing, among other
forces, fifty-one Hurricane aircraft and twenty fighter pilots. The
continued advance of the Japanese down the Malay Peninsula, the
apparent ease with which they had disposed of two of
The military situation, however, had seriously deteriorated. By
the middle of January the bulk of the British forces on the mainland of
In January, however, they began making heavy daylight raids,
concentrating mainly on the aerodromes. The first aerodrome to
suffer was Tengah.
After the first raid on each aerodrome all the native labour disappeared. This caused a serious dislocation in the ground services and put the burden of repairing aerodrome surfaces on members of the squadrons.
On 10 January the first Japanese aircraft to be destroyed over
No. 488 Squadron had its first major combat on 12 January. Eight aircraft, led by MacKenzie, were ordered to take off to intercept an enemy raid coming south. A further six aircraft, led by Hutcheson, took off twenty minutes later. The enemy force was sighted by MacKenzie's formation over Johore. The New Zealanders were at 12,000 feet and the enemy, comprising approximately twenty-seven Type O and Army Type 97 fighters in formations of nine, were 3000 feet above them.
MacKenzie ordered his squadron to fly into the sun and take
evasive action, but the Japanese fighters dived and shot down
Sergeant
As a result of these actions, it was decided to reduce the amount of fuel and ammunition carried by the Buffalos in an effort to make them more manoeuvrable and better able to compete with the Zeros; but little improvement resulted.
The next day's operations were equally severe, and are well described in the squadron's diary:
At 0630 hours Pilot Officer Hesketh led four aircraft of ‘A’ Flight on
a security patrol, but no contact was made with the enemy. At 1100 hours
Flight Lieutenant Hutcheson took off with eight aircraft to intercept 30
Type 96 bombers, making contact with them and attacking from below.
Flight Lieutenant Hutcheson was shot up by rear-gun fire and crash-landed
at base. Pilot Officer Greenhalgh
Today although we did not meet up with the fighters, because we did not attack from above, we were badly shot up from rear-gun fire. The Japanese bomber formations of 27 packed aircraft throw out such an accurate and heavy rear-gun barrage that they are very difficult to attack. Some way must be found to break up these mass formations and attack bombers independently. No doubt there was fighter escort in the near vicinity but it did not pick up our fighters owing to cloudy conditions and also because we attacked from below.
In the last two days, No. 488 Squadron has lost seven aircraft and had many others damaged, with no loss to the enemy. No blame can be attached to the pilots, who have done their best with Buffalos. Until we fly as Wings of 36 aircraft we will be unable to inflict heavy damage on the enemy.
From now on the Japanese were over
No. 488 Squadron had its first combat success, and suffered
its first battle casualty, on 15 January. Led by Hesketh, it took
off to intercept a raid and was attacked by a swarm of Japanese
fighters. Hesketh was shot down and killed. Sergeant
On 18 January Hutcheson led a successful patrol of Nos. 488
and 243 Squadrons combined. In an encounter with nine Zeros
they destroyed two and probably destroyed three with no loss to
themselves. Pilot Officer
The following day four members of the squadron accompanied
No. 453 Squadron, RAAF, on an offensive patrol over the Muar
area. They were attacked by a large formation of enemy fighters
and Pilot Officer McAneny and Sergeant
MacKenzie and Sergeant
On 19 January the Dutch fighter squadron which had been at
On 20 January pilots of Nos. 488 and 243 Squadrons carried
out a number of combined patrols. Two attempts were made to
intercept enemy bombers, of which one was successful when six
Type 97 bombers were attacked near Muar and forced to jettison
As the enemy advanced down the Malay Peninsula, the observer
system responsible for giving warning of approaching air raids
became progressively less effective. The radar installations on the
island of
On the morning of 22 January AC 1 I. V. S. Anderson; born
On 23 January Clouston was posted for duty with
On 24 January No. 488 Squadron had two serviceable Buffalos.
These were attached to No. 243 Squadron with pilots to fly them,
On the 27th a formation of enemy bombers appeared over the aerodrome with very little warning, at a time when all the machines were on the ground refuelling after a patrol. All the Hurricanes except one were damaged and most of No. 243 Squadron's Buffalos were either damaged or completely destroyed. Two Blenheims on the aerodrome were burnt out. Another wave of bombers came over forty minutes later and did further damage. The aerodrome was pitted with bomb craters, making it unserviceable. For the next three days all personnel were engaged either in repairing aircraft or in filling in bomb craters, and by the end of the month three Hurricanes and a strip of the aerodrome had been made serviceable.
Meanwhile, on the mainland of
There was now considerable congestion on the island. The
four aerodromes on
On 30 January it was decided to keep only eight Hurricanes
and the remaining Buffalos at Indomitable were to be based in
Of the fifty-one Hurricanes which had arrived in the middle
of January only twenty were now available, the rest having been
destroyed or damaged; and of the original force of Buffalos only
six remained operational. The fighters still at
At nine o'clock in the evening of 31 January MacKenzie was told that No. 488 Squadron must be ready to move immediately. Throughout the night, interrupted by frequent air raids, the men prepared for the move. They packed up all of the serviceable Hurricane equipment and stores and their personal clothing into cases and loaded them on lorries. The lorries were then dispersed in the rubber plantations around the aerodrome and the squadron awaited further orders.
Next morning, however, it was told that it would not be evacuated
but would remain in
On 2 February the squadron's four serviceable Hurricanes were
flown to
On 4 February Pilot Officer Gifford and Flight Sergeant
Later in the day the party went to Tengah aerodrome, which
was being shelled, to assist in getting the aircraft away from there.
They succeeded in flying all the aircraft, mostly Hurricanes and
Buffalos, to
Squadron Leader MacKenzie and eight sergeant pilots sailed
for Danae. Flight Lieutenant Hutcheson
and Pilot Officer Oakden, after a day spent in searching the dispersal
areas of Tengah, Sembawang, and Seletar for any serviceable
machines that might have been overlooked, joined the remainder
of the pilots on the SS City of Canterbury and sailed at 11 p.m.
for
Meanwhile No. 488's ground crews in
On the morning of the 11th the ground staff went down to the
aerodrome, expecting to find the pilots of No. 232 Squadron back
with fresh aircraft from
The squadron retired to the docks and at four o'clock went
aboard the Empire Star. Two waves of bombers raided the docks
as they were embarking. At half past six the ship pulled out into
the stream and anchored. Finally, at half past six next morning,
she sailed for
Waves of bombers continued to come over until after midday,
but the defensive fire kept them high and they scored no more
hits. The Empire Star arrived at
The pilots of the squadron had arrived in
MacKenzie was put in charge of Hurricane delivery at Tjililitan
aerodrome, 10 miles from
On the 11th the squadron's pilots returned from Buitenzorg and
helped to ferry Hurricanes from
On the morning of 14 February Hutcheson, leading a formation
of nine Hurricanes, took off for
Their arrival at
The other pilots, finding it impossible to land, fought back at
the Japanese fighters until they ran out of fuel or were shot down
into the jungle. Neither Hutcheson nor Sharp was injured when
Other pilots from the squadron continued to carry out defensive
patrols from Tjililitan in company with those pilots from Nos. 232
and 258 Squadrons who were able to reach
It had been hoped that southern
The speed of the enemy's advance had frustrated the hopes of
building up a large Allied strength in the East Indies, and
The Dutch at this time had about five bomber, three fighter,
and two observation squadrons in
On 22 February MacKenzie was instructed that he was to move
his squadron to
The rest of the squadron embarked on the MV Deucalion on the
afternoon of 23 February and sailed for Esperance Bay.
The six pilots who were left behind were not relieved. They
fought throughout the rest of the campaign until
THE Aerodrome Construction Squadron, formed in New Zealand
early in
The advance party, comprising four officers and fifteen other
ranks who formed the Survey Section, left New Zealand towards
the end of July in the Maetsuyker and arrived in Narbada on 13 August.
Accommodation on the ship was entirely unsatisfactory and the
majority of the men were off-loaded at
The advance party established a base camp at
The squadron's first major work was the construction of a bomber
aerodrome at
The area was covered by rubber plantations. The initial process
in building the strips was to remove the trees, which were uprooted
When the squadron started operations, the north-east monsoon
season had begun. Every afternoon with clock-like regularity the
rain started, turning the newly cleared ground into soft mud. After
a heavy afternoon's rain the tractors and carry-alls became bogged
to their axles, and it was impossible to work them until the next
morning's sun dried out the ground. Whenever a spell of fine
weather occurred work went on through the night to make up
for lost time. Towards the end of November when the
Early in the morning of 8 December the camp at
The loss of aerodromes in northern
In the middle of December work at
The salvage party, formed at the beginning of the war, had been
sent to northern
Early in January the detachments at Seletar and Tengah were
recalled to start work again on the
Except for final grading and surfacing, the Rifle Range strip was
finished by the middle of the month and was being used by
light aircraft of the Malayan Volunteer Air Force. It was the only
one built by the squadron in
On 15 January, with the Japanese at the northern border of Johore, the Bekok camp was finally evacuated and the runway was blown up next day.
Work on
The next day a demolition party returned and exploded the mines
at
On
For the next few days, despite frequent interruptions by enemy bombers, work was continued on the two new strips at Sungei Buloh and Yio Chu Kang, both of which were by then almost completed. When, at the beginning of February, the Japanese brought their artillery to bear on them, both had to be abandoned.
There was also a constant demand for men and machinery to help repair bomb damage on the main aerodromes, which were under daily attack, and parties were sent out as they were needed. In addition, at the urgent request of the Army authorities, a detachment spent several days building tank traps in the western part of the island.
At the end of January it was plain that
At that stage it was still hoped that
On the morning of 1 February the squadron was ordered to
embark with its machinery on the SS Talthybius. The equipment
was sent down to the docks, and at one o'clock in the afternoon was
all at the ship's side, ready for loading.
As a result of the daily bombing of the port, all the native
labourers had long since disappeared. No help could be had from
the ship's native crew, who were untrained and useless as stevedores.
Consequently all the work of loading, including working the winches
Work ceased at nightfall as a strict blackout had to be maintained.
It was resumed at daylight the next day, and by that evening most
of the stuff was on board. There were numerous air-raid alarms
during the day, but the work continued without a stop until
enemy bombers were practically overhead, when the men took
cover, some in shelters on the wharf, others in the ship's hold,
to emerge again immediately the raid was over. Several times
bombs fell close, but the Talthybius was not hit.
In sixteen hours of working time, despite interruptions, seventy men had loaded between 2300 and 2500 tons, ship's measurement, of heavy equipment, including tractors, trucks, stores and machinery.
The ship remained at the wharf again that night, and the men
returned to their camp at the Dairy Farm. The next morning a
working party went down to straighten up the cargo and help to
load some additional
In the middle of the morning there were two heavy air raids.
The Talthybius survived the first, although bombs fell close by.
In the second she received two direct hits by bombs which exploded
in the holds, and there were several more near misses. The working
party was caught on board, and Flight Sergeant
Much of the cargo was destroyed by the bombing and fire, but the heavy excavating machinery and large quantities of medical, dental, and other stores were undamaged, and it was hoped that a good deal could be saved. A party of volunteers went to the docks on the afternoon of 4 February and unloaded the medical stores and the men's kitbags; but lack of steam to work the winches prevented any of the heavier gear being taken off. Later the same afternoon another bombing attack set the ship on fire again and sank her.
The next two days were spent at the Dairy Farm waiting for
fresh embarkation orders. By this time the Japanese were shelling
the island, and the hazard of artillery fire was added to the constant
On the afternoon of 6 February the squadron was told it would be evacuated in a convoy sailing that evening. The men struck camp immediately and were transported in lorries to the docks. There, amid the litter of bomb wreckage and in the glare of burning buildings, they loaded all that was left of the unit's equipment on the waiting ships. There was not much: only their personal kitbags, the medical supplies, and their rifles and ammunition.
Two parties were formed, one going on the SS City of Canterbury
and the other on the SS
The convoy, the last to leave City of Canterbury
suffered the discomfort of overcrowding and insufficient food, and
there were frequent air-raid alarms; but the escorting warships
warded off all enemy attacks, and the ships reached
After lying at anchor in the stream all night the Darvel returned
to the wharf again on the morning of the 7th. The men landed
and were taken to an
The following afternoon they again went down to the docks
and embarked on the Darvel. After some hours, during which there
were several air raids, she eventually put to sea at dusk. She had
just cleared the harbour when she turned and was brought back
to her berth. Bad weather was brewing outside, and visibility
had become too bad to risk going through the protective minefields
The next morning the men were taken once more to the transit camp. During the night the Japanese had landed on the western part of the island and by morning had made considerable progress eastwards. Towards midday their artillery started shelling the camp, and all personnel had to take to the shelter trenches.
In the afternoon, during a lull in the shelling, the men scrambled
into their trucks and once more made for the docks. This time
they went straight aboard the Darvel, and she immediately headed
for the open sea. She escaped just in time to avoid a heavy dive-bombing and strafing attack on shipping in the docks, and the
last view of
The ship sailed through the night, and at daybreak anchored off the southern tip of a small island to avoid being seen by enemy aircraft. She was still short-staffed and members of the squadron virtually worked her. Some took shifts in the engine-room and stokehold, others mounted and manned light anti-aircraft guns, and others took over the messing for all the troops on board.
The next stage of the voyage lay through Bangka Strait, between
The ship got under way again at dusk and it was hoped
that she would pass through the danger area in the night. But
just before entering the strait she was delayed for two hours
assisting another vessel, the SS Kintak, which had run ashore during
the day. In consequence, she was still in the strait when the next
day dawned. She anchored in the shelter of a group of small
islands in the hope that the Japanese would not see her. Close by
was another small ship which had been bombed some days before
and abandoned.
The morning was peaceful until half past eleven, and then a
formation of enemy bombers appeared. They were too high for
the ship's anti-aircraft guns, so the gun crews withheld their fire
and took cover. The planes altered their course slightly to bring
them directly overhead, and then the bombs began to fall. For a
minute all was confusion as they rained down all round the ship,
the explosions tossing her about like a cork and drenching her
with spray. There were no direct hits, but concussion and splinters
from near misses made the ship a shambles. Then it was over, and
Five minutes later the bombers returned, but this time they concentrated their attack on the abandoned steamer a few hundred yards away. They sank her and, having used up all their bombs, returned to their base.
The Darvel, although spared a second bombing, was in parlous
condition. Her hull was riddled with holes from bomb splinters,
and she was leaking badly. The steering gear was damaged, and
so were all the lifeboats. Fires had broken out in several places, and
many of the troops on board were killed or wounded. The New
Zealand unit had one killed, seventeen wounded, and several more
slightly injured.
The captain gave the order to abandon ship, but the state of the
boats made this impossible. The fires were quickly brought under
control, and then working parties, composed of New Zealanders,
went below to fill in the scores of small holes with wooden plugs.
Others set to work to repair the lifeboats and rigging and clear up
the debris on the decks. There was no doctor on board, so medical
orderlies, under the direction of Sergeant
A naval officer, Lieutenant-Commander Griffiths, RN, took over
the command of the ship and decided, rather than wait for another
attack, to risk steaming through the rest of the strait in daylight.
The passage was accomplished safely, and at the southern entrance
a halt was made to repair the damaged steering gear. Finally, at
half past eight in the evening when darkness covered the ship,
course was set for
By next morning, 12 February, the Darvel was listing badly to
port, and the captain reported that she was sinking. All passengers
and baggage were crowded to the starboard side, and men from the
squadron went below and plugged more holes. After about two
hours' work the leakage was brought under control, and the ship
eventually arrived off
Senior officers who had travelled in her reported afterwards that,
although the New Zealanders formed only a small proportion of the
troops on board, it was due entirely to their work and initiative that
the Darvel reached
On arrival at
In the prevailing confusion it was difficult to obtain any
instructions. While it was still thought that
Eventually it was decided that as the unit had lost all its equipment it should be evacuated to reform and re-equip in Marella. Although Japanese air activity
was by this time increasing over Marella sailed at six o'clock that
evening, in one of the last convoys to get away from
The squadron remained aboard the Marella until she reached
Durban Castle on 18 March for New
Zealand and reached
THROUGH the first half of
A week after
A unified command was created in the south-west
In January another area was formed, known as the Anzac area.
It was an adjunct to the Pacific Ocean area, and included eastern
After the fall of
Finally the
The rapidity and comparative ease with which the Japanese had
advanced south made it necessary to revise completely the ideas
which had previously been held concerning New Zealand's defence
requirements. Instead of needing protection only against isolated
raids by enemy cruisers, she now had to be prepared to defend
herself against full-scale invasion. The Air Force, from being
primarily a training organisation, had to be developed into an
operational service capable of taking part in active combat. The
Government had never been convinced that the country was free
On the day
Personnel strength on the same date was 10,500 in New Zealand
and 450 in
At the end of December New Zealand again asked
New Zealand then asked P40 Kittyhawk; made by Curtiss-Wright,
By the middle of February the situation in the
On 20 February the operational strength of the Aircraft were classified for supply purposes as initial equipment (IE), immediate reserve
(IR), and stored reserve (SR). The figure 8 + 4 means eight IE plus four IR. The fourth had run onto a reef and had been written off.
The training organisation had the following second-line aircraft which could be available in case of emergency: 4 Vincents, 61 Oxfords, 45 Harvards, 9 Fairey Gordons and 15 Hawker Hinds, giving a total of 134.
By this time all munitions for the Allied forces in all theatres
of war came under the control of a Munitions Assignment Committee
which had been set up in
The Japanese attack on
In the first half of
With the arrival of operational aircraft, including the first Kittyhawks in March, and the promise of more to come, it became
possible to plan for the formation of further operational squadrons.
In March a Bomber Reconnaissance Operational Training Unit was
formed at
In April No. 14 Fighter Squadron formed at the Fighter
Operational Training Unit at
A further bomber-reconnaissance squadron equipped with
Vincents, No. 8, commanded by Squadron Leader C. L. Monckton,
was formed at
In May the Kittyhawks which had been allotted by the Munitions
Assignment Committee began to arrive, and two further fighter
squadrons were formed. Personnel for No. 15 Squadron followed
No. 14 at FOTU, and the squadron formed at
By July only forty-four of the allotment of eighty Kittyhawks
had arrived, and New Zealand was advised that the remainder of
the allotment would have to be cancelled owing to urgent requirements in the
At the beginning of
The main purpose of these units was to attack enemy shipping, particularly transport, and it was intended that every aircraft should be a potential bomber. A proportion of the aircraft was to be equipped also for ground strafing enemy troops, using machine guns or light bombs. All aircraft in the training schools were modified to enable them to carry out these tasks. Machine guns and bomb racks were fitted to the Vincents, Gordons, Oxfords and Harvards, and the Tiger Moths were equipped with racks for light anti-personnel bombs.
To allow the auxiliary squadrons to reach a sufficient standard
of operational efficiency without interfering unduly with the flying
training programme, a week of operational training was carried
out between the end of each flying training course and the start
of the next. In addition, to ease the burden on instructors and
staff pilots at training units, their establishment was increased.
The development of the
The aerodromes used by the
Early in the year the
The work of aerodrome construction was carried out with all possible speed by the Aerodrome Section of the Public Works Department, but was hampered in the early stages by lack of heavy earth-moving machinery.
The question of the defence of aerodromes had been raised
towards the end of
When the Army took over the
Early in
The ideal first line of defence against ground attack was
recognised to be a mobile striking force in the vicinity of aerodromes.
As the Army was unable to provide this force because the only
suitable troops available formed part of the field army which was
training for other operations, the Aerodrome Defence Squadrons
were formed. The officers and sergeants in the squadrons were
specially selected from
A further difficulty which quickly became apparent was caused through the dual role of the Aerodrome Defence Squadrons. The organisation was designed:
To provide a defence force for aerodromes, and
To give educational training to recruits to fit them for entry into either the Initial Training Wing or the Technical Training School.
This meant that there was a constant turnover of personnel as
men were posted to their aircrew or technical training. There was
at all times a conflict between the need for educational training
and that for military training. By the end of
To provide facilities for twenty hours a week of educational training to all prospective aircrew personnel;
To give as much infantry training as possible to all men passing through the squadrons, to ensure that they would be fitted to fight effectively against enemy troops on the ground when they found themselves in the forward areas; and
To maintain a basic organisation to reform as operational squadrons should the need arise.
In
At the end of This proof that New Zealand was willing to do its best for the general war effort, to the
extent of stripping itself of AA defences, was later to have a very favourable effect on
the attitude of the Allied supply authorities in
Throughout
During the year dispersal pens were built on all operational
aerodromes. All buildings and a number of flying fields were
camouflaged and plans drawn up for the evacuation and demolition
of aerodromes should that become necessary. By December the
Early in
He arrived at the end of April and was attached to the office
of the New Zealand Liaison Officer, Squadron Leader Wallingford,
at the
As a result two radar sets, one a ground unit and the other an
airborne unit, were ordered by the
The first ground set, which had been ordered by Marsden, was
used by the Electrical and Wireless School at
As New Zealand, in the early years of the war, did not possess
the fighter aircraft necessary to intercept attacking air forces, the
development of a ground radar warning system was considered
unnecessary. Consequently the
In the middle of
In
The only station operating at that time was one in the
It had been intended originally to manufacture as much as
possible of New Zealand's radar requirements in the Dominion,
but the essential components, particularly valves, had to be obtained
from abroad, and many difficulties were encountered in getting
them. It became obvious that dependence on New Zealand-built
sets was not a practical proposition, and consequently it was decided
that complete units should be ordered from
By August three stations were in operation in the
Three radar flights were established to administer the units which
were formed or planned. No. 1 Flight, with headquarters at
As with other aspects of New Zealand's defence the completion
of the radar system was dependent upon supplies from overseas,
and it was not until the chief danger of invasion had passed that
the organisation was functioning satisfactorily. By
Shortly afterwards the air-warning system was reduced, partly
because of the improving war situation and partly to release
personnel for the manning of
Although New Zealand was not subjected to air attack, and the
units were therefore never called on to perform their primary
function, they did sterling work in other directions. Their major
commitment was to assist the Navy by plotting all ships round
their respective areas of the coast, and when vessels were reported
in unexpected positions aircraft were sent out to investigate. In
addition radar units, especially in the
On one occasion a hostile aircraft, launched from a Japanese submarine, did make a reconnaissance flight over
Besides the radar warning system, an
The system was never completely developed. The main source
of manpower was the
The air-warning system depended primarily on plots from the radar stations. In a COL station these plots appeared as bright spots of light on the plan position indicator, which was covered by a gridded map in perspex, the centre of which represented the radar station. The number of aircraft and their exact range could be checked on what was termed the A tube. A COL team normally comprised four persons: a PPI tube observer, range tube operator, converter, and recorder. The usual procedure was for the observer to pass the plots to the filter room, where plots from various stations would be co-ordinated by experienced filter officers. The plots were then passed to the operations room.
In the operations room the plots were recorded on a large table
similar to that in the filter room, and above this table sat the
controller, normally an
During
When war was declared in
At the end of
The entry of
Three Group Headquarters which were to function as bomber and fighter sector controls.
Three sub-sectors for fighter control.
Ten bomber stations.
Ten fighter stations.
Four army co-operation squadrons.
Four air-support controls.
An air-warning radar chain extending from North Cape to the Bluff and including GCI stations for fighter control.
Eighteen VHF D/F stations comprising six triangulation systems for the control of fighter aircraft.
Six H/F D/F stations for long-range navigational purposes.
Part of this organisation was already in existence, but a part,
owing to the changed aspect of the war in
The equipment needed for the plan was ordered, and in August
Scott went to
Besides the expansion of the radio organisation, the
Up to the outbreak of war the
The two depots were considered adequate until
No. 3 Stores Depot was formed in
No. 2 Depot was later moved from the Exhibition Buildings at
The arrival of new types of aircraft in
The system of a decentralised maintenance organisation was
satisfactory as long as the
In
With the prospect of large numbers of operational aircraft being
based in the country, it was decided to establish three repair depots
to undertake work which had previously been done on stations. The
depot at
No. 2 Repair Depot was established at
No. 3 Repair Depot was formed from
In
A large proportion of the increased strength lay necessarily in
the skilled technical trades, particularly in the engineering and
electrical groups, and a problem which had been apparent in
In
Another difficulty developed in
An important contribution towards solving the manpower
problem was made by the WAAF. Women were first recruited for
the
At the beginning there were dire forebodings as to the effect of introducing women into what had been a purely masculine service; but the women very quickly proved their worth. Not only did their employment release men for overseas and combat duties, but in many trades they proved more efficient and reliable than men.
In the first eighteen months women were not granted service
ranks; but by the Women's Auxiliary Air Force Emergency Regulations
Originally, women were employed only as cooks, mess-hands,
drivers, clerks, equipment assistants, medical orderlies and shorthand
typists; but by the end of the war they were found to be in nearly
every trade that was not beyond their physical capabilities. WAAFs were employed in the following Cooks Mess-hands Clerks, General Duties Clerks, Stores Accounting Clerks, Pay Accounting Clerks, Special Duties Clerks, Signals Clerks, Medical Shorthand typists Librarians Fabric workers Parachute packers Equipment assistants Instrument repairers Tailoresses Drivers, petrol Meteorological assistants Medical orderlies Medical orderlies, Special Duties
(Psychological Research) Aircrafthands, General Duties
(runners, cleaners, etc.) Physical and recreational training
instructors Telephone operators Wireless operators Teleprinters Telegraphists Radio telephonists Dental clerk orderlies Dental mechanics AML bomber teacher instructors Link-trainer maintenance Workshop assistants Dry Canteen assistants GRU (Gunnery Research Unit) assessor,
tracers Disciplinarians Motor-boat crew Shoe fitters (on loan to Ministry of Supply)
At its peak strength, in
To stem the tide of Japanese aggression in the South and South-West
An American fighter squadron disembarked at
The most vital link in the defensive chain was
Early in February a detachment of six Hudsons from No. 2
Squadron was sent to
On 13 February aircrew were briefed for an attack on a Japanese
task force which was reported to be approaching. Coastwatchers
further north had reported a force including three aircraft carriers
apparently heading for Lexington and Saratoga, was also
heading for
The Hudsons were briefed to bomb from 9000 feet and the Fortresses from 16,000 feet, and pilots were told that unless the Allied force arrived in time they would stand very little chance of coming out of the action alive as the sky would be thick with Japanese fighters.
Aircrews remained at readiness for the rest of the day and that night. The Fortresses took off before dawn next day on patrol. As there had been no further sighting of the enemy force, the Hudsons did not take off till later. They were eventually airborne at 10 a.m. and carried out a parallel track search in the vicinity of the Ellice Islands. No sightings of the enemy were made during the day, and apparently he had turned back and occupied islands farther to the north-west.
With the safe arrival of the Allied reinforcements and the averting of the immediate threat to
It was thought that the problem of obtaining supplies for the
For the next three months negotiations were carried on between
A great deal of correspondence passed between General H. H. Arnold, Admiral J. H. Towers, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, the last
replaced by Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal.
In view of the overall supply position and the fact that the
expansion and re-equipment of the
In August the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Goddard, Air Mshl Sir Victor Goddard, KCB, CBE, DSM (US);
As a result of discussions with the American Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral King, the directive to the Commander South
The basis on which New Zealand was to obtain equipment from
It recognised that:
In the prosecution of their common war undertaking … the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by each in the ways which most effectively utilise available materials, manpower, production facilities and shipping space.
The aim of the Agreement was that:
As large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each Government to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.
An
Early in May a large force of Japanese warships and transports
was severely damaged in the Coral Sea by aircraft from a combined
Australian and American task force based on the carriers Yorktown
and Lexington. At the beginning of June another enemy force was
defeated by American aircraft when approaching Midway Island.
The damage done to the enemy's naval strength in these two battles,
while it did not give the Allies control of the sea, allowed them a
breathing space in which to organise their forces.
Early in July the Japanese, who had occupied
It had been intended to train an American task force in New
Zealand for operations against the Japanese in the
While preparations for the attack on
At this stage the conditions of employment of
The advance party of ground personnel left New Zealand in the
Mackinac on 1 July. It comprised
four officers and thirty other ranks, under the command of Squadron
Leader Mackinac, a seaplane
repair ship, and an antiquated French gunboat. The commander
offered to put the New Zealand contingent ashore, but all volunteered to remain on the ship and help in any way possible. The
alarm was maintained until two o'clock the following afternoon,
when a signal was received stating that the invading force had
turned away and was steaming towards the Coral Sea. At eight
o'clock next morning the New Zealanders disembarked, after being
mustered by the ship's commander and thanked for the help given
in the emergency.
They were taken in trucks to
Kidson chose a site for a camp and all personnel were put to work
When the camp had been erected, the signals section which had
formed part of the advance party went to work with the American
69th Bombardment Squadron, which was already operating from the
airfield, while awaiting the arrival of its own equipment. The
administrative staff, meanwhile, continued to make the camp ready
to accommodate the main body of the unit, which was brought from
New Zealand on a second trip by the USS Mackinac.
The move of a unit to
Until prefabricated wooden huts arrived from New Zealand all
accommodation was in tents erected by the advance party. Later,
huts were put up for messes and offices, but most of the men lived
under canvas all the time they were on the island. All cooking and
messing equipment was taken from New Zealand, as well as stocks
of technical supplies and paint for camouflage. Field service rations
were to be supplied by the Americans, but an emergency ration for
twenty-one days was to be held by the
Shortage of domestic equipment, caused partly by the failure of
the Americans to supply all that was expected and partly by the
failure of the
In the initial stages of its formation the unit was designated
a detached flight of No. 4 Squadron and was established as a self-contained unit under the command of Squadron Leader
The first two
At half past eleven that night they were wakened and told to be on ‘Alert’ at the American operations room by the airstrip at half past four the next morning, as a Japanese aircraft carrier was reported to be heading for the island. After remaining on the alert for some hours they were finally stood down. Stevenson decided that the New Zealand camp was too far away from the airfield, so made arrangements for the two crews to eat and sleep with the American B26 Squadron in their camp near the strip. Captain Waddleton, CO of the squadron, was most helpful, providing tents and men to set them up.
The New Zealanders were instructed to take over the dawn and
dusk anti-submarine patrols round the coast of
Three more Hudsons arrived from New Zealand on 23 July
under the command of Squadron Leader Grigg, with several spare
crews, and No. 9 Squadron was officially formed as an operational
unit. A camp was built for the aircrews close to the American
camp on the airfield, and they lived there while operating from
The memory of the threatened Japanese attack of 6 July was
still fresh in
No. 9 Squadron's tour of duty on the island, lasting from July
Possible submarines, the only ones on the tour, were seen on 6 and 7 February. On 6 February an aircraft, taking off on patrol before dawn, observed signal lights on the sea 18 miles from Plaine des Gaiacs. It dropped four 250-pound bombs, and then patrolled the area until daylight. There was a patch of oil on the water, and the radar showed that the submarine might still be in the vicinity; but no further action could be taken as all bombs had been used.
Next morning another light was seen on the sea. The patrolling aircraft dropped a sea-marker and searched till dawn. After daylight the crew saw the periscope of a submarine, but it submerged before the aircraft could attack.
Domestically the unit grew increasingly self-supporting as the
months went by. In the first weeks it had been dependent on the
Americans for many things: medical services, transport, signals,
rations, fuel and oil. As the size of the squadron grew and more
equipment was sent from New Zealand, fewer services had to be
supplied by the United States Army Air Force, until by the end
of the year they consisted only of fuel and rations. No. 69 Squadron
left to go farther north, and thereafter No. 9 Squadron was called
on by the American commander at
From the first, aircraft operated by No. 9 Squadron were provided with spare parts, etc., by the
To understand properly the part which the
Until
The South Pacific contained three subdivisions: the Combat Area in which the Allied forces were in actual contact with the enemy; the Forward Area which, although not in contact with the enemy, might be liable to attack, and which was organised for defence and for supporting operations in the Combat Area; and the Rear Area. As the campaign moved north, so did the boundaries of the respective areas.
The main objectives in the American offensive up through the
As the combat area moved northward the task forces and their reserves moved too, and local Island Air Commands took over complete control of all air operations in the areas they vacated. The duties of New Zealand and American squadrons stationed in these areas were limited to training, the local defence of bases, and the protection of shipping.
At the end of August COMGENSOPAC (General Harmon) signalled New Zealand asking for a second bomber-reconnaissance
squadron to be sent to
Colonel F. V. Schneider, General Harmon's Chief of Staff, visited
On 10 September COMGENSOPAC signalled that the squadron
would be required at once, and should be ready to sail on the 23rd.
At the same time its destination was changed from
It had been decided that the
As a result of his discussion with Rear Admiral McCain, Nevill signalled from Santo that the squadron should also take such additional equipment as timber, construction materials, wire screening, water tanks, chlorination equipment, camp beds and mosquito netting.
If
Group Captain Nevill's signal indicating the need for extra
equipment, and the final notification of the squadron's destination,
were received in New Zealand on 18 September, only five days
before the unit was due to leave. Apparently co-ordination between
COMAIRSOPAC and COMGENSOPAC and the
General shortages of equipment in New Zealand, and the absence
of previously prepared scales of equipment for the move, strained
the
The unit ordered to go overseas was No. 3 BR Squadron, which
had formed as a general reconnaissance squadron at Harewood in
Wahine and the
Taybank were procured from the Royal New Zealand Navy.
In spite of these difficulties, the unit was ready for embarkation
on the target date. The main party, comprising 11 officers and
218 other ranks, left Wahine with 37
tons of equipment on 22 September. The Taybank sailed three
days later with 387 tons of equipment in the charge of Pilot Officer
W. A. Chandler and a small party of airmen.
The squadron's aircraft, thirteen in number, left
The Americans had first surveyed Santo in May and had found
that an excellent anchorage was available in the
When No. 3 Squadron arrived there were about 8000 American
works troops on the island, and Santo was in the process of becoming
the Allies' greatest base in the South Pacific. The airfield consisted
of a strip cut out of the jungle,
The Wahine reached Santo on 8 October, and the main ground
party disembarked the following day and set up camp in an area
of jungle which had been allocated to them beside the Pallikulo
airstrip. On the first night ashore the men pitched their tents
wherever there was a space for them between the trees and cleared
away the undergrowth with their bayonets. In the next fortnight,
with the help of American bulldozers, they cleared the site and laid
out an orderly camp. First priority in the work was given to the
erection of camp accommodation and the preparation of servicing
facilities for aircraft so that the squadron could become operational
as soon as possible. It was some weeks before there was time to
build messes and other camp amenities.
Some of the shortages in the equipment brought from New Zealand were made up by supplies from neighbouring American units. Despite initial difficulties the ground party was ready for the aircraft when they flew in, and the squadron became operational on 16 October.
From the middle of October until 6 December No. 3 Squadron
operated from Pallikulo. During the last fortnight of this period,
a detached flight of six aircraft was stationed at Curtiss, was stationed in
Six hundred miles to the north-west, American task forces were
engaged in repelling repeated attempts by the Japanese to land
large reinforcements on
Patrols by
During November it was reported that Japanese patrols had landed on Gava, Vanualava, Banks and Torres Islands, immediately to the north of Santo, and No. 3 Squadron was ordered to cover the islands in its searches. Nothing suspicious was ever seen.
While No. 3 BR Squadron was establishing itself at Santo,
No. 15 Fighter Squadron was sent to
Wing Commander
No. 15 Squadron was assembled under the command of Squadron
Leader President
Jackson on 23 October, arriving in
The aircraft comprised twenty-three P40s, and on inspection were
found to be in very poor condition. Engines and airframes showed
signs of neglect, and gun barrels were badly corroded. There was
consequently a great deal of work to be done to make them air-worthy. Additional difficulty was caused by the fact that, although
airframe, propeller, and instrument spares were plentiful, there
were no engine spares except spark-plugs. The Americans worked
under a system whereby any engine which needed more than
superficial repair was replaced by a fresh one and sent back to
On arrival at
The squadron spent three and a half months in
Enemy submarines had been active in the area, and the patrols
were designed to keep them under water. Until nearly the end
of the tour no bomb racks were available to fit the P40s, so that
operations could have only a moral value. If a submarine had
appeared, it could have been attacked only with machine guns. A senior American Army officer at the time suggested that the pilots should carry depth-charges on their laps, and drop them by hand if they saw an enemy submarine. A depth-charge weighs 325 pounds.
Except for a number of false alarms, the tour was uneventful
and no enemy activity was met. The unit remained at
From the end of
It operated two radar sets and an air-warning centre which
corresponded to an operations and filter room. For the next three
months it tracked the P40s of No. 15 Squadron on patrol and also
other aircraft arriving in
THE battle for Named
For a fortnight after the original landing on 7 August the
Marines had little opposition on land; but the disastrous naval
action off Savo Island on the night of 9 August, in which a
Japanese force sank four American and Australian cruisers, had
given the enemy full, if temporary, control of the sea. His naval
units were able to bombard the Marines' positions ashore at will
and almost with impunity. He was also able to reinforce and
supply his own troops while cutting off all seaborne supplies to the
Americans. There were three American carriers in the South Pacific
which could have supported the Marines with aircraft, but they
were being held in reserve well to the south, out of range of search
planes, until the enemy should make a major attempt to retake
See map facing p. 149.
On 17 August reports of a large concentration of Japanese
shipping at
The battle of the eastern
On 18 September the Americans were reinforced by the 7th
Marine Regiment which had been brought up from
By the end of September the position, although still critical, had improved. The addition to the fighting force had relieved the strain a little and, moreover, some 1100 construction personnel had been brought in in small parties as opportunity offered. These men, the 6th Construction Battalion, took over maintenance work which formerly had necessarily been done by combat troops, and in addition began other work which it had not been possible to do before. They drained the airfield, which had previously become waterlogged after every rain, built roads and bridges, and made additional strips beside the main airfield.
The next Japanese attempt to land large reinforcements on the
island occurred on the night of 11–12 October. Their escorting
naval force of cruisers and destroyers was defeated by a task force
under Rear Admiral Scott, USN, in the battle of Cape Esperance,
So named because it completed its training in
Very heavy land fighting took place on 23–25 October when the
Japanese, using all the forces at their command, attempted to overwhelm the American positions. At the same time they assembled
a large fleet to the north which was to drive south and eliminate
the American naval forces in the area. The land attack failed to
capture the airfield, and on 26 October the naval force was met
by an American task force near the Santa Cruz Islands. Shipping
losses in the engagement were fairly equal, and the Japanese lost
an estimated 123 aircraft against the Americans' 74. But the issue
had already been decided by the failure of the land forces to capture
The last major attempt by the Japanese to land reinforcements
with naval support was made in the second week of November.
In a series of engagements known as the Battle of These destroyer convoys were known by the Allied troops as the ‘Tokyo Express’.
From now on the Japanese gave up hope of recapturing Guadalcanal, and subsequent operations were aimed at delaying the advance
of the American forces as long as possible, while a system of
defence in depth was built up in the northern and central
An attempt to reinforce their troops on
During December the Marines were relieved by
After a comparatively inactive period in
Towards the end of the month enemy air and shipping activity
in the
During the first week of February the situation on
According to American intelligence the Japanese had 175 aircraft
available in the
On 9 February the American Command discovered that the
Japanese activity of the previous weeks had been not a prelude to
an offensive but a cover for the evacuation of their troops on
No. 3 Squadron,
The airfield at this time was crowded with planes, as the second
bomber strip had not yet been completed. In all the Americans had
64 fighters, 5 heavy bombers, and 34 dive-bombers, torpedo-bombers,
and other types. All aircraft were under the operational command
of the Senior Naval Aviator, CACTUS was the code-name for
Aircraft were used by the American Command in four main
roles: (i) the protection of installations; (ii) support for the
ground forces on
This was the primary role of No. 3 Squadron. The Hudson was essentially a reconnaissance aircraft. It was armed with machine guns for self-defence, and carried bombs which could be used if a suitable target presented itself; but it was impressed on all crews that their job was to report enemy movements, not to go looking for trouble. The bomb-load of No. 3 Squadron's Hudsons when on patrol normally comprised four 500-pounders.
In its efforts to counter aggressive operations by enemy naval
and air forces the American Command depended upon advance
intelligence of Japanese aircraft and shipping concentrations at
The name given to the channel between the New Georgia Group on one side and
Until the arrival of the New Zealand squadron the Americans had been using torpedo- and dive-bombers for sea reconnaissance work, supplemented by long-distance patrols with their heavy bombers. The dive-bombers had had to carry out search patrols and, having found a target which they reported, they had been obliged to return to base and bomb-up for strike missions. During the intervening period targets often disappeared. The Hudsons with their longer range relieved the dive-bombers so that they were more readily available for their proper role when reports of targets were received. At the same time, the Hudsons released the American long-range bombers from much of their reconnaissance work and let them get on with the job of bombing the enemy. Thus the arrival of No. 3 Squadron filled an important gap in the types of aircraft available in the area, and was heartily welcomed by the overworked aircrews of American Air Group 14.
The American Command had planned to use the six New Zealand
Hudsons on five searches daily. The achievement on most days of
this commitment became a heavy strain on both aircrews and
ground staff. By 6 December congestion at
The advance flight began operations the day after it arrived at
A more severe engagement occurred three days later on
27 November when a Hudson, again captained by Gudsell, sighted
an enemy task force to the south-west of
This early action contributed to the high morale which prevailed in the squadron throughout its tour of operations. In the previous month the Americans had lost a number of their search planes through enemy action and, after seeing the comparatively light armament of the Hudsons, had told the New Zealanders that they would be sitting ducks for Japanese fighters. The proof that the Hudson could repel odds of three to one when properly handled and resolutely fought was comforting to all the aircrews.
Until the middle of December Hudsons flew on four, five,
or six patrols daily over
The task of the reconnaissance crews was perhaps as arduous as
any in the campaign. In the first two or three months camp facilities
were still primitive and crews on early morning patrols had to take
off without breakfast. Eventually tea and a piece of toast were
On 2 December a Hudson captained by Sergeant
Twice in the first week of December the Tokyo Express ran
down from the northern
Another enemy convoy was reported off
At midday on 11 December the coastwatcher near Buin reported
by wireless that a convoy of Japanese destroyers had left the
anchorage there and was steaming south-east at high speed. An
American photographic reconnaissance early in December confirmed previous reports that the Japanese were building an airfield
at
One of the first Allied attacks on
From this date on Achilles, was hit by a bomb. In spite of the damage done by the
bombardment the Japanese were operating aircraft from
Allied air operations in January and February were hampered by bad weather. The rainy season had started by the end of December, and for the next few months there were frequent heavy rainstorms throughout the area. Japanese shipping took full advantage of the cover which they provided, and which enabled it on many occasions to escape detection by searching aircraft.
After a relatively quiet period during December, the Japanese
in January again started large-scale attempts with destroyers to
reinforce their garrison on
The Tokyo Express made another run on 10 January when eight
destroyers again reached Cape Esperance during the night. They
were attacked by PT boats, which claimed torpedo hits, and retired
before daylight. Groups of them were seen next morning by
Another strong attempt was made by the Japanese with destroyers
and cargo ships on the 14th. They were first reported by the coastwatcher on
In the late afternoon on 15 January an
Reports from American search planes on 17 January showed that
large numbers of enemy ships were still moving into the northern
Another successful engagement with enemy shipping took place
on 28 January. Six Japanese destroyers were reported in the after-
Throughout January enemy shipping activity in the area increased
steadily and numerous sightings were made by patrolling aircraft
in addition to the major ones already described. At the end of the
month shipping in the northern
Throughout the month aircraft of No. 3 Squadron averaged just
under seven sorties a day. Summary of operations by No. 3 Squadron, November 1942–January 1943.
Early the next morning the area was raided again, but on a larger
scale, by five American B17s which were guided to the target area
by Flying Officer The High Commissioner for the Western Pacific objected to the bombing of native villages,
as he felt that in some cases the information concerning pro-Japanese activities was not
reliable enough to warrant such measures. Consequently Admiral Halsey ordered that
it should be done only when the information was quite certain or where the village was
completely occupied by the enemy.
Another Hudson bombed Empty bottles, when falling, make a noise like bombs coming down and help to disturb
the enemy's peace of mind.
On 22 January a Hudson made a reconnaissance flight over Vila, on Kolombangara Island, where the Japanese were building an airfield, and photographed the area as part of the preparation for an American naval bombardment which had been planned to take place two days later. The aircraft met fairly heavy anti-aircraft fire over Vila but did not encounter any enemy aircraft. As a result of the reconnaissance COMAIRSOPAC Intelligence was able to state that the runway had been cleared but that no surfacing work on the strip had been started.
On 24 January a Hudson on patrol attacked a Japanese tanker
in Vella Gulf, 215 miles from
Enemy air activity in the
On the 21st the personnel of No. 3 Squadron,
The camp still consisted solely of tents set on the muddy ground. The absence of dugout accommodation meant that the men had to tumble out of their beds into foxholes whenever enemy planes were overhead; and for some weeks the efficiency of the squadron was threatened, although it was never impaired, by fatigue caused by broken nights and lack of sleep.
February opened with air activity more intense than any that the
Allied forces had experienced since November. The large and
increasing concentrations of enemy shipping in the south Bougainville area caused the American Command to expect a major invasion
attempt. On the first day of the month the coastwatcher on
On 1 February the American bases at
On 2 February the American Air Command made every effort
to re-establish contact with the enemy ships before they reached
their bases in the northern
In contrast to the preceding few days, 3 February was uneventful for No. 3 Squadron. Seven routine searches were flown, all of which were negative.
The next day, however, was again full of incident. Shortly after
one o'clock the
At four o'clock in the afternoon they were attacked by American
dive-bombers, torpedo-bombers, and fighters off
The last run made by the Tokyo Express to
After their major effort to recapture
The Japanese air force based its main concentrations south of the
Equator at
IN the months which followed the Japanese evacuation of
When No. 3 Squadron had first moved to the forward area, it had gone as a self-contained unit complete with its maintenance, medical, and signals organisation. The posting of further squadrons to the area made it desirable to establish most of the ancillary services on a station rather than a squadron basis in order to avoid unnecessary duplication. This was achieved in the first instance by withdrawing a number of men from the administrative and maintenance organisations of each squadron. Later, additional administrative personnel arrived from New Zealand, and by the end of the year squadrons going overseas comprised merely the aircrews and one or two specialist officers. All ground services were awaiting them when they reached their destination.
In Curtiss, which was stationed in
The control of air operations from a ship was by no means easy
owing to communication difficulties. For example, it frequently
happened that the ship swinging with the tide rode around its buoy,
and the telephone lines connecting it with the squadron and other
units ashore were put out of action. Consequently, early in
By early
No. 1 (Islands) Group Headquarters was formed at Santo on
The group became one of the subordinate headquarters within the command of COMAIRSOPAC. Other subordinate headquarters were those of United States Naval Aircraft, 1st Marine Air Wing, and 13th United States Army Air Force.
Wallingford was responsible to COMAIRSOPAC for the operational
efficiency of all units under his command, but operation orders were
issued direct to the units concerned by the American commanders
to whom they had been allocated. At the same time, as the Group
Headquarters was within the headquarters of COMAIRSOPAC, the
AOC and his operational staff had some voice in the employment
of
The wireless-telegraphy point-to-point communications system, which had previously been operated by No. 3 Squadron, was transferred to Group Headquarters, through which in future passed all administrative signals traffic for squadrons in the forward area. Operational signals continued to be passed through COMAIRSOPAC channels.
The camp in which No. 3 Squadron had lived since it came to
Santo—near the north end of the Bomber I airstrip at Pallikulo—
was established as an
Until the Group Headquarters was fully staffed and could
function as a complete unit, an interim organisation was set up
within
The first appointments to be filled for the formation of Group Headquarters were: Personnel Staff Officer, Flight Lieutenant S. G. Lester, and Group Engineer Officer, Squadron Leader A. T. Giles, MBE. Over the next two months additional posts were filled as follows:
By the end of May the headquarters had a strength of 14 officers and 13 other ranks and was getting into its stride. Five months later, at the end of October, it had grown to 34 officers and 179 airmen.
In the period immediately following the formation of No. 1
(Islands) Group, the overall administration of the
Considerable difficulties existed also with regard to supply, not
only for the
At Santo the unloading of ships was done under the control of
the United States Army, who decided what cargo was most urgently
required and what ships should be first unloaded. The result was
that Navy and
The move of New Zealand squadrons to the forward area necessitated the setting up of a repair and maintenance organisation, in addition to the squadrons' own servicing units, to keep the aircraft serviceable.
At the end of
The Deputy Director of Repair and Maintenance, Squadron
Leader
On the basis of his report it was decided to send a party of men
to be used in the American Naval Air Service Repair Organisation
at Santo until they could be replaced by the personnel coming from
The unit was assembled and left
At the beginning of May a detachment under Flight Sergeant
Material for building hangars and workshops was sent from New
Zealand, and a works party under Pilot Officer
Earlier in July the detachment at SBD Dauntless; made by Douglas,
By the beginning of October four hangars had been completed at the repair depot, and it was decided to build no more. The depot consisted of the hangars, in which complete overhauls and major inspections of airframes and engines were carried out; the general engineering section, with coppersmith's and blacksmith's shop; and an electrician's shop, instrument shop, armoury, propeller shop, fabric workers' and carpenter's shop, parachute section, engine repair shop, engine store, main store and offices.
The unit by this time was working smoothly at high pressure,
as was the
The establishment of the Repair Depot was cancelled and was replaced by a larger establishment for a Base Depot Workshops. The manning position at home, and the difficulty of finding men in the required trades who were fit for tropical service, caused some delay in filling the new establishment, but the additional personnel were posted to Islands Group before the end of the year.
It had been intended originally that the Repair Depot at Santo
should carry out complete overhauls of both airframes and engines,
making the
Under the revised policy the engines of fighter aircraft, when
they became due for complete overhaul, were handed over to the
Americans in exchange for new or reconditioned ones and were
overhauled by the American depots and put into a common pool.
Bomber-reconnaissance aircraft needing engine overhauls continued
to be flown back to New Zealand, where the work could be done
by the large number of technical men in the
The problem of daily servicing of aircraft, as distinct from repair
and overhaul, was met by the formation of servicing units. The
first New Zealand squadrons to go overseas, both bomber-reconnaissance and fighter, went as complete units taking their
servicing staffs as well as aircrews. American experience had shown,
however, particularly with regard to fighter squadrons, that aircrews
could remain in the combat area only for a short time if they were
The practice of giving aircrew short tours in the tropics contributed greatly towards efficiency in the air and to a low wastage rate. It was costly in movement and loss of time, but it ensured a high standard and also reduced the necessity for training new crews.
It was naturally impossible to transport whole squadrons, including ground staff, to and from New Zealand every three months;
nor was it necessary, since the men working on the ground suffered
less strain and could remain efficient in the forward area longer than
those flying in combat. Consequently, in
The principle was extended to bomber-reconnaissance squadrons
in August. Up till then Nos. 3 and 9 Squadrons, which were in the
forward area, relieved their crews by infiltrating fresh crews from
the rear areas. In that month, however, it was decided that, taking
all things into consideration, the divorcing of the maintenance units
and the flying squadrons was the most efficient way to operate in
the tropics. Henceforth bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, like
the fighters, moved as complete aircrew units. In October the
When the dual organisation of squadrons and servicing units was first proposed there were fears that it would break up the team spirit between ground crews and aircrews. Its introduction caused numerous complaints from officers and men, especially in the longer-established bomber-reconnaissance squadrons where they had been working together for a long time and had built up a solid squadron spirit. There is no doubt that at times a rift did develop between aircrew and ground staff, but the effects proved less serious than might have been expected. If squadrons in the forward area failed to combine as closely with the ground staffs as they would have done had they been stationed permanently with them, the effect did not result in any noticeable lowering of morale or efficiency.
When the
Early in
Since the Americans could not help in bringing the New Zealand
camps up to the required standard, it became necessary during
The most urgent need at
During March and April No. 3 Squadron was joined at Guadalcanal by No.
Another works party was sent to Santo in March and was immediately employed in moving the original
At the end of May more than a hundred additional works
personnel were sent to
Another matter with which No. 1 (Islands) Group Headquarters
was intimately concerned was the question of supply. Although the
broad principles of obtaining supplies for the
By the end of
In
During
On
Air, surface, and mechanical transport
Supply, maintenance, and works
Equipment, technical and non-technical
Medical services
Personnel matters, other than those concerning officers and aircrew which remained under the administration of the Senior Personnel Staff Officer.
The re-allocation of duties following the establishment of Base Depot resulted in a number of postings from Group Headquarters to the base strength. At the end of November the strength of Group Headquarters had fallen to 17 officers and 60 other ranks.
Wing Commander
At its inception the Base Depot comprised the following units:
No. 4 Repair Depot
No. 14 Squadron
No. 3 Squadron, which had recently returned from Guadalcanal.
Nos. 1 and 12 Servicing Units
No. 6 Flying Boat Squadron, located at
Base Depot Headquarters, which included No. 2
The total strength of these units amounted to 1196 men. Group Headquarters was also located at the Base Depot, as was a transit camp which was independent of the Base.
Although it was desirable that the Group Headquarters should
be in touch as closely as possible with the forward squadrons, its
location was so closely related to that of COMAIRSOPAC that it was
not possible to make a move until the higher command also moved
forward. It had been intended to move the headquarters forward
in November, but owing to lack of accommodation at
The camp was not yet fully completed, but, allowing for this,
all ranks found it moderately comfortable. Its completion was
delayed by bad weather, and it was some weeks after the Group
moved into it before it was entirely satisfactory. The splitting up
of functions between Group Headquarters and Base Depot, and the
subsequent move of the group to
The need for the development of the Group Headquarters, and
indeed for much of the administrative organisation in the South
Such criticism failed to take account of the practical difficulties
which would have been involved, even had the Americans wanted
us to take such a course, as well as the effect on morale both in the
That being the case, it became necessary to evolve our own
administration in the
The detailed planning of all changes dictated by higher policy,
as well as the maintenance of supply and personnel services, was
the responsibility of the Group Headquarters. Policy was often
changed at short notice, making necessary sudden and drastic
changes in planning. Shortages of shipping space delayed the
execution of projected moves sometimes for weeks, and in turn
upset other plans already made. By executing the policy of the
American command on the one hand and co-ordinating the administration of the lower formations on the other, the headquarters
The support of the
Early in
Until these became available the
With the promise of transport aircraft to be supplied in
A
For the first two months after the formation of No. 40 Squadron
in
This difficulty was overcome when the squadron obtained its
full quota of aircraft and trained crew and was able to start
operating on regular schedules. The first schedules to be flown,
starting in August, provided two C47s and four C60s from
WITH the Japanese evacuation of
Until June there were no important land operations in the
The operational strength of the
No. 14 Squadron, as soon as it settled in, took over the
fighter defence of the island. Operating under orders of the United
States Interceptor Command, it maintained twenty-four-hour readiness in anticipation of sneak raids by Japanese aircraft. Frequent
scrambles were ordered, both by day and by night, to intercept
unidentified aircraft, but no hostile planes were met. The only
occasion on which an enemy machine was identified was on a night
in late May, when four pilots were ordered up to intercept a
Japanese bomber which had dropped bombs on
No. 3 Squadron's operations from
The task of the Allied air forces was to strike at the bases and
airfields in the Buin-
The only engagement which No. 3 Squadron had with the enemy
in February, after the Japanese evacuation, occurred on the 13th
when a Hudson on patrol fought off an attack by three Japanese
fighters. A major contact with enemy shipping was made on the
27th when a Hudson sighted two warships and a cargo ship off
Twice in February Hudsons sank enemy barges carrying troops
and supplies, one off southern
Routine operations were daily search patrols, three in the morning
and five in the afternoon. Besides these,
In March No. 3 Squadron was still employed on sea patrols and
flew a total of 249 sorties during the month. Only four Japanese
ships were sighted on these flights, and the Hudsons were engaged
on four occasions with enemy aircraft without loss to either side.
The squadron also took part in minor air attacks against the enemy
barge staging points on Viru, and continued to carry out nuisance
raids on
On the nights of 20–21 and 21–22 March, when American
bombers made heavy attacks on enemy shipping and laid magnetic
mines off the coast of southern
During April the squadron flew a total of 197 searches and other missions. Only four contacts with enemy ships were made, but a total of 71 enemy aircraft were sighted on 34 different patrols. Hudsons were in action against enemy aircraft on five occasions.
The first enemy plane to be shot down by the
That particular patrol was far more eventful than most. Before
the fight with the float-plane, the Hudson had dropped two depth-charges and two bombs along the track of a submarine which had
crash-dived twenty-five seconds before, and later it was involved
The most notable feature of the patrols by No. 3 Squadron in
early April was the number of sightings of Japanese submarines.
Two of the aircraft on reconnaissance on the morning of 1 April
saw submarines to the north of Santa Isabel, but on both occasions
the vessels crash-dived before the aircraft could attack. The following afternoon another Hudson sighted one surfaced 120 miles south
of
Throughout April No. 3 Squadron continued to carry out routine
patrols on a slightly reduced scale, some of the longer searches
being taken over for a few days by American B17s. Most of the
patrols were uneventful, with the exception of frequent afternoon
sightings by Hudsons of Japanese float-planes in the vicinity of
On the afternoon of 10 April a Hudson was attacked by a float-plane 106 miles north of Simbo. The enemy fired several bursts at 800 yards' range without scoring any hits, and then broke off the action. Two float-planes were seen on the 12th but did not attack. Two days later a Hudson on afternoon search was twice intercepted. It was attacked first by a float-plane 74 miles off Simbo and drove the enemy off by fire from its turret guns. Shortly afterwards it was attacked by a second enemy aircraft, but eluded it and returned safely to base.
In an effort to destroy the float-planes, American fighters were sent out to escort the patrolling Hudsons in the Simbo area. On the afternoon of 16 April the Hudson on afternoon search was accompanied by four P38s. An enemy plane was seen in the usual area about ten miles away, but the fighters did not see it and all efforts to attract their attention to it failed. The next day four fighters patrolled the area on their own but failed to make contact.
On the afternoon of 21 April a Hudson captained by Flying
Officer
Throughout February and March the Japanese air force in the
On 7 April nearly a hundred enemy aircraft attacked American
shipping off Moa sunk, with three other
vessels damaged.
This was the first major action in which No. comairsopac.
During May the position of the enemy air force in the
No. 3 Squadron continued in its role as a reconnaissance squadron, its operational commitment being seven routine searches daily. Only two sightings of enemy ships were reported during the month and on twelve occasions enemy aircraft were seen. Hudsons were attacked on four occasions by enemy aircraft without loss to either side.
At the end of April
After completing training in
The shipping allocated to carry the ground staff and equipment
to the forward area from
At this phase of the
Fighter patrols over American base areas at the Russell
Islands and
Fighter cover for American convoys in the area.
Strafing of enemy land targets and ships.
Fighter escort for American bombers attacking enemy bases, airfields, and shipping.
Offensive fighter sweeps over enemy bases in the northern
Interception of enemy air attacks against the American bases
on Russell and
The first few operations by No. 15 Squadron, beginning on
29 April, were local patrols. All the early patrols were uneventful,
as were a number of other operational flights in early May; these
comprised escorts to American naval task forces and to American
bombers attacking the enemy air bases at
The squadron's first contact with enemy aircraft occurred on
6 May, when the squadron commander, Squadron Leader Herrick,
and Flight Lieutenant Duncan Sqn Ldr S. R. Duncan, m.i.d., Air Medal (US); born
The enemy was still three miles away; he had come down to 800 feet and was flying along beside a heavy, black cloud. The fighters were at 1000 feet. They jettisoned their belly tanks and gave chase, overtaking him in two minutes. Until they opened fire, the Japanese pilot apparently had no idea they were there as he made no attempt to dodge into the shelter of the cloud. They approached from slightly below and directly behind, and fired bursts into the float-plane from a range of 200 yards. It burst into flames and crashed into the sea, and in a minute all that remained of it was a patch of oil and a wing floating on the water.
Two days later eight aircraft of No. 15 Squadron took part in an attack on enemy warships. The Allied coastwatcher at Kolombangara had signalled that three Japanese destroyers were in Blackett Strait, one of them apparently on fire and low in the water. One of them, following an explosion, had gone aground on a reef and another was drifting in the strait, very low in the water and obviously crippled. The ships had evidently struck mines which had been recently sown in Blackett Strait by American naval units.
Despite very bad weather an Allied striking force of 62 aircraft
attempted to attack the ships. At half past nine in the morning
19 SBDs and 3 TBFs, escorted by 32 F4Us and 8 P40s of No. 15
Squadron, took off from
For the rest of May operational activity by No. 15 Squadron was
confined almost entirely to local patrols, during which only one
contact was made with enemy aircraft when Japanese fighters
ventured into the patrol area on the 13th. Only two New
Zealanders were in the air at the time. One of them, Flying Officer
By the middle of
The Allied force in the attack on comairsols, Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, the
striking force, and Task Group 33+2 under the Commander, Espiritu
Santo, which was a supporting force and acted as a forward reserve
for the units in combat.
comairsols had at his disposal a total of approximately 290
fighter aircraft, 170 dive- and torpedo-bombers, 35 medium bombers,
72 heavy bombers, 18 flying boats, and 42 aircraft of other types.
Task Group 33+2 comprised 40 fighters, 72 dive- and torpedo-bombers, 10 medium bombers, 43 heavy bombers, 35 flying boats,
and 18 of other types.
The immediate object of the task force was to capture
The building up of the Allied forces in the
Twelve P40s of No. 15 Squadron took part in the battle and shot down four enemy aircraft. They suffered no losses, but four were damaged and two of them had to make crash-landings on the Russell airstrip. Two of the enemy were shot down by No. 15 Squadron in the early stages of the battle when the initial Japanese attack was broken up, and part of the squadron carried on in pursuit of the scattered aircraft. Later a series of dogfights took place between small groups, and in this phase the squadron shot down two more.
The following is a report of the action made by one of the pilots,
Flying Officer G. H.
We orbited at the Russells at about 22,000 feet—saw three Zeros—
I did not fire at these. Flight Lieutenant Duncan and his section came in
and followed them. Sergeant Martin
Twenty miles S/W of the Russells we saw a close vic formation of five
Zeros, to our port and five hundred feet below. I led the attack, turning
left and diving—the Zeros did a left hand steep climbing turn to get back
on our tails, and got into line astern. The first three in close line astern,
Squadron Leader Herrick and Davis had joined us by this time, making a total of five P40s against five Zeros. We made several attacks and passes, more or less individually. McKenzie and my leader then dropped out with gun trouble, and Martin had also dropped out. I saw two Zeros on Davis's tail—the first one firing all guns, with the second Zero above and slightly in the rear, not firing, but protecting the first Zero. I made a left hand turn and fired a long, full deflection burst into the leading Zero. As I turned into the attack I saw another Zero about a thousand feet below me and flying level—I did not pay attention to this plane as I did not think it possible for it to join the fight, but as I was firing at the Zero on Davis's tail I noticed tracer coming up past the fuselage, and my plane was hit. I looked down and saw this lower Zero firing at a distance of only 60 to 75 yards away.
I stopped firing when my machine was hit and smoke started to pour in to my cockpit—I broke away from the engagement and headed towards the Russells. The motor was knocking badly—oil and engine temperature gauges were off the clock. I prepared to bail out, but as I stood up and prepared to open the canopy the smoke died down, and as I was at 15,000 feet I decided to attempt a crash landing at the Russells. On reaching them my engine stopped and I could not land on the main field as other aircraft were landing. So I landed on the other uncompleted strip which was not long enough, and my aircraft flipped on its nose in the soft mud at the end of the strip.
Throughout the action the manoeuvrability of the Japanese
fighters troubled the New Zealanders, whose P40s were the oldest
type of fighter engaged, but the battle tactics and flying discipline
of the squadron appear to have been an outstanding factor in their
successes. According to American intelligence reports the work of
the P40s, both
The Japanese made a second fighter sweep on 12 June which was
intercepted by ninety Allied fighters to the north-west and east of
the Russells. Twenty-five Japanese were shot down for the loss of
five American fighters and one
On 16 June the Japanese made their third and largest attack of
the month on American positions when they sent down more than
a hundred dive-bombers and fighters, which were reported by the
coastwatcher at
Apart from these three engagements, for which the Japanese had
brought reinforcements from
The airfield at
The Raider Battalion landed unopposed and undetected by the enemy, and two days later was joined by two infantry companies which constructed defensive positions. Construction troops were then brought in, and by 10 July an emergency fighter strip had been built and was ready for operation.
On 29 June the troops to make the main assault on
On the night of 30 June–1 July troops were ferried in small craft
from
The original plan of operations called for the capture of
At the end of June the Allied air forces had two forward bases
for their operations over
The main bases used by the enemy during the campaign were
In the attempt to prevent the loss of
After the defeat of a major attack on 15 July the enemy gave up
his attempts to attack the Allied forces in daylight. In the last
phase of the battle, although his land forces needed all possible
air support, his offensive operations were limited to fighter sweeps,
Fighter squadrons were employed by the American Command
as bomber escorts for daylight patrols over
The maintenance of a constant patrol was criticised by some
since it meant having a limited number of aircraft constantly in the
air and vulnerable to attack by large enemy formations. However,
the patrol was seldom seriously challenged. Its success in warding
off enemy air attacks is indicated by the fact that in the entire
operations, lasting more than five weeks, only three hits were
scored on ships by Japanese bombers and torpedo-planes and none
of the ships was sunk. Only one horizontal bombing attack reached
its objective in daylight and this occurred when there was no Allied
fighter patrol in the area. As a result American shipping bringing
vital supplies and reinforcements to the land forces on
From the day of the initial landing until 7 July, No. 14 Squadron
was engaged regularly on
On the morning of 1 July a force of enemy dive-bombers and
fighters attacked American positions on Plt Off J. F. Burton; born
In an action which took place two days later eight aircraft of
No. 14 Squadron, on patrol at 14,000 feet over
I was flying No. 2 to S/Ldr. Quill. Tracer passing my wing and a cannon shell in the wing root were the first warning I had of the attack. As S/Ldr. Quill took no immediate action, and was apparently unaware of the attack, I stayed with him as long as I could, and then crossed my controls to the right, doing a quarter roll. On climbing into a fight above me, I found no Warhawks remaining, and was alone among about 40 Zekes. I fired at one from full beam, one from rear quarter and was then simultaneously attacked from astern and starboard. I used the same evasive action as before. I then saw upward of 10 aircraft apparently in combat. I climbed to their level, about 9,000 ft., and attacked them out of the sun. All were Zekes. I fired a burst at one from the rear quarter, and at two from directly astern. I concentrated on the nearer of these and put a good burst into him. I could see smoke from incendiaries coming from him, but he flew away and I did not see him again, being myself attacked by six aircraft from the starboard quarter, and by others from astern. I again took the same evasive action.
I left these aircraft milling round by themselves and I saw two Zekes in close formation ahead of me. I overtook them and put a long burst dead astern, into the leader. As I was firing, at about 150 yards, I was attacked by a number of Zekes from beam and astern, and my aircraft was hit by a cannon shell in the port wing, and by sundry bullets. White petrol vapour trails came from the fuselage or wing root of the Zeke I had attacked. He rolled on his back, and pulled out under and to starboard of me. The white smoke turned to heavy black smoke. I was busy evading his mates by a violent downward skid to the right. I was then at 6,000 to 7,000 feet. As I came out of this manoeuvre, I saw a circular white patch of foam on the water below me some 4–5,000 ft. There was also oil round the splash area. There was no further sign of this enemy aircraft, which I claim as destroyed.
Six enemy aircraft, which had followed me down, were joined by possibly another 10. They came in from astern, above and both sides, entirely boxing me in, except from below. I could see tracer going past me. I turned toward the nearest aircraft and fired at them. I passed very close, about one foot from the nearest Zeke. My aircraft was faster at this level, and I broke out, but they followed me and I turned back into them to find that about three were supporting one Zeke, which made a head-on attack. Others were higher. I fired at the attacker, and broke away down to avoid a head-on collision. This aircraft, I consider, tried to ram. The Zekes then appeared to give up the fight, as they merely sat up above me and did not attack.
After another encounter with other Zekes, I saw further aircraft which I thought might be Allied aircraft, so I went to join them, but found they were all Zekes. I attacked the nearest and put a good burst into him from the quarter until finally only one gun of my aircraft was firing. I then broke away and dived to sea level, and came home at about 5,000 ft. with my aircraft damaged …
I learned later that I was the last N.Z. pilot to break off the action. Had I known this at the time, I would have broken off earlier if possible and returned.
I consider the enemy pilots I met on this occasion to be superior to those I had encountered previously. They maintained some type of formation at all times, never breaking to less than pairs. Their evasive action was excellent, and pilots made full use of their manoeuvrable aircraft. There was no ‘fancy’ flying, such as rolls, which I had seen enemy aircraft do in the other action in this area in which I had taken part. Their evasive action comprised mainly violent skids and steep turns, and occasionally half-rolls.
It appeared to me, however, that determined action upset the Japanese. A determined effort to break through was successful, if pressed home. On the other hand, they did not press home their attacks very firmly, particularly if any retaliation was attempted. A more or less casual burst at an attacking enemy aircraft, even if this burst was poorly aimed, was usually enough to upset the attack, the Japanese sheering off.
During the second week in July enemy air operations were on a smaller scale. Weather hampered operations on both sides, but American intelligence considered that the enemy had been forced to limit his sorties because of heavy losses and was reorganising his strength to meet the next Allied move.
The next heavy raid occurred on 15 July, when twenty-seven
enemy bombers and forty to fifty fighters attacked
Besides taking part in the
One of the most important operations in which No. 14 Squadron
took part was the American strike against enemy shipping at
On 25 July No. 14 Squadron handed over its duties at Guadalcanal to No. 16 Squadron and moved back to Santo, where it spent a few days employed on local defence. On the 29th No. 17 Squadron arrived at Santo from New Zealand and the pilots of No. 14 returned to New Zealand the next day for leave. During their tour they had destroyed twenty-two Japanese aircraft and had probably destroyed four more, with a loss in action of four aircraft and three pilots.
No. 16 Squadron had formed at
During its tour of duty at
American bombers were daily attacking
Throughout August the squadron continued to provide cover for
bombing strikes on various targets and carried out routine patrols
over
On the 25th two aircraft, piloted by Flight Lieutenant
The following day five aircraft, led by Flight Lieutenant
On 3 September eight aircraft acted as bottom cover to a force of
B24s bombing
The squadron was relieved at
The Allied capture of
On New Georgia the American land forces began a series of
small mopping-up operations. Enemy forces holding outposts on
the mainland and on the small islands off
The next Japanese-occupied area was Kolombangara Island,
10 miles from
The position of the Japanese at
A month earlier they had abandoned their seaplane base at
Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel. It had never been a great success on
account of its proximity to Allied land-based aircraft. It was only
During August the Japanese had made several naval attempts first
to reinforce, and then to evacuate, garrisons in the central
In early October the Japanese made several attempts to evacuate
their men from
During this stage of the comairsols was directed
against the enemy bases and outposts in the mid-
The effectiveness of Allied fighter operations was increased by
the possession of the airstrips at
The work of No. 16 Squadron up to the time it was relieved in
mid-September has already been referred to. After 14 September
New Zealand fighter representation in the forward area was
increased, at American request, to two squadrons based at Guadalcanal, with one in reserve in Santo. No. 17 Squadron arrived at
As the two New Zealand squadrons were urgently required in
the combat area, and as half the pilots of No. 15 Squadron already
had the experience of one tour of duty behind them, the squadron
came up to
On 14, 15, and 16 September American bombers made particularly heavy raids on
During the next few days Allied bombing strikes were limited
by the fact that fighter squadrons were needed to cover shipping
moving up from
On 1 October American shipping lying off
No. 3 Squadron was still based at
The other aircraft was brought down by Japanese fighters off
Baga Island, near
At the beginning of August the X-ray patrol was taken over by
a squadron of American PV1s PV1 Ventura: made by Vega,
It handed over its duties to No. 1 Squadron,
CHIEFS OF
AIR STAFF
THE elimination of the Japanese defence network in the central
Preparatory to the main operations the
In preparation for the attack on
On
The main body of men left
The squadrons' aircraft continued to operate from
The camp site allotted to the
Four hours after the landing a power plant had been set up by
the W/T Section and the new station was in direct communication
with
On the 23rd the airfield, constructed by American Seabees, was
ready for operations and the ground crews, who had set up their
servicing section beside the strip, were waiting to receive the
squadrons and their aircraft from
The two squadrons flew in from
The first enemy air raid took place on the evening of the 27th when bombs were dropped near the New Zealand camp. As foxholes were still under construction and had no roofs to give shelter from falling shrapnel, the experience was an uncomfortable one. By the next night all foxholes had been completed and covered.
By 30 October all sections of the station had been established.
No. 15 Squadron flew aircraft maintained by No.
The last unit to come from
From the time the squadrons first arrived, rain almost every day
made living conditions thoroughly uncomfortable. The aircrews,
who were quartered in a separate mess near the airstrip along with
American units, were not so badly off, but the site of the main
From the date of their arrival at
On 14 November Freeman was appointed Air Ops,
The triple responsibility of controlling air operations, commanding the wing, and commanding the
The American Command built up an impressive array of naval,
military, and air forces in the
Against these the enemy was estimated to have just over 400
aircraft based at Santa Cruz, in the
The campaign to neutralise the Japanese airfields, especially those
in southern
At the same time as the
The
New Zealand and American troops went ashore at
Five groups of transports brought the troops up from
New Zealand troops landed on
Throughout the day fighter patrols were maintained over the
Treasuries to give protection to the landing forces and shipping.
The
No contact was made with enemy aircraft until the afternoon,
when thirty to forty Val dive-bombers and fifty to sixty Zeke
and Hamp fighters attacked the landing craft unloading at the
beaches. At the time both American and New Zealand fighters
were patrolling to the north-west and north-east of the islands. In
all, three groups of enemy planes were successfully intercepted by
the Allied fighter screen, but a fourth group got through and
damaged the fighter director ship, the USS Cony, with two direct
bomb hits. Flights from both New Zealand squadrons intercepted
enemy formations and between them shot down four Japanese
fighters for no loss to themselves.
The landing of the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion on
On 30 October an American striking force of twelve TBFs
escorted by twenty-six fighters, including twelve from the
To encourage the enemy to believe that the main Allied landing
on
The landing operations at
Saratoga and Princeton. Further strikes were
made by this task force on the aerodromes and also on shipping in
the area over the next two days.
While the preliminary operations against Japanese positions
were being carried out, preparations for the landing at Empress
Augusta Bay proceeded. After a period of training and rehearsal
at
Before the landing craft left the transports with the first wave of
the assault, the beaches were well covered with fire from the
supporting naval forces. This fire provoked no response from the
Japanese positions and it appeared that nothing could be left alive
on the shore. The bombardment was lifted from the beaches at
7.21 a.m., and immediately afterwards thirty-one TBFs from
The area of the landings extended from the north side of Cape
It was estimated that there were only about 300 Japanese altogether opposing the landing, but their resistance was stubborn and determined. About half of them were killed, and when it was obvious that the American troops had established themselves on shore the remainder withdrew inland. American losses in the landing were 70 killed and missing and 124 wounded.
In spite of the heavy attacks on Japanese airfields in the
Conway, the patrol was responsible
for driving off a number of enemy planes which attempted to enter
the area. During the day only two attacks succeeded in breaking
through.
A patrol of eight aircraft of No. 18 Squadron,
While the New Zealanders were fighting their own battle, another formation of Zekes was intercepted by a flight of American P38s, which shot down seven and probably destroyed three more with no loss to themselves. In the meantime all ships in the bay had got under way and were manoeuvring to avoid bombs. A dozen dive-bombers got through the fighter cover and attacked the ships, but one vessel only was slightly damaged by a near miss.
Another Japanese attack was made in the early afternoon, when bombs were dropped on the landing beach and near some of the ships without doing any damage. The Japanese were again engaged by American fighters, which shot down a number, but New Zealand patrols during the rest of the day did not make any further contacts.
On the night of 1–2 November the Japanese sent a force of
cruisers and destroyers which they had gathered at
At eight o'clock in the morning a large group of enemy dive-bombers and bombers, covered by fighters, appeared over the ships,
which fought back with a tremendous barrage of anti-aircraft fire.
Thanks to the evasive action taken by the ships and the concentration of fire, the Japanese bomb aimers were thoroughly rattled,
and the only direct hits scored on the task force were from two
The events of 2 November showed that, while many Japanese
airfields had been put out of action by the continuous pounding they
had received from the aircraft of the
Until aerodromes could be built on
Following this attack three additional carriers, the Essex,
Bunker Hill and Independence, under Rear Admiral Alfred E.
Montgomery, USN, were lent by Admiral Nimitz to the South
Pacific Command, and on 11 November
Planes from the
Throughout November and December the Allied positions on
the Treasuries and
On
Two days after the first landing naval construction battalions
began building an airstrip 100 yards from the coast on the south side
of Cape Torokina. It was first used on 24 November. Before
the end of the year two other larger strips had been built at
The month following the
The day's work began before dawn, when pilots who had been
warned the night before for early morning operations—a dawn
patrol over
Meanwhile the ground crews had their aircraft ready to take off.
Since returning from operations the day before, every machine had
been checked, refuelled and rearmed, and bullet holes and
mechanical defects had been repaired. The servicing and repair
parties often worked all through the night by torchlight, their
For example, at five o'clock on the afternoon of 2 November a
maintenance party, under Corporal
As the early flights took off in the first light the camp woke up
and the routine of the day began. Two hours after the first pilots
had left another flight was ready to take off to patrol over the Torokina beach-head or strafe enemy targets on
In the revetments beside the strip maintenance and servicing parties clad in sunhats, shorts and boots, worked in the mounting heat throughout the day on aircraft undergoing periodical inspections and major repairs.
In the afternoon other flights took off for
From early in November
Another successful attack was made by eight aircraft of No. 18
Squadron on 15 November when they strafed barges in Tonolei
Harbour in southern
On the 28th a small formation, led by Wing Commander Freeman, was supposed to escort some American B25s bombing Tinputs
Harbour in north-eastern
On 11 December the
The development of airstrips at
The first attack, a fighter sweep by eighty aircraft, was made on
17 December. Twenty-four aircraft of the New Zealand Fighter
Wing, led by Freeman, took part. Originally the American Fighter Command had not planned to use P40s over
On 24 December the New Zealand Wing, in conjunction with
twenty-four American fighters, made another sweep over Flying boats engaged on air-sea rescue were christened ‘Dumbo’, after the big-eared
kind-hearted flying elephant of the film cartoon.
Squadron Leader
On the way in [to the target] we could see clouds of dust rising off
the Tobera strip. When we were about five miles south-east of Praed
Point two groups of ‘bandits’, with more than twenty aircraft in each,
were seen climbing up on our port side. The further group was a little
higher than the nearer group. Squadron Leader J. H. Arkwright
I picked a Zeke near the front of the very loose formation and opened fire at 300 yards in a stern quarter attack, continuing firing as I followed the Zeke round in a turn until I was dead astern. The Zeke exploded at the wing roots and started to burn, with bits of the aircraft flying off. He tumbled over and went down in flames. I saw many aircraft shot down by the squadron in this initial attack. I pulled round to the left, looking for another target. The sky was full of P40s and bandits milling round. I saw a Zeke on my left at the same level doing a left-hand turn. I turned, closing in astern, and fired a one-second burst at 250–300 yards. He did a complete flick roll to the left and when he pulled up I was still astern at 200 yards. I fired a 2–3 second burst and got hits all round the fuselage. He fell off in a lazy roll to the right and went straight down, apparently out of control.
I then found another Zeke milling round in the sky where about twelve P40s were mixing with a mass of Zekes. We were now down to about 12,000 feet. I turned in towards him and as he started a gentle turn to the left, I closed right in to 300 yards astern and fired a short burst. He flick-rolled to the left and as he straightened up I fired a long burst from dead astern. He fell away in a lazy roll to the right and then went down in a vertical dive. I rolled behind him and fired short bursts as he came in my sights. I observed my tracer going into the fuselage. I broke away at low level as I saw the Zeke go into the sea. As I was following him down I saw another Zeke go into the sea. This could have been the Zeke I had engaged previously and left in an uncontrolled dive.
I started to regain altitude and was set upon by six Zekes. I fired several
bursts haphazardly at them, but they hemmed me in and I broke violently
down again. At full throttle I could not shake off some of the Zekes, so
I went right down to the water and headed for the Duke of York Islands.
I found another P40 in the same predicament, so we scissored together. As
the Zeke broke away we turned back towards the fight. As I saw four
P40s making out to the rally point (Cape St. George) and as the fight
seemed to be working out from
The attacks on
The fighter sweep of 17 December was followed, two days later,
by a strike by American Liberators from
Royal New Zealand Air Force fighters took part in every major
attack made on
Dive-bomber attacks by American TBFs and SBDs were begun
early in January. In these operations also,
Close co-operation with the bombers was made the more difficult
because fighters and bombers operated from different airstrips,
and in most cases from different islands, and it was therefore
impossible for formation leaders to be together for briefing before
a strike. As a result, fighter leaders often had to set out without
knowing the bomber commanders' full plans for the operation.
At times, in bad weather or as a result of last-minute changes in
plan, the fighters failed to rendezvous with the bombers. This
difficulty was overcome later when SBDs and TBFs were based at
While the
No. 1 Squadron, under the command of Squadron Leader
During the latter part of its tour No. 3 Squadron had been doing
four patrols daily from
The Ventura was a more versatile aircraft than the Hudson and
had greater offensive power. Consequently No. 1 Squadron was
employed on a greater variety of work than No. 3 had been. It
carried out its first special mission on 28 October when an aircraft
dropped a message to the Task Force Commander during the initial
landings by 3 New Zealand Division on the
From the end of October all the squadron's operations except
the searches from
This practice resulted in a lot of time being wasted in transit
flights between
In terms of missions carried out, routine patrols and searches
constituted the greater part of the squadron's work, but there was
Bombing and strafing missions round the coast of
A typical operation took place on 10 December, when six
Venturas were ordered to attack copra warehouses being used by
the Japanese at Arigua Plantation, on the east coast of
On the 22nd four aircraft were ordered to bomb and strafe a
lighthouse and radar station at Cape St. George on
On the same day six Venturas were ordered to attack enemy
barges and other craft reported to be unloading at Ambitle Island
off the east coast of See map on p. 238.
With the institution of almost daily attacks on
As the ‘survivor patrols’ followed the striking forces practically
to Flt Lt D. F. Ayson, DFC;
Ayson's aircraft, cruising over the mouth of the channel, was
attacked by from six to nine Zekes and a running fight ensued.
Flying Officer The original report of the action had claimed only two enemy aircraft destroyed. The
third was confirmed later. ‘Beggar up finish’: pidgin English in the W/O G. E. Hannah, DFM;
Other operations carried out by the squadron during its tour included minelaying by night in Buka Passage, searches for suspected submarines, and the dropping of supplies to coastwatchers and propaganda leaflets to natives.
During the last ten days of its tour the squadron was relieved
of all its miscellaneous activities and was engaged, in conjunction
with an American Ventura Squadron, VB140, solely on patrols over
the sea west of
For the maintenance of its aircraft the squadron was based on No.
Pinkney on 13 October. Servicing problems were difficult
until nearly the end of the tour, as no spares had been available in
New Zealand and the squadron was obliged to leave without any.
American Ventura squadrons at
The following is a detailed summary of the squadron's flying activities during its tour:
By the middle of January accommodation was available at Torokina for the two New Zealand fighter squadrons, and on the 17th
the Wing moved there from
For several days after the move the squadrons operated from
On reaching
Station Headquarters and No.
For the first few days after landing, all hands were employed in
setting up camp, digging foxholes, and moving equipment from
Puruata Island. Among other cargo the units had brought with
them 30,000 super, feet of timber for camp construction. The work
was finished on 23 January, and next morning the men paraded for
normal duties. By this time temporary station headquarters,
orderly rooms, post office, and a non-technical store had been
established at the camp site; and by the airstrip a wing operations
and intelligence section, squadron huts, servicing unit areas,
engineers' offices and technical store were ready to function. A
week later the station was completely settled in. Conditions were
The move to
While the front-line squadrons were moving forward through
the
From the time when No. 3 Squadron began operations at
In Fiji No. 5 Squadron, which had consisted of Vincents and a
flight of
No. 4 Squadron, now fully equipped with Hudsons, carried out
regular reconnaissance operations, and at the same time served as a
training unit for crews to reinforce the squadrons in the forward
area. Enemy submarines were still active in Fijian waters. At a
time when senior commanders were interested in the rear areas
only so far as they affected operations in the forward areas, the
employment of Japanese submarines in the vicinity of
In William Williams, Hearst
and Vanderbilt, were attacked. The Williams was torpedoed early
in the month 120 miles south of Hearst, which was sunk later in the month. One aircraft
sighted them and dropped supplies.
Six submarines were reported during June by ships and aircraft.
On the 25th a Hudson sighted one 180 miles south-west of
In the following months No. 4 Squadron escorted every ship
entering or leaving Saugatuck between Saugatuck reached harbour safely
without being attacked.
Long-range patrols and reconnaissance flights were carried out
from
The
Curtiss
in
One of the earliest operations, carried out before the squadron
had been officially formed, was a search by an aircraft captained
Vanderbilt, which
was torpedoed on 2 May. Eight men were found on a raft in very
rough seas and the Catalina stood by for three hours waiting for
the arrival of rescue ships. As none turned up, it finally landed and
picked up the men. The waves did some damage to the hull, but
the aircraft took off safely and returned to
For the next few months the squadron combined training with
shipping escorts and searches for submarines. When training was
completed, at the beginning of August, orders were received to
prepare a detached flight to serve at
Aircraft of the detachment took part in the rescue of survivors
of the American troopship San Juan, which was torpedoed on
11 November. Rescue operations, to which the aircraft of No. 4
Squadron also gave air cover, extended over two days. During most
of the time the sea was too rough to permit flying boats to land, but
the Catalinas dropped smoke flares to guide surface vessels to
survivors who were clinging to rafts and bits of wreckage scattered
over 20 miles of sea. Altogether 1180 men were rescued.
The main body of the squadron left
At Segond the unit came under the operational control of
the American Navy seaplane tender USS Wright, which was
based there. It carried out its first operational patrol from its new
base three days after its arrival, and for the next two and a half
months was engaged in searching for enemy ships and submarines
to a range of 670 miles over the seas to the west of Santo. All
aircraft on patrol carried full armament, including depth-charges,
but no hostile craft was seen. The flight at
Operations were carried out from Segond until just before
Christmas and then the unit moved forward to Halavo Bay on
Wright,
arriving on 26 December. The first patrol from Halavo was
Reference has already been made in Chapter 9 to the
development of an air-warning system in New Zealand. In
the operational areas of the South Pacific a similar system was
developed, and it combined with the coastwatching organisation to
give warning of approaching Japanese raids. Actual interceptions
of enemy aircraft, particularly at night, were also directed by radar.
During the first year of the South Pacific campaign there was an
acute shortage of trained radar personnel, and New Zealand was
asked several times by the American Command to supply them.
Demands could not always be met in full as the supply was limited
and it took a long time to train more men. In
Some units had gone overseas before then. Early in December
When the Americans took over the defence of
In
One of the stations was in open country near the coast, and the other was located on the highest point of the island, five miles from Nukualofa. Both sites had their drawbacks—the former was too low-lying for satisfactory radar operation, and the latter was surrounded by bush—but they were the best available. Both were connected by telephone with an air-warning centre, which was also taken over by New Zealanders, near the airfield at Fuamotu. During the time the unit was on the island no enemy activity was reported, but plots were made of all friendly aircraft and shipping in the area.
Early in President Hayes for
They spent three weeks there in a transit camp, and then went to
An
An instance occurred in the latter.part of
Early in
The unit formed at
An advance party of the unit left New Zealand for
The main body, consisting of the Adjutant, Pilot Officer
George Clymer. The unit landed at
The New Zealand GCI set was the first of its kind in the South
Chicago and fighter cover had been flown from the
carriers
By 20 August F4Fs and SBDs were based at
The arrival of the
The unit kept watch twenty-four hours a day, except for an hour and a half each morning when it was off the air for maintenance. Two controllers were on duty each night, one experienced and one under instruction. During the day the duty controllers stood by in camp where they were on call in case of daylight raids. The operating crew was divided into four watches, each consisting of an NCO in charge and four airmen in the operations room, plus a radar mechanic. One airman acted as long-range warning plotter, one as GCI plotter, one as PPI reader, and the fourth as height-range reader.
The unit's first major operation took place on 7 April when the Japanese sent over a large formation of dive-bombers and fighters in a daylight raid. The unit gave accurate plots and heights to the Island Fighter Control, information which contributed largely to the Japanese loss of thirty-three aircraft reported as shot down by American fighters. After the battle it received a letter of commendation from COMAIRSOLS for its share in the day's work.
In the last big daylight raid on
During the first half of
To co-ordinate and administer these units a Squadron Headquarters was formed at
The first of the COL units to go overseas was named No. 53
and was commanded by Flying Officer
Its site on top of the cape was excellently located and enabled
the unit to obtain first-class cover over the area for which it was
responsible. As
Supplies were sent to the unit weekly from
Like other small outlying groups, the unit suffered through being outside the areas of malarial control. Throughout its tour of duty, the sickness rate caused by malaria was particularly high.
During the greater part of the tour Japanese aircraft were rarely in the area and the unit was seldom called upon to report any. It was, however, responsible for the rescue of a number of Allied airmen whose aircraft had been forced down into the sea.
The numbers 54 and 55 were originally given to the two
A mobile GCI unit, No. 56, was formed in New Zealand in
Nos. 57 and 58 COL Units were the next to be formed. The
former was stationed on Fg Off J.Russell;
No. 59, another mobile GCI unit, went overseas in November
They chose the only position available, close by the newly formed fighter strip. It was by no means ideal as the surrounding area was heavily wooded, especially to the north-west, which was the direction from which Japanese aircraft generally approached. There was also a large ration dump in front of the position of the aerial; this caused interference until it was later partially removed.
After the return of the siting party, an advance party of two
officers and nine other ranks, headed by Flight Lieutenant
The main party left
The party was the first
In night fighting, contacts with the enemy were either radar contacts or visual. In the former the fighter was directed by the ground station into such a position that he was able to pick up the enemy on his airborne radar screen. In the latter, which occurred on clear nights, he was directed close enough to see the enemy.
The Japanese made constant use of ‘window’—metal strips which were dropped from the aircraft. This practice, which had been developed in the European theatre, confused the readings on the ground radar screen and enabled a number of aircraft to escape detection.
Early in
After the middle of February Japanese air activity practically ceased except for an occasional ‘snooper’ on moonlight nights. The unit continued to operate from Cape Torokina, achieving its share of success against such planes as did come over, until the beginning of August when it handed over to an American unit and returned to New Zealand. By that time it had been responsible for the detection of a dozen enemy aircraft destroyed and eight probably destroyed, as well as a number damaged.
By mid-
The set at Norfolk was maintained as a navigational aid, and
in addition three sets in
The history of active operations by
The establishment of Allied air forces on
The policy of encirclement was decided upon early in
Forces were available in 14 New Zealand Brigade, which was
on garrison duty at
The New Zealand troops eventually landed on the morning of
15 February, supported by American naval and anti-aircraft units
and by aircraft operating from
The next link in the encircling chain was forged on 29 February
when troops of General MacArthur's South-West Pacific Command
landed on
The Admiralties were important, not only because of their
position outflanking
Until March both Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur
expected that their next objective was to be
The troops used were the 4th Regiment of the 3rd Marine
Division which was brought up from
The capture of
After the initial fighter sweeps and heavy bomber raids of
The attacking forces operated from numerous bases which the
Allies had captured or built in the
In spite of losses the Japanese air force continued to put up
fighter opposition until 19 February, after which it ceased. After
the elimination of the Japanese air force in
In the second week in March the Allies turned their attention
to areas outside the town where the Japanese had built up huge
dumps of supplies. The first to receive severe bombing attacks was
the village and plantation of Vunapope to the south of Blanche
Bay. See map on p. 210.
After Vunapope had been disposed of, the supply areas at Rataval and Talili Bay had their turn. There the Japanese had stored their main supplies of ammunition and bombs. By the middle of May these areas were largely destroyed.
With the three main storage areas apparently wiped out, the smaller supply and personnel concentrations were attacked—in the plantations around Keravat, Vunakanau and Tobera airfields, on Matupi Island and in the Kabanga Bay region.
From early in March P38s, P39s, and P40s were fitted to carry bombs. The usual bomb-load for P38s was, to start with, two 500- pound bombs, and for P39s and P40s one 500-pounder. Later the bomb-load for all three types was doubled.
After 23 March the heavy bombers of the South Pacific air force
were used against Japanese bases at
The
By the end of January the Japanese air force was showing the
effects of the continuous losses it had suffered in the past two
months, but it still sent up numerous fighters to intercept the raids.
The majority of these were dealt with by the low, medium and top
cover of American fighters, and few succeeded in penetrating to
the lower level where the
Intense and accurate anti-aircraft fire was put up by the enemy.
The Japanese attached such importance to
Operations against
On 22 January No. 17 Squadron was withdrawn from operations
against
The fighter sweeps and heavy bomber raids of December had
destroyed many Japanese fighters in the air and on the ground.
Allied claims for the month were 144 shot down, besides those
destroyed and damaged on their aerodromes by bombing, for the
loss of 24 Allied aircraft. The Japanese naval air force gives its losses for the month as 41. The army air force was, by that time, a negligible factor, most of its aircraft having been sent to Allied claims for the month were 393.
The last successful meeting of
During the
The landing forces had been attacked en route to St. Louis, had been hit. Another attack was
made by fifteen dive-bombers early in the morning of the 15th as
the first wave of troops was going ashore. After making sporadic
attacks and slightly damaging one LST, the enemy were driven off
by American fighters and intense anti-aircraft fire from the landing
craft and destroyers. By the time the New Zealanders came on
station the attack was over and they saw no enemy aircraft during
the day.
Fighter patrols from
The Allied perimeter at
The Americans had developed three airstrips: the original Torokina fighter strip running parallel to the beach just to the east of
Cape Torokina, and a fighter and a bomber strip at Acorn:
Late in February the American intelligence service intercepted a code message to the Japanese commander in the South-West Pacific, ordering an attack on the perimeter on 7 March. According to the Japanese plan the perimeter was to be heavily bombed for two days and the land attack was to be assisted by 300 planes. The Allied forces were to be driven back to the beaches, where a naval attack would annihilate them. One of the factors which upset the plan was the absence by this time of any significant number of Japanese aircraft.
Confirmation of the proposed Japanese attack was brought in by
Fijian and other patrols operating outside the perimeter, and this
information was supplemented by the interrogation of prisoners of
war and by air observation of enemy troop movements. During the
The main line of defence was held by the 14th Corps. It consisted of a strip of cleared ground about 75 yards wide round the
whole perimeter, guarded by barbed wire and land mines and
covered by machine guns and mortars. Behind this was the second
line of defence, held by Marine units in strong defensive positions.
A third line was manned by American construction battalions, Acorn
13, the 68th American Fighter Squadron and the
The
During the preparatory period the companies made themselves
familiar with their positions, dug trenches and built machine-gun
nests. Communications, transport, rations and medical services were
organised on a combat basis. While the defensive preparations
were being made the major task of servicing and despatching
aircraft to operate over
At six o'clock on the morning of 8 March, a day later than
expected, the Japanese attack began with an artillery bombardment
of the Allied positions.
The shelling continued daily until 20 March, after which it
decreased in intensity and by the end of the month had ceased
altogether. Some shells fell on
Enemy infantry attacked at three points round the perimeter on the 8th and by the following day had made a slight penetration into the American lines. Determined counter-attacks by the Americans, assisted by aircraft which bombed and strafed the Japanese lines, were successful and by the 11th the Japanese were pushed back with heavy casualties. They attacked again strongly on the 12th and 13th and made another small penetration, but again the Americans pushed them back. After that there was a week's lull in the ground fighting, but on the 23rd the Japanese launched what was to be their last major effort. Just before dawn in a heavy attack they penetrated the American lines on a narrow front to a depth of 300 yards, but savage fighting drove them back and by the afternoon the line was once again intact. Fierce fighting continued on the 24th and 25th, but by the 26th activity on the perimeter had decreased, and three days later the Japanese were so weakened by the losses they had sustained that they no longer caused any serious threat to the Allied positions.
Direct support of ground operations was given by squadrons of
American SBDs and TBFs, which maintained patrols over the
perimeter and bombed and strafed enemy troop concentrations and
gun positions. Flying over one hundred sorties a day, they did
much to reduce the weight of the enemy attack. Fighter-bombers
were used to attack lines of communication between
On 22 March twelve aircraft of No. 14 Squadron, led by Nicholls,
attacked a large concentration of enemy troops which had been
reported by a prisoner of war near the Laruma River, at the eastern
end of the perimeter. The aircraft were armed with 1000-pound
bombs, which were all dropped in the target area. As the operation
took place only six miles from
In the same week New Zealand P40s, working with American
P39s, attacked the main Japanese supply route from Buin in
southern
Fighter-bomber operations against
The
Nicholls himself led the first fighter-bomber attack on
From this date onwards the New Zealand fighters carried bombs on practically every offensive mission they undertook. At first 500- pound general purpose bombs were carried, or 500-pound incendiary clusters. Later it was found that the P40s could successfully carry a 1000-pound bomb, and from 21 March onwards they often did.
During March the strength of the Gp Capt T. J. MacLean de Lange, DFC; Octans and
arrived at
The aircrew of No. 25 Squadron arrived at Santo at the end of January and spent February in operational training in conjunction with American dive-bomber units.
No. 30 Squadron had formed at
The servicing unit was to have left New Zealand by sea for
Santo on Alchiba, arriving at Santo on 10
February.
The squadron was based at Luganville Field for a month and
was engaged in operational training with American units. The
need for torpedo-bombers in the South Pacific had now passed and
Early in March both the servicing units embarked with their
equipment and travelled by sea to
The first week was spent in unloading equipment, improving the camp, digging foxholes and preparing for the arrival of the squadron. The camp site was only 1000 yards from the front line, and as the units had arrived in the midst of the Japanese attack on the perimeter they quickly learnt what it was like to be under fire. Shell and shrapnel landed in and near the camp on several occasions, and on the night of the 17th several tents were hit by rifle fire. Shortly after landing the men were organised into platoons and allocated positions in the third line of defence in case the Japanese should break through.
The aircraft of Nos. 25 and 30 Squadrons were to have flown
in from Santo shortly after the servicing units had landed, but their
arrival was postponed until the risk of shelling on the
No. 30 Squadron and the balance of No. 25 flew in on the 24th and next day joined in operations. On the 25th, No. 25 Squadron made fourteen sorties and No. 30 Squadron twelve. Targets were enemy troops and gun positions round the perimeter. They were so close to the airstrip that the aircraft had merely to bomb up, fly round the circuit, make their attacks and land. The ground crews had a perfect view of the bombs falling on the enemy. For the next fortnight, until the Japanese attack was finally crushed, both squadrons bombed and strafed the enemy by day and carried out perimeter patrols by night.
On 26 March Nos. 25 and 30 Squadrons were detailed to take
part, with American units, in an attack on
The main effort of the squadrons while stationed in the combat
area was against
Over
Both squadrons remained at
During its two months' tour it carried on the work done by No.
30 Squadron, bombing airfields, anti-aircraft positions, and supply
areas on the Gazelle Peninsula and various targets on
During May a new type of target came into vogue. The sea and
air blockade of the
As the Allied policy of bypassing isolated Japanese garrisons
included starving them out, the American command regarded the
destruction of crops as an important objective. TBFs, including
New Zealand formations, carried out experiments in south-western
The New Zealand Fighter Wing continued to operate from
A typical day of fighter-bomber operations is described in the
operational record of No. 19 Squadron on 14 April. Two sections
Three sections were briefed in the early morning by the Squadron
Intelligence Officer for an attack on an ammunition dump south of
Rataval, near
They took off again at ten o'clock and set course for
On the same morning twelve aircraft of No. 16 Squadron flew
on a similar mission. They reached
During
On arrival at
Until the middle of
The squadron carried out six routine patrols daily, except when it
was briefed for special operations and the number was reduced to
three. At the end of February the squadron took part in two
offensive operations against the Japanese in the
The next day two aircraft, captained by Flight Lieutenants
During March and April several sightings were made of
submarines. On 5 March Flight Lieutenant
In the middle of March a new long-range search was introduced
and added to the squadron's commitment. The route, which
covered 1300 miles, was up the west coast of
While the squadron was at
In the fourth week in May the squadron returned to New Zealand for rest and refitting, having flown a total of 3758 hours on operations against the Japanese. Its sorties during the tour comprised:
611 anti-submarine patrols and escorts
132 special submarine searches
109 bombing strikes and searches
56 miscellaneous missions
Its place was taken by No. 9 Squadron, commanded by Wing
Commander
The regular patrols flown by No. 6 Squadron from Halavo Bay were in the main uneventful. They involved flying continuously for eleven or twelve hours at a time over hundreds of miles of empty sea, and not once did the crews sight any enemy ships or submarines. Special searches for submarines which were reported on various occasions by Allied shipping or aircraft were equally unproductive.
On the other hand, in its air-sea rescue operations the squadron
achieved considerable success. Nearly all the flying in the
No. 6 Squadron's first ‘Dumbo’ mission from Halavo was carried
out on 26 January when an aircraft on stand-by duty, captained by
Flying Officer Mackley, DFC,
Landings on the open sea, except in the best of weather, were
not without risk. Strong winds or heavy swells could, and sometimes did, damage the Catalinas and make it impossible for them
to take off again. Early in February an aircraft captained by Flying
Officer
The hazards of open-sea rescues are further illustrated by the
following extract from a report made by Warrant Officer
On
We now settled down to wait for the arrival of the crash boat, as we
realised that it was hopeless to repair the damaged float. We maintained
voice contact until our batteries ran low, being unable to keep them up as
during the water loop the APU APU, Auxiliary Power Unit.
An American SBD crew, who had to ditch off the south-west
coast of
On 9 February two aircraft and crews were sent to the Treasury
Islands, where they formed a detached flight based on the United
States seaplane tender Koos Bay. Individual aircraft and crews
were relieved each fortnight and the flight remained there until
early in April, standing by for air-sea rescue duties. Whenever
strikes were flown against
Besides patrol and rescue operations, No. 6 Squadron's aircraft
carried out numerous miscellaneous missions. From January
onwards a weekly flight was made to
With the neutralisation of
The original
As the South Pacific campaign drew to a close the future of the
In April the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in
The New Zealand Minister in
The first course, which was the one most favoured by New
Zealand, was open to two objections from the American point of
view. In the first place there was no scope in the forthcoming
operations in the Central Pacific for the land-based fighters and
medium bomber-reconnaissance aircraft with which the
A transfer to the South-East Asia Command was open to the objection that there was no role there at the time for short-range aviation, in which New Zealand squadrons had been trained.
This left only the third course open. The New Zealand Minister
in
In the meantime the transfer of the Northern Solomons command
to the South-West Pacific Area had been projected, and
COMAIRSOPAC, on the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had
ordered that all
The programme adopted after the change-over in the South
Pacific Command called for eleven squadrons on garrison duty in
and south of
New Zealand squadrons to be transferred to the South-West
Pacific Area likewise comprised four fighter, two medium bomber,
and one flying-boat. One fighter squadron was to remain at
This allowed one bomber and two fighter squadrons to be in New Zealand at one time for rest and refitting.
At the middle of
The major concentrations of Japanese troops trapped in the
Bismarcks and
Land operations in the middle six months of
In spite of the Allied blockade, the physical condition and morale of the Japanese remained good. Reports came in from time to time that they were short of food and low in spirits, but the reports applied in general only to isolated units and labour troops. The main body of their forces remained intact and in good condition and were a potential threat to the Allied positions.
A matter of increasing concern to the enemy was the attitude of
the natives in both
At sea enemy activity was limited to nightly barge traffic carrying
supplies along the coasts of
Allied air operations were carried on continuously, and were aimed at softening up the enemy against the day when he could be attacked by ground forces and exterminated. The campaign was designed:
To reduce the strength of the enemy forces, to disrupt their organisation and weaken their morale.
To destroy or damage their means of living: camps and bivouacs, supply dumps, vegetable gardens and livestock.
To eliminate or disrupt their transport system by destroying or damaging barges, motor vehicles, jetties, bridges and roads.
To eliminate or reduce their capacity for defensive action by destroying or damaging coastal and anti-aircraft artillery positions, airfields and ammunition dumps.
During the latter part of October and the first week of November
a few Japanese aircraft reappeared in the Bismarcks area. Several
radar contacts were made of unidentified planes, and some
apparently serviceable machines were seen on the
On 9 November the Allied Command was surprised and
perturbed to find that the Japanese were still capable of offensive
air operations. In the afternoon three Zekes from
In contrast to the role that they had previously played as
individual units operating within the American Command, the New
Zealand squadrons transferred to the South-West Pacific Area were
formed into an air task force with a specific duty—the conduct of
air operations in the northern
Until the American Command was dissolved the Officer Commanding the New Zealand formation (COMZEAIRTAF) was to be
responsible to COMAIRNORSOLS for the operational sub-control of
New Zealand units in the South-West Pacific. Thereafter he would
become the Senior Air Commander in the
ZEAIRTAF was officially formed on 1 September. Wing Commander Newell and Wing Commander Tancred each acted as Commanding Officer for a few days until Group Captain Roberts arrived on the 16th to take over the appointment. By the middle of October a full administrative staff had been established and the organisation began to function.
Headquarters was at
It had been intended originally that COMZEAIRTAF should take
over from COMAIRNORSOLS on 1 November. By the middle of
October it was obvious that the change of command would not
take place so soon and the date was put back to 1 December.
Thereafter there were further delays, and it was not until
Before the New Zealand squadrons could move to their allotted
bases in the South-West Pacific there was a great deal of work to be
done in preparing camps for them. Generally speaking the provision of accommodation was an American responsibility, but they
provided only the minimum requirements. Anything further had
to be done by the
The work required on the new stations at Green,
None of the moves of
The first move to be effected was that of No. 3 (BR) Squadron,
which had been stationed at
On 5 October an advance party of No. Frank J. Sprague. The following week
Venturas of No. 3 Squadron flew in, and the squadron began
operations a week later.
Until it returned to New Zealand on the completion of its tour
at the end of
Dawn and dusk patrols over the coast of
Servicing difficulties and shortages of spares resulted in the
squadron not always having its full quota of aircraft, but whenever
there were three or more to spare, after providing for daily routine
jobs, strikes were made against specific targets on
On its return to New Zealand No. 3 Squadron was replaced at
PBY5A: an amphibious version of the PBY5 Catalina.
In
During September the squadron discarded its Hudsons and was rearmed with Venturas, which were flown up from New Zealand.
It moved to
A second servicing unit, No. 5, arrived at Alkaid from New Zealand by
way of
At that time three American Corsair squadrons were stationed
at
The
During the early part of the squadron's tour servicing of the
aircraft was complicated by the fact that the majority of the men in
No.
When there were enough aircraft available, formations of four
or eight were sent out to bomb objectives on
As at
The works party cleared the growth and put up temporary buildings ready for the arrival of the servicing units. As dressed timber was unprocurable, poles and bamboos were cut from the surrounding jungle to make frames for stores, workshops and other buildings, and covered with canvas. These temporary structures served their purpose until prefabricated huts were shipped from New Zealand.
Nos. 3 and 14 Servicing Units landed at
No. 20 (Fighter) Squadron flew in from
During the last week of its tour, which finished on 19 November,
the squadron also carried out sweeps over
No. 18 Squadron, which took over No. 20's operational duties,
had already spent twelve weeks at Santo and
It started operations on 22 November, providing four aircraft
daily for scramble alert and local dawn and dusk patrols, as escort
for ‘Dumbos’ supporting strikes on
On 1 December one of the American fihter squadrons was
ordered to Leyte, and No. 18 Squadron shared with the remaining
one the responsibility for maintaining a standing patrol over the
The American fighters had been in the habit of carrying bombs on
their
On the last operation of the tour two pilots patrolling over
When No. 18 Squadron left
No. 1 (Bomber-Reconnaissance) Squadron flew in to Green
Island from
The first few weeks were spent in flying training, using such
aircraft as could be kept serviceable; in improving the camp, which
at first was uncomfortably primitive; in hiking expeditions and
swimming to promote physical fitness; and in learning jungle lore
from
Operations began on 21 November when No. 1 Squadron took
over from one of the American PBJ squadrons on the island the
daily weather flight and shipping count over
Early in December the squadron began to take part in ‘night
heckles’ over American Catalians used on night operations; so called because of their colour.
During its stay at
Bombing strikes were of two types: medium altitude and low-level. Medium bombing attacks, which were mostly directed against
Low-level attacks were all made on
During December a section of the Australian Intelligence Bureau
was established on
A works party was sent to
In November the American Command decided that the island
should, after all, come within ZEAIRTAF's sphere of responsibility.
The surprise raid by Japanese aircraft on the 9th caused
Despite shortages of material, the works party had done a very creditable job in preparing a camp. With American help they had erected and built a mess quonset hut, canteen, post office, medical hut and headquarters. There was still a great deal of construction to be completed, however, and for the first week all personnel were engaged in completing the living quarters, messes, ration stores, and maintenance sections. No flying could be done until the ground staffs were able to operate.
Until the
No. 23 (Fighter) Squadron had formed at
It began operations from
Operations consisted of dawn and dusk patrols, and scrambles
whenever strange aircraft were reported by radar. The latter
occurred on an average once a day. Often the strangers were
identified as friendly, but on a number of occasions they sheered off
in the direction of
The redeployment of the
The year ended with two New Zealand fighter squadrons on
New Zealand bomber-reconnaissance squadrons were based at
Fighter operations did not change greatly from July to December
During October, November and December, American Army
units were gradually withdrawn from the
On
At the time of handing over command the Americans held the
Aircraft of No. 5 Squadron, RAAF, flew into
No. 84 (Army Co-operation) Wing (Group Captain W. L. Hely, AFC, RAAF).
No. 5 (Tactical Reconnaissance) Squadron, equipped with Australian-made Wirraways and Boomerangs.
No. 10 Local Air Supply Unit, equipped with Australian-made Beauforts, used for dropping supplies and equipment to front-line troops. At first it was called Communication Flight and equipped with Ansons and Beauforts. Later, its name was changed and unit was re-equipped with Beaufighters.
No. 17 Air Observers' post, equipped with Austers, used similarly to No. 5 Squadron; also for artillery spotting and evacuation of wounded from forward air stations.
No. 39 Operational Base Unit.
In the following months Australian Wirraways, Boomerangs,
Beauforts and Ansons were to become as familiar to the New
On 8 December all squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing ceased
operations preparatory to moving to the
The moves forward of the
Since the headquarters of No. 1 (Islands) Group had moved up
at the beginning of the year.
Domestically, the latter half of
To provide a leave centre for the men serving on
Operations from
In the first half of
Normally there were always two fighter squadrons at
Besides their operational commitments, all squadrons trained for the work they would be doing when they went forward. The training comprised air tactics, gunnery and bombing practices, and practical courses on survival in the jungle.
Since the Americans had first landed on Santo in
Although the
In September the output of Corsairs, which at the peak period
had averaged two a day, was reduced to two a week, and sixty-two
men of the Assembly Unit were posted to Halavo Bay to learn
about servicing Catalinas. They were destined to form the nucleus
of a flying-boat servicing unit at
The assembly of Corsairs at Santo ceased in
The
Fighter squadrons continued to stage at Santo throughout the year, and while they were available for operations if necessary, their main occupation was training.
No. 5 (Flying Boat) Squadron started operations from Segond
Channel on 11 November. It had formed at
During
No. 3 Operational Training Unit, which had been formally
established in
The war in the
Whereas in the first three years of the war the training organisa
tion had been designed to produce aircrew trained to the initial,
elementary, or advanced stages of flying, it had now become
necessary, in order to man the squadrons in the
Fighter and bomber operational training units had been formed
in
In May a Fighter Gunnery School was formed at
The last of the fighter squadrons to be formed under the 1944–45
programme was assembled in
The bomber OTU at
Crews for the two flying-boat squadrons which were formed
during 1943–44 were trained at
The increasing strength of the
At this time a new transport squadron, No. 41, was formed and took over the operation of the Lodestars and Hudsons.
As commitments increased and aircraft became available the
number of scheduled flights from
Twenty Dakotas were allotted to the
During
The following figures of men, mail, and equipment carried
indicate the increasingly important part played by the transport
squadrons as the war progressed. In
In
The prompt delivery of mail by the transport squadrons was a major factor in maintaining morale in the Islands. Letters and newspapers reached even the most distant bases in a matter of days, and kept the troops in touch with what was going on at home. Also, whenever there was space to spare, food was carried: fresh meat, vegetables, and butter. Although limited, these supplies provided relief from the monotony of the regular ration and also helped to keep up morale. Most welcome of all, probably, were the occasional supplies of beer taken up to augment the spasmodic shipments made by sea.
In addition to the transport squadrons and the training units
which were permanently based in New Zealand, there were always
fighter and bomber-reconnaissance squadrons in the country, either
in the course of formation or resting and reforming between overseas tours. During
Bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, which also spent periods in
New Zealand between tours in the
The
The most northerly station in New Zealand was
Onerahl, near
Immediately to the south of
Royal New Zealand Air Force Station,
One other station was added to Northern Group before the end
of the year, when
All North Island stations outside the
Royal New Zealand Air Force Station,
The military camp at
The only station on the East Coast was
In the
The
Southern Group embraced all stations in the
In Christchurch itself there were portions of No. 3 Stores Depot
and No. 3 Repair Depot. These were to move respectively to
The year
The three Group Headquarters, which had been formed to meet
operational requirements, were abolished. Central Group had in
fact been suspended in
During the year there was a general pruning and consolidation
of home establishments, and stations were closed down as they
became redundant.
The reduction of the flying training organisation in the last quarter
of the year resulted in
A new station was formed in
The disbandment of stations and consolidation of establishments
during the year resulted in a substantial saving of manpower in
administrative trades, and the reduction in the flying training
organisation released several hundred technical tradesmen. These
savings, however, were counter-balanced by the increasing demand
for fit men to serve in the
The manning problems which had emerged by
It had been planned to form twenty operational squadrons for
service in New Zealand and overseas, of which it was thought that
seventeen or eighteen would form in
In
The total ground strength was distributed among the different
classes of trades in New Zealand and the
In order to fulfil New Zealand's operational commitments, a
total of 1000 aircrew and 7500 ground staff was required in the
In an effort to improve the position recruiting of non-flying
personnel, which had been reduced to 150 a month, was stepped up
in
During the latter part of the year recruits were harder than ever
to obtain. The Army urgently wanted more men, and competition
between the services was extremely keen. There appears to have
been no co-ordinating authority to consider the relative needs
of the services and allocate the available manpower accordingly.
Eventually, in November, the Army and the
A possible additional cause of the difficulty the
The staffing position had been under examination, both by the
Public criticism of the
A certain discrepancy between available manpower and immediate
needs at the time was inevitable. The
Greater experience and closer supervision of establishments might
have resulted in a more accurate assessment of manning needs;
but in a force which had grown from 750 to 34,000, excluding those
in
With the relief of the Americans by the Australians, the
campaign on
The campaign developed into three separate drives. To the north,
the enemy was to be pushed up the west coast to the Bonis Peninsula and contained there until he could be starved out or destroyed.
Inland from
The first actions fought by Australian troops on
During these operations
The bombs were 325-pound depth-charges. They had not been
used before against land targets on
Another strike was made in the same region the following week. The Australians were to attack Japanese troops entrenched on a hillside half a mile south of Retsiopaia, and eight aircraft of No. 15 Squadron, each carrying a depth-charge or a 500-pound bomb, went in first to soften up the position.
The advance to southern
The information gained by the patrols enabled the 29th Brigade early in the new year to launch the first stage of the offensive, which was to be carried as far as the Puriata River. Mawaraka and Motupena Point, at the southern extremity of Empress Augusta Bay, were occupied against light opposition on 17 and 19 January. Patrols on the coastal track southward from Motupena Point did not encounter any enemy, and on 2 February company was landed by barge at Toko, near the mouth of the Puriata, where it established itself against minor opposition.
Inland, where the advance was along the line of the main trail leading south from the Jaba River, enemy resistance was more severe and slower progress was made.
The drive southward along the main trail was assisted by thrusts inland from Mawaraka and Toko, which took the enemy in the rear. The capture of Darara on 23 February, by a force operating from Toko, gave the Australians command of the chief ford across the Puriata, and thereafter Japanese communications were limited to crossings farther upstream.
Having reached the Puriata, the Australians prepared for the next stage of their advance, which was to carry them first to the Hongorai and then to the Hari River. Two columns crossed the Puriata early in March. One crossed at the chief ford and established itself in depth on the main track to Buin with its forward company in the neighbourhood of Tokinatu. The other, further inland, crossed at Makapeka and advanced towards the Horinu area.
Both columns met stiffening opposition, and at the end of the month the whole advance was held up by a determined enemy counter-offensive which was intended to push them back across the Puriata and reoccupy the Toko area. The counter-offensive failed after several days of bitter fighting, and after regrouping their forces the Australians continued their advance in the latter half of April.
By the 27th the inland column had reached the Hongorai in the region of Rumiki and had cleared the enemy from a lateral trail which gave communication with the other column on the main road at Tokinatu. On 17 April the main road force resumed its advance, and on 7 May it reached the Hongorai ford.
The inland force, fighting its way south along a track which became known as the Commando Road, crossed the Hongorai on 17 May. The Buin Road force crossed it lower down, on both sides of the main ford, on the 20th. Three days later the road was cleared of the enemy for 3000 yards beyond the ford. On 28 May a new lateral track between the two forces was secured, and this greatly eased the problem of supplying the Commando Road column.
The Australians continued to advance until the end of June, fighting every inch of the way along Commando Road and the Buin Road, and by the 30th they had reached the Mivo River. From there they sent patrols westward to reconnoitre the next stage, which was to take them to the Silibai.
During July forward movement was prevented by torrential
rains, which flooded the rivers and destroyed or damaged most of
the bridges that had been built on the Buin Road. The disruption
of the line of communications made impossible the assembly of
The capture of Pearl Ridge at the beginning of January, and the
establishment of strong defensive positions there, had prevented
any further enemy attack on
Operations in northern
The Japanese had moved troops down from
A further series of operations, against determined opposition.
resulted in the Japanese being cleared from the Soraken Peninsula.
Then the Australians advanced to Pora Pora and Ratsua, on the
western side of the base of the Bonis Peninsula. From there, early
in May, a line was established to Ruri Bay, on the east coast, and
the Japanese on Bonis were cut off from the rest of
The line, about 10 miles long, was held at intervals by posts of company strength. Attempts were made to advance northward but they were unsuccessful. The enemy occupied the peninsula in strength and had developed strong defensive positions that could not be overcome with the forces available.
In July it was decided that the line was too thinly held to be effective, for the Japanese were becoming increasingly aggressive. Consequently, the company bases were withdrawn and concentrated at Bonis Plantation and Ruri Bay. From there, on either side of the peninsula's base, strong patrols were sent out to cover the escape routes to the south. By the end of July enemy activity south of their main defensive line had been reduced to a minimum as a result of these patrols, and this state of affairs lasted until hostilities ceased on 15 August.
A fourth theatre of war on
The year
In April the need to provide fighter squadrons for garrison duty
in the
At the beginning of May the squadrons stationed there were Nos. 14, 16, 22 and 26, all of which had arrived during April. They were relieved in June and July by Nos. 15, 23, 24 and 18 respectively, the four squadrons which were on the island when the war ended.
The
Roughly, the operations were divided into three categories: close
support of the ground troops, when enemy forces and strongpoints
were attacked a few hundred yards in front of the Australians'
Until the beginning of April, all sorties by comairnorsols on
request by Headquarters 2nd Australian Corps. Thereafter, however, closer liaison was established between the
Twelve Corsairs, at fifteen-minute readiness, were kept at the
disposal of the forward brigade in south-west
During the first three months of the year, when two squadrons
were at
In April, with four squadrons available, the weight of attack rose
sharply, and the daily sorties averaged between fifty and sixty. In
the next three months the average rose even higher. At times
aircraft from
The usual bomb-load for a Corsair was 1000 pounds, which might
take the form of one 1000-pounder or two 500-pounders, although
on occasions two 1000-pounders were carried. The type of bomb
used varied with the nature of the target, and was sometimes
dictated by the supplies available. General purpose bombs were
most commonly used. When employed against troop positions,
particularly in swampy country, they were modified by having a
stick, 2 ft. 6 in. long, projecting from the nose. The stick, on
striking the ground, caused the bomb to explode before it was
buried. The blast, instead of being deflected upwards from a
crater, spread laterally, causing casualties and destroying cover over
The scale of attack, steadily mounting from the beginning of
the year, is best illustrated by the following table showing the total
sorties against Japanese positions on
Fighter-bomber attacks on Japanese positions were normally made
from 3000 feet, the aircraft diving to
As the terrain was covered with dense jungle and the enemy took full advantage of the concealment it offered, pinpoint targets were extremely difficult to locate from the air. A lead-in aircraft was used to identify the objectives from a low level and drop smoke bombs on it to guide the attacking force. Normally this task was done by Boomerangs or Wirraways of No. 5 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, RAAF, but where the intensity of ground fire made it dangerous for the relatively slow reconnaissance machines, a Corsair flown by an experienced pilot was used. Having observed the fall of his bombs, the lead-in pilot, known as ‘Smoky Joe’, orbited the area and told the strike aircraft by radio telephone exactly where to drop their bombs in relation to the marker smoke.
In close-support operations the target was frequently marked by the ground forces by means of mortar fire.
Before the Australians began their forward move from the Jaba
River line in January,
After the middle of January, as the offensive got into its stride, ground and air operations became progressively more integrated. Strikes behind the Japanese lines were ordered by Headquarters 3rd Division as part of the general preparation for the advance, while attacks on objectives immediately confronting the ground troops were made on request from the battalion in the field.
During the advance to the Puriata, constant air attacks in the area immediately to the north of the river helped considerably to lower the morale of the enemy and break down his opposition. In support of the Australians' operations eastward from Mawaraka towards Mosigetta, aircraft of No. 20 Squadron were called on to clear an area of swamp and jungle immediately in front of the troops. They combed it thoroughly with 1000-pound and 500- pound stick-bombs and depth-charges and by strafing, starting from a line only 80 yards in front of the foremost Australian positions.
When the north bank of the Puriata was reached, air attacks were switched to the area to the south, and the softening process was repeated there. The procedure was the same in each stage of the campaign: first, a pounding of the troops and communications behind the line, and then, as the Australians advanced, the blasting of opposition immediately in their path.
A very successful close-support operation was carried out on 26 April by forty-one aircraft of Nos. 14, 22 and 26 Squadrons. The target was a 700-yard strip of road in the Hiru Hiru area, down which the Australian advance was blocked by strong Japanese defensive positions. To clear it, bombs had to be dropped in the jungle on either side, 25 yards apart and 25 yards from the road, from a point 300 yards ahead of the foremost Australian troops.
The three squadrons held a combined briefing at
No. 14 Squadron, led by Squadron Leader
As soon as No. 14 had finished, No. 26 Squadron followed it, led
by Squadron Leader
When they were clear, Squadron Leader
The bombing was excellent, and the enemy positions were completely shattered. Australian patrols, which had moved up through the jungle on either flank, captured numbers of dazed Japanese trying to escape from the area. By evening the ground forces had advanced the full 1000 yards over the bombed area.
Such attacks as this enabled the advance to go on much more rapidly than would otherwise have been possible. Difficulties of supply were so great that only a relatively small spearhead could be maintained in the front line. To put in the ground forces which would have been needed to overcome Japanese resistance without the help of constant air support, it would have been necessary to spend months in building an elaborate system of roads and bridges.
Air operations in northern
No. 18 Squadron had an interesting day in this area on 3 March.
Pilot Officer
The first sighting was made at 10.50 a.m., and at 12.30 Corbet
was back from
In the afternoon another strike was made by seven aircraft. They bombed the two tanks in the jungle and set one of them on fire. All the pilots, and a reconnaissance pilot who was observing the operation, agreed that both were badly damaged. Then they strafed the third tank, which had not moved since it was first sighted. After a beam attack it was obscured by heavy black smoke and red oil flames, and shortly afterwards its ammunition went off in a series of explosions, completely wrecking it.
Next morning the tanks in the jungle had been moved, but one of them was discovered by a tactical reconnaissance Boomerang in the late afternoon, heavily camouflaged and hidden under trees. As soon as it was reported, three aircraft of No. 18 Squadron took off to bomb it. It was dark when they reached it, but the reconnaissance pilot marked the target with tracer fire. This tank was finally knocked out on the morning of 5 March in another attack by nine aircraft of No. 18 Squadron. Two of the bombs were almost direct hits and blew off the tank's turret and two doors.
A number of other attacks were made on the area in the next
two days by fighter-bombers and by bomber-reconnaissance aircraft
from
Strategic bombing on
Until April most of the attacks on the area were carried out from
The bombing of southern
New Zealand squadrons were maintained on
Of the two fighter squadrons stationed there at the beginning of
the year, No. 14 completed its tour of duty in late January and was
relieved by No. 17. No. 16 returned to New Zealand in the middle
of February and was replaced by No. 15. No. 17 remained on
the island until the end of March, when it was relieved by No. 24.
No. 21 relieved No. 15 in April. In May No. 20 Squadron came
up and was quartered at
Fighter-bomber operations from
No. 1 (Bomber Reconnaissance) Squadron, which had been on
The three servicing units which had been posted to
No. 3 (Fighter) Servicing Unit was the first to go, leaving Green
Island on 18 May and arriving at
The fighter squadrons stationed at
In the early part of the year many bombing strikes were made
on barges, camps, and other targets in the
Enemy opposition was limited to anti-aircraft fire, which varied in intensity and accuracy but was seldom absent. The weather was often a more formidable hazard.
Nos. 14 and 16 Squadrons had a disastrous day on 15 January.
Twelve aircraft from
Keefe was an exceptionally fine swimmer and struck out for the harbour entrance. For some time he made good progress, and reached a point midway between Matupi Island and Vulcan Crater. Then, in the middle of the afternoon, by which time he had been swimming for six hours, the tide and wind changed and he began to drift back up the harbour. All day he was covered by aircraft of Nos. 14 and 16 Squadrons. A Catalina stood by, but anti-aircraft fire prevented it from going in to rescue him. Two rafts were dropped, one falling within 100 yards of him, but he was not seen to attempt to use them.
At evening, with their petrol running low, the patrolling aircraft
had to leave to return to
The following account of the episode is taken from No. 14 Squadron's operations record book:
A combined strike was scheduled for targets No. 1 and 2 at Toboi, on the
Western side of Simpson Harbour. Twenty
Flight Lieutenant
No. 16 Squadron did not escape. Of their section, which had formated
with Hay, two were seen to hit the water and explode immediately prior to
the collision. The remaining pair managed to get home but they were
extremely lucky. Squadron Leader Green led his pair home almost on a
After the war it was reported by Japanese captured at
In addition to regular patrols over
No. 2 Squadron opened its tour of duty at
The major part of the squadron's operational effort was directed
against
A typical medium-level attack was made on 11 February. Eight
aircraft of No. 2 Squadron, led by an American PBJ, combined
Attacks against
The squadron's heaviest attack, and the heaviest made by any
eight New Zealand aircraft in the
No. 3 Squadron relieved No. 2 in March. During its tour it was
employed chiefly against targets on
Miscellaneous operations by No. 2 and No. 3 Squadrons included photographic reconnaissance flights and a number of unsuccessful searches for reported enemy submarines.
In April a number of Venturas were modified to enable a bomb-sight suitable for medium-level bombing to be fitted. Thereafter,
it was no longer necessary for New Zealand formations always to
be led on to their target by a PBJ. The first occasion on which a
Ventura was used as a bombing leader was on 8 April, when six
The
No. 4 (November 1944–February 1945)
No. 8 (February-March)
No. 9 (March-May)
No. 1 (May–June)
No. 4 (June-July)
No. 19 (November 1944–January 1945)
No. 22 (January-March)
No. 23 (March-May)
No. 25 (May–July)
No. 14 (July-August)
Throughout the period the squadrons were based on Nos. 10 (BR) and 5 (F) Servicing Units.
Operations followed much the same pattern as they had since
the
In February, and again in May, June and July, Venturas and
American Mitchells from
In June all
New Zealand forces on
No. 23 (November 1944–January 1945)
No. 25 (January-March)
No. 19 (March-May)
No. 17 (May–September)
No. 14 (August-October)
No. 4 (BR) Squadron, which came from
Fighter operations during the year were similar to those carried
out in
One enemy air raid was made on the night of 28–29 April. Two
torpedo-carrying aircraft, flying low over the water, came in shortly
after midnight to attack shipping in Seeadler Harbour. One of
them hit and severely damaged a floating dock. The defences were
taken by surprise, and both aircraft retired unscathed. Japanese
records captured after the war showed that one of them was lost
on the return trip to
When the war ended it was thought that a fighter squadron and
servicing unit from
At the same time a start was made with repatriating as many
personnel as possible. Royal New Zealand Air Force strength on
the island was 1085 in the middle of September, and at the end of
the month it had been reduced to 533. Equipment was checked and
packed ready to be shipped home and camps were dismantled. By
Australian forces had occupied
It was intended that No. 79 GR Wing, RAAF, should be based
there to support the final assault on
Royal New Zealand Air Force units were established at Jacquinot
Bay in May. On the 18th four aircraft of No. 21 Squadron were
flown in to take over scramble alert duties, and on the same day an
advance party arrived by air to arrange for camp sites. On the
19th No.
When they first landed at
Although a few fighters had been available for scramble alerts
since 19 May,
No. 21 Squadron, which remained at
No.
No. 20 Squadron was relieved by No. 16, which reached
Bomber-reconnaissance operations were at first restricted by lack
of bombs. No. 3 Squadron remained at
No. 2 Squadron, which came up from New Zealand towards the
end of June, spent its first three weeks in practice bombing and
familiarisation flights over the area, and started offensive operations
on 14 July. From then on until the end of the war it carried out
a series of medium-level bombing attacks, mainly against targets on
the Gazelle Peninsula and on the islands off the north coast of
On 6 September aircraft of the squadron helped to give cover to
HMS Glory, on which Lieutenant-General V. A. H. Sturdee,
General Officer Commanding 1st Australian Army, received the
surrender of Lieutenant-General Imamura and Vice-Admiral
Kusaka, commanding the Japanese forces in the South-West Pacific.
While the war was being pushed to a successful conclusion in
the north,
Bomber-reconnaissance squadrons operated from
At Guadalcanal No. 3 Squadron, coming up from New Zealand
for its third tour, started operations on 9 February. When it moved
forward to
Of the two flying-boat squadrons, No. 5 operated from Segond
Channel, on Santo, until after the war, when it was withdrawn to
When the Japanese finally surrendered, on
Of the bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, four had been disbanded after completing their tours as there was little prospect of
further employment for them after the completion of the South-West
The two flying-boat squadrons were based at Santo and Halavo,
and the flying-boat OTU was still at
Headquarters of the New Zealand Air Task Force was at
No. 1 (Islands) Group Headquarters had closed down on 1
August, and RNZAF Station,
News of the acceptance by the Japanese of the Allies' surrender
terms came to units in the
Units in the forward area remained at a state of readiness, and
daily patrols were flown over the enemy's positions. Squadrons
operating over
Although operations ceased on 15 August, the formal surrender
ceremonies did not take place until the following month. At the
main surrender, which took place on board the USS Missouri in
Tokyo Bay on 2 September, New Zealand was represented by the
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Isitt, who had flown up
from New Zealand. In the South-West Pacific, Air Commodore
G. N. Roberts was the senior New Zealand officer present when
General Imamura, Commander of the Japanese South-East Army,
surrendered to General Sturdee on HMS Glory, off
When the war came to its abrupt conclusion in
To evacuate New Zealand personnel from
The first two aircraft eventually left New Zealand on 4 September
to fly via Santo,
The first two New Zealand aircraft to reach Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees.
A report came in that there were New Zealand prisoners of war
and civilian internees in
In the meantime, more Dakotas had arrived from New Zealand
and repatriation had begun. Aircraft left
The job was completed by the middle of October, and the last
aircraft left
As soon as operation ceased, preparations were made to repatriate
the men serving in the South and South-West Pacific. Shipping
was still scarce and, although the Union Steam Ship Company's
Wahine was chartered and made three trips to the Islands, bringing
back about
During September and October stations in the South-West Pacific
Area progressively closed down as quickly as circumstances permitted. The fighter and bomber-reconnaissance squadrons flew their
aircraft back to New Zealand, where most of them were disbanded.
In allocating priorities for repatriation a system of points was worked out, based on length of service overseas, marital status, number of children, and other factors affecting the eligibility of personnel for release from the service. Men who were due for repatriation in any case were given first priority, followed by others in their turn. For those who were low on the priority list, the period of waiting passed slowly. The stimulus of war was gone, and the men were impatient to return home. To keep up morale and help to make the time pass, sporting activities were greatly extended. Swimming and yachting were popular recreations, and most units had cricket teams which played a series of keenly contested matches. In addition, classes were organised in a wide variety of subjects to enable men to study and prepare themselves for rehabilitation when they arrived home.
By using every available aircraft of the transport organisation,
repatriation proceeded fairly rapidly, and by the end of the year
the only men left in the South-West Pacific Area were small rear
parties on
A flying-boat servicing party was stationed at île Nou in New
Caledonia to attend to transient aircraft, and at
All told, the number of personnel remaining in the
At home in the last four months of
The detailed plans for final demobilisation were put into operation on 11 August when it was clear that the Japanese were about to surrender. As a result, the release organisation was in full swing within a day or two after the end of the war. Men returning from overseas were posted to one or other of the non-effective pools, where they were medically examined and where all the necessary accounting and documentary action was taken for their release. To relieve the pressure on the pools, release organisations were set up on a number of New Zealand stations, and a large proportion of men serving in New Zealand were discharged by their home units.
The factor which determined the rate at which personnel could be discharged was the availability of medical boards, and especially of X-ray units. All personnel had to be thoroughly examined before returning to civilian life, and this, in the first few weeks after the war, caused a bottleleneck. The difficulty was eased by setting up several systems of medical boards. Where possible, personnel were examined on their home stations. Others had their examinations at the non-effective pools, where service and civilian medical boards operated. Others, again, appeared before civilian boards which were established in eight of the main towns throughout New Zealand.
Releases were granted according to a priority system based on
length of service and other factors. The general system of
priorities was overridden in certain instances, following a direction
by the Prime Minister that men in a number of essential industries
were to be given first priority. At the same time, personnel in some
air force trades could be given no priority, as they were needed to
carry on the machinery of demobilisation and to maintain the
continuing functions of the
A total of
Since the foregoing chapters were written, the Royal New
Zealand Air Force has passed through a period of uncertainty and
confusion that resulted from the sudden transition from war to
peace conditions, and has been developed into a compact, well-organised force of between 4000 and 5000 men, capable of rapid
expansion should the need arise. To bridge the gap between the
end of the war and the reorganisation of the service to meet peace
time conditions, the
Most of the stations that were established to meet the needs of
wartime expansion were closed down as soon as possible after
hostilities ended, and where necessary their functions were taken
over by those stations which remained to become part of the
permanent air force organisation. Stations which remained in
operation at the end of
Most of the wartime operational squadrons had been disbanded
by the end of
Nos. 40 and 41 Transport Squadrons operated for some time
after the war in both service and quasi-civil capacities. It was some
time before civil air services could be organised to cope with peacetime requirements, and in the interim the
By
The future role of the
The Air Force which grew up during the war was based on
remarkably slender foundations. In
A Boys' School, which has been established at
In addition to training at home, a number of officers each year
attend staff colleges in the
To back up the Regular Air Force, the non-regular components of
the
With the exception of the Flying Training School and the
Territorial (fighter ground-attack) squadrons, which use American
Harvards and Mustangs respectively, all flying units have been
re-equipped with British types of aircraft. This, plus the fact that
methods of training and organisation are patterned as closely as
possible on
No fighting service can be fully prepared for war when bound by the limits of peacetime economy. All that can be done is to ensure that the resources available are used to the best advantage to provide an efficient force for immediate action and a reserve which can be brought into action as quickly as possible. That is what the Royal New Zealand Air Force is doing today, confident in the experience of difficulties overcome in the past and the knowledge that it can meet those of the future.
Formed (as the New Zealand General Reconnaissance Squadron)
Aircraft: Baffins, Vincents, Vildebeestes up to
Formed (as No. 2 General Reconnaissance Squadron)
Aircraft: Vildebeestes and Vincents to
Formed (as No. 3 General Reconnaissance Squadron)
Aircraft: Baffins and Vincents, 1941–42; Hudsons, 1942–44; Venturas, 1944–45.
Formed (as No. 4 General Reconnaissance Squadron) in
Aircraft: Vincents and converted civil aircraft to
The first No. 5 Squadron was formed in
Aircraft: Singapores.
A new No. 5 Squadron was formed in
Aircraft: Catalinas.
Commanding Officer: Wing Commander J. W. H. Bray.
Formed in
Aircraft: Catalinas.
Formed
Aircraft: Vincents, Vildebeestes.
Tour of Duty: New Zealand.
Formed
Aircraft: Vincents, Vildebeestes.
Tour of Duty: New Zealand.
Formed
Aircraft: Venturas.
Formed (as No. 9 General Reconnaissance Squadron) in
Aircraft: Hudsons, 1942–43; Venturas, 1943–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Buffalos, Hurricanes.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1942–44; Corsairs, 1944–47.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1942–44; Corsairs, 1944–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1942–44; Corsairs, 1944–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1942–44; Corsairs, 1944–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1943–44; Corsairs, 1944–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks, 1943–44; Corsairs, 1944–45.
Formed
Aircraft: Kittyhawks,
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Formed
Aircraft: Dauntlesses.
Commanding Officer: Squadron Leader
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Commanding Officer: Squadron Leader G. M. Fitzwater
Formed
Aircraft: Corsairs.
Commanding Officer: Squadron Leader G. A. Delves
Formed
Aircraft: Avengers.
Formed
Aircraft: Avengers.
Commanding Officer: Squadron Leader M. Wilkes
Formed
Aircraft: Hudsons, Lodestars, Dakotas.
Tour of Duty
Based at
Formed
Aircraft: Hudsons, Lodestars, Dakotas; Hastings and Freighters since
Tour of Duty
Based at
The chief documentary sources of the information contained in this volume
are:
Air Headquarters,
Albert, Fg Off K. L.,
Alchiba, USS,
Aldridge, Fg Off S. P.,
Alford, Fg Off R. J.,
Allen, Wg Cdr A. C.,
Allen, Sir J.,
Allison, Flt Lt W. G. C.,
Anderson, AC 1 V. S.,
Angus, Fg Off F. J. S.,
Anti-submarine operations,
Aotearoa,
Apperly, W/O W. R.,
Awarua,
Australian Imperial Forces,
Balfour, Sqn Ldr R. H.,
Banwell, Sqn Ldr C. J.,
Bates, Lt Cdr C. A.,
Begg, Flt Lt A. G.,
Bell, Fg Off L. D.,
Bignall, Fg Off E. D. B.,
Bolt, G. B.,
Brandon, Maj A. de B.,
British Commonwealth Air Training Plan,
Brown, Flt Lt E. H.,
Buckeridge, Flt Lt J.,
Bullen, Fg Off W. M.,
Burbidge, Sqn Ldr A. W.,
Burn, Lt W. W. A.,
Burton, Fg Off J. F.,
Calder, Air Cdre M. F.,
Callendar, G.,
Campbell, Wg Cdr D. C.,
Caradus, Wg Cdr E.,
Catalina—
Charters, W/O C. D.,
Conway, USS,
Cony, USS,
Conyers-Brown, Flt Lt J. P.,
Cook, F/S A. I.,
Corbett, Fg Off D. A.,
Corsair (F4U),
Court, Sqn Ldr J. R.,
Cox, Plt Off E. W.,
Crocker, Sqn Ldr L.,
Croskery, AC 1,
Crump, Fg Off H. P.,
Danae, HMS,
Dauntless (SBD),
Day, Sqn Ldr J. R.,
Deegan, Sqn Ldr F. J.,
Delves, Sqn Ldr G. A.,
Deucalion, MV,
de Willimoff, Wg Cdr J. J.,
Dexter, R. A.,
Dix, Gp Capt F. R.,
Dunedin, HMS,
Durban Castle, MV,
Emirau,
Employment of
Equipment, overseas assistance,
Esperance Bay,
Farr, Plt Off L. R.,
Fisken, Fg Off G. B.,
Fountain, Flt Lt C. A.,
Frank J. Sprague, USS,
Franks, Sqn Ldr C. W.,
Gaby, Flt Lt W. A.,
Ganley, Flt Lt T. E.,
Gedge, Wg Cdr E. G.,
George Clymer, USS,
Gibbs, Wg Cdr R. J.,
Gifford, F/S E. A.,
Giles, Sqn Ldr A. T.,
Goddard, Air Mshl Sir V.,
Goetz, Sqn Ldr G.,
Going, R.,
Golden, Flt Lt W. M.,
Graham, Fg Off T. A.,
Grant-Dalton, Wg Cdr S.,
Green, Sqn Ldr P. S.,
Greenhalgh, Fg Off W. J.,
Gregory, Fg Off N.,
Griffiths, Lt Cdr,
Grigg, Wg Cdr H. T.,
Grundy, Sqn Ldr E. M. F.,
Hammond, J. J.,
Hannah, W/O G.E.,
Hardwick-Smith, Maj J. E.,
Harris, W/O M. T. B.,
Hartshorn, Sqn Ldr R. G.,
Harvard aircraft,
Hay, Flt Lt B. S.,
Hearst, Phoebe M.,
Hesketh, Flt Lt F. R. F.,
Hill, C. M.,
Hodson, Air Cdre G. S.,
Holmwood,
Honan, W/O T. W.,
Hood, Lt G.,
Hopkins, Flt Lt W. A.,
Hudson, Flt Lt P. E.,
Hudson (PBO),
Hughes, Sqn Ldr A. A.,
Indomitable, HMS,
Isitt, AVM Sir L.,
Johnson, R. J.,
Jones, Hon F.,
Jury, Sqn Ldr A. V.,
Kahili,
Kaiwarra, SS,
Kay, Sqn Ldr R. M.,
Keogh, Gp Capt M. S.,
Kidson, Sqn Ldr C. J.,
Kidson, Sqn Ldr M.,
Kingsford, Sqn Ldr C. D. M.,
Kintak, SS,
Kittyhawk (P40),
Kohimarama. See
Koos Bay,
Lawrence, Fg Off E.,
Leatham, Fg Off W. G.,
Lester, Flt Lt S. G.,
Lewis, Gp Capt E. M.,
Lucas, Wg Cdr F. J.,
Lumsden, Flt Lt K. D.,
McArthur, F/S J. S.,
McCormick, Flt Lt M. W.,
McKechnie, Fg Off R. M.,
MacKenzie, Sqn Ldr J. N.,
Mackie, J. G.,
Mackley, Flt Lt W. B.,
MacMillan, Flt Lt R. W.,
McNab, Sqn Ldr P. R.,
Maetsuyker,
Marceau, Flt Lt C. S.,
Marella, SS,
Martin, Flt Lt W. R.,
Matthews, M.,
Mercer, J. C.,
Merrin, Pte F. A.,
Middlemiss, Sgt C. J.,
Miller, W/O J. E.,
Missouri, USS,
Mitchell, Fg Off R. R.,
Moa, HMNZS,
Molloy, Flt Lt J. M.,
Moncrieff, Lt J. R.,
Monowai,
Moore, J. E.,
Morpeth, Fg Off K. P. C.,
Mulcahy, Gen F. P.,
Munro, F/S I. J.,
Narbada,
see also
New Zealand—
NZ Permanent Air Force—
Niagara, SS,
Nicholl, Gp Capt B. S.,
Octans, USS,
Oldfield, Wg Cdr J. A.,
Oliver, Flt Lt B. E.,
Onerahi,
Pacific, Command organisation,
Page, Fg Off I. M.,
Parry, Wg Cdr L. H.,
Parsons, Flt Lt R. R.,
Partridge, Flt Lt F. A.,
Pettit, Flt Lt H. S.,
Pinkney, USS,
Pirie, Sqn Ldr M. L.,
Pirie, Fg Off N. A.,
Pollard, T. R.,
Potter, Brig L.,
Presidet Hayes, USS,
Prince of Wales, HMS,
Puddy, Fg Off W. E.,
Rabaul,
Radar, see
also
Randell, Fg Off G.,
Rangatira,
Ragitance,
Rees, Sqn Ldr J.,
Repulse, HMS,
Reserve, Civil,
Rhodes-Moorhouse, 2 Lt W. B.,
Row, Brig R. A.,
Rowe, Flt Lt I. S.,
1 (Islands) Group,
Strength,
Training Schools—
Fighter Gunnery School,
Fighter Leaders' School,
Flying Training Schools,
Gunnery Training Flight,
Initial Training School,
Initial Training Wing,
Operational Training Units,
Overseas Training Pool,
Technical Training Schools,
Units—
Aircrew Reserve Flights,
Air Department Unit,
20 (Army Co-operation) Squadron,
Army Co-operation Squadron,
Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons,
General Reconnaissance Squadrons.
See
Repair Depots,
15 Servicing Unit,
1 (BR) Sqdn,
2 (BR) Sqdn,
3 (BR) Sqdn,
4 (BR) Sqdn,
5 (FB) Sqdn,
6 (FB) Sqdn,
9 (BR) Sqdn,
14 (Fighter) Sqdn,
15 (F) Sqdn,
16 (F) Sqdn,
17 (F) Sqdn,
18 (F) Sqdn,
20 (F) Sqdn,
40 (Transport) Sqdn,
Russell, Fg Off J.,
Rutherford, Flt Lt W. O.,
St Louis, USS,
San Juan
Santo. See
Saugatuck,
Saward, Fg Off A. N.,
Scott, Flt Lt R. E.,
Service, AC 1,
Shanahan, F.,
Shand, 2 Lt E. T.,
Shuttleworth, Fg Off R. L.,
Simpson, Sqn Ldr J. J.,
Sinclair, Sqn Ldr D. G.,
Sinclair-Burgess, Maj-Gen W. L. H.,
Sisson, Flt Lt F. A.,
Spicer, Flt Lt E. St. J.,
Spurdle, Wg Cdr R. L.,
Stead, Wg Cdr G. G.,
Stevenson, Wg Cdr G. S. A.,
Stevenson, Sqn Ldr J. H. J.,
Sunderland flying boat,
Tasman,
Taybank,
Temple, Wg Cdr W.,
Territorial Air Force,
Townsend, Cpl W. C.,
Training,
Transport, Air, see also
Turakina,
Tyrer, Flt Ft T. G.,
United States Air Forces,
Upham, Wg Cdr A. C.,
Vanderpump, Sqn Ldr M. T.,
Ventura (PV1),
Vincent aircraft,
Waddleton, Capt,
Walker, H.,
Walker, Wg Cdr H. C.,
Walther, W/O D. G.,
Watson, Sqn Ldr R. B.,
Weber, Fg Off R. A.,
Wellington, HMS,
Wharton, Maj S.,
White, Wg Cdr G. R.,
Wigley, Wg Cdr H. R.,
Wilford, Hon Sir T.,
Wilkes, Wg Cdr M.,
Williams, Fg Off D. A.,
Williams, Capt D. E.,
William Williams,
Winstone, Sqn Ldr D. P.,
Wipiti, W/O B. S.,
Wright, USS,
Young, Maj-Gen. R.,
This volume was produced and published by the
the author:Ross
r. e. owen, government printer, wellington